PAKISTAN’S ENGAGEMENT AS A FRONTLINE

STATE IN THE US-LED ‘WAR ON TERROR’:

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC

DIMENSIONS

PhD Dissertation

By

Sadaf Bashir

Department of International Relations & Political Science

Qurtuba University of Science & Information Technology Peshawar (Pakistan) 2015

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In The Name Of

The Most Beneficent The Most Merciful

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PAKISTAN’S ENGAGEMENT AS A FRONTLINE

STATE IN THE US-LED ‘WAR ON TERROR’:

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC

DIMENSIONS

PhD Dissertation

By

Sadaf Bashir

Department of International Relations & Political Science

Qurtuba University of Science & Information Technology Peshawar (Pakistan) 2015

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A DISSERTATION TITLED, “PAKISTAN’S ENGAGEMENT AS A FRONTLINE STATE IN THE US-LED ‘WAR ON TERROR’: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS” SUBMITTED BY SADAF BASHIR D/O MUHAMMAD BASHIR, IS OF SUFFICIENT STANDARD TO JUSTIFY ITS ACCEPTANCE BY DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS & POLITICAL SCIENCE, QURTUBA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, PESHAWAR, FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

------

(Supervisor)

External Examiners:

1. ------Dr.

2. ------Dr.

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This Dissertation is Dedicated to

My Parents, Muhammad Bashir and Shahnaz Parveen ─Whose Prayers are Great Source of Strength to Me in Every Noble Venture.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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All praises to Almighty ALLAH for the strengths and His blessing in completing this thesis. The completion of my PhD dissertation has been a long journey but I could not have succeeded without the constant support of the select few I’m about to mention.

First and foremost, I am highly indebted to my Research Supervisor, Dr. A. Z. Hilali, who has supported me throughout my thesis with his wealth of knowledge, invaluable guidance and patience whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I doubt that I will ever be able to convey my appreciation fully, but I owe him my eternal gratitude.

I am most grateful to the Department of International Relations & Political Science, Qurtuba University of Science & Information Technology, Peshawar for their academic and research support. I expand my thanks to all the staff in the University for their Assistance and kindness. My sincerest appreciation extends to Professor Dr. Saleem whose distilled wisdom was very helpful, sometimes in most surprising ways. I am very thankful as well, to the Higher Education Commission, Islamabad, for granting me a scholarship to pursue my studies.

I also want to express my gratitude to my best friend Shabana Noureen, not only for her excellent comments, but also for listening to me whenever I got excited about a new idea. Sincere thanks to her for intellectual and moral support during my study.

Of course no acknowledgments would be complete without giving thanks to my beloved parents. They’ve taught me about hard work, self-respect and determination. Words cannot express the gratitude I have for my grandfather Fazl-ur-Rehman (Late) and my sister Aasya Bashir for their endless affection, prayers and encouragement. I must acknowledge my brothers Muhammad Basharat and Muhammad Bilal for helping me get through the difficult times, and for all the support and caring they provided.

Sadaf Bashir

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the political, economic and strategic dimensions of Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan’s objectives in the ‘War on Terror’ seek to protect the country from an internal backlash from militants and extremists and from the external threat emanating from India. In line with these objectives, Pakistan seeks to retain a delicate ‘balancing act’ in its relations with United States and Afghan Taliban. This ‘balancing act’ involves extending significant counterterrorism assistance to the US-led coalition by combating Al-Qaeda operatives and anti-Pakistani state, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, while also ‘continue investing’ its political and financial capital in Afghan Taliban fighting the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan is feeling the heat on both sides, with extremists and Taliban rebels have turned against the state for joining the US- led coalition ‘War on Terror,’ while the US officials criticize Islamabad for declining to cooperate wholeheartedly. United States has repeatedly pressured Pakistan to fall in line with its objectives which seek to disrupt and dismantle Al-Qaeda network, stabilize ‘AfPak’ region, encircle China, purge the threat of the emergence of Nuclear Iran, and shore up the US political and military influence in Central Asia. Pakistan’s concerns, however, revolve around the emerging US-India nexus in South Asia, which Islamabad perceives is directed to minimize its influence in Afghanistan and the region and put its vital security interests at risk. In fact, the US ‘tilt’ toward India forced Pakistan to avoid complementing the US objectives fully. Islamabad, therefore, insists to recognize the benefits of partnering against combating terrorism which must be balanced against Pakistan’s security interests. In this regard, well-crafted US policies are needed to address Pakistan’s insecurities vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan, its economy and internal stability and acknowledge Pakistan’s growing relationship with China and Iran before the US can expect Pakistan to support its objectives in the ‘War on Terror’.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANP Awami National Party

ATC Anti-Terrorism Court

BCC Border Coordination Centre CARs Central Asian Republics

CIA Central Intelligence Agency CSF Coalition Support Funds

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CBM Confidence Building Measures

CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee ESF Economic Support Funds EU European Union FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FC Frontier Corps

FCR Frontier Crimes Regulations

FMF Foreign Military Financing FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GHQ General Headquarter

GNP Gross National Product IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IED Improvised Explosive Device ISAF International Security and Assistance Forces ISI Inter Services Intelligence ISPR Inter Services Public Relations JD/JuD Jamaat-ud-Dawa

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JI Jamiat-e-Islami JM/JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed JSOC Joint Special Operations Command JUI-F Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl-ur-Rehman Faction) JUI-S Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq Faction) KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (Province of Pakistan) LJ/LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LoC Line of Control (Kashmir) LT/LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyaba MMA Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal MQM Mutahiddah Qaumi Movement NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization NWA North Waziristan Agency OEF Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) PML-N Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif Faction) PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Faction) PPP Pakistan Peoples Party QST Quetta Shura Taliban RAW Research and Intelligence Wing (of India) ROZ/ROZs Reconstruction Opportunity Zone(s) SMP Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan

SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan SWA South Waziristan Agency TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas pipeline TJP Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan TNFJ Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jaffria TNSM Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

UK United Kingdom

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UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development

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Chapter – 01

INTRODUCTION

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (New York) and the Pentagon (Washington), totally transformed Pakistan’s relations with United States. The George Bush administration quickly blamed that Al-Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan, was involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Given Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and its diplomatic and military relations with the Taliban, the Bush administration sought Pakistani military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf’s cooperation to dismantle Al-Qaeda’s network in Afghanistan and to overthrow the Taliban regime that allegedly provided safe haven to Al-Qaeda’s central leadership.1 Pakistan’s dilemma was that it had supported the Taliban regime (1996-2001) in Afghanistan as part of its traditional ‘strategic depth’2 policy against India and Taliban had extensive ethnic, economic, and political ‘connections’ to Pakistan’s tribal areas. In fact, Taliban had access to more influential lobbies such as state institutions, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), major political parties, militant groups, the extensive madaris (Islamic religious schools) network, the drug mafia, business community and transport groups in Pakistan than most Pakistanis.3 Islamabad, therefore, “feared that an abrupt reversal in [Afghan] policy would cause an internal backlash” from Islamic parties, militant groups and ISI. 4

In this context, the tragic events of 9/11 hit the Musharraf regime like a ‘thunderbolt’, compelling it to choose between the Taliban and America. Faced with intense pressure from United States and its Western allies, General Musharraf agreed to modify the pro-Taliban policy of the state and align it with that of the US objectives in the region. 5

General Musharraf presumed that engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ would provide Islamabad the opportunities to secure its core national security interests which included: protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, safeguarding its nuclear and strategic assets, obtaining the US support for Kashmir cause, installing a friendly and ethnically broad-based government in Kabul and securing American economic and military

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assistance. He also presumed that military and security cooperation with the US would improve Pakistan’s image as a “responsible and honourable” state.6 Consequently, Pakistan became a ‘frontline state’ of high strategic importance as the US-led ‘War on Terror’ unfolded in neighboring Afghanistan. As a ‘frontline state’, Islamabad shared military intelligence, provided logistical support, air and naval bases to the US-led coalition forces to topple the Taliban regime, hunt down Al-Qaeda leaders and achieve their military objectives in Afghanistan.7 Pakistan has also deployed a large number of troops along the Pak-Afghan border in support of US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to capture Al-Qaeda operatives and disrupt Al-Qaeda network and its affiliated groups.8

Nevertheless, Pakistan backed the OEF in Afghanistan under the assumption that the antiTaliban, non-Pashtun and pro-Indian, United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA, commonly known as Northern Alliance) would not be allowed to seize control of Kabul. Pakistan’s support and assistance to Taliban regime (1996-2001) alienated the Northern Alliance which opposed the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Hence, Pakistan was worried that if Northern Alliance takes over Kabul, it would provide India the political and strategic space to cause political and security problems for Pakistan. 9

United States, on the other hand, sought to achieve two goals in Afghanistan. The first was to destroy and dismantle Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. The second was to use Afghanistan as a base for wiping out Al-Qaeda remnants in Pakistan in order to prevent the return of AlQaeda to Afghanistan. To achieve these goals, Washington sought to make Afghanistan “inhospitable” to Al-Qaeda, by overthrowing the Taliban regime and installing Northern Alliance dominated, anti-Taliban set up in Kabul under President Hamid Karzai.10 Frustrated by the Northern Alliance’s seizure of power in Kabul in November 2001, Islamabad decided to protect Afghan Taliban to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan.11 This decision reflected a divergence of interests between Pakistan and the US in the ‘War on Terror’. Islamabad afterward, is highly suspicious of the US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Washington is equally distrustful of Pakistan’s objectives even as the two partners continue cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’. Over the years since the commencement of OEF in Afghanistan, the US conflict with Afghan insurgents (Afghan Taliban led by Mullah

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Muhammad Omar, the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) has now become a conventional guerrilla war, and a stunning reminder that the divergence in US and Pakistani objectives is a major problem.

US-Pakistan Relations Since Pakistan’s inception in 1947, its relations with the United States have been marked by few overlapping interests but divergent strategic objectives and priorities. This pattern was well pronounced during the Cold War when both the countries were allies against Soviet Union. The US gained more during the period of overlapping of strategic interests from Pakistan’s geo-political position in the region and its security dilemma vis-à-vis India. On the contrary, Pakistan was bitterly disillusioned when it did not receive from Washington, the support it expected particularly, during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India.12 In the post Cold War period, Pakistan’s nuclear development programme further strained the relations between the two countries. Pakistan’s nuclear programme was a critical feature of Pakistan’s strategic objective to offset India’s greater conventional military superiority. The US priority was, however, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, which hurt Pakistan more than India. 13

In the post-9/11 era too, Pakistan-US engagement is narrowly anchored in combating terrorism and militancy. Despite the US goal to develop an effective and robust partnership with Pakistan; both Washington and Islamabad have a growing feeling of disenchantment with each other. These illusions are derived from divergent strategic objectives in the ‘War on Terror’. Initially, Washington has sought to dismantle Al-Qaeda network, later it expanded its war to target Afghan Taliban and Kashmir focused militant groups because from US perspective, they threaten the security of South Asia region and that of United States. In addition, American efforts to assist India become a global power and its indifference to India’s involvement in supporting terror activities in Pakistan using Afghanistan as a base have done much to undermine US relations with Islamabad by exacerbating Pakistan’s security concerns about India.14 From Pakistan’s perspective, the US Afghan strategy and its broader approach to the region have forced Pakistan to deal with both a hostile government in Kabul and a regional imbalance tilted in favour of India. Pakistan army, therefore, confined itself to dismantling Al- Qaeda network but sought to protect Afghan insurgents and Kashmir focused militant groups

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because they serve the “abiding rivalry” with India; and a hostile and irredentist Afghanistan,15 claiming the Pashtun areas of Pakistan east of the Durand Line.16 Furthermore, an overarching objective of the US in the ‘War on Terror’ is to use Afghanistan as a base against Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Islamabad, however, resents the expansion of US-led coalition operations in its territory and considers the role of US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and military contractors in Pakistan as a grave threat to its security. Worst still, Pakistan’s military fears that the US has “plans to seize its nuclear arsenal” to prevent them falling into the hands of extremists.17 The persistence of these divergent strategic objectives over an entire decade led a deepening distrust between the US and Pakistan Army, especially the ISI.18

In this context, Pakistan seeks to retain a delicate ‘balancing act’ in its relations with United States and Afghan insurgents. Pakistan army provides vital logistical support and intelligence cooperation on counterterrorism operations to US-led coalition and has incurred tremendous losses itself in counterinsurgency campaign; yet, it is also providing assistance to Afghan insurgents, who are fighting against the US and NATO troops and Afghan security forces. Puzzled by this, United States has repeatedly pressured Islamabad to fall in line with its objectives in the region. Pakistan, on the country, is unmoved by the US financial aid and pressure, and is determined to chase its own objectives as it sees them. 19 Put it simply, Washington failed to adjust its policies to convince Islamabad to modify its regional strategic calculus, which has always been ‘India-centric’ with a fear of a ‘two-front scenario,’ whereby rivalry with India was compounded by a hostile and unfriendly government in Kabul. In fact, the US counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan became the reason for Islamabad’s “growing, not lessening, reluctance” to align its strategic objectives with the US.20

An effective counterterrorism strategy must take into account Pakistan’s strategic objectives so that the US and Pakistan can find “zones of agreement” such as combating Al-Qaeda, stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, normalization of relations between Islamabad and New Delhi, bolstering economic progress and strengthening democratic process in Pakistan.21 To reach these “zones of agreement,” United States needs to modify Pakistan’s “cost-benefit equation” by addressing the country’s security concerns before it can demand

Islamabad to ‘do more’ to support its objectives in Afghanistan and the region.22

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Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategies Following the events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan joined the US-led coalition and has taken several measures to strengthen its internal security and law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and extremism. Since 2002, Pakistani security forces have been involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign against Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Islamabad’s policy in FATA and Malakand Division remains a peculiar mixture of military offensives and operations, verbal and written peace agreements, empowering and raising tribal lashkar (militias), deradicalization of youth and economic development. Though Pakistan army made key gains against militants yet, none of these appears to be leading to long term peace and stability in the region. This is due to constraints and limitations of Pakistan’s ‘balancing act’ in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan’s ability and willingness to engage in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is limited by a number of factors including its policies on Kashmir and Afghanistan, financial constraints, political turbulence, economic fragility, developmental deficit and Institutional weaknesses. Pakistan’s performance in the war is also affected by American campaign of drone strikes in the tribal areas which alienate tribal people and further fuel the bloody insurgency. In spite of all these limitations, Pakistani security forces are trying to build an effective response to extremism and terrorism across the country. Most importantly, since late 2008, Pakistan army’s counterinsurgency strategy has been evolved from ‘enemy centric’ to ‘population centric’ approach, which is aimed at clearing and holding the territory from insurgents and providing security and economic assistance to the population.23

Pakistan’s Perception about Terrorism Pakistan considers terrorism a grave threat to humanity but its ability and willingness to combat terrorism is also constrained by ‘the divided political will’ amongst Pakistani society, media and political circles about terrorism and about how the state and society should respond to this menace. Pakistan’s perception on the US-led ‘War on Terror’ seems split, incoherent, complex and animated with anti-American sentiments. The strong opposition to Pakistan’s ‘unstinted cooperation’ in the US-led war is mainly due to the ideological indoctrination of

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Pakistani youth during Afghan Jihad,24 the centrality of Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s policies, the impact of the war on Pakistan’s security and economy, and above all, deep-seated distrust for the United States as an ‘unreliable ally’ and a global hegemon.25 Ironically, despite General Musharraf’s strong rhetoric against combating extremism and terrorism, his regime was unable to generate a broad consensus in the country about ‘War on Terror’. Hence, a majority of Pakistanis see the US-led ‘War on Terror’ as a ‘war against Muslims’ and view Pakistan’s engagement in this war as fighting not its own war. Consequently, this perspective is implying a “war against America rather than against terrorism” whose root causes the US is not ready to address.26 When Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led coalition government came to power after February 2008 election; it gave political ownership to the US-led ‘War on Terror’ in order to build a broad consensus on the war. However, the task of building a broad consensus is not going to be an easy one as Pakistani public opinion is split along political, sectarian and ethnic lines. Yet, the political ownership of the ‘War on Terror’ by the civilian government raised the morale of the army, police and paramilitary forces fighting the TTP, especially during Swat operation in 2009. 27

‘War on Terror’ and Its Implications for Pakistan Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has grave Implications for its political, strategic and economic interests. Pakistan has descended into chaos, caught in a vicious circle of political instability, economic crisis, sectarian violence and terrorism.

On the internal political front, Pakistan’s engagement in the ‘War on Terror’ brought “metamorphosis” of General Musharraf from a “villain” in the eyes of international community, who seized power in ‘a bloodless coup,’ to a “natural ally” of the US-led coalition. 28 Washington provided economic assistance, waived economic sanctions and strengthened diplomatic ties with General Musharraf because it needed the military regime to fight the war. Musharraf used the substantial US assistance to strengthen his own position domestically and expanded the influence and power of the army at the cost of democratic process in Pakistan. Currently, the weakened civilian institutions, the growing civil-military imbalance and

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mounting political uncertainty and political fragmentation are direct consequences of the US- backed prolonged Musharraf rule in the country. Moreover, American “structural presence” and penetration in Pakistan’s polity is becoming deep and pervasive to ensure the continuity of Islamabad’s efforts in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan’s political landscape has been shaped by increasing interference of the US in country’s security issues, its counterterrorism strategies and its economic policies which further alienate Pakistani public from America. 29

Externally, Pakistan’s strained relations with Northern Alliance are a stumbling block in establishing normal ties with Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance dominated Afghan government has antagonized Pakistan by cozying up to India and has openly strengthened its ties with New Delhi.30 Moreover, taking advantage of the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’, India has adopted an aggressive posture towards Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir dispute. India, being ‘a status-quo power,’ would like to convert the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir into an international border, which is unacceptable to Pakistan. Islamabad’s efforts for more than six decades have been aimed at altering the territorial status quo in its favour.31 Thus, the Kashmir peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad seems to have reached a political stalemate, with neither side being able to make any progress. On the strategic front, the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has blurred the borders between the internal and external security threats. Militancy, sectarianism and terrorism are the growing security threats that Pakistan faces from the 9/11 developments. Pakistan’s internal security threat has acquired four dimensions with disaster consequences: i. The rebirth and splitting of Punjab based, banned Kashmir focused militant groups particularly, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM); and sectarian outfits, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) under new names; ii. The emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in FATA; iii. The emergence of a nexus between Punjab based militant groups, Taliban and AlQaeda. This nexus not only threatens Pakistan’s domestic security but also targets interests of India, United States and Western countries using Pakistan’s territory and;

iv. The increased linkages between narco-trade, crime and terrorism, which further complicate the country’s security landscape.

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On external strategic front, Pakistan and the US have divergent strategic objectives regarding India, China and Iran. In this context, Pakistan faces a three dimensional threat. First, the US ‘AfPak’ strategy shifted the strategic centre of gravity of the ‘War on Terror’ to Pakistan. This strategy has escalated the US drone strikes against suspected targets in FATA which increase instability in Pakistan and contributes to “a sense of lost of sovereignty” among public. Moreover, the war has opened the doors to Indian, Afghan and American intelligence agencies’ clandestine operations in Pakistan. Islamabad believes that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) duly backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is involved in destabilization of Baluchistan province to prevent the emergence of Gwadar port as a strategic shipping and commercial hub for China, Afghanistan and Central Asia.32 Islamabad is also worried about US ‘dual game’ with Pakistan by supporting terrorist groups such as TTP in FATA and Swat to defocus Pakistan army by ‘engaging it all over’ and thus, forcing it to change its policies in Afghanistan, Kashmir and South Asian region.33 Second, Pakistan is alarmed by the emerging US-India nexus directed against China and by extension Beijing’s strategic ally, Islamabad, which would have wide-ranging security implications for Pakistan and the region. Third, US-Iran standoff could also impact on Pakistan’s security environment and may put at risk, Pakistan’s energy interests particularly, the construction of the valuable Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project.34 To sum up, Washington wants Islamabad to become ‘a junior partner’ in restraining Iran and China. Thus, Pakistan’s realignment of its objectives with those of the US puts Islamabad in a state of conflict with the interests of Beijing and Tehran. On economic front, since Pakistan joined the US-led ‘War on Terror’ in 2001, it has to bear the massive financial costs with the disruption of investments and growth, damage to infrastructure, decline in tourism and job opportunities in the war-torn areas. The cost of the war to Pakistan is estimated at $102.51 billion between 2001 and May 2014. 35 Pakistan’s 2009-2010 economic survey report noted that Pakistan as a frontline state in the ‘War on Terror’ “may face a permanent degree of welfare loss” due to the diversion of development spending toward the security budget, decline in trade, capital flight and brain drain.36

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Conclusion

Pakistan is a ‘pivotal state’37 and its geo-political and geo-strategic importance means that the continued existence of a stable Pakistan is in the interest of all other countries in the region and beyond. Pakistan’s path will be driven by internal, regional and international factors, and the United States should play a constructive and supportive role.38 Pakistan, for its part, is weary of engaging in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ that is fomenting political unrest and economic instability while the US seems indifferent to its security concerns vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. This implies a US response to Pakistan’s security concerns due to its centrality in the Afghan conflict and the region. Pakistan is more than willing to support an Afghan-led and Afghanowned peace process and the US drive for reconciliation with Afghan insurgents. But Washington and Islamabad disagree on the means to achieve a negotiated settlement. Moreover, Islamabad keeps a wary eye on the US military presence in post-2014 Afghanistan which would further undermine stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, while Kabul and New Delhi see US military presence as a “stabilizing factor.”39 It is important to note that Pakistan’s support to end Afghan conflict does not entail abandoning Pakistan’s security interests, and these security concerns revolve significantly, around India and will continue to define and shape the ‘AfPak’ region in the future. 40

By and large, the India factor has led to the divided opinion amongst Pakistani policy makers about fighting the ‘War on Terror’, given that there is a deep-rooted fear of the evolving USIndia nexus in Afghanistan and the region. The Afghan insurgents are a natural boost to Pakistan’s drive to protect its political and strategic interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that Afghan insurgents will advance its security interests in post-2014 Afghanistan either as a part of broad based government in Kabul or as a strategic asset in a future civil war. Against this backdrop, the US strategy must be based on understanding and appreciating Pakistan’s objectives as well as its security concerns.41 So, US relations with Pakistan, on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other hand, should be designed to advance the prospects of regional peace and stability. In addition, the US needs to provide economic aid and military assistance to ensure an economically stable Pakistan.

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On its part, Pakistan needs to gain ‘strength from within’ and it needs to play its cards well. Pakistani state needs to take on board all stakeholders including the public, media and civil and military leadership to tackle the thorny issue of terrorism and extremism. Pakistan must establish the writ of the state to every inch of its territory, particularly FATA through well crafted political, security and economic strategies. Pakistan should also get engage in dialogue with other ethnic groups such as Tajik and Uzbek in Afghanistan given that Pakistan is willing to accept an inclusive, broad based government in Afghanistan that will involve representation from all major ethnic factions. Islamabad can transform itself into a functional polity if it disengages itself from domestic and international conflicts; realigns its foreign policy focus from the West to the East, particularly increasing trade and commercial ties with China, Iran, India, Central Asia, and Russia; and empowers its people through genuine participatory democracy.42

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY This doctoral dissertation focuses on the political, strategic and economic dimensions of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and sets the following objectives:

1. To analyse Pakistan’s political and strategic trajectory prior to 11 September 2001;

2. To examine Pakistan’s perceptions on terrorism and the US-led ‘War on Terror’;

3. To highlight the key elements of Pakistan’s response to the events of 11 September 2001, including its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies as a coalition partner in the war;

4. To assess the impact of the ‘War on Terror’ upon Pakistan’s political, strategic and economic interests;

5. To examine the problems and prospects which are linked with the ‘War on Terror’ and US-Pakistan relations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The US-led ‘War on Terror’ has been a factor of utmost importance in the political, economic and strategic dynamics of Pakistan. Pakistan is a ‘pivotal state’ and “influences its neighbours

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through economic and/or political linkages.” If Pakistan “grows smoothly and equitably, its success would foster stability of other states in the region.” On the contrary, chaos in Pakistan would spawn turmoil in the region.43 The present state and the prospects of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is the subject that is directly linked to the central issues of security, stability and development of Pakistan and the region. There are very few academic studies focusing on the political, strategic and economic dimensions of Pakistan’s engagement in the US- led ‘War on Terror’ in the post 9/11 milieu. The proposed research aims to examine these dimensions at state level to address some pertinent questions and issues.

Why Pakistan joined the US-led ‘War on Terror’? What are the US and Pakistan’s objectives in the ‘War on Terror’ and to what extent these objectives converge or diverge? The study also seeks to find out the perceptions of Pakistani citizenry, media, government and the army on the ‘War on Terror’ and their effects upon Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. The study assesses the gaps between crafting and execution of Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies and explores the ways these gaps could be filled. Most importantly, it assesses Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategies in FATA and their impact on Pakistan’s campaign against terrorism.

The US-led ‘War on Terror’ has impacted Pakistan at multiple levels and presents both challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. It is important to find out the impact of the war on Pakistan’s political landscape, its internal and external security environment and its economy. In this regard, this study seeks to find out the impact of post-9/11 developments upon Pakistan’s ability to maneuver in Afghanistan and the region and explore the challenges flowing from developments in Afghanistan and its spillover effects in the shape of political fragmentation, growing militancy, extremism and violence in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan. It also seeks to find out the impact of ‘War on Terror’ on Kashmir cause and in turn, implications of Kashmir dispute on Afghan conflict and India-Pakistan relations. The study also analyzes the direct and indirect economic costs of Pakistan’s campaign against terrorism.

It is also important to find out how Islamabad and Washington can astutely deal with the challenges of extremism and terrorism and what are the impediments in this regard? Equally important is the question for Pakistani policy makers: What impact may the evolving US policy towards Afghanistan and the region have on the perceived value of United States as an

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ally in the eyes of Pakistani strategic community? And finally, will Pakistan be able to successfully safeguard its security interests and emerge out of this quagmire or otherwise, drastically change the national, regional and international strategic and geo-political dynamics? These questions and issues are complex, but extremely important, as these are having a bearing on the national, but also on the regional and on world prospects.

CHAPTERS FORMAT

Chapter – 01: Introduction This chapter will introduce the Research topic; describe objectives of the study and its significance. It will also briefly mention scheme of the study.

Chapter – 02: Pakistan’s Security Compulsions and Its Response to the Events of 11 September 2001

This chapter will analyze Pakistan’s security compulsions prior to 9/11. It will also outline Musharraf’s regime response to the events of 11 September 2001.

Chapter – 03: US-Pakistan Relations This chapter will briefly analyse US-Pakistan relations prior to 11 September 2001. It will outline the US and Pakistan’s objectives in the ‘War on Terror’. It will then examine the problems and prospects which are associated with the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and USPakistan partnership.

Chapter – 04: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies This chapter will assess Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. The first part of the chapter will detail Pakistan’s diplomatic, law enforcement and internal security strategies in its fight against terrorism and extremism. It will also highlight the gap between crafting and execution of Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategies. The second part will analyze Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategies in FATA and their implications on Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign.

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Chapter – 05: Pakistan’s Perception about Terrorism

The chapter will explore the elements in Pakistan’s definition of terrorism. It will evaluate Pakistani public, government, military establishment and media perception on militancy, extremism, terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’. It will also detail reasons for opposition against Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

Chapter – 06: Implications of Pakistan’s Engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ This chapter will assess political, strategic and economic implications of Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

Chapter – 07: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations This chapter will detail the challenges relating to preserving the basic fabric of US-Pakistan partnership which loom ahead. It will also assess constraints and limitations of Pakistan’s ‘balancing act’ in the ‘War on Terror’. The chapter will conclude by offering policy recommendations towards a long-term, robust and stable US-Pakistan relationship.

END NOTES

1 Frank Pellegrini, “The Bush Speech: How to Rally a Nation,” TIME, 21 September 2001; Farhana Ali, “US– Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 4 (June 2007), p. 1. 2 Pakistan’s strategic depth policy meant a desire to prevent a possible ‘strategic envelopment’ by India through Afghanistan. Pakistan fears that New Delhi could manipulate events in Afghanistan to cause political and security problems for Pakistan. At the heart of Pakistan’s strategic depth policy is to establish a friendly government in Kabul that at the minimum does not pose a second front in the event of a war with India and at the maximum provide a ‘strategic relief zone’ for limited logistic sustenance and backup in case of war with India. For details see Feroz Hassan Khan, “Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Strategic Insight, Vol. 2 (January 2003), p. 6. 3 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 185.

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4 Moeed Yusuf, “The US-Pakistan Relationship and Finding an End State in Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 9 (September 2010), pp. 7-8. 5 Farhana Ali, “US–Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 4 (June 2007), pp. 1-2. 6 “Text: Musharraf Rallies Pakistan,” BBC News, 19 September 2001. 7 Leon T. Hadar, “Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client,” Policy Analysis No. 436 (Washington: CATO Institute, May 2002), p. 2. 8 C. Christine Fair, “Cooperation with Pakistan and India: The Counter Terror Coalition,” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), pp. 27-42. 9 Peter Wilson Prabhakar, Wars, Proxy-wars and Terrorism: Post Independent India (New Delhi: Mittal, 2003), p. 172. 10 George Friedman, “Strategic Divergence: The War against the Taliban and the War against Al Qaeda,” STRATFOR, 26 January 2009. 11 This policy was manifested during the US-led coalition move into Afghanistan in 2001, ‘when Afghan border with Pakistan’s Khyber Agency was closed while North Waziristan’s Miranshah and Mirali routes were left open’ to facilitate the escape of Taliban to Pakistan. See Qandeel Siddique, “Pakistan’s Future Policy towards Afghanistan,” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, August 2011), p. 19. 12 Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue”, Regional Studies (Winter 2010- 11), pp. 1-2 13 Teresita C. Schaffer, “US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners have Divergent Priorities,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), p. 169. 14 Carol Christine Fair, “2014 and Beyond: US Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 3 November 2011, p. 3. 15 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 9. 16 The Durand Line was established in 1893 through a treaty between Afghan King Amir Abdur Rahman and British Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand to separate Afghanistan from British India. In 1947, Durand Line became the international border between Afghanistan and newly created Pakistan. While the Durand Line is internationally accepted border, No Afghan government has ever accepted it. Successive Afghan governments lay claims to the Pashtun majority areas of Pakistan in an effort to undermine Durand Line. See Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (London: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 34- 65. 17 “Elite US Troops Ready to Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks,” The Times, 1 January 2010. 18 Ashley J. Tellis, “Marching to a Meltdown,” The News, 10 September 2011. 19 “The US-Pakistan Relationship: Toward a Complementary Strategy,” National Strategy Forum Review (Chicago), Vol. 20, Issue 2 (Spring 2011), p. 16. 20 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 6. 21 “The US-Pakistan Relationship: Toward a Complementary Strategy,” National Strategy Forum Review (Chicago), Vol. 20, Issue 2 (Spring 2011), p. 1. 22 Ibid., p. 9; See also Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 15.

23 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Lions and Jackals: Pakistan’s Emerging Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2009), p. 2. 24 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 87-88; See also Laila Bokhari, “Radicalization, Political Violence and Militancy” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2011), pp. 87-88. 25 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2004), pp. 31-32; See also Randall L. Koehlmoos, “Positive Perceptions to Sustain the US-Pakistan Relationship,” Parameters (Summer 2010), p. 47. 26 Khaled Ahmed, “Three Terminal Narratives of Pakistan,” The Friday Times, Vol. XX, No. 22 (16-24 July 2008), p. 8.

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27 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “New Trends in Counter-Terrorism,” Daily Times, 19 July 2009. 28 Jagmohan Meher, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed (New Delhi: Kalpaz, 2004), p. 240. 29 Dr. Saeed Shafqat, “Social and Political Transformation of Pakistani Political Elites,” A talk delivered at the Gymkhana Club on the 4 June 2008, Research & News Quarterly, No. 2- 3 (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy & Governance, Forman Christian College University, October 2008), p. 12. 30 Robert D. Kaplan, “Behind the Indian Embassy Bombing,” The Atlantic, 1 August 2008. 31 Fahmida Ashraf, “Post 9/11 Trends in Indian Foreign Policy,” Strategic Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), p. 65. 32 Ziad Haider, “Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (Winter/Spring 2005), p. 95. Central Asia is here defined as including the five postSoviet States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 33 Imtiaz Gul, “Cobweb of Spy Network,” The News, 27 February 2011. 34 Dr. Zahid Ali Khan, “US post 9/11 Persian Gulf Policy: Iran’s Concern and Options,” IPRI Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Research and policy Institute, Winter 2011), p. 57. 35 Sardar Sikander Shaheen, “Pakistan Lost Rs 8,264 Billion in ‘‘War on Terror’’,” Daily Times, 3 June 2014. 36 “Economic Survey 2009-10,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2010), p. 9. 37 Sunjay Chandiramani, Marc Finaud et al., “Pakistan and South Asia’s Security Nexus: Scenarios for the Future,” Geneva Papers 11(Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010), pp. 59-60. 38 Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future,” Asia Society (May 2011), p. 53. 39 Javed Hafiz, “Strategic disconnect?” The Nation, 16 July 2012. 40 Alexander Evans, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 4 (August 2011), p. 65. 41 Moeed Yusuf, “The US-Pakistan Relationship and Finding an End State in Afghanistan,” Op Cit., pp. 10-11. 42 Yousuf Nazar, Balkanisation and Political Economy of Pakistan (Karachi: National News Agency, 2011), pp. 197-198. 43 Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, et al., (ed.), The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US- Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p.7.

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Chapter – 02

PAKISTAN’S SECURITY COMPULSIONS AND ITS

RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

INTRODUCTION

Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan came under huge pressure from Washington to join the US-led military campaign directed against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. General Pervez Musharraf’s space to maneuver on the post 9/11 geopolitical landscape was squeezed because of Pakistan’s internal and external security compulsions. Musharraf apprehended that if he declined to cooperate with Washington, he would put at risk Pakistan’s aid dependent and fragile economy and perhaps its nuclear and missile assets as well. Pakistan also feared that rejecting cooperation with the US could lead to install an anti-Pakistan political setup in Kabul. Moreover, a rift with Washington might allow New Delhi to draw Kashmiri freedom struggle into the ambit of the ‘War on Terror’, which was unacceptable to Islamabad. In his address to the nation on 19 September 2001, General Musharraf articulated Pakistan’s security compulsions to join US-led ‘War on Terror’. He stated: “First of all is the security of the country from external threat. Second is our economy and our efforts for its survival. Third priority is our strategic, nuclear and missile assets. And finally, the Kashmir cause.” 1

He went on to say that Indians “want the United States to side with them and to declare Pakistan a terrorist state…They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause…In my view, they want a change in Afghanistan and the establishment of an anti-Pakistan government there.” 2

Musharraf’s speech reflected his high hopes to extract as much as he could from the US in exchange for Pakistan’s support in the ‘War on Terror’. By asserting publicly that Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause were not on the negotiating table, he barred the US from dealing with these issues on Indian terms but he overtly accepted that he was seeking economic assistance from the US and ready to cooperate with the US on postTaliban

41

government in Afghanistan.3 Musharraf warned that in the worst case scenario, the “critical concerns” of Pakistan “may be harmed.” He also acknowledged that by cooperating with the US, Pakistan “could emerge as a responsible and honourable” state.4 Consequently, Islamabad extended its cooperation to Washington to overthrow Taliban regime and became a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

This chapter examines Pakistan’s security calculations which compelled Pakistan to change its policy vis-à-vis Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to withdraw its support soon after 9/11. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part assesses Pakistan’s internal, regional and international security calculations prior to 11 September 2001. The second part outlines Musharraf regime’s response to US demands, where Pakistan extended its ‘unstinted cooperation’ to the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CALCULATIONS OF PAKISTAN’S SECURITY MILIEU

Pakistan’s decision to join the US-led ‘War on Terror’ came through compulsions by internal, regional and international security calculations.

A. INTERNAL SECURITY CALCULATIONS Internally, Pakistan was facing an expanding economic crisis and growing extremism and sectarian violence. The events of 11 September 2001 offered Musharraf’s regime the opportunity to revive the economy and improve law and order situation in the country by joining the US-led ‘War on Terror’. Though, Washington indicated to provide economic assistance but there were no assurances given by the US to help Pakistan boost its economy. a) Fragile Economy

Pakistan’s economic conditions prior to 9/11 were appalling. After a significant record of economic growth during the 1980s, Pakistan’s economy slowed down in the 1990s. Most of the decade was lost in disorder with abrupt and frequent regime changes, poor governance, mounting public spending on military and defense, economic mismanagement and weakened institutions of the state. In particular, the public spending on defense continued to grow at the cost of social and human development which resulted in difficult economic conditions in the

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country.5 According to United Nations Human Development Report 2000, Pakistan’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking was very low—135 among 174 countries.6 Furthermore, the nuclear testing in May 1998 jolted investors’ confidence, disrupted foreign economic assistance and led to the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and other countries. 7 Nuclear tests related sanctions (under Glenn Amendment) were in addition to those brought in through Pressler Amendment and its imposition by the then President Bush in 1989.8 After the nuclear tests, Japan suspended annual budgetary support fund of about $500 million and US wound down its financial support to development projects.9 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) too stalled the final installment of the $1.56 billion worth of credit which had been allocated to Pakistan earlier in 1997.10 Worst still, a third layer of US sanctions was imposed in 1999 to protest against Musharraf’s bloodless military coup. By the year 2001, the US assistance to Pakistan was declined to the extent that Islamabad received only $5.4 million for counter-narcotics and food assistance.11

When General Musharraf took over power in October 1999, Pakistan economy was in ‘downward spiral’ with a low growth rate, low levels of foreign investment, a weak balance of payments with stagnant exports and rising debt burden. The economic indicators of Pakistan made bleak reading. Consider the following: 12

• Pakistan’s per capita income was about $526 only while inflation rate was 5.7 percent in 1999–2000. • In Fiscal Year (FY)13 1989–90, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant factor was 6.3 percent but it fell to 4.2 percent in October 1999. • Investment ratio was 19.4 percent in 1990-91, moving in a downward direction since 1996- 97 (8 percent) and reached -3.6 percent in 1998–99. Pakistan’s fiscal deficit was averaging about 5.1 percent of GDP in 1999, and the foreign exchange reserves were at $991 million in FY 1999. • More than 84 percent of Pakistan’s national revenue was spent on debt servicing and defence alone. Public debt represented 84 percent of GDP while external debt represented 47.6 percent of GDP in 1999. • The black economy14 in the country represented 50 percent of GDP in 1999.

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• Pakistan failed to spend a significant amount on social services. Primary gross enrolment rates in 1998–99 were around 69 percent, well short of the target of 88 percent set by the country’s ambitious Social Action Program (a multi-donor programme of assistance implemented during the 1990s). • In health, an infant mortality of 83 percent, higher as compared to Bangladesh (73 percent), India (70 percent) and Sri Lanka (15 percent), was observed in 1998–99.

Most importantly, Pakistan was “a state in debt.” 15 Most of the debt accumulated in General Zia-ul-Haq last years of rule (1986-1988) and the following ‘decade of democracy’ (19881999). 16 The loans kept an “artificial prosperity” in the 1980s, but produced no “economic assets” to pay off the debts. Later on, Pakistan got caught in the classical ‘debt trap scenario,’ as the increased borrowing was not enough to return even the existing debt. 17 Pakistan debt increased from (Rupees) Rs. 802 billion in 1990 to Rs. 2907 billion in June 1999, which accounted for 99.8 percent of GDP. By 2001, Pakistan had run up outstanding debt of Rs. 4003.3. 18

Table 2.1: Profile of Domestic and External Debt (Pakistani Rupees, Rs. billion)

FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Total Debt 1877.3 2184.5 2516.1 2907.1 3095.5 4003.3

Total Debt as percent of GDP 88.5 90.0 94.0 99.8 97.5 1708.5 Domestic Debt 901.4 1037.2 1176.2 1375.9 1558.8 1558.8 Domestic Debt as percent of GDP 42.5 42.7 43.9 47.2 49.1 49.2 External Debt 975.9 1147.3 1339.8 1531.2 1536.7 2223.8 External Debt as percent of GDP 46.0 47.2 50.0 52.6 48.4 64 Total Debt Servicing 199.8 255.9 275.5 339.9 338.2 325.0 Total Interest payment 130.5 158.4 188.8 216.9 240.2 237.1 Domestic 104.8 129.9 160.1 178.9 189.6 178.8 Foreign 25.7 28.5 28.7 38.0 50.5 50.5 Ratio of Total Debt Servicing to:

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Tax Revenue 65.4 78.8 76.2 87.0 83.3 68.9 Total Expenditure 38.6 47.3 46.7 52.5 45.5 49.5 Source: “Annual Report 2000-2001,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2001), p. 112; See also “Annual Report 2001-2002,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2002), p. 118.

In 1999-2000, debt servicing was estimated at Rs. 338.2 billion, which amounted to around 45.5 percent of total expenditure and 83 percent of the total tax revenue. Another worrying aspect of Pakistan’s debt profile was the amount of interest paid on domestic and foreign debt. During 1999-2000, it constituted Rs. 240.2 billion as compared to around Rs. 130.5 billion in 1996-97. This indicated that Pakistan was geared towards a situation of ‘debt trap.’ In addition to the increased burden of debt servicing for fiscal imbalances, was lower tax effort. Tax to GDP ratio had moved up to 14.5 percent by 1996-97, but since then it had consistently eroded and was down to 12.8 percent by 1999-2000. As a result of this ‘twin menace’, development expenditure took a major hit and reached a low level of 3 percent of GDP in the year 1999-2000 from 6.4 percent in 1990-91.19

Given rising fiscal imbalances, the key priority of Musharraf’s regime was reducing the country’s external debt portfolio and raising tax revenues for fiscal consolidation. General Musharraf stated in an interview in November 2000 that economy was high on his list of priorities. He noted:

“Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays income tax. Our debt burden is $38 billion, and we have to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, and broadening our tax base.”20

Accordingly, General Musharraf’s regime undertook several measures to manage and stabilize the economy such as eliminating certain subsidies on wheat; cutting back public sector jobs by 12 percent; and decreasing interest rates from 20 to 5 percent which drove up demands to do business. His government imposed tax on agricultural income, and General Sales Tax (GST) on electricity. His economic recovery package followed oil-price mechanism which resulted in price hike from 7.5 to 22.5 percent. Most importantly, Musharraf’s regime decided to reduce the defence budget by 5 percent as part of economic recovery measures.21 The reserve position

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over the decade was improved from $0.3 billion to $1.5 billion. In FY2000-01, the IMF approved a Stand-By Arrangement with Pakistan for nine month period followed by a three year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The IMF completed all the reviews successfully and released all the tranches on time. This resulted in decrease in the budget deficit from 6 percent in 1999 to 5.2 percent in 2001. Yet, the deficit remained $1.2 billion due to interest payments of $1.6 billion. Inflation, however, jumped down from 6 percent in 1998 to 3 percent in 2001.22

Despite these measures to stimulate economy, Pakistan’s economic recovery remained uncertain. In fact, 2001 was a disappointing year of little growth in the country with a growth rate of 2.6 percent against the target of 5.0 percent. The insignificant growth performance was true of all sectors of economy: agricultural growth was negative 2.5 percent (due to worsening drought conditions); manufacturing grew by 7.1 percent; construction by 2.6 percent; and services sector by 4.4 percent.23 The slower growth of economy resulted in considerable problems for Pakistani populace. Incidence of poverty increased from 32.6 percent to 34 percent in 2001. Foreign direct investment also declined from $511 million in 1999 to $352 million over the same period. Despite the reforms in tax collection, tax revenues in 2001 stood less than 13 percent of GDP, as they had been in 1998.24 In education, a decline from 2.4 percent of GNP in 1994-95 to 2.1 percent in 1999-00 was observed. 25 The expenditures allocated for health showed decrease from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1995-96 to 0.5 percent in 2000-01, which was “very low by international standards.” 26

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Figure 2.1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (FY01) as Percent of GDP

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Target Actual Proved

Source: “Annual Report 2000-2001,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2001), p. 2.

In 2001, the total accumulated debt exceeded Pakistan’s GDP; income per capita was lower than per citizen indebtedness.27 By the year 2001, the rupee was trading at about 30 percent of its value in 1990 against the US dollar. It continued its slide and hit a record low against the dollar since 1982 when it had sunk to 18.6 percent against the dollar, and moved to a “managed float.”28 Pakistan’s economy was so fragile and so indebted that Musharraf’s regime had to “cave in” to American demands in severing their ties with Taliban regime in Afghanistan lest Washington cut off donor aid and debt relief.29 Economic incentives, therefore, acted as a catalyst to support the US-led ‘War on Terror’. b) Religious Extremism and Sectarian Violence Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was irrefutably plagued by religious extremism and sectarian violence. The extent of extremism and violence unleashed upon the society can be measured from the number of people killed or injured in sectarian terrorism between 1989 and 2001: 1258 people were killed, and another 3018 injured in 1,733 incidents of sectarian violence across the country, an average of more than 133 incidents per year.30

Pakistan’s descent into extremism and sectarian violence was the result of several interlinking factors which included: General Zia-ul-Haq’s ‘Islamization’ politics, Iranian Revolution of 1979, Pakistan’s association with the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets during the 1980s, the

47

Afghan Civil War (1989-2001), and the subsequent extension of the Afghan Jihad to support Kashmir insurgency after 1989. 31 It seems pertinent to analyze each of these factors briefly.

General Zia’s ‘Islamization’ Politics: A significant development that served to raise the level of religious intolerance and sectarian tensions was the General Zia regime’s (19771988) ‘Islamization’ politics,32 which attempted to legitimize his own military rule by infusing Islamic conservatism in the state and society. He patronized Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Sunni Deobandi Islamic religious-political party Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). General Zia’s Islamization politics brought Islamic clerics to control madaris which transformed “forward- looking” Deobandi teachings into the texts that were even “unrecognizable to their Deobandi progenitors.” Ultimately, madaris students were indoctrinated by these teachings that revolved around a strict interpretation and application of Sharia (Islamic Law). 33 Zia’s controversial Islamization policies cultivated religious intolerance and sectarian divisions in a number of ways. He endorsed Deobandi interpretation of Islam which “broke the bond of unity” between Shiite (Shia) and Sunni communities.34 The imposition of zakaat (necessary alms giving) and ushr (zakaat on agricultural products) by the regime of Zia-ulHaq in June 1980 threatened the minority Shiite community that Pakistan was “being redefined as a ‘sectarian state.’” These policies served to radicalize the Shiite community, and led to the formation of a Shiite political front, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jaffria (TNFJ, or movement of implementation of Shiite Law).35 TNFJ forcefully demanded to exempt Shiites from deduction of zakaat. Though, Zia regime reluctantly caved in to TNFJ demands, yet, the increasingly confrontational and aggressive posture of TNFJ resulted in “a Deobandi backlash” that created Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (Later Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), or Soldiers of the Prophet’s Companions) in 1985. The SSP’s formal goals were “to have Shiites declared non-Muslims” and “to have Sunni Islam declared the ‘state religion’” of Pakistan. 36

Besides, Shiite-Sunni divide, the sectarian lines were clearly drawn between the two Sunni sects, Deobandi and Barelvis as the discord grew over the control of the mosques. 37 General Zia favoured the graduates of Deobandi School to be appointed as khateeb (mosque orators) and imams (religious leaders) in mosques. As a result, several Barelvis mosques fell into the hands of Deobandis. In addition, the rise of Saudi influence in Pakistan strengthened the nexus between Deobandis and Sunni Ahl-e-Hadith sects (the People of the Tradition, also known as

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Wahabis in South Asia) of Islam. The zakaat and usher funds were distributed generously to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith/Wahabi controlled madaris which resulted in their mushroom growth. 38 These policies “created and nurtured a sectarian consciousness” beyond the boundaries of madaris.39 Most importantly, Zia government also undertook a thorough, revision of textbooks and course curricula to prepare “a new generation wedded to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam.”40 This narrow and restricted “Islamic model of citizenship” taught in schools and madaris during Zia rule nurtured an environment conducive to sectarian violence, extremism and intolerance by marginalizing non-Muslim citizens and people of minority sects.41

Iranian Revolution: The Iranian Revolution in 1979 had a profound impact on the balance of power between Pakistan’s Shiite community and Pakistani state. Equally important, the Iranian revolution also created polarization between Shiite and Sunni communities in the country. Following the revolution, growing Shiite activism gave birth to TNFJ, which later evolved to Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) or movement of Shiite. Iran openly supported TNFJ. In response, General Zia with the backing of Saudi Arabia and Iraq decided to employ the most radical Sunni group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), to “squeeze” the Shiite in Punjab Province. 42

In Punjab, violent sectarian conflict began in the mid-1980s as a ‘vendetta’ between SSP and TNFJ. In 1987, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, a Saudi-backed Sunni cleric in Lahore, was assassinated. This incident dramatically escalated the ‘vicious circle’ of sectarian violence and led to the killing of a leading Shiite leader, Arif Hussaini in Peshawar, the next year. The violence intensified with the murder of SSP co-founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in 1990. Believing he was assassinated by Shiite militants supported by Iran, Sunni militants killed Iran’s Consul General, Sadiq Ganji, in Lahore.43 This resulted in spate of sectarian violence between Iran-supported Shiites and Saudi Arabia-supported Sunnis in Pakistan.

The sectarian violence worsened in the 1990s, when the militant wings of SSP and TJP came into existence. In 1994, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP, the Army of Mohammad), a splinter group of the TNFJ/TJP, with a significant following in District Jhang in Punjab province, emerged as a prominent Shiite militant outfit involved in anti-SSP campaigns,

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violence and target killings. In January 1997, in an act of blatant terrorism, an SSP leader, Zia- ur-Rehman, present for a hearing in the Lahore High Court was murdered by SMP. A journalist and twenty-two police constables were also killed during the attack. Reprisal by SSP was swift. Hundreds of angry protesters of SSP set ablaze the Iranian Cultural Center in Lahore. 44

In February 1997, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ, Jhangvi’s Soldiers, named after a Sunni cleric, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi), an offshoot of the SSP and the “mirror image” of the Sipah-e-Muhammad, burnt the Iranian Cultural Center in Multan, killing seven staff members of the center, including its Director. Under Riaz Basra’s leadership the LJ became one of the most dreaded militant sectarian organizations in Pakistan. Throughout the late 1990s, LJ claimed responsibility for assassinations of Shiite leaders and diplomats. In one of the most terrible incidents in January 1998, 22 people were killed in Mominpura, Lahore while praying. This incident was designed to coincide with the anniversary of the killing of Maulana Jhangvi. In 1999, LJ also carried out an assassination attempt on the then-Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, who was trying actively to fight the group. 45

Afghan Jihad: During Afghan Jihad, local and international patronization of Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith madaris and militant training camps by intelligence agencies of Pakistan, United States and Saudi Arabia strengthened the radical religious impulses in Pakistani state and society. Meanwhile, madaris increasingly radicalized Pakistani youth. Many future leaders of Afghan Taliban also hailed from these madaris, thus amalgamating the various militants with “a common experience of their ideological genesis.”46

It has been argued that there is a direct link between Saudi Arabia and the US proxy war against Iran in Afghanistan and the subsequent increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Indeed, Saudi funding to Afghan fighters “also subsidized militant Sunni organizations in Pakistan” with consent of elements in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). According to Syed Vali Nasr, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and Harkat-ul-Mujahadeen (HuM) which in 1993 merged together to form Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), SSP, and Afghan Taliban “all hail from the same Deobandi madaris and receive training in the military camps” in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province of Pakistan and southern Afghanistan.47 Suroosh Irfani noted that during Afghan Jihad, the distribution of Saudi funds “lopsided” in favour of Afghanistan’s Ahl-e-

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Hadith Sunni parties, for instance, Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami (HIG) over others. Hence, the scourge of Shiite–Sunni sectarianism was “transposed on the Afghan Jihad” in order to “marginalize Iran in a post-Soviet Afghanistan that was to be dominated by forces friendly to their US-Saudi Pakistani benefactors.”48 Shiite and Persianspeaking pro-Iranian factions in Afghanistan, on the other hand, vied for power and position with Saudi and American backed Mujahedeen groups based in Pakistan. Syed Vali Nasr opines that “the rivalry between these groups and competition for control of Afghanistan ineluctably spilled over into Pakistan”, as the SSP and TJP and their respective off shoots started “to do the bidding of their foreign patrons.”49

Reign of the Taliban (1996-2001): Displaced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan Jihad, millions of Afghans took refuge in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), KPK and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan, where most of them were indoctrinated in JUI-run Deobandi madaris. The number of JUI-dominated madaris grew exponentially through these years.50 In 1994, the Taliban emerged from these madaris under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar and gathered support from Pashtun across Afghanistan, as they brought security, law and order to the Afghan districts under their control.51

The JUI boosted its position in FATA, KPK and Pashtun populated districts of Baluchistan through its ‘symbiotic relationship’ with the Taliban. Thousands of Pakistani youth went to Afghanistan to join and support the nascent Taliban movement against anti-Taliban front, United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (also known as Northern Alliance, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani.52 They returned home having received “weapons training and combat experience, ideological indoctrination and a shared experience with other true believers in a grand Jihad.” A large number of SSP, LJ and HuA cadres also went to Afghanistan for training at Al-Qaeda bases and helped Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, initially in their fight against the Northern Alliance.53 Many of the youth developed a militant tendency to purify and “Islamize their own society,” particularly, the extremism and “vibrancy of Islamism” in Pakistan manifested along Pak-Afghan border in FATA, 54 where the presence of the Arabs, especially the Egyptian fugitives Ayman Al-Zawahiri acted to further radicalize

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local tenets of Islam with Salafi ideals. 55 Consequently, the “internal sovereignty” was surrendered to the militants in KPK and FATA. In fact, well before 9/11, many analysts expressed their fear that Pakistan could be ‘Talibanized’, along the lines of neighbouring Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid noted that the “threat of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan has never been greater” and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam’s support for the Afghan Taliban added to such fear.56

Kashmir Jihad: After 1989, the Ahl-e-Hadith militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Deobandi militant groups, such as HuM/HuA gained control of Pakistani militant landscape as these militant groups became the arbiters of Jihad in Kashmir. It is important to note that Pakistan Army Chief, General Aslam Beg permitted Deobandi madaris in District Bahawalpur and District Rahimyar Khan of Punjab province, so that their militants could form “second line of defence” in case of a potential Indian attack from Rajasthan. These policies radicalized unemployed youth in many parts of the country and led them to fight for an ‘Islamic cause’57 particularly in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. Various militant groups were united by their varying commitments to free Kashmir from unlawful occupation of India. They were also ‘anti-American’ and ‘anti-Israeli’, who they regarded as the “two sides of the same coin.” The youth were also indoctrinated to try to enforce Islamic Sharia in Pakistan.58

When General Musharraf seized power in October 1999, militancy and sectarian violence had become a routine matter. In a period of two years from October 1999 to August 2001, 220 people were killed and 2,000 injured in sectarian violence.59 Musharraf faced various armed and trained sectarian groups in a large number of madaris in the country.60 As pointed out by Hasan Abbas:

“Through the active fostering by Zia-ul-Haq, the funding of Saudi Arabia, espoused by the United States, and the venal abandon of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif the seed of religious fanaticism sown more than two decades earlier had come to confront [Musharraf] as fully grown trees perversely balanced by the empty coffers of state.” 61

Musharraf took several steps to stem the radical and the sectarian impulses in the country in order to promote sectarian harmony. On 18 June 2001, General Pervez Musharraf made the decision to promulgate the Pakistan Madaris Education Board Ordinance 2001, under which over 10,000 madaris were to be brought into the public education system through registration,

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curriculum reform and financial audit.62 On 14 August 2001, General Musharraf announced a ban on LJ and SMP. Earlier, in his address to the 25th National Seerat Conference on 5 June 2001 in Islamabad, General Musharraf told the religious leaders that “lslam is vibrant and forward looking. But more than that claim it is the most tolerant of faiths.” 63 He further stated:

“How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other…. Our claim of tolerance is phoney in eyes…. For our internal strife, the outside world is asked to declare us terrorists. Some say we are primitive. Others say we are a failed state. It hurts badly….Religious and sectarian harmony is therefore an inescapable necessity in Pakistan.” 64 Musharraf measures and his strong rhetoric against sectarian violence prior to 11 September 2001, suggested that he was determined to fight this menace to improve Pakistan’s image as a progressive modern state.

B. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CALCULATIONS

At regional and international level, Pakistan stood ‘isolated’ due to its increasingly failing pro- Taliban Afghan policy, its support for insurgency in Kashmir, its nuclear explosions in 1998, acquisition of nuclear and missile technology from North Korea and China, and its military incursion at Kargil in 1999. Hence, prior to 11 September 2001, Pakistan had had “few bastions of support” to stand against the US-led coalition in the ‘War on Terror’.65 i. Failing Afghan Policy

Prior to 9/11, Islamabad increasingly grew frustrated with the Taliban regime due to the adverse impacts of Pakistan’s pro-Taliban Afghan policy on domestic and foreign matters. Pakistan’s support to Taliban had been decisively shaped by Islamabad’s quest for a friendly and peaceful regime in Kabul to counter the demands of Afghanistan for an independent state for Pakistan’s Pashtun ethnic population.66Another major interest of Pakistan was to minimize the influence of its regional rivals (India and also Iran) in Afghanistan. In addition, Islamabad also wanted to keep itself in a position of greater influence in Central Asia as compared to other states. 67

Professor Rasul Bakhsh, a renowned political analyst, argues that “Pakistan’s interests in the Taliban government were pragmatic.” Taliban were powerful to “provide stability in Pashtun areas of Southern and eastern Afghanistan,” which had been plagued with war, lawlessness

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and warlordism. In fact, prior to 9/11, ninety percent of Afghanistan’s territory was under the control of Taliban (the Northern Alliance was posing resistance to Taliban only in the north, around the Panjshir Valley). Moreover, Taliban purged Indian influence from Afghanistan. Taliban ride also provided Pakistan an opportunity to build trade and energy ties with Central Asian Republics (CARs). 68

Political and strategic relations with Taliban, however, had severe limitations which raised political costs on domestic front. The Taliban’s unique ‘connections’ to Pakistani state enabled Taliban to influence some Pakistani policies towards Afghanistan to their advantage. With the growth in Taliban movement, Pakistan was left with little leverage over the Taliban leadership.69 This became evident in early 2001 when Taliban refused to hand over the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi trainees, who were involved in anti-Shiite sectarian violence in Pakistan using Afghan territory as a safe haven. Taliban also refused to recognize the Durand Line.70 In fact, their ascent to power “virtually eliminated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.” As a result, drug trafficking across the Durand Line increased. What’s more, Taliban policies promoted “Pashtun nationalism” of “an Islamic character” that cultivated extremist tendencies among Pashtun living in the tribal belt. 71

On external front, support to Taliban intensified the rivalry with Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs) particularly, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.72 In fact, Pakistan’s assistance to Taliban regime was hindering political and economic cooperation with CARs. In Central Asia, the Taliban regime was perceived “as a major factor of destabilization.” The presence of Afghan Taliban in Tajik Civil War alongside local militants adversely affected Pakistan’s ties with Tajikistan.73 Likewise, Taliban support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) strangled Pakistan’s hopes to establish good ties with Uzbekistan.74

Nevertheless, General Musharraf tried his best to convince the leaders of CARs to recognize the Taliban regime. For instance, during a visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in November 2000, General Musharraf maintained that “direct negotiations” should be held between Taliban and Kazakh and Turkmen government for transit of Kazakh and Turkmen oil through Afghanistan to Pakistan.75 Islamabad, anxious to build a consensus on the political set up in Kabul, also attempted to take regional countries on board. Pakistan’s support to Taliban sparked a discord rather than hope to promote a consensus, because Islamabad was seen by

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Iran and Central Asian Countries as a “dispassionate negotiator” to end Afghan conflict. For that reason, these countries backed anti-Taliban, Northern Alliance with arms and money along with India and Russia.76 Tehran also accused that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and America all financed and backed the Taliban movement.77

The US favoured Taliban as a force of stability in Afghanistan and energy rich Central Asia up until 1998’s terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.78 These attacks alleged to trace back to Osama bin Laden, the Saudi millionaire, and former Mujahedeen commander of Afghan Jihad, who had established Al-Qaeda, a militant organization, and a ‘private base’ near Jalalabad in 1990. He had reportedly provided “the Taliban $3 million to buy the defections which opened the road to Kabul in September 1996.” 79 The attacks of AlQaeda network on the US embassies provided a reason to Clinton administration, to launch retaliatory strikes on bin Laden’s training camps at Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar in 1999. The bombings also caused a strain in the emerging relations between Taliban and America. Against this backdrop, in August 1999, the US Corporation UNOCAL postponed its work on the pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Most importantly, the bombing of Afghanistan was a signal to Pakistani government to change its pro-Taliban Afghan policy.80

Taliban connections with Pakistan also caused major image and prestige problems for Islamabad which further served to isolate Pakistan internationally. Much to Pakistan’s chagrin, Mullah Muhammad Omar rejected Musharraf’s request, not to demolish the preIslamic statues of Buddha in Bamiyan in March 2001. Despite international ire, hardliners among Taliban destroyed Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic heritage.81

As the Taliban regime faced international criticism and sanctions on account of Mullah Omar’s “extreme interpretation” of Islamic Sharia, discriminatory policies toward women and minorities, 82 and Taliban’s refusal of US demands for the closure of terrorist camps and the handover of bin Laden, Islamabad experienced what could be called ‘syndrome of guilt by association.’ Pakistan’s repeated but failed attempts to influence the Taliban regime made Islamabad realize the limits of its pro-Taliban Afghan policy. By 2001, there was huge diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to abandon Taliban and to withdraw diplomatic recognition of Taliban government (Pakistan accorded diplomatic recognition to Taliban regime on 25 May

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1997). 83 The United States, European countries, and even China showed resentment towards Pakistan for its failure to influence Taliban on any issue.84

The diplomatic cost of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was, therefore, very high. But for Pakistan, severing ties with Taliban could mean insecure western borders and destabilized Pashtun belt.85 Nevertheless, Pakistan altered its pro-Taliban policy, after Al-Qaeda operatives from bases in Afghanistan were accused to attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in US on 11 September 2001. ii. Duality in Kashmir Policy Pakistan regards the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) as “a disputed territory” and “it demands the resolution of Kashmir dispute in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations (UN)” which call for a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. Pakistan believes that the accession of the Muslim majority state to Pakistan would be confirmed by reference to the Kashmiri people under the auspices of the UN. But the will of the people was never ascertained as India refused to hold a plebiscite and hence, Kashmir issue remains a bone of contention between the two nuclear armed neighbours, Pakistan and India.86

Prior to 11 September 2001, the international community became alarmed at the prospect that Kashmir dispute could escalate into a wider war between Pakistan and India. These concerns began to develop after the May 1998 nuclear tests of Pakistan and India, but deepened after the Kargil crisis in 1999. General Musharraf too felt that normalization of Pakistan-India relations “would benefit Pakistan,” and to achieve this objective a “softer line” had to be pursued. Musharraf calculated that the support for Kashmir insurgency would become a “live option” in case, if New Delhi failed to reciprocate. An implication of this calculation was that Musharraf’s regime adopted a “managerial approach” to Kashmir dispute.87 Musharraf “managerial approach” aimed to extend political, diplomatic and material support to insurgency in Kashmir in order to secure “a change in the status of Kashmir, or at least drawing attention of the international community to the issue.” At the same time, this approach also served to tie down Indian forces in Kashmir. In line with this approach, Musharraf expressed his broad-minded willingness to enter into negotiations with New Delhi to reduce the threat of war on Kashmir dispute. 88

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Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir insurgency in the 1990s had its roots in a ‘strategic mindset’ that was shaped by three factors:

1. Isolation from United States in the 1990s: The imposition of Pressler amendment sanctions by the US in 1990 torn down all the “constraints” on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy which Islamabad could experience owing to its relations with the US.89

2. The Victory of the Mujahedeen in Anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan: The victory of Afghan Mujahedeen created “a sense of military opportunities” in Pakistan’s political and military elite to alter the status quo in Kashmir by raising the political, economic, and military costs for India of controlling Jammu and Kashmir.90 Another aim was to “drain India of military resources and force it to cut back on conventional war spending” thereby, diminishing the threat of war on the central front.”91 Significantly, neither India nor International community put any real pressure on Islamabad to hold back its support for the insurgency.92 Peter Lavoy noted that “Europe, Japan, and even Russia seemed to share Washington’s concern for the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims” under a brutal Indian occupation and refrained from buying India’s line of Pakistan sponsored ‘cross border terrorism’ in Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s support to Kashmir insurgency also “enjoyed China’s tacit support and Saudi Arabia’s active financial assistance and moral backing.”93

3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability: Pakistani military believed that Islamabad can support Kashmir insurgency because “their incipient nuclear capabilities had effectively neutralized whatever conventional military advantage India possessed.”94 International opinion, however, altered significantly after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests of May 1998, a change that Pakistan’s strategic community failed to “fully appreciate” till Pakistani and Indian forces were fighting on the heights of Kargil, along the northern reaches of the Line of Control (LOC), which demarcates the de facto boundary between Pakistan and Indian administered parts of Kashmir. In spring 1999, Pakistani army in a “brilliant tactical maneuver” blocked the Srinagar-Leh highway, “a key artery in India’s transportation network” in Indian-administered Kashmir.95 Some experts believed that Kargil war reflected a ‘new thinking’ in the strategy of Pakistan military. The military was convinced

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that a “stable nuclear balance between India and Pakistan allowed more offensive actions to take place with impunity in Kashmir.”96

According to Robert Wirsing, Pakistan’s repeated appeals for international support for its position in Kashmir did not led to any progress in the decade of 1990s, in spite of a popular uprising of Kashmiri Muslims against Indian brutal and inhuman occupation. Therefore, Pakistan decided to take a risk that “a major flare up” in insurgency would ‘internationalize’ the Kashmir dispute. Pakistanis expected that “yoked to world nuclear anxieties, internationalization of the issue would work in Pakistan’s favour by pushing recalcitrant India to accept serious negotiations of Kashmir dispute.” This modus operandi of the Kargil operation defines “Pakistan’s objectives as political rather than military.”97

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Figure 2.2: The Disputed State of Jammu & Kashmir and the LoC

India claims all areas of the state of Jammu and Kashmir based on an Instrument of Accession signed in 1947 with a Hindu Maharaja of the State. Pakistan maintains that Instrument of Accession was a “Fraud” and signed under duress. It claims the entire state except for those areas claimed by China (i.e. Shaksam Valley and Aksai Chin). Source: C. Christine Fair, “The counterterror coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004), p. xxii.

