Industry Structure and the Marketing of Synthetic Fibers

Amy L. Hardin Universityof Delaware

In the decadesfollowing World War II, a revolutiontransformed our material surroundings.A wide range of goodswas reformulatedusing organicchemicals and syntheticpolymers. One aspectof this sweeping change,the growth of the syntheticfibers industryradically altered the patternof Americanfiber use. While the consumptionof all fibersrose, the shareof naturalfibers declineddramatically, making synthetic fibers ubiquitous. In 1940, the first full year of nylon production,the United Statesconsumed a total of five billionpounds of fibers,of which10% were cellulosic,rayon and acetate, and less than .1% were nylon. The consumptionof all non-cellulosicsynthetic fibers outpaced that of cellulosics in 1965 and reachedfour billion poundsin 1970. In 1980, out of total United Statesfiber consumptionof 12 billion pounds,seven billion were syntheticand only three billion were natural [17]. In additionto vastly increasingthe quantityof textileproducts available, synthetic fibers brought new qualitiesto and changedexpectations of the performanceof apparel, home furnishings,and industrialgoods. Through syntheticfibers, the chemicalrevolution touched every life. The directionand characterof the syntheticfibers revolutionwere shapedby dynamicinteraction among three groups: the companiesthat producedthe newfibers and manipulated their properties;the manufacturers of textiles,textile products, home furnishings, and carpets;and consumers and their culture. As part of a largerwork that examinesthis interaction, this paper will focuson the relationshipbetween fiber makersand their textile industrycustomers and on how industrystructure shaped the marketingof syntheticfibers. The new fibers bound integratedand diversifiedcompanies in the highlyconcentrated petrochemicals business to the fragmentedand specializedtextile trades. The interdependenceof two industriesstrikingly different in structure opensa number of questions.What were the structuresof the synthetic fibersindustry and the textileand textileproducts industry when synthetic fiberswere introduced,and how did they changein the followingyears? How did leadingfiber makers'strategies address the challengesposed by textileindustry structure? What did fiber makersassume about the textile trades and consumers?How strongwere fiber usersin the textile trades in the face of an oligopolisticsupplier? Here I presentpreliminary answers to such questions. My working hypothesisis that the syntheticfiber

213 214 companiesshaped their strategiesto suit not only their own competitive contextbut alsotheir desireto counteractthe competitivepattern of the fragmentedtextile trades. During the 1960sintense price competition plaguedfiber makers,who weakenedrelative to their customersin the textiletrades. The largertextile firms drew strengthfrom the experience of cooperativeproduct development encouraged by fiber makers. Many marginalproducers moved farther from fiber companies'control as stocks of fibersbecame more available when capacities and imports rose. Applying structuralanalysis to eachindustry will bringinsights to the studyof the life cycleof syntheticfibers. A highly concentratedoligopoly characterizedsynthetic fibers manufacture. Concentration ratios from the census of manufactures confu'm this concentration.In 1963, 14 companiesproduced the syntheticfibers most used in consumergoods, nylon, polyester,and acrylic. The four largestfu-ms controlled 94% of total industryshipments by value. Although the degreeof concentrationdeclined somewhat over time, in 1977the top four of 37 firmscontrolled 78% of total industryshipments [20]. Most fiber makers were petrochemicalcompanies and were verticallyintegrated upstreamfrom fiber polymerizationand spinning,producing their own intermediateand primary materials and often their ownfeedstocks [15, 16]. As a rule, they did not integratedownstream, in part becauseof a reluctanceto competewith customersand partly from the awarenessthat the processingof fibers into fabrics and other goods used different technologyand skills and did not permitthe sameeconomies to whichfiber makers were accustomed. The economiesof scalein fiber productionexisted primarily in the capital-intensiveprocesses of polymerizationand spinning[12]. However, the diversifiedchemical company that produceda largevolume of several fibersbenefited from economiesin other areasas well, suchas researchand development,engineering, distribution, service, promotion, and sales--what Alfred Chandler and others have called economiesof scope. These economiesreinforced the high barriersto entrypresented by proprietary technologyin the earlyyears of syntheticfiber production. Later, economies of