China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
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Order Code RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 12, 2008 Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Summary Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere since the 1990s about China’s military modernization. Several of the U.S. Navy’s most expensive acquisition programs, as well as Navy initiatives for homeporting ships and for training sailors, are for developing or maintaining capabilities that could be useful or critical in countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities in coming years. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China’s military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China’s military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, naval mines, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave (HPM) devices. China’s naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and shipbuilding dependence on foreign suppliers. Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an anti- access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China’s naval modernization include asserting China’s regional military leadership and protecting China’s maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests. China’s naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons. China’s naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward homeporting in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Introduction ......................................................1 Issue for Congress .............................................1 Scope, Sources, and Terminology.................................1 Background ......................................................2 China’s Naval Modernization ....................................2 Missiles .................................................2 Mines...................................................4 Nuclear Weapons ..........................................5 High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons .......................6 Aircraft..................................................7 Submarines...............................................8 Aircraft Carriers..........................................16 Surface Combatants .......................................19 Amphibious Ships........................................23 Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ships .........................25 C4ISR Systems ..........................................25 Doctrine, Education, Training, Exercises, and Logistics ...........28 China’s Naval Limitations and Weaknesses ........................29 In General...............................................30 Sustained Operations in Distant Waters .......................31 Joint Operations..........................................32 C4ISR Systems ..........................................32 Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) ..................................34 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)..............................34 Mine Countermeasures (MCM) ..............................35 Shipbuilding Dependence on Foreign Suppliers.................35 Goals or Significance of China’s Naval Modernization ...............40 PLA Navy as a Modernization Priority........................40 Near-Term Focus: Taiwan Situation..........................43 Anti-Access Force for Short-Duration Conflict..................45 Broader or Longer-Term Goals..............................48 Potential Implications for Required U.S. Navy Capabilities ............58 Capabilities for Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict .................58 Capabilities for Maintaining Regional Presence and Influence ......63 Capabilities for Tracking and Countering PLA SSBNs ............63 Potential Oversight Issues for Congress ...............................64 China as a Defense-Planning Priority .............................64 DOD Planning ...........................................64 Navy Planning...........................................64 Navy Force Structure and Basing Arrangements.....................66 Size of the Fleet..........................................66 Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy.............................66 Forward Homeporting in the Western Pacific...................68 Number of Aircraft Carriers.................................68 Number of Attack Submarines (SSNs) ........................69 Number of ASW-Capable Ships and Aircraft...................72 Fleet Architecture — Larger vs. Smaller Ships..................72 Navy Warfare Areas and Programs...............................74 Destroyer Procurement ....................................74 Missile Defense..........................................74 Air Warfare .............................................81 Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) ..................................84 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)..............................87 Mine Warfare............................................92 Computer Network Security ................................92 EMP Hardening..........................................93 Legislative Activity...............................................96 FY2009 ....................................................96 FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001) ..........97 FY2008 ....................................................98 FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585/S. 1547/H.R. 4986 /P.L. 110-181) .......................................98 Appendix A. Examples of Expressions of Concern.....................100 Appendix B. Additional Details on China’s Naval Modernization Efforts . 104 Missiles ...............................................104 Mines.................................................107 Nuclear Weapons ........................................113 High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons .....................115 Aircraft................................................116 Submarines.............................................117 Aircraft Carriers.........................................123 Surface Combatants ......................................125 Amphibious Ships.......................................128 List of Tables Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings........................11 Table 2. Chinese Submarine Patrols Per Year, 1981-2007 .................14 Table 3. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes............................21 Table 4. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes..............................22 Table 5. Potential Ship Travel Times to Taiwan Strait Area ...............61 Table 6. Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy, FY1995-FY2007 ..............67 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress Introduction Issue for Congress Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere since the 1990s about China’s military modernization and its potential implications for required U.S. military capabilities. China’s military modernization is an increasing element in discussions of future U.S. Navy requirements.1 Several of the U.S. Navy’s most expensive acquisition programs, as well as Navy initiatives for homeporting ships and for training sailors, are for developing or maintaining capabilities that could be useful or critical in countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities in coming years. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China’s military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Congress’s decisions on this issue could significantly affect future U.S. Navy capabilities, U.S. Navy funding