Nevertheless, the international community viewed the conflict between the two nuclear neighbours as “unacceptable” and expressed concerns against Pakistan’s “irresponsible” military flare up. International concerns increased when Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed stated on 31 May 2001 that an escalation of the limited conflict could force

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Islamabad to use “any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.”98 This statement was considered by the international community as ‘a nuclear threat’ by Islamabad in case, Kargil conflict expanded to a conventional war with India. The concerns heightened when the US “received intelligence that Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenal for possible deployment.”99 Pakistan, however, denied that its nuclear arsenal and delivery system “had not been assembled” during the Kargil conflict.100 Nonetheless, fears of a nuclear war in the region due to Kashmir issue prompted Washington to put immense pressure on Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, to withdraw from Kargil, which he did unconditionally. The United States depicted Pakistan as the “instigator” and insisted that “the status quo ante be unconditionally and unambiguously restored.” The Kargil conflict uncovered the constraints of Islamabad’s strategy of low intensity conflict in Indianadministered Kashmir in “a nuclear environment” and compelled Islamabad to resort to dialogue to resolve Kashmir dispute. Even General Musharraf, known as the “architect of the Kargil” conflict, realized that “war scares were neither good for Pakistan’s image as a nuclear weapon state nor for its economic development and progress.” 101 Most importantly, in order to reposition Pakistan amongst the responsible states of the world, political option to pursue the strategic objectives was considered crucial.102 General Musharraf understood the need for a political process that could lead to normalization of ties between Pakistan and India. In fact, that process had commenced in February 1999, when Indian Premier, Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Pakistan by famous ‘bus ride’ and signed Lahore Declaration. But the promises and hopes to bring peace and stability in the region vanished after the Kargil crisis.103

While Musharraf had realized the value of reducing the level of tension with India, his “Islamist cohorts” (General Aziz, General Usmani and General Mahmood) opposed any compromise on Kashmir dispute. The difference of opinion resulted in duality in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy which became evident during the course of the Agra Summit in July 2001. “Musharraf consistently talked of a ‘flexible approach’ to all issues,” including Kashmir dispute.104 But he also insisted that “Kashmir was the core issue to the Pakistan-India dispute and until it is resolved, talks on other issues such as economic cooperation and Confidence Building Measures (CBM) were pointless.” 105

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This duality in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy failed to produce the desired results at Agra Summit. India was equally responsible for the failure of the peace talks. It refused to accept the centrality of Kashmir dispute and the agreed draft of the communiqué was later amended “to include a mention of ‘cross border terrorism’” which General Musharraf was unlikely to “concede.” The failure of the talks proved the hardliners’ stance that India never wants to resolve the dispute through negotiations and political means.106 Syed Slahauddin, Hizbul Mujahideen leader, declared that “the breakdown of the talk would result in more Mujahedeen attacks in Kashmir as they had no other alternative but to fight.” Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) appreciated the stand taken by President Musharraf at the summit. JI leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmed stated: “The President and his delegation rightly said there cannot be any thaw in bilateral relations between the two countries unless India considered Kashmir as a disputed territory.”107 Though Pakistan’s strategy kept Indian troops “tied down” in “counterinsurgency operations” in Kashmir, yet, there was “no visible strategy” for the resolution of Kashmir dispute prior to 9/11. 108 iii. Safety and security of Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Assets The safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets were crucial elements of Musharraf’s regime policy. Prior to 11 September 2001, General Musharraf was committed to reform “Pakistan’s nuclear sector and command system as a strategic deterrent to India.”109 In February 2000, Musharraf set up the National Command Authority (NCA) to create and consolidate “command and control mechanisms” for the country’s nuclear arsenal and missile systems. 110 The move aimed “to send a positive signal” to Washington that Islamabad was “strengthening its control on export of fissile materials and technology” through the NCA, despite Pakistan’s non-adherence to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).111

Since the beginning of Pakistan’s active nuclear programme, Americans were worried about non-proliferation. In mid-1978 till November 1979, President Jimmy Carter Administration made various efforts “to roll back Pakistan’s secret nuclear programme.” Nevertheless, US diplomatic and political pressure met with strong resistance from Pakistani policy makers; who considered nuclear programme “as a matter of national survival and an “unfettered right.”112 In October 1990, the US cut its aid to Pakistan in response to Pakistan’s determined efforts to develop nuclear weapons programme. In 1993, Washington once again demanded that Islamabad should “roll back” its nuclear programme. Pakistan’s refusal in this regard, “evoked

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the specter of Pakistan being put on the list of those countries whom Washington accused of sponsoring terrorism.” 113 While such initiatives were a response to Pakistan’s suspected nuclear cooperation with North Korea,114 these were also meant to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology by Islamabad to other Muslim countries like Iran and Libya. US concerns were accentuated in May 1998, after Pakistan’s tit-for-tat response to India’s nuclear tests, against the repeated appeals for “restraint” by Washington. 115 Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear technology coupled with Pakistan’s “irresponsible” role in Kargil conflict and its support to Taliban regime made the situation even worse. By the end of 2000, United States sought to “restrict Pakistan’s nuclear capability” to “a minimum deterrence posture” and dampen Islamabad’s security competition with New Delhi.116 In this regard, President Clinton during ‘his five-hour stopover’ in Pakistan, insisted that Pakistan should sign CTBT, cut off in fissile material production, curb export of technologies to other countries and also restraint in the development and deployment of new missile systems. General Musharraf gave Clinton a very firm assurance that “Pakistan would not be the source of the export of any dangerous technologies or weapons of mass destruction.”117

George Bush Republican Administration also insisted that Pakistan should sign CTBT. Bush administration, however, declined to insist India’s adherence to CTBT and argued that more intensive cooperation with India would lead to a resolution of nuclear differences.118 In other words, United States “conceded India as a de jure nuclear power” while Pakistan was considered a ‘nuclear offender.’ Washington’s unwillingness to accept Pakistan as a nuclear state imparted credence to Pakistani fears that the US wanted to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear programme. General Musharraf expressed such fears in a statement in June 2001 that Pakistan’s “minimum nuclear deterrence can and will never be compromised.”119 These fears led General Musharraf to join the US-led ‘War on Terror’ as he argued that refusal to support America in its hunt for Al-Qaeda might deprive Pakistan of its nuclear assets. Musharraf’s decision to shift the sites of “critical nuclear weapons components” only after two days of 11 September 2001 too indicated that he feared possible pre-emptive strikes against country’s nuclear facilities. 120 Hence, the safety and security of nuclear and missile assets led General Musharraf to join the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

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MUSHARRAF’S REGIME RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Following the events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan came under enormous pressure to change its pro-Taliban Afghan policy in accordance with “global dispensation.” 121 The attacks on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon building in Washington were alleged to be planned and carried out by Al-Qaeda operatives from their bases in Afghanistan.122 In Bush administration’s view, the Taliban regime, which provided support and bases to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network in carrying out attacks against America, had to be removed. Addressing the American nation after the tragedy, President Bush bluntly stated that, “We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbour them.” The Taliban regime asked for the US to provide a “concrete evidence” of bin Laden’s links to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration, however, refused to do so, and decided to launch the ‘War on Terror’ to ouster Taliban regime and to dismantle Al-Qaeda network.123

The US national security officials focused immediately on securing Pakistani co-operation as they planned the attack on Afghanistan. In fact, Washington realized that “Afghanistan cannot be approached politically or militarily” without engaging Islamabad. Pakistan borders Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean and US policy makers believed that US forces could easily operate from bases in Pakistan and the Arabian Sea to sustain US air campaign against Taliban regime.124 From the US point of view, engaging Pakistan would also help gather intelligence to track down Al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban fighters and to provide logistical support in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.125

On the morning of 12 September, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage held a meeting with Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, Director General of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), who was on an official visit to United States. Armitage stated that the US was building a coalition in response to 9/11 attacks and “clearly there was a worldwide momentum right now to stand up and be counted. Are you with us or not?” Richard Armitage admitted that General Mahmood “was immediately willing to cooperate.” 126 Armitage met again with General Mahmood on the same day and told him that he would soon be given specific “non-negotiable,” US demands to which General Mahmood reiterated that “Pakistan

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would cooperate with the US.” 127 On 13 September, Wendy Chamberlain, the then US Ambassador to Pakistan, met with General Pervez Musharraf and presented the specific list of US demands.128 General Musharraf calculated that if Pakistan refused to extend cooperation to United States, Islamabad would be “further isolated” by the US-led coalition; more worrisome, Pakistan itself could become the target of the coalition due to its support to the Taliban regime.129 Meanwhile, United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1368 which approved the “use of force” against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. This put additional pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with US-led coalition.130

On reaction to pressure from the United States following the events of 11 September 2001, General Musharraf alleged in his memoir, In the Line of Fire, that soon after 9/11, Richard Armitage had “threatened” General Ahmed, to “bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age”, if Pakistan refused to cooperate with the US. General Musharraf stated that he “war-gamed the United States as an adversary.” He questioned: “If we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not.”131

Pakistan was confronting with grave economic crisis and had to receive international economic assistance to boost its economy, and the West would perhaps “crash” Pakistan’s economy in case Islamabad refused to cooperate. Moreover, if Islamabad did not accede to US demands, Pakistan could be labeled a ‘terrorist state.’ Above all, the US-India relationship, “forged by the Clinton administration and extended by the Bush presidency, gave the United States new leverage over Pakistan,” in case Pakistan did not comply.132 Certainly, the emergent US-India nexus contributed to General Pervez Musharraf’s hasty response to US demands. In Musharraf’s view, an alliance with the US could “reverse the upward trend” in US-India partnership and benefit Pakistan economically as well as politically. Talking to a selected group of retired generals, seasoned diplomats, and politicians on 18 September 2001, Musharraf maintained that the decision to extend “unstinting support” to Washington was taken under tremendous pressure and in the face of a potential threat of direct military action by the US-led coalition which also included India, and Israel.133

Earlier on 16 September 2001, Pakistan gave ‘a three day deadline’ to Taliban regime either to handover bin Laden to Washington or face US-led coalition military action. Taliban regime, however, insisted that Osama bin Laden would be transferred to a third country only if

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“concrete evidence” about his links to the terrorists was produced. Till then, Taliban permitted bin Laden to stay in their country “as guest.” The Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar also showed his willingness to hold talks with America over Osama bin Laden. But Bush administration refused to talk with the Taliban and decided to ouster the Taliban regime through military action. 134

Pakistan eventually decided to join the US-led coalition and assigned an air corridor to US planes.135 On 19 September 2001, Musharraf in a televised address explained to his nation that his decision to support the US was based on key Pakistani interests. General Musharraf agreed to support the US-led ‘War on Terror’, provided certain conditions are met:

1. Pakistan military will engage only in military actions inside Pakistan’s territory; 2. The US-led coalition should try to “minimize collateral damage” in Afghanistan; 3. Post-Taliban government in Afghanistan should not be hostile to Pakistan; 4. Washington would support Pakistan’s Kashmir cause; 5. The US should not seize Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets.

Hence, General Musharraf made public that Pakistan, as a ‘frontline state’ in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ was expecting that Washington would be willing to take into consideration Pakistan’s interests, including the economic assistance, the diplomatic backing on Kashmir dispute, a new friendly government in Afghanistan and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.136

On 24 September 2001, Pakistan’s cooperation in US-led coalition military campaign in Afghanistan “took solid shape” when “a broad set of agreements” was reached between Islamabad and the US Departments of State and Departments of Defense. Islamabad provided ‘unstinting support,’ to the US-led coalition which included: blanket flyover and landing rights, access to air and naval bases, and critical Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants support.” Pakistan also provided logistical support and access to its ports of Pasni and Karachi to deliver supplies to the US-led coalition forces operating in neighbouring Afghanistan. 137 All this assistance was provided “without any of the formal agreements or user fees that are normally required for such privileges.”138

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On diplomatic front, American and Pakistani policy makers agreed to set up “a broad-based, representative government in Kabul” and declared Kabul a “demilitarized city.” 139 In fact, Pakistan and United States vowed to set up a coalition government which included a “moderate faction of the Taliban, to break away from the mainstream [Taliban] movement and to become part” of the post-Taliban political process.140 Northern Alliance however, completely opposed that idea.141 Most importantly, Pakistan’s suggestion to include ‘moderate Taliban’ in the government also met opposition from India and Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries including Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran.142

In early October 2001, Colin Powell, the then Secretary of State, opposed the plan that Northern Alliance should seize Kabul in order to avoid a strategic “setback” for Pakistan.143 It was also reported that the ISI, the US and the British intelligence agencies saw Jalaluddin Haqqani as the likely leader of ‘moderate Taliban’ and offered him a leading role in the future Afghan government. Jalaluddin Haqqani also visited Islamabad “as part of search for a broad based government.” But the initiative did not succeed, possibly because of the lack of coordination between different US authorities. After the talks failed in October 2001, Jalaluddin avowed that he would wage “guerilla war” against the expected US-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan.144

On another plan, ISI also sought help from Mullah Zaeef, the Taliban leader and the then Ambassador of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Pakistan, in splitting the ‘hardliners’ from ‘moderate Taliban’ and leading ‘moderate Taliban’ against Mullah Muhammad Omar. But he rejected such divisions and declined to become part of that plan.145 Hence, there was no split between the ‘hardliners’ and the ‘moderates’ which clearly demonstrated the “cohesion of the Taliban movement.” 146

Nevertheless, in a bid to destabilize the Taliban regime, General Musharraf removed General Mehmood, the head of the ISI and “the most vociferous supporters of the Taliban”147 To ensure that his change in policy toward Afghanistan would be implemented, Musharraf appointed Lieutenant General, Ehsan-ul-Haq, a moderate officer, as the new Director General of ISI. General Ehsan signaled a major policy change by closure of two major units of ISI that had close links to militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir. He also purged the “Taliban cell” established in the ISI by General Mehmood. Despite these significant changes, ISI links with

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Afghan Taliban were never completely cut off. Nonetheless, the ISI’s support “tilt the balance” in US-led coalition favour during OEF in Afghanistan. The removal of the ISI’s support to Taliban resulted in the swift fall of the Taliban regime on 13 November 2001. But contrary to what had been decided between Islamabad and Washington, anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, egged on CIA, took control of Kabul on 13 November. For Pakistan this was a huge strategic setback because of Northern Alliance’s pro-India and pro-Iran posture.148

In December 2001, at Bonn Conference, the warring Afghan factions agreed to a new interim set up in Afghanistan headed by a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, who became a Transitional Administrator following ‘an Emergency Loya Jirga’ (Grand Assembly) in June 2002.149 The set up to some extent, curtailed the role of Northern Alliance, but the Alliance remained the most powerful section of the government, controlling the ministries of defence, interior and foreign affairs.150

In response to Pakistan’s “indispensable help” in the ‘War on Terror’, Bush administration quickly waived nuclear-related as well as most military coup-related sanctions on Pakistan. By November 2001, an emergency aid package of more than $1 billion focused on the areas of economic stability and support for US operations in Afghanistan was announced for Pakistan.151 In December 2001, the Paris Club of International Creditors restructured Pakistan’s $13.5 billion bilateral debt in order to help the country’s economy. Later on, IMF agreed to a $1.3 billion new loan to Pakistan. The US, being the biggest shareholder in the IMF, supported Pakistan; previously such loans were not provided to Pakistan due to three layered of US economic sanctions against it.152 The total US aid figure (not including food aid) to Pakistan in Fiscal Year 2001 was only $3.5 million for its counter-narcotics efforts but Pakistan received more than $l billion of US economic and military assistance in Fiscal Year 2002.153 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which had remained close for many years in Islamabad, also reopened in early 2002 to work in the areas of education, health and job creation.154 These early efforts by America to re-engage also included rescheduling Pakistan’s debt of about $400 million and alleviating Pakistan’s $38 billion foreign debt. United States also provided $600 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to

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Islamabad and Pakistan became “the biggest beneficiary of economic aid in return for its support of the OEF in Afghanistan.”155

CONCLUSION

Pakistan’s decision to join the US-led ‘War on Terror’ was the product of internal, regional, and international calculations of the country’s security milieu. Pakistan’s situation before September 2001 was very dismal. The military regime had overthrown an elected civilian government. The economy was fragile under crippling effects of public sector debt, lack of investments and international economic sanctions.156 Pakistan was said by responsible observers to be “drifting toward religious extremism” due to growing sectarian cleavages and the resultant sectarian violence in the country.157

On regional front, support to Taliban regime and Kashmir insurgency put Pakistan on a slippery slope toward international isolation. 158 In this context, Musharraf made clear to his nation that cooperation with Washington would provide Pakistan with “breathing space” to secure its national interests, which included, as Musharraf pointed out, developing and safeguarding its nuclear weapons capability, defending the Kashmir cause, building its economy and protecting its territorial integrity. Musharraf also expressed the hope that Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’ would enable Islamabad to put in place a friendly and ethnically broad based government in Kabul.159 Much to Pakistan’s chagrin, anti-Taliban Northern Alliance seized power in Kabul with US backing and there was “a visible estrangement” in Islamabad’s relations with the new regime in Kabul, headed by Hamid Karzai. 160

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s ostensible cooperation in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ brought it some immediate economic and diplomatic gains in the form of US waiver to economic sanctions, debt relief, and perseverance of its territorial integrity. Pakistan was also successful in altering its earlier “internationally isolated,” image. Engagement with the US also enabled Islamabad to improve its economically weak and vulnerable image, though in the short run.161 However, in the long run the engagement was proved more of a liability than an asset. These details have been discussed in the next chapter. The chapter will outline the US and Pakistan’s objectives

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in the ‘War on Terror’ and will examine the problems and prospects which are linked with the ‘War on Terror’ and US-Pakistan relations.

END NOTES

1 “Text: Musharraf Rallies Pakistan,” BBC News, 19 September 2001. 2 Ibid. 3 Liam Collins, “United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11,” (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, May 2008), pp. 5-6. 4 “Text: Musharraf Rallies Pakistan,” Op Cit.

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5 See for details “Pakistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” World Bank Report No. 23189-PAK (Washington: World Bank, November 2001), p. 2. 6 Quoted in Sohail Mahmood, The Musharraf Regime and the Governance Crisis: A Case Study of the Government of Pakistan (New York: Nova Science, 2001), p. 62. 7 Ishrat Husain, “The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy,” Journal of International Affairs (New York: Columbia University), Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009), p. 6. 8 Glenn sanctions included a ban on military assistance, financial assistance except for humanitarian purposes, a ban on public sector trade finance, restrictions on US exports of high-technology products, opposition to loans from international financial institutions, and a ban on US bank loans to Pakistan. Pressler Amendment banned most economic assistance and military equipment to Pakistan unless the US President certified annually that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and that the proposed US assistance programme will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear weapon. See Jita Mishra, The NPT and the Developing Countries (New Delhi: Concept, 2008), p.101. 9 Bashir Ahmad and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan: Economic Challenges for New Millennium,” in Craig Baxter (ed.), Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 148. 10 “IMF Clears $75 m Loan to Pakistan,” The Indian Express, 16 January 1999. 11 Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy toward South Asia and Its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April-June 2003), p. 146. 12 Aftab Ahmad, “What Pushed up Our Per Capita Income,” Dawn, 26 July 2004; Ishrat Husain, “Pakistan’s Economy 1999/2000-2007/2008: An Objective Appraisal,” Business Review (Karachi), Vol. 4, No. 1(January-June 2009), p. 12; Sohail Mahmood, Op Cit., p. 60; See “Pakistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” Op Cit., pp. 2-6. 13 Pakistan’s Fiscal Year starts on 1 July of each year and concludes on 30 June of the next calendar year. 14 This included smuggling ($3-5 billon), tax evasion ($2 billon), corruption in state institution ($2.5-5 billon), unpaid electricity bills ($2 billon in 1999), and bank debts ($4 billon in 1999). Christophe Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and Its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2004), p. 179. 15 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 250. 16 “Annual Report 2000-2001,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2001), p. 112; See also “Annual Report 2001-2002,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2002), p. 118. 17 According to a Japanese study, “Pakistan’s high economic growth during 1980s was a house of cards built precariously upon external assistance and workers’ remittances.” Quoted in Sreedhar, “Pakistan’s Economic Dilemma,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (June 1998), p. 452. 18 “Annual Report 2000-2001,” Op Cit. 19 Ishrat Husain, “Pakistan’s Economy 1999/2000-2007/2008,” Op Cit., p. 2. 20 Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 23; Quoted in Shabana Fayyaz, “A Break from the Past: Trends in Pakistan’s Security Policy After 9/11,” (Islamabad: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, August 2005), p. 11. 21 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp-183-184; See also Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2004), pp. 35-36. 22 Sohail Mahmood, Op Cit., p. 60. 23 “Annual Report 2001-2002,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2001), p. 2; See “Annual Report 20002001,” (Islamabad: State Bank of Pakistan, 2001), p. 2. 24 Stephen Cohen, Op Cit., p. 253. 25 “Economic Indicators of Pakistan,” Economic Research Wing, National Bank of Pakistan, February 2005, pp. 1-2; Available at: http://www.nbp.com.pk/EconomicBulletin/Economic-Indicators-Pakistan- February2005.pdf (accessed 5 December 2009).

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26 See “Pakistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” World Bank Report No. 23189-PAK (Washington: World Bank, November 2001), p. 8. 27 Ibid., p. 117. Per capita debt surpassed per capita GDP in FY99 and the gap continued to rise. In FY01, per capita debt was Rs. 28,784 as compared to per capita GDP of Rs. 24,965 only. 28 Sohail Mahmood, Op Cit., p. 60. 29 Stephen Cohen, Op Cit., p. 248. 30 See “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sectkilling.htm (accessed 14 February 2010). 31 Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan’s sectarian violence: between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture,” in Satu P. Limaye and Robert Wirsing et al (ed.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 160-165. See also Khaled Ahmed,” Islamic Extremism in Pakistan,” South Asian Journal (Lahore), Issue 2 (October/December, 2003). 32 General Zia visualized a social order in which all sectors of life including administration, judiciary, banking, trade, education, agriculture, industry and foreign affairs were regulated in accordance with Islamic principles. But he endorsed Deobandi interpretation of Islamic Sharia to some sectors. Thus, began a radicalization of Pakistan in religious terms which was referred to as Islamization.” See Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison,” Conflict and Peace Studies (Islamabad), Vol. 2, No. 3 (July-September 2009), p. 1. 33 Traditional Deobandi teachings are “forward-looking” and committed to harmonizing “the classical Sharia texts with current realities.” These teachings are in accordance with the Hanafi School of Islamic law, which is considered the “most liberal of the four schools— Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali” and “promote beliefs perceived as representing ‘pure’ Islam and actions intended to restore it to its pristine nature—that which supposedly existed during the ‘Golden Age’ of Islam (610-850 A.D.).” Quoted in Charles P. Blair, “Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo-Taliban,” (Washington: Federation of American Scientists, June 2011), p. 71. 34 Moonis Ahmar, “Sectrarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” Pakistan Vision (Lahore: Punjab University), Vol. 9, No.1 (2008), p. 6. 35 For details see Hassan Abbas, “Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence,” (New York: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2010), p. 32. 36 Moonis Ahmar, Op Cit., p. 7; See also Amir Mir, “Blood Flows Freely in Pakistan,” Asia Times, 5 October 2011. The SSP’s ideal goal is the revival of Khilafat-e-Rashida, in Pakistan, the rightly guided Caliphate that succeeded Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) and lasted for 31 years. See Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding out the Heretics: Sectarianism in Pakistan,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 4 (Washington: Hudson Institute, November 2006), p. 9. 37 The Barelvis justify the “mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the saints” on behalf of Allah. These beliefs were condemned by the Deobandi and the Ahl-i-Hadith scholars, who strongly oppose practices such as veneration of saints and their shrines, the anniversaries of saints,’ and the distribution of food on religious occasions, and popular mysticism. See Tariq Rahman, “The Madrassa and the State of Pakistan,” HIMAL Southasian (February 2004); Available at: http://www.himalmag.com/2004/february/essay.htm (accessed 2 May 2009). 38 Ahle-Hadith (also known as Wahabis in Indian subcontinent—follow the Islamic interpretation of Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703– 1792) of Najd, Saudi Arabia. This school of thought is ‘predominant in Saudi Arabia.’ The moving spirit behind the Ahle-Hadith movement and the subsequent Wahabi-Deobandi nexus in Pakistan and Afghanistan was Syed Ahmed Barelvi [died 1831]. See Dr. Eamon Murphy & Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, “Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Summer 2009), p. 22; See also Suroosh Irfani, Op Cit., p. 152. 39 Riaz Ahmed Shaikh, “Developing Extremist-Madrasah Education in Pakistan” in D.M. Nault (ed.), Developing Asia: Interdisciplinary, Post-Neoliberal, and Transnational Perspectives (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2008), p. 184. 40 Mir Zohair Husain, “The Politics of Islam in Pakistan,” in Santosh C. Saha and Thomas K. Carr (ed.), Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 25. 41 Dr. Eamon Murphy & Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, Op Cit., p. 25.

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42 Frédéric Grare, “Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy,” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 26. 43 Riaz Ahmed Shaikh, Op Cit., p. 184. 44 Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the ‘Arabist Shift’ and the Indo-Persian Culture,” in Satu Limaye et al. (ed.), Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 159. 45 Frédéric Grare, Op Cit., p. 27; See also Syed Nooruzzaman, “Terrorist Basra: Is He Dead or Alive?” Tribune (Chandigarh), 19 May 2002. Basra was killed in May 2001. 46 Charles P. Blair, Op Cit., p. 72. 47 S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), p. 92. See also Khaled Ahmed, Op Cit. 48 Suroosh Irfani, Op Cit., p. 161 49 S.V.R. Nasr, Op Cit., pp. 93-95. 50 Pakistan had 2,861 madaris in 1988. Between 1988 and 2000, growth of madaris increased by 136 percent: Deobandi madaris (64 percent) and Barelvi madaris (25 percent). Only 6 percent new Ahle Hadith madaris were set up. Quoted in Khaled Ahmed,” Op Cit. 51 Richard P. Cronin, “Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Modern State,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2002), p. 12. 52 Northern Alliance included ethnic Tajik Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society ) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Shura-e-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of the North) led by Ahmad Shah Massoud; ethnic Uzbek Junbish-e- Milli-e- Islami (National Islamic Movement) led by Abdul Rashid Dostum; Shiite Tajik and Hazara- dominated Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement) led by Sayed Hussain Anwari; Shiite and Hazaradominated Hezb-e Wahdat Afghanistan (The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Mohaqiq and Karim Khalili and ethnic Pashtun dominated Eastern Shura led by Abdul Qadir. It brought down Najibullah’s government days before the scheduled transfer of power to a US-selected team of Neutral Afghans in 1992. Pakistan believed that Iran had played a major role in creation of Northern Alliance, which had tremendously increased Iranian influence in Afghanistan. See Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan,” in William Maley (ed.) Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan Under the Taliban (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998), pp. 122-123. 53 “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” Asia Report No. 164 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 13 March 2009), p. 7; See also S.V. R. Nasr, Op Cit., pp. 93-95. 54 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of Taliban (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 161. 55 Khaled Ahmed,” Op Cit. Salafis condemns venerating the graves of Islamic prophets and saints. Salafis have come to be associated with the jihad of Al-Qaeda and related groups that advocate the killing of civilians for their political agenda. However, a majority of Salafi scholars oppose the killing of civilians. See Jonathan Brown, “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt,” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2011), p. 3. 56 Ahmad Rashid, “Pakistan and the Taliban,” in W. Maley (ed.), Op Cit., pp 72–89; Also see William Maley, “The ‘War against Terrorism’ in South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 207. 57 Quoted in M. Maqbool Khan Wazir, “Geopolitics of FATA after 9/11,” IPRI Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2011), p. 62. 58 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's ‘War on Terror’ (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 202. 59 Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Straus and Giroux), p. 23. 60 Amir Mir, “Pakistan: Sectarian Monster,” Asia Times, 8 June 2005. 61 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, Op Cit., p. 20. 62 Amir Mir, Op Cit. 63 Quoted in Syed Rifaat Hussain, Op Cit., p. 39. 64 Ibid. 65 C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2004), p. 55.

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66 This new state was to be carved geographically from Pakistan’s northwest including FATA, the KPK Province and Pashtun populated areas of Baluchistan Province and to be known as ‘Pashtunistan.’ See Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan Harder, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and their Consequences,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2008), p. 26. 67 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “In the Shadow of the Past: Pakistan’s Afghan policy,” in Craig Baxter (ed.), Op Cit., p. 45. 68 Warlord operated within the hauzas (the military zones set up by communist regimes in the 1980s in Afghanistan) and exercised a combination of military, political and economical power outside Afghan constitutional framework. The Taliban successfully subordinated these warlords.” For details see Deepa Ollapally, “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony,” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, April 2003), p. 9. 69 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 185-187. 70 The Durand Line was established in 1893 through a treaty between Afghan King Amir Abdur Rahman and British Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand to separate Afghanistan from British India.. In 1947, Durand Line became the international border between Afghanistan and newly created Pakistan. While the Durand Line is internationally accepted border, No Afghan government has ever accepted it. Successive Afghan governments lay claims to the Pashtun majority areas of Pakistan. See Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (London: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 34-65. 71 Ahmed Rashid, Op Cit., p.187. 72 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Op Cit., p. 45. 73 Gillis Dorronsoro, “Pakistan and the Taliban: State Policy, Religious Networks and Political Connections,” in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 172-173. 74 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 142. 75 Rizwan Hussain, Op Cit., p. 223. 76 P. Stobdan, “The Afghan Conflict and Regional Security,” Journal of the Institute for Defence & Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi), Vol. XXIII, No. 5 (August 1999), pp. 719-747. 77 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Op Cit., p. 44. 78 The US saw a strategic interest in the Taliban, as they promised to work towards; (i) disarming of warlords, (ii) driving out Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan; (iii) combating religious radicalism, (iv) removing unexploded landmines, (v) stopping drug-trafficking, (vi) creating a stable government in Afghanistan. US also considered Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti- Shiite and pro-Western. See P. Stobdan, Op Cit., pp. 719-747. 79 In February 1998, bin Laden issued a manifesto for what he called ‘The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,’ in which he blamed the US “of turning Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and Sudan into “paper statelets” in order to “guarantee Israel’s survival.” The manifesto went on to declare that: “to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military- is an Individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change” Strategic Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Islamabad: Winter 2002), pp. 43-75. 80 Rizwan Hussain, Op Cit., p. 218; P. Stobdan, Op Cit., pp. 719-747; Gillis Dorronsoro, Op Cit., p. 174. 81 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 42-43. 82 Taliban shut down girls’ schools and forbid women to work outside of their homes. They banned most forms of entertainment, including television, music, chess-playing and kite-flying. For details see Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban and the Great Game in Afghanistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), pp. 118-121. 83 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change,” Op Cit., pp. 43-75. 84 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Op Cit., p. 45. 85 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 50.

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86 Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?” Contemporary South Asia, Vol.12, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 190. 87 Ibid., p. 195. 88 Ashley J. Tellis, “The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia,” in Zalmay Khalilzad and Davis Orletsky et al. (ed.), The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Moncia, California: RAND, 2001), p. 223; Samina Yasmeen, Op Cit., p. 190.

89 Matthew P. Taylor, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy and Strategy since 1947,” (PhD Dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School California, March 2004), pp. 68-69. 90 Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy after the Bush Visit to South Asia,” Strategic Insights, Vol. V, Issue 4 (April 2006), p. 3. 91 Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian C. Gustafson (ed.), Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere (Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 127-128. 92 ISI backed several militant groups: the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Al-Badr Mujahedeen, and the Harkat-ul Mujahedeen (previously known as Harkat ul Ansar), the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and 313 Brigade headed by Ilyas Kashmiri in order to force India back to the negotiating table, where Pakistan could negotiate a more favourable outcome. See Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2001), p. 42. See also Bruce O. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad (Washington: Brookings, 2011), pp. 39-40. 93 Peter R. Lavoy, Op Cit., p. 3. 94 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 92. 95 Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass & Co, 2003), p. 48. 96 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Instability in South Asia,” in Robert J. Art, Kenneth Waltz (ed.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 374. 97 Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (New York: M. E. Sharp, 2003), p. 79. 98 “Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, 31 May 1999. 99 Bruce Reidel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India (University of Pennsylvania), 2002, p. 3. 100 “Nuclear Delivery System was not Operational during Kargil War: FO,” Daily Times, 30 October 2007. 101 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Pakistan’s Changing Outlook on Kashmir,” South Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2 (December 2007), pp. 199-200. 102 See Mohammad Waseem, Op Cit. Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stressed the need for a “political process that [could] generate hopes that the freedom struggle can be waged by political means.” Hannah Bloch, “Conversations: Our Differences have to be Resolved Peacefully,” The Time, 25 January 2001. 103 Peter R. Lavoy, Op Cit., p. 4. 104 Samina Yasmeen, Op Cit., pp. 195-197. 105 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir In Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 233-234. 106 Ibid., p. 234. 107 Ibid. See also K.J.M. Varma, “Violence will Escalate, Warns Hizbul,” Outlook India, 16 July 2001. 108 Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect, Op Cit., p. 47. 109 “Musharraf Strengthens Grip on Nukes, Power ,” STRATFOR, 7 December 2000. 110 NCA formulates policy and “exercises employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations” including Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), National Development Complex (NDC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). See “National Command Authority Established,” Associated Press of Pakistan, 3 February 2000. 111 Zhang Guihong, Op Cit., p. 152; See also “Musharraf Strengthens Grip on Nukes, Power,” Op Cit. 112 See “The United States and Pakistan’s Quest for the Bomb,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 333, The George Washington University, Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/ (accessed 20 June 2011).

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113 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” Op Cit., p. 37. 114 Joseph S. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23. 115 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” Op Cit., p. 37. 116 Feroz Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myths and Reality,” Arms Control Today, 8 July 2009; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/khan#41 (accessed 21 June 2011). 117 The White House, “Background Press Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on the President’s Meetings in Pakistan,” 25 March 2000. 118 C. Raja Mohan, “India, US and Non-proliferation,” The Hindu, 25 September 2003. 119 Faraz Hashmi, “Nuclear Deterrence Vital to Security,” Dawn, 30 June 2001. 120 Naeem Ahmed, “State, Society and Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan after September 11,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Karachi, 2007), p. 82. 121 Syed Farooq Hasnat and Tahmina Rashid, “Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2004), pp. 93-106. 122 Steven R. Weisman, “President Bush and the Middle East Axis of Ambiguity,” New York Times, 13 April 2002. 123 “Pak Assures US of ‘Unstinted Cooperation’ in Fighting Terrorism,” Rediff, 13 September 2002. Available at: http://in.rediff.com/us/2001/sep/13ny5.htm (accessed 6 May 2009). 124 Tim Reid, “We’ll bomb you to Stone Age, US told Pakistan,” The Times, 22 September 2006; Rizwan Zeb, “US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan,” Margalla Papers (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004), p. 75. 125 John Murphy, “Pakistan Offers ‘Unstinted’ Aid in Hunt for Terrorists,” Baltimore Sun, 14 September 2001. 126 Liam Collins, Op Cit., pp. 5-6. 127 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s ‘War on Terror’, Op Cit., p. 220. These demands included the following: i) US and Coalition flights over Pakistani airspace and provide landing rights for all US aircraft; ii) Give the US access to naval bases, airports, and borders; iii) Provide immediate intelligence sharing and cooperation; iv) Stop Al-Qaeda operatives on the Pak-Afghan border and intercept all arms shipments through Pakistan while ending all logistical support for bin Laden; v) Cut all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from joining the Taliban; vi) Publicly condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends or allies; and vii) End support for the Taliban, breaking diplomatic relations with them. See Bob Woodward, Bush At War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 58-59. 128 Liam Collins, Op Cit., p. 6. 129 Zhang Guihong, Op Cit., p. 156. 130 Liam Collins, Op Cit., p. 5. 131 Pervez Musharraf, Op Cit., p. 201. 132 US threatened to “unleash India against Pakistan,” by allowing New Delhi to capture Pakistan-administered Kashmir or even “to invade all of Pakistan, possibly with American assistance.” See Eric S. Margolis, “Pervez Musharraf had Little Choice,” Daily Times, 2 October 2006. 133 Hassan Abbas, Op Cit., p. 222. 134 Peter Wilson Prabhakar, Wars, Proxy-wars and Terrorism: Post Independent India (New Delhi: Mittal, 2003), p. 166; See also Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 119. Former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, Niaz Naik revealed that the US “was planning military action against bin Laden and the Taliban even before 9/11 attacks.” Naik also stated: “It was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately” by the Taliban after 9/11. See George Arney, “US ‘Planned Attack on Taleban’,” BBC News, 18 September 2001. 135 Zahid Hussain, Op Cit., p.37. 136 Liam Collins, Op Cit., p. 6. 137 C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” Op Cit., p. 14. 138 Liam Collins, Op Cit., p. 6. 139 Zahid Hussain, Op Cit., p. 46. 140 Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 66.

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141 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2005), p. 323. 142 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealised (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), p. 132. 143 Ibid. 144 Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 66. 145 Abdul Salam Zaeef, Op Cit., p. 153. 146 Antonio Giustozzi, Op Cit., p. 328. 147 Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 24. 148 Zahid Hussain, Op Cit., pp. 46-47; See also Rodney W. Jones, “America’s ‘War on Terrorism: Religious Radicalism and Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia,” in Satu P. Limaye and Robert Wirsing et al (ed.), Op Cit., p. 182. 149 Shehzad H. Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency & the American End Game in Afghanistan,” (Washington: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2011), p. 15. 150 Zahid Hussain, Op Cit., p. 49. 151 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan and US Foreign Policy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), p. 167. 152 Ahmad Shaiq Qassem, Afghanistan’s Political Stability: A Dream Unreleased (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), p. 134. 153 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., p. 167. 154 Ahmad Shaiq Qassem, Op Cit., p. 134. 155 Evelyn Iritani, “Aid Plan May Displease Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, 10 November 2001. 156 Ahmad Shaiq Qassem, Op Cit., pp. 133-134. 157 In 2001, a report titled ‘Transition 2001’ presented to the Bush administration by the Rand Corporation mentioned that “Pakistan continues to be beset by unhealthy political, economic, and strategic trends” including “the growth of Islamic extremism.” The report further stated that “extremist groups thrive because of Pakistan’s continuing state failures and because they are intentionally supported by the Pakistan military and secret services in the pursuit of the latter’s goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan.” Quoted in Robert G. Wirsing, Op Cit., p. 115. 158 Rodney W. Jones, Op Cit., p. 182. 159 Leon T. Hadar, “Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism: Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client,” Policy Analysis No. 436 (Washington: CATO Institute, May 2002), p. 4. 160 Zahid Hussain, Op Cit., p. 49. Shabana Fayyaz, Op Cit., pp. 7-8.

Chapter – 03

US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan and United States relationship has seen sharp upturn and downturn but never have the stakes been higher than since 9/11 in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. Perhaps, USPakistan bilateral ties are a “combustible combination of strategic importance and perilous instability.”1

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Pakistan is ‘pivotal’ for the realization of the vital US security objectives of dismantling Al- Qaeda network in ‘AfPak’ region, stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, promoting nuclear nonproliferation and strengthening democracy.

This chapter examines US-Pakistan relations since 1947. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first section analyzes US-Pakistan relations prior to 11 September 2001. The second part outlines the US and Pakistan’s objectives in the ‘War on Terror’. The third part examines the problems which are associated with the US-led ‘War on Terror’and USPakistan partnership. The Final section presents the prospects in US-Pakistan relations.

BRIEF HISTORY OF US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan relations with United States have been shaped by politico-strategic contours of South Asian region.2 US-Pakistan ties were established and consolidated during the Cold War. Pakistan’s geography, the Kashmir dispute left by the British colonial rule and India’s desire for regional hegemony, fully backed by the then superpower, Soviet Union, posed grave threats to Pakistan’s security.3 Pakistan was desperate to get military assistance from Washington due to a perceived threat from India. For its part, United States decided to pursue a proactive policy to contain China as well as Soviet expansionism in South Asia after the communist triumph in China (1949) and the Korean War (1951). From the US perspective, Pakistan’s strategic location was of great regional relevance from which Persian Gulf and important areas along the southern border of the Soviet Union could be protected.4 In these circumstances, the channels were created that increased the interaction between Pakistan military and the US. General Ayub Khan, the commander of Pakistani Field Forces, in a meeting with the Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Byroade in 1953, went so far as to say, “Our army can be your army if you want us.” 5 This led to establishment of relations between Pakistan military and Pentagon. Despite being asymmetrical, the ties with the US were seen by the Pakistan military as a means to acquire modern weapons, arms and equipment against Indian hegemony. In May 1954, the two countries signed a Mutual Defense Agreement to contain Soviet communism. In September 1954, Pakistan entered the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in February 1955 it signed the Central Treaty Organization

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(CENTO). 6 These alliances earned Islamabad an additional $2 billion in US military aid between 1955 and 1961.7 In March 1959, Pakistan sealed the first major bilateral agreement with the US, the Agreement of Cooperation, which secured United States as an ally in its conflict with India.8 This was the period of convergence of interests between the two countries and, President Eisenhower aptly described Islamabad as “America’s most allied ally in Asia.”9 Pakistan’s membership in the US-sponsored alliances secured some US support for Kashmir cause in the United Nations.10 But in the long run, it had severe implications for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. In December 1953, Indian Premier, Mr. Nehru stated that the Pakistan- India accord signed earlier to resolve the Kashmir dispute through “a fair and impartial plebiscite” would be imperiled since the “whole context” of the accord “will change if [US] military aid comes to Pakistan.”11 Soon after this announcement, Pakistan made efforts to save the accord, but unfortunately, India refused to negotiate on Kashmir dispute.

Worst still, the Soviet Union which earlier had upheld a neutral stance on Kashmir dispute, also changed its position because of Pakistan’s participation in “an aggressive Western alliance” directed against Soviet Union. Soviet President Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganian declared in Srinagar (Capital of Indian-administered Kashmir) in December 1955 that Kashmir was “an integral part of India.” After that, the Soviet Union gradually thwarted nearly one hundred UN Security Council attempts from 1956 to 1964 to find an “equitable solution” of the Dispute.12 In 1960, US-Pakistan relationship began to decline. In John F. Kennedy administration’s view, the “Cold War with the Soviet Union was now less about fighting a war in Europe and more about winning friends in the developing world,” such as India to counter communist China.13 In this context, New Delhi received more military and economic assistance from the US than Pakistan, particularly after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962.14 But, this US tilt towards India made Pakistan turn to China to acquire military and defence equipment. Assessing Islamabad’s discontent, Kennedy administration again extended its commitment to defend Pakistan in the case of war with India. Also in these circumstances, Kennedy administration pressurized Nehru that he should resume dialogue with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue as a condition for US military aid to New Delhi. In January 1963, under the US pressure, Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru began talks with Pakistan on Kashmir issue. However, Nehru was unwilling to “demonstrate the political will” to settle the Kashmir dispute which resulted in the

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collapse of the talks. Kennedy administration too felt that better relations with India are more important than those with Pakistan. 15 Subsequently, on 30 June 1963, United States and Britain issued a joint statement which refused to link military assistance to India to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. According to General Ayub, this joint communiqué had ended the hope of solving the Kashmir dispute diplomatically.16 This was the crucial turning point in US- Pakistan relations and produced political distancing between the two countries.

Again in 1965, Pakistan was bitterly disappointed at US betrayal of its promises to help Pakistan in its conflict with India. During the 1965 war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, instead of going to the aid of Pakistan as promised in the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation, US President Lyndon B. Johnson responded to the conflict with an embargo on Pakistan and India. From Pakistani perspective, the embargo impacted “Pakistan much more severely than India.”17 After the war ended, Pakistan was swept up in a massive and rising tide of anti-American sentiments.18 Meanwhile, the US had been engaged in diplomatic damage control in Pakistan. For America, Pakistan’s geo-strategic location was a “bulwark against communism,” so to keep Islamabad on its side, Johnson himself reassured Pakistanis that Washington remained a “faithful friend” to Islamabad. Johnson promised President Ayub during his visit to America in December 1965, that US would not allow India to undo 1947 partition and threaten Pakistan’s existence.19 Nevertheless, the sanctions imposed in 1965 were not lifted even during Pakistan-India war in 1971 and were repealed in 1975.20

In July 1971, Pakistan made possible a secret trip by the then National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, to Beijing. This visit reflected the new thinking in Nixon administration that China could become an effective “counterbalance” to Soviet Union. The trip created a split in “apparently monolithic Communist movement.” Islamabad’s role to facilitate this visit was duly acknowledged by Washington.21 The Moscow reaction to this perceived “de facto US–China alignment” against Soviet Union was swift. On 9 August 1971, precisely one month after Kissinger’s flew to Beijing from Chaklala Air Base in Pakistan, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko signed the SovietIndian Friendship Treaty in New

Delhi. Clearly, this treaty was in response to Pakistan’s role at bringing about the US–Chinese rapprochement. Under the terms of the treaty, Soviet Union supported India against Pakistan during Pakistan-India war of 1971.22 In contrast, US didn’t help Pakistan for saving its

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territorial integrity and the war resulted in the dismemberment of its East Wing (now Bangladesh).

All this happened despite the fact that Pakistan was a US ally and member of the security pacts SEATO and CENTO. Islamabad held that United States was bound to help Pakistan against Indian aggression—fully assisted by Soviet Union. But President Nixon and Henry Kissinger maintained that the 1971 military action in East Pakistan was “an internal affair, and that outside powers had no right to intervene.” Nevertheless, to deter an Indian attack on West Pakistan, President Nixon took certain steps that ‘tilted’ the balance towards Islamabad vis-à- vis New Delhi and thus, a ceasefire was declared in East Pakistan on 14 December and in West Pakistan on 17 December 1971.23 The aftermath of 1971 war witnessed a low ebb in US- Pakistan relations and challenged “the raison d’être of the alliance.” Consequently, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972.24 US-Pakistan ties further strained over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development programme which was a critical feature of Pakistan’s national security to offset India’s greater conventional military superiority.25 Pakistan’s determination to go ahead with its nuclear programme led the Carter administration to impose economic and military aid related sanctions in 1979.26 Despite tense ties, the relationship quickly recovered following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The United States declared Pakistan a ‘frontline state’ against the Soviet aggression. In order to earn Pakistan’s cooperation to contain communist threat, Washington courted the then military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq and offered military and economic assistance as incentives. By 1981, the US gave over $3.2 billion aid to Islamabad and from 1982 to September 1990; the aid package grew to $4 billion. Besides, the US also showed willingness to sell forty F-16s to Pakistan. Above all, Washington adopted a softer line towards Pakistan’s nuclear development programme. 27

Pakistan, on the other hand, “served as a channel for covert US military aid” to Afghan insurgents and Pakistan’s tribal areas became “the assembly points for the volunteers to train and fight in Afghanistan and the transit points for the supply of weapons.”28 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided between $3 to $20 billion assistance through the Pakistani secret service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for this purpose.29 Besides, from 1978–1992, US sent arms and weapons valued at $6 and $12 billion.30

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Ahmed Rashid notes that between 1982 and 1992, 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Muslim States came to Afghanistan and Pakistan tribal areas to take part in Afghan’s Jihad.31 The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) camp in Virginia was used to train the Afghan insurgent leaders.32 In 1984, Osama bin Laden along with his mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, set up Maktab-al-Khidamat (MAK, ‘Office of Services’) in Peshawar to recruit and train Arab fighters for Afghan Jihad.33 It is estimated that MAK organized paramilitary training for 20,000 Muslims recruits belonging to 20 countries across the world.34 Branches of MAK also opened in more than 30 US cities including the most important branch in Brooklyn, New York and Muslim-Americans donated millions of dollars to support anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad.35 MAK maintained a close liaison with ISI through which the CIA and Saudi Arabia funneled money to Afghan Mujahedeen.36 After Azzam was assassinated in November 1989, MAK split with the radical faction joining bin Laden. Later, this MAK faction was morphed into Al-Qaeda.37 In effect, the US collusion with the ISI, Saudi Arabia, Afghan warlords and the Mujahedeen during Afghan Jihad produced Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Adviser, admitted in an interview in 1998 that CIA began to provide aid to the Mujahedeen after the Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan. But in reality, “It was 3 July 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid [$500m] to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul,” in order to drag in Soviet Union into the “Afghan trap” and to give the Russians their “Vietnam war” and hence, defeat communism.38 After mission accomplished in Afghanistan, the US left the war-torn country, “leaving Pakistan alone to clear the debris” of the Cold War, in the shape of over two million Afghan refugees, proliferation of small weapons and the profusion of narcotics which spread from Afghanistan to several parts of Pakistan.39 Post Cold War US-Pakistan Relations: The end of the Cold War persuaded America to reevaluate its relationship with Pakistan. According to a commentator, Washington began to focus on non-proliferation, of nuclear weapons, economic liberalization, and support for democracy in South Asian region.40 An immediate and significant consequence of this policy was the divergence of interests between Pakistan and America on the nuclear issue. In fact, with the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons emerged as the issue of most concern for American policy. In October 1990, George Bush Senior administration terminated most of the economic and military assistance to Pakistan as required

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by the US Non-Proliferation Law (1985 Pressler Amendment) unless the president could certify Islamabad’s ‘nuclear virginity.’ Accordingly, the US assistance to Pakistan dropped from $7.26 billion in 1988 to an estimated $0.24 billion in 1992.41 United States also suspended arms sales to Pakistan for which Islamabad had already paid an estimated $1.2 billion. US-Pakistan relationship hit a low point amidst Pakistani charges of ‘American betrayal.’ As the decade of 1990s unfolded, relations between Pakistan and the US further deteriorated. United States watched with a wary eye as Pakistan “slipped perilously close to being a rogue state.” From US view, Pakistan moved forward with its nuclear weapons programme, imported ballistic missile technology from North Korea and China and supported the Kashmir insurgents and Taliban. Meanwhile, “Quasi-democratic governments” in Pakistan abruptly changed one after the other giving rise to political and economic instability,42 which further tarnished Pakistan’s image. In the late 1990s, Islamabad ties with Washington were managed under the ‘new status quo’ introduced by the nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan in May 1998. After Indian tests, President Bill Clinton impressed upon the then Pakistani Premier, Nawaz Sharif, not to carry out nuclear tests. But Nawaz Sharif demanded certain US guarantees targeted at India before he could take the decision to avert the nuclear tests. Clinton instead offered “unspecified security aid” to Nawaz Sharif. Given the history of the US military aid, frequently punctuated with embargos and economic and military sanctions and the ‘instances of US betrayal,’ Pakistan declined to accept US offer and conducted 5 nuclear tests on 28 May 1998.43

Following Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998, a series of US sanctions under Glenn and Symington amendments were imposed on both the countries. But soon after the tests, the US recognized India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China and regarded it as the ‘regional power’ in South Asia. From Pakistan’s view, nuclear explosions related sanctions reflected strong US bias towards Pakistan’s nuclear tests as the US did not take the similar action against India’s first nuclear explosion (Smiling Budddha) in 1974. The nuclear explosions shifted the focus of the US non-proliferation efforts to nuclear risk reduction and non-deployment of weapons. 44 In 1999, US security concerns were compounded when Pakistan and India fought a war in the summer at Kargil heights. During the conflict, it was reported that Pakistan military was preparing to deploy nuclear missiles. Alarmed by the risk of escalation, President Bill

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Clinton exerted diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to vacate the Himalayan ridge unilaterally.45 He asked Pakistan to “commit itself to observing the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.” Worried by the specter of further isolation from international community, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed to “take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the LoC.”46

Clinton administration was also annoyed by the October 1999 ‘bloodless military coup’ in the country by General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan felt the US wrath and fury when President Clinton enacted democracy-related sanctions on Pakistan but waivered nuclear related economic sanctions on India within 15 days after General Musharaf coup. For Pakistan, nuclear related sanctions remained in place. By October 1999, Washington was “in simple damage control mode with respect to Islamabad.”47 In contrast, Clinton administration was dedicated to a strategic engagement with a democratic India. This convergence of interests became evident when President Clinton paid a five day state visit to India in March 2000. In his address to the Indian Parliament, Clinton called India a “great nation” by adding that relations between the two countries were ‘”too important to ever fall into disrepair again.”48 On the other hand, during his ‘five-hour stopover’ in Pakistan, Clinton pressed for General Musharraf to cease support to Kashmiri insurgents and Taliban. Clinton administration was concerned that Taliban regime allowed Al-Qaeda to use Afghanistan as a ‘safe heaven’ to target US interests in the world. On Kashmir issue, Musharraf did not agree to maintain the status quo, though his government asked Taliban to close Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Taliban regime refused to comply with Musharraf demands. Clinton also asked General Musharraf to restore democracy, but no progress was achieved on this issue. 49 Thus, US-Pakistan ties remained strained by these problems. When George Bush became the forty-third President in January 2001, his administration pursued Clinton policy of keeping pressure on Pakistan on contentious issues. During his June 2001 visit to America, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar was told by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell that Pakistan must end its support to Taliban regime, strictly prevent nuclear proliferation and restore democracy. Islamabad failed to act in accordance with these US demands. 50 Hence, prior to 11 September 2001, a diplomatically isolated Pakistan was a “low priority” on US’s agenda.51

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US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE POST 9/11 MILIEU US-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 scenario are narrowly focused on ‘War on Terror’. Several major problems in US-Pakistan engagement exist. These include the degree to which Pakistan will fight militancy, extremism and terrorism, end sanctuaries of Al-Qaeda, reform madaris system and ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The clash of US and Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan; the US ‘tilt’ towards India and its impact on Kashmir dispute, issues related to US economic assistance to Pakistan impinge heavily on Pakistan’s performance in the ‘War on Terror’, peace and stability inside Pakistan as well as in the region and the nature and extent of future Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. US AND PAKISTAN’S OBJECTIVES IN THE ‘War on Terror’ US Objectives: The primary US objective in engaging Pakistan in the ‘War on Terror’ is to disrupt and dismantle Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and Pakistan territory. Soon after 9/11, United States declared Al-Qaeda an “existential threat” along with Afghan Taliban, who gave refuge to Al-Qaeda in order to prevent further attacks on the US from Afghanistan. In terms of Pakistan’s involvement, the US wanted to ensure continued use of Pakistani army, police and intelligence assets to eradicate Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries in Pakistan. America also required Pakistan’s co-operation in defeating Taliban insurgency by interdicting Afghan insurgents, who cross Pak-Afghan border to attack ISAF/NATO forces.52 In addition, Washington wanted to secure Islamabad cooperation in attacking safe havens of Afghan Taliban on Pakistan territory.53 The US-led coalition also needed Pakistan’s support to continue Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. United States could not carry out its campaign in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s logistic support including access to ports, airfields, and the use of Karachi-Khyber, and Karachi-Chaman lines of supply.54 Therefore, one of the US objectives was to have continued access to Pakistan’s airspace and air bases.

The US also shows an interest in ensuring that militants and extremists targeting the heartland of Pakistan are eliminated as well.55 Washington realizes that state collapse in nuclear-armed Pakistan could have a catastrophic impact on regional and global security. Washington is worried about events that could create chaos in Pakistan and make nuclear technology or weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals or radical elements within the military,

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which manages the command and control of the nuclear assets. A major US objective is therefore, to address the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and keep up “close liaison” with Pakistan’s army to upgrade nuclear safety mechanism.56 Furthermore, Islamabad and New Delhi remain in a perpetual state of confrontation on their border, especially over the Line of Control (LoC) along the State of Jammu & Kashmir. With regard to the issue of Kashmir, ending violence in the Kashmir valley remains a key US objective. United States “continues to look for ways to encourage peace in Kashmir…through political dialogue and negotiation.” 57 Another key interest of Washington lies in avoiding any potential Pakistan-India crisis that would undermine the OEF in Afghanistan, or distract Pakistan army from ongoing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in FATA.58 Moreover, the US also desires to avert escalation of Pakistan-India conflict to a nuclear war.59 Strengthening of democratic process in Pakistan remains another important US objective. For the Bush administration “a democratic Pakistan was seen as desirable” in the long run, “but getting there might disrupt the state in the short-term” and might disrupt US efforts in the ‘War on Terror’.60 In contrast, Obama administration’s objective is to support democratic government and strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan. Above all, a leading US objective is to shore up Pakistan’s economic and social development. The US assistance programme includes development assistance, balance-of-payment support, debt rescheduling and forgiveness, and agricultural, trade and investment support. 61 Apart from its frontline status in the ‘War on Terror’, Islamabad also holds a fundamental position vis-à-vis other key concerns of the US: purging the threat of the emergence of Nuclear Iran, containment of China, and even Russia and buttressing the US political and military influence in Central Asia.62 Pakistan’s Objectives: After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Pakistan’s primary interest was to avoid itself becoming an immediate ‘target’ by the US-led coalition in the ‘War on Terror’. Islamabad also wanted to minimize the threats to the [Musharraf] regime and the state from Islamists and other militant groups, who were anti-American in their outlook.63 Pakistan also desires a stable, friendly, and cooperative regime in Kabul in order to avoid the ‘strategic dilemma’ of being caught between a powerful and hostile adversary ―India in the east, and an irredentist Afghanistan with claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun dominated areas in the

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west. Equally important, Pakistan sees strong and friendly ties with Afghanistan as a means of ‘balancing out’ India’s hegemony in South Asia. 64 Pakistan also wanted to avoid any scenario that might inflame the sensitivities of Pakistani Pashtun. In fact, Pakistan could not afford a political configuration in Afghanistan which would not include sufficient Pashtuns. From Pakistan’s view, little Pashtun representation in any future Afghan political set up would alienate Pashtun—the Taliban’s base—and consequently, destabilize Pakistan’s own Pashtun belt. Pakistan’s strategic community understood that if Pakistan would destabilize, then there would be immense pressure on Islamabad to dispose of its nuclear and missile assets to prevent them falling into hands of extremists. Hence, Pakistan strongly favoured to include ‘moderate Taliban’ in the future administration to avoid Pashtun marginalization and to pacify its own Pashtun belt. From Pakistan’s perspective, the inclusion of “moderate Taliban” could also give Islamabad a political voice in new Afghan government following the overthrow of Taliban regime in the wake of US invasion of Afghanistan.65 Above all, Pakistan strongly desires that US-led coalition forces stabilize Afghanistan so that Pakistan could explore economic benefits of reaching to Central Asian States.66 Another crucial objective of Pakistan was to “preserve the legitimacy” of Kashmiri peoples’ struggle for their right of self-determination while supporting the US-led ‘War on Terror’. Since 1947, when Pakistan came into being, following the partition of the Indian subcontinent, it has extended diplomatic, moral and political support to the Kashmir cause. In 1989, when insurgency in Indian Administered Kashmir erupted, Pakistan stepped up political and material support to the fighters in Kashmir. But in the wake of the tragic events of 9/11, Pakistani policy makers worried that “bin Laden might have also buried the Kashmir cause in the rubble of the twin towers in New York.”67 Pakistan hoped that by cooperating with the United States in the ‘War on Terror’, the Kashmiri people struggle for their right of self determination should not be included in the ambit of terrorism or considered part of ‘War on Terror’.

Moreover, Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ presented an opportunity to Islamabad to obstruct a complete US drift toward New Delhi as an ally in South Asia. Cooperation with Washington also offered Pakistan to obtain US military arms and equipment to maintain conventional balance of power vis-à-vis India.68 Another important objective of Pakistan is to seek economic assistance and trade concessions, and other financial assistance from the United States and other countries such as Japan and

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European Union members, as well as an expanded interaction with the international community.69 Finally, General Musharraf wanted “to have Pakistan re-emerge” on political and diplomatic front as “responsible and dignified” state.70 He hoped that by cooperating with the US, Pakistan would emerge as an honourable and peaceful country on international arena.

PROBLEMS IN US-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP

A. US CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN

Although Pakistan is a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’, Washington has still major concerns vis-à-vis Islamabad’s campaign against terrorism. a) Al-Qaeda’s Sanctuary in Pakistan’s Territory A major US concern vis-à-vis Pakistan is that Al-Qaeda maintains major base of operations, strategic communications, recruitment, finances and most lethal allies in Pakistan’s territory.71 The 9-11 Commission concluded that “terrorist groups require sanctuaries that provide them with time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff work, a command structure” with “opportunities and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication” and “opportunity to test the workability of the plan.”72 The Commission also noted that Pak-Afghan border area seem to be primary location for sanctuaries for terrorist groups. It is said that Al-Qaeda gained this sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) following the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. OEF devastated Al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, but Al-Qaeda senior leadership (also called Al-Qaeda Central or Al-Qaeda core) and Afghan Taliban remnants linked up with a handful of pro-Taliban local tribal militants and other militant groups involved in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Pakistani tribal militant groups provided Al-Qaeda with shelter, “logistical support…forged identification documents, and occasionally, ready recruits.”73 Despite repeated military interventions from Pakistani government in South Waziristan Agency (SWA) and North Waziristan Agency (NWA), Al-Qaeda re-enacted a “more rudimentary version of their Afghan training infrastructure” on a small scale, firstly in the Shakai Valley of SWA during 2002-2003, and later in NWA during 2004-2006. Meanwhile,

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Al-Qaeda also established their command center in Shin Kot town of Bajaur agency.74 Pakistani and US intelligence sources at some time believed that Al-Qaeda’s Deputy Chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was hiding in Bajaur.75 Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda continued to shift its command center from time to time in order to avoid a US drone strike or Pakistani military operation. This command and control infrastructure is largely believed to be situated in the areas of Mirali, Sedgi and Data Khel in NWA.76 US intelligence officials also believe that Al-Qaeda established new bases of operations in major urban centers such as Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and the port city, Karachi.77 b) Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in Pakistan

Another important problem in US-Pakistan relations is the resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. As of 2005, US intelligence assessments depicted Al-Qaeda Central “as cut off from their foot soldiers and able only to provide inspiration for future attacks.” But since 2006, US intelligence estimates described Al-Qaeda core “as intact and strengthening.” In January 2007, John Negroponte, the then US National Intelligence Director, stated in a testimony before the House of Representative’s Intelligence Committee that “Al Qaeda’s core elements are resilient” and the network was “cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.” 78 While recognizing Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in the tribal areas, the Bush administration put the blame fairly and squarely at a ‘hands-off approach’ toward FATA by General Pervez Musharraf. American officials criticized Musharraf strategy of signing the 2005 South Waziristan deal, and later the 2006 North Waziristan accord, to pacify militancy in Waziristan, by saying that Musharraf “granted Al-Qaeda a de facto safe haven.” Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary of State, acknowledged that North Waziristan accord provided Al-Qaeda an opportunity “to operate, meet, plan, recruit, and obtain financing in more comfort in the tribal areas than previously.”79 Stephen Hadley, President Bush National Security Adviser, expressed similar view that President Pervez Musharraf “failed to contain Al-Qaeda and must regain control over areas bordering Afghanistan where Al-Qaeda is free to plan” and operate. He went on to say that the failure of Musharraf’s “tribal strategy” allowed the reestablishment of some operational training centers in tribal areas.80 Musharraf signed the North Waziristan accord in response to rising tensions with New Delhi and domestic political pressure from a coalition of six Islamic parties, Muttahida-Majlis-eAmal

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(MMA).81 Musharraf, however, insisted that the accord was “not a deal with the Taliban.”82 He claimed that the agreement was an attempt to “isolate Al-Qaeda” from the Pakistani Taliban and to create a “hostile” milieu for Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas. The strategy, in effect, helped Al-Qaeda and the local Taliban in strengthening their presence in NWA. According to a US military official, militants operating from tribal areas tripled attacks in Afghanistan since the North Waziristan accord signed.83 US frustration with Islamabad grew alarmingly high, following the release of July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)84, which concluded that Al-Qaeda “protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven” in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In fact, the NIE proved a real eye opener for the US officials, who perceived that the Musharraf government was firmly committed to combating Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Many US officials and commentators started raising doubts about the seriousness of Pakistan’s commitment and saw Islamabad losing its ‘War on Terror’ owing to Pakistan military’s “poor counterinsurgency capabilities” and Musharraf government’s “policy of appeasement” in FATA.85 US officials also claimed that Al-Qaeda Central from its sanctuary in FATA, issues propaganda material to “radicalize Muslims across the world” recruits and trains extremists and offers them “guidance” for targeted attacks against ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan as well as US and the West.86 It is important to note that operating out of FATA and Swat/ Malakand Division, Al- Qaeda recruited and trained some Westerners of Pakistani origin to carry out attacks in Europe and North America. For example, UK security officials believe that Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, the British Al-Qaeda operatives, received training from a militant camp in Malakand between 2003 and 2004. They received additional training in 2005 in NWA in making bombs out of concentrated hydrogen peroxide and hexamethylene triperoxidediamine (HMTD), which they detonated on London tube trains and a bus on 7 July 2005.87 According to UK security officials, Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Pakistani descent was their Al-Qaeda contact in NWA and a key ‘facilitator’ behind the July 7 bombings.88 Similarly, the August 2006 foiled plot to destroy ten aircraft over the Atlantic Ocean with liquid explosives also signaled the resurgence of Al-Qaeda’s core in the tribal areas. It was reported that high-level Al-Qaeda operative Matiur Rehman directed the British airline plot from Pakistan. If the London airline plot had not been thwarted, “death tolls would have rivaled

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those of 9/11.”89 Similarly, the Danish recruit, Hammad Khurshid of Pakistani origin, was trained by Al-Qaeda in 2007 in Mir Ali town to make TATP (triacetone triperoxide) detonators. He was arrested in Copenhagen in September 2007 and subsequently, convicted of plotting to explode ‘unspecified targets’ in Denmark. Najibullah Zazi was suspected to receive training by Al-Qaeda instructors in FATA in the fall of 2008. Plot by “suspected cell” led by Zazi to attack Several New York, subways was foiled in September 2009. 90 At regional level, the resurgence of Al-Qaeda has proven to be a major setback to American efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. US officials and commanders argue that Al-Qaeda has the freedom to train, arm and infiltrate insurgents as well as Improvised Explosive Device (IED) into Afghanistan with “little fear of reprisal” from Pakistani security forces. It was reported that groups of 10 to 20 men were being trained by Al-Qaeda in tribal areas.91 Al-Qaeda carried out a number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, and it is reported that Arab fighters in FATA are the core elements in “transferring and legitimizing suicide attacks” among Punjab based militants and Taliban in Pakistan’s FATA.92 Pakistan, on the other hand, rejects such charges and claims that Islamabad arrested over 700 Al-Qaeda figures since the 9/11 attacks.93 Pakistan also claims that since 2008, successful military operations against Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in FATA disrupted their activities, and destroyed Al-Qaeda’s command, communication and propaganda centers. General Pervez Musharraf, while speaking at the French Institute for International Relations noted: “When the Army battles with Al-Qaeda now, the number of [Al-Qaeda] casualties are in the single digits, three or four,” highlighting the point that Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan has become weaker.94 Yet, Al-Qaeda has shown “great resilience” and flexibility by substituting operatives swiftly and skillfully with a “new generation” of ruthless operational leaders. In an annual report on Terrorism 2010, the US State Department revealed that though Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan had been disrupted to a high degree, yet it “retained the capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks,” because of “increased resource-sharing between AlQaeda and its Pakistan-based allies and associates such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network.”95 c) Concerns over Cross Border Nature of Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan United States have deep concerns about the cross-border nature of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Since 2003, US military commanders in Afghanistan have complained that

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Taliban have been able to found safe haven across the border in Pakistan to regroup and to carry out hit-and-run attacks against coalition troops, at times in cooperation with Al-Qaeda operatives.96 In fact, US-led coalition forces believe that since 9/11, Pakistan has played a ‘double game’ of appearing to combat terrorism by targeting Al-Qaeda and anti-Pakistan Taliban, while at the same time protecting the Afghan insurgents. United States and NATO officials charge that elements within the military and the ISI continue to work with the Taliban and thus contribute to their successes, despite Taliban tactical links to Al-Qaeda.97 After 9/11, a major turnabout in Pakistan’s Afghan policy came as a surprise to certain segments of Pakistani establishment which were sympathetic to Taliban, so certain elements of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military are still tolerant of the Taliban. With the passage of time, the reasons not to target Afghan insurgents appeared increasingly realistic to Pakistan. These include: India’s growing influence and intelligence presence in Afghanistan, the progressive deterioration of Pak-Afghan relations, and since 2005, the strategy to “hedge against potentially unfavourable outcomes in Kabul”, after Western troops withdrawal “by protecting the Taliban” as a “force-in-being.” 98 Keeping in view these reasons, General Musharraf pursued a strategy based on a ‘balancing act’ to appease the US without creating an internal backlash.

Musharraf regime reluctantly sent military into tribal areas and carried out military operations which were frequently punctuated by peace deals. United States and NATO military officials observed “a sharp deterioration in border security” following Musharraf regime policy to struck peace agreements with local tribes and militants, that in effect “allowed the militants to operate in Afghanistan without fear of Pakistan’s reprisal.” Though, Washington recognizes that there is no purely military solution to militancy in tribal areas; still, it maintained that any accord should be “enforceable” by the “credible threat of force.”99 Indeed, some of these deals reached with the tacit understanding that attacks in Afghanistan would be tolerable if militants do not mount attacks against Pakistan security forces. As a result, insurgents continued their attacks in Kabul and eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan. US civilian and military officials, therefore, believe that the insurgency in Afghanistan will “persist” if Afghan insurgents’ sanctuaries in Pakistan are not destroyed. US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad while speaking at the Centre of Strategic and International Studies in April 2004 argued that Taliban are still able to “base, train and operate

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from that [Pakistan’s] territory.” He warned Musharraf regime: “We cannot allow this problem to fester indefinitely. Unless Pakistan roots out Taliban sanctuaries, it will be difficult to fully eliminate security problems in the south and east of Afghanistan.” 100 According to Pentagon, the persistence of militant safe havens inside Pakistan’s tribal areas “represents the greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan,”101 and hence, a constant friction in US- Pakistan relationship.

In early 2009, the US government publicly stated that Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan directly supported by the “ISI’ S Wing, which is responsible for activities external to Pakistan.” The ‘ISI’ S Wing’ supplies money, fuel and weapons and offer “strategic planning guidance” to Taliban against US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Washington further claims that ISI has divided its support among three major Afghan factions; The Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani group led by the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad veteran, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, and Hezb-i-Islami run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.102 The detail of each faction and Islamabad’s alleged support to them is given below.