scale remainedimportant, although fiber technologybecame readily availableat lower cost and many processinnovations became available throughlicensing. The leadingfiber makersdominated the market for a technologicallysophisticated product line, in sharpcontrast to thosefarther alongin the textileproducts sequence. The customersof fiber companiesresided in fragmentedtrades. Fiberproducers sold fibers primarily to the fabric-formingtrades, including throwstersand spinners, weavers and knitters, thread mills, carpet mills, and the like. However,fiber makersalso had to "sell"the performanceand desirabilityof the syntheticsto makersof appareland home furnishings downthe chainof production.These trades were far from undorm. In general,the appareltrades were more volatile and fragmentedthan the fabric-formingtrades, and carpetsand householdproducts manufacturers weremost likely to be verticallyintegrated. However, they shared certain general characteristics,including specialization and lack of vertical integration,low barriers to entry, and lack of concentration. The 215 appearanceof large, integratedfirms did not spur consolidationof whole specialtiesor integrationof the whole industry. Heterogeneitywithin each specialtyin termsof size,ownership, number of unitsin eachfirm, and the pricelevel for whicha firm produced,compounded the effectsof diversity amongthe trades[19, pp. 12-16;10, pp. 113-16;2, p. 13; 3, pp. 132-34]. Concentrationratios from the censusof manufacturesagain provide a roughsketch of the structureof the varioustextile trades. I surveyedthe percentagesof the total valueof shipmentsaccounted for by the four and eightlargest companies in threefabric forming categories and four end-use categories:cotton and syntheticweaving mills; knit fabric;men's and boy's suitsand coats;women's and misses'suits and coats;tufted carpets;and curtains and draperies. Some of these trades became steadily more concentrated.In others,the degreeof concentrationwaxed and wanedover time. The least concentrated of these trades was women's and misses' suits and coats,roughly representative of otherwomen's apparel classes. The mostconcentrated sub-industry was the weavingof predominantlysynthetic yarns. By 1963,the four largestof 277 firmsaccounted for 39% of the total shipmentsby value. This ratio remainedlittle changedthrough the 1960s and 1970s. In 1977 the four largestof 267 firms accountedfor 42% of shipmentsby value. The largestweavers clearly dwarfed most of their numerous rivals, yet they could not control the market. Other fabric-formingand textile products trades were much less concentrated [20]. The fragmentationof the textile and textileproducts industries was directlyrelated to the natureof their productsand their diffusemarkets. Textileproducts were made to fit everyprice and income level, every taste and fashion,in everypart of the country. This broad and varied market limited the benefitsof economiesof scalein many textiletrades. The vagariesof fashion in apparel and home furnishingscalled for the manufactureof diverseproducts and frequentchange in productlines. Retailersranging from small,specialized stores to chaindepartment stores made the link with consumersof textilesand textile products. Their judgmentsabout the market,their patternsof purchasingand distribution undoubtedlycreated constraintswithin which the diverse textile trades operated[8, pp. 59, 64; 13, pp. 329-47]. The heterogeneityand specializationwithin the many textile sub-industriescombined with exigenciesin fiber manufacturingto produce the marketingapproach of the leadingfiber makers. I will focushere on the experienceof theDu PontCompany. Although Du Pont,as the leading makerof syntheticfibers, was atypical, the companyset the pacefor those that followed. FollowingWorld War II, the Du Pont Companyfaced a complex challenge in simultaneouslyexpanding markets for nylon while commercializingits new acrylicand polyesterfibers. The companyhad experiencedthe hazards of undifferentiatedprice competition in rayonin the 1930sand wantedto avoida repetitionin the syntheticfibers [9; 6, pp. 166-69]. However,the companyalso learnedquickly that it could not replicatethe rapidsuccess of nylonin takingover the high-returnhosiery marketby securingsimilarly ideal marketsfor its new fibers. Du Pont managersdecided to marketacrylic and polyester fibers based on the subtle 216 propertyof resilience--recoveryfrom wrinklesand crushing. Numerous organizationaland technicalproblems challenged Du Pont as it soughtto developproducts and producefibers in sufficientvolume for testingin severalmarkets at once[6, pp. 257-74,387-413; 4, Pt. 1; 18]. Anticipation of competitionshaped Du Pont'smarketing strategy in the 1950s,and rivals followed Du Pont's lead. Overall, a