The Tanks of August
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The Tanks of August Edited by Ruslan Pukhov Foreword by David Glantz Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Moscow, Russia Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 1 02.08.2010 11:41:01 UDK 355.4 BBK 66.4(0) The Tanks of August / M.S. Barabanov, A.V. Lavrov, V.A. Tseluiko; Edited by R.N. Pukhov. – Мoscow, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010. – 144 pages. The publication of this collection of essays coincides with the second anniversary of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia on August 8-12, 2009. The first essay looks into the transformation of the Georgian armed forces under President Mikhail Saakashvili and details Tbilisi’s key preparations for the war. The second and central essay offers a detailed timeline of the hostilities. It draws on a wide range of sources, from official chronicles and statements to recollections of the eyewitnesses on both sides and Internet reports. The timeline contains detailed descri ptions of all the key combat operations and episodes during the war. The third essay analyses Georgia’s efforts to rebuild its military machine since August 2008, as well as the existing military situation and the balance of power in the region. The four remaining chapters look into several individual aspects of the Five Day War, including combat losses on both sides, Russian aviation losses, and the post-war deployment of Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, now recognized by Moscow as independent states. The Annex details in chart form Georgia's procurement of heavy arms and military equipment in 2000-2009. ISBN 978-5-9902320-1-3 The publication of this book is financed by a donation from the Russkiy Mir Foundation. Cover photo: a convoy of Russian tanks in South Ossetia, August 2008, REUTERS/Denis Sinyakov © Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010 Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 2 02.08.2010 11:41:01 Contents 05 Foreword 09 Georgian Army Reform under Saakashvili Prior to the 2008 Five Day War 37 Timeline of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in August 2008 77 Present and Future of the Georgian-Russian Conflict. The Military Aspect 99 Russian Air Losses in the Five Day War Against Georgia 107 State of the Georgian Army by the End of Hostilities 115 Post-war Deployment of Russian Forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 129 Russian and Allied Losses 139 Known Deliveries of Military Equipment to Georgia in 2000-2009 142 Russian Armed Forces in Georgia (by the end of August 12, 2008) 143 Georgian Armed Forces (by the end of 12 August, 2008) 144 The Authors Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 3 02.08.2010 11:41:01 Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 4 02.08.2010 11:41:01 Foreword This substantive book, an anthology of seven chapters and an appendix, contains essays dealing in detail with various aspects of the Russo-Georgian War, a conflict which took place over a period of five days in August 2008. It is the first comprehensive account published to date about the short, but vicious war between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation. Sharply conflicting political points of view render the causes, nature, and consequences of this war innately controversial. Nonetheless, at the very least, the political, social, and military dimensions of this war vividly illustrate many of the sharp controversies characterizing the post-Cold War world – a world many observers mistakenly asserted would mark the final triumph of peace over war. Therefore, together with the on-going and increasingly violent “War against Terror,” which pits an especially radical and bellicose form of Islamic Fundamentalism in armed struggle against fundamental aspects of Western civilization, the Russo-Georgian War defies the views of those who proclaimed an “End to History” in the wake of over forty years of Cold War. In short, the descriptions of war contained in this book starkly confirm that nations and their governments still act like nations and governments of old, and man, with all of his inherent flaws, remains man. Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 5 02.08.2010 11:41:01 6 Foreword Produced by the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a non-governmental organization [NGO] based in Moscow, the six essays written by members of the NGO provide in-depth analysis of the political, social, economic, and military context for and causes of the war, the nature of wartime military operations, the human and materiel costs of the brief struggle, and the war’s likely implications for the future. Because the book’s authors are based in Moscow, quite naturally they present primarily the Russian perspective on most matters. Despite this inherent “slant,” the book clearly and candidly addresses such controversial issues as purported wartime atrocities, air and missile attacks on civilian targets and ensuing civilians casualties, Russian military combat losses, even those caused by “friendly fire,” and, in addition to problems faced by Georgian forces, those that plagued the Russian Army during the course of combat. Therefore, in terms of its detailed content and clarity, this book represents an ideal point of departure for the publication of subsequent more detailed accounts of the war. For context, the readers of this book should also examine the report prepared by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, now available on line.1 As for the book’s contents, the lead essay, written by Vyacheslav Tseluiko, describes the development of the Georgian Armed Forces from the formation of the independent Georgian state in 1991 to the conflict in August 2008. By exploiting a wide range of documents related to foreign military assistance to Georgia, Tseluiko reveals the nature and perceived intent of Georgia’s military reform program and assesses the impact of that reform on the course and outcome of the ensuing war. The second essay is a detailed account of the military dimension of the war written by Anton Lavrov, which describes the war’s course chronologically, and, while highlighting such controversial issues as military and civilian losses, assesses the performance of the contending armies. Of note in this chapter are the striking continuities in Russian force structure as indicated by the Russian Army’s extensive employment of battalion tactical groups to conduct tactical maneuver on a battlefield increasingly dominated by new precision-guided weapons and munitions (PGM), a theme that has dominated Soviet and Russian military thought since the 1980s. Tseluiko’s second essay returns to military-institutional matters by assessing the impact of the war on the Russian and Georgian Armed Forces. Specifically, Tseluiko emphasizes changes in force structures, the increasing importance of crisp and effective automated command and control, particularly in the realm of air- ground combat, and the influence of new types of weaponry in the Russian military and extensive international arms transfers to Georgia. 1 See Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, prepared by the Indepen- dent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volumes I and II, September 2009, at <http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html> Tanki_august_block_zamena_02.indd 6 02.08.2010 11:41:01 Foreword 7 Lavrov follows with four detailed essays dealing with the nature, causes, and likely effects of Russian aircraft loses during the war; the nature and reasons for the Georgian Army’s excessive personnel and equipment losses; the postwar establishment of Russian bases in the independent Abkhazian and Southern Ossetian states; and a separate essay on Russian and allied losses during the war. Finally, the appendix details in chart form arms transfers to and purchases by the Republic of Georgia between 2000 and 2009. The authors have also provided a useful map that shows the locations where most of the fighting occurred. Above and beyond the issues directly related to the Russo-Georgian War, this book also focuses on and analyzes the probable nature of military operations in the post-Cold War world. This is vitally important because, to a considerable degree, this war illustrated most if not all of those tendencies and trends so evident in that emerging world. For example, politically, the war pitted the Russian Federation, the chagrined and somewhat resentful successor state to the bulk of the former Soviet Union, against the Republic of Georgia, a new but far smaller successor state situated in the Caucasus region along the Russian Federation’s southern border. The Russian Federation, having lost vast territories, resources, and populations to successor states that emerged independent after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, perceived genuinely severe threats to its national security largely because the dissolution of the former Soviet Union deprived it of necessary strategic defensive depth, that is, large territories hitherto considered vital parts of its first and second strategic echelon. On the other hand, the Republic of Georgia, enthusiastic over its newly won independence, seemed determined to flex its new military “muscles” and victimize its former parent state by seizing and annexing the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which it believed were rightfully its own, but without consulting the inhabitants of both regions. Similarly, many economic and social differences only intensified hostilities on both sides, as did prospects for possible Georgian admittance to NATO, which earlier discussions between the Russian Federation and Western nations seemed to preclude. In terms of its nature, conduct, and duration, the Russo-Georgian War also closely resembled the circumstances and outcome of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Just as Israel anticipated Arab aggression, absorbed a first strike by Arab states, and then struck back effectively in a massive counteroffensive that demoralized and defeated the coalition of Arab states in just six days of fighting, the Russian Federation too accepted a Georgian first strike, then responded massively and routed Georgian forces in just five days.