Infantry Organization

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Infantry Organization FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 1945 – 1962 US Army Command and General Staff College FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATION AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 1945 - 1962 Avertissement Dans le cadre de ses travaux de recherche consacrés à la contre-guérilla, et avec l’autorisation de l’US Army, le CDEF publie en version originale une étude relative à l’adaptation de l’armée française à la guerre révolutionnaire. Cette étude a été réalisée par le major Peter Drake Jackson dans le cadre de sa scolarité à l’US Army Command and General Staff College. A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History By Peter Drake Jackson, MAJ, USA B.A., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, 1992 US Army Command and General Sta ff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2005 CDEF/ Division recherche retour d’expérience/ Bureau recherche Tél: 01 44 42 52 08 PNIA 821 753 52 08 / [email protected] Table of contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 9 THESIS ............................................................................................................................................................. 11 CURRENT RELEVANCE .................................................................................................................................... 12 KEY TERMS ..................................................................................................................................................... 12 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................. 13 SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................................ 14 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 15 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 15 CHAPTER 1. ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS AND INITIAL DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1946 ................................................................................................................. 19 THE COLONIAL LEGACY.................................................................................................................................. 23 THE GREAT WAR LEGACY ............................................................................................................................... 28 FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN ALGERIA, 1939-1945........................................................................................ 30 FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN INDOCHINA, 1939-1945.................................................................................... 32 ORGANIZATION TO RETURN TO THE FAR EAST .............................................................................................. 33 REOCCUPATION OF INDOCHINA...................................................................................................................... 35 CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR IN INDOCHINA ...................................................................................................... 39 THE WAR IN INDOCHINA.................................................................................................................................. 41 THEATER TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................ 44 INFANTRY ORGANIZATION.............................................................................................................................. 48 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 54 ORGANIZATION OF FIRE SUPPORT .................................................................................................................. 57 ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL................................................................................................. 59 BRIEF SUMMARY OF INDOCHINA ORGANIZATIONAL LESSONS....................................................................... 63 5 French ground force organization and counterrevolutionary warfare CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR IN ALGERIA 65 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR IN ALGERIA ...................................................................................................... 68 ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND SUEZ ............................................................................ 70 TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................................ 72 INFANTRY ........................................................................................................................................................ 76 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 79 FIRE SUPPORT.................................................................................................................................................. 81 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................ 82 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ALGERIAN WAR ..................................................................................................... 84 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS ........................................................... 85 TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................................ 89 INFANTRY ........................................................................................................................................................ 91 MOBILE FORCES .............................................................................................................................................. 93 FIRE SUPPORT.................................................................................................................................................. 94 INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................ 95 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 96 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 97 6 ACKNOWLEGMENTS « Recueillir le maximum d’information afin de renseigner au mieux le Commandement sur les activités de l’ennemi dans leur Zone. Pour cela, monter des embuscades et exécuter des coups de main en territoire Vietminh. Observer les mouvements d’unités, surprendre des réunions politiques, désorganiser et décourager l’adversaire par des actions audacieuses permettant de réaliser des récupérations d’armes et de faire des prisonniers. Enfin, opposer la contre-guérilla a la guérilla, créer un climat d’insécurité permanente sur les arrières de l’ennemi »1. Jean-Pierre Pissardy, Commandos Nord-Vietnam 1 Jean-Pierre Pissardy, Commandos Nord-Vietnam (Paris: Indo Editions, 1999), 23, mission statement for newly created commando units: “Obtain the maximum information on the enemy so as to inform the Command of enemy activities in their zone. Conduct ambushes and raids in Viet Minh territory. Observe the movements of units, surprise political meetings, disorganize and discourage the adversary by daring actions and capturing enemy weapons and prisoners. Lastly, oppose guerrillas with guerrillas, creating a climate of permanent insecurity in enemy areas.” 7 INTRODUCTION Introduction THESIS The French developed ground force organization models adapted to conduct counterrevolutionary warfare between 1945 and 1962 based on their traditional colonial warfighting concepts and refined by technology and evolved opponents. These models were geared towards the territorial organization of the theater, supported by subordinate tailored organizations. These organizational concepts supported French operational theories of how to fight insurgents and in turn defined how the French were able to conduct such operations. These organizational constructs possess enduring interest to those considering current and future counterinsurgent operations. While one might disagree with the Jominian idea that all war may be reduced to formula, the French concepts of territorial organization for counterinsurgency and the related force structures to support such operations are worthy of continued study and possibly considered emulation. 11 French ground force organization and counterrevolutionary warfare CURRENT RELEVANCE The relevance of French lessons in organizational development in Indochina and Algerian counterrevolutionary warfare may be questioned. No review of literature is possible thus far since there has been no analysis
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