two-part problem faced Du Pont. The strongest competitionfor syntheticfibers came from naturalfibers, chiefly cotton and wool, and rayon. These were less expensivethan the new fibers. Consumersknew and appreciatedtheir characteristicsand their traditional forms. The fabric-formingtrades were not onlyfamiliar with the properties of natural fibers but also were organizedin specialtiesaround fiber and fabric type,with specializedmachinery, skills, chemicals, and markets. Du Pont thus neededto acceleratethe learningprocess for both the textile tradesand consumersto makethe newfibers familiar and desirable in spite of their higher cost. Lookingahead, however, the company'stextile fibers strategistsexpected competition in nylonand acrylicby the mid-1950sand in polyesterby 1960 [1, pp. 124-26;6, p. 439]. Their task was not simply to makepeople buy syntheticfibers but primarilyto securea strongmarket sharefor Du Pont and establishloyalty to its products. The company's messageto textiletrades and consumerswould thus also have to identifythe specialproperties and/or servicesassociated with Du Pont brand names. Accomplishingthe dual objectivesof informingfiber usersand securing market share requiredDu Pont to interactwith diverseelements in the textiletrades and to attemptto governinnovation and imitationin textile products. In the textile trades,new developmentsin style,design, finish, or colorwaysgenerally came from verticallyintegrated companies, those large enough to support some research and development,or high-end, high-fashionfu'ms. When not the productof an integratedfirm, innovation oftenresulted from the collaborationof a numberof firmsin the production sequence.Imitations, or "knock-offs,"eventually made innovations available at everylevel of priceor fashion.Trade associations,through meetings and publications,and textile schoolsoften spreadword of new techniquesand products[8, p. 61]. Du Pont'sfiber marketingprogram had both to exploit and to counteractthis patternof innovationand oftendisorderly imitation while at the same time being informativefor diversetextile trades and consumersand building a large market share. Efforts to meet these complexgoals came to be organizedaround principles that evolvedfrom experiencewith rayon and nylon. In spite of such rules, important dilemmasarose in attemptingto satisfydiverse goals. Developmentsin oneproduct category--men's suits--in the 1950swill demonstrateDu Pont'sfiber marketingstrategy. Althoughmen's apparel sectorswere more concentratedthan otherapparel trades, this exampleis usefulin showingthe evolutionof the fiber maker'sstrategy. Based on the propertyof resilience,blends with wool were a remarkablesuccess for polyester,although wash-and-wear blends with cotton for shirtssoon became more important. 217

Du Pont marketingmanagers selected men's suits as the primary target for both Dacron polyesterand Orlon acrylicin apparel. The steps the companytook to introducesynthetic fibers into suitsconstituted a fibers marketingpolicy with generalprinciples. Du Pont would: developfabric blends and know their characteristics;work directly with mills as they developedtheir own fabrics; join with mills to inform cuttersand retailers; and aim advertisements,publicity, and productinformation at consumer education. Du Pont worked with mills, converters,cutters, and retailers to make surethat trial itemsmet highquality standards. Du Pont'sadvertising further supportedthose mills willing to experimentwith the new fibers, creatinga demandfor finishedproducts by informingconsumers not only of their specialcharacteristics but alsoof their makers. Fabricdevelopment by Du Pont providedsubstitute experience for the mills, a knowledgebase that reduced risks. Havingchosen men's suitings as a marketfor Orlon and Dacron,Du Pont soughtout leadingtextile and suitmakers, highly respected for quality work and yet willing to risk experimentationwith a new material. Several companieswere selectedto producesuits of both 100% syntheticfibers and wool blends: PrincetonWorsted Mills and Witty Brotherscollaborated on suits made of 100% spun Dacron staple; Deering-Milliken and Hart, Schaffner,and Marx made Dacron/wool blends;Dan River Mills and HaspelBrothers made seersucker suits of a mixtureof Orlon filamentyarn and cotton. Du Pont provided technicalassistance at all stages of manufacturing,including carding and other processingsteps, dyeing procedures,and the effectsof heat, pressure,and time in pressingand tailoring. Du Pont had gleanedmuch of this informationfrom prior tests in whichfibers were spun and woven in the company'slaboratories, tailored into garments,and wear-testedby staff members.Tests such as these enabledthe companyto resolveexpected problems such as dyeingcolorfast