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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs August 18, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Summary China since the early 1990s has been steadily building a modern and powerful navy. China’s navy in recent years has emerged as a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. Observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China’s improving naval capabilities as posing a challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China’s naval capabilities as a key element of a broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Observers believe China’s naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also adequately performing other missions around the world; whether the Navy’s plans for developing and procuring long-range carrier-based aircraft and long-range ship- and aircraft-launched weapons are appropriate; whether the Navy can effectively counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture. Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1 Scope, Sources, and Terminology ............................................................................................. 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................... 2 Date of Inception................................................................................................................. 2 A Broad-Based Modernization Effort ................................................................................. 2 Quality vs. Quantity ............................................................................................................ 3 Limitations and Weaknesses ............................................................................................... 4 Roles and Missions for China’s Navy ................................................................................. 5 2014 ONI Testimony ........................................................................................................... 7 Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ...................................................... 7 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) .............. 7 Submarines, Mines, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) ................................... 9 Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft .................................................................... 19 Navy Surface Combatants and Coast Guard Cutters ........................................................ 27 Amphibious Ships and Potential Floating Sea Bases ........................................................ 38 Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) .......................................... 45 Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons ....................................................... 47 Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems.................................................................. 47 Naval Cyber Warfare Capabilities .................................................................................... 48 Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters.............................................................. 48 General .............................................................................................................................. 48 Bases Outside China ......................................................................................................... 51 Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ..................................... 52 Numbers Provided by ONI ............................................................................................... 52 Numbers Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress ................................................ 55 Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities ............................................................. 57 DOD Response to China Naval Modernization ...................................................................... 59 Efforts to Preserve U.S. Military Superiority ................................................................... 59 U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to Asia-Pacific Region .......................................................... 61 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy .......................................................................... 61 Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in Global Commons (JAM-GC) ....................... 62 Navy Response to China Naval Modernization ...................................................................... 63 May 2017 CNO White Paper ............................................................................................ 63 Force Posture and Basing Actions .................................................................................... 64 Acquisition Programs........................................................................................................ 65 Training and Forward-Deployed Operations .................................................................... 66 Increased Naval Cooperation with Allies and Other Countries ........................................ 67 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 67 Future Size and Capability of U.S. Navy ................................................................................ 67 Long-Range Carrier-Based Aircraft and Long-Range Weapons ............................................. 68 MQ-25 Stingray (Previously UCLASS Aircraft) .............................................................. 68 Long-Range Anti-Ship and Land Attack Missiles ............................................................ 69 Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile ......................................................................................... 71 Navy’s Ability to Counter China’s ASBMs............................................................................. 72 Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Breaking the ASBM’s Kill Chain ..................................................................................... 72 Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM ............................................... 75 Navy’s Ability
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