Quetta Shura Taliban: The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) has been the key source of US-led coalition concern. US and NATO officials as well as Western analysts regularly allege that Mullah Omar and his closest associates (‘Quetta Shura Taliban or Qandhari clique’) operate out from Pashtunabad, a dusty suburb of Quetta, to mount military attacks in the southcentral Afghanistan provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Zabol).103 US led coalition commanders also point out to the increasing number of attacks on NATO convoys in Balochistan, carried out by Taliban, who are present in that region. 104 The US and NATO officials’ charges have sparked furious denials from Pakistan. Addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels in September 2006, General Musharraf rejected the reports about presence of QST in Quetta. “The battle, if it is to be won,” Musharraf stressed, “has to address the center of gravity of the force—and the center of gravity lies in Mullah Omar and his command echelon, which happens to be in southern Afghanistan.”105 Balochistan Frontier Corps (FC) Inspector General, Major General Ubaidullah Khan, also claimed that “no Quetta Shura Taliban existed in any part of the province.” 106 Nevertheless, US officials believe that QST is “the ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency”,107 and operate from Quetta.

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In a sign of how seriously Washington views the QST issue, the US Congress imposed a condition on an aid package to Pakistan that requires Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to certify that Pakistan is acting against militant bases in several areas, including Quetta. Earlier, the New York Times reported in mid-2009 that President Barack Obama administration desires to extend drone operations into Balochistan. But former Chief Minister of Balochistan, Nawab Aslam Raisani denied the charges that QST is directing Afghan insurgency from Quetta and threatened to suspend NATO supplies through Balochistan if unmanned US drone attacks were carried out.108 Certainly, drone operations in Balochistan constitute a clear Pakistani ‘red line’ that cannot be crossed.

Many Western officials and analysts also claimed that since QST being exposed to potential attacks by US drones in Quetta, ISI shifted the QST to Karachi. In November 2009, The Washington Times quoted senior US intelligence officials, who alleged that the ISI had facilitated Mullah Omar travel to Karachi where he set up a Taliban shura. Bruce Riedel, former CIA official, also confirmed such reports by saying that “there are huge madrassahs in Karachi where Mullah Omar could easily be kept.”109 This development reinforced the suspicions among US officials that ISI has been working against the US interests in Afghanistan.

Haqqani network: Another issue that sours US-Pakistan relations is the ISI alleged links with Haqqani network, one of Afghanistan’s most aggressive and sophisticated insurgent group. The US accuses that Haqqani group fighters maintain their main command and control, training, and logistical node in and around Miran Shah, in NWA with the alleged support and assistance of the ISI. US commanders state that the Haqqani network runs a sophisticated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) network in Afghanistan and executes attacks in the Afghan capital Kabul and Loya-Paktia.110 The Taliban successful suicide campaign (21 in 2005, 136 in 2006 and 137 suicide attacks in 2007) increased their control of Afghanistan from 30 districts out of 364 in 2003 to 164 districts by the end of 2008. American officials pointed the fingers squarely at the ‘double game’ of the ISI arguing that 80 percent of the suicide attacks in Afghanistan are carried out by Haqqani Network based in NWA. 111 In August 2008, President George Bush reportedly showed evidence of ISI’s involvement in the July 2008 attack of the Indian Embassy in Kabul to the visiting Pakistani Premier, Yusuf Raza Gillani. Bush warned that “in case of another such

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attack, he would consider serious action” against Pakistan. Gilani, however, rejected any assertions of ISI’s links to the Haqqani group. 112 US officials also believe that the “symbiotic relationship” between Haqqani network and AlQaeda increases network’s ability to execute huge and deadly attacks in Kabul. For example, in January 2008, a suicide bomber, allegedly belonging to Haqqani network, detonated himself inside luxury Serena Hotel in Kabul, reportedly targeting the Norwegian Foreign Minister staying at the hotel. Norway has been targeted by Al-Qaeda on two separate occasions for their participation in Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It is argued that Al-Qaeda may have had a role in target selection (Serena Hotel) for Haqqani network.113 Similarly, a suicide attack at the CIA base in Khost on 30 December 2009 is also considered to be a joint operation of Al-Qaeda, Haqqani network and TTP, which killed seven CIA officers.114 After the Khost attack, Pakistan has become under intense pressure from the US to launch an offensive against the Haqqani network in NWA. Pakistani officials, however, argue that Pakistan army “need to consolidate the areas newly under their control,” particularly Swat valley, Bajaur and SWA.115 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami (HiI): Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami (HiI) is considered by the US officials as a major group of the Afghan insurgency. In 2003, the US Department of State designated Gulbuddin as a terrorist, accusing him of engaging and supporting attacks against coalition forces by Al-Qaeda and Taliban. 116 Afghan officials also accuse that ISI provides financial and military support to the fighters of the HiI group to mount attacks in the northeastern Nuristan Province 117 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is said “to shuttle between hideouts” in FATA and in northeast Afghanistan.118 d) Coalescence of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Punjab based Militant Groups American intelligence and counterterrorism officials view with concern the growing nexus among Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Punjab based militant groups which include individuals or dissident factions of groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM/JeM), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). According to Western officials and analysts, massive growth in militancy and Talibanization has spilled over from the “periphery [tribal areas] into the heartland” of Punjab Province due to this growing nexus. After Pakistan army successful military operation in Swat and Malakand in 2009, many TTP militants escaped to Punjab where they reorganized and regrouped. Bruce Riedel contends that due to the “coalescence of these militant groups,” the Taliban now had “extensive links into the Punjab.” He noted further that

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“connections that have always existed are becoming tighter and more public than they have in the past.” 119

The Punjab based militant groups had had links with the Taliban since the 1980s, and they still continue to fight in Afghanistan. Some of the Punjab based militants are veterans of insurgency against Indian forces in Kashmir like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT/LeT). It is estimated that between 5,000 and 9,000 militants from South Punjab are engaged in fierce battle in Waziristan and across the border in Afghanistan.120 Admiral Mullen also stated in December 2009, that all militant groups, “whether it’s Pakistani Taliban/Al-Qaeda, or Al Qaeda/Afghan Taliban— they’re all working much more closely together” now.121 The coalescence of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Punjab based Militant Groups has been proving a daunting challenge for the US in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan is “a pivotal state”, whose volatility not only affects the security of regional countries but also that of the United States and Europe. 122 e) Alleged Linkage of extremism and terrorism to Pakistani Madaris The linkage of extremists and terrorists to Pakistani madaris is of ongoing concern in the United States and a sour point in US-Pakistan relations. The 9/11 Commission report released in 2004, described a few of Pakistan’s madaris “as incubators for violent extremism.”123 Pakistan’s madaris received much media coverage and attention following the multiple bombings in London on 7 July 2005. The allegation, that two of the bombers got indoctrinated when they stayed at madaris in Pakistan, sparked strong calls from around the world for strict control of the madaris.124 It has also been reported that some madaris along Pak-Afghan border are linked to the insurgency in North and South Waziristan and Afghanistan.125 In particular, there is deep concern that few madaris in Pakistan’s tribal region provide suicide attackers in Afghanistan.126 According to Christine Fair, some madaris have ties to Deobandi and Ahl-e- Hadith militant groups and “help channel potential recruits to their representatives.”127 Nevertheless, all madaris with more than one million poor students are not involved in extremism and terrorism.128 Many scholars describe madaris playing peaceful roles in society; like, increasing literacy rate, spreading religious, moral and human values, discouraging criminality and, thereby maintaining a social order. Indeed, the madaris provide free basic literacy skills and training for students in theological studies, jurisprudence and polemics

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thorough Islamic instruction.129 Furthermore, madaris also play an important role in religious guidance and counseling in the state and society. Many Afghan students and children of Afghan refugees also attend madaris, particularly along Pak-Afghan border, to study under particularly distinguished religious teachers, rather than militant training.130 However, some Afghan children subsequently, joined Taliban resistance movement against US-led coalition forces which created suspicions for madaris education and made them controversial.131 It is worthy to note that General Musharraf in his Memoir, In the Line of Fire, writes that madaris are “strong providers of human welfare,” and “free board and lodging to their students.” Musharraf argues that out of 14,000 madaris, only a few “get involved in terrorism and extremism.”132 Of the 6761 Deobandi madaris, some 200 (2 percent) were suspected to have links to militant organizations.133 It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the acts of militant groups and genuine madaris in Pakistan.

f) Lackluster Madaris Reforms The alleged connections between some madaris and militants have led officials in United States to consider the reform of Pakistan’s madaris as a crucial step in the war against terrorism. General Musharraf also pledged to reform the madaris sector to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.134 This pledge was not backed by decisive action and Washington is becoming increasingly concerned that Pakistan is unwilling or unable to significantly reform the madaris.

Musharraf initiated various rounds of reforms following Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led coalition and the fallout of July 2005 bombings in London. Musharraf regime launched a USaided, five-year Madaris Reforms Project (MRP) valued at $71 million. The MRP project aimed at facilitating 8,000 registered and willing madaris to include subjects such as computer science, social studies, science and English into the religious curriculum from the primary to the higher secondary level.135 But many madaris administrators and owners refused to accept the government’s intervention, saying that the Islamabad wanted to control madaris on behalf of America.136 Certainly, US involvement in madaris reform serves “to delegitimize the government’s efforts and reduce them to mere action items dictated by Washington.”137 Consequently, Musharraf regime did not succeed to meet the target of reforming around 8,000 madaris in five years. The government reformed 507 madaris only, benefiting 50,000 students

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(3.3 percent) against the target of 1.5 million within five years.138 Moreover, General Musharraf also failed to register all madaris with the government and to provide an account of their financing sources.139 Some analysts observed that Musharraf was less inclined to enforce madaris reform because he wanted to remain on good terms with MMA, which supported his Legal Framework Order (LFO that made General Musharraf a powerful President till 2007). In late 2007, Musharraf acknowledged “lack of achievement,” in reforming the country’s madaris, but stated that the registration and curriculum reform campaign made some progress.140 Some religious leaders believe that reforms and changes to the madaris must be agreed upon through collective decision-making by the madaris administrators and Islamic community.141 Mufti Munib-ur-Rehman, President of a supervisory board of 10,000 Sunni madaris and a member of Ittihad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris-e-Deenia (ITMD, Union of the administrations of Religious Seminaries) of Pakistan argues, “madrasah reform comes from within.” According to him, “5,000 madaris incorporated contemporary subjects [liberal studies] earlier on without federal aid.” 142 It is important to note that American and Pakistan’s intelligence efforts curtailed to some extent, some madaris funding from militant organizations, but simply cutting off finances to the madaris “without providing viable alternatives” pushed them more toward foreign donors.143 Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, in a cable sent to the State Department in November 2008, stated that “financial support estimated at nearly US $100 million annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” Hunt referred to a network of Deobandi and Ahl-e- Hadith mosques and madaris in the south- west Punjab “being strengthened through the influx of this ‘charity’ which originally reached…organizations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Al-Khidmat foundation.”144 Financial support is also provided to clerics in order to expand these sects’ presence in a “potentially fruitful recruiting ground.” 145 Christine Fair writes that Pakistani government is less inclined to completely purge these groups and their charity wings because Islamabad feels the need to support militant groups for political and strategic influence in the region.146

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A cable dispatched by the then US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, from US Embassy in Islamabad in October 2009 observed that Pakistan’s “education system failed to prepare the youth for alternative careers and did not provide employable skills, leaving them frustrated.” This frustrated youth is recruited by militant organizations such as Lashkar-eTayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The cable further mentions Ajmal Kasab, who was allegedly recruited by LT to carry out attacks in Mumbai in 2008 147 (sometimes referred to as 26/11).

To counter growing extremism in Punjab, the US officials recommended that Pakistan government should “offer alternate and positive dreams to the disillusioned and frustrated youth.” 148 Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani also admitted in September 2011 that some of the unemployed youth were suffering from the “malaise” of extremism because of lack of job opportunities. He stressed that the “need of the hour is to equip the youth with competitive skills to espouse the cause of social development as well.”149 g) Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons United States is deeply concerned that Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups could acquire material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan and could use it against US or its allies to cause havoc and inflict massive casualties. US experts have expressed concern that Al- Qaeda sought assistance from Pakistani scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear proliferation network, which supplied “designs and uranium enrichment materials to Libya, North Korea, and Iran for profit.” 150 Washington is also worried that Pakistan’s “government insiders” may secretly obtain and then transfer nuclear secrets to Al-Qaeda. 151 A report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US regarding ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ revealed in 2005 that “AlQaeda had established contact with [two] Pakistani scientists” Bashir Mahmood and his associate Abdul Majeed “who discussed building a nuclear device” with bin Laden and AlZawahri. It was reported that the contacts with the two scientists may have been facilitated by some personnel within the Pakistani army and ISI. In November 2001, Musharraf detained these scientists. This case heightened the concerns about “insider threat” and subsequently led to strict measures by Islamabad to improve export controls, and scrutinize personnel related to nuclear weapons programme.152 Nevertheless, Pakistan claims “its nuclear weapons have indigenously developed safety systems to prevent misuse.” 153

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Another serious US concern is that “nuclear assets could fall into the hands of radical Islamists” within the army responsible for managing the command and control of the nuclear arsenal. Fears are also raised that ‘radioactive materials’ may be seized by extremists during shifting or transporting them. Shaun Gregory argues that there are “8,000-12,000 [people] in Pakistan with some type of role in nuclear missiles — whether as part of an assembly team or security. It’s a very large number and there is a real possibility that among those people is sympathizers of terrorist or militant groups who may facilitate some kind of attack.” 154 Pakistani officials, on the other hand, state that the soldiers and civilians associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme are “screened rigorously for their probity and competence and for signs of political or religious immoderation” and for “changes in their lifestyle and income.”155 In an address to a French Foreign Policy Institute in January 2008, Musharraf stated the only way extremists would seize control of any of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons was if Al-Qaeda or the Taliban “defeat the Pakistani army entirely” or if Taliban come to power by “winning popular support” in elections. He stressed there is “zero percent chance of either one of them happening.”156 In March 2009, after US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton voiced concerns over the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; President Zardari assured that “the nuclear capability of Pakistan is under safe hands.” President Obama has also expressed “confidence” in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Addressing this issue in a press conference in April 2009, Obama stated: “I’m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands.” 157

Nevertheless, political instability and deteriorating security situation in Pakistan has raised questions about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. In this context, several attacks were carried out on or near areas believed to be associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme. For example, militants stormed a nuclear missile storage facility at Sarghoda on 1 November 2007; carried out suicide bombing on Minhas nuclear Airbase at Kamra on 10 December 2007; and attacked Wah Ordinance Factory known for ‘nuclear-weaponsassembly’ in Wah cantonment on 21August 2008.158 Such attacks demonstrate that the nuclear facilities remain “vulnerable” because they are located in the north and west of the capital areas, where “Taliban and Al-Qaeda are more than capable of launching terrorist attacks.”159

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In 2009, as militants of TTP crossed from the Swat Valley and took over the district of Buner (60 miles from the capital of Islamabad) after signing a ‘controversial’ peace deal with KPK government, alarm bells rang in Washington that Pakistan People’s Party-led coalition government may have lacked the will to combat terrorism. Hillary Clinton told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington that Pakistan’s new civilian government was “basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.” She warned that the instability in nuclear-armed Pakistan “poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world.”160 She further stated:

“We cannot underscore the seriousness of the existential threat posed to the state of Pakistan by the continuing advances, now within hours of Islamabad that are being made by a loosely confederated group of terrorists and others who are seeking the overthrow of the Pakistani state, which is, as we all know, a nuclear- armed state.” 161

The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen also expressed his concerns about the advances of Taliban in Swat and Buner. He noted that “the consequences of their success directly threaten our national interests in the region and our safety here at home.” He therefore, insisted that Islamabad must launch a military action to defeat terrorists.162 US civilian and military officials also argued that chaos in Pakistan could cause the government to “collapse entirely” and the army to “fragment.” The Taliban could take “advantage of chaos to seize power…If that happened,” former US Ambassador to the United Nations John R. Bolton warned, “a radical Islamist regime in Pakistan would control a substantial nuclear weapons capacity” with global implications. 163 In response to US concerns, Pakistan army launched Swat operation in May 2009 and by the end of June 2009, the army claimed to have cleared Taliban stronghold in Swat. Pakistan’s successful operation in Swat reduced the threat of Taliban takeover of the country.164 h) Global Role of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s efforts to target US, UK and Israeli citizens in November 2008 Mumbai attacks vaulted the militant group to the level of a major threat to the US and its Western allies. According to Western intelligence reports, LT has “embraced a more global and anti-Western ideology” that regards India and United States together with Israel to be its principal adversaries.165 Admiral Robert Willard, Chief of US Forces in the Pacific, in a hearing of the

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Senate Armed Services Committee stated that LT “had declared a jihad on America, although India continues to be its main target.” He also stated that the US “had evidence of Lashkar’s presence in Europe, the broader Asia-Pacific and even in the past in Canada and the United States.”166 During the 2008 Mumbai attacks, armed militants allegedly belonging to LT, attacked several sites frequented by foreigners. The attacks on two luxury hotels, the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident café, and a Jewish cultural center (the Nariman House) killed 25 foreigners including four American and eight Israeli citizens.167 It is argued that LT’s close cooperating with “Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, may have led it to target the ‘Zionist-HinduCrusader’ alliance.”168 This shows that LT has deviated from a “purely Kashmir-focused agenda towards a more global jihadi one that appeals especially to funders from the Gulf.” 169 Most importantly, Mumbai attacks also served the purpose of undermining President Zardari’s policy of pursuing good relations with India and fighting militants in the tribal areas. It is argued that the attack may have been “calibrated to engender an Indian military response and to provide [Al-Qaeda and TTP] some respite from military operations along the Afghanistan border.”170 Islamabad maintains that Mumbai attacks “partially planned” in Pakistan; however, “the system of various other countries” including India, Austria, Spain, Italy and Russia and the US was also used to plan the attacks.171 i) Misspent Counterinsurgency Assistance The Coalition Support Funds (CSF) disbursements have been a thorny issue between Pakistan and the United States. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, Pakistani Army was deployed into FATA under pressure from the United States to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Pakistani Army had “limited capability” to engage in campaign against terrorism, making Washington to create the CSF, administered by the Defense Department, as a “mechanism to reimburse” Islamabad for its operational and logistical support in US-led ‘War on Terror’. 172 From 2001 to June 2008, Pakistan received more than $5.56 billion worth in CSF and the US assumed that the CSF will be used for counterterrorism. Nevertheless, since 2006, concerns grew high in Washington that a large proportion of CSF funds have been misspent by Pakistan and has been diverted to finance weapons systems aimed to counter India, not Al-Qaeda or Taliban.173

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The US officials also believe that Washington paid a huge amount in overstated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs. Estimates by some Western military officials put the fraction of “illegitimately” spent CSF at 70 percent, totaling to about $3.8 billion. Alarm bells sounded in Washington, after a critical 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that “for a large number of claims [the Department of] Defense did not obtain sufficient documentation from Pakistan to verify that claimed costs were incremental, actually incurred, or correctly calculated.” For instance, the report cited that $80 million were paid a month in 2006 and 2007 for Pakistan military operations, despite the fact that Islamabad enjoyed ceasefires with pro-Taliban tribal elders.174 This report raised questions about the purpose and efficacy of CSF to Islamabad.175 Musharraf Government, on the other hand, stated that Army had “full account” of CSF.176 But Musharraf claims were contradicted by members of his ‘inner circle.’ General (Retired) Mahmud Durrani, former Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US during General Musharraf regime, recalled that “Musharraf diverted money” intended for the ‘War on Terror’ to “bolster his sagging image through economic subsidies.” He noted that “the army itself got very little” military aid. According to PPP-led coalition government and retired military officials, the diversion of the counterinsurgency assistance by General Musharraf hurt the military campaign in FATA. For example, in 2007, more than 200 military personnel were trapped by militants in the tribal area, but helicopter to rescue them “were not available.” 177 The Department of State cables between May 2006 and April 2009 revealed that the US Embassy in Islamabad repeatedly advocated that reimbursements should be linked to Pakistan’s army “performance, behavior [and] measurable combat operations” instead of its “mere presence” in FATA.178

The Bush administration began to scrutinize Pakistan’s reimbursements claims in 2008. Senior Pakistani military officials contend that escalation in counterinsurgency missions requires an increase in CSF. They argue that “CSF should be used to pay a subsidy for basic soldier compensation as well as for benefits for deaths and injuries.” 179 But US denial rates to Pakistan’s reimbursements’ claims climbed from a low of 1.6 percent in 2005, to 38 percent in 2008. The denial rates for Pakistan’s bills increased after Obama administration took over in January 2009. This issue has caused strains in US-Pakistan relationship.

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Figure 3.1: CSF to Pakistan that US Paid or Rejected (2004-2010)

1.2

0.9 Paid Rejected 0.6

0.3

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Adam Entous, “U.S. Balks at Pakistani Bills,” Wall Street Journal, 16 May 2011.

B. PAKISTAN’S CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES

Pakistan joined US-led ‘War on Terror’ to safeguard its sovereignty, save its nuclear and strategic assets, enhance its internal security, obtain support for Kashmir cause and secure economic benefits. However, US-Pakistan engagement remains “narrowly anchored in counterterrorism”, and Islamabad did not receive from Washington, the support it expected over its national security concerns.180 i. Northern Alliance based Political Configuration in Afghanistan In the post 9/11 scenario, a major concern of Pakistan vis-à-vis United States is the US backed new political configuration in Afghanistan, which rests on the power base of nonPashtun Northern Alliance. In Islamabad’s view, this new political order is fragile and unsustainable in the long run, as it lacks legitimacy among 45 percent or so of Pashtun population, the Taliban’s base.181 Islamabad felt that it will be a matter of time that “politically marginalized” Pashtun in Afghanistan would “join hands with Taliban,” even though “they were not ideological supporters of the Taliban,” to rise against Karzai government and its foreign backers.182

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Indeed, the US support to Northern Alliance at the expense of Pashtuns in Afghanistan is fueling recruitment to the “neo Taliban” on both sides of Pak-Afghan border, which constitutes a threat to US as well as Pakistani counterterrorism operations in the tribal belt.183 Zahid Hussain opines that the US strategy to support Northern Alliance ascent to power, transformed the ‘War on Terror’ into a “Pashtun war” and that the Pashtun in Pakistan “become so strongly allied with both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”184 Islamabad, therefore, argues that improving security in Afghanistan is directly linked to the political participation of moderate elements of Afghan Taliban. In November 2006, Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri during a meeting with his NATO counterparts warned that “the Taliban is winning the conflict in Afghanistan” and urged NATO countries to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban in Afghanistan.185 In January 2010, Islamabad again declared that moderate elements of the Taliban should be given “a respectable share in power” to “drive a wedge between moderates and hardliners,” Taliban and bring peace and stability in Afghanistan. 186 ii. US-India nexus in Afghanistan

India political and strategic advances in post-Taliban Afghanistan remains at the heart of the fractious US-Pakistan relationship. Islamabad closely “gauges the scale” of New Delhi cooperation with Kabul and Washington, and believes that India is acting in concert with the US in Afghanistan.187 Pakistan is particularly chagrined that United States “handed the keys of Kabul to India’s proxies, i.e. Northern Alliance.” It could be argued that Bush administration’s decision to utilize Northern Alliance warlords to gain political control of Kabul compelled Pakistan to continue support to the Afghan Taliban. 188 Pakistan believes that United States has remained insensitive to its concerns about India’s clandestine activities in Afghanistan which are aimed to destabilize Pakistan. Islamabad accuses India of interfering in Balochistan and Pakistan’s tribal regions along Pak-Afghan border.189 Washington, however, does not appreciate Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India. In late 2009, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated that the US had been provided with “no supporting evidence” of Indian involvement in terror acts in Pakistan. Yet, senior Pakistani officials remained insistent that India is planning and financing insurgency in Balochistan and tribal areas through its consulates in Afghanistan.190 Pakistan is also deeply worried about Indian role in training Afghan Security forces. Pakistan believes that the US, NATO as well as Afghan officials, have encouraged India to train Afghan

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National Army (ANA, mostly comprising Tajik and Uzbek soldiers) in counterinsurgency operations.191 On the contrary, Defence Secretary Robert Gates turned down Pakistan’s proposal to train the Afghan National Army (ANA).192 Pakistan army feels that Indian trained ANA will adopt a hostile, suspicious and aggressive posture towards Pakistan in future.193 General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani echoes the sentiment of Pakistan army: “It would be a cause of worry for Pakistan if Afghanistan’s projected army developed the potential to take on Pakistan.” He further elaborated his point by saying:

“Strategically we cannot have an Afghan army on my western border which has an Indian mindset. If we have an army trained by Pakistan, there will be better interactions on the western border. We have opened all doors … It’s a win-win for Afghanistan, United States, ISAF and Pakistan.” 194

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s role in training the Afghan army was denied by General Caldwell, the head of NATO training mission.195 Unfortunately, it seems that NATO uses the growing Indian involvement in Afghanistan “as leverage” against Islamabad to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan, on the other hand, resents India’s training of Afghan Army, which it sees as being directly facilitated by Washington.196 Worst still, the US has “pledged its support to help India become a global power” by providing military hardware, extending cooperation in missile technology, concluding IndoUS nuclear agreement in 2008 197 and endorsing India’s bid for the permanent seat on United Nation Security Council.198 In April 2009, Richard Holbrooke, former special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, declared that India plays a “critical role” in South Asia and without India’s involvement “we cannot settle Afghanistan and many other world problems.”199 US efforts to forge a strategic relationship with New Delhi have irked Islamabad. In fact, Pakistan sees an increasingly “pro-India tilt in US’ South Asia policy.”200 Islamabad cannot accept that while it has been awarded a “Major non-NATO ally” status, it is New Delhi that is headed to become a key player in Afghanistan and beyond. From Pakistan’s perspective, the US support to India is leading New Delhi to “military superiority and regional ‘hegemony’.”201 Pakistan maintains that it has “more stakes in Afghanistan than India” and sees US backed India’s involvement in Afghanistan as a threat to its strategic interests.202 This clearly raises doubts about Pakistan cooperation with the US because it is a very serious national security issue for Pakistan. General Musharraf has expressed his concern about this threat: “India is trying to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan…Afghanistan is under the influence of India.”203

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In a press briefing in February 2010, General Kayani emphasized that Pakistan’s “strategic paradigm needs to be fully realized.” He declared:

“We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan…Strategic depth does not imply controlling Afghanistan… If Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly, we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure…. [Then,] you’re not looking both ways…[But] an environment hostile to Pakistan could strain its battle against militancy and extremism.” 204

By and large, the ‘India factor’ has led to the apparently “divided opinion” amongst Pakistani strategic community and policy makers about fighting the war against terrorism. In such scenario, “Pakistan will assert its legitimate interests in Afghanistan, no matter what it takes.”205 The Afghan Taliban are, therefore, “a natural boost to Islamabad’s drive to protect its interests” by minimizing Indian influence in Afghanistan.206 The killing of an Indian engineer by the Taliban in February 2006 and 2008 bomb attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul were widely attributed to Afghan Taliban working at the behest of ISI. Pakistan denied any involvement in these incidents but the fact remains that Islamabad sees Indian influence in Afghanistan as a threat and perhaps, could react negatively. The February 2009 attack on a Kabul guesthouse revealed that at least one of the victims was an undercover Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW) agent. It has been suggested that the attack may be planned by the ISI to ‘dilute’ the Indian influence in Afghanistan. 207 General Stanley McChrystal, US commander in Afghanistan, stated that India’s growing influence in Afghanistan is “jeopardizing” US mission to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and “is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.”208 He suggested to “scale back” India’s increasing presence in Afghanistan in order to decrease tensions in the region.209 In a 2011 speech at Oklahoma’s Cameron University, Senator Chuck Hagel (now US Defence Secretary) suggested India as a “troublemaker in the region.” He went on to say:

“India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border.”210

Hagel’s comments on India’s role in Afghanistan provide yet another indication that Pakistan security concerns vis-à-vis India are well founded and until, Washington does not address these security concerns, Pakistan’s battle against terrorism may be compromised.

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iii. North Waziristan Operation Another sour point in US-Pakistan relations is Pakistan’s continuous refusal to launch North Waziristan operation to target Haqqani network and its allies. Pakistan does not toe the US line that targeting the Haqqani group in North Waziristan Agency, will break “the backbone of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.” As Ijaz Haider has noted that Afghan insurgency “does not have a defined center of gravity (COG); there are multiple COGs and command lines are much more diffused.” This has resulted in “much dispersal” of the leaders and the fighters of the network because of frequent US drone strikes. This dispersal of the network provides militants “the flexibility to retain their asymmetric advantage over foreign troops in Afghanistan.” 211 Moreover, Pakistan believes that the Afghan insurgency has developed its “own momentum” due to US ‘light foot print’ approach in Afghanistan, the lack of a comprehensive reconstruction effort in the country, delays in building up the country’s institutional infrastructure and the Afghan security sector and the nexus between drugs, narcotrade and militancy. Pakistan maintains that Afghan Taliban’s recruitment, training and organization efforts are indigenous, as highlighted by their northward spread towards Kunduz, Baghlan, and even Badakhshan.212 Hamid Karzai quoted in a cable sent by the US ambassador in Kabul (and released by WikiLeaks), underscored this point: “But, Pakistan is a puzzle to me now…“I see things happening on a massive scale in the northwest that are not the work of ISI.”213

Besides, Pakistani officials also point out that Kabul has not set up enough border posts along the Pak-Afghan border to monitor cross-border movements of insurgents. In a meeting with a European Union Special Representative on Afghanistan, Mr Francesc Venderell, General Musharraf claimed that “the militancy problem was essentially an Afghan problem and underscored that border security was a collective responsibility of Pakistan, Afghanistan and ISAF/NATO.”214 Mr. Shah Mahmood Qureshi, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, also sought closer coordination of coalition forces to control the border region “by undertaking an expansion of military deployments and check posts on the Afghan side of the border” to check infiltrations. He also called for robust real time intelligence sharing and “relocation of Afghan refugee camps” from FATA and other districts of KPK to “controlled sites in Afghanistan.”215 Furthermore, there is strong resentment inside military to Washington’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach towards Pakistan in the war against terrorism. Pakistan army perceives a clear US

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‘tilt’ vis-à-vis India which threaten Pakistan’s political, strategic and economic interests in Afghanistan, Kashmir and beyond. 216 That resentment has only deepened under President Obama administration which has remained unwilling to share its ‘AfPak’ strategy with Pakistan Army. Moreover, Obama administration has accelerated drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas and deployed secret agents and contracted personnel who are involved in covert operations across the country. Above all, negotiations with the Afghan Taliban—which constituted a crucial part of Obama’s ‘AfPak’ strategy—were repeatedly delayed due to reported opposition from the Pentagon and CIA.217 The US ambiguous ‘AfPak’ policy creates profound doubts and suspicions in junior ranks of military for launching new operation in NWA218 about which the US is vociferously insistent. Such an operation is perceived “as threatening the unity” of Pakistan army. Khalid Aziz claims that these are “real threats of possible fragmentation” of the military which “compel the Pakistan military to avoid…..moving against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan.” 219 Finally, Pakistan considers Haqqani network “a significant player” and “has kept communication lines” with the group “open” as it would “guarantee” Islamabad “a major role in future negotiations” to end Afghan conflict and to increase its influence in Afghanistan after the coalition forces exit from the country.220 iv. AFPAK: Shifting the Strategic Centre of Gravity of the ‘War on Terror’ to Pakistan Pakistan is deeply concerned over Obama’s administration ‘AfPak’ strategy, which in Islamabad’s view, has “proved counterproductive” until now. The ‘AfPak’ strategy declares its goal to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan,” and to “eventually destroy extremists and their safe havens within both nations [Afghanistan and Pakistan].”221 Pakistan policy makers are vexed that Obama’s ‘AfPak’ strategy combines the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and militancy in Pakistan into “single theatre of combat.”222 According to an analyst, “the White Paper on US policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan emphasizes Pakistan in the lexicon of the ‘war against terrorism’ and Afghanistan in the lexicon of ‘reconstruction’—moving the strategic centre of gravity of the threat to Pakistan.”223 This policy escalated US drone strikes against targets in FATA especially in NWA and SWA from 43 strikes during 2004-2008 under Bush administration to 308 under Obama first term—a 710 percent increase. Former CIA Director, Leon Panetta stated that these strikes “had thrown Al- Qaeda into complete disarray.”224

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Figure 3. 2: No. of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan (2004-2013)

117 120 100 80 53 64 60 46 35 40 28 20 1 3 5 0 1 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 others South Waziristan North Waziristan

Source: http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (accessed 30 July 2014). Although drone strikes have targeted some militants successfully, civilian deaths have significantly damaged the US image in Pakistan. It is reported that drone strikes in Pakistan since 14 January 2006 to 8 April 2009 killed 2 percent Al-Qaeda operatives and 98 percent innocent Pakistani civilians. 225 The drone attacks recorded an overall 134 percent increase in 2010 compared with the 2009’s figures, jumping from 53 strikes in 2009 to 124 attacks. Of the 1,184 persons killed by the US drone strikes in 2010, 703 (59 percent) were civilians, including women and children and 481 were suspected militants (41 percent).226 According to Bureau of Investigating Journalism, since 2004, 168 children have been killed in drone strikes so far. It also revealed that CIA’s drone campaign in Pakistan has killed dozens of civilians who had gone to help rescue victims or were attending funerals.227

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Figure 3.3: Estimates of US Drone Strikes and Persons (Combatants and Non-Combatants) Killed (2004-2013)

1500

1000

500

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Killed 4 6 28 71 296 709 1184 447 410 195 Minimum Civilians 2 5 93 11 59 98 84 52 63 4 Deaths Drone Strikes 1 2 2 4 34 53 132 75 50 27

Source: “2010, The Year Assassination by Drones: Annual Report on CIA’s Target Killing Campaign in Pakistan’s Tribal Area,” (Islamabad: Conflict Monitoring Center, 2011), pp. 517; Manzoor Ahmad, “Civilians: Common Victim of Anti-State Violence,” (Islamabad: Conflict Monitoring Center, April 2011); “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2011,” New America Foundation; http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (accessed 28 December 2011). “CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004–2013;” http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama2013-pakistan-drone-strikes/ (accessed 2 August 2014).

Substantial increase in missile strikes by US drones creates resentment and anger among Pakistani citizenry. Consequently, the continuation of these attacks increases instability in Pakistan and contributes to “a sense of lost of sovereignty” and independence among public.228 In a land mark decision, on 9 May 2013, Peshawar High Court declared that US drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas are “naked aggression against the country “and constitute “war crimes.”229

The court noted that most of drone attacks occurred in North and South Waziristan. It stated that 896 people were killed and 209 seriously injured in North Waziristan between 2008 and December 2012 and only 47 of them were foreigners. It added that in South Waziristan, 70 drone strikes were carried between 2008 and June 2012 in which 553 local civilians were killed

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and 126 injured. The court ordered the government to raise the drone issue at the United Nations Security Council and to take all possible measures to halt the attacks. 230

On another plane, Pakistan was also disappointed about the prospects of the military ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. President Obama’s policy of a troop surge of 30,000 announced on 1 December 2009 aimed to demonstrate “sufficient resolve” to bring Taliban to the negotiating table and strike a political agreement with them that will leave in place a viable and stable non-Taliban controlled Afghan government, so that US can “run honourably” from Afghanistan. 231 Pakistanis feared that an all-out massive US ‘military surge’ would flush militants out from Afghanistan into Pakistan. In fact, it has been reported that the first major ‘surge’ operation launched on 13 February 2010 in District Marjah failed to bring peace in the area as the “US control is patchy.”232 Furthermore, the Karzai government failed to fill the vacuum with good governance in Marjah. Most importantly, Afghan security forces were unable to prevent the Taliban’s return to the area.233 In reality, the Marjah operation “revealed the notion that a ‘government in a box’ can be established in a territory that has been secured is fundamentally flawed.”234 On the contrary, the ‘surge’ strategy pushed back militants out from Afghanistan into FATA, causing spillover effects on Pakistan military operations in the tribal areas. 235 This in turn, increased the threat of growing militancy and terrorism in Pakistan. By December 2010, Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Review was complete and the US was forced to substantially downgrade its expectations: “Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda and prevent its return to the region.” Though, the review admitted that the ‘AfPak’ strategy made little progress in degrading the ever growing Afghan insurgency.236 Yet, Washington argues that it has to “trade-off Pakistani stability for success in Afghanistan at this point.”237 Clearly, the new US strategy places Pakistan as the “central node of global terrorism,” which in the words of Daniel Markey, lends to a strategy shift “from ‘AfPak’ to PakAf.”238 v. Concerns over Cross-border Incursions Ground force raids are one of the most sensitive of Pakistani “red lines.” Violations deeply strain US-Pakistan relations, and met stern reaction from Pakistan.239 Islamabad believes that ground raids by NATO or US Special Forces are counterproductive and fuel anti-American

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sentiments.240 United States and NATO officials on the other hand, maintain that Pakistan’s failure to act against Afghan insurgents who launch cross-border attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan, has compelled the US to continue to consider ‘hot pursuit’ of Taliban. The policy of ‘hot pursuit’ came after the first border clash between the US and Pakistani troops in South Waziristan during which one American soldier was injured and two members of Pakistani Border Scout were killed. 241 Meanwhile, the US media reported that there is a tacit agreement between Pakistan and United States that ‘hot pursuit’ of suspected Taliban and AlQaeda fighters across Pakistan-Afghan border will be quietly allowed, as long as the distance is not deep into Pakistani territory, and as long as no civilians were killed.242 Pakistani officials denied any such consent of Pakistan and stated that “operations within Pakistani territory would be conducted solely and exclusively by our own forces and in response to decisions taken by Pakistan.”243

General Kayani also stated, “There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.” 244 Yet, Pakistani officials regularly overlook raids across Pak-Afghan border if these incursions do not draw much public attention.245 Nevertheless, the attack by the US ground forces on 3 September 2008, at the Pakistani village of Musa Nika in South Waziristan killing 20 people set off alarm bells across Pakistan. Worse still, the attack came at a time when Pakistan army was carrying out military operation against TTP in Bajaur agency.246

It was reported in the New York Times that the 3 September attack was the result of a July 2008 “secret authorization” by President Bush to allow US ‘Special Operations Forces’ to carry out air and ground attacks without notifying Pakistan in advance. 247 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen’s assertion that “increased US incursions in Pakistan are likely” lends credence to such reports. 248 These concerns suggest a high level of distrust between Islamabad and Washington on the “operational aspects” in the ‘War on Terror’. Subsequently, Pakistan blocked “a NATO supply route through Torkham” (through which 25 percent of NATO/ISAF’s non-lethal cargo is transported daily) to Afghanistan.249 The coalition forces, on the other hand, continued ground raids against targets inside Pakistani territory.250

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Tensions over cross-border incursions by the US came to a boil on 30 September 2010 when US cross-border helicopters’ attack killed three Pakistani paramilitary soldiers.251 Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs called “these attacks on its territory a clear violation and breach of the UN mandate, which authorized ISAF combat operations in Afghanistan only.”252 The situation led Pakistan to shut down Pak-Afghan border at Torkham. Hundreds of NATO containers “were trapped at the crossing, described as sitting ducks, left vulnerable and defenceless” to attacks by the militants. During the blockade, about 150 supply vehicles were torched by the militants.253 As the blockade got worse, United States expressed regret for the raid in several messages. The US Ambassador in Pakistan, Anne Patterson termed it “a terrible accident.” 254 After the US apologies, Pakistan reopened the NATO’s supply route at Torkham. 255 It is important to note that to avoid deep strains in Pakistan-NATO relations, Islamabad let other supply lines continue through Balochistan. 256 This blockade proved that Pakistan could exercise a valuable “veto power” over US-led campaign in Afghanistan.257 The US failure to find alternative supply routes indicates that US would remain vulnerable to Pakistani leverage in this regard.258 Hence, the closure at Torkham established the fact that Pakistan is “central” to the US-led counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan. In other words, any interruptions in supply lines would have a huge impact on US and NATO operations across the border.259 vi. Covert US Intelligence and Military Operations Inside Pakistan The covert US intelligence and military operations inside Pakistan has been another major source of Pakistan’s concern. US covert presence includes US military trainers, CIA’s paramilitary special Activities Division intelligence, team of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and contracted personnel of US private security companies.260 Many analysts argue that General Musharraf government gave unprecedented permission to the US intelligence agencies to start covert operations in Pakistan. It was reported that in December 2001, President Musharraf struck a deal with President George Bush, which allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CIA to conduct their raids inside Pakistan if the target is bin Laden; Al-Qaeda Deputy Chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri; or other key Al-Qaeda leaders. The deal was reaffirmed in early 2008, when Musharraf’s hold on power seemed shakier.261

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Since 2008, Pakistan is becoming increasingly concerned that CIA and the US military and security personnel seeking to “penetrate” the ISI and learn more about ISI links with Afghan insurgents and Kashmir focused militant groups as well as Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In FATA, Pakistani forces had small teams of US ‘Special Operation Forces’ “embedded” with Pakistani senior officers, and these units captured more than 400 Al-Qaeda fighters.262 Senior Pakistani officials indicated that CIA and FBI agents were taking part in search operations and helping gather intelligence about militants. While the joint efforts by Pakistani investigators and US intelligence agencies had had tremendous success in capturing key AlQaeda operatives including Al-Qaeda’s Chief of Operations, Abu Zubaydah, the FBI and CIA soon seized “complete control over intelligence collection and dissemination” and isolated ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) from this process. 263 CIA and FBI established Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in FATA, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta. 264 According to Marc Ambinder and Grady, Washington exploited the situation of mayhem following the Kashmir earthquake in 2005 to send teams of US ‘Joint Special Operations Command’ (JSOC) and CIA operatives and contractors in the garb of “construction and aid workers.” Their mission was “to develop rings of informants” to collect “targeting information about Al-Qaeda” operatives. They have also revealed the JSOC team’s important goals in Pakistan:

“JSOC needed better intelligence about how Pakistan transported its nuclear weapons and wanted to penetrate the ISI. Under a secret program code-named SCREEN HUNTER, JSOC, augmented by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and contract personnel, was authorized to shadow and identify members of the ISI suspected of being sympathetic to Al-Qaeda…. One official said that the goal of the program was to track terrorists through the ISI by using disinformation and psychological warfare.” 265

Moreover, rotating teams of SEALs in collaboration with Rangers and ‘Special Operations Forces’ operated in the tribal region of Pakistan and “targeted courier networks, trainers, and facilitators” with little or no coordination with Pakistan army.266 Forward intelligence bases in Pakistan were staffed by JSOC-contracted security personnel from murky private security companies such as Blackwater (Xe Services), and DynCorp. It was reported in October 2009, that JSOC was running a “covert forward base” in port city Karachi with Xe Services. According to the reports, Blackwater or Xe Services helps JSOC in

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intelligence collection and facilitates drones campaign in Pakistan. It is also involved in “snatch and grabs” and “targeted assassinations of Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives.”267 Pakistani military and the intelligence agencies are also worried that DynCorp is being employed by the US “to develop a parallel network of security and intelligence personnel” to penetrate into Pakistan’s “nuclear security apparatus.”268 Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rehman Malik stated in February 2010 that General Musharraf struck a deal with DynCorp for “capacity building and training of FC” in 2003. DynCorp had been training FC at the Sihala Police College. But the training centre was transferred to a different place because the DynCorp personnel were reportedly “involved in espionage” of the nuclear site of ‘Kahuta Research Laboratories’ (KRL) located nearby.269 The CIA has also relied on “Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams” comprising 3,000 Afghan paramilitary force personnel, operating out of secret forward bases in Khost, Paktika and Jalalabad in Afghanistan to carryout target killings of pro-government and anti-US clerics in Pakistan.270 It seems that the US strategy is to “prick” Pakistan security forces through clandestine operations to align their policies vis-à-vis US objectives in the region.271 vii. US ‘tilt’ towards India vis-à-vis Kashmir Dispute Pakistan’s discomfort with the US ‘tilt’ towards India vis-à-vis Kashmir dispute has the potential to upset the partnership. Pakistan is deeply concerned that following 9/11, Washington has increasingly sought to buy Indian point that Kashmiri resistance was a “‘cross border terrorism’ sponsored by Pakistan.” President Bush decision on the eve of 11 September 2001 that “any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by United States as a hostile regime” was exploited by India to describe Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir insurgency as ‘cross border terrorism.’ Although President Musharraf initially portrayed the Kashmir insurgency as ‘freedom struggle’272 but after Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) militants were blamed for the attacks on State Assembly in Srinagar in October 2001, and on Indian Parliament in December 2001, it became increasingly challenging for Islamabad to maintain its diplomatic and material support to the insurgents in Kashmir, and as a result “its decade-old strategy came under pressure” from the US.273 During his visit to New Delhi in October 2001, US Secretary of State, Collin Powell told India that US-led ‘War on Terror’ was “not confined to Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda” and “includes the terrorism that has been directed against India as well.” It was perhaps “the first time that

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[Bush] administration openly used the word Al-Qaeda in the context of Kashmir.”274 Moreover, the Bush administration froze the financial assets of JM and added both JM and LT to its list of ‘Designated Terrorist Organizations.’275 These moves raised fears and anxiety among Pakistan’s official circles that “the US will agree to India’s demands that Kashmir be treated as a global terrorism problem.”276 Nevertheless, Washington required Pakistan army’s cooperation to fight the war against terrorism, hence, it did not include Kashmir into the ambit of the ‘War on Terror’ as desired by New Delhi, but constantly exerted pressure on Islamabad to address India’s concern on ‘cross-border terrorism’ in Kashmir. 277 In fact, Musharraf was forced to ban Kashmir focused militant groups JM and LT on January 2002; 278 however, these groups moved their training camps to Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-Administered Kashmir) or FATA and continued training until March 2004. 279 The then ISI Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani reformed the ISI and removed the anti-Indian, radical officers. The result was dramatic as the militants’ intrusions into Indian- administered Kashmir reached to their minimum.280After 2004, Pakistan military cut down militant infiltration to Kashmir by “95 percent”, but India refused to hold talks to settle the Kashmir dispute once and for all. 281 Pakistan has increasingly looked to the United States to pressure India for a meaningful dialogue. However, Bush as well as Obama administrations remained indifferent to Pakistan’s appeals to mediate on the Kashmir issue. President Obama, while speaking to a joint session of the Indian Parliament in November 2010, stated US policy vis-à-vis Kashmir dispute:

“We will continue to welcome dialogue between India and Pakistan, even as we recognize that disputes between your two countries can only be resolved by the people of your two countries.”282

Ironically, a week before President Obama was elected in November 2008; he declared that to minimize the Pakistan-India rivalry in Afghanistan, Kashmir dispute needs to be resolved.283 President Obama later recognized that pressuring New Delhi to come to negotiating table to resolve the Kashmir dispute will be “counterproductive” for the US economic interests.284 Therefore, Obama administration later refused to mediate on Kashmir dispute and excluded India from its ‘AfPak’ strategy. This constrained the capacity of Richard Holbrooke to intervene and mediate in Kashmir dispute, a factor which is essential to regional stability.285

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In effect, the US wants solution of the Kashmir dispute purely on Indian terms which envisages conversion of Line of Control (LoC) into “permanent border with minor realignment.” To that end, United States supported Pakistan-India bilateral Composite Dialogue (2004-2007). Beyond this, however, Washington avoided any mediation between the two countries to settle the dispute.286 For Islamabad and New Delhi, the Composite Dialogue was aimed to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”287 The dialogue after making substantial progress vis-à-vis Kashmir issue collapsed due to three factors: i. The political crisis that loosened Musharraf grip on power after he sacked Pakistan’s Chief Justice in 2007, negatively affected the progress on peace process.

ii. The peace process also collapsed because New Delhi did not “reciprocate to Musharraf ‘flexible approach’” on Kashmir issue. iii. It completely derailed following November 2008 Mumbai attacks. 288

Although Washington facilitated the peace process, yet it remained unable to prevent the process from being derailed completely. Much to Pakistan’s chagrin, the US on which Islamabad “pinned high hopes, sided with India.”289 The Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Robert Blake stated:

“The first part of that sequencing (resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue) will be for Pakistan to take action against these five Mumbai suspects, to prosecute them.... And then for the two sides to agree on the ways that India can be sure and Pakistan can be sure that Pakistan’s territory is not being used by these militant groups to threaten India, Afghanistan or the US.”290

Such statements irk Pakistan that the US views Pakistani “security apparatus through the Indian prism.” Buying Indian line, Americans want Pakistan to “delegitimize and disarm” Kashmir focused militant groups but ignored calls by Pakistan that India should extend cooperation in Mumbai probe and resume the dialogue on Kashmir dispute.291 After Mumbai attacks in 2008, and the subsequent debriefings of David Headley (linked with Mumbai attacks) increased cooperation between the US and India against Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. The joint Obama- Manmohan communiqué issued from Washington called for a well-coordinated strategy to disrupt “terrorist safe havens” in the region (referring to Pakistan). But to Pakistan’s dismay, it avoided the resolution of longstanding disputes particularly Kashmir that have “provoked

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proxy wars in the region.”292 Washington’s determination to avoid the Kashmir issue to keep New Delhi satisfied, thus, frustrates Pakistan. Certainly, without the resolution of this ‘core issue’, Pakistan’s “security paradigm will remain India-centric,”293 thus, making the US ‘War on Terror’ in ‘AfPak’ region a “secondary” concern.294 viii. Inadequate Economic Aid and Trade

Pakistan’s economy remains in a severely troubled state. Pakistan has suffered ‘a colossal loss’ of $78 billion (7 trillion) between 2001 and 2012 due to the ‘War on Terror’, but received Rs. 990 billion in US aid programme through NGOs and USAID.295 Washington ignores the “cumulative impact” of the war on Pakistan’s economy such as massive raise in expenditure on military operations and internal security, damages to infrastructure, displacement of population, decline in foreign investments and flight of capital and colossal losses to local economies in FATA, Swat/Malakand and other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

It is estimated that during 2001-10, the US spent $2,000 billion in Afghanistan, Iraq and on upgrading homeland security; Pakistan received only 0.1 percent ($20 billion) of this lion amount.296 In fact, the $1.5 billion in annual assistance under the Kerry-Lugar Bill is “dwarfed” in comparison to the US assistance to these countries.297

Figure 3.4: Comparison of US Aid and Loss to the GDP of Pakistan (2011)

Loss to the GDP, 8.50% US Aid, 0.20%

Source: “Pakistan lost Rs. 7,020 billion, got only Rs. 990 billion,” The News, 8 February 2012.

The result could be that Pakistan would remain economically unstable and very poor.298 It has been suggested that to generate economic activity and employment for Pakistan’s youth,

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growth rate would have to persist over 8 percent per annum. It has instead slowed down with high fiscal deficit, causing alarming levels of inflation.299 Since 2001, most US foreign aid has been earmarked to Pakistan’s military. Over the period of 2002–2007, Washington provided $10,097 million in assistance. This included $2,728 million for economic-related aid and $7,369 million for security-related aid.300 It means that the social and economic sector received about one-fourth of assistance (27 percent) while US assistance to military constitutes more than 73 percent of the total aid during 2002–2007. United States generosity toward Pakistan military was meant to prop up General Musharraf regime and to “appease his primary constituency, the Pakistan army,” in order to secure military regime continued engagement in the ‘War on Terror’.301 General Musharraf presented the aid to the military and the public “as benefits” of engagement in the otherwise unpopular ‘War on Terror’. But at the same time, he persistently argued that the aid was narrowly focused and should bring relief to common people. Musharraf repeatedly suggested that the US and European Union “should provide additional market access” to Pakistan’s exports in view of its tremendous contributions in the war against terrorism. He stressed that “the US has awarded preferential trade status to several developing countries. A similar status for Pakistan would enable the establishment of more factories and create more jobs which will contribute to poverty alleviation.” 302 The United States has attempted to address the radicalism in FATA largely through military means but socio-economic development of the tribal areas is also a crucial part of counterinsurgency campaign. Sadly, the resources allocated for tribal areas are almost overshadowed by security and military-related expenditures. Ninety-six percent of US assistance in FATA during fiscal years 2002-2007 spent on military expenditures. Only one percent of aid ($40 million) was directed to development assistance through USAID during this period.303 The US legislators have argued that despite massive spending for border control and military operations by Pakistan Army, Al-Qaeda has been able to resurge in the tribal areas while at the same time Taliban has accelerated insurgency in Afghanistan.304 Between 2008 and 2012 US increased economic assistance to Pakistan. Of the total $15,815 million provided, $5,958 million (37.67 percent) were allocated for economic support funds (62.32 percent) and $9,857 million for security-related aid.305 This showed an increase of 10.66 percent in economic assistance during 2008–2012 as compared to that of 2002-2007.

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Nevertheless, the US economic aid has not been showing significant improvement in the economic development of Pakistan. In particular, the quality of education and health services provided remains poor and inadequate. As noted by Christine Fair, Washington like other “supply-driven donors in Pakistan, tends to define its output as funds disbursed or things built, such as schools and clinics, rather than services delivered, such as quality of education provided or quality of medical care delivered.”306 ix. Pakistan’s Image and Prestige Pakistan, being an Islamic country, is seen in United States through the lens of ‘West versus Islam.’ There are around 450,000 Pakistanis in the US and most of them are semi-skilled and have only one purpose: to earn money for survival. Nevertheless, after 11 September 2001, Pakistani citizens in United States are facing serious problems only because the alleged “perpetrators” of 9/11 attacks were Arab Muslims. Pakistanis in particular, are the main target of the US ‘Patriot Act’ (signed into law by President Bush on 26 October 2001)307 and frequently required to “be fingerprinted, photographed and interviewed” by the Immigration

and Naturalization Services (INS). Since the start of the INS programme, some 1100 Pakistanis had been “deported,” 3,000 went to neighbouring Canada. The US also introduced new Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) directed towards the Muslims particularly, Pakistani citizens.308 A very large number of Pakistanis (45,000 of the estimated 100,000) were “deported or left voluntarily” from New York under INA following the 9/11 attacks.309 Many Pakistanis are subjected to interrogation by intelligence agencies because they are suspected to be engaged in terror related activities. Pakistan’s government and opposition publicly criticized the Transportation Security Administration’s decision, announced on 4 January 2010, in the aftermath of a foiled bombing attempt on a 2009 Northwest Airlines flight, to include Pakistan among the “countries of interest” whose citizens will face “enhanced airport security screening.”310 In a letter to the US Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan military’s Joint Staff Committee described the enhanced screening as “contradictory” to the role played by Pakistan in the ‘War on Terror’. According to the letter, the enhanced screening “puts to serious questioning” Islamabad’s “status as a major non-NATO ally” and “impinge(s) adversely upon the enhanced cooperation between the US and Pakistan.” The letter demanded

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that Pakistan be “removed” from the list of “countries of concern.” After thorough review, Obama administration repealed the policy in April 2010.311 Pakistan policy makers are also concerned that anti-Pakistan sentiments are increasing gradually in America. The US officials and media analysts label Pakistan’s tribal areas as “the most dangerous place”312 in the world, and “hot bed of terrorism.”313 The US doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to fight against Afghan Taliban and Kashmir focused militant groups also remain widespread. Throughout the engagement, the US view of the partnership was that Pakistan was an “unreliable ally.” 314

In fact, US officials portray Pakistan, as a state that is at “the brink of collapse,” or at the verge of becoming a “Failed State” and its nuclear weapons may soon be seized by terrorists.315 Bruce Riedel, in an exclusive interview with FOX News stated that Pakistan has “the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world and it has more terrorists per square mile than any other country in the world.” He further stated: “Imagine a state with…the sixth largest army, that’s an active sponsor…of terrorist groups…that welcome Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda out of their hiding places into the Presidential palaces in Islamabad. That’s the nightmare that we have to worry about.”316 Such statements led Pakistani authorities to declare that “the nuclear installations are so safe that even the US satellite cannot monitor them.”317 The tremendous social and economic problems due to Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’, however, receive little media coverage and attention in America. This increases the ‘trust deficit’ between Washington and Islamabad.318

PROSPECTS OF US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS a) Counterterrorism and Security Cooperation

There are prospects of greater US-Pakistan cooperation in the area of counterterrorism and security of tribal areas. Pakistan and the US have embarked on a multi-year Security Development Plan (SDP) for Pakistan’s Pak-Afghan border region. The SDP is aimed to improve Pakistan’s ability to engage extremist and militant organizations by:

• Reinforcing Pak-Afghan border security; • Denying sanctuaries for extremists and terrorists; and

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• Ensuring a safe and stable environment for the development activities in the border areas.319

A key aspect of the SDP is the building of six Border Coordination Centers (BCC) along Pak-Afghan border in order to speed up “the delivery of target intelligence” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and ISAF forces. This coordination is crucial for the forces to operate against Taliban, Al-Qaeda and narco-smugglers. The first BCC, Khyber Border Coordination Centre, was opened on 29 March 2008 at Torkham Gate on the Afghan side of the border.320 Sadly, this Centre has failed to produce the desired results because of language barriers, border disputes and growing distrust among Afghan, US, and Pakistani forces.321 Nevertheless, the tri-lateral participation between Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani; the US General David Petraeus and later, General John R. Allen; and Afghan Army Chief, General Bismullah Khan and later General Sher Muhammad Karimi continued to enhance border coordination in line with the objectives set forth in SDP.322 During the early phase of implementation of ‘AfPak’ strategy in 2009, Pakistan military offensive against TTP in Swat and South Waziristan has resulted in some “overlap” between American and Pakistani counterterrorism strategies. The same period has also seen credible expansion of military and security cooperation in US-Pakistan relations, the possibility of such cooperation may in the future is also likely. As Pakistan army’s expanded operations to Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber and Bajaur agency in order to interdict Taliban fighters fleeing Pakistan army operation in South Waziristan in late 2009, the US Special Operations Forces began conducting ‘train-and-equip’ activities with Pakistan military which proved very beneficial. Particularly, security cooperation in the areas of the fusion of intelligence and the overall military-to-military partnership has improved. In this regard, Bajaur offensive in February 2010, led by the Frontier Corps was of immense significance on account of effective communication between Pakistan military and their ISAF counterparts across the border in Afghanistan.323 Most importantly, to disrupt insurgent sanctuaries in Quetta, Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) also approved an Office of the Defense Representative (ODRP) and Coalition presence at the Pakistan army 12 Corps Headquarter (Quetta).324 These initiatives reflect key overlaps in objectives, particularly in the shared desire to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in FATA; although the US would pressure Pakistan to

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expand ‘war theater’ into Afghan insurgents’ strongholds of North Waziristan and northern parts of Balochistan, which Islamabad is determined to resist for political and strategic reasons.325 Nonetheless, Pakistan does not want to see an invincible Taliban rule in Afghanistan because of the offshoots of the movement such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that is now challenging the state writ. The triumph of Taliban in Afghanistan will offer “Pakistan’s own Taliban its own strategic depth and energize its fight against the Islamabad government and the country’s constitutional system.” 326 This strategic interest of Pakistan could create overlaps for future security cooperation between Islamabad, Washington and Kabul. b) Solution to Afghanistan Conflict There are prospects of greater US-Pakistan cooperation to find a mutually amenable solution to Afghanistan conflict. In this regard, three Pakistani objectives dovetail nicely with those of United States. One, Pakistan wants to see Haqqani network, Hizb-e-Islami and other Afghan Taliban groups to quit sanctuaries in tribal areas and return to Afghanistan, as Pakistan could not deal with the TTP firmly because it has “tactical” associations with these groups.327 Pakistan desires that these Afghan insurgent groups should break ties with Al-Qaeda and integrate politically into Afghan government. In other words, Pakistan, like the US, does not want Afghanistan to slide back to being a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and affiliated transnational militant organizations.

Two, Pakistan is cautious of the likelihood of an internal conflict in Afghanistan after the exit of US-led coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014. In case, if coalition forces failed to stabilize Afghanistan significantly before their withdrawal, Pakistan’s tribal areas and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan will become a ‘war zone’ with state control being vanished. This will also buoy up their allied Kashmir focused groups and sectarian outfits in Punjab and Karachi to attack Pakistani state and its institutions.328 To shield itself from the negative fallout of post-2014 conflict in Afghanistan, Islamabad knows it has to “control these ‘buffer territories’”,329 aptly described by an analyst as Pakistan’s “real strategic depth”, 330 to further secure the “Punjabi-Sindhi core.”331 United States also sees an interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and tribal areas. Thus, both the countries share the interest of peace and stability in the ‘AfPak’ region.

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Three, Pakistan recognizes that peace in Afghanistan is essential to achieve its goal of economic stability and growth by reaching out to Central Asia. The focus of Pakistani vision is a trans-Afghan pipeline that would bring gas through the war-torn Afghanistan and terminate at Gwadar port. Islamabad has worked hard to endorse the trans-Afghan pipeline and announced that New Delhi could also participate in this project, hence, the name Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.332

Figure 3.5: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) Project

Source: John Foster, “A Pipeline through a Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, and the New Great Energy Game,” Foreign Policy Series, Vol. 3, No. 1 (19 June 2008), p. 8.

United States also encourages the Central Asian States “to develop new ties and synergies” with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.333 America strongly backs TAPI gas pipeline as the project challenges Russian strategy at “consolidating an energy monopoly over Central Asia”

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by directing some of the region’s energy flows toward South Asia, and to the West via Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province, which will make Islamabad the US “gateway to Central Asia.” Additionally, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India together with American Oil Company, UNOCAL, and Saudi Oil Company, DELTA, would gain tremendously from such project.334 It is important to note that TAPI will run through Helmand and Kandahar provinces, where the US ‘military surge’ was focused. In other words, United States wants to stabilize these Afghan provinces, crucial for the success of TAPI project.335 Figure 3.6: Map Showing TAPI Route and Areas of Conflict in ‘AfPak’ Region

Source: M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pipeline project a new Silk Road,” Asia Times, 16 December 2010.

Surely, TAPI project, if operational, will buttress the US political and military influence in Central and South Asia. For Pakistan, this project would enhance its status in the American regional strategy, would win the US commitment to shore up its economy and ultimately would strengthen Pakistan’s security. Pakistan’s interests in ensuring ‘AfPak’ region and beyond as a secure economic hub thus, find convergence with those of the United States.336 c) Parity with India and Regional Stability

One of the objectives of Pakistan’s support to US in the ‘War on Terror’ was securing military assistance and defense articles. Pakistan needs advanced and conventional military equipment

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to combat India in case of any future conflict. 337 Washington understands that military assistance is “a key incentive” in inducing Pakistan’s cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’, as it makes Pakistan “more secure vis-à-vis India.”338 The declaration of Pakistan as a “major non- NATO ally” in 2004 opened the way to significant US military sales to Pakistan.339 For the period from 2002 through to 2010, the total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan were worth about $5.4 billion.340 Since 2001, United States also provided Pakistan with over $2.751 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF)341 to buy US military equipment for longer-term modernization efforts. Between 2007 and 2010, Pakistan has purchased defense articles and services worth $4.1 billion through the Foreign Military Financing (FMS) programme.342 Washington provided Pakistan $2.7 billion in military assistance in 2010 alone.343 Analysts argue that the US arms sales to Pakistan facilitate regional stability by enhancing Pakistan’s conventional weapons capability.344 d) Monetary Aid for Economic Development The best measure to counter the ever increasing growth of extremism and militancy in Pakistan is to bolster its capacity to achieve economic development and social progress, especially to create employment in the context of mounting “demographic pressures” and “one of the World’s largest youth bulges” with thirty-five percent of populace aged fifteen or under.345 For that reason, US monetary aid and assistance remains essential for Pakistan’s continued economic development. Pakistan has to expand the economy to educate, train, and employ the youth; otherwise, uneducated, unskilled and unemployed youth would create a huge recruitment pool for militant organizations.346 In line with this theory that support for extremism and militancy is often caused by unemployment, poverty and poor governance, United States decided to provide economic assistance to Islamabad to reduce the threat of militancy and terrorism. Washington granted more than $600 million in economic assistance for Fiscal Year 2002, along with export credits and guarantees, and the Bush administration requested $250 million from US Congress for fiscal year 2003.347 In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where he announced a $3billion economic assistance for a period of five-year.348 Pakistan began to receive annual installments of military and economic aid valued at $300 million each in FY2005. Between 2005 and 2007, assistance to Pakistan that was not related to security grew 13.5 percent (from $340 million to

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$401 million). Between 2001 and 2008, twenty-five percent of total aid was allocated for economic and development assistance, including food aid. 349 Obama administration attempted to develop bilateral aid relationship beyond military assistance through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as Kerry- Lugar Bill. Obama declared supporting “a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan” and a “stable constitutional government” to be principal objectives of the US policy.350 The Bill allocates $7.5 billion for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

Table 3.1: Money Allocation to Pakistan through Kerry-Lugar Bill

Programme Money Allocation Focus on Sectors High impact, High Visibility $3.5 billion Energy and Agricultural Infrastructure Focused Humanitarian and $2 billion Education, Health Service and Social Services Humanitarian Programs Government Capacity $2 billion a) Improved National & Local Developm Governance b) Improved Security & Legal Institutions Source: “Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report,” US Department of State, 14 December 2009; See at: http://www.state.gov/s/special_rep_afghanistan_pakistan/133902.htm (accessed 5 August 2010).

This financial assistance, which has buttressed the economy, is designed to show Pakistani people that the US has a long-term interest in their country’s economic development and prosperity.351 It is important to note that United States needs to find means to strengthen Pakistan’s planning capabilities and to ensure that performance targets are set and reviews are conducted by Pakistan to effectively handle the US aid. Both the US aid machinery and Pakistani implementing agencies will also need to ensure that aid reaches people on the ground, rather than being diverted to power brokers, to buttress the long-run fundamentals of Pakistan’s economy. 352

There is an opportunity for Islamabad to persuade the US that Pakistan’s economic development and growth is crucial for continued engagement of Pakistan in the ‘War on Terror’, and for peace and stability in the region.353

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e) Democratic Process in Pakistan Both Washington and Islamabad recognize the importance of a stable democratic government and strengthening civilian institutions in Pakistan. While Bush administration counterterrorism approach revolved around military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, Obama administration, on the contrary, declared its solid commitment to promote democracy and strengthen civilian institutions. Barack Obama criticized the Bush administration for its support to the military regime of General Musharraf. Therefore, Obama administration will not back any possible military coup and undemocratic government in Pakistan.354 The Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) proposed a $1.5-billion “Democracy Dividend” which shows Obama administrations’ commitment to Pakistan’s democratic process. 355 In December 2009, President Obama declared to provide “substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development.” He also promised to build a long and stable relationship by saying that “the Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.” 356 In fact, Obama administration seeks to foster a stable civil—military balance that “will not cycle back and forth between military regimes.”357 For this purpose, the administration emphasizes its support for civilian government and strengthening of institutions while at the same time building a more robust relationship with the military to secure its cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’.358

CONCLUSION

The history of US-Pakistan relations had been “marked by convergence and divergence” of security and political objectives that “kept on switching from friendship to friction.” 359 The US gained immensely during the period of “convergence of interests from the geo-strategic location of Pakistan and its traditional security dilemma vis-à-vis India.” Whereas Pakistan benefited “less” as the US left Pakistan alone once Washington’s policy preferences shifted vis-à-vis Islamabad and the region. In the post 9/11 era, Pakistan strategic community has also developed a growing feeling of disenchantment with American policymakers because of their inability to understand and assuage Pakistan’s concerns vis-à-vis US-led ‘War on Terror’. This narrowly defines US-Pakistan engagement which is grounded in

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“counterterrorism centered agenda.”360

Pakistan is a ‘Pivotal State’ in the US strategy in Central and South Asia. The US objectives including counterterrorism and extremism, regional and global stability, political and economic development of Pakistan and the region are significantly affected by internal security situation in Pakistan. Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is complicated by the fact that Pakistan disputes several components of US policy especially, Washington’s ‘tilt’ towards India and its refusal or inability to address Pakistan’s concerns regarding peculiar nature of militancy, extremism and terrorism-related issues in FATA, across the border in Afghanistan and in ‘mainland Pakistan.’ The US insists only on military solution by Pakistan against Afghan insurgents particularly, the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. Islamabad, on the other hand, is “unable or unwilling” to confront the issue that FATA is a ‘safe-haven’ for Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and affiliated militant groups and it pursues a “selective counterterrorism approach.” Hence, United States sees difficulties to “reformulate” Pakistan army counterterrorism strategies in tribal areas, as Washington is unwilling to address Pakistan’s vital security concerns vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. 361

To be successful, US strategy must be based on understanding and appreciating Pakistan’s objectives as well as its security concerns. Reaching at a balanced and successful strategy calls for “identifying,” negotiating and expanding potential “zones of agreement” or areas of common interests of both the countries. 362 Once these zones are identified and understood, both the countries need to negotiate to act jointly on potential “zones of agreement.” In reality, such zones exist and offer opportunities for an effective and robust partnership; these include: combating Al-Qaeda, stabilizing Afghanistan, normalization of relations between Islamabad and New Delhi, fortifying Pakistan’s internal security, bolstering economic progress and strengthening democratic process in Pakistan. To conclude, US-Pakistan engagement implies a need for Washington to understand and appreciate Pakistan’s security objectives before it can expect Pakistan to align its objectives with those of the US in the ‘War on Terror’.363 The next chapter will detail Pakistan’s diplomatic, law enforcement counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. END NOTES

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1 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous US-Pakistan Relationship” (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2010), p. 1. 2 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” Report RL 33498 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, February 2009), p. 32. 3 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Pakistan-US Relationship,” Defence Journal (Islamabad), Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 1998), pp. 25-26. 4 Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59 (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 26. 5 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 26. 6 Ibid., Maleeha Lodhi, “The Pakistan-US Relationship,” Op Cit., p. 26. 7 Jayshree Bajoria, “US Involvement in Pakistan,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 15 February 2008); Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/15260/ uspakistan_relations.html (accessed 15 May 2009). 8 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbours: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy (Hampshire: Asghate, 2005), p. 96. 9 K. Alan Kronstadt, Op Cit., p. 73. 10 Stephen Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” in Chandra Chari (ed.) Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 77. 11 Safdar Sial, “Pak-US: A Balance Sheet of Relations,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, June 2007), p. 3. 12 Hafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics: 1947-92 (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 115-117. 13 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., pp. 115. 14 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst, 2009), p. 173; See also S. M. Burke, and Lawrence Ziring (ed.), Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 241. 15 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., pp. 118-121. 16 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 152. 17 Jayshree Bajoria, Op Cit. 18 Stephen P. Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” Op Cit., p. 77. 19 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., p. 121. 20 Stephen P. Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” Op Cit., p. 77. 21 Ibid. From this point onward, the US made a distinction between major Communist powers that were friendly (China), and those that were hostile (Soviet Union). 22 Lester H. Brune, Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988 (2nd ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 807. 23 Ibid. Although publicly claiming neutrality, President Nixon acted in a fashion that prevented a wider war. He persuaded Jordan and Iran to send obsolete F-5, F-86 and F-104 jets to Pakistan. He also ordered a naval task force led by an aircraft carrier to move from the pacific to the Bay of Bengal. This ‘tilt’ indicated to India and its Soviet ally that the US might aid Pakistan if necessary. 24 Safdar Sial, Op Cit., p. 3. CENTO was also disbanded following the withdrawal of Pakistan and Iran in March 1979. 25 Teresita C. Schaffer, “US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners have Divergent Priorities,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), p. 169. 26 Stephen Philip Cohen, “America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?” Current History (March 2005), p.132. 27 Malou Innocent, “Pakistan and the Future of US Policy,” Policy Analysis 636 (New York: Cato Institute, April 2009), p. 4. 28 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan B. Harder, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and their Consequences,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2008), p. 29.