dark shadesand broughtattention to unforeseenddficulties such as the pillingof 100% syntheticfiber fabrics. Du Pont sharedthis information not only to make salesof its fiberspossible but also to assurea high quality productthat wouldgive consumersa goodfirst impressionof the fibers. Du Pont made follow-upsurveys of purchasersof suits,gathering informationon reasonsfor purchaseand the type of wear suitsreceived as well as reasonsfor satisfactionor dissatisfaction.The surveysshowed an overwhelmingpreference for blendsover 100% syntheticfabrics. Also, washabilityin a suitwas importantto only a few buyers,diminishing the value of 100% syntheticfiber or Orlon/cottonfabrics. Du Pont drew on the resultsof the surveysin its nationaladvertising campaignsdirected at the textile trades and consumers. The company informedthe tradesof consumers'preference for blendsof syntheticfibers and wool, pointedout the benefitsof Du Pont promotionalsupport, and praisedthe firmsthat pioneered.Advertisements told consumerswho made the suits,introduced their propertiesas "carefree"or "practicalfashion," and offered men the opportunityto look "fresh"without looking "careless." Target groupswere thusinformed that syntheticfibers were successfuland that Du Pont was behindthem, whetheras purveyorof scientificmiracles or as sourceof technicaland salessupport. 218

Du Pont believed that information was vital for the successful introductionof syntheticfibers into suchproducts as suits (and shirts). Textile tradesand consumerslacked experience with syntheticfibers, and the companyfeared that untutoredtextile and apparel makers would attempt simply to substitutethe new fibers into establishedproduction patterns, experiencingfrustration as theyturned out poor goods,and that consumers' highexpectations of productsmade of syntheticfibers would be disappointed easily. Althoughit gave the most desirableattributes to textile products, blendingpromised to exacerbatesuch problems. For textile ftrms, the subtletiesof blendingposed a greater technicalchallenge and requireda willingnessand an abilityto experiment.In an era withouttextile product labeling,blends muddied consumers' shopping decisions. Technicaland productinformation was thus a key part of Du Pont'sproduct in the 1950s. The successfulintroduction of the Dacron/woolblend suit (and the Dacron/cottonblend shirt) raisedseveral dilemmas for Du Pont. Some, suchas the conflictbetween supplying fibers to expandproven end usesand the goal of developingnew uses,were easedby eventualincreases in fiber production.Resolving other dilemmas required a balanceof opennessand control. For example,the companydesired high volumeproduction and widespread.use in order to exploit economiesof scale but wanted to cultivatea reputationfor high qualityand commanda high price.During the 1950s,Du Pont achievedthis balancethrough the restrictiveaspects of cooperationwith textile and textileproducts makers: licensingthe use of trademarks;setting quality standards;specifying the ratios of Du Pont syntheticfibers in blendswith cotton,wool, and rayon. Du Pont controlled informationrather than dispensingit liberally. Theserestrictions gave Du Pont a certainamount of controlover the diffusionof its fibers during the 1950s as the companyrepeated the developmentprocess exemplified by men's suits and fostered the developmentand testingof manyother products.While Du Pont spread informationabout its fibers to the textile trades and consumersthrough advertisements,articles in trade periodicalsand women'smagazines, and contactsin professionalorganizations, the companyalso believed it would establishsome brand loyalty among all fiber users.However, the restrictive stick that Du Pont teamed with the information carrot was limited in its effectivenessby the extentof competitionin syntheticfibers. The challenge to Du Pont'sdominant position in the 1960schanged the terms on which it could sell fibers. Throughthe 1950sthe textiletrades remained weak relativeto fiber makers. There werefew suppliersof the high-demandsynthetics and many textile firms required technicalassistance. By the 1960s,however, the numberof fiber producersand the quantityof fibersavailable increased, and knowledgeof fiber processingbecame diffused. Nylon ftrst showed signs of glut and price cuttingin the textilerecession of 1958. Overcapacityand risingimports brought similar woes to polyesterby 1965. The synthetic fiber industrybecame haunted by overcapacity:new firms enteredwhat appearedto be a profitablebusiness in the midst of a textile boom, establishinglarge plants;existing firms expandedcapacities to reduceunit costs;process developments increased the productivityof existingfacilities. 219

