German Bundestag Motion
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German Bundestag Printed paper 17/10781 17th electoral term 25 September 2012 Motion tabled by the Members of the Bundestag Dr. Michael Meister, Klaus-Peter Flosbach, Peter Aumer, Ralph Brinkhaus, Michael Grosse-Brömer, Olav Gutting, Bettina Kudla, Patricia Lips, Dr. h.c. Hans Michelbach, Dr. Mathias Middelberg, Stefan Müller, Eduard Oswald, Norbert Schindler, Dr. Frank Steffel, Christian Freiherr von Stetten, Antje Tillmann, Norbert Barthle, Norbert Brackmann, Cajus Caesar, Axel E. Fischer, Herbert Frankenhauser, Alexander Funk, Bartholomäus Kalb, Alois Karl, Volkmar Klein, Rüdiger Kruse, Dr. Michael Luther, Andreas Mattfeldt, Eckhardt Rehberg, Georg Schirmbeck, Bernhard Schulte-Drüggelte, Klaus-Peter Willsch, Volker Kauder, Gerda Hasselfeldt and the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, and the Members of the Bundestag Dr. Volker Wissing, Dr. Daniel Volk, Holger Krestel, Dr. Birgit Reinemund, Björn Sänger, Rainer Brüderle and the FDP parliamentary group Banking union – observing the subsidiarity principle The Bundestag is requested to adopt the following motion: I. The German Bundestag notes: Europe and Germany are in the vanguard of financial market regulation by global standards. Banks and insurance companies will gradually have to meet higher capital requirements in order to be able to better cushion risks. Their remuneration systems must be appropriate, transparent and geared to sustainable development. With the Restructuring Act, instruments are now available for the recovery and resolution of German banks. The bank levy makes provision for this eventuality. Uncovered short sales are prohibited. Computer-driven high frequency trading and trade in derivatives will likewise be regulated soon. Investor protection has been improved, above all in the grey capital market. With the implementation of the AIFM Directive, all managers of alternative investment funds will be better supervised in the future. A strengthening of national supervision and the coordination of supervision at European level round out these measures. With these measures, the key causes of the financial market crisis will be eliminated and the resilience of the financial markets will be strengthened. In the medium term, the financial sector must be made significantly more robust through better self- provision. Financial institutions that have over-speculated must in future be able to leave the market in an orderly manner without threatening the very existence of the system. This will also reduce other banks’ exposure to possible contagion effects and minimise the risks of state bailout measures – and hence also the risks to taxpayers. On 29 June 2012, the Federal Chancellor and the euro area Heads of State or Government asked the European Commission to present proposals for a single supervisory mechanism, involving the ECB, 2 in order to break the vicious circle between impending bank insolvencies, bailouts and financing risks for states. On 12 September 2012 the European Commission presented proposals for a single supervisory mechanism for banks in the euro area and, in particular, called for accelerated adoption of the proposals for directives on deposit guarantee schemes and on bank recovery and resolution. In addition, it presented a communication outlining a roadmap towards a banking union. A core element of these proposals is the supervision of all banks in the euro area by the ECB. It is to assume key sovereign supervisory tasks including, for instance, authorising and closing credit institutions, ensuring compliance with minimum capital and liquidity requirements, establishing governance requirements and exercising direct intervention rights. The other remaining tasks, such as supervising payments services, are to remain with the national supervisory authorities. The separation of monetary policy and supervision is to be ensured through the establishment of a special supervisory body at the ECB, whilst the right of final decision in both monetary policy and bank supervisory matters is to lie with the ECB Governing Council. Accountability safeguards vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the Council in bank supervisory matters are to ensure democratic legitimacy. After a phasing-in period, as of 1 July 2013 all systemically important credit institutions and, as of 1 January 2014, all other credit institutions are to be put under the supervision of the ECB. The German Bundestag welcomes the progress in financial market regulation and the swift framing of proposals for a European bank supervisory regime. It shares the opinion of the European Commission that confidence in the euro and in a stable banking system is a key factor for overcoming the crisis. To this end, it is above all essential that the necessary structural reforms and the consolidation of public budgets be implemented in the Member States. A further strengthening of supervision can be another important step towards overcoming the current crisis and preventing new crises. II. The German Bundestag therefore calls on the Federal Government to work in the upcoming negotiations to ensure that: 1. the independence of the ECB in terms of monetary policy is fully preserved and that every effort is made to achieve this without changing the Statute of the ECB. The right of final decision in monetary policy and supervisory matters must not lie with the same decision- making body. Under these conditions an involvement of the ECB in a single supervisory mechanism is possible. The performance of supervisory tasks must be subject to sufficient democratic scrutiny; 2. in all preparatory work quality must take precedence over speed. The clear objective of any new supervisory mechanism must be a tangible improvement of the effectiveness of European supervision in order to decisively improve crisis prevention in Europe and boost market confidence. The competences for future EU supervisory issues must be clearly and efficiently regulated; in this context the cooperation between the ECB and national supervisory authorities as well as the present European Banking Authority (EBA) must be clearly defined. Overlapping competences and double burdens at affected institutions must be avoided; 3. the new supervisory mechanism is also open to non-euro area countries and, if possible, covers all EU Member States under the same terms and conditions; 4. the subsidiarity principle and the principle of proportionality are observed. This means that the direct supervisory competence of the European supervisory body shall be concentrated on major systemically important banks and banks providing cross-border services. It must be able to address systemic risks at any time. In this context, the intensity of supervision must be governed by the risk structure of the supervised bank, and existing national supervisory expertise must be utilised as much as possible; 3 5. banks posing systemic risks are subjected to a stress test and restructured or resolved at the expense of their respective national restructuring fund before they are incorporated into the direct supervisory mechanism; 6. uniform rules are established at European level for the recovery, restructuring and resolution of systemically important institutions or institutions providing cross-border services. In this context a network of national restructuring funds shall be created that shall be fed by institutions’ contributions along the lines of the German bank levy model; 7. deposit guarantees are not communitised at European level. Deposit guarantee schemes may be harmonised but must continue to fall under national responsibility and remain nationally funded. Berlin, 25 September 2012 Volker Kauder, Gerda Hasselfeldt and parliamentary group Rainer Brüderle and parliamentary group.