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29 “1986-1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War,” Cooperative Research; Available at: http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a86operationcyclone (accessed 15 May 2009). 30 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 238. 31 Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November- December 1999), pp. 22-35. 32 “What Good Friends Left Behind,” The Guardian, 20 September 2003. 33 Sheikh Abdullah Azaam, in his famous Fatwa on “Defense of the Muslim Lands” delivered in 1984, declared that “the open border between Afghanistan and FATA is not under political influence and thus, forms a protective shield for the Mujahedeen and is a great asset.” See Khalid Aziz, “FATA Reforms and Militancy,” The Express Tribune, 17 November 2010. 34 N. C. Asthana and Anjali Nirmal, Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities (Jaipur: Pointer, 2009), p. 107. 35 Benjamin Weiser, Susan Sachs and David Kocieniewski, “US Seeks Brooklyn Link to World Terror Network,” New York Times, 22 October 1998. 36 Evan Thomas, “The Road to Sept. 11,” Newsweek, 1 October 2001. 37 Thomas J Biersteker and Sue E Eckert (ed.), Countering the Financing of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 51. 38 “What Good Friends Left Behind,” Op Cit. 39 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Pakistan-US Relationship,” Op Cit., p. 29. 40 Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy toward South Asia and its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April-June 2003), pp. 145-146. 41 Amer Rizwan, “South Asian Security Complex and Pakistan-United States Relations Post 9/11,” IPRI Journal, Vol. X, No. 2 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Summer 2010), pp. 44-45. 42 Devin T. Hagerty, “The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time’s Charm,” in Craig Baxter (ed.), Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 2-3. Benazir Bhuttos’s government was dismissed from office in 1990 by Pakistan’s President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and succeeded in office by Nawaz Sharif’s coalition. Sharif in turn, was also dismissed by the President Ishaq Khan and replaced by Bhutto, yet again after new election in 1993. Ms. Bhuttos’s second government was also dismissed by the then President Farooq Leghari on charges of corruption and mismanagement in 1997, and Sharif was re-elected for a second term in 1997. See Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., p. 138. 43 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Op Cit., pp. 138-139. 44 Zhang Guihong, Op Cit., p. 149. 45 Ibid. See also Osama Yashida, “Nuclear Development in South Asia,” in Wade L. Huntley (ed.), Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century (Hiroshima, Japan: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004), p. 178. 46 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2004), pp. 36-37. 47 Devin T. Hagerty, Op Cit., p. 4. 48 Jane Perlez, “US and India, Trying to Reconcile, Hit Bump,” New York Times, 22 March 2000. 49 Hassan Abbas, Op Cit., p. 189. 50 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan -US Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust and its Deficit,” Pakistan Vision (Lahore: Punjab University), Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), p. 57. 51 Zhang Guihong, Op Cit., p. 154. 52 C. Christine Fair and Keith Crane et al., Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2010), p. 139; See also Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 17. 53 Shibil Siddiqi, “Afghanistan after bin Laden,” Asia Times, 20 May 2011. 54 C. Christine Fair and Keith Crane et al., Op Cit., p. 139. 55 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 18.

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56 Richard Friedman and Frank Schell, “The US-Pakistan National Security Relationship,” National Strategy Forum (Chicago), 24 August 2010; Available at: http://nationalstrategy.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/the-u-s-pakistan-national-security-relationship/ (accessed 26 August 2011). 57 See Nancy J. Powell, “US Foreign Policy towards Pakistan,” Remarks to the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, 13 November 2003; Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/26277.htm (accessed 25 November 2010). 58 Daniel Markey, “Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 6, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2011), p. 3. 59 Zhang Guihong, Op Cit., p. 166. 60 Stephen Cohen, “The United States and South Asia: Core Interests and Policies and Their Impact on Regional Countries,” (Washington: Brookings Institution, October 2003), pp. 8-9. 61 The White House, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 March 2009, p. 1. 62 M. K. Bhadrakumar, “US Brings Silk Road to India,” The Hindu, 24 December 2010. 63 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 18. 64 Harsh V. Pant, “India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jun 2010), p. 138. 65 Humayun Akhtar, “Army is Behind Me, Says Musharraf,” The Nation, 12 November 2001. 66 M. K. Bhadrakumar, Op Cit. 67 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan’s Challenges and the Need for a Balanced Solution,” Strategic Insights, Vol. I, Issue 6 (August 2002), p. 3. 68 C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2004), p. 5. 69 Fazal-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan and the ‘War on Terror’ ism,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), p. 58; See also C. Christine Fair and Keith Crane et al., Op Cit., p. 147. 70 See “Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf,” (19 September 2001); Available at: http://www.gritzie.com/Musharraf-address-9-19-01.htm (accessed 15 October 2009). 71 Haider Mullick, Pakistan Security Paradox: Countering & Fomenting Insurgency (Hulburt Field: US Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009), p. 50. 72 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 365-366. 73 Haider Mullick, Op Cit., p. 50. 74 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Militant Organisations and Their Driving Forces,” in Kristina Zetterlund (ed.), Pakistan: Consequences of Deteriorating Security in Afghanistan (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009), p. 38. 75 “A purported US-led strike reportedly missed Zawahri by a few hours in the village of Damadola [Bajaur Agency], in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.” See Kenneth Katzman and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and US Policy,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, November 2008), p. 2. 76 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Op Cit., p. 38. 77 Haider Mullick, Op Cit., p. 50; See also Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistani Backlash to FBI Raids,” Asia Times, 15 January 2003. 78 John D. Negroponte, Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 January 2007; Available at: http://www.dni.gov/testimonies_2007.htm (accessed 24 December 2009). 79 Mark Mazetti and David E. Sanger, “Bush Aides See Failure in Fight with Al-Qaeda in Pakistan,” New York Times, 18 July 2007. 80 “US says Musharraf must Regain Control over Border Areas,” Dawn, 15 July 2007; See also “Musharraf has Failed to Contain Al-Qaeda,” Daily Times, 15 July 2007. 81 Kevin McGrath, Confronting Al Qaeda: New Strategies To Combat Terrorism (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), p. 137. 82 Douglas Waller, “Bush and Musharraf: Friends Again,” TIME, 22 September 2006.

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83 “Attacks Tripled in Afghanistan after Waziristan Deal: US,” Daily Times, 28 September 2006. 84 The NIE is a composite report, representing “the consensus view of all 16 agencies that make up the American intelligence community.” Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Terror Officials See Al-Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power,” New York Times, 19 February 2007. 85 Ibid. See also K. Alan Kronstadt, Op Cit., pp. 51-52. 86 “Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” United States Government Accountability Office (April 2008), pp. 9-10. 87 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah, Op Cit., p. 37. 88 Peter Finn and Greg Miller, “EU Cites Nationals Training in Terror,” Washington Post, 30 September 2010. 89 Eric Sayers, “The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and the Bajaur Tribal Region: The Strategic Threat of Terrorist Sanctuaries,” (Washington: Center for Security Policy, February 2007), p. 5. 90 Paul Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West,” (Washington: New America Foundation, February 2010), p. 11. 91 Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Terror Officials See Al Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power,” Op Cit. 92 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Op Cit., pp. 37-39. 93 Muhammad Amir Rana, “1,000 Al-Qaeda Suspects Arrested from Pakistan,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, 26 May 2006), p. 2. 94 Quoted in Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah, Op Cit., p. 36. 95 See “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,” US Department of State (August 2011), p. 9. 96 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 2006), pp. 5-6. 97 Kevin McGrath, Op Cit., pp. 136-138. 98 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), p. 12. 99 These agreements took effect in South Waziristan in April 2004 and February 2005; in North Waziristan in September 2007, and the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in 2008. All these agreements collapsed in 2009. See Barry Leonard, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” (Darby: Diane Publishing Company, June 2008), p. 70. 100 T. V. Parasuram, “Crush Taliban, or We Step in, US Tells Pak,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), 5 April 2004. 101 Barry Leonard, Op Cit., p. 70. 102 Eric Schmitt and Marc Mazetti, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, US Aides Say,” New York Times, 26 March 2009; See also Kevin McGrath, Op Cit., p. 138. 103 According to one western official, Pashtunabad is like the “Taliban’s post office in Balochistan,” and the Quetta Shura uses its contacts in this place to send and receive messages from Afghanistan. See Farhan Bokhari, Matthew Green and James Lamont, “US focuses on Taliban’s border ‘post office’,” Financial Times, 12 October 2009; Erich Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears,” New York Times, 9 February 2009. 104 Balochistan is a critical transit route for NATO non-military supplies, transiting from Karachi’s port through Quetta to the Chaman border crossing, leading to Kandhar. Attacks on NATO containers witnessed a sharp increase in 2010 in Balochistan (102 attacks), after increase in US drone strikes in FATA. See Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability: A National Net Assessment,” (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2011), pp. 80-81, See also “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 2011), pp. 56-59. 105 Ahto Lobjakas, “Afghanistan: Taliban Could Spark Pashtun ‘National War’,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 12 September 2006. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071280.html (accessed 3 May 2009). 106 “No Taliban or Quetta Shura in Balochistan: FCIG,” Daily Post, 12 December 2010. 107 Erich Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Haven in Pakistani City Raises Fears,” New York Times, 9 February 2009. 108 Bari Baloch, “Raisani Warns Against Drone Attacks,” The Nation, 1 October 2009. 109 “Taliban Chief Hides in Pakistan,” Washington Times, 20 November 2009.

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110 Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan,” (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, October 2010), pp. 5-22. Loya-Paktia encompasses the provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika in Southeastern Afghanistan. 111 See Raheem-ul-Haque, “Strategic Depth: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?” Research & News Quarterly, No. 11-13, Centre for Public Policy & Governance (Lahore: Forman Christian College University, April 2011), p. 16. 112 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” New York Times, 30 July 2008. 113 Jeffrey Dressler, Op Cit., p. 32. 114 “CIA Attack Linked to Top Al-Qaida Leaders,” United Press International, 6 January 2010. According to a Pentagon consultant, the suicide bombing was some kind of retaliation by the Haqqani network because CIA officers at the base were involved in an aggressive campaign against the network. See Mark Mazzetti, “CIA Takes on Bigger and Riskier Role on Front Lines Twitter,” New York Times, 31 December 2009. 115 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, June 2010), p. 16. 116 Gulbuddin is the well known, hardliner leader of the Afghan Jihad and former Premier of Afghanistan from 1993 to 1994 and in 1996. See “Profile: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,” BBC News, 23 March 2010. 117 Rohullah Anwari and Frud Bezhan, “Afghans Demand Intervention After ‘Pakistani Taliban’ Attacks,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 29 March 2012; Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/afghans_cry_for_help_in_nuristan/24531213.html (accessed 30 March 2012). 118 Nick Grono and Candace Rondeaux, “Dealing with Brutal Afghan Warlords is a Mistake,” Boston Globe, 17 January 2010. 119 Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2010); Available at: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new- generationterrorists/p15422#p4 (accessed 15 May 2010). 120 Ibid. 121 “Resolving Kashmir Issue Key to Stability in South Asia: Mullen,” The Indian Express, 24 December 2009. 122 In November 2006, the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns stated: “It is in South Asia where our future success in the struggle against global terrorism will likely be decided in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” See R. Nicholas Burns, “U.S. Policy in South Asia,” Remarks to the Asia Society, 27 November 2006; Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/76984.htm (accessed 9 June 2009). 123 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, Op Cit., p. 367. 124 “Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism,” ICG Asia Report No. 130 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 29 March 2007), p. 18. 125 C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 67. 126 A 2007 report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan noted that suicide bombers in Afghanistan “appear to be young (sometimes children), poor, uneducated, easily influenced by recruiters and draw heavily from madrassas across the border in Pakistan.” See “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan: 2001-2007,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), (9 September 2007), p. 10. 127 C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, Op Cit., p. 67. 128 According to Ministry of Religious Affairs there were 8731 madaris in 2000, of which 6761 were Deobandi, 1363 Barelvis, 310 Ahli Hadees and 271 Shia. See “Pakistan Madrassa Reforms in Tatters,” Daily Times, 17 July 2009. 129 Tahir Mehmood Butt, “Social and Political Role of Madrassa: Perspectives of Religious Leaders in Pakistan,” South Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (July-December 2012), p. 397; Tahir Andrabi, Khwaja Asim et al.,“Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data.” Comparative Education Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August 2006), pp. 446-477. Saleem Mansoor Khalid, ed., Deeni Madaris Main Taleem (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2005). 130 Sarah Ashraf, “Religious Education and Training Provided by Madrassas, “The Arts and Humanities Research Council (December 2012), pp. 22-23. 131 Tahir Mehmood Butt, Op Cit., p. 402.

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132 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 312. 133 Faizah A. Samat, “Militancy and Madariss in Pakistan: An Overstated Connection,” (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, May 2005), pp. 2-4. 134 Resolution 1373 adopted on 28 September 2001 required member states to change and/or adopt domestic legislation to i) criminalize terrorist acts; ii) deny safe haven and support to terrorists and iii) take measures in terms of international co-operation against terrorism, ranging from collaboration between police and intelligence services to that between judiciaries. See Javier Rupérez, “The UN’s Fight against Terrorism: Five Years after 9/11,” (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, September 2006), pp. 1-10. 135 Tahir Niaz, “Interior Ministry Blamed for Failure of Madrassa Reforms,” Daily Times, 14 December 2009. 136 Salman Masood, “Pakistanis Back Off Vow to Control Seminaries,” New York Times, 2 January 2006. According to the Minister for Religious Affairs, Ijaz ul-Huq, 5,000 of the estimated 12,000 schools were not registered with Islamabad. See Tahir Niaz, Op Cit. 137 C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, Op Cit., p. 92. 138 Tahir Niaz, Op Cit. 139 “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military,” Op Cit., p. 23. 140 K Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” Op Cit., p. 74. 141 Faizah A. Samat, Op Cit., pp. 2-4. 142 ITMD acts as the liaison between madrassas and the government. See Haider Mullick & Jonathan Ruhe, “Are madrassas Producing Pakistanis?” Daily Times, 2 October 2007. 143 A majority of the madaris get the required funds from local businessmen and traders, along with religious foundations, charities and Pakistanis living abroad. See “Pakistan madrassa reforms in tatters,” Op Cit. 144 Qurat-ul-Ain Siddiqui, “Saudi Arabia, UAE Financing Extremism in South Punjab,” Dawn, 22 May 2011. 145 Ibid. The cable details that the “children recruited are given age-specific indoctrination and would ultimately be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith sects or recruiters.” 146 C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, Op Cit., p. 96. 147 A. Srivathsan, “Pakistan’s Punjab Turning into Hotbed of Extremism, US had Warned,” The Hindu, 22 May 2011. 148 Ibid. 149 “Govt Committed to Woo Youth away from Extremism to Technical Training; PM,” The Frontier Post, 15 September 2011. 150 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 283284. George Tenet, the former Director of CIA, Washington “received fragmentary information from an intelligence service, that in 1998 Osama Bin Laden had sent emissaries to establish contact” with A.Q. Khan Network. “These attempts,” writes Tenet, “were reportedly rejected by the A.Q. Khan Network.” 151 Malou Innocent, Op Cit., p. 4. 152 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, February 2010), p. 15. See also George Tenet, Op Cit., pp. 262-268. 153 A key security measure is ‘the physical separation of nuclear components: Warheads, detonators, triggers and missiles are not stored fully-assembled,’ but are scattered separately across Pakistan’s 6 to 10 highsecurity military bases, each equipped with standard safeguards, such as iris scanners, code-locked doors, and Permissive Action Links (PALs) to prevent unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon. See Kaushik Kapisthalam, “Guarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Estate,” Asia Times, 6 April 2005; See also Malou Innocent, Op Cit., p. 4. 154 Christina Lamb, “Elite US troops Ready to Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks,” The Times, 17 January 2010. 155 Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Pentagon’s Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” National Journal (Washington), 9 November 2011. 156 “Pakistan Weapons ‘in Safe Hands’,” BBC News, 22 January 2008. 157 “President Obama’s 100th-Day Press Briefing Transcript,” New York Times, 29 April 2009.

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158 Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 7 (July 2009), p. 1. 159 Dean Nelson, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bases Targeted by Al-Qaeda,” The Telegraph, 11 August 2009. 160 Aryn Baker, “Taliban Advance: Is Pakistan Nearing Collapse?” TIME, 23 April 2009. 161 Toby Harnden, “Hillary Clinton toughens US stance on Pakistan and Iran,” The Telegraph, 23 April 2009. 162 “DoD News Briefing With Admiral Mullen From the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.,” 4 May 2009; Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4413 (accessed 9 June 2009). 163 John R. Bolton, “The Taliban’s Atomic Threat,” Wall Street Journal, 2 May 2009.

164 Late Richard Holbrooke, the then President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy to Pakistan, observed that the military’s success in Swat was a “sign of progress” but also expressed skepticism, “I cannot tell whether the Taliban have been destroyed or dispersed as a result of this operation in Swat.” See Shaiq Hussain, “America to Help Ease Energy Crisis,” The Nation, 17 August 2009. 165 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 61. 166 “India-Pakistan Unlikely to Break Impasse Soon: US,” Dawn, 13 April 2011. 167 B. Raman, “The Big Picture,” Outlook India, 8 December 2008. 168 Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk et al, “The Lessons of Mumbai,” Occasional Paper 249, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2009), p. 16. 169 Jonathan Paris, Prospects for Pakistan (London: Legatum Institute, 2010), p. 47. 170 Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk et al. Op Cit., p. 16. 171 “Islamabad Hands over Mumbai Probe Report to New Delhi,” Daily Times, 13 February 2009. It is interesting to note that a member of a Special Investigating Team (SIT) of India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Satish Verma had accused Indian governments of “orchestrating” the terror attack on Parliament and the 26/11 carnage in Mumbai “with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation.” Verma stated that “the 13.12.2001(attack on Parliament) was followed by POTA (Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act) and 26.11.2008 (terrorists’ siege of Mumbai) was followed by amendment to the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act).” See “Govt Behind Parliament Attack, 26/11: Ishrat Probe Officer,” Times of India, 14 July 2013. 172 US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates stated that CSF payments were utilized to keep more than “100,000 Pakistani troops in the field in northwest Pakistan by paying for their food, clothing, and housing” and “to support about 90 Pakistani army operations. They also compensate [Pakistan] for coalition usage of Pakistani airfields and seaports.” See Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 February 2008; Available at: http://armed- services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2008/02%20February/A%20Full%20Committee/08-02%20-%202-608%20- %20full%20committee.pdf (accessed 9 April 2010). 173 Robin Wright, “US Funding to Pakistan Plagued With Problems, GAO Report Says,” Washington Post, 25 June 2008. 174 Specific cases of oversight failure included: More than $200 million reimbursed for Pakistan’s air defense radar, though the terrorists lacked any air attack capability; approximately $55 million paid for maintenance of the Pakistan army’s MI-17 utility and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter wings from July 2006–February 2007, while Pakistan army was not maintaining them, causing poor readiness rates for these critical assets; More than $1.5 million paid in inflated costs for damage to Navy vehicles not used in combat. See “Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds,” United States Government Accountability Office (24 Jun 2008), pp. 45. See also Robin Wright, Op Cit. 175 In June 2008, US Senator John Tierney in a hearing in the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, described CSF to Pakistan as “waste, fraud, and abuse of a huge amount of US taxpayer funds,” which failed to achieve “vital US security objectives” in the ‘War on Terror’ as well as “long-term strategic partnership” between the US and Pakistan. See Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Military ‘Misspent up to 70% of American Aid’,” The Guardian, 28 February 2008. 176 Ibid.

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177 In August 2008, Asif Zardari claimed that “some $700 million of reimbursements per year were found ‘missing’ under General Musharraf.” See “Billions in US Aid Never Reached Pakistan Army,” Associated Press, 4 October 2009. 178 Since 2008, the imposition of stricter scrutiny of CSF payments has led to ‘running disputes’ with Islamabad. Pakistani officials complain “of late payments and a failure to recognize the costs borne by their military.” Adam Entous, “U.S. Balks at Pakistani Bills,” Wall Street Journal, 16 May 2011. 179 US Embassy (Islamabad) Cables, “CSF and the Potential for Civil-Military Tension,” 24 March 2008; http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ISLAMABAD1269 (accessed 19 June 2010). 180 Polly Nayak, “US Security Policy in South Asia since 9/11: Challenges and Implications for the Future,” (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2005), p. 4.

181 The Pashtun (Pashtoon, Pahktoon or Pathan) are a people divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of its approximately 42 million members, about 60-65 percent live in Pakistan (28 million) and about 45 percent (13-15 million) ‘the biggest ethnic component of the Afghan population,’ live in Afghanistan. See Ann Wilkens, “Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan,” in Kristina Zetterlund (ed.), Op Cit., p. 89. 182 Pervez Musharraf, “The Afghan-Pakistan Solution,” Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2009. 183 Polly Nayak, Op Cit., p. 5. 184 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan and How It Threatens America (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 211. 185 “Kasuri did not ask NATO to accept Taliban: foreign office,” Business Recorder, 1 December 2006. 186 “Pakistan advises Taliban role in Afghan government,” BBC News, 28 January 2010. 187 M K Bhadrakumar, “Battle Lines Move from Kashmir to Kabul,” Asia Times, 9 August 2008; As Christine Fair argued that, Indian influence continues to be protected largely under a “shrinking US security umbrella,” otherwise, India has not attained the capability to independently achieve any of its desired objectives in Afghanistan. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End-Game in Afghanistan?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 179-192. 188 C. Christine Fair, “India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints,” (New York: Century Foundation, 2010), p. 17. 189 “Proof of India’s Involvement in Militancy Found,” Dawn, 3 November 2009; See also Hamid Mir, “India and the Baloch Insurgency,” The Hindu, 28 July 2009. 190 K. Alan Kronstadt and Paul K. Kerr et al., “India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and US Relations,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, September 2011), p. 20. 191 At least 70 percent of the Afghan National Army is comprised of Tajiks. “Tajik Grip on Afghan Army Signals Strife,” Asia Times, 1 December 2009. 192 Jeremy Page, “Britain and US Consider Asking India to Train Afghan National Police,” The Times, 19 January 2010. 193 Raja M Khan, “Training offer to Afghan Army,” The Nation, 4 March 2010. Over 100 Afghan senior defence officials are being trained every year in India’s military institutions. 194 Zahid Hussain, “Kayani Spells out Terms for Regional Stability,” Dawn, 2 February 2010. 195 Ali K Chishti, “Indian Boots in Afghanistan?” Daily Times, 8 November 2010. 196 “Afghanistan: Why India’s Cooperation is a Problem for Pakistan,” STRATFOR, 11 April 2008. 197 Carol Christine Fair, “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 3 November 2011, p. 3. 198 “Obama endorses India’s bid for permanent seat in UNSC,” Times of India, 8 November 2010. 199 Shaiq Hussain, “FO admits differences with US,” The Nation, 10 April 2009. 200 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 26. 201 M K Bhadrakumar, Op Cit. 202 Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated that “India’s interests in Afghanistan cannot be the same as ours because we share a border…We have been impacted [by the events in Afghanistan]. They have not been impacted to that extent because even today we have three million Afghan refugees living in

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Pakistan…Practically our economies are one. Culturally, linguistically, ethnically, there are commonalities which Afghanistan shares more with Pakistan than India.” See “India’s Interests in Afghanistan cannot be Same as Pak: Qureshi,” The Nation, 28 March 2010. 203 Jyoti Thottam, “Afghanistan: India’s Uncertain Road,” TIME, 11 April 2011. 204 Zahid Hussain, “Kayani Spells out Terms for Regional Stability,” Dawn, 2 February 2010. Ashley J. Tellis, “Beradar, Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban: What Gives?” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2010), p. 8. 205 M K Bhadrakumar, Op Cit. 206 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 2011), p. 157. 207 Jason Burke and Jon Boone, “Kabul Attacks Apparently Aimed at Indians Leave 17 Dead,” The Guardian, 27 February 2010; See also Qandeel Siddique, “Pakistan’s Future Policy towards Afghanistan,” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, August 2011), p. 43. 208 Siddharth Varadarajan, “US Sees Rising Indian Influence in Afghanistan as Problem,” The Hindu, 21 September 2009. 209 “US General Criticizes Indian Influence in Afghanistan,” Dawn, 23 September 2009. 210 Chidanand Rajghatta, “US Defence Secretary Nominee Backs Pakistan Against India,” Times of India, 27 February 2013. 211 Ejaz Haider, “North Waziristan is a Bad Idea,” The Friday Times, 24 December 2010. 212 Joshua Partlow, “Taliban Takes Hold in Once-Peaceful Northern Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 15 August 2010. 213 Quoted in Shehzad H. Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency & the American End Game in Afghanistan,” (Washington: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2011), p. 15. 214 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Militancy an Afghan Problem: Musharraf,” Dawn, 16 December 2006. 215 Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, “Statement to the Meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan,” 9 July 2008; Available at: http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/July/PR_208_08.htm (accessed 11 August 2009). 216 Khalid Aziz, “Dangers of the Afghan war,” Dawn, 10 June 2011. 217 Ahmed Rashid, “The US-Pakistan Relationship in the Year Ahead,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (18 January 2012), p. 3. 218 Khalid Aziz, “Dangers of the Afghan War,” Op Cit. 219 Ibid. “Operationally, sympathy for the Taliban cause creates the ‘Danger of Leakage of Battle Secrecy.’” This was the case in the 2009 attack on GHQ and in the Mehran Naval Base attack in May 2011. 220 A New York Times report of September 2008 summarized that Pakistan has continued to regard the Haqqani Network as a valuable asset for protecting Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan in the event of US/NATO withdrawal and “therefore, have been unwilling to move against them.” See Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “US attack on Taliban Kills 23 in Pakistan,” New York Times, 9 September 2008. 221 The White House, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on US Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 March 2009; Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf (accessed 22 June 2009). 222 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Future of Pakistan-US Relations: Opportunities and Challenges,” (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, April 2009), pp. 3-4. 223 Ayesha R. Khan, “Conceptualizing AfPak: The Prospects and Perils,” Asia Programme Paper ASP PP2010/01 (London: Chatham House, January 2010), p. 9. 224 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, Op Cit, p. 3. The CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus claimed that the drone campaign in FATA is “extremely important” and killed key Al-Qaeda leaders including ‘Abu Laith Al-Libbi, Usama Al-Kini, and Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid.’ See “US Senators Defend Drone Attacks,” Dawn, 8 January 2010. 225 Amir Mir, “60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians,” The News, 10 April 2009. A report released by Brookings Institution in 2009 stated that ‘10 civilians died in the drone attacks for every militant killed.’ See Daniel L. Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” (Washington: Brookings Institute, July 2009), p. 1.

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226 Amir Mir, “Drones killed 59pc Civilians, 41pc Terrorists,” The News, 3 January 2011. 227 “CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004–2013;” http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama2013-pakistan-drone-strikes/ (accessed 2 April 2013). 228 Andrew M. Exum, Ahmed A. Humayun et al, “Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Center for a New American Security (June 2009), pp. 19-20. 229 Umer Farooq, “Legal challenge: PHC Terms Drone Strike ‘Naked Aggression’,” The Express Tribune, 10 May 2013. 230 Waseem Ahmad Shah, “PHC Directs Govt to Raise Drone Issue at UN,” Dawn, 10 May 2013. 231 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, Op Cit., pp. 196-197; see also Brahma Chellaney, “Surge, Bribe and Run,” Washington Times, 15 February 2010. 232 Bassam Javed, “AfPak Review: Same Wine in Old Bottle,” The News, 25 December 2010; See also Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, Op Cit., pp. 196-197. 233 Jonathan Steele, “Afghanistan: Is it time to Talk to the Taliban?” The Guardian, 4 May 2010. 234 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, Op Cit., p. 210. 235 General Aslam Beg, “AfPak Strategy and Pakistan,” The Nation, 14 July 2009. 236 Syed Moazzam Hashmi and Yangtze Yan, “Yearender: ‘War on Terror’ Costs Pakistan Heavily,” Xinhua, 14 December 2010. 237 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 21. 238 Daniel Markey, “From AfPak to PakAf: A Response to the New US Strategy for South Asia,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2009), pp. 1-14. Quoted in Ayesha R. Khan, Op Cit., p. 19. 239 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 199. 240 Simon Tisdall and Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Reacts with Fury after up to 20 Die in ‘American’ Attack on Its Soil,” The Guardian, 4 September 2008. 241 As early as in March 2002, the then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that “US might chase Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters into Pakistan in hot pursuit.” In January 2003, Major Steve Clutter, the US Military Spokesperson at the Bagram Base near Kabul, indicated that “hot pursuit is official US policy.” See Scott Baldauf, “US ‘Hot Pursuit’ Roils Pakistanis,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 2003; Mushahid Hussain, “US Ties Weigh Heavily in Pakistan,” Asia Times, 10 January 2003. 242 Muralidhar Reddy, “Pak-US Tensions over ‘Hot Pursuit’ to the fore,” The Hindu, 5 January 2003. In August 2007, newly uncovered documents revealed that the US Secretary of Defense, then Donald Rumsfeld and Head of US Central Command “gave elite units broad authority” in 2004, “to pursue suspected terrorists into Pakistan, with no mention of telling the Pakistanis in advance.” See Scott Lindlaw, “AP: US Gave Troops OK to Enter Pakistan.” USA Today, 23 August 2007. 243 Muralidhar Reddy, Op Cit. 244 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid,” New York Times, 10 September 2008; See also Tahir Niaz, “US not allowed to conduct Ops inside Pakistan: Kayani,” Daily Times, 10 September 2008. 245 Pakistani government even rapidly overcame the negative fallout from US SEAL Team 6 raid at Damadola in 2006 and ISAF air strike at FC border checkpoint in June 2008. Noah Shachtman, “US Commandoes Hit Pakistan: Islamabad Howls,” Wired Danger Room, 4 September 2008; http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/09/us-special-oper/ (accessed 5 May 2009). See also Candace Rondeaux, “Pakistan allegedly repulses U.S. Raid,” Washington Post, 16 September 2008. 246 Candace Rondeaux, Op Cit., Syed Saleem Shahzad, “A Sting in Pakistan’s Al-Qaeda Mission,” Asia Times, 4 September 2008. 247 Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. over a Raid,” Op Cit. 248 Candace Rondeaux, Op Cit. 249 Saad Khan, “Pakistan Blocks Fuel Supply Route to Western Forces,” Reuters, 6 September 2008. 250 Imtiaz Gul, “Security Dynamics in Pakistan’s Border Areas,” in Kristina Zetterlund (ed.), Op Cit., pp. 83-84. 251 -Pakistan Border Rules: The US Role,” Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2012), p. 16.

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252 Ibid., p. 8. 253 Daniel C. Giacopelli, “Critical AfPak Border Crossing Reopens to NATO Convoys,” Open Democracy, 11 October 2010; See at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/daniel-c-giacopelli/critical- afpakborder-crossing-reopens-to-nato-convoys (accessed 15 October 2010). 254 Admiral Mullen offered General Kayani, “a private, but official, apology;” and General Petraeus, Commander of NATO Forces in Afghanistan also “expressed regret for the tragic loss of life.” See Carlotta Gall “Pakistan Will Reopen Route to Supplies for NATO,” New York Times, 9 October 2010. 255 “Pakistan reopens NATO supply route,” Daily Times, 10 October 2010; 256 Kevin McGrath, Op Cit., pp. 150-151. 257 Daniel C. Giacopelli, Op Cit. 258 Kevin McGrath, Op Cit., pp. 150-151. 259 Paul Rogers, “A Pakistani dilemma,” Open Democracy, 15 November 2007; Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/a_pakistani_dilemma (accessed 8 December 2010). 260 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability: A National Net Assessment,” (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2011), p. 137. 261 Declan Walsh, “Osama bin Laden Mission Agreed in Secret 10 Years ago by US and Pakistan,” The Guardian, 9 May 2011. See also Greg Bruno, and Jayshree Bajoria, Op Cit. 262 Dexter Filkins, “F.B.I. and Military Unite in Pakistan to Hunt Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 14 July 2002; See also Gretchen Peters, “Pakistan Takes Hunt for Al Qaeda to Cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 October 2002. 263 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 50. 264 Dexter Filkins, Op Cit. 265 Marc Ambinder, D. B. Grady, The Command: Deep inside the President’s Secret Army (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), pp. 62-63. 266 Ibid. 267 Jeremy Scahill, “The Secret US War in Pakistan,” The Nation, 23 November 2009; “CIA Cancels Blackwater Drone Missile-Loading Contract,” BBC News, December 12, 2009. 268 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Push to Expand in Pakistan Meets Resistance,” New York Times, 5 October 2009; See also Hamid Mir, “Sacking of Two Top Men Delayed after GHQ Attack,” The News, 12 October 2009. 269 In 2009, three Americans along with a Pakistani had tried to encroach into the restricted area of Kahuta to check the security arrangements for the KRL but the official security agency deployed at the check post intercepted them. The Pakistani accompanying these Americans was a retired assistant director of the FIA and managed to free the Americans and returned. See “Malik insists no Blackwater in Pak,” Daily Times, 10 February 2010; Ansar Abbasi and Shakeel Anjum, “US involved in espionage near the Kahuta nuclear site,” The News, 22 October 2009. 270 Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, “U.S. Covert Paramilitary Presence in Afghanistan Much Larger Than Thought,” Washington Post, 22 September 2010; Asif Haroon Raja, “Get rid of CIA Network,” Pakistan Observer, 14 March 2011; Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 137. 271 Imtiaz Gul, “Cobweb of spy network,” The News, 27 February 2011. 272 Shireen M. Mazari, “Pakistan in the Post-9/11 Milieu,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol. 22 (Autumn 2002), pp. 6-7. 273 Raheem-ul-Haque, Op Cit., p. 11. 274 Moeed Pirzada, “Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiative since 9/11 and Imperatives for US Policy in the Region,” IPRI Journal, Vol. III, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2003), p. 113. 275 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Pakistan’s Changing Outlook on Kashmir,” South Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2 (December 2007), p. 200. 276 Quoted in Matthew P. Taylor, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy and Strategy since 1947,” (PhD Dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004), p. 78. 277 Raheem-ul-Haque, Op Cit., p. 11. 278 On 12 January 2002, Musharraf stated: “We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris...No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir...Let

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there be no attempt of crossing the border in any sector as it will be met with full force. Do not entertain any illusions on this count.” See “Text of President Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” Dawn, 12 January 2002. 279 The 3000 detainees of banned organizations were freed a month after January 2002 but continued US pressure forced “demobilization” of Kashmir focused militant groups in 2003-04 and closing of the ISI’s Kashmir Cell by 2004. See Raheem-ul-Haque, Op Cit., p. 11. 280 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan,” Middle East Research and Information Project, Report 251, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 3-4. 281 Graham Usher, “Taliban v. Taliban,” London Review of Books, Vol. 31, No. 7 (9 April 2009), p. 12. 282 The White House, Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 8 November 2010. 283 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Future of Pakistan-US Relations: Opportunities and Challenges,” Op Cit., p. 4. 284 India is to create 50,000 US jobs and this appears to have successfully diverted US attention away from Kashmir dispute, all the while keeping the focus primarily on terrorism related to ‘AfPak region’ as suggested by India. See Qandeel Siddique, Op Cit., p. 66. 285 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Future of Pakistan-US Relations: Opportunities and Challenges,” Op Cit., p. 4. 286 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 22. 287 Jawed Naqvi, “Delhi Talks on Kashmir Make Progress: HCs’ Full Strength to be Restored,” Dawn, 29 June 2004. 288 Graham Usher, “Taliban v. Taliban,” Op Cit., p. 11. 289 Ibid. 290 “US to Pak: Talks with India only after Action on 26/11,” The Economic Times, 16 August 2009. 291 Imtiaz Gul, “India and Pakistan’s Dilemma,” Friday Times, 24 September 2010. 292 Najam Sethi, “Obama’s Af-Pak Gamble,” Friday Times, 4 December 2009. 293 “Pakistan Army will Remain India-Centric: Kayani,” Economic Times, 4 February 2010. 294 “On the Issues: US-Pakistan-India,” An Interview with Moeed Yusuf (Washington: United States Institute of Peace November 2010). 295 “Pakistan lost Rs. 7,020 billion, got only Rs. 990 billion,” The News, 8 February 2012. 296 Ishrat Husain, “US Assistance: Differing Perceptions,” The Express Tribune, 19 May 2011. 297 http://www.pakpac.net/DOH6_TP.pdf (accessed 5 May 2011). 298 David Wildman and Phyllis Bennis, “The War in Afghanistan Goes Global,” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (18 August 2010), p. 478. 299 Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai and Molly Kinder, “Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the US Approach to Development in Pakistan,” (Washington: Center for Global Development, June 2011), p. 6. 300 Security-related assistance includes reimbursements, arms sales, counter-narcotics funds, and internal security assistance. Economic-related assistance includes economic support funds, human rights, democracy funds, food aid and Disaster and Refugee assistance. See K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan: FY2002-FY2014,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, April 2013), p. 1 301 C. Christine Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 152. 302 “US, EU should Give Pakistan More Market Access: Musharraf,” Daily Times, 7 January 2006. 303 Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, “We Need a Plan for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” Center for American Progress (Washington), 23 April 2008. 304 Huma Imtiaz, “Financial assistance to Pakistan: US Congress Votes against Proposal to Cut Aid Republican Lawmaker Proposed to Decrease Monetary Help by $2b,” The Express Tribune, 9 July 2011. 305 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan: FY2002-FY2014,” Op Cit. 306 C. Christine Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” Op Cit., p. 153. 307 The ‘Patriot Act’ included several important changes to immigration law. It broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorismrelated acts. See Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, “Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal of Aliens,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 2010), pp. 3-11.

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308 A. Z. Hilali, “U.S. Policy towards Pakistan after September 11, 2001 and Its Implications,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2009), pp. 136-137. 309 Rob Winder, “Big Issues Hit ‘Little Pakistan’,” Al Jazeera, 17 October 2008. 310 “2010: Military Wanted Special Exemption from Pakistani Passenger Screening in US,” Dawn, 9 June 2011. 311 Ibid. 312 “Roots and Fallout of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan,” The Friday Times (Editorial), 10 January 2003. 313 “US Recognizes Pak as ‘Hot Bed of Terrorism’: Mittal,” The Nation, 19 March 2009. 314 “Pakistan Unreliable Ally, Says Biden,” Dawn, 14 September 2011. 315 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US Eyes on Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Asia Times, 15 November 2007. 316 Jennifer Griffin, “Pakistani turmoil renews deep concerns about troubled U.S. ally,” Fox New, 7 January 2011. 317 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Op Cit. 318 Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani tried to convince his US counterpart that for a robust relationship, trust gap must be filled. He argued: “I have been telling Mullen and Petraeus, as well as others in NATO, that if you keep suspecting and insinuating against us publicly, we will find it difficult to motivate our rank and file. With doubts and allegations, our room for maneuvering also shrinks.” Quoted in Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan Plays Ball,” Foreign Policy, 24 February 2010. 319 “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” (Darby: Diane Publishing Company, October 2009), pp. 42-43. 320 Barry Leonard, Op Cit., p. 71. 321 “U.S.-Funded Intelligence Center Struggles in Khyber Region,” Washington Post, 12 January 2009. 322 “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Op Cit., p. 43; I Hussain, “Pakistan, Afghanistan, ISAF Meet after Several Months,” Daily Times, 14 May 2012. 323 “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” (Darby: Diane Publishing Company, April 2010), p. 81. 324 “US Embassy Denies Presence of US Forces in Quetta,” The Express Tribune, 27 November 2010. 325 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 149. 326 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Regime and System Change,” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), Pakistan’s Future (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2011), pp. 231-232. General Ashfaq Kayani declared that the Taliban triumph in Afghanistan similar to the 1990s, would threat the viability of Pakistan as a modern, Islamic democratic state. He stated: “We can’t have Talibanization. We want to remain modern and progressive.” He went on to say: “We cannot wish for Afghanistan what we don’t wish for Pakistan.” See “Pakistan’s Army Chief Seeks Stable Afghanistan,” The Tehran Times, 3 February 2010. 327 Raheem-ul-Haque, Op Cit., p. 35. 328 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Triangular Tensions,” Pakistan Today, 4 October 2011. 329 George Friedman, “The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 3: The Pakistani Strategy,” STRATFOR, 15 February 2010, pp. 2-3. 330 A. Z. Hilali, “FATA: The Strategic Depth of Pakistan,” Margalla Paper (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2010), p. 18. 331 George Friedman, Op Cit. 332 “Turkmen Natural Gas Pipeline TAPI to cross Afghanistan,” BBC News, 11 December 2010. 333 The US ‘Greater Central Asia’ strategy puts forth the idea of developing a power grid connecting Central Asia’s underutilized energy’ resources (hydro-power potential of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, power stations based on Uzbekistan’s gas and Turkministan’s gas) with consumers customers in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. See Arun Sahgal & Vinod Anand, “Strategic environment in Central Asia and India” in Reconnecting India and Central Asia: Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions (ed.), (Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2011), p. 52. 334 Mohsin M Milani, “Iran’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 243. 335 M. K. Bhadrakumar, Op Cit. 336 Ibid. 337 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 141.

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338 K. Alan Krondstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Op Cit., p. 90. Military assistance and arms transfer under the Kerry-Luger Berman Bill is dependent on the certification given by the US Secretary of State. Pakistan has to cooperate with the US in “fighting forces related to the unlawful acquisition of nuclear weapons and show ‘sustained commitment’ in ceasing support to militants, preventing cross-border attacks and upholding counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws.” Finally, Pakistan has to ensure that its security forces “do not undermine political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” See Aqil Shah, “Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 74-80; See also Omar Waraich, “How a US Aid Package to Pakistan could Threaten Zardari,” TIME, 8 October 2009. 339 Polly Nayak, Op Cit., p. 3. 340 Richard F. Grimmett, “US Arms Sales to Pakistan,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, August 2009), p. 1. 341 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan: FY2002-FY2014,” Op Cit. 342 Richard F. Grimmett, “US Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, December 2011), p. 2; 343 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., p. 141. 344 K. Alan Krondstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Op Cit., p. 90. 345 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous US-Pakistan Relationship” (Washington: Atlantic Council, 2010), p. 15. 346 Ibid. 347 Teresita C. Schaffer, “U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners have Divergent Priorities?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.1 (Winter 2002-03), p. 175; See also Samira Shackle, “Pakistan’s youth bulge,” The Express Tribune, 25 March 2013. 348 Masood Haider and Anwar Iqbal, “US Offers $3bn Aid Package: Bush-Musharraf Talks at Camp David,” Dawn, 25 June 2003. 349 S. Akbar Zaidi, “Who Benefits from US Aid to Pakistan?” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011), p. 5. 350 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 March 2009; Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategyfor Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed 5 August 2010). 351 Ahmed A. Humayun, “No Shortcuts: US Policy and the Challenge of Stabilizing Pakistan,” (Washington: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, March 2011), p. 25. 352 Paul Staniland, “Caught in the Muddle: America’s Pakistan Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 2011), p. 139; See also Shuja Nawaz, Op Cit., p. 17. 353 Najam Rafique, “Rethinking Pakistan–US Relations,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn 2011), p. 135. 354 Jay Solomon and Siobhan Gorman, “US Outlines Approach to Pakistan amid Political Turmoil,” Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2009. 355 Najam Rafique, Op Cit., p. 134. 356 The White House, Transcript of President Obama’s West Point Address on Afghanistan, 1 December 2009; Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way- forwardafghanistan-and-pakistan (accessed on 2 January 2010). 357 Paul Staniland, Op Cit., p. 135. 358 Najam Rafique, Op Cit., p. 134. 359 Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, Winter 2010-11), pp. 1-2. 360 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “Foreign Interference in Pakistani Politics,” Weekly Pulse, 14-20 December 2007. 361 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Triangular Tensions,” Op Cit. 362 “The US-Pakistan Relationship: Toward a Complementary Strategy,” National Strategy Forum Review, Vol. 20, Issue 2 (Spring 2011), p. 9. 363 Moeed Yusuf, Op Cit., p. 1.

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Chapter – 04

PAKISTAN’S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES

INTRODUCTION After joining the US-led coalition in the ‘War on Terror’, Pakistan took several measures to boost its internal security and strengthen its law enforcement agencies. Islamabad banned several militant groups and extremist religious parties, curbed the publication and sale of hate material and suppressed financing of terrorism. Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been constantly engaged in a fierce battle with Al-Qaeda and affiliated militant groups in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the country, which has cost Pakistan heavy human, material and financial losses. Despite these challenges, Pakistan has shown its determination to combat extremists and terrorists and stabilize the ‘AfPak’ region. Most American officials and military commanders have praised Islamabad for providing extensive access and support to United States, both in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and in the post-OEF phase of the operation. According to an unclassified US Central Command (CENTCOM) Liaison Officer (LNO) briefing: “Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists, and committed more troops than any other nation” in the US- led coalition against terrorism. 1 This chapter outlines Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part details Pakistan’s diplomatic, law enforcement and internal security strategies in its fight against terrorism and extremism. It also highlights the gap between crafting and execution of counterterrorism strategies. The second part analyzes Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategies in FATA and their impact on Pakistan’s campaign against terrorism.

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PAKISTAN’S DIPLOMATIC AND LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ a) Cooperation with United Nations (UN) Pakistan has pledged full support and cooperation to the United Nations in order to rid Pakistan and the world of the scourge of terrorism. Pakistan has shown its commitment to implement the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy2 which was adopted on 8 September 2006. Pakistan has also ratified 10 out of 13 UN Conventions relating to terrorism.3 In its efforts towards ratification of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Pakistan has enacted anti-Money Laundering Act in 2010. According to Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, Islamabad has shown its commitment “to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in forty recommendations on money laundering and nine special recommendations on terrorist financing” of the Financial Action Task Force.4 He also revealed in the meeting of the Security Council on 26 May 2009 that 128 suspected bank accounts totaling Pakistani Rupees 747.08 million have been frozen so far.5 Pakistan ensures the implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1368 (2001), UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), and UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005) 6 and reports regularly to the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on the steps that it has taken to implement these resolutions. These measures demonstrate Pakistan’s political will to extend cooperation to the global body on counterterrorism. b) Policy of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ Following the events of 9/11, there were deliberate attempts by the Western media to distort a benign and favourable image of Islam and link this great religion to fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism.7 Pakistan strongly opposes this Western media campaign to vilify Islam, and considers this campaign as sowing the seeds of confrontation between the Islamic World and the West. Pakistan advocates political engagement of the Islamic World and the West to facilitate greater mutual understanding among all religions and cultures. Islamabad, at various diplomatic forums, has been urging the international community to counteract the negative portrayal of the Muslims by presenting a benign image of the noble religion: Islam. In this context, General Pervez Musharraf made public the strategy of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ to foster positive image of Islam at the Summit meeting of the Organization of

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the Islamic Conference (OIC) in October 2003 at Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia).8 In his view, “the world has become an extremely dangerous place” due to high-tech “devastating power of explosives” and “proliferation of suicide bombers” in spreading terrorism. Unfortunately, both the perpetrators as well as the victims of militancy and terrorism are Muslims. “This has caused,” noted Musharraf, “many non-Muslims to believe wrongly that Islam is a religion of intolerance, militancy and terrorism.”9 Highlighting the strategy of ‘Enlightened Moderation,’ as a win for all, President Musharraf stated:

“It is a two-pronged strategy. The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The second is for the West and the United States in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world.”10

Musharraf argued that the most essential component of his strategy was combating stark poverty, illiteracy and political injustice. Many analysts appreciated Musharraf strategy of ‘Enlightened Moderation.’ Others observed divergence between what General Musharraf claimed and what he practiced. Certainly, he made a case for ‘Enlightened Moderation’ in terms of “liberal, modern, progressive, but not necessarily democratic vision of Pakistan” and in reality accommodated a six-party religious-political alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (The United Council of Action, MMA), as a means to remain in power. Musharraf did not recognize that ‘Enlightened Moderation’ would carry weight only if the military was to extricate from politics in Pakistan.11 It is important to note that Musharraf’s ‘Enlightened Moderation’ strategy rested on a “onedimensional view” of the world. The strategy orders the Muslim world “to bow unquestioningly to US demands,” and “the salvation of the Muslims lies in the benevolence shown by the US, as a reward for complying with those demands.”12 The US, however, seems least likely to “suddenly metamorphose into a benevolent entity,” which will “resolve all political disputes with justice?” Despite this criticism, the 9/11 Commission recognized and supported General Musharraf strategy of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ in order to combat terrorism and extremism.13 c) Promotion of Religious and Cultural Harmony Pakistan considers it extremely important to promote religious and cultural harmony. It emphasizes that the vast majority of Muslims is peaceful, tolerant, honest, just and kind people.

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Pakistan took an initiative to sponsor a resolution on behalf of the OIC entitled Combating Defamation of Religions in the seventh session of the Human Rights Council held from 3 to 28 March 2008. The Council adopted the resolution which urged the states “to take actions to prohibit the dissemination of racist and xenophobic ideas and materials aimed at any religion or its followers that constitute incitement to racial and religious hatred, hostility or violence.”14 Similarly, in a Conference on Interfaith Dialogue and Cultural Harmony at the United Nations on 3 November 2008, Pakistan along with Philippines submitted a draft resolution, under which the 192-member General Assembly affirmed that “mutual understanding and inter-religious dialogue were important components of the culture of peace.” 15 in October 2012, Pakistan’s Representative to the UN, Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar, cautioned western policy makers to avoid a confrontation with the Muslim world and pressed for a genuine and sincere dialogue to comprehend each other grievances and promote peace and global harmony:

“The unfair and bigoted portrayal of Islam and Islamic beliefs and the acts of incitement and hate-speech against the faith of nearly two billion Muslims exacerbates the divergence in attitudes and perceptions between the Islamic and the Western worlds. An honest dialogue between different civilizations has become a political imperative.”16 On 15 January 2013, Pakistan has presided over a debate on comprehensive approach to counterterrorism at UNSC. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar reiterated Pakistan’s stand that to counter terror an “honest dialogue between different religions and civilizations” is a “continuing political imperative.”17 d) Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga held in Kabul on 9 to 11 August 2007 opened an avenue to promote peace in the region. Around seven-hundred people of Pakistan and Afghanistan including members of the parliament, political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, provincial councils, civil society and business community participated in the Jirga. Earlier, a ‘Loya Jirga’ or Grand Jirga’ was convened in 2002-2003, in which Pakistan had made efforts behind closed doors to get the ‘moderate’ Taliban on board but failed to convince the Afghan government on this issue. Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga provided another such opportunity to persuade Afghan authorities as well as the US-led coalition to open direct talks with Afghan Taliban in order to bring peace and stability in the war raged country.18 Against

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this backdrop, the Peace Jirga proposed that the ‘War on Terror’ should be accelerated along with pursuing peace and reconciliation with the Afghan insurgent groups: i.e. Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network and Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar. The Jirga also discussed the issues of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan because Taliban and Gulbadin Hikmatyar have already demanded that a timetable be given for such a withdrawal for successful future negotiations. A clear declaration of the US-led coalition forces mentioning a timetable to withdraw from Afghanistan in the future would bring Afghan insurgent groups, JUI (F) and the tribesmen in FATA to the negotiating table. Hence, it will complete the Jirga for any successful and meaningful negotiations in order to bring peace and stability to Pak-Afghan border region. 19 e) Pakistan’s Efforts to Bring Peace and Stability to Afghanistan Pakistan has constantly been making efforts to end the Afghanistan conflict and bring durable Peace to the country and the region. To quote Former Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, “Afghanistan’s success is our success because we share commonalities…. We are loser if there is instability in Afghanistan.” He further stated that Pakistan wants all the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland and “it is possible only when they have resources to earn their livelihood.”20 This notion directs Pakistan’s efforts for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been consistent in supporting all Afghan-led peace endeavours. Moreover, Pakistan maintains that the political negotiations must be broad and inclusive of all the Afghan factions which are party to the conflict including the ‘moderate’ Taliban.21 Pakistan’s stance was acknowledged in The London Conference on the Future of Afghanistan which accepted Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Taliban Reintegration Plan, with the stated aim to “offer an honourable place in society” to those Afghan insurgents “willing to renounce Al-Qaeda, abandon violence and pursue their political goals peacefully and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.”22 President Karzai also recognized Pakistan’s central role to reach out to the core of the Taliban by saying: “We ask all neighbours, particularly Pakistan, to support our peace and reconciliation endeavours.” In response to the statement by Karzai, former Foreign Minister, Mehmood Qureshi affirmed that Pakistan is “ready to mediate in reconciliation talks between the western alliance and Taliban, if the country is asked to do so.”23 To this end, Pakistan endorsed the proposed peacemaking Kabul Plan of President Karzai which was outlined in the

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London Conference. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and the US Commander General Petraeus attended the meeting, held in September 2010 in Islamabad, to discuss the war situation and the Afghan reconciliatory plan.24 Former Prime Minister, Yousuf Gilani told President Karzai that Islamabad has always maintained that the use of force alone cannot bring peace and stability to the warravaged country and the use of military instruments should be supplemented by political instruments. In line with this approach, Gilani declared that “Pakistan supports the initiation of an inclusive political reconciliation process by Afghanistan and establishing of a highlevel peace council to talk to the Afghan opposition groups.” President Karzai stated that Kabul intends to enter into consultations with Pakistan to adopt a coordinated approach in reconciliation and rehabilitation process with Afghan insurgent groups.25 Pakistan extended full support to the goals of Kabul Conference held on 20 July 2010 and the Traditional Loya Jirga of November 2011, which pushed for peace talks with Afghan 26 insurgents. Pakistani has also endorsed the Peace Process Roadmap to 2015 plan produced by the Afghan High Peace Council (HCP), headed by Salahuddin Rabbani, with advancing the ‘peace and reconciliation’ process in Afghanistan.27 f) Decimation of Al-Qaeda Network Since Islamabad joined US-led coalition, Pakistani security forces have been engaged in “constant battle” with Al-Qaeda, disrupting and weakening the network. In December 2001, Pakistan deployed ‘a military contingent’ in Khyber and Kurram tribal agencies which border area opposite Tora Bora—a cave complex situated in the White Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, located about twenty-five miles southwest of Jalalabad—along the Durand Line. This deployment was in response, to US intelligence reports that Osama bin Laden had taken refuge in Tora Bora. Pakistan initially captured 240 Al-Qaeda operatives of 26 different countries who had escaped from Afghanistan following the OEF.28 But the US operation Tora Bora proved unsuccessful and American forces failed to seal egress routes from Tora Bora into Pakistan; the routes taken by Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and Deputy Head, Ayman Al-Zawahiri.29

Table 4.1: Key Al-Qaeda Operatives’ Arrests

Date and Places Al-Qaeda Operatives Description of Arrests

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March 2002 Abu Zubaydah Key recruiter and operational planner of (Faisalabad) Al-Qaeda September 2002 Ramzi bin al-Shibh Planner of the 9/11 attacks and other Al- (Karachi) Qaeda operations February 2003 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Mastermind behind the 11 September (Quetta) 2001 attacks March 2003 Yassir al-Jaziri Al-Qaeda financier (Lahore) May 2005 Abu Faraj al-Libbi Organizer of two failed attempts to (Near Peshawar) assassinate President Musharraf July 2005 (Gujrat) Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Participant in the August 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi (Kenya), and Dar-us-Salaam (Tanzania). January 2008 Dr. Amin-al-Haq Security coordinator of bin Laden’s (Lahore) Black Guard. a May 2009 Essa Al-Misri Top Al-Qaeda ideologue b (Faisalabad) March 2010 Abu Yahya Mujahdeen Al- Affiliated with operations division of (Karachi) Adam Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan c May 2011 Abu Sohaib Al Makki Senior Al-Qaeda operative (Karachi) September 2011 Younis al-Mauritani Al-Qaeda’s external operations Chief d (Quetta) June 2012 Naamen Maziche (French Close aide of Al Mauretani and In charge National) of Al-Qaeda’s international operations e

Source: “who’s who in al-Qaeda” BBC News, 27 April 2007; a Bill Roggio, “Report: Osama bin Laden’s Security Coordinator Captured in Pakistan,” The long war journal, 6 January 2008; b “Al-Qaeda Leader Esa Al-Misri with $50 Million Head Money Arrested in Faisalabad,” Khabrain (Urdu), 1 April 2009; c Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, “Qaeda Operative Arrested in Pakistan,” New York Times, 7 march 2010; d Kamran Yousaf and Huma Imtiaz, “Rekindling Ties: Top Al-Qaeda Operatives Captured from Quetta,” The Express Tribune, 6 September 2011; e “Key Al Qaeda Leader Held,” Dawn 20 June 2012. According to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report of 30 November 2009, the escape of Al-Qaeda’s leaders from Tora Bora was facilitated because of US flawed strategy and lack of military manpower on the ground. The task to capture bin Laden was handed over to greedy Afghan warlords who had received money from Al-Qaeda financers to provide safe passage to Al-Qaeda leaders. It is important to note that if Americans had shown competence to capture bin Laden during Operation Tora Bora through the use of US ground forces, the

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conflict in Afghanistan might have ended earlier and Pak-Afghan border region might have not witnessed the ongoing insurgency.30 Nevertheless, Pakistan has provided some of the most stunning successes against Al-Qaeda, including the capture or deaths of some of the top leaders. According to Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan arrested six-hundred sixty Al-Qaeda suspects between January 2002 and May 2006. Moreover, the security forces also killed more than 1,000 Al-Qaeda fighters in various military operations in Pakistan, thereby, disrupting the network’s ability to carry out coordinated operations at large scale in the West.31 In May 2004, Commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno praised Pakistan’s operations against Al- Qaeda and stated:

“I can tell you that Pakistan is widely known as tremendous partner with the US and coalition forces during the ‘War on Terror’…There have been more Al Qaeda turned over and arrested by the Pakistani government and military than any other government we have worked with around the world.”32

Pakistan navy, Maritime Security Agency and Coast Guard “coordinated several interdiction operations through the Liaison officers (LNO) team along the Pakistani littoral” to capture Al- Qaeda fugitives seeking refuge in Gulf countries.33 In March 2012, US Marine Corps General James N. Mattis acknowledged that “Pakistani intelligence support has been critical to neutralization efforts against Al Qaeda senior leadership.”34 g. Pakistan’s Intelligence-Sharing with US-Led Coalition to Combat Terrorism Accurate and precise intelligence collection and Intelligence sharing is another notable and remarkable Pakistani contribution in the ‘War on Terror’. In the words of Derek Reveron, “the ‘War on Terror’ requires high levels of intelligence to identify a threat relative to the amount of force required to neutralize it. This fact elevates intelligence in importance and places it on the frontline against terrorism.”35 Accurate intelligence is crucial to counterterrorism. Many terrorist cells in other parts of the world have links to some AlQaeda operatives in Pakistan, hence, accurate intelligence reports by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies can foil such attacks planned to be carried out overseas. Thus, Pakistan’s intelligence support has been crucial to combat Al-Qaeda.

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Through sharing of intelligence with many counties, Pakistan has been able to prevent terror attacks against other countries. For instance, in late August 2006, Pakistan shared intelligence reports of a terror plot to UK government, which in turn, facilitated preemptive actions against some militants linked to Al-Qaeda. These militants planned to use chemical explosives on a number of flights to United States and Canada. Pakistan arrested seven persons on suspicion of involvement in these plots including Rashid Rauf, a British citizen and an Al-Qaeda operative. Pakistan’s cooperation to save precious lives was acknowledged and appreciated by United Kingdom.36 In an unprecedented example of counterterrorism cooperation, Islamabad has started sharing information with New Delhi about 2008 Mumbai attack. Pakistan also shares intelligence reports about activities of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, “while keeping Central Intelligence Agency in the loop.” 37 Pakistan has also been providing assistance to CIA for its drone campaign flying along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.38 Pakistani informants are at times present at US bases to supply human targeting intelligence to the CIA, and are “increasingly involved in target selection and strike coordination about Al-Qaeda and Taliban” operatives in FATA.39 In this regard, US-Pakistan cooperation reached to such an extent that the US started embedding Special Forces with Pakistani troops in NWA and SWA to better coordinate drone operations.40

Nevertheless, United States and Pakistan also tussle over how to collect and to use ‘actionable’ intelligence on the activities of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. A case in point is the information sharing with CIA about the Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad, situated in Hazara Division of KPK province. Soon after US Navy SEALS killed bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistani Foreign Office issued a statement which stated that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence “[ISI] had been sharing information” about bin Laden’s targeted compound in Abbottabad “with the CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies since 2009” and “had continued to do so till mid-April 2011.” But the ISI failed to analyze or interpret the information themselves due to lack of “superior technological assets.” Pakistan provided “Intelligence leads” on bin Laden in the shape of “cell phone details of his most trusted courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti,” which the CIA pursued and developed that ultimately led to bin Laden’s killing on 2 May 2011.41 Pakistan had “expressed deep concerns and reservations” about the operation which was conducted “without prior information or authorization” from

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Islamabad. Washington, on the other hand, was fearful that Islamabad “could jeopardize” the Abbottabad Operation and “might alert the targets,” If Pakistan was informed about the mission in advance.42 This case emphasizes the mounting mistrust and suspicion between CIA and ISI over the use of action-able intelligence sharing.

It could be argued that Pakistan’s security calculations factor in to share intelligence against Taliban with US-led coalition forces; these include: a loss of sovereignty due to continuous US drone attacks, increased involvement of India in Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan and the prospect of a limited conflict or war with India.43 In this context, Islamabad wants significant “control of drones” flying over Pakistan but Americans have declined to accept Pakistan’s repeated demands. American officials charge that information shared before with the ISI about planned drone attacks had been “leaked” to the Taliban and other militants. 44 This trust deficit needs to be bridged between Pakistan and the US to better coordinate counterterrorism efforts. h) Ban on Militant and Sectarian Organizations Following 13 December 2001 attacks on India’s parliament, Pakistan came under tremendous pressure from United States to clamp down on militant groups. As a result, Musharraf government banned six militant organizations in January 2002. The banned organizations included: Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM or JeM, Army of the Prophet Muhammad), Lashkar- eTayyaba (LT or LeT, Army of the Righteous), anti-Shiite Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, Army of the Friends of the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon Him), Shiite -sect political party, Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP, movement of the followers of Fiqah-e-Jaferia) and also Tehreek-e-Islami (TI, Islamic movement), the new name of TJP, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat- eMohammadi (TNSM, Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) active in Swat for implementation of Islamic Sharia. In addition, the government placed one organization, Sunni Tehrik (Movement of Sunnis) on the watch list.45 Al-Qaeda was banned in 2003, and

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban movement of Pakistan, TTP) along with Lashkar-eIslam (LI, Army of Islam) and Ansar-ul-Islam (AI, Helpers of Islam) was banned in 2008. The 2008 ban came into effect amid an expansion of Taliban influence in Pakistan’s tribal region and Swat valley in KPK province.46 Nevertheless, these successive bans have made little impact on the militant organizations’ ability to operate, recruit, collect funds, distribute literature and run charity wings. Banned

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organizations explicitly operate with new names without any fear. The statements of their leaders, websites, periodicals and videos are somewhat easily accessible across the country. For example, the proscribed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) has been active as Tehreek-eKhuddam- ul-Islam (TKI, movement of the Servants of Islam), while collecting funds and campaigning as Al-Rehmat (Compassion) Trust, the charity wing of the organization.47

In a similar way, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan changed their names to Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP, the Path or Way of Pakistani Muslims) and Islami Tehreek (IT, movement of Islam) respectively and are carrying out their activities despite previous bans. 48 The same is the case with Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) that renamed itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD or JuD) and continue operating across the country as Tehreek-eHurmat-e-Rasool (movement for the Honour of Prophet). Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK, Organization for the Service of People) supervises the JD’s “charitable projects and funds collection.”49 JD is known for its extensive humanitarian relief work after the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, after the October 2008 earthquake in Balochistan and during and after the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Still, some analysts fear that JD could use charity funds to serve its interest.50 JD, however, denies accusations that it is a front for the Lashkar-e- Tayyaba.51 Jamaat-ud-Dawa was banned on 13 December 2008 in response to the UN-ordered sanctions in the wake of 2008 Mumbai attacks. In view of that Islamabad responded by detaining Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, Jamaat-ud-Dawa leader, and directing the banks to freeze all accounts held by the JD. Eleven JD offices were closed in several cities in Pakistan.52 Despite being banned, the JD organizes public rallies and runs offices under the new name Tanzeem Falahe-Insaniyat (Organization for the Welfare of Humanity). Hafiz Saeed was released in June 2009 by the Lahore High Court which stated “there was no evidence” that he was involved in Mumbai attacks. 53 In fact, New Delhi did not handed over any concrete evidence to Islamabad against Hafiz Saeed’s involvement in Mumbai attacks.