Althoughdemand rose rapidly, capacity grew faster. Chemicalengineering farmsmade syntheticfiber technologyavailable to a range of prospective producers,including large petrochemicaland chemicalprocess companies that enteredon a relativelylarge scale, a handfulof largetextile and rubber companiesthat set up relativelysmall captivefiber plants,and nations seekingto restrict imports and establishtextile industries. Production outsidethe United Statesgrew faster within the United States,and imports contributedto the glut in the United States[4, Pt. III; 3, p. 66-81]. WhereasDu Pont and its first competitorshad pursueda strategyof productdifferentiation, many imports and newdomestically-produced fibers were unbranded.By the mid-1960ssurpluses made price competitionthe rule in commoditygrades of all the syntheticfibers. Economiesof scale remainedimportant in protectingthe marketshares of the largercompanies, such as Du Pont, Monsanto, and Celanese. Changesin the textile trades increasedthe challengein selling brandedfibers. In mosttrade specialties the numberof firmsand operating plants decreased during the 1960s, reflecting slight increases in concentration.Able to operateon a larger scale,big companiessuch as Burlington,Dan River Mills, or Cone Mills took advantageof greater predictabilityof fiber supplyand characteristicsafforded by the synthetics and in distributionof textile productsthrough growing national chains. Althoughsuch firms became textile giants, most textile producers remained small and marginal. Together,both ends of the textile spectrumwere strengthenedin the new fiber market. Once the knowledgeof how to processthe syntheticfibers becamewidespread, price sensitivemarginal farmseagerly purchased unbranded fibers. Largefarms, now often taking a leadingrole in new productdevelopment and marketingtheir own brand names,were alsowilling to shopfor the right combinationof price and propertiesin the fibersthey bought. Two appareldevelopments of the 1960sillustrate the relativedecline of fibermakers' power. Bothpermanent pressprocesses for shirtsand otherapparel and doubleknit men'ssuitings originatedin the textiletrades. Althoughone succeededand one failed, both exacerbatedcompetition within the syntheticfiber industry. Permanentpress extended the wash-and-weardevelopments of the 1950s. In addition to the Dacron/cotton shirt, other wash-and-wear productsincluded all-cotton and Dacron/cottonshirts treated with resins. Most of thesehad disappointedconsumers: seams puckered and frayed, shirts yellowedin the wash, many felt stiff, all still needed ironing. Appliancemanufacturers joined weavers, finishers, apparel makers, fiber companies,and CottonCouncil researchers in seekingthe ideal combination of flatnessin largeareas, permanent creases where desired, smooth seams and a pleasing"hand" or feel in machine-washablegarments. Permanent press apparel emergedfrom the trades in 1964. Koret of California, a sportswearmanufacturer, developed the "delayedcure" process in which resinswere appliedto fiat fabricand sensitized;then completedgarments were curedin ovensafter pressing. Koret licensedits process,while other firms, including Cone Mills, Dan River Mills, and Wamsutta Mills, introducedtheir ownvariations on the sequenceof processingsteps. 22O

All permanentpress processes worked best with blendsof polyester and cotton. While fiber makers participatedin the developmentand refinementof permanentpress processes, they did not directit. Permanent press greatly increaseddemand for polyesterin apparel and household goods,attractting entrants to the fiber businessand aggravatingcompetitive pressures.When the pricesof polyesterstaple began to fall, however,many turnedto the manufactureof ffiamentyarns for doubleknits. Polyester double knits resulted from two developments. First, European machine-buildersintroduced machines that interknittedtwo strandsof yam in intricatestitches to producea stablefabric with appealing body and texture. Then, Celanesedeveloped a heat-stabilizedtextured ffiamentyarn. Crimpedand then set by reheating,the new yarn did not stretch,shrink, or causedistortions in knits as had other textured yarns. Texturedfilament yarns reduced the costof doubleknits. The new fabrics becamepopular in women'swear in the mid-1960s,riding the fashionfor bright colorsand geometricpatterns. Successof double knits brought new entrants to both the fiber industryand the knittingtrade. Large weaversstarted integrated knitting operationsand establishedknitters expanded into doubleknits. Although economiesof scaleexisted in doubleknits, entry costs were not prohibitive for smallknitters [5, 7, 11]. However,the boom maskedproblems as many small producersand recent entrants convertednylon yarn capacityto polyesteryarn to recouplosses. By the late 1960sthe marketfor polyester