It is important to note that a 2010 budget document presented in the provincial Punjab Assembly revealed that Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Faction (PML-N)-led Punjab government allocated 80 million rupees [$940,000] for two schools and a hospital, linked to JD. The provincial government maintained that it had taken control of these institutions, after

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the charity was banned in 2008. But the reality is that these institutions are being overseen by JD and not by the Punjab government.54 It can be argued that Pakistan faces multiple political and strategic issues to deal effectively with banned militant and terrorist organizations. According to defense analyst, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan does not view Kashmir focused groups “as completely undesirable”, if New Delhi continues to maintain status-quo vis-à-vis Kashmir dispute. In this regard, many analysts conclude that the interests of Pakistan’s military, Islamic and conservative political parties and converge to utilize militant groups such as Kashmir resistance groups as a strategic tool, in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Consequently, this leaves the civilian government with limited ability to uproot the militant organizations as the government fear to undermine its own hold in power. 55 i) Curb on Publication and Sale of Hate Material Soon after 9/11, Pakistan launched a campaign to curb publication and sale of hate material including books, daily newspapers, weekly and monthly magazine, pamphlets, cassettes and Compact Discs (CDs) being sold in some parts of the country, spreading hatred, militancy and sectarian violence. On 6 March 2002, Musharraf ordered Azad Kashmir government and provincial governments of Sindh and Punjab to ban the publication of 22 magazines and propaganda tools of various religious and militant organizations. The curbs were in line with the measures suggested by the UN Security Council Sanction Committee and the Bush administration against terrorist individuals and entities.56 Following 7 July 2005 bombings in London, Musharraf government banned several militant publications in August 2006. The banning of hateful religious publications included: 16 books, one newspaper ‘Islam’ of Al Rashid Trust (Karachi), 11 weekly and 9 monthly magazines and various pamphlets. A ban was imposed on sale of CDs of the banned Baloch Liberation Army and Al-Qaeda members. These CDs carried recordings of radical speeches and “guerrilla training material.” 57 Yet, many of these publications continue to reappear at news-stands under the same names or new names. For example, JD’s Jihad Times continues to be published and circulated as Ghazwa Times. Similarly, Sipah-e-Sahaba’s Khilafat-e-Rashida (named after the System of Government established in the City of Madinah by the Rightly Guided Khulafa or rulers between 632-661 AC) and monthly Aab-e-Hayat (Water of Life) and Tehrikul Mujahideen’s

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monthly Shahadat (Martyrdom) are being published among their cadre despite government’s ban.58 The continued publications and sale of hate and militant literature remains the government’s biggest challenge. A major obstacle in implementation of the ban is an ineffective and slow mechanism to ban these publications. When a banned publication reappears, the process to proscribe it again takes more than eight months. Besides, a number of publications are published by the banned organizations and these “organizations have ostensibly transformed into charities” and trusts and under the law their publications cannot be banned until these charities are proscribed.59 j) Measures to Close-down Illegal Radio Broadcasts by Religious Extremists in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Pakistan has taken stern measures to illegal radio broadcasts by religious extremists in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province and FATA. FM radio broadcasts emerged as “powerful new medium for communicating the message of jihad…against the ‘infidels and their lackeys’” by militant and sectarian groups. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) stated in 2006 that over 100 seminaries and mosques broadcast extremist, sectarian and jihad related propaganda from illegal FM channels across the KPK and FATA.60 A 2009 BBC News report noted the broadcast of about 150 illegal FM radio stations in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.61 These illegal FM radio stations used to threaten the communities which try to stand against extremism and violence. Maulvi Fazlullah, the leader of the TTP Swat Chapter, used his radio sermons to expand his control over the Swat valley 62 and insisted on implementation of his interpretation of Sharia law in Swat valley and Malakand Division. While his sermons filled a “justice deficit, rendering verdicts for long unresolved disputes,” 63 he, nevertheless, terrorized political workers, populace and government officials and “listening to his radio sermons became compulsory for the [locals].” Militants were also recruited and organized by receiving “instructions on the radio.” In addition, his orders prevented children from getting polio vaccines and have called for the destruction of religious sites, music stores and girls’ schools. After successful completion of Swat operation, Pakistan army shut down his illegal FM radio stations. 64

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PEMRA enforcement teams have closed down 125 illegal FM Radio stations in KPK so far. Nevertheless, some of these stations re-emerge as militants buy a new transmitter and find a new broadcasting frequency.65 It has been suggested that the best way “to counter broadcasts by religious extremists,” is “to empower local media.” Already some local FM channels in both KPK and FATA have demonstrated success. For instance, Radio Khyber in the Jamrud area of the Khyber tribal agency has been very “popular among the local” populace that “it has almost replaced [militant leader] Mangal Bagh’s….FM station.” Pakistan’s army has also set up an FM station “Mera Swat” (My Swat) in Swat valley,” but the channel needs community ownership and local labeling” to be successful. 66 k) Measures to Counter Money Laundering and financing of terrorist acts Following 11 September 2001, Pakistan has quickly taken steps to suppress financing of terrorism. With the conclusion of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, Pakistan put financial measures at the centre of its focus to combat terrorism. All commercial Pakistani banks were ordered by the State Bank of Pakistan to freeze the accounts of organizations suspected of having ties to terrorists or organizations in lists compiled by the UNSC, the Asian Development Bank and the US Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.67 Islamabad also took measures for money laundering. In September 2007, President Pervez Musharraf promulgated the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO) which ‘enacted overall regulations for Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (AML/CFT), and ‘criminalized money laundering.’ On 27 March 2010, Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) was passed which repealed the AMLO. Under this act, money laundering has been made an “extraditable offence.”68 Currently, the ‘anti-terrorism laws framework’ is grossly inadequate and needs to be re-crafted to deal with challenges of militancy and terrorism.69 l) Increase in the Number of Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs) Since 9/11, a campaign to expand the number of anti-terrorism courts was undertaken by Islamabad to strengthen existent anti-terrorism mechanisms. During September and October 2001, eleven new courts were established in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and four in Sindh which brought the total number of anti-terrorism courts to 41.70 In order to prosecute captured militants during military operations against Pakistani Taliban in Swat and in South Waziristan Agency in 2009, the government also established new ATCs in Malakand Division.71

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Currently, there are forty-four anti-terrorism courts in Pakistan and these have decided 3501 cases during 2012.

Table 4.2: The Disposal/Pendency Figures of ATCs in 4 Provinces

Province No. of Courts Total Cases Decided during 2012 Pending Cases Punjab 14 1344 437 KPK 13 1409 201

Balochistan 6 289 216 Sindh 11 459 1405 Total 44 3501 2259 Source: Azam Khan, “Effective Measures Needed for Terrorism-related Cases: Says CJ,” The Express Tribune, 17 February 2013.

The ATCs have begun to start hearing cases to bring terrorists to justice. On 30 January 2010, the arrested spokesman of TTP- Swat chapter, Muslim Khan along with 23 other militants “were declared proclaimed offenders” by an ATC in Saidu Sharif in Swat and currently indicted on “charges of murder attempt,… treason and terrorism.” 72 In spite of an increase in the number of anti-terrorism courts, the country has witnessed an ‘insignificant prosecution rate’ of the perpetrators of terrorism. The absence of a joint strategy and poor prosecution by police and legal departments are main hurdles to bring terrorists to justice.73 A significant example of a poor prosecution is the release of 4 accused persons by an ATC “due to lack of evidence” in the Marriot Hotel Bombing (2008) case.74 One of the accused persons, Aqeel Ahmad alias Dr. Usman later on, led the 10-man assault team to attack Pakistan Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on 10 October 2009. Dr. Usman was captured alive and put in military detention.75 Had he prosecuted and put to jail earlier, he would not have led that assault.

Few problems also exist to bring suspected militants particularly residents of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to justice. For example, the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act76 does not apply to the residents of FATA. Hence, charges cannot be framed against FATAbased suspected militants or terrorists as they are subject to judgment under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), drawn up by the British in 1848. These suspected militants rejoin the Taliban insurgency after they are sent back to tribal areas.77

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Another reason behind the poor performance of ATCs is the “lacunas” in the process of appointment of judges. Expressing his dissatisfaction over the functioning of anti-terrorism courts particularly, the low disposal and high pendency of cases in the ATCs, Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry emphasized in 2010 to “appoint competent and qualified judges” so that “terrorists’ and extremists’ cases are properly investigated and quickly decided” and thereby, the anti-terrorism law could serve as “a deterrent” against terrorism.78 Finally, owing to the defective anti-terrorism legal craft, the prosecution rate remains very slow. According to government officials, the 1997 AntiTerrorism Act (ATA) could not cope with the situation emerging out of militancy and terrorism in different parts of the country. The amendments have been made in ATA in the form of ordinances issued by the President from time-to-time; however, “an ordinance lapses after 120 days, unless it is re- promulgated by the President or approved by the Parliament,” thereby restoring the Anti- Terrorism Act into its previous forms.79

m) Strengthening Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Strengthening law enforcement and internal security is a vital aspect in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism. A country’s police and law enforcement agencies act as the “first line of defense” against terror and organized crime, thereby ensuring internal security. In Pakistan, the law enforcement agencies, especially the police are short-staffed, poorly equipped and illtrained to counterterrorism operations.80 The police in capital city Peshawar need concrete bunkers, rocket launchers and heavy weaponry to counter attackers from the nearby tribal belt.81 In fact, the attacks on the police are on the rise, and since 2005 four hundred police officers have been killed every year in terrorist attacks or in encounters with militants in the country.82 In particular, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police, as a frontline force offered enormous sacrifices. Between 2006 to September 2012, 600 police personnel were killed and 1400 were wounded in 168 suicide attacks and other incidents of terrorism.83 Also, high desertion rate is a worrying trend in the police. For instance, in Swat valley some 700 out of 1737 police officers deserted or resigned their jobs in 2006-07 upon receiving threats from Maulvi Fazlullah and Taliban. Nevertheless, Pakistan has been taking measures to strengthen intelligence apparatus and increase operational capabilities of law enforcement agencies particularly police and Frontier Corps (FC). The PPP-led coalition government planned to recruit an elite force of 80,000

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(20,000 in each province) supplied with “special equipment and special pay package.” In this regard, 55,450 members police force was recruited in 200910 and 78,320 in 2010-11; however, insufficient foreign assistance for training and equipment of police continues to remain a worrying aspect.84 Similarly, in an effort to boost the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Frontier Corps (FC),85 Pakistan with US assistance has been working on a major modernization programme for FC from late 2007.86 This development plan envisages the expansion of the corps to 100,000, re- equipment of the FC with helmets, bullet-proof vests, armored vehicles and radios to improve the FC’s surveillance capabilities and also providing military training.87 It has been reported that 30 US military advisers and 23 British military personnel are engaged in training FC. But the training programme is “quite limited.” The FC is now acting under Army’s command in North and South Waziristan while it is effectively managing the counterinsurgency operations in Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai, Bajaur, Khyber and also in Dir area of KPK province.88 Furthermore, in July 2003, the Special Investigations Group (SIG), under the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) was established to identify, to arrest and to investigate the most wanted terrorists and prepare threat assessment reports for the Federal government. The counter terrorism functions of SIG also include building a national database of terrorists and training courses for police departments. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was expected to train SIG officials on “how-to-locate weapons of mass destruction, take postblast action, trace terror financing, investigate money-laundering, combat corruption within law enforcing agencies, manage crisis and improve techniques for fingerprinting and interviewing.” 89 Since 2003, four to five FIA and police officials have received training in short FBI courses from America on annual basis. Such cooperation, however, is quite small and needs to be expanded. 90 n) Introduction of Personal Identification and Finger Print Identification Systems at Transit Points in Pakistan

Pakistan has installed ‘a computerized Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES)’ at sixteen sites across the country with the US cooperation. This computer software is said to make “real-time comparisons of photographs and other personal details…with the FBI database…in order to track the movements of the Islamic militants at all

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18 major transit points.”91 It is important to note that “data and records of more than 26 million travelers have been stockpiled with about 3445 hits in different categories of the record.”92 Former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik stated: “Installation of PISCES has not only made (the) immigration process swift, but it provides a filter for the movement of passengers having restrictions. In the first quarter of 2009, 196 passengers belonging to different categories were checked with the help of this system.”93 Pakistan has also developed a centralized and standardized process for collecting and categorizing fingerprints through ‘Pakistan Automated Fingerprint System (PAFIS).’ United States provided $13 million funding for this project. Pakistani police have stockpiled “440,000 fingerprint records,” with “122,000 are already active in the database.” The PAFIS is connected to 52 remote terminals and is likely to further expand.94 In addition, an Air wing in the Ministry of Interior in Quetta (Balochistan) is also set up to offer basic police training and launched an Automated Finger Print Identification System (AFIS). The Air wing also supports counterterrorism and counternarcotics programmes. 95 o) Establishment of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) In order to “coordinate and unify national counterterrorism efforts,” Islamabad decided to establish the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) in December 2009.96 NACTA was envisioned to act “as the think tank to formulate strategies against extremism, terrorism and radicalism.” According to Tariq Pervez, the former Director General (DG) of NACTA, the idea behind establishing such an organization revolves around a “complete cycle of exchange of information” among its three wings: the Counter Extremism Wing of NACTA will work on anti-radicalization and rehabilitation of militants and extremists, the Counter Terrorism Wing will develop a database of terrorists and the affiliated groups and a record of terrorist incidents, and the Research and Analysis Wing will “feed both the others and will coordinate input from them to generate information for developing policy options.” 97 NACTA had drawn the interest of international partners and special security agencies including Interpol. The European Union has committed 15 million Euros while Britain has stated that it would furnish expertise and equipment to NACTA.98 Nevertheless, since its establishment in 2009, the NACTA has not been given the authority and an administrative structure due to internal wrangling about control of NACTA. Therefore, NACTA remains unable to evolve rules, governing the organization’s working or forming a counterterrorism policy and hence, operates in vacuum.99 This delay has caused hurdles in better coordinating counterterrorism

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efforts. Currently, there is very little to no coordination among the ISI, the FIA, Intelligence Bureau (IB); and the police involved in counterterrorism efforts. In fact, all these investigation and intelligence agencies have been working in isolation with no clear and coordinated counterterrorism strategy. Tariq Parvez notes that “platform for coordination” and cooperation exists neither between provincial police departments and intelligence agencies, nor between the civil and military counterterrorism departments.100 Nevertheless, in February 2014, Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar affirmed to activate NACTA as the lead platform for counterterrorism. In this regard, NACTA has prepared the draft of the National Security Policy 2013, which has five layers of the national security policy : to dismantle, to contain, to prevent, to educate and to reintegrate.101 This effort is a step in the right direction.

The extremists need to be challenged through coordinated counterterrorism and counter radicalization strategies, otherwise, anarchy is unavoidable. This anarchy and chaos can only be curtailed if concentrated institutionalized efforts, like NACTA, are supported and the government shows the will and sincerity to let such institutions function. 102

PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES IN FATA AND MALAKAND DIVISION

Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in FATA have gradually shifted from full scale direct military action to a campaign centered on the well-being of its people in FATA and Swat/Malakand region. The current strategy entails the use of military force to seal the borders and target militants in order to reestablish the writ of the state. The strategy strengthens the system of governance through development and economic activities and also focuses on the use of tribal people to achieve control of the area. Pakistan’s strategies to deal with the militancy and terrorism in FATA have produced mixed results as described below.

A. MILITANCY IN FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), spread over an area of 27,220 square kilometers, located in the north-west of Pakistan, shares a 600-kilometer border with Afghanistan. FATA consists of seven parts called agencies and six smaller zones known as Frontier Regions (FR). The seven agencies from north to south are Bajaur, Momand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan. All the agencies share a border with Afghanistan except Orakzai

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agency. Next to the east of FATA and west of the settled districts of KPK are six contiguous Frontier Regions (FR) administered by the District Coordination Officer (DCO) of the adjacent district. These include FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Tank, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, and FR Dera Ismail Khan.103

Figure 4.1: District Map of FATA and KPK

Source: Qandeel Siddique, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West,” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010), p. 19.

FATA seems to be stuck in a time-warp. It has remained ‘semi-autonomous’ since Pakistan’s inception in August 1947. The tribal region is governed by the British-era colonial

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administrative system based on the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901.104 Under the FCR, the Political Agent (PA) is the “pivot” of the administration. The PA selects tribal leaders who are provided with government funds “in line with their tribe’s cooperation in suppressing crime, maintaining social peace” and “supporting the government.” Each tribal leader has been provided with millions of dollars in secret funds “to buy loyalty” resulting in pervasive corruption in the administration. 105 The law and order is governed by the local tribal forces known as ‘khassadars’ (tribal police) and ‘levies’ as well as civil armed forces Frontier Corps (FC) and Frontier Constabulary. Many analysts argue that the system of governance in FATA “cannot be justified by any standard of modern administration and even basic human rights.”106 Another reason which obscures the issues of governance is the “transnational character” of the Pukhtun (also Pakhtun, Pashtun or Pathan) tribes living along the Pak-Afghan border area. FATA is inhabited by over 3.5 million Pukhtun and approximately 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan. Adjacent to FATA and KPK, is a chain of nine provinces across the border in Afghanistan extending from north to south. Most of these Afghan provinces are also inhabited by Pashtun,107 (the forty percent of Afghanistan’s population, approximately 15 million consists of Pashtun).108 Due to porous nature of the border, cross border trade and commerce and inter-marriages are common custom among tribesmen.109 In fact, FATA’s porous border is like a “giant sieve, enabling militants to slip into and out” of Afghanistan.110 Pukhtun cherish “individual and tribal honor,” preferred to be guided by a tribal code of Pukhtunwali or Pashtunwali (the Way of Pukhtun).111 They “unite under elected tribal” to enforce “the deliberation of a jirga,” and “coalesce around one leader” when he is “considered divine and leading a Jihad.”112 In this context, Afghan Taliban movement, grown out of chaos and civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s “transformed a brand of puritan vigilantes into an all conquering Islamic army led by Amir-ul-Momenin” (Mullah Muhammad Omar), in line with “Quranic percepts.”113 The tribesmen in FATA were “naturally fascinated by the regime of the mullahs.” As a result, many tribesmen join Jihad under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar. It could be argued that the transnational, “supra-tribal” and “anti-traditional,” higher cause of Jihad created the pre-9/11 Taliban and has, to some extent, shaped the neo-Taliban, now targeting NATO-led ISAF forces and

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Pakistan army. In fact, the Taliban movement is an amalgam of religion and tribal values. Hence, the emergence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in FATA is the result of tribal dynamics and began, principally “at the tribal level, by the tribal actors and in accordance with tribal values and tenets.”114 It is important to note that in the wake of the US-led invasion in Afghanistan, a number of militants including the core group of Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, Chechen, Uzbek and Uyghur found refuge in tribal areas particularly North Waziristan Agency (NWA) and South Waziristan Agency (SWA) under the Pukhtunwali code of traditional hospitality. In fact, the “support networks” and the militant recruitment, training and propaganda centers created along the Pak-Afghan border and the special bonds established between the Taliban, AlQaeda and Pukhtun tribes during Afghan Jihad and strengthened during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, were by no means “ceased to exist and were reactivated” following the overthrow of Taliban regime from Kabul. 115 After relocation to FATA, Al-Qaeda and Afghan insurgents established and revived their links with local tribes and militants. For example, when the US invasion of Afghanistan began, Nek Muhammad, “a Hamed Zai Wazir,” helped many Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants to settle in South Waziristan. He and his foreign associates established a new militant organization called Jaish-ul-Qibla-al-Jihadi-al-Alami (Jaish-ul-Qibla). This group recruited youth, provided training and to recruits and prepared propaganda material (literature and films) for indoctrination in facilities located in NWA and SWA. 116

B. MAPPING MILITANT LANDSCAPE IN FATA The militant landscape in the tribal belt is diverse, distinct and dynamic. It could be divided into three categories: i) FATA-based militant groups; ii) Non-FATA-based Pakistani militant groups; iii) Foreign militant groups with ‘core’ leadership either in FATA or Afghanistan. Many of these groups have shared objectives and “overlapping memberships.”117 Most importantly, the militant landscape in tribal areas is a “complex adaptive system” with multiple networks that “change and adapt,” to conduct their campaigns with some coordination.

A diverse array of militant groups has emerged and grown inside FATA acting at global, regional and domestic levels. At global level, jihad is carried out by groups such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. At regional level, there is ongoing jihad in Afghanistan and Indian

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administered Kashmir. At domestic level, a bloody insurgency aimed at implementation of ‘Sharia Law’ in line with “Deobandi principles” is ongoing. Moreover, there is a deep-rooted militant-criminal nexus which have their well-defined agenda.118 Thus, groups operating inside FATA can be “force multipliers” as well as “ideological guides” or “operational facilitators” for some missions.119 i. FATA-Based Militant Groups with Core Leadership Based in FATA.

The significant among these include Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan; Muqami Tehrik-i-Taliban or the Local Movement of Taliban led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir; and Lashkar-e- Islam.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): TTP is a “loosely defined mix” of various militant groups from all the seven agencies of FATA, Swat/Malakand Division, and several districts of the KPK Province (Baanu, Tank, Lakki, Marwat and Dera Ismail Khan). These militant “groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsood” on 14 December 2007 to create TTP.120 Baitullah Mehsood, subsequently, was killed by a US drone strike in August 2009 and succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsood. The TTP’s declared aims are: to assist the Afghan Insurgents against the ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan, “enforce [Islamic] Shariah” in Pakistan, and execute “defensive jihad against Pakistani security forces.”121 Pakistani Taliban groups combat against NATO forces under the “hierarchical structures of the Afghan Taliban.”122 Pakistani Taliban are products of Deobandi madaris in Pakistan which are largely funded by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian charities are sympathetic towards Wahabi/Salfi and Deobandi version of Islam. The Taliban movement thus, became “a demotic cocktail” of Deobandi and Wahabi interpretations of Islam.123 Equally important, the TTP draws “ideological guidance from Al-Qaeda [Salfi in character] while Al-Qaeda relies on the TTP for safe haven.”124 Muqami Tehreek-e-Taliban (The Local Movement of Taliban, MTT): The Muqami Tehreek- e-Taliban is active in both agencies of Waziristan. The MTT is a military block formed between Hafiz Gul Bahadur-led militants in NWA and Mullah Nazir led-militants in SWA to defend the Wazir Tribes’ interests in North and South Waziristan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur-led Taliban control NWA and are believed to host the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network. MTT is

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considered pro-government and target the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Hafiz Gul Bahadur alternates its support between TTP and Pakistani army according to the condition and the needs of the moment.125 Lashkar-e-Islam (LI): In Khyber Agency, Mangal Bagh Afridi leads a Deobandi militant group, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI). Mangal Bagh runs an illegal FM radio station. His militants have been engaged in “vigilante justice” in the area. It is worth noting that LI has resisted to merge with TTP and sometimes acted as “an effective counterweight” to TTP in Khyber agency.126 ii. Non-FATA-Based Pakistani Militant

Groups

Prominent among these are Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, sectarian and Kashmir focused militant groups of Punjabi origin.

Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM): Since 1992, TNSM-by Maulana Sufi Mohammad, has struggled for the implementation of Sharia in the Malakand region.127 In December 2001, Sufi Mohammad was detained in Kurram Agency on his return to Pakistan from Afghanistan where he had dispatched 10,000 volunteers to fight the US-led coalition forces. Since then, TNSM was run by Maulvi Fazlullah, son in law of Sufi Mohammad, and supported by TTP. As the TTP “patrons” became more dominant over their TNSM comrades in Swat in 2008, the TNSM movement, ultimately, adopted a hard-line and aggressive posture against the state and political leaders.128 Punjab Based Militant Groups (‘Punjabi Taliban’): These include banned militant groups of Punjabi origin: sectarian groups such as anti-Shiite Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ); Kashmir focused groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Lashkare- Tayyiba (LT), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and their various splinter groups. After these militant groups were banned in 2002-2003, they started moving to safe sanctuaries of FATA and reportedly established separate training camps, especially in NWA.129 These groups link up with foreign fighters, Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban in FATA. Since 2007 Operation Silence, directed against suspected militants, present in Red Mosque at Islamabad, Punjab based militant groups began to provide logistical support to FATA based militant groups to carry out attacks in Punjab province. These groups also recruit as many Punjabis as well as Afghans for operations against ISAF/ NATO forces in Paktia, Paktica, Logar, Kunar,

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Nooristan and Helmand and Kandhar in Afghanistan.130 Moreover, SSP and LJ are engaged in sectarian violence in Kurram and Orakzai agency in collaboration with TTP. LT collaboration with Al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban groups has also increased from late 2006. The LT has been engaged in recruiting and training the militants, and by facilitating their infiltration into Afghanistan from their bases in Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies.131 It should be noted that since 2008, the most brilliant militant strategists captured in FATA and KPK belong to LT, JM and SSP.132 iii. Foreign Militant Groups with some Leaders either in FATA or Afghanistan

These include Afgan insurgents such as Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network in North Waziristan, Hizb-e-Islami militants, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Afghan Taliban: The Afghan Taliban focus on ousting US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime and enforcing Islamic Sahria by restoring the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, allegedly operate from Quetta with shuras in Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi and NWA.133 North Waziristan Shura directs activities of Taliban in southeastern Afghanistan which includes the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar and Wardak. The North Waziristan Shura is reported to provide Afghan Taliban, “logistical, financial and technical assistance” from its bases in Waziristan.134 The Haqqani Network: It is the most important “Taliban-affiliated network led by Sirajuddin Haqqani” (son of former mujahideen commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani). The network operates from the Loya-Paktia or greater Paktia (the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost), which is largely inhabited by the Pashtun, belonging to Zadran tribe. In particular, the Khost Province abuts North Waziristan which provides Sirajuddin Haqqani and his militants with the vital ‘strategic depth’ to operate from Miran Shah into Afghanistan. 135

Hizb-i-Islami (HiG): It is another major faction of Afghan insurgency led by the former antiSoviet Jihad leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. His fighters operate in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, northeast of Kabul.136 In the Southeast of Afghanistan, HiG’s areas of influence are predominately non-Zadran areas of Paktika and Paktia, parts of Logar and Ghazni and some areas of Wardak and Khost. HiG is “operationally distinct” from Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network; however, HiG and Haqqani fighters are in “tactical alliance” to combat

Afghan and ISAF/ NATO forces in Loya-Paktia.137

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Figure 4.2: Militant Networks in FATA and Swat/Malakand

Source: Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), p. 26.

Al-Qaeda (Also Al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, ‘The Base’) and its Affiliates: Al-Qaeda’s principal goal as stated by Osama bin Laden in 1998 is “to liberate the lands of Islam from unbelief and to apply the law of Allah Almighty in it until we meet Him and He is pleased with us.”138 To achieve this goal, Al-Qaeda seeks to end the US hegemony and to revive the vision of a pan- national, pan Islamic group of states free from Western influence particularly, in the Middle East.139 According to bin Laden, righteous Muslims must not tolerate such governments which deviate from Sharia Law. Instead, they must overthrow pro-American, pro-Western “Arab governments in favour of protecting [Muslim] Ummah from the corruption, immorality and ignorance that comes with apostasy.” These secular governments are “nothing less than the

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enemies of Islam whose duplicity has fostered a decline in the greatness of Islam.” Al-Qaeda, therefore, “provokes aggressive responses from its enemies”― through the use of militancy and radical rhetoric― that can then be used to fan the flames throughout the ‘restive Muslim world’ in support of a radical thought and insurgency.140 This insurgency will “provide the power to liberate Muslims” from the clutches of ‘Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition’ that Al-Qaeda “blames for a litany of social and political ills” in Muslim World.141 To combat this ‘Zionist-Crusader attack on Islam, bin Laden called for a global defensive jihad against US and its allies.142 The US-led ‘War on Terror’ in AfPak region and Iraq has provided Al-Qaeda a pretext to motivate Muslims all over the world including Pakistan to “wage jihad against the West,”, the American “occupiers” and overthrow “secular regimes” in Muslim countries.143 In FATA, Al- Qaeda seized the opportunity “to combine the struggle against the so-called ‘near enemies’, which include Western-allied governments like Pakistan and Afghanistan, with ‘far enemies’”, which include United States, Israel and European countries.144 In fact, Al-Qaeda has been re-framing the ‘jihad’ in Pakistan as one that has both local and global aspects. To achieve its objectives, Al-Qaeda is providing ideological platform for “religious justification acting as a force multiplier” and a “mediator and coalition builder among a variety of Pakistani militant group” including the TTP, Haqqani Network, LT, SSP, LJ and other Al-Qaeda affiliated groups like Brigade 313, an operational Al-Qaeda cell, to further Al-Qaeda’s aims.145 A significant proportion of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are foreign, non-Arab militants which are based in FATA and include: the militants of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)146 and its splinter group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) active in Uzbekistan; Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) active in Xinjiang province of China; Libyan Islamic Fighters Group (LIFG) and Chechen fighters active in Chechnya, Russia. Although considerably degraded in tribal areas (due to Pakistan military actions and US drone strikes), 147 it is “remarkably adaptive.”148 Al-Qaeda “continues to provide advanced training in third-generation improvised explosive devices (IED), plastic explosives, information operations, counterintelligence, recruitment and fundraising” campaigns and indoctrination to youth and militants in Pakistan. According to Haider Mullick, Al-Qaeda “has survived and thrived due to a highly profitable train the trainer programme” for militant groups which in turn, serve

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Al-Qaeda’s objectives.149

C. PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES To eradicate militant networks and establish the writ of the state in FATA and Swat, Pakistan has adopted various counterterrorism strategies as detailed below.

1. Border Security The border control and security is a key element of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategy in FATA. Pakistan has taken strict security measures along the Pak-Afghan border to check infiltration of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives in the tribal areas. These include regularization of the entry and exit of seven passes along the Pak-Afghan border, deployment of troops and setting up of security check posts along the Durand Line. Islamabad has also introduced a ‘biometric system’ in order to maintain clear record of those crossing the Pak-Afghan border.150 Pakistan captured more than 600 suspected Al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban partly because of effective border control.151 To thwart the suspected movement of militants across border, Pakistan army has deployed well over 140,000 troops into the area, operating around 938 check posts along the border.152 In sharp contrast, the coalition forces and Afghan National Army have only 100 posts and deployed 36,500 troops153 on the Afghan side bordering FATA. In fact, Pakistani check posts outnumbered Afghan posts “by ten to one.”154 Hence, Pakistan rightly claims that NATO and Afghan Army are “not pulling their weight” to seal the long and porous border due to which many militants simply escape into Afghanistan from FATA, whenever an operation is launched by Pakistan army in tribal areas.155 Besides, Pakistan maintains that the Afghan National Army (ANA, largely composed of Tajiks and Uzbeks) is not “trained enough” to monitor the border effectively.156 Yet, NATO and Afghan official accuse Pakistan military of failing to seal the border. Analysts argue that completely sealing off the border along difficult mountain terrain perhaps, requires a “Berlin Wall Style construction and a half-a-million strong army to patrol 24 hours, seven days a week.”157

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2. Military Operations in FATA Operation Al-Mizan (2002 and 2006): Pakistan launched Operation Al-Mizan (The Balance) in FATA, in support of the OEF in 2002. Operation Al-Mizan comprised about “two dozen major operations” against Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives between 2002 and 2006.158 A number of small scale operations were also carried out. For instance, on 16 March 2004, Pakistan army began an offensive centered on Wana in SWA, to capture and kill foreign militants believed to be hiding in the area amid their local supporters, Nek Mohammad, Noor- ul-Islam, Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz. The operation was launched after tribal leaders failed to surrender a number of wanted militants by the deadline imposed by the army.159 Wana Operation failed to eradicate militants and incurred heavy casualties for Pakistan Army, “establishing that the adversary is well entrenched, fully equipped and motivated.”160 For General Musharraf, the operation was a watershed in counterinsurgency. He opined:

“It displayed our firm resolve and commitment despite the intensity of the opposition faced. Nonetheless, it also exposed our continuing inadequacies in terms of night flying and insufficient helicopters, and it caused further tension in our relations with the United States. We were even denied the use of helicopters provided to our Ministry of Interior by the United Sates government’s Drug Enforcement Agency during this very critical operation. It would have also been very helpful to have unmanned aerial vehicles for realtime information, but we were out of luck there too.”161

Similarly, another crucial operation was launched in Shakai valley in June 2004, during which the army discovered Al-Qaeda’s ‘operational nerve center’ in South Waziristan. The army found heavy weaponry as well as extensive range of audio-video equipment, propaganda films, various computers, CD-ROMs and tapes that were distributed throughout the tribal areas, Pakistan’s urban cities and even the Gulf region.162 Operation Al-Mizan had produced “mixed results.” The operation had resulted in the capturing or killing of several senior Al-Qaeda operatives and dismantled Al-Qaeda‘s nerve centre in SWA. By 2006, Pakistan apprehended 689 Al-Qaeda suspects, of which 369 were handed over to the US.163 Yet, the operation failed to clear North and South Waziristan of militants because of “the ties and the sympathy” of Pakistani tribes toward the Taliban and foreign fighters. 164 Ultimately, the growth of Taliban and other militant groups in the area accelerated. They targeted pro-government and powerful tribal leaders to increase their influence and power.

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Likewise, the influence of mullahs (religious clerics), who supported Taliban’s “worldview”, also increased. Besides, tribesmen also resented Pakistan’s army operations due to its “destructive tactics”; the army demolished a number of houses, shops and markets and used private houses and schools as barracks.165 It was unfortunate that after clearing a territory from militants, Pakistan army did not hold and build the area and in the absence of a ‘follow-up policy’ the militants returned to those areas. Most importantly, following Pakistan army operations in Wana in 2004, the Taliban militancy gravitated towards the Mehsud-inhabited areas of SWA, where Baitullah Mehsud transformed the Taliban movement into “a formidable fighting force” and the most vital actor “in tribal politics.”166 Operation Zalzala (2008): In January 2008, Pakistan army undertook a major operation called ‘Zalzala’ (The Earthquake) in South Waziristan, with the aim of clearing the area of TTP and capturing or killing Qari Hussain, who ran ‘Spinkai Ragzai suicide training camp,’ and led a campaign of suicide attacks in the country since 2006. The operation dispersed the militants, however, the army failed to capture or kill Qari Hussain. Besides, the forces did not hold the territory, and the militants returned to the area, once Pakistan army left.167 Subsequently, Qari Hussain Mehsud resumed his campaign of suicide bombings across the country. By mid-2008, the TTP effectively controlled SWA while it controlled Bajaur Agency and Mohmand Agency in collaboration with TNSM. It had ‘spread its tentacles’ beyond the tribal belt into settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) such as Dir District and Swat Valley.168

Operation Sherdil (2008): Since 2008, Pakistani military began re-evaluating its counterinsurgency strategy and shifted the strategy from ‘targeting enemy’ to ‘population security.’169 Pakistan’s “population-centric approach” became visible during Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) in the Loisam area of Bajaur on 6 August 2008. The operation was successful, for it bolstered troop morale and disrupted Al-Qaeda’s and Taliban’s sanctuaries in Bajaur. Table 4.3: Al-Qaeda and Taliban Commanders Killed during Operation Sherdil

S. No. Al-Qaeda and Taliban Commanders Nationality 1 Abu Saeed Al-Masri Egyptian 2 Abu Suleiman Arab

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3 Mullah Mansoor Uzbek 4 Manaras Afghan 5 Abdullah (son of Maulvi Faqir Mohammad who Pakistani had close ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri) Source: “Pakistan says 1,000 militants killed in Bajaur campaign,” Reuters, 26 September 2008. During Operation Lion Heart, Inspector General Frontier Corps, Lieutenant General Tariq secured the population through “troops patrol on the streets, working with tribal lashkar (militias) and jirgas (councils) to identify and capture irreconcilable” militants, incorporating advice from ‘junior officers’ and encouraging Pashtun-Punjabi personnel cooperation which led to innovative use of forces and equipment on the battlefield.170 Yet, Pakistani security forces failed to capture or kill TTP leader, Maulana Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur. They also failed to stop the growing influence of TNSM and TTP in Dir and Swat.171 Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009): Building on roaring success of ‘population-centric approach’ during Operation Lionheart in Bajaur, Pakistan Army launched operation Rah-e-Rast (Righteous Path) on 26 April 2009, with the aim of retaking Buner from militants and to “liberate” Swat from the control of the TNSM and TTP.172 By 30 June 2009, security forces claimed of regaining control of Buner and Swat Valley.

During Operation Rah-e-Rast, the military focused to actively clear out the population (population resettlement), in order to better target militants and reduce collateral damage. Some 2.4 million people were encouraged to move out from war-torn Swat to relief camps or other cities. UN termed it as “the largest refugee exodus since Rwanda refugee exodus of 1994”.173 Nevertheless, this gave the military a tactical gain in cleaning up of the valley from militants. 174 Although some militants did escape during the operation, more than 1,600 militants were killed, and 700 of them were captured. In mid-July, the government declared the Malakand Division safe and allowed refugees to return to Swat. The military coordinated its efforts with some Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGO) to resettle the internally displaced persons (IDPs), re-establish the writ of the government and rebuild the local economy, although this process is ongoing. 175

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Figure 4.3: Growing strength of Taliban in FATA and KPK in 2008 and Early 2009

Source: “Pakistan conflict map,” BBC News, 22 June 2009; Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8046577.stm (accessed 25 June 2009).

Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009): In the aftermath of successful victory and recapture of the entire Swat valley, Pakistan Army took the crucial decision to launch operation Rah-e-Nijat (The Path to Deliverance) in South Waziristan. The major objective of the operation was to clear the area of an estimated 10,000 insurgents, including 1,500 foreign fighters and dismantling “the nerve centre” of the TTP.176 Pakistan Army started its military campaign in South Waziristan, involving 60,000 troops on 17 October 2009. In order to gain tactical advantage, Pakistan army persuaded Maulvi Nazir Ahmad in SWA “to remain neutral” in conflict and “allow the safe passage” to security forces to enter Mehsud controlled territory.177 Moreover, the army followed a “ridgeline approach,” to control the barren mountain “heights to secure the valleys” rather than “main roads.”178 Additionally, the military set up a blockade around SWA to cut-off movement and logistics,

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employed embedded intelligence networks to intercept TTP communications and carried out air attacks to ‘soften targets’ with some intelligence collected by the US drones. In August 2009, TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike which further disrupted TTP fighters. The army completed the first phase of operation within six weeks as security forces took control of ‘Makeen, Srarogha and Ladha’ areas in SWA.179 The operation successfully threw the TTP into disarray; however, many militants were able to escape from SWA to NWA and Orakzai Agency, before the launch of the operation. Therefore, dislodged militants have resumed guerrilla operations against Pakistan army in South Waziristan and other tribal agencies.180 On 23 March 2010, Pakistan army launched an offensive to clear Orakzai agency from militants. For the military, establishing the writ of the state in Orakzai agency was a key step towards crippling TTP’s ability to train and launch suicide attacks.181 In addition, the military wanted to deny TTP another sanctuary, in which it may regroup following the army operations in South Waziristan. By 3 June 2010 Pakistan army announced a victory over the militants in Orakzai. 182

Currently, Pakistan security forces are in various stages of operations across South Waziristan, Bajaur, Kurram and Orakzai agencies and Swat valley to end the TTP insurgency in FATA and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.183 Nevertheless, the pace of the post-operation phases such as safe repatriation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been very slow. Repatriation of IDPs is crucial as it would bring stability to the region and deny the Taliban a safe haven in SWA.184 According to officials, at least 5,000 families (only a small fraction of 400,000 IDPs from the Mehsud tribe) returned their homes in the first phase beginning in December 2010.185 Most of the IDPs are still reluctant to return to their homes due to security concerns in SWA.186 The delay in repatriation, however, serves only the cause of the militants, and damages Pakistan’s strategy to stabilize the region. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations continue to lead to major, rapid movements of IDPs. More than 415,000 people were displaced in 2012 and 1.1 million IDPs were registered in June 2013 as displaced by conflict in the tribal agencies and Malakand division.187 Despite these hurdles, successes in Pakistan’s military operation in Swat and South Waziristan give evidence to the fact that Pakistan has sufficient counterinsurgency capability to disrupt

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the Al-Qaeda and TTP and dislodge Taliban from their strongholds in FATA and Malakand Division.

3. Peace Deals and Agreements Pakistan made various peace agreements to isolate Al-Qaeda and affiliated foreign fighters from local militant groups. But these peace deals have brought little success so far. The main effect has been to make militants’ “de facto ascendance” in FATA similar to their “de jure presence.”188 Peace agreements in North and South Waziristan: The first of the series of peace agreements in FATA was ‘a verbal deal’ known as ‘Shakai agreement,’ in SWA. The agreement was reached on 24 April 2004 with Ahmadzai Wazir Tribe and Pakistani Taliban led by Nek Mohammed in Shakai Valley, whereby Musharraf regime agreed to grant amnesty to foreign fighters, and the militants agreed to register the foreigners, and not to use Pakistan’s territory for attacks against ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan.189 The military commander, Lieutenant General Safdar Hussein pushed for the peace deal.190 Nevertheless, the militants led by Nek Mohammed declared later on, that the registration of militants was not part of the deal. 191 The deal fell through as Nek Mohammad was killed in a first-ever US drone strike in June 2004. According to Rahimullah Yusufzai, the drone attack was precisely meant to foil the peace deal that was concluded between the government and the Nek Mohammad.192 Subsequently, there were three more peace agreements in South Waziristan. One with Commander Nek Mohammad’s successors in Wana, and two with Baitullah Mahsud; in February 2005 at Sararogha and the other in February 2008. As part of the agreements, the Baitullah Mashud and his associates promised that they “would not attack government installations or security forces and would not shelter and assist Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants.” None of these peace agreements lasted, as there were violations of the terms of agreements soon after such pacts were inked. 193 In September 2006, Musharraf government concluded a peace agreement known as ‘Miranshah Accord’ with Uthmanzai Wazir Tribe in North Waziristan and members of the Taliban including Hafiz Gul Baade.194 The Government agreed “to stop air and ground attacks against militants” in North Waziristan and “to withdraw from control points.” As part of the agreement, the militants would neither “cross border into and out of Afghanistan,” nor “enter agencies adjacent” to NWA. Most importantly, it mentioned that foreign militants living in NWA would

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either have to leave the tribal region, or lived there “peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement.”195 According to Amir Rana, the government opted “to adopt this course after realizing that the foreigners have nowhere to go as their countries do not accept them and that the constant use of force was proving counterproductive to get rid of militancy.”196 The Taliban later withdrew of the pact because of the security forces’ deployment on main check posts in 2007.197 Pakistani authorities claimed that the peace agreements in Waziristan were an attempt to detach Al-Qaeda from Pakistani Taliban and to make the atmosphere hostile to Al-Qaeda and affiliated foreign militants.198 Critics of the North Waziristan agreement, however, viewed it as a “sign of weakness” by General Musharraf who was under huge pressure from MMA to end his US-backed fight in tribal areas.199 NATO officials argued that in the three months following the signing of the ‘Miranshah Accord’, the number of cross border attacks on USled coalition forces “tripled.”200 Since the signing of the peace deals, Pakistani Taliban gained enormous political and administrative control in NWA and SWA. This was due to the fact there were no guarantors” from tribal elders to ensure that militants would not violate the terms of the peace agreement. Moreover, by concluding the agreements with the militants, the military extended “legitimacy” to them. Furthermore, the peace deals in FATA made it easier for militant groups to send weapons and fighters across the border in Afghanistan. ISAF/ NATO forces were certainly “irked” by these agreements and reacted in a way to spoil the prospects of peace negotiations in future. For instance, the prospects for lasting peace in tribal areas particularly, Bajaur agency, signaled by ‘Miranshah Accord’, “were overshadowed by angry tribal reaction to the 30 October 2006 missile attack on a madrassa in Bajaur; which killed 85 innocent people including children.”201 Swat Peace Agreement (2008) and Peace Deal (2009): In April 2008, Awami National Party (ANP)-led coalition government in Kyber Pukhtunkhawa province signed a peace agreement with TNSM led by Maulana Sufi Mohammad. Under the agreement, TNSM agreed to pursue a peaceful struggle for the enforcement of Shariah in Swat valley and in Malakand Division. The TNSM also declared that killing of police, military personnel or other government employees was “un-Islamic.” In return, the provincial government withdrew all pending cases against Sufi Mohammad. He was released from jail on 21 April 2008 to put an end to hostilities

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and to make peace between the government and militants in the valley. The effort initially bore some fruit with the conclusion of a peace deal with militants of Swat on 21 May 2008. Maulvi Fazlullah agreed to recognize the writ of the state by not attacking security forces, allowing women education and permitting vaccination of children against polio. But the peace deal was “unilaterally revoked” by Maulvi Fazlullah under intense pressure from TTP leader,

Baitullah Mehsud, who was annoyed by Pakistan’s army military operation in SWA. 202

In February 2009, ANP-led coalition government negotiated a “Shariah for Peace” deal with Maulana Sufi Mohammad’s TNSM in order to isolate the Swat-based Taliban from TNSM. The deal promised enforcement of the Sharia through qazi (religious) courts in ‘the seven districts of Malakand Division and in Kohistan district of Hazara Division.’ In return, Fazlullah-led fighters agreed to surrender arms, recognize the writ of the government and denounce suicide attacks and violent acts. It was also agreed that TNSM will allow women to study and work without any fear and will permit vaccination of children against polio. On 13 April 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari signed the ‘Sharia Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009’ into law, thereby effectively sanctioned the government’s deal with the TNSM. 203 The deal was severely criticized by the US officials. Pakistani government officials, however, hold that the peace agreement was aimed to “marginalize and wean” Fazlullah-led militants away from both Sufi Mohammed’s followers and Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP fighters.204 Nevertheless, the agreement failed because the militants refused to recognize the writ of the government and spread into adjacent areas of Bunir, Dir and Shangla. The militants continued abducting soldiers, policemen, government employees and attacked government and NGO offices. Many moderate-liberal elements, civil society as well as ordinary people started arguing that the “militants had sinister designs and Sharia was just a façade to cover their hidden agenda.” 205 Fazlullah-led militants’ attempts to expand their sway beyond Swat valley compelled Pakistan army to launch Operation Rah-e-Rast in April 2009 which led to the collapse of the peace deal. Rahimullah Yusufzai noted:

“the fact that Swat Taliban were part of Baitullah Mehsud-led TTP was a reminder that the fate of a peace deal in one theatre of war was linked to the

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situation elsewhere in FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa…. [Hence], no deal could work in isolation and bring durable peace.”206 4. Pakistan’s Tacit Approval for US Drone Strikes Pakistan has granted tacit approval to United States to carry out attacks on targets in the border region using UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) as part of its counterinsurgency strategy.207 The implicit understanding gave Pakistan the right to protest against the drone attacks as “breach of Pakistani sovereignty and international law,” in order to keep Pakistani people satisfied. 208

Though, the drone strikes kill key Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, but these alienate tribal people in FATA from Pakistani government and from the US-led coalition forces.209 Consequently, the tribes’ resentment and rage at drone attacks has been successfully exploited by Al-Qaeda and the TTP to increase recruitment of militants to sustain and spread insurgency. Khalid Aziz, an expert on tribal affairs, noted that Al-Qaeda used fighters from Waziristan and Pakistani Kashmiri militant organizations like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) “to open up a point of insurgency by radicalizing Swat, Bajaur, Dir, Kohistan and Shangla. Soon this area was engulfed in active fighting.”210 Furthermore, the drone strikes trigger suicide attacks in KPK and other parts of the country. For instance, Baitullah Mehsud claimed the responsibility of May 2009 Lahore Police Academy attack which killed 12 people. Baitullah declared that this was “in retaliation for the ongoing drone attacks in the tribal areas and there will be more such attacks.” 211 Finally, US “[drone] strikes have a unifying effect” on the extremists and local tribes and therefore, the strikes “undermine Pakistani strategy of driving a wedge” among various militant groups in FATA. As a result, the continuation of these attacks increases instability in Pakistan as well as contributes to a sense of “breach of sovereignty” among people. The American drone campaign, in one way, is “similar to the air control methods” used by the British in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the 1920s. Due to this “historical resonance,” people in tribal belt perceive the drone attacks “as a continuation of colonial-era policies.”212 5. Support for Tribal Jirga and Tribal Militias A crucial tool of Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy in the tribal belt is Pakistan’s efforts to end tribes’ support for Taliban and foreign fighters through traditional tribal means like holding jirga and forming tribal militias, known as lashkar. United States has also encouraged Pakistan

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to raise lashkar to battle Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters.213 The first tribal jirga was held in August 2002 and the first tribal lashkar to oust the foreign militants was raised in October 2002.214 Since 2008, holding tribal jirga and emergence of lashkar has accelerated. In fact, the formation of lashkar in tribal regions correlates with growing influence of Taliban. In January 2008, tribesmen raised a lashkar of 600 to fight Al-Qaeda and affiliated foreign militant groups in South Waziristan.215 Similarly, in March 2009, a grand Mamond tribal jirga in Bajaur Agency was held, which agreed to a 28-point peace deal with the government, aimed at securing peace in Bajaur agency. The emergence of the tribal lashkar is not only an obvious sign of the tribes’ rising frustration with the brutality of the militants but also a clear indication of the tribes’ “traditional desire to run their own affairs and keep Pakistani military at bay.”216 The lashkar formed in Dhog Darra in Upper Dir district, Salarzai area in Bajaur Agency and Ambar in Mohmand Agency and Swat proved effective, although the tribesmen suffered huge human and material losses at the hands of Taliban.217 It has been argued that “many tribal elders often wonder for how long they would have to mobilize their young men to take on an enemy as determined as the Taliban.” The targeted killings of pro-government tribal leaders, attacks on jirgas and lashkar continue to take a toll owing to the non-cooperative attitude of the Federal government. 218 For instance, in July 2009, a leader of a local Shiite lashkar in Kurram agency called for government’s support as it clashed with Taliban who wanted to cross the border into Afghanistan, but the government did not provide considerable support.219

Table 4.4: Suicide Attacks on Jirga and Lashkar

Date Distict/Agency Killed 2 March 2008 Darra Adamkhel (Orakzai) 40 tribal chieftains 20 November 2008 Bajaur 22 tribal elders

10 October 2008 Khadezai (Orakzai) 140 tribesmen of Ali Khel tribal Jirga and lashkar 9 July 2010 Ekkaghund (Mohmand) 106 people of Utmankhel tribal jirga 6 December 2010 Ghalanai (Mohmand) 43 tribesmen & lashkar elders. a 23 April 2011 Bajaur 5 people, including lashkar chief. b

c 9 September 2013 Khyber Agency Three volunteers of Peace Lashkar

Source: Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Lashkars, private militias and militants,” The News, 13 July

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2010. a “Bloodbath in Mohmand Agency: Death toll rises to 43,” The Express Tribune, 7 December 2010. b Iftikhar Firdous, “Bajaur Agency: Tribal militia Chief, Four others Killed in Suicide Attack,” The Express Tribune, 24 April 2011; c “Three volunteers of Peace Lashkar killed in Khyber Agency,” Samaa TV, 2013.

The constant Taliban attacks further exacerbate lashkar members’ anger at the government for its “perceived inaction.” In fact, after the Taliban attacked the Shalbandai village lashkar in Buner District in 2008, the villagers threatened to dissolve the lashkar. In March 2011, the leader of the Adezai lashkar went so far as to say that “the lashkar would join the Taliban” if it did not receive more ammunition from government.220 It remains to be seen whether tribal militias could be sustained due to “episodic” military assistance and political support of the government,221 but there is no doubt that Pakistan’s strategy of raising tribal militias to fight the Taliban could lead to the emergence of armed militant groups, like Afghan warlords. 222 6. Pakistan’s “Divide and Rule” Strategy in FATA In conjunction with providing support to tribal jirga and militias, Pakistan has also employed historically-tested divide and rule policy based on pitting one militant group against the other, with some concessions offered to the pro-government militant group.223 For example, in 2007, Pakistan army backed pro-government Mullah Nazir to dislodge Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) led by Tahir Yuldashev from SWA. During the fighting, Pakistan military provided “medical services to Mullah Nazir and his fighters” and assisted them to secure deserted Uzbek camps. By April 2007, Mullah Nazirled militants killed about 250 Uzbek fighters and drove them out of Wana.224 The IMU-Mullah Nazir clashes had strain relations between Baitullah Mehsud-led Taliban and the Mullah Nazir-led Taliban of the Ahmadzai Wazir Tribe, since Mullah Nazir resented “the refuge” offered by the Mehsuds to the IMU. Subsequently, Mullah Nazir led militants came under constant attacks from the IMU that was now operating from the area controlled by Baitullah Mehsud. Nevertheless, this internal strife provided Pakistani government to drive in Wana “by establishing a permanent military presence” there, and by initiating development activities in the region.225

Pakistan military also supported anti-TTP factions like Abdullah Mehsud group and Turkistan Bhittani group to create further rifts in the TTP. During Operation Rah-e-Nijat Abdullah Mehsud group and Bhittani group fought beside Pakistani military. The two groups also kept

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peace in adjacent Tank and Dera Ismail Khan District as the TTP militants retreated deeper into the mountains of South Waziristan during the operation.226 Pakistan’s strategy to pit one militant group against the other till now proved effective in sidelining and defeating hard-line militants. Nevertheless, many analysts argue that Pakistan should carefully weigh the costs and the benefits of this strategy which appears to give shortterm gains, but in the long run, many warlords and militant groups could turn against the government breeding further militancy.227 7. Pakistan’s Deradicalization Measures In Pakistan, deradicalization strategies are considered a crucial part of a comprehensive counterterrorism approach, aimed at rehabilitating extremists and militants.228 Islamabad’s first major project is Sabawoon (first light of dawn) founded in September 2009 in Malakand, which works to deradicalize and rehabilitate Swat valley youth, who drifted towards Pakistani Taliban that captured the Swat valley in 2007.229 An army official stated that many young boys surrendered during Operation Rah-e-Rast in April 2009 or escaped from Taliban prisons in the valley.230 Dr. Farooq Khan, a religious scholar, stated: the Taliban told these young boys that “Pakistan is a liberal and infidel country”, and to fight the infidels was “justified” according to Islamic Shariah.231 In this context, the measures to deradicalize the youth become more important. Dr. Feriha Peracha, the Director of Sabawoon and the supervising psychologist, notes that the deradicalization programme addresses challenges of extremism and religious radicalization through a combination of secondary school education, psychosocial intervention, vocational training, social training and religious instruction. She observed that most of the boys “will not revert to militancy…The changes have been phenomenal.” Sabawoon has educated more than 200 Pakistani youth, 143 of whom have been rehabilitated so far. Their progress continues to be monitored to make sure that detained militants and extremists do not return to extremism. Pakistan army also runs a deradicalization School, ‘Mishal’ in Barikot Tehsil of the Swat Valley. Started in 2010, the school successfully brought about deradicalization of 566 people; mostly males aged 18 to 25 within a period of one year, who were productively reintegrated into society. 232

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8. Pakistan’s Development Activities in FATA FATA is the most underprivileged region of Pakistan and desperately needs development. In particular, developing FATA’s physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools and hospitals, electricity, irrigation and other facilities should be a priority. FATA has only 1.5 percent of Pakistan’s GDP with per capita income of only $250, which is half the national average. Sixty-six percent people in FATA are living below the poverty line.233 The growth of industry is not possible due to the defective supply of electricity while the crop productivity is low because of lack of proper irrigation system.234 Many people seek employment in very few industries and in unorganized mining at small scale in some parts. Others often become a member of local criminal networks or join local security and paramilitary forces. The FATA’s harsh and difficult topography further disconnects tribal people from markets, schools and health centers and isolates tribes from “outside influences.”235

FATA received less than 1 billion Pakistani Rupees (Rs.) in Annual Development Programme (ADP) until 2001. The Table 4.5 documents comparative socioeconomic indicators which clearly show the government interest in the economic development of the tribal area vis-à-vis KPK and the rest of the country. Nevertheless, after 9/11 Musharraf government initiated various development projects in FATA to bring prosperity to this region. The government increased the ADP by 214 percent from 2001 to 2002.236 Between 2002 and 2010, FATA development budget was increased from Rs. 800 million to Rs.15 billion under the FATA Annual Development Program.237 Even with increased budget allocation since 2002, per capita government funded development investment in FATA (Rs. 905 or US$ 11.30) stands very low as compared to the national per capita government funded development investment (Rs. 2044 or US$ 25.55).238 Table: 4.5: FATA: Comparative Socio-Economic Indicators (1998, 2003)

DESCRIPTION PAKISTAN KPK FATA

Cultivated area (million hectares) 21.92 1.71 0.19 Irrigated area (million hectare) 18.17 0.86 0.10 Literacy rate (%) 45.00 56.50 39.30 17.42 Male 32.60 58.4 29.50

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Female 19.9 3.5

Population per hospital bed (#) Population 1450 1869 2327 per doctor 1529 4946 8189 Roads per square kilometres 0.31 0.13 0.17 Source: http://fata.gov.pk/ (accessed 6 June 2010).

In 2009, Rs 8,108 million had been spent on 1,012 development schemes while 150 of them were completed. For the year 2010-11, PPP-led coalition government approved Rs.15 billion ADP to uplift the development work. As many as 424 development schemes were announced to be completed including 94 projects in education sector, 82 in communications sector and 64 in the health sector. For the year 2011-12, the total volume of FATA ADP is also Rs. 15 billion. Rs. 1452 million were allocated for FATA Development Authority to develop over 1,000 schemes including around 300 new development schemes. The government also allocated Rs. 7.61 billion for education in FATA’s ADP between 2005 and 2010. The government appointed 20,709 male and female teachers in FATA. 239 Musharraf government developed a nine-year, two-billion-dollar Sustainable Development Plan (SDP, 2007–15) for the tribal areas worth $2 billion with partial help from donors including United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The plan addresses the existing social and economic problems and outlines measures to improve services, upgrade infrastructure, promote the sustainable use of natural resources, and bolster activity in the trade, commerce and industrial sectors. This will be a demanding effort and requires international assistance and support.240 But the flow of funds are considered insufficient, as 20-30 percent of USAID project funds do not actually reach the target populations due to complicated procedures involved in trying to implement the programme.241 Figure 4.4: Annual Development Programme Funding Allocation for FATA (in Rs.

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billion)

16

14 15 15 15 12

10 8.612 7.2 7.5 8

6 5.15

4

2 1.15 1.15

0

Source: “FATA Development (2000-2015),” Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, Economic Division (1 July 2008), p. 10. Pakistan army also played a crucial role in development work in FATA. The projects in FATA include construction of over 400 kilometers roads, dams, canals and hydroelectric works. These projects speak of the concern at the part of Pakistan army regarding the miseries and helplessness of the people because of the ‘War on Terror’.242 For instance, Pakistan army constructed a nineteen kilometers long Shilman-Shinpokh road which links Khyber Agency and Mohmand Agency and benefited approximately 20,000 people of the area.243 By July 2010, army engineers also completed work on “108 kilometer long TankMakeen Road and 101 kilometer long Tank-Wana Road.” These roads reduced the distance between the southern districts of KPK and SWA.244 Pakistani government also plans to build a 2,326 kilometer long road connecting all the seven tribal agencies and the Frontier Regions. This road will provide an alternative road to Afghanistan that will reduce the traffic burden on Peshawar city. By building the road network in FATA, the government will trigger development in the country’s war-torn parts and further its writ in the tribal areas. 245 In addition, work has been initiated to construct a total of 12 small dams in the tribal area to meet the requirements of water and agricultural needs. In this regard, the US-funded Gomal Zam Dam is a major project of Islamabad’s effort to develop militancy-hit Waziristan.246 This dam will have the capacity to store 1.14 Million Acre Feet water to irrigate 163,000 acres of farmland. The project will generate 17.4 Megawatts of electricity for 25,000 households in South Waziristan and other areas of FATA.247

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The army believes it can create goodwill by encouraging education in tribal areas. Army has built 11-million-rupee Waziristan Institute of Technical Education and 500 million rupees Cadet College Spinkai. Seventy-five students graduated from the Waziristan Institute of Technical Education in December 2012 with diplomas in auto-mechanics, carpentry and IT. According to an official, if Pakistani government stays “committed and continue” such development work for next few years, it “will change the face of FATA.” However, there are problems that won’t go away soon, such as threats of retaliation by TTP, inadequate financial resources and the lack of effective and honest civilian administration. 248

CONCLUSION Pakistan strategies as a ‘frontline’ state in the ‘War on Terror’ seek to serve Pakistan’s interest in fighting militancy and extremism in the country and to establish and extend writ of the government in FATA by eliminating militant and terrorist networks. But there are a number of limitations upon Pakistan’s ability to combat militants. Some of these limitations arise from Pakistan’s domestic political situation and its policies on Kashmir and Afghanistan. Others emerge from Pakistan’s financial limitations and persistent lack of resources, including training and equipment facilities, law enforcement capacity and effective bureaucratic culture. Furthermore, the measures to prevent banned militant organizations from operating across the country, to curb on terrorism financing and publication and to ban sale of hate material prove to be insufficient and unsatisfactory. Also adequate counterterrorism legislation, judicial capacity and better coordination among intelligence agencies are lacking. In addition, the US campaign of drone strikes in tribal areas results in population alienation, thereby, further fueling the insurgency in FATA and mainland Pakistan. In spite of all these limitations, Pakistani security forces are trying to build an effective response to extremism and terrorism across the country.

In light of the ongoing insurgency plaguing the region, a balanced counterinsurgency approach is needed which should focus on “people-centric” rather than “enemy-centric” operations. And this needs to be coupled with political, ideological and economic offensive to deny legitimacy to insurgents and to ensure improved human security. Since late 2008, Pakistan has been focusing on a campaign centered on the well-being of its people in FATA and Swat/Malakand region. Pakistan military has pursued a balanced counterinsurgency approach by clearing and

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holding the territory and deterring the return of insurgents and terrorists while at the same time providing economic assistance and security to the population. In fact, when a state’s security institutions are unable to establish law and order within its own territory, militant groups establish the order and fill the vacuum. The more severe the “decline of state authority” in an area, “the more the population becomes virgin territory” for militant groups who establish “an alternative government.” 249 Pakistan, therefore, needs international support and assistance to strengthen its law enforcement institutions in order to fight the militants. Assistance to expand Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities may help also bolster Pakistan’s will to combat militants as its capabilities increase. In order to understand Pakistan’s political will to fight growing militancy and extremism, it is crucial to examine Pakistan’s perception about terrorism and the War on terror. The next chapter will explore Pakistani public, government, army and media perceptions on Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

END NOTES

1 Quoted in C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2004), p. 27. The 9/11 Commission Report acknowledged Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the US-led war and recommended that, “the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.” See Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 369. 2 UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy aims to bring all the counterterrorism activities of the UN system into a common, comprehensive, global, strategic framework and required all the Member States to take a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating UN system’s counter-terrorism activities. See http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml (accessed 18 August 2010). 3 Munir Akram, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts” Statement to the

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United Nations (4 October 2002); Available at: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml (accessed 18 August 2010). 4 Abdullah Hussain Haroon, “The second review of the UN Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy,” Statement to the United Nations (8 September 2010); Available at: http://www.pakun.org/statements/Sixth_Committee/2010/09082010-01.php (accessed 2 December 2010). 5 Abdullah Hussain Haroon, “Joint Briefing by the Chairmen of 1267, CTC and 1540 Committees,” Statement to the Open Meeting of the UN Security Council, New York, 26 May 2009; Available at: http://www.pakun.org/statements/Security_Council/2009/05262009-01.php (accessed 18 August 2009). 6 The UNSC resolution 1368 adopted on 12 September 2001 called on all countries “to co-operate in bringing the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors” of the 9/11 attacks to justice. Resolution 1373 adopted on 28 September 2001 required member states to change and/or adopt domestic legislation to i) criminalize terrorist acts, including the support and financing of such acts; ii) deny safe haven and support to terrorists and iii) take measures in terms of international co-operation against terrorism, ranging from collaboration between police and intelligence services to that between judiciaries. It also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor its implementation. Resolution 1624 adopted on 14 September 2005 called upon all states to adopt measures necessary to prohibit incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance and deny safe haven to terrorists. Countries were also asked to co-operate in order to strengthen the security of their international borders by enhancing terrorist screening and passenger security procedures. For details See Javier Rupérez, “The UN’s Fight against Terrorism: Five Years after 9/11,” (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, September 2006), pp- 1-10. 7 Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” The Washington Post, 1 June 2004. 8 See “President’s Address to the 10th OIC Summit in Kuala Lumpur,” 16 October 2003, Cited in “Enlightened Moderation: The Post 9/11 Scenario,” Special Report (Islamabad: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 2004), pp. 18-19. 9 Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” Op Cit. 10 Ibid. 11 Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistan and the United States: A future unlike the past?” (New York: Center for the Study of Pakistan, Columbia University, March 2005), pp. 24-29. 12 Masooda Bano, “Unraveling Enlightened Moderation,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 695 (17-23 June 2004), pp. 23-24. 13 See Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, Op Cit., pp. 369-376. 14 “Human Rights Council adopts two important initiatives sponsored by Pakistan,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 April 2008); http://www.mofa.gov.pk/press_releases/2008/April/PR_080_08.htm (accessed 18 August 2010). 15 “Pak 5-Point Plan to Address Terror Causes,” The Nation, 14 November 2008. 16 Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” Statement at the Sixth Committee during 67th UN General Assembly (New York 8 October 2012).

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17 Ms. Hina Rabbani Khar, “A comprehensive approach to Counter-Terrorism,” Statement at the Open Debate of the Security Council (15 January 2013); http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=65 (accessed 20 January 2013). 18 “Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue 2009,” (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 2010), p. 16. 19 Khalid Aziz, “Militancy in the Pashtun Belt: Perspective of a Peace Jirga Participant,” Criterion, Vol. 3, No. I (January-March 2008), p. 10. 20 “Pakistan Wants Stable Afghanistan: Shaukat,” The Nation, 28 November 2006. 21 Simbal Khan, “The Quest for Peace and Security: the Regional Context,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 26 November 2010, pp. 15-16. 22 “Afghan Handover Plan Endorsed,” Al-Jazeera (English), 20 July 2010. 23 “Afghanistan Security Transition by 2010-End,” The Nation, 29 January 2010. 24 Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan Endorses Karzai’s Kabul plan,” The Express Tribune, 17 September 2010. 25 Ibid. 26 Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, Winter 2010-11), pp. 4-5 27 According to the plan, by 2015, all Afghan insurgents will have given up armed opposition and would join the political process including contesting elections. The plan calls upon Pakistan to facilitate direct contacts and formal negotiations between HCP and leaders of Afghan insurgents in 2013. “High Peace Council Peace Process Roadmap to 2015”Foreign Policy (November 2012), pp. 1-4. 28 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 264. 29 Brian Cloughley, “Insurrection, Terrorism and the Pakistan Army,” in Usama Butt (ed.), Pakistan’s Quagmire: Security, Strategy, and the Future of the Islamic-Nuclear armed Nation (New York: Continuum International, 2010), p. 101; Hamid Mir, “How Osama bin Laden Escaped Death Four Times after 9/11,” The News, 11 September 2007. 30 See Mushahid Hussain, “Obama offers an opening to Pakistan,” The News, 5 December 2009. 31 Muhammad Amir Rana, “1,000 Al-Qaeda Suspects Arrested from Pakistan,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, 26 May 2006), p. 2. 32 “US General Praises Pakistani Campaign against Al Qaeda,” Daily Times, 12 May 2004. 33 C. Christine Fair, Op Cit., pp. 31-32. 34 Gen. James N. Mattis, “Posture Of US Central Command,” Statement made before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 March 2012, p. 15; Avaiable at: centcom.ahp.us.army.mil/en/about- centcom/posturestatement/ (accessed 18 March 2012). 35 Cited in James Igoe Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing and United States Counter-Terrorism Policy,” in Ersel Aydinli (ed.), Emerging Transnational (In) security Governance (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 45. 36 “Pakistan’s Fight against Terrorism,” in Yoshiaki Sakaguchi (ed.), East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, May 2010), p. 52. 37 Jay Solomon and Siobhan Gorman, “Pakistan, India and US Begin Sharing Intelligence,” Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2009; See also Masood Haider, “Pakistan, India in Rare Anti-Terror Cooperation,” Dawn, 21 May 2009. 38 Three drones operated by the CIA were reportedly deployed positioned at Shamsi airfield (30 miles from the Afghan border) and could be launched without specific permission from Islamabad. See Tom Coghlan, Zahid Hussain and Jeremy Page, “Secrecy and Denial as Pakistan lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants,” The Times, 18 February 2009. 39 Adam Entous, “Special Report: How the White House Learned to Love the Drone,” Reuters, 18 May 2010. 40 Declan Walsh, “WikiLeaks Cables: US Special Forces Working Inside Pakistan”, The Guardian, 30 November 2010. 41 “CIA Exploited Intelligence Leads Given by Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, 3 May 2011; See also Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Kayani Orders Probe into Intel Failure, Seeks Cut in US Personnel,” Dawn, 6 May 2011. 42 “CIA Feared Pakistan would Alert bin Laden,” Al-Jazeera (English), 4 May 2011. 43 James Igoe Walsh, Op Cit., p. 60.

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44 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “In a First, U.S. Provides Pakistan with Drone Data,” New York Times, 13 May 2009. In November 2009, the US accused ISI of helping Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar evade drone attack. See “Taliban Chief Hides in Pakistan,” Washington Times, 20 November 2009. 45 Owais Tohid, “Analysis: Musharraf on a Tightrope,” BBC News, 7 January 2002; See also “Pakistan Bans 25 Militant Organisations,” Dawn, 6 August 2010. 46 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Banning the Banned Organizations,” Daily Times, 11 July 2010. 47 Saba Imtiaz, “Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The Impact of ‘Banning’ an Organization,” The Express Tribune, 12 April 2011; Muhammad Amir Rana, Op Cit. 48 Ibid. These banned organizations also ‘wear political hats.’ Tehreek-e-Jafaria was part of the Muttahida Majlis- e-Amal (MMA) and Sipah-e-Sahaba was an ally of the Pervez Musharraf-led PML-Q government. 49 Ibid. 50 “Pakistan’s Fight against Terrorism,” in Yoshiaki Sakaguchi (ed.), Op Cit., pp. 52-53. 51 “Pakistan ‘Gave Funds’ to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” BBC News, 16 June 2010. 52 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for US Interests,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 2009), pp. 10-11. 53 “Banned Militant Group Defiant,” Washington Times, 26 February 2010. Pakistan also began the trial of the 7 suspects, held in Adiala Jail (Rawalpindi) since 2008 linked to Mumbai attacks. Pakistan sent its Judicial Commission to India in March 2012 but it was denied access to Ajmal Kasab, who was the alleged lone surviving gunman of the 10 members militant group which India blames for the assault on Mumbai. It is important to note that India’s refusal to allow cross-examination only proved the stance of those who believe that there is no ‘court-admissible evidence’ implicating any Pakistani intelligence agency, organization or citizens in the Mumbai attacks. Mudassir Raja, “2008 Mumbai Attacks: India’s Refusal to Allow Cross- Examination Challenged,” The Express Tribune, 29 April 2012. 54 “Pakistan ‘Gave Funds’ to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” Op Cit. 55 “Banned militant group defiant,” Op Cit. 56 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview,” Conflict and Peace Studies, (Islamabad), Vol. 1, No. 1 (October-December 2008), pp. 7-8. 57 “Provinces to curb sale of hate material,” Dawn, 22 September 2006. Some of the monthly and weekly magazines inclded Ghazwa, Al Dawa (preaching of Islam), Tayyabat (all things good and pure) for Women, Zarb-i-Tayyaba (The Rod of Pure) and Voice of Islam of Jamaat ud Dawa, Al Qalam (The Pen), Rah-i-Wafa (Path of Faithfulness) and Jaish-i-Mohammad of Khuddam-ul-Islam, Zarb-i-Momin (The Rod of True Muslim), Khawateen (Women), Bachoon Ka Islam (Islam for Children) and Islam of Al-Rashid Trust, Intaqam-i-Haq (Revenge of the Truth) of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Al Arif (Awareness) Al Hadi (The Guidance to the Right Path) and Al Muntazir (The Awaiting) of Islami Tehrik Pakistan. 58 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview,” Op Cit., pp. 7-8. 59 Ibid. 60 “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” ICG Asia Report No. 125 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 11 December 2006), pp. 23-24. 61 Dawood Azami, “Pakistan’s Taliban Radio Insurgency,” BBC News, 22 June 2009. 62 Mukhtar A. Khan, “FM Mullahs Spread the Taliban’s Word,” Asia Times, 4 June 2009. “In late 2005, Fazlullah started his FM service and was extremely popular amongst the local women, who donated cash and jewelry for his madrassa in Imam Dheri.” 63 Mark Dubowitz, “Wanted: A War on Terrorist Media,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No.17 (Fall 2009), pp. 55-62. 64 Mukhtar A. Khan, Op Cit. 65 “PEMRA Resolves to Uphold Rule of Law,” Pakistan Observer, 1 October 2010; See also Dawood Azami, Op Cit. 66 Mukhtar A. Khan, Op Cit. 67 C. Christine Fair, Op Cit., p. 33.

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68 “Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing Standard,” Available at: http://www.estandardsforum.org/pakistan/standards/anti-money-laundering-combating-terrorist financingstandard (accessed December 2010). 69 “Anti-terrorism laws,” Dawn, 14 June 2010. 70 Shabana Fayyaz, “Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Laws,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. II, Issue 6 (March 2008), p. 15. 71 Huma Yusuf, “Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Courts,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (March 2010), pp. 22-23. 72 Available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=504 (accessed 31 December 2010). 73 Vidya Rana, “No Stopping of Terrorists on Psychological Front,” Daily Times, 30 May 2010. For instance, in 2009, ‘629 terrorism cases came before the ATCs in Punjab. Suspects in 471 cases were acquitted due to poor prosecution.’ Asad Kharal, “Suspects in 471 cases acquitted in Punjab,” Daily Times, 23 April 2010. 74 Mudassir Raja, ‘Four accused in Marriot Bombing Case acquitted,” Dawn, 5 May 2010. These persons included Rana Ilyas, Dr. Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Hameed Afzal and Tehseen Ullah Jan. 75 Bill Roggio, “Rawalpindi attack mastermind previously arrested and released,” The Long War Journal, 12 October 2009; See at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/rawalpindi_attack_ma.php (accessed 8 September 2010). Dr. Usman was executed in 2014. “Two Terrorists Hanged In Faisalabad,” The Nation, 20 December 2014. 76 The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) was adopted on 17 August 1997. It was intended to “provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.” According to ATA, an act of terrorism includes any act which is designed to strike terror, alienate, or “adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people.” See “AntiTerrorism Act (ATA), 1997,” Available at: http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm (accessed 11 July 2009). 77 Huma Yusuf, Op Cit., pp. 22-23. 78 “HCJP Gets Briefing on Performance of Anti-Terrorism Courts and Conditions of Prisons,” Supreme Court of Pakistan, 30 December 2010; Available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=504 (accessed 31 December 2010). 79 “The Missing Link in Terrorism Cases,” Dawn, 14 March 2011. 80 Hassan Abbas, “Police and Law Enforcement Reforms in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success,” (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, April 2009), pp. 7-8. 81 Javed Aziz Khan, “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police put lives on line in war on terror,” Central Asia Online, 22 April 2010; http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/2010/04/22/feature-01 (accessed 25 April 2010). 82 Kathy Gannon, “AP IMPACT: Pakistan Police Losing Terrorism Fight,” Associated Press, 5 December 2008. 83 “IGP Lauds KPK Police Role against Terrorism,” The Nation, 6 October 2012. 84 Hassan Abbas, “Police and Law Enforcement reforms in Pakistan,” Op Cit., p. 16; See also Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure,” (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, February 2011), p. 7. 85 ‘Frontier Corps (FC) is under operational control of the XI Corps based in Peshawar. FC, a largely peacetime militia of eighty thousand troops, is stationed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The task of the FC is to help local law enforcement in the maintenance of law and order, and to carry out border patrol and antismuggling operations.’ See Greg Miller, “US Military Aid to Pakistan misses Its Al-Qaeda Target,” Los Angeles Times, 5 November 2007. 86 Ibid. Jeremy Page, See also “British Forces Train Pakistan’s Frontier Corps to Fight Al-Qaeda,” The Times, 21 March 2009. 87 Jayshree Bajoria, “Realigning Pakistan’s Security Forces,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2008); Available at: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/realigning-pakistans-security-forces/p19660 (accessed 11 July 2009). 88 Jeremy Page, Op Cit. See also Shuja Nawaz, “Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency,” (Washington: Atlantic Council of the United States, February 2011), pp. 13-14. 89 Hassan Abbas, “Police and Law Enforcement reforms in Pakistan,” Op Cit., pp. 15-16. 90 See “SIG Joins Police Probe into Lankan Team Attack,” The News, 5 March 2009.

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91 “Passengers’ Identity System Installed,” Dawn, 11 November 2002. 92 Shabana Fayyaz, “Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Laws,” Op Cit., p. 17. 93 Saba Imtiaz, “Pakistan to Replace ‘Insecure’ US Border Watch Software,” The Express Tribune, 8 June 2011. 94 “US-Funded ‘Pakistan Automated Fingerprint Identification System’ Launched,” 25 January 2008. http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-012309.html (accessed 6 November 2010). 95 S D’Souza, “US-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Dynamics and Challenges,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July-September 2006), p. 532. 96 “Countering Terrorism,” Daily Times, 13 December 2009. 97 Tariq Pervez, “Challenges of Establishing a Rehabilitation Programme in Pakistan,” in Rohan Gunaratna, Lawrence Rubin et al. (ed.), Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 131. 98 Tariq Butt, “New Anti-Terrorism Law Diluted, Causing Heartburn,” The News, 15 March 2010. 99 Umar Cheema, “NACTA, ISI Lack Powers,” The News, 9 April 2011. NACTA has been the victim of political turf battles; its first DG Tariq Pervez, resigned in July 2010 because of the opposition in some quarters to placing NACTA directly under the Prime Minister as opposed to the Ministry of the Interior. See Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure,” Op Cit., p. 14. 100 Salman Siddiqui, “Post 9/11: 35,000 Lives Later, Pakistan still Mulls Counter-Terror Policy,” The Express Tribune, 3 September 2012. 101 “Nisar Outlines Upcoming Approach to Terror Threat,” The Express Tribune, 15 December 2013. 102 Tariq Butt, Op Cit. See also Gulmina Bilal Ahmad, “Yes to NACTA,” Daily Times, 23 July 2010. 103 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA–A Most Dangerous Place,” (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2009), pp. 1-2. 104 Dr. Noor ul Haq et al., “Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan” IPRI Paper 10 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), pp. 71-88. 105 Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” Special Report 176 (Washington: US Institute of Peace, October 2006), p. 12. 106 “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” ICG Asia Report No. 125 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 2006), p. 4. 107 These include: Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz. Cited in Shuja Nawaz, Op Cit, p. 60. 108 Shahid Javed Burki, “How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts,” Criterion Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October-December 2008), p. 18. 109 The British “were aware of these practices and approved ‘easement rights’ for the tribesmen for cross-border movement under a clause in Durand Line Agreement.” See Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, Op Cit, p. 265. 110 Malou Innocent, “US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in CATO Handbook for Policy Makers (7th ed.), (Washington: CATO Institute, 2008), p. 534. 111 Pakhtunwali has core tenets that include self-respect, independence, justice, hospitability, nanawati (‘Protection/Asylum, that cannot even be denied to a criminal or enemy’), badal (the right of revenge), forgiveness, and tolerance, ‘that cannot and must not, be abandoned at any cost.’ See Paula Holmes-Eber and Patrice Scanlon et al., Applications in Operational Cultural: Perspectives from the Field (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2009), p. 89. 112 Haider Mullick, Op Cit., pp. 41-42. 113 Claudio Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 272. 114 “Competing Voices within the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan,” NEFA Foundation, September 2009; See at: http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_competingvoices0909.pdf (accessed 14 June 2010) 115 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington: Potomac Books, 2004), p. 64. 116 Laila Bokhari, “Waziristan: Impact on the Taliban Insurgency and the Stability of Pakistan,” (Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, October 2006), p. 15.

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117 Imtiaz Gul, “Security Dynamics in Pakistan’s Border Areas,” in Kristina Zetterlund (ed.), Pakistan: Consequences of Deteriorating Security in Afghanistan (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009), pp. 70-81. 118 Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability : A National Net Assessment,” (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2011), p. iv 119 Ibid., p. 51 120 Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt,” Special Report No. 36 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, August 2008), p. 17. 121 “Tribal Areas under Centralized Control,” Daily Times, 16 December 2007. 122 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Militant Organizations and Their Driving Forces,” in Kristina Zetterlund (ed.), Op Cit., p. 42. 123 Ashok K. Behuria, “The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 5 (September 2007), p. 704. 124 Charlie Savage, “US adds legal pressure on Pakistani Taliban,” New York Times, 1 September 2010. 125 “Mehsud Challenged by New Militant Bloc,” Daily Times, 2 July 2008. Both Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir belong to Wazir tribe. See also Reza Jan, “The FATA Conflict after South Waziristan,” American Enterprise Institute, 22 February 2010. 126 Imtiaz Gul, “Security dynamics in Pakistan’s border areas,” Op Cit., p. 75. 127 See Riaz Khan, “Inside Rebel Pakistan Cleric’s Domain,” USA Today, 27 December 2007. 128 Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier (Arlington: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008), p. 89. 129 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 4 (April 2009), p. 1. 130 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Al Qa’eda and Pakistan: Current Role and Future,” (Washington: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, October 2010), p. 8. 131 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” (Washington: New America Foundation, February 2010), p. 2. LT does not have “close ties to the [Afghan] Taliban” because it follows Ahl-e-Hadith tenets, “but did train in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan during the 1990s.” See Daan Van Der Schriek, “Nuristan: Insurgent Hideout in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 10 (May 2005), pp. 8-9. 132 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Al Qa’eda and Pakistan,” Op Cit., p. 8. 133 Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” The Long War Journal, 23 February 2010; See at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php (accessed 9 June 2010). 134 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2008), pp. 6-8. 135 Jalaluddin Haqqani belongs to Zadran tribe. See Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Report No. 6 (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, October 2010), p. 7; Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Op Cit., p. 42. 136 K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 21 November 2008), p. 5. 137 Jeffrey Dressler, Op Cit., p. 15. 138 Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism (Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 2008), p. 61. 139 Farhana Ali, “US–Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 4 (June 2007), p. 4. 140 Jimmy Gurulé, Op Cit., pp. 59-61. 141 A text attributed to Al-Qaeda military commander Sayf-al-Adl released in May 2005 identifies Al-Qaeda’s objective in perpetrating the 9/11 attacks “to prompt [the US] to come out of its hole.” In doing so, “Al Qaeda hoped to make it easier to attack elements of US power” and to build its “credibility in front of [the Islamic] nation and the beleaguered people of the world.” See Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” Report RL 32759 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, July 2007), p. 5. 142 Jimmy Gurulé, Op Cit., p. 60. 143 Farhana Ali, Op Cit.

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144 Brendan Boundy, “An Adapting Al-Qaeda,” Atlantic Council (Washington), 16 July 2009. 145 Don Rassler, “Al-Qaeda’s Pakistan Strategy,” CT C Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 6 (June 2009), p. 1. 146 The IMU is a militant Islamist and political group, established in 1997 in Uzbekistan with the declared aim of overthrowing the government of President Islam Karimov and establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. While IMU focuses on fighting Pakistani army in FATA, IJU is believed to carry out operations in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. See Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 2010). 147 According to some estimates, “after 9/11, the membership of Al-Qaeda depleted from 3000-4000 to a few hundred in FATA.” See N Ilahi, “The existential Threat: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan?” in Usama Butt (ed.), Op Cit., p. 133. 148 Bruce O. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future, 2nd Edition (Washington: Brookings, 2010), p. 135. 149 Haider Mullick, “Al Qa’eda and Pakistan,” Op Cit., p. 8. 150 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Vilification Campaign against Pakistan,” The Post, 28 January 2007. 151 “Securing, stabilizing, and developing Pakistan’s border area with Afghanistan,” United States Government Accountability Office (February 2009), p. 28. 152 Abdullah Hussain Haroon, “The Second Review of the UN Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy,” Statement made at UN Security Council, New York (8 September 2010); http://www.pakun.org/statements/Sixth_Committee/2010/09082010-01.php (accessed 10 December 2010). 153 “Afghan Troop Map: US and NATO Deployments,” BBC News, 19 November 2010. 154 “NATO not Pulling Their Weight,” Daily Times, 16 July 2008. 155 Ibid. See also “US Must Seal Afghan Border for Waziristan Push: Pakistani Official,” The Express Tribune, 11 August 2012. 156 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA–A Most Dangerous Place,” Op Cit., p. 60. 157 Quoted in Lubna Abid Ali, “Religions Radicalism Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy: Implications for Pak–Afghan Relation,” Journal of Political Studies (Lahore), Vol. XVII (Summer 2010), p. 12. 158 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 2009January 2010), p. 168. 159 Rizwan Zeb, “The Wana Operation: Pakistan Confronts Islamic Militants in Waziristan,” Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, 24 March 2004; http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2232 (accessed 6 December 2009). 160 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 234. 161 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, Op Cit., p. 269. 162 Khalid Hasan, “Al Zawahiri behind Assassination Attempts on Musharraf,” Daily Times, 13 July 2005. 163 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, Op Cit., p. 237. 164 In particular, “the Mehsud tribe in SWA strongly resisted the army operation,” and “allowed safe passage to the foreign fighters.” Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Unlearned Lessons from Waziristan,” Asia Times, 22 July 2004. 165 Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), p. 172. 166 Ibid., p. 62; Claudio Franco, Op Cit., p. 279. 167 Mansur Khan Mahsud, “Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan,” New America Foundation (April 2010), pp. 10-16. Qari Hussain gave training to many suicide bombers, “some as young as 11 years old, to target Pakistani military and government installations as well as markets, funerals, hospitals, and other ‘soft’ targets.” Qari Hussain eventually reactivated the Spinkai Ragzai suicide training camp that the Pakistan Army had dismantled during operation. 168 Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Op Cit., p. 62; See “Pakistan conflict map,” BBC News, 22 June 2009. 169 See Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Lions and Jackals: Pakistan’s Emerging Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2009), pp. 1-2. 170 Ibid., p. 2. 171 Frederick W. Kagan, Op Cit.

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172 According to a Pakistani security Analyst, Ikram Sehgal, “the Taliban could have used Buna [valley in Distric Buner] to advance on Tarbela, a dam which is critical for water and electricity supplies, before setting their sights on Islamabad.” Therefore, “It is very important psychologically, tactically and strategically to make sure that Buna is cleared of these Taliban.” See Zahid Hussain and Jenny Booth, “Pakistan Army Retakes Main Town in Buna from Taliban Militants,” The Times, 29 April 2009. 173 Andrew Buncombe, “In Pakistan, an exodus that is beyond biblical,” The Independent, 31 May 2009; See also Declan Walsh, “Swat Valley could be Worst Refugee Crisis since Rwanda, UN Warns,” The Guardian, 18 May 2009. 174 As a military officer explained, “We wanted to drain the swamp, sanitize it, bring back the people, and then hopefully turn it into a nice lake.” See Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Holding Pakistan: The Second Phase of Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency Operations,” Foreign Affairs, 24 March 2010. 175 “1.6 million Pakistani Refugees Return Home: UN,” The Times of India. 22 August 2009; Sameer Lalwani, “The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 9-13. 176 Kathy Gannon and Ishtiaq Mahsud et al. “Ground Offensive Begins in Pakistan Al-Qaeda Haven,” Associated Press, 17 October 2009. Chief of the Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, ‘in a letter to Mehsud tribe’ wrote that the goal of operation is “to pull the Mehsud tribes form the clutches of cruel terrorists elements and aimed at Uzbeks, foreign and local militants in South Waziristan.” See Iftikhar A. Khan, “Kayani Writes to Mehsuds, Seeks Tribe’s Support,” Dawn, 20 October 2009. 177 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “A New Battle Begins in Pakistan,” Asia Times, 20 October 2009. 178 Maliha Lodhi, “The Next Phase of Counter-Militancy,” The News, 25 November 2009. 179 Sameer Lalwani, Op Cit., pp. 9-13; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress of Pakistan’s South Waziristan Offensive,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 12 (December 2009), p. 9. 180 According to Siraj Mehsud, Deputy to Shamin Mehsud, the Taliban Chief in Ladha, SWA; Wazir and Daur fighters come in groups of 30 to 50 to conduct guerrilla attacks against Pakistan army, staying for 10 days or so before returning to NWA, at which point fresh groups of militants are sent into SWA to carry on the cycle. See Mansur Khan Mahsud, “Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan,” (Washington: New America Foundation, April 2010), p. 17. 181 Pakistani government had been informed that 90 percent of suicide bombers are being trained in the Orakzai Agency and then sent to settle in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly Peshawar. See Raheel Khan, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Orakzai,” (Washington: New America Foundation, September 2010), p. 7. 182 Reza Jan, Nicholas Patella and Benjamin Schultz, “Daily Tracker: Pakistani Military Operations in Orakzai,” Critical Threats Project, 13 May 2010; http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/daily-tracker- pakistanimilitary-operations-orakzai-mar-30-2010 (accessed 16 September 2010); See also Anita Joshua, “AntiTaliban Operations Successful: Pakistan,” The Hindu, 3 June 2010. 183 The South Waziristan and Swat operations were divided into three phases: 1) ‘seize control of communication infrastructure’ and clear the area, as well as destroy the command and ‘control structure of the Taliban militants’; 2) clean-up operations aimed at the remaining militant infrastructure in the remote areas; and 3) reconstruction of the area and rehabilitation of the IDPs. See Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “New Strategies in Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Operation in South Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue: 37 (3 December 2009), pp. 5-6. 184 Reza Jan, “Trickling Home to South Waziristan,” Foreign Policy, 10 December 2010. The TTP has circulated pamphlets in IDPs camps intimidating locals and warning them against returning. 185 Andrew M. Exum, Ahmed A. Humayun et al., “Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Washington: Center for a New American Security, June 2009), p. 12. 186 In June 2013, Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani “appealed” to the South Wasiriztan IDPs to return to their homes. See “Army to Stay in South Waziristan, Says Kayani,” The Nation, 21 June 2013 187 “North-West Pakistan: Massive New Displacement and Falling Returns Require Rights-Based Response,” Report by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council (June 2013), p, 1. 188 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Are We Losing to the Taliban?” Newsline, 30 May 2009. 189 “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Op Cit., p. 16.

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190 According to Rahimullah Yusufzai, General Barno (commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan during 2003–05) rang up Corps Commander Peshawar, Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain, to congratulate and thank him for formulating a policy that would isolate Al-Qaeda by draining it of its local support in South Waziristan. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “All Quiet on the North Western Front,” Newsline, 12 May 2004. 191 Iqbal Khattak, “No Deal on Foreigners’ Registration: Nek Muhammad,” Daily Times, 10 May 2004. 192 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Were the Attacks Preventive Sabotage? The News, 8 December 2011. 193 Shamim Shahid, “Baitullah, Supporters Lay down Arms,” The Nation, 9 February 2005. 194 Shamim Shahid, “Government, Militants ‘Ink’ Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Peace Pact,” The Nation, 6 September 2006. 195 Pazir Gul, “Waziristan Accord signed,” Dawn, 6 September 2006. 196 See Muhammad Amir Rana, “Pitfalls in Miramshah Peace Deal,” Dawn, 30 September 2006. 197 Iqbal Khattak, “Anti-Terror Pact Reached with NW Tribesmen,” Daily Times, 19 February 2008. The deal was revived on 17 February 2008, and “all sub-tribes and clans of Wazir and Daur tribes agreed to jointly struggle” against terrorists in their area. 198 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah, Op Cit., p. 37. 199 Massoud Ansari and Colin Freeman, “Omar Role in Truce Reinforces Fears that Pakistan ‘Caved in’ Taliban,” The Telegraph, 24 September 2006. 200 Roland Paris, “NATO’s Choice in Afghanistan: Go Big or Go Home,” Policy Options, Vol. 28, No. 1 (December 2006-January 2007), p. 41. 201 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Responding to Terrorist Threat: Perspectives from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (Spring 2007), p. 18. 202 Amir Mir, “Govt-TNSM Deal a High-Risk Affair,” The News, 17 February 2009. 203 See at: http://pkpolitics.com/2009/04/14/parliament-endorses-nizaam-e-adl-regulation/ (accessed 10 June 2009); See also Zahid Hussain and Matthew Rosenberg, “Pakistani Peace Deal Gives New Clout to Taliban Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2009. 204 It was considerd that “if Fazlullah acts against the government or continues with his parallel system of justice and governance, then the people of Swat will no more oppose an all-out military action against the Taliban even if the collateral costs are high.” Nirupama Subramanian, “Faustian pact,” Frontline, Vol. 26, Issue: 6 (14-27 March 2009), pp.42-43. 205 Asif Haroon Raja, “Ugly face of so-called Swat Taliban exposed,” Pakistan Observer, 4 June 2009. 206 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Are We Losing to the Taliban?” Op Cit. 207 In January 2008, US officials reached a ‘tacit understanding’ with General Musharraf “to allow for increased US aerial surveillance and drone strikes on Pakistani territory.” In September 2008, President Zardari set a secret accord with the US after his visit to Washington. “It provided new mechanics for coordination of drone attacks and a jointly approved list of high-value targets including Al-Qaeda operatives, some Afghan warlords (including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network) and Baitullah Mehsud.” See “US Launches Waziristan UAV Strike with Tacit Pakistani Approval,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 March 2008; See also David Ignatius, “A Quiet Deal with Pakistan,” The Washington Post, 4 October 2008. 208 See Shaiq Hussain, “US Strikes Violation of Sovereignty: FO,” The Nation, 25 June 2009; According to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, Premier Yosuf Gilani told Ann Patterson, the former US Ambassador to Pakistan, in August 2008 about his policy on US drone attacks: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. See “We’ll Protest in the National Assembly and then Ignore It.” Available at: http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08ISLAMABAD2802.html (accessed 9 December 2010). 209 “Pakistani Tribesmen Protest against US Drone Strikes,” Dawn, 30 September 2010. 210 Khalid Aziz, “Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province & Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” (Peshawar: Regional Institute of Policy Research, December 2007), p. 7. 211 “Lahore Hit in Response to Drone Strikes, says Baitullah,” The Nation, 1 April 2009. 212 Andrew M. Exum, Ahmed A. Humayun, Op Cit., pp. 19-20. 213 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Lashkars, Private Militias and Militants,” The News, 13 July 2010. 214 Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2006), p. 55.

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215 Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment,” (Washington: New America Foundation, September 2009), p.39 216 Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias in Taliban War,” New York Times, 23 October 2008. 217 Ibid. See also Issam Ahmed, “Pakistan Tests Civilian Militias to Keep Taliban out of Swat Valley,” The Christian Science Monitor, 17 September 2009. 218 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 10 November 2008), p. 16. 219 “Troops out in Kurram after Foes Hold Fire,” Dawn, 2 July 2009. 220 Daud Khattak, “The Risks of Supporting Tribal Militias in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue: 3 (March 2011), p. 17. 221 K. Alan Kronstadt, Op Cit., p. 16. 222 Haroon Rashid, “Pakistan’s Risky Militia Strategy,” BBC News, 15 October 2008. 223 Sadia Suleman, “Empowering ‘Soft’ Taliban Over ‘Hard’ Taliban: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue: 15 (25 July 2009), pp. 3-4. 224 Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” critical threats Project, 17 July 2009; Available at: http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/question- marksouth-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-maulvi-nazir-ahmad (accessed 6 June 2010). 225 Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah, Op Cit., p. 44. 226 Mansur Khan Mahsud, “Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan,” (Washington: New America Foundation, April 2010), p. 17. 227 Rehmat Mehsud, “Pakistani Taliban under Pressure from Tribal Rival,” The Christian Science Monitor, 10 May 2009. 228 For instance, Pakistan’s Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) in its August 2011 meeting, “decided to pay special attention to deradicalization programme to free youth from militancy’s grip.” Yasir Rehman, “Pakistan to Emphasize De-radicalisation Programme,” Central Asia Online, 8 August 2011; Available at: http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/main/2011/08/18/feature-02 (accessed 18 August 2011). 229 Nadir Hassan, “Rehabilitating militants: The road to redemption,” The Express Tribune, 6 June 2011. See also “The Challenges of Countering Radicalization in Pakistan,” News Feature, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, May 2012). 230 Yasir Rehman, Op Cit. 231 Iqbal Khattak, “Sabawoon: A New Dawn for Children in the Swat Valley,” Central Asia Online, 12 December 2009. Available at: http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/politics/2009/12/22/feature-02 (accessed 18 August 2011). 232 Ibid. See also Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, “How to Defuse a Human Bomb: Rescuing Taliban’s Teenage Recruits,” The Guardian, 16 October 2010; Yasir Rehman, Op Cit. 233 Daniel Markey, Op Cit., p. 3. 234 Only 7 percent of the total area is cultivable out of which 44 percent is irrigated & the remaining land is rain fed. See “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA,” ICG Asia Report No. 178 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 October 2009), p. 10. 235 Daniel Markey, Op Cit., p. 3. 236 Dr. Noor-ul-Haq et al, “Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Op Cit., pp. 71-88 237 “Rs 7.5 bn Proposed for Development in FATA,” Dawn, 2007; See also “Govt. Raises FATA Uplift Budget,” The Nation, 11 June 2010. 238 Raza Khan, “The Aggrieved Tribesman,” The News, 27 June 2010. 239 “Rs 15bn FATA ADP approved,” Dawn, 10 August 2010; “FATA ADP Approved,” Pakistan Observer, 5 June 2011; “Militancy, Poverty Dropout Rate in FATA Schools Reaches 69 Percent,” Dawn, 24 October 2010. 240 John D. Negroponte, “Pakistan’s FATA Challenge: Securing One of the World’s Most Dangerous Areas,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 May 2008; http://2001- 2009.state.gov/s/d/2008/105041.htm (accessed 26 June 2008).

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241 Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place,” Op Cit., p. 21. 242 Dr. Hasnat Nabi, “Development in FATA, Swat,” Pakistan Observer, 5 June 2012. 243 Dr. Noor-ul-Haq et al., Op Cit., pp. 71-88. 244 “Army has Launched Innumerous Development Projects in SWA,” Daily Times, 9 July 2010. 245 Imdad Hussain, “FATA Road Hopes to Trigger Regional Development,” Central Asia Online, 13 July 2010; Available at: http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/07/13/feature-03 (accessed 12 October 2009). 246 The construction of Gomal Zam Dam began in 2002 and was delayed for three years after Taliban abducted 2 Chinese engineers from the project in 2004. One engineer was rescued by Pakistan army while other died. The Chinese firm ‘withdrew from the project,’ and ‘the army’s construction branch resumed work in 2007, subcontracting to Sinohydro and Tekser.’ See Anwar Shakir, “Dam is Step to Stabilize Pakistan Terror ‘Epicenter’,” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6VPSLivDbgI (accessed 25 October 2010). 247 Zeeshan Javaid, “Gomal Zam Dam to be Operational by Q3 of 2012,” Daily Times, 24 December 2011. 248 “Army Battles Legacy of Mistrust in South Waziristan,” Daily Times, 4 February 2013; See also “Pakistan Looks to Highway to Fight Militancy,” Reuters, 2 November 2011. 249 C. Christine Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” Op Cit., pp. 45-46, p. 97.

Chapter – 05

PAKISTAN’S PERCEPTION ABOUT TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION Pakistani society at large is religiously conservative but this does not imply that Pakistani citizenry shows religious extremism or radicalism.1 The vast majority of Pakistanis, who are resolutely religious, do not favour militancy, religious extremism, violence or radicalism, yet there has been a reasonably “high degree of social acceptance for jihad as defined by the militant groups” in many spectrums of Pakistani society.2 This fact could partly be explained by taking into account Pakistan’s history of bitter relations with Afghanistan, its opposition to ‘Hindu-dominated’ India’s hegemony, the centrality of Kashmir dispute in its policies, the dismemberment of its Eastern Wing (now Bangladesh) in 1971 and the role India played in it. The ‘Islamization’ politics of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq also played its part in promoting religious radicalism in the society. Above all, Afghan Jihad (1979-88) against the former Soviet

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Union’s occupation of Afghanistan significantly transformed Pakistani society.3 Undoubtedly during Afghan Jihad, Pakistan with the assistance of international patrons, particularly United States and Saudi Arabia “managed to arm an entire generation” with the religio-political indoctrination towards militancy and jihad.4 At that time, the media, the state education system as well as the traditional Islamic education through the madaris in Pakistan were used to emphasize the ‘Islamic dimension’ of the war in Afghanistan. As the Afghan Jihad progressed, so did the influence and radicalization of militants coming out of madaris. Meanwhile, the US indirectly and sometimes directly promoted militancy and the “culture of jihad” by supporting Muslim clergy in its fight against communism.5 It could be argued that General Zia’s Islamization politics and Afghan Jihad merged together to produce a “national security doctrine” that transformed Pakistan’s foreign policy at regional level into an “offensive war.”6 In fact, impressed by the highly motivated, determined and skilled jihadi organizations, which defeated the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan army and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) decided to remodel these militant groups into a new “strategic weapon” that could be used with equal effectiveness to ‘bleed India’ in Kashmir and to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan.7 Pakistan’s “offensive war” policy fostered the idea that jihad can be used to liberate ‘occupied’ Kashmir from India, and consequently, Pakistani youth was indoctrinated to pursue religio- political agenda via militancy. According to Hasan Askari Rizvi, the policies during Afghan Jihad created a narrow Islamist worldview among Pakistani youth, who saw national and international affairs in religious frame and “projected World affairs in terms of ‘We, the Muslims’ versus ‘they,’ the non-Muslims” enemies of Islam. Such a narrow Islamist worldview made them “vulnerable to the appeals” of the veterans of the Afghan Jihad―“whose thought process was frozen in the Afghan experience”― and other militant and sectarian groups that directed Jihad against the “adversaries of Islam” and their local clients Muslim regimes. Therefore, many across the spectrum of Pakistani society had a natural empathy with extremists like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Kashmir focused militant groups such as Lashkar- e-Tayyaba (LT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), and entertained antiIndia and anti-US outlook. Due to such “skewed orientation and an emphasis on Islamic discourse, continued during Musharraf [rule]”, a vast majority of Pakistani people still support militants’ pursuance of

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religio-political agenda in Afghanistan, Kashmir and other occupied Muslim territories such as Palestine and Chechnya from the occupation of nonMuslims. 8 Pakistan’s civilian leadership and the senior-most military leaders also criticize Pakistan’s ‘unstinted cooperation’ with the United States, though they remain crucial allies in US-led coalition in the ‘War on Terror’. They argue that the US strategies in the war have undermined Pakistan’s efforts to fight extremism and terrorism. In other words, US policy in ‘AfPak’ region is perceived by Pakistani policy makers to be equally as negative as terrorists’ agenda. Assessments of Pakistani civil society narratives, political parties and media debates, and parliamentary discussions reveal the widespread opinion that the US has failed to stabilize Afghanistan and the South Asia region. In sum, Pakistani citizenry as well as leadership tends to hold United States accountable for destabilizing Pakistan and the region.

This chapter explores Pakistani public, government, army and media perceptions on Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. In order to understand Pakistan’s political will to fight growing militancy and extremism, it is crucial to examine these perceptions. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explores the elements in Pakistan’s definition of terrorism. The second section analyzes Pakistani public, government, army and media perceptions on terrorism, extremism and militancy and Pakistan’s partnership with the US in war against terrorism. It also details reasons for opposition against Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the Pakistani perspectives and its implications on Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies.

PAKISTAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is not a post 11 September 2001 phenomenon, but the very term ‘terrorism’ has undergone momentous changes in its meaning and interpretation in the post 9/11 scenario: especially, it has blurred the distinction between the freedom fighter and the terrorist. It should be noted that the individuals, groups or states, often use terrorism as part of their strategy to achieve their political and economic interests. Yet, terrorism seems the most ambiguous and contested term. Despite the efforts made by several actors to arrive at a universal and unified definition of the term, terrorism; no consensus regarding the definition has been achieved so

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far. 9 Nevertheless, the debate on the subject has been vigorous and still continues. In fact, many scholars argue that “an objective definition of terrorism is not only possible: it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism.”10 A reasonably acceptable and broad definition of terrorism proposed by Schmid and Jongman states:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators [for] intimidation, coercion or propaganda.”11

This definition highlights that terrorism is not an ideology but a method which may be used by individuals, groups or even states for personal, criminal, political and propaganda purposes. This definition does not exclude the state from the ambit of terrorism. As Michael Stohl has noted that the “use of terror tactics is common in international relations and the state has been and remains a more likely employer of terrorism within the international system than insurgents.” 12 Noam Chomsky makes a similar point in saying that the states or governments and their agents employ “violent means to inspire great fear as a method of ruling or of conducting political opposition.”13 In David Rodin’s view, terrorism is the “deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants, by state or non-state actors for ideological ends and in the absence of a substantively just legal process.”14 These statements pave the way to the conclusion that states may commit acts of terrorism when it serves their interests. But in the post 9/11 environment, there is a strong bias that favours excluding actions of the states from being defined as terrorism. No doubt, the use of brutal force by the state is increasingly viewed as legitimate; however, the use of force by an individual or a group to claim their just and fair political and social rights provokes angry reactions from international community. 15

Against this backdrop, Israel, India, and Russia used the events of 11 September 2001 to frame the insurgency in occupied Palestinian territories, Kashmir and Chechnya as terrorism waged by ‘Islamist fundamentalists.’ In the post 9/11 environment, Pakistan’s support to Kashmir freedom struggle suffered a major blow. India has attempted to try and use the ‘War on Terror’

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as an opportunity to draw Kashmir freedom struggle into the terrorism ambit and to veil its own state terrorism directed against Kashmiris. Indian strategy is to talk of “Pakistan sponsored terrorism” in Indian-administered Kashmir as it is a “marketable commodity to US and Western audience,” but in reality Indian tactics aimed at clipping “Kashmiri pipeline of hope that Pakistan stands with them.” Indian strategic community concluded that once this ‘pipeline of hope’ is cut off, Kashmiri leaders and populace would clearly see that “a besieged Pakistan” cannot sustain support to their resistance movement against Indian unlawful rule. 16

It is true that Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led war against terrorism heavily impinged on the Kashmir cause, but it is equally true that Pakistan continues to remind the international community that resistance movement against Indian rule in Indian-administered Kashmir is a freedom struggle and should not be treated as terrorism.

As Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri pointed out:

“Some states have sought to misuse the campaign against terror to denigrate and suppress the right of peoples to self-determination, such as those in occupied Jammu and Kashmir and in Palestine.” 17

He laid stress on the fact that the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to selfdetermination is sanctioned by the resolutions of the Security Council. Their struggle against Indian occupation, he noted, “is a just, legitimate and noble struggle. Equating such a freedom struggle with terrorism is unjust.”18 Pakistan regrets such attempts as “a method of demeaning all those legitimate struggles and wars for independence, which, throughout history, had been met with pride.”19 Accordingly Pakistan maintains that a distinction should be drawn between genuine and legitimate freedom struggle and terrorism.20 Moreover, Pakistan considers terrorism a grave threat to humanity and “condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purpose.” Pakistan believes that “all acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations.”21 It disapproves violence and terror in the name of religion, ethnicity, faith, value system, culture or society and asserts that terrorism has “no creed, culture or religion.”22 Pakistan is the frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and, consequently it is

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the great victim in this war. It stresses that “terror is a menace that we need to combat at all levels, national, regional and global.”23 A brutal form of terrorism is state terrorism. Pakistan believes that the ‘War on Terror’ should include and combat state terrorism. Islamabad maintains that Israel’s and India’s brutal tactics and violent acts to suppress Palestinian and Kashmir freedom struggle respectively should be framed as terrorism.24 It has repeatedly urged the international community not to “ignore the phenomenon of state terrorism as a tool of foreign occupation and defiance of United Nations resolutions.”25 Pakistan declares that: “Those who employ the state apparatus to trample upon the fundamental and inalienable rights of people are also perpetrators of terrorism….Thirteen million people in the Indian-held Kashmir are struggling for their freedom against foreign occupation and alien domination…. They have been victims of brutal sort.” 26

Pakistan further maintains that:

“While a just cause cannot be ennobled by the killing of innocent civilians, neither can the civilized community of nations condone the use of force for the repression of the legitimate cause of a people.”27

Pakistan stresses that the human rights of the Palestinian and Kashmiri people must be respected and urged the international community to pressure Israel and India to end its tyranny and repression in Palestine and Kashmir. Pakistan has steadfastly supported Palestinian and Kashmiri people’s legitimate quest for the realization of their right to selfdetermination.28 Moreover, Pakistan maintains that the root causes of terrorism should be addressed as part of the ‘War on Terror’. It argues that the root causes of extremism and militancy lie in poverty, political injustice, marginalization, exclusion, denial and deprivation from foreign occupation and repression of peoples. 29 Pakistani policy makers believe that the Afghan Jihad of 1980s and the subsequent militancy sparked in Afghanistan during Afghan civil war (1989-1992), Serb atrocities and ethnic cleansing of the Muslims in Bosnia, “invigorated Palestinian Intifada” in the 1990s the angry reaction of the US-led coalition against Taliban and AlQaeda in Afghanistan after September 11, US-led invasion and operations in Iraq without United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authority; West indifference to the plight of Kashmiri and Palestinian people and the American hostile domestic responses against Muslims, inhuman

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treatment of Muslims, mostly innocent at the detention centers in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Bagram in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib in Iraq led to total polarization of the Muslims against the US and its Western allies. These disputes and injustices are the root causes, which angered and provoked the Muslims across the globe, and united them to identify themselves with ‘Islamic Movements’ or show solidarity with the notion of ‘Muslim Ummah.’30 For the sake of peace and common good, political and socioeconomic remedies have to be found.31 President Asif Ali Zardari also stressed that fight against terrorism requires “political will, popular mobilization, and a socio-economic strategy” to win “the hearts and minds of nations” afflicted by scourge of terror. Therefore, “the fight must be multifaceted. The battleground must be economic and social as well as military.”32 Pakistan also declares that a distinction should be drawn between the extremism and terrorism. General Musharraf himself claimed that terrorism has to be “confronted with force, with all the military force at every level, globally, regionally, domestically by all countries involved or concerned,” but extremism has to be “handled with care. [It is] a battle for hearts and minds. It needs a totally different strategy to address and resolve,” he concluded.33 Finally, Pakistan asserts that the Islamic religion and terrorism should not be linked together. After 9/11, the Western officials, media and an increasing number of scholars and analysts, linked Islam with terrorism. A close examination of Qur’anic verses reveals that Qur’an categorically condemns terrorism of all sorts, whether employed by an individual or a state. In Qur’an Allah declares:

“We ordained for (all mankind, but particularly for) the Children of Israel: He who kills a soul unless it be (in legal punishment) for murder or for causing disorder and corruption on the earth will be as if he had killed all mankind; and he who saves a life will be as if he had saved the lives of all humankind.”34

Muslims are warned against the use of undue violence and bloodshed:

“Fight in the Cause of Allah against those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for Allah does not love transgressors.”.…And fight them on until there is no more persecution.35

According to the above verses, Qur’an sanctions to ‘take up arms in self defence’ and to fight till there is an end to the persecution of oppressed people. But Qur’an forbids undue violence, killing and terrorism. In essence, the doctrine of Jihad is defensive not offensive. Extremist and

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militant groups, however, misinterpret this doctrine, primarily in terms of the use of force; to fight non-Muslims to “liberate” Palestine and Kashmir from the “occupation of infidels”; and to purge the influence of America and the Western World from the Muslim Ummah (Muslim community at the global level). So, they invoke jihad to help Muslims who face oppressions the world over, although their agendas are more political than religious. These extremist and militant groups take the view that even killing of innocent civilians to fight the ‘adversaries of Islam’ is justified, though this is in clear violation of the established laws of Islamic warfare. According to these laws, noncombatants (especially, old men, women, and children) are to be protected at all costs during any form of military conflict.36 Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) gave instructions to one of his commanders, saying: “I am instructing you in ten matters: do not kill a women, a child or an old person; do not cut down a tree which is in fruit or set fire to inhabited areas; do not wound a ship or a camel except for food; do not burn a date palm or flood it; do not put people in chains or act treacherously.”37 Most importantly, the doctrine of Jihad is distinguished by the “clarity of purpose,” which is not to create wealth, seize a property, or to usurp power or commit an act of unprovoked aggression against innocent people. Jihad, on the contrary, is ‘legitimized’ so as to exalt the Cause of Allah Almighty, “protect the freedom to propagate the Islamic message, defend the Muslims,” end oppression, tyranny and aggression and establish peace. When the person who undertakes Jihad is fighting in the ‘Cause of Allah,’ he is well aware that he is waging a war which is noble, “just, and honourable in its objectives, means” and ends.38 Today’s militant groups, however, are least concerned about such Qur’anic injunctions and Islamic values. It is unfortunate that not only Hindus, Jews, and Christians are their perceived enemies, but also Muslims who do not accept their ‘brand’ of Sharia are considered “heretics” and hence worth killing.39 Pakistan, therefore, upholds that Islam is a “religion of peace,” compassion and brotherhood and terrorism is a “complete antithesis to Islam’s humanistic outlook and noble values.” Pakistan asserts that terrorism has “no creed, culture or religion.” 40 It declares that “respect for beliefs, cultures and traditions are the hallmark of civilized conduct.” For that reason, Pakistan resolutely rejects attempts to identify this noble religion, Islam, with terrorism and “the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists.”41 It believes that the growing Islamophobia across the United States and Europe is rooted in developments that arise from the ‘War on Terror’ and

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indicates a growing confrontation between cultures and civilizations. No doubt, following the events of 9/11 and 7 July 2007 bombings in London, Muslims are increasingly seen as “an enemy within” in Western societies.42 Islamabad has relentlessly advocated effective cooperation with the UN to stand up against negative stereotyping, ‘inferiorization’ and discrimination of Muslims. Pakistan declares that “such attempts must be collectively opposed by the international community lest they sow the seeds of endemic confrontation between cultures and civilizations.”43 It has made consistent calls for global legislation to criminalize defamation of religions and religious hatred as a means to promote human rights and social cultural and religious harmony. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a strong signal to international community that stereotyping of Muslims and defamation of Islam is unacceptable and may presage ‘clash of civilization’:

“Islam is a religion of peace, compassion and brotherhood. And yet most insidious form of contemporary racism in the name of religion is on the rise. Peaceful Muslim communities are profiled and subjected to discriminatory practices. Their faith, culture, holy personalities and scriptures are under attack. Stereotyping of Muslims as extremists and terrorists must stop. We must all use the influence and reach of the United Nations to avert a clash of civilizations and promote harmony among followers of diverse religions, all around the world.”44

PAKISTAN’S PERCEPTION ABOUT EXTREMISM, MILITANCY AND TERRORISM

A. PAKISTANI PUBLIC PERCEPTION ABOUT TERRORISM AND PAKISTAN’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ Below are given Pakistani public perception of extremism, militancy and terrorism as well as the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistani public perception of Pakistan’s engagement in the war is conflicting, split, complex and animated with anti-Americanism. a) Perception on Growing Religious Extremism and Militancy in the Country Majority of Pakistanis denounce religious extremism and violence and consider them contrary to the teachings of Islam.45 Nevertheless, Pakistani people deny the way the US-led coalition has defined and interpreted terrorism and conducted the ‘War on Terror’. All the same, Pakistanis are strongly opposed to the killing of the innocent civilians by the terrorist groups

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in the name of Islam, the noble religion.46 Support for suicide bombings has declined sharply in the country in recent years. In 2004, roughly four-in-ten (41 percent) Pakistani people said suicide bombing and violence against civilians are ‘often or sometimes justified,’ to protect Muslims and defend their religion. But, support for these kinds of attacks dropped to 9 percent by 2007 and remained in the single digits since then.47 In pew Global survey, conducted in 2011, 8 percent of Pakistanis considered suicide attacks ‘justifiable,’ and only 3 percent opined it is ‘rarely justified.’48 At the same time, the people who believed that suicide bombing was ‘rarely or never justified’ climbed from forty-three percent in 2002 to ninetytwo percent in 2010. This sharp decline in support for suicide bombing, and the sudden increase in the opposition to such attacks is mainly due to the reason that since 2007, Pakistan has witnessed frequent suicide attacks itself. 49 Dozens of suicide bombers have targeted Pakistani cities, killing and injuring civilians as well as security forces. Pakistan experienced highest number of suicide attacks during April 2009 and January 2010. While many people consider that suicide attacks are a reaction to Pakistan’s military operations and frequent US drone strikes in FATA, public opinion seems to be hardening against such attacks due to increased violence and terrorism. Public attitudes about the identity of extremists and terrorists have also changed to a great degree. Earlier majority of people thought that a ‘foreign hand’ is involved in all the terrorist activities in the country; however, they gradually accepted that country’s political dynamics also factor in for the growing extremism and terrorism. People started admitting that domestic and foreign policy choices to pursue Jihad in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir also contributed to this mess in the country.50 Another important factor in the sharp increase in the opposition to suicide attack was the role played by Pakistani ‘Ulema’ and ‘Mushaikh’ (Muslim clerics and spiritual leaders). They declared suicide bombings, violence and beheadings as “un- Islamic.” 51 It is important to note that Pakistani society is becoming increasingly concerned with growing militancy and extremism. In a 2006 Pew poll, 74 percent of Pakistanis expressed their concerns about the growing extremism in the country.52 During late 2007 to 2009, Public attitudes to the threat posed by extremist groups, predominantly the Taliban have hardened. Most importantly, the number of Pakistanis, who viewed Al-Qaeda favourably, dropped from 25 percent in 2008 to 9 percent in 2009. This was due to Al-Qaeda’s increased involvement in violence and terrorism in Pakistan. Nevertheless, 2010 Pew poll findings revealed that Pakistanis feel less

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threatened by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It seems that in 2009, at a time when the Pakistani military was carrying out Operation Rah-e-Rast against Taliban in Swat valley and Malakand Division, most people (sixty-nine percent) were concerned about Taliban seizing control of the country. Today, after successful military campaign in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009, just fifty-one percent worried about extremists’ takeover of Pakistani State. 53 b) Perspective on Pakistan’s Engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ Pakistani people appear split on the issue of Pakistan’s military efforts to combat militants and terrorists despite their own concerns about extremism and terrorism. Majority Pakistanis strongly prefer political means to counter growing terrorism. Only a small minority supports using military means to fight terrorism, while a plurality favours a negotiated approach to settle the issue. For instance, most Pakistanis (64 percent) rejected the Musharraf regime’s military operation against some religious radicals at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, 54 which killed many innocent students. Similarly, until March 2009, a majority (74 percent), supported the 2009 ‘Shariah for Peace’ deal in Swat, and expressed their opinion that the agreement was a step towards bringing peace in the valley. However, when the Swat peace deal was broken, and Taliban intruded into more settled areas of Dir, Buner and Shangla, public opinion began to turn significantly in favour of military campaign. Yet, after the military operations in Swat, a July 2009 joint poll carried out by Gallup and Al-Jazeera noted that forty-one percent Pakistanis would support the military campaign in Swat, but the number of those supporting dialogue increased to forty-three percent.55 A Gallup Pakistan poll conducted in October 2009 revealed a cautious support in the Pakistani public opinion for the military action in South Waziristan. While a majority supported military action against Taliban, only a small number (25 percent) were against the military action and 37 percent accused America for bringing the ‘War on Terror’ to their country. Still others (36 percent) placed the blame on Pakistan’s own politicians and their policy. Additionally, the poll found that slightly more people considered the military operation would further deteriorate the situation (37 percent) than bring peace (36 percent).56 Several surveys by a variety of outlets were conducted to illuminate the opinions of Pakistanis, toward their country’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. A plurality of Pakistanis overwhelmingly opposes Islamabad’s policy of ‘unstinted cooperation’ with the United States in the war.57 According to a spring 2010 Pew poll findings:

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• Sixty percent Pakistanis viewed the US as Pakistan’s enemy, and expressed concern that the US could become a military threat to Pakistan. • Nearly two-thirds opposed US-led ‘War on Terror’ and want US-led coalition forces to exit from Afghanistan. • Ninety percent Pakistanis opined that the drone strikes are a “bad thing” as these kill too many innocent people. • About half of Pakistanis viewed that US policies tend to favour New Delhi than Islamabad • Nearly half of Pakistanis support the army’s ongoing military operations in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.58

A New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow survey in July 2010 indicated that the United States’ military, as well as Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, enjoy little support in FATA; however, nearly seventy percent people back Pakistani military to fight Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in FATA. 59 This suggests that overwhelming majority oppose operations that appear to be part of a US—not Pakistani government agenda.60 Most importantly, only ten percent of tribal people consider suicide attacks are ‘sometimes justified’ against Pakistani security personnel and almost sixty percent think these attacks are ‘justified’ against the US military. This shows the intensity of opposition to the US military presence in AfPak region is relatively high in FATA. 61

While US military strategy may be unpopular in Pakistan, many Pakistanis support US economic aid and assistance. Particularly FATA residents strongly support US aid and assistance in tribal areas. As demonstrated by the findings of New America Foundation survey in July 2010, almost three-quarters of the people inside the tribal regions stated that their opinion of US would “improve” if Washington increases visas, educational scholarships and US aid for education and medical services for the tribal people. They also stated that if the US withdrew its military from Afghanistan or negotiated a comprehensive peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, it would also help create a benign image of America in FATA. 62 It is worth noting that relief efforts and aid provided by the US military in the aftermath of Pakistan’s devastating earthquake in October 2005 produced a favourable image of United States. But, anti-American sentiment is too deeply embedded in Pakistani society to be uprooted by aid.63 Pakistanis have the perception that the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

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Act (the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill of 2009) is a threat to their state’s sovereignty. They also consider the Act as an American attempt to seize Pakistan’s nuclear assets.64 Yet, most Pakistanis support the US providing financial and humanitarian aid to areas, where extremist groups operate.65 In addition, the quest for friendly relations with United States also enjoys a favourable view in Pakistan; and many Pakistanis believe that improving relations with the United States is important. 66 c. Reasons for Opposition against Pakistan’s Engagement in the US-led War The strong opposition to Pakistan’s partnership with the US-led coalition is mainly due to the high impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on Pakistani society, its political, security and economic interests. The deep-rooted distrust and political opposition to the America as a “global hegemon,”67 coupled with the perception that America is exercising “extraordinary influence” on Pakistan’s political outcome also factor in for opposition against the US policies in ‘AfPak’ region.68 Pakistanis also consider United States an ‘unreliable ally’, because in their opinion, US will soon depart Afghanistan leaving Pakistan to clear away the debris of US-led ‘War on Terror’ as Americans deserted and sanctioned Islamabad, for its nuclear programme following the end of cold war.69 What more, United States seems to be fighting terrorism with a “crusading zeal” that speaks of ‘an ideological tussle’ and ‘clash of civilizations.’70 Many across the spectrum of Pakistani society disagree with the US ‘War on Terror’, ‘a three letter’ word that has fostered suspicions towards American objectives in the region and beyond and has promoted the growth of anti- American sentiments across the Muslim world against US foreign policies.71 Most Pakistanis bear resentment towards US global foreign policy as it is perceived to be hostile to the Muslim World for example, in Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Libya. No wonder, many believe that the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is actually a “religious crusade against Islam.” According to Khaled Ahmed, many People who share this perspective are alienated from the state and identify themselves with ‘Islamic movements’ or show solidarity with the notion of ‘Muslim Ummah’. They believe that Muslim states, its institutions and the governments are “slaves of America,” and serve the interests of the US and the West that are considered a threat to the Ummah. Therefore, a plurality of Pakistanis see US-led ‘War on Terror’ ‘as a war against Muslims’ and view Pakistan’s engagement in this war “as fighting not its own war.”72

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It is noteworthy that the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ is perceived to be a major cause of growing radicalization of youth in ‘AfPak’ region and beyond. According to Imran Khan, the Chairman of Pakistan Tehrik-e Insaf (PTI), the longer this war goes on, “the more chances of a radical takeover in Afghanistan” and “the greater the threat of radicalization amongst the Muslim youth,” especially in the Western countries, that pose a “greater danger to these countries including the US than Al-Qaeda.”73 The US military presence in Afghanistan is also perceived negatively by many Pakistanis. The vast majority of people believe that US military presence in Afghanistan upsets the strategic balance in the region and puts Pakistan’s political and strategic “interests at risk” in Afghanistan.74 Also, the growth of closer relations between United States and India are viewed, a threat to Pakistan’s interests. A majority of Pakistanis believe that the ‘War on Terror’ is part of a two- front military strategy concocted by United States and India to contain Pakistan and seize its nuclear assets. New Delhi insists that Washington should “declare Pakistan a ‘terrorist state’” and seize its nuclear assets, which in turn, adds to Pakistan’s fear of “Indianinspired agendas” within the framework of US regional policy and actions. Pakistani citizenry and leadership believe that Washington “has the leverage to control India, and therefore by default, sees Indian efforts to destabilize Pakistan as condoned by America.”75 It is beyond an ‘average Pakistani’s comprehension,’ why Washington believes that while India controls Muslim-majority Kashmir through instruments of state terror, there should be no reaction in their country and Pakistan- Administered Kashmir, in the form of political and military support, directed against Indian forces in India-Administered Kashmir? 76 US dual policies in the ‘War on Terror’ for two different countries in South Asian region, coupled with US inability to completely disrupt Al-Qaeda network, and the failure in establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan increase anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. As Steve Coll has noted that US policy in the region, “failed to bridge the deepening mistrust among Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi governments after 2001,” or to formulate a comprehensive strategy of “political negotiation, reconciliation, and national reintegration in Afghanistan that would provide a platform for Pakistan’s genuine security concerns.”77 Pakistan’s security concerns are based on the belief that Islamabad needs to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan for its security and political interests. When it comes to the strategic

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threat perception of Islamabad, the danger from traditional rival, India, continues to supersede the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, or Kashmir focused groups.78 This is despite the frequent official statements that the main threat to the state comes from growing extremism and militancy. Certainly, Pakistan army sees the growing involvement of India in Afghanistan, and presence of its intelligence network there as a threat to the security of the country. Army is equally suspicious of the US role in facilitating Indian influence in Afghanistan.79 Put it simply, the threat perception of Pakistani society and Pakistan army converges on US-India nexus in the region.

In Pakistan, America “relied for too long and too exclusively” on military regime to promote US interests in the ‘War on Terror’. Musharraf on the other hand, led a model of ‘guided democracy’ at the cost of civilian institutions and much needed political reforms. This “bad bargain” has been “driving a wedge between Pakistani people and the US-supported [Pakistani] governing elite and, by extension, between the US and Pakistani people.” 80 Hence, the US policies caused many Pakistanis to safely conclude that the US military “presence in their region was narrowly conceived, self-interested, and ultimately unreliable.”81

B. MEDIA’S PERCEPTION ABOUT THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

Since 2002, the media in Pakistan has developed from a largely “state-run industry” into a free broadcast, print and online media. Pakistani media is becoming “increasingly vocal” on political, security and economic issues of global and domestic importance.82 Nevertheless, it has become polarized along class, economic, educational and political lines. In particular, the English language media echoes the outlook of the urban elite of Pakistan while the Urdu language media reflects the viewpoint of middle class and rural audience. According to a senior Pakistani journalist, Zahid Hussain, English newspapers cover issues related to foreign and security policy of the country while there is scarcity of such issues in Urdu newspapers. This has, instead of clarifying the important security issues, only led to more misunderstanding among policy makers and the populace. This dichotomy coupled with the Pakistani populations’ and media’s distrust of the United States is the main reason of divergence and confusion over important matters like combating terrorism and inability to reach consensus on such issues. 83

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i. Media’s Perception about Terrorism and Militancy Media is increasingly becoming a crucial tool to wage informational and psychological warfare every day around the globe. Both the terrorists and the governments rely on the media in order to shape public opinion. Media plays a critical part in shaping the public perception, giving it a direction and setting the national agenda of a country.84 In this context, media has a great opportunity to utilize its resources to alleviate the effectiveness of terrorism by creating hostility towards militant and terrorist organizations. Also, media can “help diminish the success of terrorists’ informational and psychological warfare against the target population” to achieve their objectives.85 Pakistani media is often accused of inducing frustration and confusion on issues of fighting extremism and terrorism which is exploited by the extremists. Many talk show hosts, on Pakistani channels, invite retired hardline diplomats, bureaucrats, and retired army officers, who in the words of Ahmed Rashid, “give viewers loud, angry crash courses in anti-Western and anti-Indian [outlook], thereby reinforcing views already held by many [people],” creating more confusion and suspicion in the environment, which in turn, breeds extremism and militancy in the society.86 Moreover, media is repeatedly being accused of providing platform to extremists and terrorists to advance their interests. By showing the videos of militants and the interviews of chiefs of some extremist and banned organizations, the news channels are usually blamed for advancing extremists’ and militants’ agenda. The media persons, however, reject such accusations and state that by giving militants space, the media helps uncover their hidden agenda in front of the people. Media has to help its audience make sense of the unpredictability and confusion that exists in the country. 87 Thus, the real challenge for Pakistani media is, to cover militant activities without spreading fear and anxiety. The media must shape public opinion against extremism and militancy and try to raise the cost of using violence to achieve political ends within the society. Indeed, when the media constructively engage in informing and educating the public on extremism and terrorism, the results can improve societal understanding of these threats. A case in point is the 2009 occupation of Swat and other districts by the Taliban fighters and the media’s response to this. Pakistani media has become increasingly critical of militants and extremists, often describing Taliban leaders as “anti-constitution” and “anti-democracy,” 88 and the ones who “aim to destroy everything they cannot abide.”89

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This media campaign encouraged public awareness of militancy, extremism and terrorism and Pakistani nation gathered behind military operation in Swat in 2009. Similarly, when the issue of Mohammad Ajmal Kasab’s identity was raised―Ajmal Kasab was the lone surviving member of the alleged militant group that created havoc in Mumbai on 26 November 2008―Pakistan’s various media channels provided an excellent analysis on the issue. Few media channels also raised the issue of the clandestine detention of Pakistani nationals in India and their use as ‘cannon fodder’ in “fake encounters” to malign Pakistan. It was disclosed by the media that about 200 people including Ajmal Kasab were arrested by the Nepalese authorities in early 2006 in Kathmandu and transferred to India for interrogation by the Indian intelligence agencies which later implicated few of them in Mumbai attacks to conduct “coercive diplomacy” against Islamabad.90 Other media groups tried hard to check Kasab’s identity, confirmed “Kasab’s nationality and exposed his links to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba…without fear or favour” at a time when Pakistani government was reluctant to admit Kasab’s identity. 91 Ultimately, Islamabad decided to extend intelligence cooperation to New Delhi to complete the investigations of Mumbai attacks. ii. Media’s Perception about Pakistan’s Engagement in the ‘War on Terror’ Pakistani media is ardently divided over Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. English press was rather cautious about Islamabad’s cooperation with the US-led coalition forces. The Urdu press, on the contrary, responded to the events of 11 September 2001 by becoming more anti-American. The reaction of the Urdu press to the events of 9/11 began with the belief that the ‘Twin Towers’ were destroyed by Israel. 92 Later, it became focused on the US-led campaign in Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan.

One of Pakistan’s largest-circulation Urdu daily, Nawa-i-Waqt, observed:

“The United States is trying to make us fight this friend [Afghanistan]... The American agencies are seeking a scapegoat to hide their own failures. Bin Laden is an easy target. [Cooperating with Washington will] “destroy our national security, defence, foreign and domestic policies…. Our situation would be worse than Iraq as we would lose the friendship not only of Afghanistan, but also of China.” 93

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The Urdu-language Jasarat suggested that “the real target is Pakistan”, noting that the events of September 11 are “part of a pre-planned project under which Israel wants to militarily occupy the only nuclear power in the Islamic world,” and that the “Zionist lobby in the United States has started a worldwide war against Islam.” 94 An editorial in the Englishlanguage Pakistan Observer stated, “It is imperative that the advantage of Pakistan’s ‘unstinted cooperation’ in fighting terrorism should also accrue to Islamabad. Let Washington not be the only beneficiary of the international coalition.”95 As early as December 2001, The News cautioned that “the finest help that America can extend is to reduce its requirements from [Pakistan} in the ‘War on Terror’...There is an extent that Pakistan can go to without jeopardizing its own fundamental principles and interests of state.”96

As far as Pakistan’s foreign and security policy is concerned, Pakistani media is much more vocal and nationalistic, but somewhat opaque. Media is openly critical of the US strategy in Afghanistan, and portrayed the US strategy as an “American grand design” aimed at ‘controlling Central Asia’s energy resources,’ ‘depriving Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal,’ countering China, and keeping an eye on Iran and Russia. The threat emanating from an emerging US-India nexus in Afghanistan gives “heartburn” to many Pakistani analysts. Insurgency in tribal areas and parts of Baluchistan is also perceived as a “conscious effort” by the alleged “American-Israeli-Indian alliance” to destabilize Pakistan. In addition, violation of country’s airspace by the US drone attacks, the suspected activities of CIA security contractors, and the unjust Pakistan specific legislation to target the safety of its nuclear arsenal, and its intelligence agencies, also gets a “negative response” from print as well as electronic media. 97

An editorial in Daily Times stated:

“The role and activities of the US in Pakistan has been the subject of suspicion and debate for a long time. Drone attacks in tribal areas and leaks about Blackwater’s mercenary operations at places, which regular US forces and intelligence agencies cannot penetrate, have irritated many. Additionally, overly concerned with the security of their staff, armed US marines have harassed and intimidated Pakistani citizens, apparently forgetting that Pakistan is not a colony of the US, but a sovereign country.”98

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Pakistani electronic media regularly flash news of high-ranking US officials and diplomats meeting various government and opposition officials on a regular basis. The media concludes from these high profile visits and “unexplained meetings”, that US officials “dictate” policies to their Pakistani counterparts on the ‘War on Terror’ ; and Pakistani officials in turn, serve as “surrogates to their senior partners in the deal.”99 US officials are seen as “well-bunkered” having no “real interaction” with the Pakistani people. In short, United States is seen as much “a liability as a friend” by the media. 100 Pakistani media is also critical of the United States expectations and demands to ‘do more’ in the ‘War on Terror’, and describes these demands as “unrealistic.” Many media pundits “consistently draw conclusions that the US-led coalition forces or Afghan security forces have not done as much, as has been contributed by Pakistanis “in terms of sacrifices and dislocations.”101 Many media commentators are also critical of US-led coalition’s narrative on Pakistan which neglects Pakistan’s geo-political and strategic objectives vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Imtiaz Gul writes that this ‘internationally popular narrative’,

“Totally dismisses even the thought of possible involvement of India, Iran, Afghanistan, or the United States in the proxy war inside Pakistan, as part of a long-held conspiracy theory. Any suggestion that the Indian, Afghan or any other establishment may be doing to Pakistan what it did to the interests of these countries is met with instant scorn and laughed off…..For them Pakistan is the only bad player and all other victims of this war - including India and Afghanistan - are ‘helplessly watching’ Pakistan undermine their interests.”102

Also, the media reflects the widespread feeling that Pakistan is fighting the wrong war, and killing its own people and that it needs to get out of the deal made by President Musharraf with President Bush after 9/11. On the other hand, high profile attacks in Pakistan including the attack on Marriott Hotel in September 2008, dubbed “Pakistan’s 9/11” and attacks on Pakistan Mehran Naval Base in May 2011 led many media outlets to contend that the ‘War on Terror’ “could no longer be perceived as American war”, as it undoubtedly, requires Pakistani citizenry and army to fight against the enemies of Pakistani state― Al-Qaeda and TTP. It seems that media has started playing a constructive role to shape public perception to own the ‘War on Terror’. The 24/7 media reporting on Pakistan security forces’ efforts to combat terrorism points to this constructive role of the media. 103

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C. GOVERNMENT AND THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT PERCEPTION OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ a) General Musharraf’s Regime Perception about the ‘War on Terror’

Following the events of 9/11, General Musharraf supported the US-led ‘War on Terror’ but broke the militants into three categories: the Afghan militants and Pakistani militant groups who supported the Afghans; Pakistani Taliban, especially sectarian militant groups and TTP, engaged in waging a jihad against Pakistani regime; and the transnational militant groups such as Al-Qaeda fighters. This classification fit perfectly into Islamabad’s geo-strategic framework vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India.104 Accordingly, Musharraf regime disrupted AlQaeda network and some sectarian outfits, and has constantly been engaged in battles against Pakistani Taliban. It remained “much more reluctant” to decisively purge Kashmir focused groups and Afghan Taliban fighting against US-led coalition and Karzai Government in Afghanistan. As Ashley Tellis points out, strategic and geopolitical factors shaped Musharraf “segmented approach” to counterterrorism.105 Until 2008, this “segmented approach” allowed the militants to “expand their religio-political space.”106 Both the military and the government lacked a “shared clarity of purpose” on how to deal with the militancy and extremism. Meanwhile, the army, alternatively, went for military action in the tribal areas followed by peace deals with the militants. “Musharraf’s highly centralized political system,” notes Hasan Askari Rizvi, was “unable to evolve a broad-based supportive consensus” on the ‘War on Terror’. The political parties and civil society that supported the military campaign against extremists and terrorists were “pushed to the periphery of the political system.” Rizvi observes further that despite Musharraf’s “strong rhetoric against terrorism, his civilian and security personnel gave enough space to extremists to carry on with their activities, despite periodic military actions in tribal areas.” 107 For that reason, General Musharraf’s regime segmented and ambiguous policy in the ‘War on Terror’ did not produce a broad consensus in the country about fighting extremism and terrorism. This created a dilemma for the security forces as the army cannot operate in a “political vacuum,” 108 and cannot fight a war on which there is no national consensus.