double knits in women'swear began to wane and knittersbegan a search for new markets. Tailored men's wear had alwaysbeen the most conservativeand concentratedof appareltrades. Retailersand fashiondesigners, pushing for change,proposed introducing double knits to bringincreased comfort and freedomof movementas well aswrinkle resistance and a varietyof patterns to men'swear. However, for double knits to succeedin men'swear, they had to satisfythe high standardsof men'swear cuttersand retailersfor the yard goodsdelivered to them. Fiber makerssuch as Du Pont and Celanese resisted the idea of double knit men's wear, recognizingthe inherent contradictionin forcinga fabricconstruction suited to rapid fashionchange into the staid men's wear mold. However, the companiestested and developedyarns, and advocatedthe use of yarnsthat combinedwool with specialtypolyester filament. Althoughthe firstdouble knits of all-polyesterand combinations with wool succeeded,a numberof factorsconspired against long-term growth. Much more doubleknitting capacity was in coarserwomen's wear gauges and more ffiamentyarn capacityin commoditygrades than in the fine gaugesand specialtyyarns needed for men'swear. When the priceof wool rose, wool disappearedfrom all but the most expensivemen's wear, and doubleknitted 100% polyesterfabrics became common. The leisuresuit, introducedas a casual,loose form of suit that simplifiedconstruction for men'swear makers,absorbed much of the glut of inappropriatedouble knit men's wear fabrics. As consumers became more familiar with double knits and their problems--hotand dammy, easily snaggedor melted, not alterable--theyrejected them in favor of traditionalfabrics. In the end, 221 doubleknits grew to a muchgreater volume than fiber makerslike Du Pont predicted,but what one editor of a trade periodicalcalled the "industrial behaviorpattern"[14] of opportunisticknitters highlighted the contradictions that the conservativefiber makershad hoped to minimizeby advocating combinationyarns. The storyof the marketingof syntheticfibers is one of interplayof the concentratedstructure of the fiber industryand the heterogeneityof the textiletrades. On one hand,the diffuseand fragmentedmarket for and the very newnessof syntheticfibers required the product differentiation strategiesof Du Pontand other leading fiber makers,as the syntheticfibers were eased into the existing complex of textile technology. The developmentof the wool blend suit illustratesthe waysin whichcostly and labor-intensivemarketing efforts worked to opennew markets and introduce new products.On the other hand,certain aspects of their strategieswere intendedto counteractthe competitivepattern of the textiletrades and may havefostered the growthof sometextile firms. If indeedthe fiber makers had been able to sell to a more concentratedand technicallyastute textile industry, their task would have been simpler and their costs lower. Ultimately,however, the textile tradesremained fragmented and intensely competitive,resulting in a combinationof textilegiants and dwarvesthat necessitatedand yet limited fiber makers' efforts to control the use of synthetics. The fiber industryreached technological and competitivematurity in the 1960s with price competitionand overcapacitycharacteristic of petrochemicalsand predictableaccording to the productlife cyclemodel. However,although m'mimizing costs became more important for gainingand securingmarket share, product development and technicaland promotional assistancerepresented high coststhat couldnot be reducedin spiteof their decliningvalue as salestools. The fiascoof the double knit men's suit pointsout how the diffusetextile fibersmarket exacerbatedthe effectsof price competition,weakening fiber makersrelative to textilefirms able to buy fibersreadily if not to developtheir own products. The bind of the largest fiber makers in the 1960s and early 1970s may not be fully understoodwithout studying their customersin the textiletrades as well. The structureof the textileindustry was important in shapingand in underminingfiber makers'marketing strategies. However, this paper leaves somequestions about the textiletrades answered incompletely or not at all. I believethat fiber makers'efforts to counteractthe competitivepattern of the textileand textileproducts trades combined with the predictabilityof quality,quantity available, and priceof the fibersthemselves to reinforcean ongoingtrend towardintegration and consolidationin sometextile trades. What was the source of this trend? What were its limits? On what basis did textile companiescompete? What was the role of the retailerswho distributedtextile products? I will continueto explorethese questions. 222

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