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b) Civilian Government and the Military’s Establishment Perception of the War Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led coalition government’s counterterrorism policy was different from General Pervez Musharraf’s policy. Compared to the counterterrorism efforts made by Musharraf regime, the PPP-led coalition government demonstrated a more hard-line stance against the militants and terrorists. PPP-led coalition government’s counterterrorism policy was clear, and in accordance with the PPP manifesto, which declared that “distinctions between, and amongst terrorist groups will no longer be maintained.” 109 Most importantly, it maintained that “the ‘War on Terror’ will be led by Pakistan and Afghanistan with international support, and Pakistan’s sovereignty will be defended” at all costs. In accordance with this policy, President Asif Zardari held his first official meeting as president with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. This implied that PPP-led coalition government desired to combat terrorism with the help of Kabul and other stakeholders.110 Continuing on from the successful military operation in Swat in 2009, the government in October 2009 commenced a full-scale military operation in South Waziristan. This campaign was made possible by the PPP taking secular Mutahiddah Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), and Islamic party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam—Fazl-ur-Rehman Faction (JUI-F)111 into the coalition government, and keeping them informed to mollify opposition from the KPK and tribal areas. Both MQM and ANP supported the US invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s cooperation with Washington, to eliminate Al-Qaeda. ANP stressed “the need for clearing the terrorist sanctuaries inside the border” in FATA.112 MQM also reassured the government and military of having political backing for its operations in the tribal areas and Swat. 113 JUI-F’s leader Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman went so far to warn about the threat of the Taliban before the government decided to launch military operation in Swat.114 Yet, when the government called out the military, Maulana strongly opposed the military operation in Swat and the tribal areas. He explained, “Of the government’s policy of three Ds (dialogue, development and deterrence), our party believes in the first two.”115 Analysts claim that such statements buttress his reputation as Taliban supporter among Pakhtuns in the tribal areas, while at the same time, indirectly serve the army’s objective to pursue ‘negotiated settlements’ with ‘moderate’ Taliban in FATA and Afghanistan.116

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The PPP-led coalition government also mounted concerted efforts to get support from Pakistan military in the ‘War on Terror’.117 Most importantly, the civilian leadership gave political ownership to counterterrorism campaign with a conscious effort to mobilize popular support for the security operation against the TTP. Though, the PPP-led government efforts to build a national consensus on ‘War on Terror’ have not taken deep roots in Pakistani society. Still, government efforts were somewhat successful as these boosted the morale of the army and paramilitary forces fighting the Taliban. A large number of societal groups extended support to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in FATA and Swat. The media and the major political parties also back the security operation with some reservations; the exceptions are Jama’at-e-Islami (JI) and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI). 118 The PPP government viewed Pakistan army counterinsurgency campaign in FATA vital for internal security and stability.119 In April 2009, the Taliban intruded the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa causing strong concerns in government, military and civilian circles that TTP wanted to undermine Pakistani state and society. President Zardari responded to this challenge by saying: “The fight against militancy and terrorism will end with the complete elimination of militants.”120 The former Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani stated: “It is our national resolve not to allow terrorists any space on our territory. Equally, we will not permit use of territory of our neighbours for sponsoring, supporting or abetting acts of terror against Pakistan.”121

On the contrary, the half-measures were taken by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Faction (PML-N) provincial government in Punjab to hunt down militants which suggest the likelihood of a less proactive stance against militancy and extremism.122 The PML-N is also accused of giving official patronage to the leaders of banned sectarian outfits particularly Sipah-Sahaba- Pakistan (SSP). The SSP in South Punjab is more supportive of the PML-N now.123 It appears that the PML-N has within its ranks, hard-line anti-Indian and antiWestern politicians as well as religious ideologues, who seem to possess a sympathy for Kashmir focused groups, and sectarian organizations.124 A political analyst, Arif Nizami opined, the “Punjab government is not only complacent, there is a certain ambivalence in their attitude” towards extremists. “They compete for the religious vote bank.”125 This ambiguous approach of PML-N on extremism and militancy further complicates Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign. PML-N also showed reservations about Pakistan military operations in FATA and insisted that the PPP “government

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should initiate dialogue with all stakeholders, as a military operation is not the only solution.” 126 Primr Minister Nawaz Sharif newly elected civilian government has also demonstrated delay in ‘catching up’ with the army’s decision to launch North Waziristan operation Zarb-eAzb.127 However, Nawaz Sharif has visited North Waziristan in October 2014, in an attempt to suggest that the civilian government and military establishment were on the same page to win the ‘War on Terror’. 128 As far as Pakistan’s military establishment is concerned, many believe that Pakistan army is forced to fight the US-led ‘War on Terror’. This perception further complicates the situation. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani succulently described this dilemma while speaking at the fourth annual Youm-e-Shouhada conference in Rawalpindi on 30 April 2013, he stated: “Considering this war against terrorism as the war of the armed forces alone can lead to chaos and disarray that we cannot afford.” He pointed out that militants rose in rebellion against the state and its constitution and such rebellion “has never been tolerated” and that on such occasions the question of “is this our war?” has never been raised. Such questions create doubts and “confuse our soldiers and weaken their resolve with such misgivings…A soldier’s mind and his mission cannot be subject to such doubts,” he stressed. The Army chief also mentioned that there remains room for the extremists “to return to the national fold,” but “this is only possible once they unconditionally submit to the State, its Constitution and the Rule of Law.” 129

General Kayani demonstrated a strong commitment to work with their US counterparts on fighting terrorists and militants along the Pak-Afghan border.130 Speaking at a meeting of top military commanders, General Kayani declared: “Victory against terror and militancy will be achieved at all costs.”131 But General Kayani’s statements of condemning US military strikes within Pakistani territory, and rejecting an expanded US military presence in the form of trainers or advisors in the country had been public and forceful. This suggests that while Pakistan army has been cooperating with the US-led coalition in the ‘War on Terror’, yet it wants to avoid the local and national backlash against US security and intelligence personnel operating more openly and extensively in Pakistan.132 Moreover, General Kayani did not believe that the US and Pakistan will ever achieve their goal of eliminating the Taliban in the region and believed that US counterterrorism strategy will doom to fail. 133

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Nevertheless, under the command of the newly appointed Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan Army stepped up the ongoing War on Terror’, especially in North Waziristan, in order to clear militants from FATA before US-led coalition forces withdraw from Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the US withdrawal in 2014, Pakistan military officials worry Afghanistan’s military may not have the capability needed to secure the Pak-Afghan border. They also fear that Afghanistan instead accelerate its support to militants fighting the Pakistani state, referring to continuing refusal of Afghanistan to turn over senior TTP leaders to Pakistan, who are hiding in Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be cooperating with Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy.134 In this context, the US needs to make a greater effort to incorporate Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy to stabilize Afghanistan and the region. CONCLUSION Pakistan’s ability to stem the rising tide of extremism and militancy depends in large measure upon Pakistani state’s willingness to fight—militarily and politically the growing extremism and terrorism in FATA and other parts of the country. While Pakistani society is moderate in outlook, unfortunately the polity is sharply divided on ‘War on Terror’ due to its emphasis on Islamic discourse, partisan political considerations and suspicion towards America. One viewpoint is that the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ is “Pakistan’s war because its survival as a political and constitutional entity” is threatened. Others argue that it is America’s war imposed on Pakistan and “it hardly serves Pakistan’s national interests.”135 Even with increasing popular support for combating certain militant groups who threaten Pakistan’s security, there has not been a significant and parallel shift in public outlook toward cooperation with US-led coalition forces or “alignment with [American] strategic vision for the region” and beyond due to growing Anti-Americanism. Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan view that all the troubles in Pakistan originate from its engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. In this context, hard- liners view the US as “anti-Islam,” while the moderateliberals view it as “anti-people.” 136 The ambiguity surrounding the ‘War on Terror’ reflects the inability on the part of the government, national media, political leadership, and military intelligentsia to mobilize the country against the militant threat and develop a consensus on not only ‘who the enemy is,’ but also on what is the role of Pakistani civil society, political and military leadership and media to fight war against extremism and terrorism.

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Any victory on the battlefield will remain imperfect unless it is complemented by success in developing and maturing a broad consensus among Pakistani populace. Pakistan’s efforts to combat the forces of extremism and terrorism thus, hindered by lack of a clear vision amongst Pakistani society, political circles and media about militancy and terrorism and how the state and society should respond to it. This ambiguous and unclear vision, in turn, causes a lack of support for official policy of ‘unstinted cooperation’ with the US and therefore, creates a divided mind amongst Pakistan’s decision making elite. To sum up, divided political will is the main reason for the inability of the Pakistani state and society to cope with terrorism effectively. Consequently, Pakistan’s security, political and economic stability has disintegrated notably. The next chapter will explore the political, strategic and economic implications of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’.

END NOTES

1 In practical terms, religious conservatism means ‘piety’ while religious extremism or radicalism carries ‘political overtones’ that may lead to intolerance and violent behaviour. See Moeed Yusuf, “Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for US Policy,” (Washington: Brookings Institute, October 2008), p. 11. 2 Laila Bokhari, “Radicalization, Political Violence and Militancy” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2011), pp. 87-88. 3 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation ( London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 86-88; See also Laila Bokhari, Op Cit. 4 Hajrah Mumtaz, “Reforming the Unrepentant,’ Dawn, 10 January 2010. 5 For instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) “paid $5.1 million to the University of Nebraska (Omaha) between 1984-1994 to develop and design textbooks in order to promote Afghan Jihad. Overall, about $13 million worth of such textbooks were distributed in the Afghan refugees’ camps, schools, and madaris in Pakistan where students ‘learned basic arithmetic by counting dead Russian soldiers and AK-47 rifles.’” The same books were later used by many madaris across the tribal belt to make Taliban. See Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan- The struggle with militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 80. 6 Touqir Hussain, “Post-1979 Pakistan: What Went Wrong?” in The Islamization of Pakistan: 1979-2009, (ed.), (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 2009), p. 9. 7 Bahukutumbi Raman, “Visualising a Shared India-Pakistan Future,” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan, Op Cit., p. 176. 8 Hasan Askari Rizvi: “At the Brink?” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan, Op Cit., p. 190; See also Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Re-orienting Pakistan,” Daily Times, 28 September 2008. 9 Dr. Moonis Ahmar, “South Asian Response to the War on Terror,” Journal of Political Studies (Lahore), Vol. XI (Summer 2007), p. 2. 10 Alex. Schmid, “Terrorism: The Definitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 2 & 3 (2004), p. 375. 11 Alex Peter Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 28.

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12 Noam Chomsky et al. “What Anthropologists Should Know about the Concept of Terrorism,” Anthropology Today, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 22-23. 13 Ibid. 14 Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 119. 15 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, “Combating Terrorism,” Statement made at the Ministerial Meeting Held at the UN Security Council, New York (20 January 2003); Available at: http://www.pakun.org/statements/Security_Council/2003/01202003-02.php (accessed 26 May 2009). 16 Dr. Moeed Pirzada, “Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and Imperatives for US Policy in the Region,” IPRI Journal, Vol. III, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2003), p. 113. 17 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Op Cit. 18 Ibid. 19 United Nations Press Release - GA/SHC/3654 - Fifty-sixth General Assembly, Third Committee, 5 November 2001, 30th Meeting (PM). 20 Shaheen Akhtar, “War on Terrorism & Kashmir Issue,” Journal of Political Studies (Lahore), Vol. XI (2007), p. 2. 21 Hina Rabbani Khar, “A Comprehensive Approach to Counter-Terrorism,” Statement at the Open Debate of the Security Council (15 January 2013); http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=65 (accessed 20 January 2013). 22 Ibid. Pointing to the terror attack on a youth camp outside Oslo in 2011 by an extremist Norwegian Christian, Anders Breivik, which killed nearly 80 people, former Pakistan Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, stated that this terror incident is a “clear manifestation that terrorists have no religion, no nationality and no values. They are bloodthirsty criminals and should be treated as such universally.” See Kashmir and Palestine have Right to Self-Determination: Khar,” The Express Tribune, 24 September 2011.

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23 Shamshad Ahmad, “Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),” Statement made to the UN at the Public Meeting of the Security Council, New York, (18 January 2002); Available at: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/1610/terSC6.pdf (accessed 26 May 2009). 24 Shaheen Akhtar, Op Cit., p. 2. 25 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Op Cit. 26 Shamshad Ahmad, Op Cit. 27 Ibid. 28 “Pak Slams Indian Repression in IHK,” The Nation, 29 September 2010. 29 Hina Rabbani Khar, Op Cit. See also Munir Akram, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” Statement made at the UN Security Council, New York, (4 October 2002); Available at: http://www.un.int/pakistan/00home08041002.htm (accessed 11 June 2009). 30 General Pervez Musharraf, “Time for Enlightened Moderation,” Washington Post, 1 June 2004. 31 Ibid. 32 Asif Ali Zardari, “Pakistan will Prevail against Terrorism,” Boston Globe, 25 September 2008. 33 “Musharraf Wants West to See Beyond Terrorism,” Dawn, 30 January 2006. 34 See Qur’an, Al-Maidah (Chapter 5), verse 29. 35 See Qur’an, Al-Baqarah (Chapter 2), verse 190-193. 36 Abu al-Salam Muhammad, “Jihad in Islam,” in Idris El Hareir and El Hadji Ravane (ed.), Different Aspects of Islamic Culture Vol. 3: The Spread of Islam throughout the World (Paris: UNESCO, 2011), p. 178. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. p. 181. 39 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 201-202. 40 “Pak Slams Indian Repression in IHK,” The Nation, 29 September 2010. 41 Ibid; See also Hina Rabbani Khar, “A comprehensive approach to Counter-Terrorism,” Statement at the Open Debate of the Security Council (15 January 2013); http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=65 (accessed 20 January 2013). 42 Magda El-Ghitany, “Enemy Within,” Al Ahram Weekly, Cairo, Issue No. 751, 14 - 20 July 2005. 43 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, “Combating Terrorism,” Op Cit. 44 Anwar Iqbal and Masood Haider, “Sharif Defends Talks with Taliban, Seeks End to Drone Strikes,” Dawn, 28 September 2013. 45 Dr. Eamon Murphy & Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, “Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism,” IPRI Journal, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Summer 2009), p. 21. 46 According to the findings of the Gallup Poll of the Islamic World released in February 2002, “61 percent of the Pakistanis did not regard 9/11 attacks as morally justified. Only 13 percent thought otherwise.” Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal Vol. IV, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy and Research Institute, Winter 2004), pp. 30-47. 47 C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks,” Journal of International Affairs (New York), Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009), p. 43. 48 “US Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden Killing: Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes,” Pew Global Research (21 June 2011), p. 33. 49 C. Christine Fair, Op Cit., p. 43. 50 Hassan Abbas, “Lessons and Challenges for Pakistan,” The Hindu, 24 November 2009. 51 “Top Pak Clerics Declare Suicide Attacks Un-Islamic,” The Times of India, 17 May 2009. 52 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2009), p. 73. 53 “Public Opinion in Pakistan: Concern About Extremist Threat Slips,” Pew Global Research (29 July 2010), pp. 1-2. 54 C. Christine Fair and Clay Ramsay et al., “Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, February 2008), p. 24. 55 “Pakistan: State of the Nation,” Al Jazeera (English), 13 August 2009.

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56 “Military Action in Waziristan: Opinion Poll,” Gilani Poll/Gallup Pakistan, 3 November 2009; Available at: http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/03-11-09.pdf (accessed 3 October 2010). 57 A late 2008 Gallup survey found only one in seven Pakistanis holding the opinion that counterterrorism cooperation with the US had benefited their country. Cited in K. Alan Kronstadt, Op Cit., p. 73. 58 “Public Opinion in Pakistan: Concern about Extremist Threat Slips,” Op Cit., pp. 1-2. 59 “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” (Washington: New America Foundation, 28 September 2010), pp. 3-4. 60 Cited in Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND, Corporation, 2010), p. 105. 61 “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” Op Cit., pp. 3-4. 62 Ibid. In fact, Two-third Pakistanis welcome the US drawdown from Afghanistan starting in 2014. See “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” Pew Global Research (7 May 2013), p. 4. 63 Chris Brummitt “Study: Aid after 2005 Quake Won Trust in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, 7 September 2010. 64 Ahmed Hassan, “Kerry-Lugar Bill Widely Opposed, JI Declares”, Dawn, 24 October 2009. A national-level referendum was organized by Jamat-e-Islami (JI), a religious political party, regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill. While authenticity can be debated, people rejected the US aid bill by a big margin. 65 See “US Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden killing,” Op Cit., p. 6. 66 See “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” Op Cit., p. 25. 67 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective,” Op Cit., pp. 31-32. 68 C. Christine Fair and Clay Ramsay et al, Op Cit., p. 24. 69 Randall L. Koehlmoos, “Positive Perceptions to Sustain the US-Pakistan Relationship,” Parameters, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 2010), p. 47. 70 Touqir Hussain, “US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” USIP Special Report 145 (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, August 2005), p. 10. 71 Farhana Ali, “US–Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Strategic Insights, (California), Vol. VI, Issue 4 (June 2007), p. 2. 72 Khaled Ahmed, “Three Terminal Narratives of Pakistan,” The Friday Times, Vol. XX, No. 22 (16-24 July 2008), p. 8. 73 Imran Khan, “Time to Listen to Saner Voices on Pakistan-Afghanistan-US,” The News, 7 July 2009. 74 Randall L. Koehlmoos, Op Cit., p. 49. 75 Ibid. 76 “Pak-US Perceptional Mismatch,” (Editorial), Daily Mail, 27 April 2010. 77 Steve Coll, “Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington: New America Foundation, 1 October 2009), pp. 1-3. 78 According to a 2010 poll by the Pew Research Centre, “74 percent of Pakistanis view India as the biggest threat while 54 percent considered Taliban and 49 percent thought Al Qaeda a serious threat.” See “US Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden Killing,” Op Cit., p. 35; According to May 2013 Pew poll findings 52 percent Pakistanis say that India pose very serious threats to their country While only 4 percent name Al-Qaeda as serious threat. See “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan,” Op Cit., p. 11. 79 Khaled Ahmed, Op Cit., p. 8. 80 Touqir Hussain, “US-Pakistan Relations: What Trust Deficit?” The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief No. 31 (November 2010), p. 4. 81 Steve Coll, Op Cit., p. 3. 82 Hannah Byam and Christopher Neu, “Covering and Countering Extremism in Pakistan’s Developing Media,” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 20 March 2010), p. 2; The state-run Public sector Pakistan Television Corporation operates six channels alongside more than 50 private TV channels and 100 FM Radio stations licensed by Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority (PEMRA). See Ministry of Information and Broadcasting at: http://www.pak.gov.pk/BasicFacts.aspx (accessed 2 May 2013). 83 “Speakers Highlight Importance of Media in Policy Making,” Associated Press of Pakistan, 22 February 2011.

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84 Arif Ansar, “The Enemy and the Role of the Media,” Daily Times, 28 July 2010. 85 Y. Pries-Shimshi, “Creating a Citizenry Prepared for Terrorism: Education, Media and Public Awareness,” in The Media: The Terrorists’ Battlefield (Ed.); (Ankara: IOS Press, 2007), p. 83. 86 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan Conspiracy Theories Stifle Debate,” BBC News, 27 November 2009. 87 Amna Yousaf Khokhar, “Freedom and Reform: The Political Power of Mass Media,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 2011, pp. 4-5; Arif Ansar, Op Cit. 88 Hannah Byam and Christopher Neu, Op Cit., p. 2. 89 “Bombing of Shrine,” Dawn, 7 March 2009. 90 In a TV interview, a Pakistani lawyer C M Farooque revealed that he had filed a petition in the Nepalese Supreme Court in February 2008 in which Nepalese forces and Indian High Commission were made respondents for arresting apprehending Ajmal Kasab and many others and holding them at an unknown place. Farooque was running an NGO, ‘Voice of Human and Prisoners Rights’ and the parents of Ajmal Kasab contacted him for help in this regard after appealing to the Pakistan Government for help. See Inteview of Chaudhry Mohammad Farooq Advocate on ‘Live with Talat’, Aaj TV, 15 December 2008. 91 Hassan Abbas, “Lessons and Challenges for Pakistan,” The Hindu, 24 November 2009. 92 “Press Anguish over US Co-Operation,” BBC News, 18 September 2001. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 “Words of Cheer,” The News, 3 December 2001. 97 Manzoor Ali, “Plots in Pakistan’s Press,” Foreign Policy, 15 July 2010. 98 “Diplomatic Ire,” (Editorial), Daily Times, 10 January 2010. 99 Moeed Yusuf, “Correcting America’s Image Problem in Pakistan,” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 20 August 2010), p. 3. In a private channel talk show, Former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokar described the Negroponte-Boucher visit and their subsequent meetings with Pakistani miltary and civilian officials in March 2008 in Islamabad as “typical American crude diplomacy” and “heavy handed” interference. He accused the Bush administration of making “a desperate effort to save the job of President Musharraf.” See “American ‘interference’ and our rage,” (Editorial), Daily Times, 27 March 2008. 100 “The US-Pakistan Relationship: Toward a Complementary Strategy,” National Strategy Forum, Vol: 20, Issue 2 (Spring 2011), p. 9. 101 “Pak-US Perceptional Mismatch,” (Editorial), Daily Mail, 27 April 2010. 102 Imtiaz Gul, “By Proxy,” Friday Times , 26 July 2013. 103 Shaista Malik and Zafar Iqbal, “Construction of Taliban Image in Pakistan: Discourse Analysis of Editorials of Dawn and The News,” China Media Research, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 46-56 104 “Pakistan’s Dilemma in FATA,” The News, 16 September 2008. 105 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 12-14. 106 Qandeel Siddique, “Pakistan’s Future Policy towards Afghanistan,” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, August 2011), p. 19. 107 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Re-orienting Pakistan,” Op Cit. 108 “General Kayani’s Pivotal Statement,” (Editorial), Daily Times, 26 April 2009. 109 “PPP-P Manifesto 2008,” p. 19-21; Could be read at: http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifestos/2008.pdf (accessed 5 August 2010). 110 Taimur-ul-Hassa, “Calling a Spade a Spade,” The News, 14 July 2009. 111 JUI-F separated from the government of Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani on issues of corruption, specifically the Hajj corruption scandal in December 2010. See “MQM Holds Crisis Talks after JUI-F Quits Government,” Dawn, 16 December 2010. 112 “ANP for ‘Grand Strategy’ to Tackle Terrorism,” Daily Times, 15 September 2008. 113 Pamela Constable, “Extremist Tide Rises in Pakistan,” Washington Post, 20 April 2009. 114 Addressing the Parliament on 22 April 2009, Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman cautioned, “If the Taliban continue to move at this pace, they will soon be knocking at the doors of Islamabad as the Margala Hills

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seem to be the only hurdle in their march towards the federal capital.” See Muhammad Anis, “Taliban Nearing Islamabad, Warns Fazl,” The News, 23 April 2009. 115 “JUI-F Chief Opposes Use of Force in Tribal Areas: Fazl Emerges as ‘Taliban Spokesman’ in Parliament” Daily Times, 17 October 2008. 116 Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier (Arlington: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008). p. 45. 117 “Pakistan’s Fight against Terrorism,” in Yoshiaki Sakaguchi (ed.), East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, May 2010), pp. 63-64. 118 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “New Trends in Counter-Terrorism,” Daily Times, 19 July 2009. 119 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “The turning point,” Op Cit. 120 “President, PM, COAS Discuss Operation: Terror to be Fought with Full Force,” Dawn, 2 July 2009. 121 “Pakistan PM Cribs about India to NATO,” Rediff.com, 5 June 2010; Available at: http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jun/05/pakistan-pm-cribs-about-india-to-nato.htm (accessed 8 June 2010). 122 Daniel Markey, “Pakistani Partnerships with the United States: An Assessment,” (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2009), p. 10. 123 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Terror’s Training Ground,” Newsline, 9 September 2009. 124 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Terrorism and Religious Identities,” Daily Times, 11 July 2010. 125 Rana Sanaullah, “Punjab’s Minister of law, went on the campaign trail” with the leader of SSP, for a February 2010 “by-election in the southern town of Jhang.” Sanaullah stated that “he was just trying to bring the group into the mainstream.” See also “The Punjabi Taliban: Into the Heartland,” The Economist, 3 June 2010. 126 “Military operation not the only solution: Jhagra,” Daily Times, November 04, 2009 127 See http://jinnah-institute.org/second-opinion-new-battle-lines-counterterrorism-and- counterinsurgencybeyond-zarb-e-azb/ (accessed 30 September 2014). 128 “Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif Visits North Waziristan,” BBC News, 9 October 2014. 129 General Kayani questioned: “I would like to ask all those who raise such questions that if a small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire Nation by taking up arms and for this purpose defies the Constitution of Pakistan and the democratic process and considers all forms of bloodshed justified, then, does the fight against this enemy of the state constitute someone else’s war?” “Our external enemies are busy fanning this fire.” “COAS Address on the Eve of Yaum-e-Shuhadda–2013,” No PR74/2013-ISPR, 30 April 2013; http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2013/4/30 (accessed 3 May 2013). 130 Daniel Markey, Op Cit., p. 8. 131 “Victory against Terror and Militancy will be Achieved at All Costs: Kayani,”Dawn, 25 April 2009. 132 Steve Coll, Op Cit., p. 2. 133 Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, “US Efforts Fail to Convince Pakistan’s Top General to Target Taliban,” Washington Post, 31 December 2010. 134 Umar Farooq, “The Afghan Roots of Pakistan's Zarb-e-Azb Operation,” Foreignpolicy, 18 September 2014. 135 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Re-orienting Pakistan,” Op Cit. 136 Bahukutumbi Raman, “Visualizing a Shared India-Pakistan Future,” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan, Op Cit., p. 176.

Chapter – 06

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IMPLICATIONS OF PAKISTAN’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE

US-LED ‘WAR ON TERROR’

INTRODUCTION Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ does more harm than good. The engagement as a frontline state has blurred the lines between the internal and external security threats. Pakistan’s political and economic stability has disintegrated notably. The military dominates the political landscape, civilian institutions remain weak and their integrity is eroded. Pakistan has made important progress against militants and gained some significant successes in the ‘War on Terror’. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Punjab based militants have expanded their activities over the past few years. As a result, Pakistan has been witnessing a rising wave of terrorism and sectarian violence. On the external front, relations with India and Afghanistan are increasingly strained. The distrust between Kabul and Islamabad has been growing due to the ‘War on Terror’ and the tensions over Kashmir dispute can flare into a conflict and remain the principal stumbling block in normalization of relations with India.

This chapter analyzes political, strategic and economic dimensions of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. The chapter is divided into three parts. Part one outlines the impact of ‘War on Terror’ on Pakistan’s internal and external political dynamics. Part two assesses the strategic threat of militancy and terrorism to Pakistan’s security. It also examines Pakistan’s external security environment. Part three evaluates the economic costs of Pakistan’s engagement in the ‘War on Terror’.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

Pakistan’s engagement as a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has deeply impacted Pakistan’s political landscape on internal as well as external fronts.

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A. PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS Below are given the internal political dynamics of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ which have been shaped by the increasing role of Pakistan army, Islamists and United States, and hence, resulting in the growing political instability. a) Musharraf Political Maneuvering General Musharraf decision to rally Pakistan behind the US-led coalition against terrorism benefited him the most. Musharraf used the ‘War on Terror’ to legitimize his military rule and to guard the institutional and corporate interests of Pakistan military.1 According to a commentator, in the wake of 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, General Musharraf, “sensing an opportunity to secure international acceptance for his 1999 military coup,” hastily joined the US-led ‘War on Terror’. US support and assistance provided Musharraf the opportunity to prolong his military rule. No wonder that, on 6 October 2001, the day of the commencement of US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Musharraf extended his term as the Chief of Army Staff indefinitely.2 On 30 April 2002, Musharraf held a rigged “referendum to extend his self-assumed presidency for another five years.”3 In August 2002, he issued the Legal Framework Order 2002 interjecting many amendments to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.4 He included the National Security Council (NSC) 5 in the amended 1973 Constitution and defended it by arguing: “If you want to keep the military out, you have to get them in.” He was of the opinion that the “military takeovers will not be a possibility because we have taken [on the NSC] those who can make rash decisions”6 Major political parties, however, expressed their apprehensions regarding Musharraf regime’s designs to institutionalize the role of the military in policymaking by contesting the amendments. A prominent political leader described NSC as “a permanent hanging [military] sword over the head of an elected government and parliament.”7 Actually, the NSC played the same role later on. Musharraf also expanded the influence and power of the army into the bureaucracy and economy. Retired and serving army officers occupied positions within the civil service, resulting in the militarization of civilian institutions. The military thus, become the “largest serving bureaucracy group” in the country with around 1200 serving or retired military men

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into key positions in ministries, state-run enterprises, and educational institutions resulting in “revisionist curriculum and controlled access to information.”8

On the political front, General Musharraf manipulated 2002 elections by sidelining the leadership of the two mainstream political parties; Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto, and Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz faction (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif, to create the political space for a six-party religio-political alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (The United Council of Action, MMA).9 The October 2002 general elections led to unprecedented victory by this alliance; the MMA became the second largest party in Balochistan; it gained a decisive majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province and became the third largest party in the National Assembly of Pakistan.10 The MMA formed provincial government in KPK and shared power with pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League, Quaid-e- Azam faction (PML-Q) in Baluchistan.

Several factors contributed to the MMA ascendancy to power. Pashtun sentiments were “outraged by what they saw as a massacre of fellow Pashtuns by Americans with official Pakistani connivance”, as Islamabad extended ‘unstinting cooperation’ to the US-led campaign in Afghanistan.11 The Islamic parties themselves “put aside their quarrels and the “theological debates”12 to one side to campaign on a joint agenda of pro-Taliban, pro-Pashtun and Anti- American sentiments, and to tell people to pool their votes against the mainstream parties that appeared to welcome a US role in Pakistan and the region.13 In addition, Musharraf strategy of sidelining the leadership of two mainstream political parties from electoral process, the requirement of a university bachelor’s degree from electoral candidates while accepting madaris’ degree for MMA candidates. These factors confirmed that the military regime was relying on its “ideological proxies” 14 to stoke pro-Taliban sentiment in Pak-Afghan border regions: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Balochistan and the KPK province. It also fostered the perception to the Bush administration that ‘Islamists’ were strengthening their positions in the border region, and that only a military regime in Islamabad could withhold this burgeoning threat.15

MMA, being sympathetic to the Taliban, helped create an environment politically congenial for militant groups. This helped facilitate an “increasing influx of weapons, money and recruits from Pakistan to Afghanistan.”16 According to some reports, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Fazlur

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Rehman faction (JUI-F) strengthened the Afghan Taliban position with ISI financial support and strategic guidance in Pashtunabad area of Quetta (the capital city of Balochistan). 17 The JUI-F also helped the centre to tone down the political power of Baloch nationalists parties, which advocate separatism among Baloch youth. Consequently, this “enduring complex set of relationships” between militant groups, military and Islamic parties resulted in ‘Islamization’ of many institutions in the country during Musharraf regime.18 In fact, Musharraf’s dependence upon the JUI-F, in turn, encouraged the latter to extend its support to Taliban in Balochistan. Interestingly, by supporting the LFO― which made General Musharraf a powerful President till 2007― MMA reciprocated the favour that had been shown to them by General Musharraf. 19 In brief, the military supported the ‘alliance of expediency’ with the MMA to sustain support for the military’s policy objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India.20

Turning to Musharraf political maneuvering to hold onto power, many Analysts argue that a substantial presence of MMA in the parliament provided a pretext to General Musharraf to gain international legitimacy for his presidency, as “a hedge” against civilian government if the latter attempted to increase “political power by reactionary Islamic forces.” Indeed, President General Musharraf played up the militant Islamists takeover of nuclear armed Pakistan in order to prolong his military rule and to ensure the US continued support to his regime. In the aftermath of Red Mosque operation in July 2007 in Islamabad, he succeeded in creating that impression internationally that he was “the sole bulwark that stood between the extremists and the capture of Islamabad, but did (almost) irreparable damage to the army. Mid- level officers and soldiers alike lost confidence in his leadership and even in the ‘War on Terror’.”21

On 3 November 2007, General Musharraf proclaimed an emergency and imposed a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), described by many analysts as “effectively martial law.”22 General Musharraf, however, insisted the PCO was meant to deal with the country’s security crisis and spreading Islamist militancy. But most critics believed it was a “preemptive assault” on the judiciary as the Supreme Court of Pakistan was about to nullify Musharraf’s October 2007 re-election as President.23 Musharraf’s 15 December 2007 order repealed the PCO and revived the constitution24, yet he declined to restore those judges who turned down

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his demand to take an oath under PCO; hence his PCO laid the “seeds for the disintegration of 2008 post-election political order.” 25 Without a doubt, during the course of the elections in February 2008, the political landscape seemed ‘fragmented’ and popular opposition to Musharraf’s rule remained high due to General Musharraf’s political maneuvering. The manifestoes and orientations of the political parties on important issues like restoration of the judges, strengthening of institutions, National Reconciliation Order (NRO), the ‘War on Terror’ and managing economy reinforced the trend of political fragmentation across the country.26

It was not surprising that the political fragmentation has been continued even after General Musharraf’s resignation in August 2008. His actions undercut the viability of state institutions.27 That is why, despite Musharraf’s professed commitment to fighting extremism, “radical extremists of all types raised their ugly heads in Pakistan during his rule”28 due to his inept management of the tribal assertion and “Machiavellian handling of the war.”29 b) The ‘War on Terror’ and the Subsequent Civil-Military Imbalance in Pakistan Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has increased the covert role of the military into civil affairs which renders the elected governments powerless in important policy decisions and increases civil-military imbalance.30 In February 2008, when Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led coalition came to power, it had a great opportunity to balance the ‘civil-military equation’. The PPP rode to power on a ‘wave of sympathy’ after the tragic death of its life chairperson, Benazir Bhutto, in December 2007. Meanwhile, the army was engaged in the ‘War on Terror’ and was fairly discredited after General Musharraf’s prolonged military rule. For that reason, the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani decided to take Pakistan Army “back into the barracks.”31 But, with his successful military operations in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 against Taliban, General Ashfaq Kayani gained much popular support and so, he became the “ultimate arbiter” in foreign policy and national security affairs. On the other hand, the credibility and legitimacy of PPP-led coalition government tarnished due to its ineptitude in restoring the law and order, combating corruption and managing the economy in the wake of the ‘War on Terror’. Hence, gradually, the military usurped the political space again and increased its clout in civil affairs.

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The civilian government did not show a sufficient capacity to undertake administrative, security, rehabilitation and reconstruction responsibilities in the tribal areas and Malakand Division, compelling the army to govern these areas cleared of the Taliban and other militants. 32 In fact, the civilian leadership of PPP-led coalition government seemed at ease “to cede its authority over all matters remotely related to ‘security’ to General Head Quarter (GHQ).” 33 As a result, the administrative vacuum left in the areas cleared of the Taliban is not being filled.34 What more, in many ways, General Kayani has become “indispensable” like once was his predecessor General Musharraf.35 In fact, former Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani reappointed him for a period of three years (from 2010 till 2013), citing his “spectacular successes” during military operations in Malakand, Swat, and South Waziristan, his robust ties with US and NATO military officials, and his support to democratic process. Nonetheless, many observers, who believe in civilian supremacy, cautioned that such reappointment “beyond legally delimited terms,” strengthened “individual power over institutional independence.” Pakistan’s human rights advocate and lawyer, Asma Jehangir opined that the extension of COAS was caused by “pressure from the military.” But many analysts argued that it will take years for the civilian government to cut the size of army in matters of security and foreign policy. 36

In short, the result of February 2008 elections and the unpopularity of Musharraf military rule caused the army to pull back to barracks, but the incompetence of the political leadership and the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ re-endowed the army, with authority to call the shots on most policy issues, particularly, those relating to the United States, India, and Afghanistan. And the army is least likely to weaken that dominance on foreign policy issues in the foreseeable future. The discord between the current Nawaz government which came to power after May 2013 elections and military bear witness to this fact. In other words, the ‘War on Terror’ will shape the developments of civil-military relations for years to come. The military will continue to enlarge its footprint in political landscape and to “maintain its proactive political role.”37 Nevertheless, this situation continues to weaken civilian institutions in the long run.

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c) “Structural Presence” of the US in Pakistan’s Political Landscape A major consequence of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is the growing influence and interference of United States in the country’s political arena. American penetration in Pakistan’s polity is becoming deep and pervasive to ensure the continuity of Islamabad’s efforts in the ‘War on Terror’ at the cost of Pakistan’s civil and democratic institutions. A case in point is Pakistan’s ‘own Arab Spring’ and US interference in it to safeguard its interests. In 2007, a series of widespread mass protests led by the lawyers, civil society, human rights activists, the media and the political parties and their workers mobilized public opinion to restore the judiciary, sacked by General Musharraf.38 United States, in order to save the General, “scripted” Musharraf-Bhutto political deal by which Musharraf’s continued presidency would ensure Islamabad’s continued engagement in the ‘War on Terror’, and Washington would show its support to democratic process by “bringing in the civilian face of Benazir Bhutto as the de-facto Prime Minister.”39 This deal strengthened the widely held view that Washington manipulates Pakistani politicians as well as policies to continue ‘War on Terror’ to the detriment of Pakistan’s political interests.

Many political pundits believe that the political setup led by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was set up by Washington to do its bidding. According to an analyst, soon after the February 2008 election, United States urged PML-Q to support the PPP-led coalition government from opposition to continue its policies on the ‘War on Terror’ while simultaneously informing Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif that Washington doesn’t back his demand for restoring the judiciary, as a basic condition for forming a coalition government.40 Despite the fact, that for many of the voters who cast their votes in February, a ballot cast against Musharraf’s PML-Q was a vote against the US policies in Pakistan, Bush administration remained eager to install a political setup to ensure continuity in the ‘War on Terror’. Hence, by the end of 2008, the United States penetration into Pakistan’s political affairs greatly widened. In fact, most Pakistanis began to feel that the “most important feature of the domestic political landscape was no longer Musharraf but rather the enduring influence of the US.”41

As far as the Obama administration is concerned, its policies further increased the US influence in Pakistan’s political affairs. Pakistan army considered the Kerry-Lugar Bill as a calculated

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attempt by Washington to interfere in its service and “internal organizational matters.” The future military assistance in Kerry-Lugar Bill is “tied to a Yearly Certification by the US Secretary of State that Pakistani military has refrained from interfering in politics, and is subject to civilian control over budgetary allocations, officer promotions, and strategic planning.”42 The bill also entails that Pakistani military acts against militant networks on its soil, specifying ‘Quetta Shura’ Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba compound in Muridke Town in Punjab province.

The angry backlash to Kerry-Lugar Bill in the country was fueled by a widely held perception among the public that America wanted to reverse Pakistan’s political and security paradigm without taking into consideration Pakistan’s national interests. Besides, Pakistani public perception is pervasive that in utter contrast to its commitment to democracy, the US supported President Asif Ali Zardari and his PPP-led coalition government in advancing its own agenda. For example, in 2009 the political strife between PPP-led coalition government and PML-N in Pakistan over the issue of restoration of judiciary raised concerns in Washington. Recognizing the potentially crippling political weakness of Zardari government, Washington quietly urged former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to join Zardari in a unity government to lead war against terrorism. 43

The extent of American involvement in Pakistan’s political affairs is revealed by the fact that COAS, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in March 2009, discussed with the then US ambassador, the possibility of “reluctantly pressure Mr. Zardari to resign” and replacing him with Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan.44 In another meeting with the US ambassador, Nawaz Sharif thanked the US for “arranging” to have Kayani reappointed as Army Chief. The US ambassador herself noted:

“The fact that a former Prime Minister believes the US could control the appointment of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence in Pakistan, here.”45 There is no doubt that Pakistan’s security issues, its counterterrorism strategies and its economic policies are no longer internal, as United States assistance and support has become essential in governing the country. Pakistan’s political landscape has been significantly transformed since 9/11 because of the “structural presence” of the US in Pakistan’s political arena owing to “overexposure, connivance and collaboration” of Pakistani army, bureaucracy,

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political and religious leaders. The lines between the interests of Pakistani army and civilian government, and those of the US policy makers have become blurred as a consequence.46 The US “structural presence” in Pakistan polity alienates Pakistani public from America. In this scenario, there is a need for a lower American profile in Pakistan’s political arena with greater emphasis on transparency and good governance.

B. EXTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS On external front, the rise of anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Kabul and growing Indian (and also Iranian) influence in Afghanistan has disturbed Pakistan’s regional geopolitical scenario. Moreover, Pakistan’s support for Kashmir cause faced set back. i. Political Implications in Afghanistan A grave implication of the ‘War on Terror’ was that Pakistan was completely isolated from the political process in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The December 2001, Bonn conference on Afghanistan engraved “Pakistan’s defeat” on diplomatic and political scene. The conference established an interim government in Kabul under President Hamid Karzai that rested on a power base of anti-Taliban, non-Pashtun Northern Alliance. Pashtuns are in majority in Afghanistan, and traditionally, the Afghan government was dominated by Pashtun. For Pakistan there were grave political concerns hidden in the Northern Alliance seizure of power. First, New Delhi’s backing of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the 1990s strengthened its position in the post Taliban Afghanistan. Many members of the anti-Pakistani, Northern Alliance were influential members of the new Afghan government.47 From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s collusion with Northern Alliance dominated regime in Kabul posed a profound threat to Pakistan’s political interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan feared that the new government in Kabul will maximize India’s influence in Afghanistan. Indeed, President Hamid Karzai helped New Delhi to gain “maximum political advantage” by accepting $1.3 billion of socio-economic aid, and military training recognizing that Pakistan with its $300 million programme could hardly compete with India.48

India is involved in a wide array of development projects in Afghanistan, including the building of the 218 kilometer Zaranj-Delaram Highway that connects the Iranian port of Chahbahar with Afghanistan’s Garland Highway; which links i) Kandahar, Kabul, Feyzabad to Tajikistan; ii) Farah and Herat to Turkmenistan; iii) Heart, Mazar-e-Sharif to Uzbekistan in Central Asia.49

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New Delhi’s construction of the highway in Afghanistan creates anxiety in Islamabad which cannot, at this point, be certain of the success of its own Gwadar deep sea port, envisioned to emerge as a trade and energy corridor from Central Asia to Indian Ocean via Afghanistan.

Figure 6.1. Zaranj-Delaram Highway (Road link from Iran, across Afghanistan to Central Asian Republics)

Source: Robert G. Wirsing, “Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan,” (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008), p. 9.

More worrisome, Islamabad suspects that India “seeks to consolidate an alliance with Iran in western Afghanistan to counter Pakistan’s influence in eastern Afghanistan.” 50 Ahmed Rashid notes that India’s reconstruction strategy was designed to “undercut Pakistani influence” in Afghanistan.51 Assistance to Kabul also publicizes New Delhi’s assertion to be an emerging economic and regional power.52

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Second, from Pakistan’s perspective, Northern Alliance dominated government, being hostile to Pakistan, would revive the vacuous claim that the Durand Line is not the de jure border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan fears that such vacuous claims and the subsequent policies adopted by the Afghan government to support such claims could ally Pakistani Pashtuns to their Afghan counterparts to form a separate homeland for Pashtuns— ‘Pushtunistan’—that could dismember Pakistan. By 2005, Pakistan’s worst fears come true when Afghanistan embarked on to commemorate ‘Pashtunistan Day’ on 31 August each year. During a press conference on 17 February 2006, President Hamid Karzai refused to accept “the Durand line as an international border” and referred to it as “a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers [Pashtuns on either side of Durand line].”53 Afghan officials also raised eye brows over a statement issued on 21 October 2012 by Mark Grossman, the US Special Envoy for ‘AfPak’ region, in which he clearly stated: “our policy is that [Pak-Afghan] border is the international border.” In a response to Ambassador Grossman’s statement, Afghan Foreign Ministry declared, it “rejects and considers irrelevant any statement by anyone about the legal status of [Durand] line.”54 Such statements by Afghan government produce uproar in Pakistan which states that Durand line is a closed and settled issue.

Nevertheless, Kabul has shown an ambiguous attitude towards the Pak-Afghan border so far. Afghanistan repeatedly demands for military action against militant sanctuaries in FATA. President Karzai even threatened to send troops across the border into Pakistan to fight militant groups, operating in border areas, and launch attacks on NATO and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan.55 Pakistani and Afghan troops had already clashed over the border as early as 2003. The Afghan government alleged that Pakistan army set up its bases 600 meters inside Afghan border, while Pakistan denied those charges, and declared that its counterterrorism operations are being conducted on its territory in Mohmand Agency.56 Soon, after these allegations, anti-Pakistan protests had followed in Kandahar, Lagman, Mazar-i-Sharif, Urozgan and Kabul among other cities. On 8 July 2003, protestors in Kabul ravaged Pakistani Embassy, an incident which resulted in deterioration in relations between the two countries.57 Since then, Pakistani and Afghan soldiers have periodically clashed across the border often resulting in higher casualties on both sides.

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The relations further worsened over suggestions from Pakistan that it will seal its 1510-mile border with fences and mines to better control cross-border infiltrations. Afghanistan opposed fencing of the border because “if the border is fenced, the [Durand] line will become a permanent legal reality” which is “unacceptable to Kabul.”58 Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s continuous refusal to recognize the Durand Line has led the tribes on both sides to increasingly interfere in Pak-Afghan border areas.59

Surprisingly, while Kabul has repeatedly blamed Islamabad for providing Afghan Taliban sanctuaries on its soil, it does not pay heed to Pakistan’s worries over the Bugti rebels ‘safe havens’ in Afghanistan. Islamabad has been raising concerns over the sheltering of more than 200 Bugti rebels by Kabul; including Brahamdagh Bugti, a leader of the insurgency and terrorist acts in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. In 2007, General Musharraf alleged that Brahamdagh Bugti was “enjoying freedom of movement to commute between Kabul and Kandahar, raising money and planning operations against Pakistani security forces.” Karzai refused to hand over Brahamdagh Bugti to Pakistan by saying “Fomenting uprising does not make one a terrorist.”60 In August 2012, Interior Minister, Rehman Malik accused Afghanistan of “officially providing arms and ammunition to the Baloch separatists.” He stated that Brahamdagh and others Bugti insurgents traveled to Switzerland and India, while using Afghan passport.61 Afghan assistance to Baloch separatists remains a strong irritant in Pak-Afghan relations.

2. Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Tensions The ‘War on Terror’ has compounded problems for Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. In the post 9/11 scenario, there remain two keys sticking points that have political repercussions not only for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, but also Pakistan-India relations at large. First, resolution of Kashmir dispute faces staunch political roadblocks despite the fact that General Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh acknowledged a mutually agreeable basis for a settlement. They had agreed through protracted backchannel diplomacy, to provide ‘selfgovernance’ in the two parts of Kashmir, undertake demilitarization in phases in Kashmir and, ultimately, establish a joint mechanism to administer the two parts. But 2008 Mumbai attacks and the subsequent public sentiment in India remained hostile towards Pakistan and resulted in the suspension of Composite Dialogue. On the other hand, Pakistani political

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community disowned the progress made during the Composite Dialogue, contending that frameworks agreed upon were authorized by a military dictator, seen to lack the mandate for such unilateral decisions, particularly, vis-à-vis the resolution of Kashmir dispute. 62

Secondly, India has succeeded in shifting the focus from its unlawful occupation of Kashmir to “the overall objective of advancing the peace process” and curbing Pakistan’s sponsored ‘cross border terrorism’ in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.63 India repeatedly accused Islamabad for its inability to curtail militant activities and prosecute terrorists involved in Mumbai attacks in a sincere manner. Commenting on India’s offer for a narrow dialogue on terrorism, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani stated that Indians “have agreed to talk to Pakistan, but they don’t want to talk on Kashmir.” He went on to say that “dialogue was the only way to resolve problems between civilized nations.”64 India has declared to make attempts to normalize its relations with Pakistan only if, Islamabad “demonstrates its commitment” to combat Kashmir focused militant groups. For well grounded political and strategic reasons, Pakistan is least likely to comply with Indian demands unconditionally.65 Consequently, the dialogue has reached an impasse.

Pakistan military is deeply worried about India’s increasing sway in Afghanistan and perceives that by gaining its strategic foothold in Kabul, India is “countering Pakistan’s longstanding proxy tactics” in Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s “war of a thousand cuts” maintains “pressure on India to ultimately come to a settlement on Kashmir.” It also meant to keep a “substantial portion of the Indian military tied up in the Himalayan region, thereby reducing its strike capability against the rest of Pakistan.” Pakistan military strategists believe that this strategy “gives Islamabad a force equalizer against the much larger and more advanced Indian military.” 66 It is in this context, that Pakistan watches, with a wary eye, the growing Indian sway in Kabul as it reduces Pakistan’s chances of success in Kashmir. According to Aqil Shah, Pakistan believes that India’s political and strategic clout in Afghanistan is a “pincer movement designed to relieve pressure in Kashmir.”67 Most importantly, India’s proposed ‘Cold Start strategy’ has also heightened Pakistan’s concerns of a confrontation with India.68 These security calculations led Pakistan military to push back on the achievements of back channel diplomacy on the settlement of Kashmir dispute.69 PML-Q leader Mushahid Hussain, reflecting the military’s new thinking, argues:

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“Many problems have accumulated since the time Musharraf left. India now boasts of a cold start doctrine, there is also the looming water war, the situation in Balochistan and India’s role in Afghanistan. The Pakistan army also feels that India left no stone unturned to isolate it internationally.”70

The military’s pushback against the peace process became evident in 2008, when infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir increased. In 2008, militant infiltrations across the Line of Control increased twofold (41 in total) as compared to 2007. In 2009 number of infiltrations increased with several skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops.71 In fact, for the first time since 2004, India-focused militant groups, particularly, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) publicly surfaced in the southern Punjab, calling for Jihad against India. Holding a combined large public rally in Kotli, a town in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Hizb-ul-Mujahadeen (HuM) vowed to wage a Jihad to ‘free’ Indian-administered Kashmir. In his address, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Chief, Syed Salahuddin, who also heads the United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization of all the militant groups fighting in Kashmir, declared that “Jihad is the only way” to free Kashmir as “diplomacy, talks and negotiations” in the past failed to yield tangible solution. “We reject talks between India and Pakistan as a hoax because dialogue can never lead to the freedom of Kashmir.”72

In addition, the LT, JM and HuM increased their ‘recruitment drives’ in Pakistanadministered Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in 2009 with ISI approval. In other words, Pakistan army is not inclined to abandon entirely the ‘proxy war’ strategy in Indiaadministered Jammu and Kashmir before a settlement on Kashmir has been reached.73

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

Since 9/11, Pakistan has been more concerned with the new security threats posed by the USled coalition’s presence across Pakistan’s Western borders in Afghanistan. The section below details threats to Pakistan’s external and internal strategic and security environment.

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A. PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has worsened Pakistan’s internal security milieu. Growing militancy, extremism, sectarianism and terrorism are the main security threats that Pakistan faces from the 9/11 developments. i. Birth of New Militant Organizations US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the ouster of Taliban from power in December 2001 deeply infuriated Pakistani militant groups and some of the lower cadres of Pakistan’s military, specially, its intelligence agencies. Scores of fighters of Pakistani militant groups were based in Afghanistan when the ‘War on Terror’ commenced. They were hard hit, losing important commanders and hundreds of warriors to US-led coalition carpet bombings. For instance, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) suffered huge human losses and as many as 340 fighters of HuJI were killed in Afghanistan.74

In January 2002, Musharraf yielded to American pressure and banned five prominent militant organizations. Following the capture of a large number of militants of these organizations; the middle and lower cadre militants of these groups lost contact with their leadership, attained complete freedom from ‘official control’ and were swayed by Al-Qaeda’s “call to arms.” It could be argued that Pakistan military had miscalculated that militants would recognize Pakistan’s security compulsions whereby Al-Qaeda and sectarian groups were attacked while Afghan Taliban were assisted.75 But extremists and militant groups turned against Musharraf government for throwing its support behind the US-led coalition. Amir Rana notes that on 30 January 2002, several newspapers in Pakistan received a leaflet from a new militant group ‘Al- Saiqa.’ The leaflet depicted Pakistan “as Darul Harb (Abode of War) and Darul Kufr (Abode of the Infidels), asking the people to wage Jihad against the government and its security forces.” The message from Al-Saiqa indicated that militant groups turned against the government and security forces.76

In 2004, when General Musharraf started a peace process with India, Kashmir focused militant groups like LT and JM were put in deep freeze due to immense US pressure. Pakistan’s decision to ‘demobilize’ the Kashmiri militants in 2003-2004 and closing of the ISI’s “Kashmir Cell by 2004 without extensive de-weaponization or rehabilitation” compelled these groups to move to FATA. In 2006, the then ISI Director General, General Ashfaq Kiyani decision to

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wind up Kashmiri militant camps which were located in various parts of Hazara and Azad Kashmir, strengthened the nexus between Kashmir focused militant groups and Taliban. Scores of these well trained militants began to pop up throughout FATA and Swat, particularly, in Waziristan and Darra Adam Khel. Splinter groups of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e- Jhangvi joined hands with Maulvi Fazlullah in Swat for refuge and for training local militants.77 In 2009, it was reported that eight breakaway factions of JM have been involved in fighting Pakistan military in tribal areas.78

In fact, small, splinter militant groups have been emerging with new names since 2009: these include: Badar Mansoor, Al-Furqan, Al-Mukhtar, Al-Qittal, Al-Azam Brigade, Asian Tigers, Janood-ul-Hafsa, Lashkar-e-Baluchistan, Punjabi Mujahedeen, Itihad-e-Mujahideen Khurasan (IMK) and Al-Qital. Some of these groups focus on ever more specific kinds of attacks. For instance, Asian Tigers focus on kidnappings; IMK seeks to kill spies and government agents who provide information that led CIA-operated drones to their targets; and Al-Qittal (Fight against Infidels) specializes in targeted killings. Security analysts believe that such divisions help solve the militants’ safety and financial problems.79 ii. The Rise of ‘Pakistani Taliban’ in FATA

Pakistani Taliban phenomenon finds the primary reason of its existence in the Afghan resistance against the US-led coalition. A defensive Jihad against Pakistani security forces has been considered essential in order to guarantee Taliban survival in Pakistan, following Islamabad decision to join the US-led ‘War on Terror’.80 To compound the challenge in tribal areas, the October 2002 elections saw the Mutahaida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) came to power in Balochistan and KPK province. Two important factions of MMA, JUI-F and JUI-S were closely linked with the Taliban, and were “sympathetic to their cause.” Not surprisingly, this development led to an increase in attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in the spring of 2003. As early as 2003, ‘a loose coalition of like- minded’ and tribal affiliated militants had emerged under the Pakistani Taliban label.81 They resented the US-led OEF in Afghanistan and were determined to implement ‘Islamic Sharia’ in the tribal areas. The insurgency in tribal areas gathered momentum in 2004 when, General Musharraf sent troops in North and South Waziristan to combat Al-Qaeda and affiliated militant groups. The military intervention and operations of Pakistan army “helped generate more recruits and support for Taliban.”82

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Against this backdrop, the MMA demonstrated its support for the Taliban and other militant groups by opposing military action against them and instead, favouring negotiating peace settlement with the Taliban in North and South Waziristan. The actual effect of the accords was more protection and room for maneuver for the Taliban in Pak-Afghan border areas. 83

According to Amir Rana, Taliban formulated a four-point strategy to gain control over an area. This strategy encompasses political, administrative, economic and social aspects. As a first step, they cracked down on criminals, taxed people to collect money for their activities. Second, they executed or expelled powerful tribal chieftains, who could challenge the authority of Taliban. Seeking to exercise their control, Taliban influenced by the ideology of Al-Qaeda have killed over 600 Maliks (tribal elders). Third, they established a parallel justice system for corruption free, simple and quick dispensation of justice. Fourth, they selected their trusted men as administrators in tribal areas. Rana noted that “their strategy eroded the traditional concept of collective responsibility, which adversely affected the political administration” in tribal areas. Yet, the TTP gained legitimacy from local populace in the tribal belt who had been long denied social justice and economic development. 84 Moreover, the Taliban movement seems “more functional and transparent” in handling with economic issues, social justice and offers “some degree of empowerment” to the poor people in tribal region.85

In addition, Taliban dealt strictly with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and modern educational institutions especially female institutions that could cause ideological or political challenges for the movement. In a period of one year (2006 till 2007), the Taliban killed 61 teachers and closed down 12 local and 25 foreign NGOs in tribal areas. The Taliban also increased kidnapping of security and state officials to bolster the movement. For example, Taliban kidnapped more than 200 Pakistan army soldiers in South Waziristan on 30 August 2007 to put pressure on government to release Taliban prisoners. Taliban set free 213 soldiers on 4 November 2007, after the government freed 25 militants under a prisoners’ exchange made possible by a 21-member Peace Jirga.86

As far as Taliban operations are concerned, several areas of FATA have been used by the Taliban in order to regroup, rearm and attack ISAF/ NATO forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani security forces in FATA. Taliban also increased their presence in settled districts of neighbouring KPK province.87 Surprisingly, the MMA was often at odds with the Pakistani

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Taliban groups. The MMA politicians acknowledged the growth of their power and influence but at the same time, they certainly “played an indirect role in facilitating the spread of the insurgency” by making no serious effort to check Taliban advances in KPK. In particular, MMA government “indecisive response” to the TNSM’s and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) expanding influence in Swat helped Taliban to gain control of these areas.88 Besides, administration in Swat and the six Frontier Regions did nothing to “alert national authorities” about the ‘creeping Talibanization’ and growing militancy.89

Meanwhile, a range of commanders in Pakistani Taliban movement conducted operations in several different agencies separately. In December 2007 several of those commanders “loosely unified” under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). According to an analyst, Al- Qaeda also played a pivotal role in the creation of TTP. Documents recovered from the hideout of an Al-Qaeda commander, Hamza Rabia, in Gujrat in 2004 revealed that Al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan was not in favour of fighting with Pakistan army and sought “to keep their focus on the ‘snake head’” (United States). The raison d'être of the creation of the TTP can be witnessed in this strategy of Al-Qaeda to stay focused on US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and left the TTP to directly engage with Pakistan army.90

In sum, it was between late 2001 and 2007 that the blend of increasingly militant radical groups, Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban ‘coexisted’ in the tribal belt, Frontier Regions and Swat valley under “favourable conditions” for “cooperation and regeneration.” This coupled with ineffective military strategies of United States and Pakistan in tribal areas and beyond led to the emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which over the years have transformed into an “existential threat” to the country.91 iii. Nexus Between Al-Qaeda, Punjab Based Militant Groups and Pakistani Taliban The most damaging impact of Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ is the growing radicalization, and ‘linking and overlapping’ of Punjab based Kashmir-focused groups and sectarian militant outfits, with Al-Qaeda and the militant groups in tribal areas, particularly TTP. This nexus poses the gravest threat to Pakistan’s security.

1. The Emergence of the Al-Qaeda-Punjabi Taliban-TTP Nexus To take ‘revenge’ of the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan, ‘a five-member coalition’ of the militant groups was established in 2001 under the ‘spiritual leadership’ of Mufti

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Nizamuddin Shamzai, Head of the Banuri madaris in Karachi. The coalition was named ‘Brigade 313’ 92 and comprised Punjab based militant groups (also known as Punjabi Taliban); 93 these included: Kashmir-focused groups; LT, JM, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat- ul- Mujahideen al-Alami (HuMA); and the sectarian outfits, Sipah Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). Brigade 313 soon conducted attacks on Christians in Murree, Islamabad and Taxila in reprisal for American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. It was also alleged to be responsible for abduction and killing of American journalist, Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Brigade 313 also carried out attack on General Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December 2003. 94 This event “clearly indicated a nexus between the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ and Al-Qaeda while showing their penetration in the armed forces as more than fifty Air Force personnel linked to JM were charged”, for the attack on General Musharraf. 95

In FATA, a variety of small independent Pashtun, Taliban militant groups and Punjab based militants started to network one another while Pakistani security forces kept their focus on hunting down Al-Qaeda and affiliated foreign militants. According to Ryan Clarke, throughout this process “Pakistani Taliban never merged into organizational structure of the Mullah Omar- led Afghan Taliban” (‘though they repeatedly pledged their allegiance to Mullah Muhammad Omar’). He concluded that due to “its more decentralized nature and independence from Mullah Omar, the TTP gravitated more towards Al-Qaeda than its Afghan counterpart.”96 Of course, TTP has increasingly linked and financed by Al-Qaeda, portrayed by Pakistani Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, as “the front face of Al-Qaeda.” It is important to note that TTP growing associations with Al-Qaeda has been witnessed in Taliban’s rhetoric plus their tactics.97 Al-Qaeda has provided ideological, strategic, tactical and logistical assistance to TTP which, in turn, became expert in the use of ‘IED’ and suicide bombings against Pakistan security forces and civilians. 98

It is worth noting that Pakistan military’s Operation Silence in July 2007, cemented ties between Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjab based militants. The ill-planned and poorly conducted Operation Silence to evict suspected militants from Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and its affiliated female madrassah, Jamia Hafsa led to creation of various ‘splinter groups’ from Punjab based militants.99

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These splinter groups joined hands with Al-Qaeda and Taliban.100 According to one estimate, “more than 5,000 individuals” from madaris in southern and northern parts of Punjab province joined militant training camps in North and South Waziristan in the wake of this Operation101

The Operation also resulted in the emergence of some fiercest ‘splinter groups’ and some new militant groups called ‘Lal Masjid affectees.’102 Two such new groups are Junood-ulHafsa (soldiers of Hafsa), and the Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade or Ghazi Force, which was named for ‘slain Deputy Leader of the Red Mosque Abdul Rashid Ghazi.’103 Ghazi Force is believed to have links with TTP, Brigade 313 and Al-Qaeda, and worked closely with the TTP during the Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat in 2009.104 Commenting on the ideological links between Al-Qaeda and Punjab based militant groups (‘Punjabi Taliban’) Daniel Byman made the following observation:

“These organizations share an ideological affinity with Al-Qaeda, believing in the need for an Islamic government, the importance of jihad as an individual duty, the corruption of the most Muslim regimes, and the fundamental hostility of India and the United States.” 105

Most importantly, the cooperation among the Punjab based militant groups and TTP has developed to the point that leaders of Punjab-based militants “are represented in the TTP’s 40- member shura” (council).106 Punjabi Taliban “shuttle” between FATA and the rest of country to provide “logistical support” to Al-Qaeda and TTP to carry out operations in Pakistan. Tariq Pervez, a renowned counterterrorism expert, opines that “ideas, logistics, cash” is gained from the ‘Gulf’ region. Al-Qaeda operatives “provide the chemistry.” Punjabi Taliban “plot the attacks,” while TTP offers “the martyrs.” 107

2. Al-Qaeda-Punjabi Taliban-TTP Nexus’ Strategy and Implications for Pakistan’s Security

Engagement of Al-Qaeda-Punjabi Taliban-TTP Nexus on Multiple Fronts: Al-Qaeda, Punjab-based militants and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) nexus have recognized that they can put Pakistan security forces “at maximum disadvantage” by “engaging them on multiple fronts” to force the army to end operations in FATA.108 Therefore, militants extended their operations in various parts of the country, including Punjab province, Islamabad, Karachi, Quetta and Pakistan administered Kashmir apart from FATA and KPK province. The terrorists strike security forces as well as soft targets that they consider are involved in ‘anti-Islamic

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activities’ such as banks, CD and barber shops, Internet cafés or targets that were ‘easy to hit’ owing to “less stringent security” such as educational institutions, mosques, restaurants, press clubs, markets and even hospitals.109 These attacks not only cause higher civilian casualties but also reflect the ‘growing radicalization in the society.’

Al-Qaeda-Punjabi Taliban-TTP nexus have cooperated and coordinated to strike targets deep inside Punjab province in the wake of Operation Silence. Terrorist and suicide attacks inside Punjab have increased exponentially since the Pakistan military’s operation in Swat and South Waziristan in October 2009. In Punjab only, there had been a total of 33 suicide attacks from August 2007 to March 2010. During these three years, over 600 people have been killed i n suicide attacks and 112 have lost their lives in bomb explosions and other incidents of terrorism.110 In the words of Security analyst Ikram Sehgal, “with the collapse of the Taliban in South Waziristan and Swat, and with them being pushed on the back foot in North Waziristan and Orakzai,” the TTP and Al-Qaeda, “will try to reactivate these cells [in South Punjab] and make them effective.” 111 This development has shifted the “centre of gravity of the war zone from FATA,” more to Punjab in 2009. Pakistani authorities believe that the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009, the unprecedented attack on the military’s General Headquarters in the Garrison City, Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the suicide attack on Special Investigation Agency in Lahore on March 2010 were examples of ‘combined operations’ of this nexus. In Islamabad, Ghazi Force launched several attacks, including attack on Rescue 15 (a police helpline) office in June 2009 and attack on the UN World Food Program office in October 2009. AlQaeda, TTP and ‘Punjabi Taliban’ nexus also target Karachi in ‘joint operations.’ In November 2010, Brigade 313 was reported to jointly launched an attack with the TTP against a police headquarter in Karachi. Similarly, Badar Mansoor and Punjabi Mujahidin in collaboration with TTP carried out the 28 December 2010 bombing at the University of Karachi that wounded four students. 112

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Figure 6.2: Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan (2004- July 2014)

14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Civilians 435 430 608 1522 2155 2324 1796 2738 3007 3001 1083 Security Personnel 184 81 325 597 654 991 469 765 732 676 378 Terrorist/Insurgents 244 137 538 1497 3906 8389 5170 2800 2472 1702 1512

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html (accessed 30 July 2014).

Moreover, Militants extended their operations to Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). On AJK front, two suicide attacks occurred during 2009 and three suicide attacks and two bomb blasts took place in 2010. Al-Qaeda, affiliated ‘Lashkar-e-Zil (Shadow Army, LZ)’ is suspected to be involved in these attacks. According to Syed Saleem Shahzad, LZ comprises TTP, 313 Brigade and foreign militant groups such as Afghan insurgents as well as former Iraqi Republican Guards. 113

Increasing Sectarian and Sub-Sectarian Violence: Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban nexus has been “exploiting sectarian divisions” and cleavages in the country, particularly, Lahore, Karachi and Quetta to “undermine the state’s legitimacy and authority.”114 Between 2001 and June 2013, a total of 3,518 citizens have been killed while 6,261 have been injured in sectarian violence, triple the casualty figure of 1989-2000. 115 The number of sectarian attacks and clashes increased by 90 percent from 80 in 2007 to 152 in 2010; and by 53 percent from 139

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in 2011 to 213 in 2012 (see Figure 6.3). Analysts argue that majority of the sectarian attacks have been carried out by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) which is deeply “inspired by Al-Qaeda’s ideology.”116 But Shiite sectarian group, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, was also involved in most incidents of sectarian violence in different parts of the country.117

It is important to note that Al-Qaeda, the TTP and the LJ held Iran and the Shi’ites responsible for facilitating the US occupation of Iraq and accused them of collaborating with the US against Saddam Hussein. Therefore, the LJ attacked not only Shi’ite targets, but also symbolic Iranian targets. For instance, the TTP and the LJ both have claimed responsibility for the suicide attacks on ‘Al-Quds Day procession’ in Quetta on 3 September 2010. The attack caused 55 people dead and over 200 wounded.118

Beyond Pakistan’s urban centers, TTP and sectarian outfits have “exploited sectarian” rifts in the tribal areas such as Kurram tribal agency to mount the pressure on Pakistan security forces. The ‘Talibanization’ of Orakzai (the agency has 10 percent Shiite population) has played a key role in fueling the sectarian conflict, as SSP and LJ have amalgamated their agendas with the TTP to target the Shiite population there.119

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Figure 6.3: Annual Fatalaties in Sectarian Violence (2007-2012)

2000 250 213 1500 200 152 152 139 150 1000 80 79 100 500 50 0 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Killed Injured Sectarian Attacks and Clashes

Source: “Pakistan Security Report 2012,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, January 2013), p. 24.

Furthermore, the intra-sectarian fault-line (Deobandi-Barelvi) also broke out giving a new dimension to the sectarian conflict. Consequently, the Sunni-Barelvi (whom the AhlHadith/Wahabis and Deobandi Taliban consider ‘as kafir or non-believers’ because Barelvi believe in veneration of Muslim saints, and intercession with Allah by Muslim saints) are also being targeted frequently. In April 2006, in an act of grave provocation, the entire apex leadership of the Barelvi sect was slaughtered by a suicide bomber in Karachi. In March 2009, Taliban blew up the shrine of a 17th Century Sufi poet of the Pashto language, Rehman Baba in Peshawar. On 1 July 2010, more than 45 persons were killed by the two suicide bombers at the shrine of 11th-century saint, Abul Hassan Ali Hajvery, commonly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh, in Lahore. 120 These attacks were widely condemned and increased the rifts between Deobandi and Barelvi sects. It could be argued that the sectarian violence in Pakistan has the potential to be a major disruptive issue to foment instability and shatter people confidence on state’s authority. 121

Militant attacks on Western interests in Pakistan: In the post 9/11 period, there is an increasing tendency to target Western interests which include: attacks on US and Western consulate and embassies, Western businesses, and NATO oil tankers and containers, and the beheadings of kidnapped foreigners. In 2002, Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Alami—emerged from

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HuM—executed a string of attacks in Karachi against Western interests, including the attack on US Consulate in June 2002. On 2 March 2006, a suicide bomber blew up his car near the US Consulate in Karachi, killing four people including an American diplomat, David Fyfe.122 The attack took place a day before the US President George Bush reached Pakistan on his official visit.

Since 2008, attacks on NATO oil tankers and containers are also on the rise in the country. Abdullah Azzam Brigade, a militant group affiliated with TTP, seeks to undermine the USled mission in Afghanistan by carrying out frequently attacks on NATO oil tankers and containers.123 Between 2008 and 2012, 361 attacks were recorded on terminals of companies and oil tankers and containers transporting supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. 124

Figure 6.4: Attacks on NATO Supplies in 2010

Islamabad, 2

FATA, 24

Balochistan, 102 Punjab, 3

KPK, 12

Sindh, 3

Source: “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, January 2011), pp. 56-59.

Militant attacks on Western interests in Pakistan have damaged its political relations with Western countries. For instance, Pakistan and Poland saw a heated tension when Pakistani Taliban abducted a Polish engineer, Piotr Stanczak, in September 2008 near Attock in Punjab province. He was beheaded by militants in February 2009, after talks with the Pakistani government for the release of captured Taliban failed.125 Poland alleged that the militants had the ‘support’ of some Pakistani officials and demanded the arrest of the militants. While Pakistan rejected the accusation, polish government requested help from United States in their

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efforts to apprehend the killers.126 Similarly, Pakistan relations with Denmark faced set back when a suicide bomber with links to Al-Qaeda, blew up an explosive-laden car outside the Danish Embassy in June 2008, killing at least eight persons and injuring 30 others.127

Attacks on Western Foreign Aid Groups in Pakistan: Al-Qaeda-TTP-Punjab based Taliban nexus have also attacked people working for foreign aid groups and NGOs in Pakistan. They issued statements, saying such organizations are working against the principles of Islam by trying to “convert Muslims and employing women.” In 2008, militants killed four Pakistanis working for Plan International, a British-based children development organization that focuses on helping children in District Mansehra in KPK.128

Table 6.1: Suicide Attacks/ Attacks on Western Targets in Pakistan (2001- 2013)

Attacks on Punjab/ Years FATA KPK Sindh Baluchistan Western Islamabad Targets 2001 1 2002 9 2003 1 2 2004 1 4 1 2005 1 1 2006 1 4 1 2007 1 7 2 1 1 1 Jan-Jun Jul-Dec 12 20 10 2 2008 11 34 13 1 1 3 2009 6 51 19 1 2 4 2010 12 26 6 4 3 2011 9 22 3 3 4 2012 11 20 2 3 3 1 2013 9 21 1 4 8 Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute of Conflict Management. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html (accessed 30 July 2014).

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In November 2008, an American worker of USAID, Stephen D. Vance, was shot and killed on his way to work in Peshawar.129 On 10 March 2010, over a dozen militants stormed the office of World Vision International, a US-based Christian charity, assisting survivors of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake in Mansehra (KPK). The attack killed six people including two women.130 Such attacks have greatly hampered aid and development efforts in the poor and backward areas of the country.

Al-Qaeda and Affiliate groups Serious Plots against the West that have roots in FATA: In recent years, militant groups allied with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan-Pakistan border region such as Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), TTP, LT have increasingly plotted attacks against the Western targets outside Pakistan because these militant groups have become “ideologically committed” to Al-Qaeda and “global jihad.” In addition, such attacks “boost their prestige.” Such attacks also sent a message to the government and public of the target country to “review its policies” of engagement in the ‘War on Terror’. 131

It is interesting to note that the TTP has been providing training facilities to Al-Qaeda’s recruiters to carry out attacks in the West. TTP trained a team of eight would-be suicide bombers to attack the subway system in Barcelona. The plan was thwarted in January 2008. A Pakistani Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar claimed in a videotaped interview that “those suicide bombers were under pledge to Baitullah Mehsud” and were sent because of the Spain military’s engagement in Afghanistan.132

The TTP also trained and assisted an American recruit of Pakistani origin, Faisal Shahzad, in his failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square on 1 May 2010. Fortunately, the bomb which was designed to act as a fuel air explosive, was a ‘flop’ and Shahzad was apprehended two days later as he tried to escape for Dubai.133 Similarly, IJU trained the German ‘Sauerland group’ (Two Germans and a Turkish resident in Germany), in 2006 in the tribal area to detonate the US Ramstein airbase in Germany in 2007; however, that plot was thwarted.134

Al-Qaeda is believed to have been involved in July 2005 bombings in London, which killed 52 people.135 According to security officials in United Kingdom (UK), Pakistan “remains most

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vulnerable” due to the “presence of Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries” there. They allege that all seven of those convicted, for the ‘UK fertilizer bomb plot’ to target civilians in London in March 2004, trained in FATA by Al-Qaeda in 2003.136 In a Statement to the House of Commons on 14 October 2009, the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, claimed that “threequarters of the most serious terror plots against the UK have roots in the border and mountain areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” and the major threat to UK “still emanates from AlQaeda and Pakistan.” Gilles de Kerchove, the counterterrorism coordinator of the European Union (EU), argued that after 9/11, “radicalized European nationals and residents are traveling to conflict areas or attending terrorist training camps and returning to Europe.”137

Al-Qaeda, TTP and other affiliated militant groups terror plots against the West have contributed to increasing attention of the international community towards the potential impact of Pakistan’s fragility and instability on regional and global peace and stability. iv. The

Increased Linkages between Narco-Trade, Organized Crime and Terrorism

Various militant groups have joined hands with drug traffickers, criminals, smugglers and timber mafia to finance terrorist acts. Senior intelligence and law enforcement officials reveal interesting data about sources of TTP as shown in the pie chart below.

Figure 6.5: Sources of TTP Funding

Donations & Extortions 30 % 50 % Crimes (Kidnappings & 20 % Bank Robberies etc) Drug/Narco-Trade

Amjad Bashir Siddiqi, “Taliban’s income all termed illegal,” Central Asia Online, http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/0 4/16/feature-02 (accessed 19 April 2010).

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By one UN estimate, approximately, US$1 billion of Drugs trafficked (via Nangarhar-Kunar in Eastern Afghanistan) into FATA annually, that is under the influence of TTP and AlQaeda affiliated groups. Taliban collect ‘toll tax’ from the drug traffickers in order to purchase weapons, and recruit other fighters, and in turn, provide traffickers security.138 According to Pakistani military estimates, Pakistani Taliban collect $200 million dollars annually from drug money.139 Traffickers are also taxed for medical expenses of injured Taliban fighters.140 Taliban also tax on NATO containers. It is reported that militants receive between 2,000-5,000 rupees per truck and per NATO container or oil tanker.141

Taliban operates through a “network of sleeper cells, financers” and supporters across the country that assist TTP to earn money for its activities. Some of TTP funding comes from crimes (including kidnappings, bank robberies and extortions) in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. In 2008, it was reported that TTP kidnapped seventy persons from Karachi and Lahore “as revenue boosting exercise.”142 According to the Federal Interior Ministry, “of the dozen bank robberies that occurred in Karachi in 2009, 80 percent could be traced back to the individuals based in the tribal areas, who are believed to be working for the TTP.” 143 It is estimated that between November 2008 and April 2009 alone, TTP’s network in Karachi generated at least Rs. 250 million through kidnapping and extorting fuel contractors, who deliver fuel for US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.144 These profits help the “TTP carry out its operations and fund organizational management.”145 By one intelligence estimate, over 1000 million rupees have been raised by criminals in Karachi between January 2007 and January 2009 to finance TTP.146

Another source of TTP income comes from smuggling of consumer goods, luxury vehicles, timber, precious minerals and weapons. In recent years, Taliban have been involved in smuggling tobacco products, mainly cigarettes into and out of Pakistan. A Pakistani senior intelligence official reported that almost 15 to 20 percent of the Taliban finances are being borne out through tobacco smuggling. In Khyber Agency, Mangal Bagh, the leader of proTaliban Lashkar-e-Islam, and a rival militant group Lashkar-Ansar (LA) in the same area, collect tax from a notorious drug baron, who smuggles illegally produced international cigarette brands such as ‘Benson & Hedges, Marlboro, Dunhill, 555’ to Afghanistan, though his factory in Bara town of Khyber Agency. Similarly, the illegally produced cigarettes in

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Kohat and Bannu, districts of KPK are smuggled to Afghanistan via Miranshah in North Waziristan. This area is under the control of pro-Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that receives substantial sums of money for providing security to the convoys. 147 The ‘timber mafia’ is also responsible for funding militancy in KPK and FATA. According to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) reports, local Taliban and militant groups affiliated to Jaish-e-Muhammad, operating in District Mansehra and Batagram, obtain financial support from the local timber mafia. The timber and gemstone smugglers in Swat provided active support to the Taliban when the area was under the grip of Maulvi Fazlullah between 2007 and March 2009.148

Al-Qaeda is also said to be involved in colluding with drug traffickers and criminals. It is reported that an Indian national, Dawood Ibrahim’s “D-Company, a 5,000-member criminal syndicate” operating in Pakistan, India and United Arab Emirates presents “an example of criminal-terrorism fusion model.” The United States alleges that D-Company “shares its smuggling routes with Al-Qaeda.”149

B. PAKISTAN’S EXTERNAL SECURITY THREATS On external front, Pakistan faces a three dimensional threat. First, due to the US-led coalition and India’s presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s western borders have become the most insecure. Second, American presence in Afghanistan is aimed at containing China, while Pakistan considers China as a strategic friend. This issue could have possible negative security dynamics for Pakistan. Third, US-Iran tensions could also impact on Pakistan’s security environment. a. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and India’s RAW (Research & Analysis Wing) Covert Operations in Pakistan

US-led ‘War on Terror’ resulted in the increasing clandestine operations in Pakistan by American and Indian intelligence agencies. Many Pakistani observers express concern that taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and Gwadar Port is the real reason for IndoAmerican current “proxy war” in Balochistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. Former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Punjab Chief, Brigadier (r) Mohammad Aslam Ghuman stated that CIA and Xe Services “wish to have complete control over the entire Balochistan, especially

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the Gwadar port, and seize the nuclear assets” by providing “surveillance and support” to terrorist groups such as Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) and TTP in FATA and Swat. 150 Both United States and India are wary of the development of Gwadar Port, envisaged as energy corridor from Central Asia to Indian Ocean via Afghanistan and Pakistan. India’s increased involvement in Afghanistan enables New Delhi to “leapfrog Pakistan and build robust strategic and economic ties with the energy rich states of Central Asia.” India’s ‘great game’ strategy is aimed to “control over land routes to maritime ports” for energy rich Central Asia in order to protect “Indian assets” in this region from Pakistan and China.151 It is in this context that India views the strategic implications of the Gwadar project clearly worrisome. In September 2008, the Indian Defence Review made clear that Pakistan’s disintegration would earn “multiple benefits” for India. These benefits also include denying China to gain Gwadar Port, an objective shared between Washington and New Delhi. He also noted that this would be a “severe jolt” to China’s expanding influence and further “India’s access to Central Asian energy routes will open up.”152

Over 1000 operatives of US Special Forces, CIA, FBI, Xe Worldwide Services and India’s RAW agents are believed to be operating in Pakistan to destabilize Balochistan, FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Lahore and Karachi.153 These spy agencies have infiltrated the militants and are responsible for escalating incidents of terrorism. In May 2003, Pakistan accused that “the Indian consulates in Southern Afghanistan have been supplying money as well as arms and ammunition to the militants that has added to the trouble and violence,” in “North and South Waziristan.” 154 In September 2003, Indian consulate in Jalalabad was attacked in the midst of Pakistan charges that Indian consulates were involved in fomenting instability in Pakistani. In August 2004, Chief Minister of Balochistan, Jam Yusuf stated that RAW had established 30 to 40 terror training camps in Balochistan, and the terrorists were “paid Rs. 10, 000 monthly.”155

Pakistan also believes that “Indian Consulate in the Afghan city of Kandahar was a control room” of terror acts planned by BLA.156 In July 2009, during a meeting at Sharm-al-Sheikh, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani presented a dossier containing ‘proofs’ of India’s involvement in ‘subversive activities’ in Balochistan to Indian Premier, Manmohan Singh. The

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Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that the dossier revealed the details of Indian linkages with the Baloch insurgent leaders, particularly Bramdagh Bugti, Burhan and Sher Khan. Pictures of their meetings with Indian operatives, which also describes Bramdagh Bugti’s visit to India and the meetings he had with RAW personnel, were part of the evidence. 157 A joint communiqué, released after the meeting also stated: “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.” The communiqué was a ‘surprising admission’ of New Delhi’s involvement in the insurgency in Balochistan. 158

According to a military official, Mangal Bagh Afridi, a warlord who heads a relatively small militia called Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber agency, has contacts with RAW in Afghanistan. He revealed that Taliban leader from Mohmand Agency, Abdul Wali was also receiving financial support from RAW cells in Afghanistan.159 RAW has also been believed to support the TTP in FATA by smuggling weapons literature, medical equipment and medicines through Afghanistan. An observer even claims that TTP and BLA active in Balochistan were the “creation of CIA duly helped by RAW.” He went on to say that banned militant groups were encouraged to join TTP. Besides, CIA trained, 3000 ex-Afghan soldiers, were employed in FATA in 2007-08 to prop up TTP and to kill pro-government and antiAmerican tribal elders.160 During a briefing in the National Security Committee session headed by Senator Raza Rabbani, former ISI Chief, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha stated: “The foreign powers are involved in terrorism and destabilization of the country.”161 b. Impact of US ‘China Containment’ Strategy on Pakistan Security Milieu A strategic objective of the US was to turn Pakistan into “a reliable ally east of Afghanistan” because in US strategic thinking, the pivot of geopolitics will move from Kabul to Islamabad in the coming years. In this context, United States would like to handle and turn Pak-China relationship as well as the Iran issue into its favour. 162 Here, US and Pakistan opinions diverge greatly on China. Pakistan views China as a strategic ally in Afghanistan as well as in the region, and “a high-value guarantor of security against India.”163 The US, on the other hand, considers China “as its adversary, or a potential one covertly or overtly” because of China’s emergence as military and economic power. For this reason, “containing China” is a strategic objective of the US. 164 It should be noted that the US intrusion into Asia Pacific as well as

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Central Asia on the pretext of the ‘War on Terror’ is aimed at “strategic encirclement of China.” 165 Most importantly, United States has encouraged India to act as a ‘balancer,’ to the growing Chinese influence in South Asia. So, from Chinese perspective, a potential conflict with the US is looming ahead. 166

Undoubtedly, the US-Indian nuclear deal, the booming Indian economy and the Indo-US robust relationship, first under the Bush administration, and now under Obama administration have set off alarm bells in Beijing to pin India down rather than allow it to develop as a ‘counterweight’ in the region. Therefore, China wants to prevent India from threatening its interests in Afghanistan by backing Pakistan’s strategic interests there. Both China and Pakistan want a stable and friendly Afghanistan which could provide Islamabad safe routes to Central Asian Markets and with a degree of ‘strategic depth’ against India.167 China also wants to minimize Indian influence in Central Asia. In short, Pakistan and China interests converge on the issue of Afghanistan.

China also wants to enhance nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan has signed an agreement with China to build two civilian nuclear reactors at the Chashma Nuclear Complex. For Islamabad, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is essential to overcome growing energy crisis. In addition, such agreement could also restore a strategic balance in South Asia in the wake of 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. For China, the nuclear agreement could further strengthen its relations with Islamabad, at a time of mounting US pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ in the war against terrorism. Moreover, from Chinese perspective, the strategic relationship with Pakistan is crucial to counter growing influence of the US and India in the region. 168 The balance of power in South Asia is shifting at a time when US troops are preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan and India has just elected a Hindu nationalist leader, Narendra Modi, who aspires to achieve larger geo-strategic agenda in the international arena.169 In this context, Pak-China nuclear cooperation alarms United States, which increasingly sees relations between Pakistan and China as a ‘zero-sum game,’ meaning that any gains by Islamabad and Beijing will be a loss for Pakistan-US relations, and by extension will impact negatively on US strategic partner, India’s geopolitical advances in the region.

According to a State Department Official, the “US would vote against any exemption for China to sell two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan”, when it comes before the Nuclear Suppliers

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Group (NSG). The official added: “The NSG runs by consensus, but its decisions have no legal binding on its members.”170 Such clear statements demonstrate that Washington is not willing for an expansion in Pak-China ties at a nuclear cooperation level. Such statements also generate fears in Islamabad that Washington secretly harbours intentions of dismantling Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.171 General Kayani is quoted as saying at a press conference in November 2010, that the “real aim of US strategy is to denuclearize Pakistan.”172 c. Impact of US-Iran Standoff on Pakistan’s Security Milieu The ongoing tension between United States and Iran in the Persian Gulf region has an adverse impact on Pakistan’s external security environment. Pakistan considers Iran a strategic neighbour in the region, whereas the US wants to bring about a regime change in Iran. The US has put Iran under more nuclear related sanctions that are aimed to end its nuclear programme.173 These sanctions would have negative impacts on Pakistan’s energy interests as well. Dr. Zahid Ali provides excellent analysis of the impact of the US-Iran standoff on Pakistan strategic interests. He documents that Iran has great reservoirs of oil and gas; a large portion of Pakistan’s total imports involve purchase of crude oil which stands at 97.5 percent of its total exports to Iran. The escalation of US-Iran tensions in the region will push Tehran to increase the prices of oil or even to stop supply of crude oil to Islamabad which will badly affect Pakistan’s already marginal trade and commercial relations with Iran. Zahid opines that US-Iran standoff may put at risk the construction of the valuable Pakistan- Iran Gas Pipeline project.174

Most importantly, the standoff would beef up Jundullah, an Iranian Sunni militant group, which reportedly enjoys US assistance and cooperation. Washington is supporting this organization in an attempt to foment instability in Iran.175 This group is involved in terror acts inside Sistan- Balochistan, a province in Iran, with a population of Baloch Sunni Muslims. Tehran has repeatedly alleged that Jundullah is being supported by Pakistan on behalf of the US to destabilize the regime in Iran.176 In 2007, in a brutal act of terrorism, Jundullah killed 13 Revolutionary Guards in Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan- Baluchistan. This act of terrorism led to a worsening of relations between Pakistan and Iran. Iranian spiritual leader, Ahmad Khatami openly accused Pakistan of becoming a “sanctuary for terrorists.” He warned: “although Pakistan is our neighbour; little by little it is losing its neighbourly manners.” 177

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Iranian state officials criticize Pakistani security forces of failure to act against Jundallah. Nevertheless, Pakistan gives special importance to its ties with Iran. In 2010, Islamabad aided Iran to capture Abdulmalik Rigi (the head of Jundullah, later hanged by Tehran), which helped easing of tensions in the region. Yet, Jundullah is active and has openly threatened Pakistan- Iran Gas Pipeline project.178 In this context, the ongoing US-Iran standoff is seen with deep concern in Pakistan, as it would imperil Pakistan’s energy security as well as stir up instability in Baluchistan province which shares border with Iran.179

ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

Since 2001, Pakistan has to bear the massive economic costs with the disruption of investments and economic growth of being a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. The cost of the war to Pakistan was estimated at $ 2.669 billion in Fiscal Year 2001-02 180 (Pakistan’s Fiscal Year runs from 1st July till 30th June of the next calendar year.) But the ‘War on Terror’ continued to gain momentum in Afghanistan and spilled over into Pakistan. According to Ministry of Finance, the cost of the war increased from $ 2.669 billion (Pakistani Rupees, Rs. 163.9 billion) in the Fiscal Year 2001-02 and reached $ 6.940 billion (Rs. 434.1 billion) by 2007-8 (48.6 percent change since 2001-2002). The costs continued to rise to $ 9.180 billion (Rs. 720.6 billion) by 2008-09, and $13.560 billion (Rs. 1136.4 billion) during the fiscal year 2009-10 alone. Pakistan’s economy had borne huge costs due to the ‘War on Terror’, with $ 67.926 billion (Rs. 5036.8 trillion) between 2001 and 2011. Pakistan’s economy had borne a total loss of $68.9 billion between 2001 and June 2011 to economy due to the ‘War on Terror’. 181 However, after seven months of the Fiscal Year 2011-2012, this figure was calculated to have risen to $78 billion (Rs. 7 trillion).182 According to State Bank of Pakistan, the country’s economy had been facing a loss of Rs.3 billion every day and Rs.93 billion every month due to the ‘War on Terror’ during the first 46 months of the PPP-led coalition government. As of June 2014, the cost of ‘War on Terror’ to Pakistan’s economy is estimated to have crossed the figure of $102.51 billion. 183

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Figure 6.6: Cost of War (2001-January 2012 in Billion Dollars)

80

60

40

20

0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY0 FY1 FY1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 Billion $ 2.67 2.75 2.93 3.41 3.99 4.67 6.94 9.18 13.6 17.8 9.1

Source: “Economic Survey 2010-11,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011), p. 220; Ansar Abbasi, “Is Pakistan Preparing to Get out of US ‘War on Terror’ ism?” The News, 7 May 2013.

Source: “Economic Survey 2009-10,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2010), p. 7.

The economic costs include damaged inflicted on various sectors of economy and the war’s military expenditures. These costs are categorized into direct and indirect economic costs.

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The total direct costs increased from Rs. 67 billion in 2004-05 to Rs. 262 billion in 2009-10 (cumulative Rs. 712 billion). Indirect costs increased from Rs. 192 billion in 2004-05 to Rs 707 billion in 2009-10 (cumulative Rs. 2,304 billion).184

A. DIRECT ECONOMIC COSTS Direct economic costs include higher expenditure on defence and security which include: war- related wages; spending on high-tech armaments and weaponry; benefits to law enforcement personnel; higher costs of private security; damage to public establishments, infrastructure, machinery and equipment (of the three main economic sectors of agriculture, industries and services); and compensation to war-inflicted population.185 a) Expenditure on Defence and Security

Pakistan’s engagement as frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has particularly contributed to a substantial growth in security related government expenditures. The expenditures on defence and police grew from Rs.177 billion to Rs. 460 billion, at an annual average of 14.6 percent from 2000-01 to 2007-08. But, since 2007-08, security expenditures have risen exponentially reaching to Rs. 805 billion, at the rate of 20.5 percent per annum in 2010-2011.186

Since 2007-08, Pakistan army has been undertaking major military operations in Malakand/Swat, and FATA due to which the negative effects on the economy have greatly increased.187 Such military operations demand specialized training of security personnel for counterterrorism, investment in acquisition of intelligence gathering equipment, and communication systems, specialized weapon light armoured combat vehicles, transport helicopters as well as protected vehicles for movement of logistics and security forces to avoid Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on roads. Consequently, the war has resulted in an increase in the Defence Budget. 188 The total estimated cost of the Swat operation alone exceeds $2bn, half of it coming from Pakistan’s own budgetary resources. 189 The salaries of army personnel, who are taking part in the military operation, were increased from 1 July 2009. Due to increased salaries, the FY 2010-11 saw an increased budgetary allocation by Rs. 70 to 80 billion while non-salary part increased the budgetary allocation by Rs. 100 billion in the wake

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of the ‘War on Terror’. 190 Pakistan has spent an additional US $4 billion since 2007, or 2.4 percent of the average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in security related expenditures.191

According to Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, released by the Finance Ministry of Pakistan in 2010, the government spent Rs. 29.463 billion in 2009 on bolstering security but increased that amount to Rs. 34.526 billion in 2010.192 On provincial level, Punjab’s spending on law and order has outpaced three other provinces, as it stood at Rs. 24.172 billion from July 2010 to December 2010 as documented in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2:- Law and Order related Expenditure (Rs. in Billion)

First half of Federal Punjab Sindh Khyber Balochistan Fiscal Year Government Pakhtunkhwa

(July-December 19 22.358 10.218 7.689 3.469 2009)

(July-December 24.591 24.172 13.012 7.347 3.798 2010) Source: “Rs. 10b more Spent on Law, Order,” Daily News, 11 March 2011.

The province spending on law and order was declined by around 300 million in this period suggesting a slight improvement of law and order following Pakistan’s successful military operations in Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai agency. Sindh and Balochistan also increased their law and order budget due to a rise in sectarian violence and terrorism. b) Damage to Public Establishments and Infrastructure Pakistan suffered heavy losses in infrastructure like bridges, roads, girls’ schools, police stations and check posts and official buildings due to its engagement in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan suffered a loss of $1.72 billion in physical infrastructure in Fiscal Year 2010-2011 only.193 In Malakand Division, health facilities and water supply schemes have been “fully or partially damaged” during the military operation inflicting huge losses to infrastructure.194 Moreover, heavy containers and oil tankers carrying supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan have badly damaged the highways in Pakistan. According to former Communications Minister, Arbab Alamgir Khan, NATO and ISAF vehicles caused Rs. 15 billion worth of damage every

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year to national highways. The total damage to highways over the past decade (2002 to 2011) was estimated at Rs. 150 billion.195 c) Compensation to War-inflicted Population The compensation to the victims of bomb blasts and suicide attacks has put extra burden on government’s finances, thus increasing the fiscal deficit and causing economic losses. For example, the government gave out an amount of Rs. 321.571 million in one year as compensation to the victims of terror acts.

Table 6.3: Compensation to Victims of Terrorism (March 2008-March 2009)

Provinces Compensation Punjab Rs. 107.375 million KPK Rs. 40 million to the affected civilians and Rs. 99.5 million to the affected police personnel Sindh Rs. 0.670 million Balochistan Rs. 46.076 million Source: Asma Ghani, “1, 842 terror strikes claimed 1,395 lives,” The Nation, 18 April 2009.

B. INDIRECT ECONOMIC COSTS Indirect economic costs include: opportunity costs such as loss in potential GDP, reduction in foreign investment, fall in stock market capitalization, rising trade deficit and costs to local economies. Other indirect costs include decline in tourism, job opportunities, rise in insurance costs and dealing with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 196 i. Decline in GDP Growth The growth and investment in Pakistan have stalled to a great extent, as a result of the negative effects of the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan’s economy grew from 4.7 percent in FY 2002-03 to 5.5 percent in FY 2006-07 averaging 6.5 percent GDP growth. Nevertheless, since the beginning of 2008, an overall sense of uncertainty, violence and terrorism has slowed down domestic economic activity.

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Figure 6.8: Decline in GDP (FY02-FY12)

10

8

6

4

2

0 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 GDP 4.7 7.5 9 5.8 5.5 5 0.4 2.6 3.7 4.4 3.6

Source: “Economic Survey 2010-11,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011), p. 6; “Economic Survey 2012-13,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2013), p. 2. ii. Reduction in Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, which saw a great boost since FY 2003-04 was badly affected by the ‘War on Terror’. The FDI inflows in Pakistan declined considerably from $5.4098 billion in 2008 to $3.7199 billion in 2009. FDI inflows in Pakistan also declined to $1 billion during July-December 2009, a decrease of 56.9 percent, as against $2.4 billion in July- December 2008.197 The FDI experienced this decline due to Pakistan military operations in Swat and South Waziristan and the resultant wave of suicide bombings and violence in the country. The FDI inflows gradually declined from $2.1508 billion in 2010 to $0.8126 billion in 2011-12.198 This indicated a fall of over 62 percent in just three years

The economic situation further worsened when ‘travel advisories’ had been issued against Pakistan by United States and other major allies. Such actions by the US-led coalition have resulted in a reduction in the number of foreign ‘intending investors.’ 199

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Figure 6.9: Decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FY01-FY11)

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Source:http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180&I emid=137 (accessed 4 March 2013). iii. Growing Trade Deficit Pakistan, over the years, has been caught up in the trade deficit cycle. The trade deficit from 2002-03 was only between $1 and $ 2 billion; however it touched $20 billion in 2007-08 and $16 billion in 2009-10 200 and it stood at a massive $21.27 billion during 2011-12.201 The trade deficit during July-February (2012-13), was recorded at $13.187 billion and $12.542 in July- February (2013-14). The huge war costs reduces trade “by changing the pattern of important macro-economic variables” such as FDI, hence, indirectly widening the trade deficit. Besides, the flow of FDI after 2001 increased but to “safe and non-tradable sectors” such as oil, gas and services sectors. In other words, the FDI “start working in enclaves” and has failed to bolster manufacturing sector and trade.202 In addition, the export sector, with a contribution of 12 percent to GDP, and a substantial employment base, has faced the brunt of the fall out due to loss of export orders, higher shipment, and insurance and security costs, thereby increasing the trade deficit.203 iv. Costs to Local Economies

The ‘War on Terror’ has adversely impacted the local economies, particularly, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The industrial sector was badly hit due to worsening law and order situation in the province. According to Zulfiqar Ali Khan, the Vice President Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry about “2,254 industries were operational” in KPK before the war but “1,660 industries have been closed so far, due to the ongoing war against terrorism.” 204 He

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further revealed that due to closure of industries in KPK, the labour force working in the industrial units has also been reduced to 40,000 from 84,000.205 The cost of war estimate during 2010-11 included exports $2.90 billion, and industrial output $1.70 billion.206

Similarly, the militancy and the subsequent operation in Swat valley put dents in its fruitbased economy. Swat is a “centre of fruit orchards [and] multi-utility processing industries, cold storages, huge dry storages and an efficient transportation and marketing” system. Normally, 500 to 600 trucks transport fruit from Swat to the rest of the country during the harvest season daily. But 55 to 70 percent of the total fruit produce lost or wasted in Swat during 2007-2009 due to militancy and the subsequent military operations.207 v. Decline in Tourism Pakistan has also suffered significant economic losses in tourism due to its engagement in the ‘War on Terror’. For example, Swat valley, which emerged as a popular tourist resort, suffered badly. According to Asian Development Bank and World Bank reports in 2009, ‘War on Terror’ caused huge financial damage to the hospitality industry: 60 hotels were damaged out of 500 hotels in Swat/Malakand Division. In addition, majority of an estimated 40,000 persons, associated with the tourism and ancillary industry in Swat and Malakand, lost their jobs due to the war. 208 As a result, domestic tourism industry was badly hurt.

Moreover, Pakistan Cricket Board also suffered huge losses in terms of revenues collection due to the law and order situation in Pakistan. On 17 April 2009, Pakistan was removed as a co-host to the February-March 2011 Cricket World Cup due to “uncertain security situation” prevailing in the country. Cricket matches, which were to be played in Pakistan shifted to other co-host countries (India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). Earlier, the Cricket Champions Trophy, which was also to be held in Pakistan during September-October 2008, shifted to Eight-Nation event to South Africa by the International Cricket Council due to rising incidents of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan Cricket Board Marketing department stated that it lost about 27 million euros as revenues, since 2008 due to the ‘War on Terror’. 209 The impact of the war on the tourism industry is expected to be ‘much higher.’ vi. Cost of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

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Pakistan has had to spend up to $600 million a year on rehabilitation of IDPs, who fled Pakistan military operations in FATA and Swat.210 In 2007-08 alone, Pakistan spent Rs. 2 billion on IDPs. The majority of those displaced in 2009 were affected by the Operation Righteous Path in Swat and Malakand Division. By the end of 2009, most IDPs had returned to Swat. Nevertheless, ongoing and newly initiated military operations in different agencies of FATA have led to “new waves” of IDPs.211 In June 2013, an estimated 1.1 million IDPs have been registered with the KPK provincial government.212 According to FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), the total number of IDPs in the wake of the Zarb-e-Azb operation in NWA, has reached 0.8 million (800,000).213 vii. Loss of Employment and Increase in Poverty

The growing spending on security consumes major chunk of financial resources which are meant to alleviate poverty. Every year 2.5 million Pakistanis are entering the job market. To provide jobs to the new entrants, the economy must grow at the rate of 7-8 percent per annum. But the economic growth is in downward spiral due to worsening law and order situation, declining investment and a severe energy crisis, so, the people have failed to get jobs, resulting in massive unemployment and poverty.214

In its poverty reduction strategy papers-II, the Finance Ministry revealed that the pool of the unemployed has grown in the war-torn areas, which resulted in increase in rural poverty. The report stated that poverty had reached 37.5 percent in 2008-09 from 23.9 percent in 2007-08 (16.4 percent increase in one year).215 According to World Bank report, entitled World Development Indicators (WDI) 2013, sixty percent of Pakistan’s population is living below poverty line with 21 percent of Pakistan’s population lives below $1.25 per day.216

In Swat valley, rate of unemployment is still high due to instability in the area. It should be noted that the female education was prohibited by the militants during their control in Swat. In addition, more than 42 percent of boys’ schools were also destroyed in Swat. According to some estimates, nearly 150,000 students were deprived of education, while eight-thousand female teachers lost their jobs due to the insurgency between 2007 and 2009.217 viii. Risk to

Food Security in Pakistan

According to Pak-US Business Council report (2009), due to law and order situation and political uncertainty in Afghanistan, “a large quantity of Pakistani food items/commodities is

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smuggled to Afghanistan, which ultimately leads to acute food grain scarcity within the country.”218 ix. Loss in Tax Collection, Inflows of Privatization and Swelling Budget Deficit

The ‘War on Terror’ upsets trading activities with sizeable increase in the cost of international trade because insurance cover has jumped up; economic growth has sharply declined, import demand has shrunk with subsequent decline in tax collection. Inflows of privatization also dropped considerably.

Figure 6.10: Cost of War Estimate during Fiscal Year 2010-11

3

2.5

2

1.5 $ Billion 1

0.5

0 Expenditure Cost of Tax Collection Privatization Overrun Uncertainty 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.9

Source: “Economic Survey 2010-11,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011), p. 220. In addition, increase in Pakistan’s credit risk has made borrowing from the money market very difficult, due to which spread on Pakistan’s ‘sovereign bonds’ have gone down.219 Pakistan’s budget deficit has increased to a record Rs. 510 billion, and debt liabilities reached Rs.10, 700.5 billion, 59.3 percent of GDP in 2010-11.220 During 2011-12, budget deficit has jumped to Rs 1,761 billion (8.5 percent of the GDP) 221 and public debt increased to Rs.12, 667 billion (61 percent of the GDP).222 This increasing debt could lead to default or to higher borrowing costs and hence, hyperinflation. In sum, Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has plunged the country deeper into recession and has slowed down its economic progress.

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CONCLUSION Pakistan’s decision to be a ‘frontline’ state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has had profound impact on its political, strategic, and economic interests. The post-9/11 developments in the region have brought onto the scene the global power, United States; and the regional power, India, to exert their respective influence for their own ends, thereby constraining Pakistan’s ability to act. With the removal of Taliban regime, Pakistan “lost its ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, which provided Islamabad “more clout in its dealings with India.”223 In fact, the war allowed Afghan, Indian and American spy agencies to sponsor terrorism and separatism inside Pakistan territory.

On the internal front, the most serious fallouts from Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led war are the growing political instability, the increasing radicalization of segments of Pakistani society and deleterious effects upon Pakistan’s internal security. Religious radicalization of segments of society has now broken out of traditional tribal areas and some areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and is affecting the entire country particularly South Punjab and Karachi. Besides, the suicide bombers spread across Pakistan and the key military and civilian installations becoming vulnerable targets. Between 2002 and August 2014 Pakistan has experienced 400 suicide bombings, an average of 28 suicide bombings annually. In these suicide attacks, 6038 people have died and 12565 injured.224 In effect, Pakistan’s endorsement of the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’ has spurred new cooperation between Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban. This nexus not only threatens Pakistan’s domestic stability but also started to turn up outside Pakistani territory, in Afghanistan, in India and in Western countries to target their interests. This has adverse impact on Pakistan’s genuine political and strategic interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Kashmir. The British premier David Cameron, during his visit to India in July 2010, accused Pakistan of promoting the “export of terror, whether to India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”225 Such statements show “an emerging international discourse that looks at Pakistan as a country hopelessly degenerating into anarchy and therefore, justifying, eventually, external military interventions.”226

But this discourse totally neglects Pakistan’s tremendous contributions in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan’s commitment is demonstrated by the “silent troop surge” in the war from 60,000 in

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2001-2003 to 140,000 in 2009 and 150,000 in 2014; significantly more than the 100,000 troops committed by 43 countries in Afghanistan. The war has cost Pakistan US $102.51 billion between 2001 and June 2014.

The above analysis shows that the key to Pakistan’s stability is democratic consolidation, alleviating of Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan and economic recovery, which in turn, to a large extent depend on peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, the US-led military campaign has failed to bring peace and security to Afghanistan and has further aggravated the security situation in the region. Pakistan will remain vulnerable on political, security and economic fronts as long as Afghanistan remains, a “rickety balance of power system rather than a state.” 227 Based on these facts, the next chapter will conclude this study and put forward policy recommendations on political, security and economic fronts to bring peace, stability and prosperity in Pakistan and the region.

END NOTES

1 These interests include: preserving military influence over Pakistan’s security policy; maintaining a strong budget’ and shielding an extensive network of economic organizations run by retired military officers. Teresita C. Schaffer, “US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), pp. 177–178; Military-linked commerce accounts for about “4 percent of GDP.” Its total marketable “assets are worth some $4 billion and with realestate, the value “exceeds $20 billion.” Ayesha Siddiqa argues that “with such extensive interests at stake, the armed forces are bound to seek to institutionalize its role in the country’s politics.” Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s military economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2. 2 Aqil Shah, “The Transition to ‘Guided’ Democracy in Pakistan,” in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 215-216. 3 Official results of referendum put turnout at 71 percent, with 97.5 percent approval; independent observers estimated turnout at 10 percent. See “Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?” Asia Report No. 40 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 October 2002), p. 20.

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4 LFO empowered General Musharraf to dismiss the elected government in consultation with a military dominated National Security Council, dissolve the national assembly, appoint military Services Chiefs and approve appointments to the superior judiciary.’ See Aqil Shah, Op Cit., p. 216. 5 National Security Council was created under LFO, in order to “serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the state; and matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony.” See Ihtasham ul Haque, “NSC Set up: Powers to Sack Govt Restored,” Dawn, 24 August 2002. 6 Shahid Hussain, “Musharraf Empowers Himself,” Gulf News, 22 August 2002. 7 Saleem Shahid, “Amendments to Give Martial Law Permanence,” Dawn, 24 August 2002. 8 Shaun Gregory and James Revill, “The Role of the Military in the Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 16, No.1 (March 2008), pp. 39-61. 9 The six-party alliance brought together the Pashtun-dominated Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S) led by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq; Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the nonsectarian Islamic party; Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), a Barelvi party led by Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani; Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH), a Saudi-influenced Ahl-Hadith party led by Sajid Mir; and the Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP), a Shiite party formerly known as Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP), led by Allama Sajid Naqvi. See Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier (Arlington: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008), p. 48. 10 “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” ICG Asia Report No. 216 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 12 December 2011), p. 5. 11 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 218. 12 These Islamic parties emerged from ‘different Islamic backgrounds’ and held separate stance on how to enforce Sharia in Pakistan. See Farhana Ali, “US–Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 4 (June 2007), p. 5. 13 Stephen Cohen, Op Cit., p. 219. See also “Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?” Op Cit., p. 5. 14 Raheem ul Haque, “Strategic Depth: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?” Research & News Quarterly, No. 11-13 (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy & Governance, Forman Christian College University, April 2011), pp. 11-12. 15 Joshua T. White, Op Cit., p. 48. 16 Heidi Kjaernet and Stina Torjesen, “Afghanistan and Regional Instability: A Risk Assessment,” NUPI Report, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008), p. 8. 17 Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2007), p. 74. 18 Manjeet S Perdesi, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at the Islamabad’s Red Mosque,” in Sumit Ganguly and C. Christine Fair (ed.), Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 94-95. 19 Magnus Norell, Op Cit., p. 74; Aqil Shah, Op Cit., p. 216. 20 Manjeet S Perdesi, Op Cit., p. 94.

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21 Shaukat Qadir, “Still an Uncertain Future,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2011), p. 167. 22 Following the state of emergency declared, the “1973 constitution of Pakistan was suspended till the end of the PCO.” Higher judiciary “was required to take new oath of office under the PCO. Most of the judges were suspended as they declined to do so.” 23 Mark Schneider, Senior Vice-President of International Crisis Group, in his testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on Pakistani elections argues: “Even the text of his ‘Proclamation of Emergency’ cites terrorism alone in only two of twelve substantive clauses. In the other ten, Musharraf complains about Pakistan’s then-independent judiciary.” See Mark L. Schneider, “Pakistani elections: Will they be fair and free or fundamentally flawed?” Testimony by to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 20 December 2007; Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2007/schneider-testimony-to-the-us- housecommittee-on-oversight-and-government-reform-on-pakistans-elections.aspx (accessed 5 May 2008). 24 “After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan,” ICG Asia Report No. 74 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2 January 2008), p. 8. 25 Mark L. Schneider, Op Cit. 26 Ashok K. Behuria, “From Fragmentation to Coalition: End of General Musharraf’s Politics?” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1 May 2008), p. 335. 27 “The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan,” A Report by Pakistan Policy Working Group, (Washington: United State Institute of Peace, September 2008), p. 10. 28 Ashok K. Behuria, Op Cit., p. 333 29 Khalid Aziz, “Pakistan’s Dilemma in FATA,” The News, 16 September 2008. 30 Talat Masood, “Civil-Military Relations and the 2007 Elections in Pakistan: Impact on the Regional Security Environment,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2007), p. 54. Civil-military relations are not just one of many “structural problem of an overly centralized political system” faced by Pakistan. In fact, “civil-military relations are central to and inseparable from center-province relations, internal political stability, the prospects of warfare with India, nuclear security and proliferation, and terrorism.” See for details C. Christine Fair, “Addressing Fundamental Challenges,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Pakistan’s Future, Op Cit., p. 200. 31 See Moeed Yousuf, “Assessing US Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 5 May 2011, p. 12. In February 2008, General Kayani, ordered the Pakistan Election Commission (PEC) and civil and military bureaucracy to dismantle the then-President Musharraf’s elaborate infrastructure, thereby ensuring fair and free elections. Additionally the military removed a certain number of soldiers from civilian bureaucratic posts. In March 2009, Kayani “stepped in to arbitrate between the government and the lawyers’ movement thereby reinstating more than 60 judges dismissed by Pervez Musharraf.” Such interventions helped establish General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani as “upholder of the rule of law.” See Tarique Niazi, “Is the Military Still in Charge in Pakistan?” Foreign Policy in Focus, 14 December 2010. 32 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “At the Brink?” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., p. 195. 33 Shauqat Qadir, “Still an Uncertain Future,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., p. 167. 34 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Op Cit., p. 195. 35 Shauqat Qadir, Op Cit., p. 161. 36 Tarique Niazi, Op Cit. 37 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004), p. 336. 38 In March 2007, General Musharraf sacked the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, “on charges of nepotism and misconduct.” It was believed that “the action was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment to his continued roles as president and Army Chief, given Chaudhry’s rulings that exhibited independence and went contrary to government expectations.” Worse still, Justice Chaudhry started “investigations into the thousands of people who had ‘disappeared’ within Pakistan’s massive security apparatus” since Pakistan joined the war on terror. In July 2007, “the Supreme Court unanimously cleared Chaudhry Iftikhar of any wrongdoing and reinstated him to office.” In November 2007, Musharraf dismissed the Chief Justice again “to secure his continued rule.” See Abhishek Kaicker, “Pakistan and Democracy: Before and After Musharraf,” (Toronto: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, November 2007), pp. 7-8.

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39 Broadly, the Musharraf-Bhutto political deal envisaged: (1) Musharraf gets re-elected by the present parliament and state assemblies (2) Bhutto’s PPP will make notional and token protests but not oppose. (3) Musharraf on being re-elected would dissolve the assemblies and put a caretaker government in place for three months for fresh elections to take place (4) Musharraf would then get an endorsement from the new assemblies to continue as President in uniform till 2013 (5) Bhutto would be brought into political power on India’s Sonia Gandhi pattern – since she cannot become PM for a third time (due to Musharraf’s 17th amendment of Constitution), her nominee would become PM whereas actual political power would be exercised by her. See Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Pakistan: Democracy Doubly Betrayed by Benazir Bhutto,” SAAG Paper No. 2220, South Asia Analysis Group, 28 April 2007; http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2220.html (accessed 5 June 2008). 40 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan Sifts through Election Aftermath,” Asia Times, 21 February 2008. 41 Matthew J. Nelson, “Pakistan in 2008: Moving beyond Musharraf,” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 1 (January/February 2009), p. 27. 42 Aqil Shah, “Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 74-80. 43 Omar Waraich, “How a US Aid Package to Pakistan could Threaten Zardari,” TIME, 8 October 2009; Ikram Sehgal “No Easy Strategy,” The News, 1 July 2010. 44 Jane Perlez, David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan,” New York Times, 30 November 2010. 45 Declan Walsh, “Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari ‘Prepared for Assassination’,” The Guardian, 30 November 2010. 46 Dr. Saeed Shafqat, “Social and Political Transformation of Pakistani Political Elites,” Report of a talk delivered at the Gymkhana Club on the 4 June 2008, Cited in Research & News Quarterly, No. 2- 3 (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy & Governance, Forman Christian College University, October 2008), p. 12. 47 Harsh V. Pant, “India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jun 2010), p. 140. 48 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Quandary–Part II,” Yale Global, 15 April 2009. See also “India: Afghanistan’s influential ally,” BBC News, 8 October 2009. 49 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 82. 50 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan,” The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 6 July 2009. Christine Fair confirmed that the Indian mission in Zahedan (Iran) is “pumping money into Balochistan.” See Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is past prologue?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 2008), p. 220. 51 “India: Afghanistan’s Influential Ally,” Op Cit. 52 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood,” Special Report 1621 (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 16. 53 Quoted in Shibil Siddiqi, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: History and Geopolitics in a Regional and International Context: Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy,” (Toronto: Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2008), p. 34. 54 “Line a ‘Settled Issue’, Says Pakistan,” Dawn, 26 October 2012. 55 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era” Carnegie Paper No. 72 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2006), p. 7. 56 At a detailed briefing at the Pakistan XI Corps Headquarters in Peshawar, while Pakistani officials produced British maps, the Afghans instead produced Russian maps of [Pakistani-Afghan] border, both maps having different delineations.” See “Afghanistan-Pakistan: Focus on Bilateral Border Dispute,” See Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) News, 30 October 2003. 57 Shibil Siddiqi, Op Cit., pp. 34-35. 58 “Mr. Karzai can’t have it Both Ways,” Daily Times, 12 March 2006. 59 See Khalid Aziz, “FATA: Internal Security and Pakistan’s International Obligations,” A talk delivered by Khalid Aziz to the Conference on, “Rule of Law and Democracy in Pakistan: The Road to the Future,” (Marriot, Islamabad: Organized by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), 17 June 2008).

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60 Declan Walsh, “WikiLeaks Cables Reveal Afghan-Pakistani Row over Fugitive Rebel,” The Guardian, 30 November 2010. 61 Imran Mukhtar, “Kabul Fomenting Baluchistan Unrest,” Nation, 4 August 2012. 62 Apoorve Shah, “Pakistan’s Time in the Shadows,” Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2011; Stephanie Flamenbaum and Megan Neville, “Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks,” Peace Brief 98 (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), p. 3. 63 Tayyab Siddiqui, “Peace and Kashmir,” The News, 12 January 2010. 64 “India doesn’t Want to Talk on Kashmir,” Daily Times, 12 February 2010. 65 Stephanie Flamenbaum and Megan Neville, Op Cit., p. 3. 66 Shibil Siddiqi, Op Cit., p. 42. 67 “What’s the Problem with Pakistan?” Report of Roundtable Discussion, Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2009. 68 The Indian ‘Cold Start strategy envisages “moving Indian forces without any warning or mobilization into unpredictable locations at high speeds against Pakistan seeking to defeat Pakistan by achieving total surprise at both the strategic and the operational levels, striving for a decision before the US or China could intervene on Pakistan’s behalf.” A hypothesis is that “rapid operations would prevent India’s civilian leadership from halting military operations in progress, lest it have second thoughts or possess insufficient resolve.” See Ikram Sehgal, “Stabilizing Af-Pak,” The News, 6 May 2009. 69 Apoorve Shah, Op Cit; See also Najam Sethi, “Time to Talk,” Friday Times, 12 February 2010. 70 Mariana Babar, “The Pindi Manifesto,” Outlook India, 1 March 2010. 71 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan,” Middle East Report, Vol. 39, No. 2 (July 2009), p. 20-21. 72 “LeT, Hizb vow to intensify jihad against India,” Economic Times, 25 March 2010. 73 Graham Usher, Op Cit., p. 20. 74 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p. 60; Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan under Siege,” Foreign Policy, 16 October 2009. 75 Raheem ul Haque, Op Cit., p. 14; See also Asif Shahzad, “Pakistani Militancy Spreads to Country’s Heartland,” Associated Press, 16 June 2010. 76 Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Punjabi Taliban,” Dawn, 9 July 2010. 77 Raheem ul Haque, Op Cit., p. 11; After the October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, these “camps came into the spotlight and were easily identified by the NATO relief missions.” Therefore, the army dispersed the Kashmiri militants. See Khalid Aziz, “FATA: Internal Security and Pakistan’s International Obligations,” Op Cit. 78 Omar Waraich, “Why Pakistan Must Widen Hunt for Militant Base,” TIME, 13 October 2009. 79 Majeed Babar, “Why are Pakistan’s Militant Groups Splintering?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 5 October 2011; See also Zulfiqar Ali and Pazir Gul, “Differences Crop up among Waziristan Militant Outfits,” Dawn, 16 September 2011. 80 Claudio Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 289. 81 Robert M Cassidy, War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011 (Virginia: Marine Corps University Press, 2012), pp. 70-71. 82 Ibid., p. 71. According to Khalid Aziz, Pakistan’s military Kalusha operation in March 2004 in South Waziristan “purported to challenge ‘Melmastia’ offered by Wazirs to foreign Uzbek and Arab guests. It ought to have been handled differently. This failure indicated to the Wazirs that the leadership lacked the will to deal with them.” Khalid Aziz, “Pakistan’s Dilemma in FATA,” The News, 16 September 2008. 83 The Shakai agreement (April 2004) and Sararogha peace deal (February 2005) in South Waziristan and North Waziristan accord in September 2006 emphasized the central government’s powerlessness vis-à-vis the militant groups and the power of JUI-F, which played a key role in negotiation. In all the accords tribal leaders “pledged to ensure that militants will not move across the Pak–Afghan border or attack Pakistani military.” Heidi Kjaernet and Stina Torjesen, Op Cit., p. 9. 84 Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Taliban Consolidate Control in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, Issue 7(June 2008), pp. 7-8; Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda: The Threat from Tribal Pakistan,” in Usama Butt (ed.), Pakistan’s Quagmire: Security, Strategy, and the Future of the Islamic-Nuclear armed Nation (New York: Continuum International, 2010), p. 169; Robert M Cassidy, Op Cit., p. 72.

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85 Khalid Aziz, “Prospects of Peace and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 20 June 2008; http://www.khalidaziz.com/art_detail.php?aid=109 (accessed 2 May 2009). 86 Muhammad Amir Rana. Op Cit; See also “Pakistan Security Report 2007,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), 2008), p. 16. 87 Magnus Norell, Op Cit., p. 78. 88 See Joshua T. White, Op Cit., p. 56. 89 Hassan Abbas, “Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency,”(Washington: New America Foundation, April 2010), p. 7 90 N Ilahi, “The Existential Threat: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al- Qaeda in Pakistan?” in Usama Butt (ed.), Op Cit., p. 133. 91 N Ilahi, Op Cit., p. 72. See also “The Pakistani Taliban: Falling out,” The Economist, 27 August 2009; “Mullah Omar stays most of the time in Pakistan: Petraeus,” Daily Times, 5 December 2009. 92 313 is the number of Muslim fighters in ‘the Battle of Badr,’ fought on 13 March 624 A.D. against 1000 members of Quraish of Mecca, in the times of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him). 93 “The word ‘Punjabi Taliban’ first used by people of tribal areas for non-Pashtun militants belonging to different jihadi groups headquartered in Punjab, who came there for either taking refuge or fighting the security forces by joining hands with local militants.” See Zia Ur Rehman, “Punjabi Taliban in Crosshairs of Karachi: Officials,” Central Asia Online, 15 December 2011; Available at: http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/main/2011/12/15/feature-01?mobile=true (18 December 2011). 94 “Sectarianism Strikes at the Top” Daily Times, 31 May 2004. 95 Raheem ul Haque, Op Cit. p.11. 96 Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 141. 97 Simon R. Valentine, “We are the Soldiers of Islam”: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the ideology of Terror,” in Usama Butt (ed.), Op Cit., p. 234. 98 Ryan Clarke, Op Cit., p. 143. 99 See Animesh Roul, “Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue: 28 (July 2010), pp. 4-6. 100 Al-Qaeda’s media wing ‘Al-Sahab’ released a videotape on 11 July 2007, showing Dr. Ayman AlZawahiri’s brief address titled “The Aggression against Lal Masjid” that called upon Pakistani people to wage jihad to take revenge of Operation Silence. See Amir Mir, “US Homes in on Al-Qaeda’s New Head,” Asia Times, 9 July 2011. 101 Raheel Khan, “Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban Forge Strong Connection,” Central Asia Online, 1 March 2010; Available at: http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/03/01/feature-01 (accessed 4 May 2010). 102 Zaffar Abbas, “Khwaja’s Murder Points to Home Truths,” Dawn, 3 May 2010. 103 Junoodul Hafsa operates out of Ghaljo area of the Orakzai Agency and the adjacent Hangu district and targets security forces and military installations in parts of KPK, Punjab and Islamabad. See Zia Khan, “The Fission of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” The Express Tribune, 17 November 2010. 104 Animesh Roul, Op Cit. 105 Daniel Byman, “Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Analysis Paper No. 4 (Washington: Brookings Institution, February 2005), pp. 125-126. 106 In October 2009, Pakistani security forces captured Iqbal and Gul Muhammad, “allegedly two high- ranking Punjabi Taliban,” who were also purportedly “members of the TTP’s shura.” See Raheel Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (March 2010), pp. 8-9. 107 Kaustav Chakrabarti, “Taliban Spreads into Pakistan’s Heart,” Rediff.com, 13 February 2009; See at: http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/feb/13guest-taliban-spreads-into-pakistans-heart.htm (accessed 6 May 2009). 108 Jonathan Paris, Prospects for Pakistan (London: Legatum Institute, January 2010), pp. 39-40; See Khalid Aziz, “Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province & Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” (Peshawar: Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, 2007), p. 13.

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109 The suicide bombings targeting the campus of International Islamic University in Islamabad and Meena Bazaar Peshawar in October 2009, the National Bank of Pakistan in Rawalpindi in November 2009, the Moon Market in Lahore in December 2009 and civil hospital in Quetta in April 2010, are a few cases in point. “Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal; http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm (accessed 31 May 2010). 110 Zaffar Abbas, Op Cit. 111 “Punjabi Taliban; A Growing Threat,” Dawn, 30 May 2010. 112 Raheel Khan, Op Cit., p. 7. See also Omar Waraich “Why Pakistan Must Widen Its Hunt for Militant Bases,” Op Cit; Animesh Roul, Op Cit; Zia Ur Rehman, Op Cit. 113 “Pakistan Security Report 2009,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 2010), p.16. See also “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 2011), pp. 12-13; Raheel Khan, Op Cit. 114 Ahmed Humayun and Aly Jiwani, “Pakistan’s Brewing Sectarian War,” Foreign Policy, 26 May 2011. 115 Available at: “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm (accessed 30 June 2013). 116 According to Sindh’s Crime Investigation Department (CID), the LJ is the biggest group operating in Karachi and of 246 militants arrested from the city since 2001, 94 belonged to LJ. See “The Fission of Lashkar-e- Jhangvi,” Op Cit. 117 “Pakistan Security Report 2012,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, January 2013), p. 25. 118 B. Raman, “Attacks on Shias in Pakistan, a Message to Iran too,” International Terrorism Monitor, Paper No. 674 (3 September 2010). Available at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4019.html (accessed 12 September 2010). 119 Raheel Khan, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Orakzai,” (Washington: New America Foundation, September 2010), p. 6. 120“Sufi Shrine ‘Blown up by Taliban,” BBC News, 5 March 2009; “Data Darbar Attack,” Dawn, 3 July 2010. 121 Ahmed Humayun and Aly Jiwani, Op Cit. 122 “Karachi Hit by Terror Attack, Four Killed: US Diplomat among Dead, 54 Injured,” Dawn, 3 March 2006. 123 Salman Masood, “Oil Truck Explosion Kills at Least 15 in Pakistan,” New York Times, 21 May 2011. 124 “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 2011), pp. 56-59. See also “Pakistan Security Report 2012,” Op Cit. p. 29. 125 Ibid; ‘Taliban demanded the release of militants including Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was found guilty of conspiring to kill American Journalist Daniel Pearl.’ 126 “Poland Asks US to Help Find Killers,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 2009. 127 Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for this attack in Islamabad and confirmed that attack was an answer to the reprinting of Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten’s blasphemous degrading drawings of Prophet Muhammad [Peace Be Upon Him] in February 2008, as well as the presence of Danish troops in Afghanistan. See “AlQaeda Claims Attack on Danish Embassy,” Reuters, 4 June 2008. 128 “Pakistan Attack Kills Aid Workers,” The Guardian, 10 March 2010. 129 Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Taliban Say They Killed Polish Contractor in Pakistan,” New York Times, 7 February 2009. 130 “Pakistan Attack Kills Aid Workers,” Op Cit. 131 Paul Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West,” (Washington: New America Foundation, February 2010), p. 22. 132 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the terrorist threat,” Bipartisan Policy Center Washington (10 September 2010), p. 12 133 Benjamin Weiser and Colin Moynihan, “Guilty Plea in Times Square Bomb Plot, New York Times, 21 June 2010. On 1 September 2010, the United States declared the TTP a terrorist organization and charged their current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, with conspiracy to murder American citizens. See Spencer S. Hsu and Greg Miller, “US Government Charges Pakistani Leader Hakimullah Mehsud in CIA Attack,” Washington Post, 1 September 2010. 134 “Four jailed over plot to attack US bases,” Associated Press, 4 March 2010.

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135 “Tributes paid at 7 July memorial,” BBC News, 7 July 2009; Dean Nelson and Emal Khan, “AlQaeda Commander Linked to 2005 London bombings led Attacks on NATO Convoys,” The Telegraph, 22 January 2009. 136 Paul Cruickshank, Op Cit., p. 3. 137 Peter Finn and Greg Miller, “EU Cites Nationals Training in Terror,” Washington Post, 30 September 2010. 138 United Nations, “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” (New York: United Nations Publications, 2010), p. 249. See also See Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability: A National Net Assessment,” (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2011), pp. 101-102. 139 Shahan Mufti, “Funding the Pakistani Taliban,” Global Post, 7 August 2009. 140 Key traffickers such as Haji Juma Khan, an ethnic Baloch, paid hefty amounts to Taliban for “protection of its labs [in Quetta] and supply routes.” he is now in custody of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). See Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman, Op Cit., pp. 101-102. 141 Ibid., p. 62. 142 Simon R. Valentine, “We are the Soldiers of Islam: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Ideology of Terror,” in Usama Butt (ed.), Op Cit., p. 240. 143 Amjad Bashir Siddiqi, Op Cit. 144 Ryan Clarke, Op Cit., p. 98. 145 Amjad Bashir Siddiqi, Op Cit. 146 Huma Yusuf, “Launch Point for Mumbai Attacks, Karachi Faces Rising Militancy,” The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 2009. 147 Farzana Shah, “Taliban Thrive on Tobacco Smuggling,” The Nation, 19 July 2010. 148 Kamila Shamsie, “Pakistan’s Floods are not just a Natural Disaster,” The Guardian, 5 August 2010. 149 The UN has “added Ibrahim to its list of individuals associated with Al Qaeda.” See John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler et al., International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, US Policy, and Considerations for Congress (Darby: Diane Publishing, 2010), pp. 15-16. 150 “Xe behind Baloch Insurgency, Terror Hits,” The Nation, 14 March 2011. 151 Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein, “India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs (1 October 2009), p. 133 152 Andrew Gavin Marshall, “Imperial Eye on Pakistan: Pakistan in Pieces, Part 1,” Global Research, 28 May 2011; http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25009 (accessed 30 May 2011). 153 Asif Haroon Raja, “Get rid of CIA Network,” Pakistan Observer, 14 March 2011. 154 Aparna Pande, Op Cit., p. 84. 155 Ibid; “RAW Camps in Balochistan,” Dawn, 31 August 2004. 156 Hamid Mir, “India and the Baloch Insurgency,” The Hindu, 28 July 2009. 157 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Proof of RAW Involvement in Terror Acts given to India” Dawn, 22 July 2009. 158 “India-Pakistan Joint Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 16 July 2009. Available at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/July/INDIA.htm (accessed 23 July 2009). 159 Personal Communication with a Senior Military Official, (Peshawar), 15 November 2011. 160 “Proof of India’s Involvement in Militancy Found,” Dawn, 3 November 2009. 161 “Foreign Powers Behind Terrorism: DG ISI,” Samaa News, 8 July 2010. 162 “Pak-US Strategic Dialogue: Implications for Bilateral Relations,” Seminar Report of Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad (7 April 2010), p. 3; Cited in Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue,” Regional Studies (Islamabad), Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Winter 201011), p. 15. 163 Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, July 2010); See at: http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070 (accessed 3 August 20100. 164 Sujian Guo, China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 153. 165 Ibid. See also Michael D. Swaine, “China and the “AfPak” Issue,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 31 (Winter 2010), p. 6. 166 Andrew Small, “China’s Caution on Afghanistan—Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010), p. 86. 167 Ibid; Michael D. Swaine, Op Cit., p. 2.

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168 Sharad Joshi, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal: A Realpolitique Fait Accompli,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 11 December 2011; Available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-pakistannuclear- deal-realpolitique-fait-accompli-1/ (accessed 14 December 2011). 169 “Army Tells Nawaz No More Talks with Taliban, Takes Matter in Its Own Hands,” The News, 24 May 2014. 170 “US to vote against China-Pak nuclear deal at NSG,” Times of India, 23 July 2010; “Pakistani plans include seven 1,000-megawatt PWR plants from China. However, to supply 600- or 1000-megawatt reactors, China would have to get approval of the Western companies that have licensed the technology to China. However, with China developing its own nuclear technology that may not be an obstacle for too long.” See Charles K. Ebinger, “Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict?” (Washington: Brookings Intitute, 2011), pp. 80-81. 171 “Elite US Troops Ready to Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks,” The Times, 1 January 2010. 172 Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, “US Efforts Fail to Convince Pakistan’s Top General to Target Taliban,” Washington Post, 31 December 2010. 173 Humera Iqbal, Op Cit., p. 15. See also “New Iranian ‘entities’ under UN sanctions,” BBC News, 9 June 2010. 174 “Apart from oil, the US has many vital concerns in the Persian Gulf region like countering terrorism, eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring the stability of friendly states primarily Israel, its close ally in the Middle East.” Obama administration “sees Iran’s current regime and nuclear programme as the main impediment in its long-standing objectives in the region.” For details see Dr. Zahid Ali Khan, “US post 9/11 Persian Gulf Policy: Iran’s concern and options,” IPRI Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Islamabad: Islamabad Research and policy Institute, Winter 2011), pp. 57-58. 175 Ibid. 176 Raja Karthikeya, “Jundullah a Wedge between Iran, Pakistan,” Asia Times, 7 August 2009. 177 “Iranian Cleric Says Pakistan becoming a ‘Sanctuary for Terrorists,” Daily Times, 3 March 2007. 178 Raja Karthikeya, Op Cit. 179 Ibid. See also Dr Zahid Ali Khan, Op Cit., pp. 56-57. 180 This calculation was based on the assumptions that: (i) The War in Afghanistan that begun on 7 October 2001 will end swiftly by December 2001: (ii) normalcy will resume from January 2002; (iii) the Taliban government will be ousted and some low intensity fight will continue but life in Pakistan will remain normal; and (iv) the additional increase in freight cargo and war risk premium will be removed. See “Economic Survey 2010-11,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011), p. 219. 181 “Economic Survey 2010-11,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011), p. 220. 182 Ansar Abbasi, “Is Pakistan Preparing to Get out of US War on Terrorism?” The News, 7 May 2013. 183 Sardar Sikander Shaheen, “Pakistan Lost Rs 8,264 Billion in ‘War on Terror’,” Daily Times, 3 June 2014. 184 “Economic Survey 2009-10,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2010), p. 7. 185 Göran Lindgren, “Measuring the Economic Costs of Internal Armed Conflict: A Review of Empirical Estimates,” Paper for the conference Making Peace Work in Helsinki, arranged by The United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (4–5 June 2004), p. 6. 186 “Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review 2009-10,” (Karachi: Social Policy & Development Centre, 2010), p. 21. 187 Sohail Ahmed, “Pakistan’s economy Hit Hard by War on Terror,” Central Asia Online, 18 June 2010. http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/06/18/feature-01 (accessed 5 October 2010). 188 “In 2009-10, Pakistan’s revised Defense Budget was approximately Rs. 378 billion, while proposed allocation for 2010- 2011 is Rs 442 Billion showing an increase of 16.5 percent.” See Dr. Huma Mir, “Pakistan’s Defence Budget 2010-11,” Pakistan Observer, 13 June 2010. 189 Najam Sethi, “Pakistan’s Afghanistan Paradigm,” The Friday Times, 5 February 2010. 190 Mehtab Haider, “Defence budget Likely to go up by Rs 130 bn,” The News, 22 February 2010. 191 Sohail Ahmed, Op Cit. 192 Khurshid Ahmad, “Pakistan amidst ‘Financial Emergency’,” Weekly pulse, 21 January 2011. 193 “Economic Survey 2010-11,” Op Cit., p. 220. 194 “Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan,” Op Cit., pp. 75-76. 195 “NATO Vehicles Caused Rs15bn Damage to Highways,” Dawn, 29 December 2011.

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196 Göran Lindgren, Op Cit., p. 6. 197 “Investment in Pakistan 2011,” available at: http://investinpakistan.pk/pdf/IG_2011/Part1.pdf (accessed 4 May 2011). 198 http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180&Itemid=137 (accessed 24 June 2011). 199 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Global War on Terror: Pakistan’s Contributions,” (Islamabad: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 2009), p. 8. 200 Owais Ehsan, “Pakistan Foreign Trade Statistics: 1984-2010,” Available at: http://www.propakistan.com/2010/06/12/foreign-trade-statistics-2010/ (accessed 24 June 2010). 201 Tariq Sayeed, “An Outlook on Pakistan’s Trade Deficit,” Business Recorder, 18 December 2012; Imaduddin, “Trade Deficit Shrinks 4.89 Percent in 8 Months of FY 2013-14,” Business Recorder, 11 March 2014. 202 Syed Hasanat Shah et al., “The Causality and Economic Impact of FDI Inflows from Trade Partners in Pakistan,” MPRA Paper 35645 (Munich: University Library of Munich, Germany, 2011), p. 14. 203 “Economic Survey 2009-10,” Op Cit., pp. 7-8. 204 Imran Ali Kundi, “Terror War Dents NWFP Industry; 1,660 Units Closed,” The Nation, 9 March 2010. 205 Ibid. 206 “Economic Survey 2010-11,” Op Cit., p. 220. 207 Arshad Ali, “Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan,” (Bradford: Pakistan Security Research Unit, 11 April 2010), p. 4. 208 Some of the famous hotels in Swat such as the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC) Hotel at Malam Jabba, Pamir Hotel, and Rock City Hotel at Fizzagut received extensive damage before and during the military operation. See “Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment: Pakistan North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” Asian Development Bank and World Bank, 30 November 2009, pp. 7-64. 209 “Pakistan Counts Cost of Cup Shift,” BBC News, 18 April 2009. 210 Shahbaz Rana, “Myth vs. Reality: US Aid to Pakistan Dwarfed by Economic Cost of War,” The Express Tribune, 20 March 2011. 211 This displacement included “Bajaur (over 220,000 people), Mohmand (over 180,000), South Waziristan (428,000), Khyber (56,000-100,000), Kurram (128,000), Orakzai (200,000).” See Christopher Rogers, “Civilians in Armed Conflict: Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest Pakistan,” (Washington: Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, 2010), p. 36. 212 See North-West Pakistan: Massive New Displacement and Falling Returns Require Rights-Based Response,” Report by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council (June 2013), p, 1. 213 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “North Waziristan IDPs Figure Reaches 800,000,” Dawn, 8 July 2014. 214 Dr. Ashfaque H Khan, “Bad Inheritance,” The News, 2 July 2013. 215 Cited in “War on Terror Costs Pakistan $35 Billion: Reports,” Business Recorder, 24 May 2009. 216 The international poverty line is two dollars a day or an income of Rs. 200 per day. Zaheer Abbasi, “60 Percent Population Living Below Poverty Line: World Bank Report,” Business Recorder, 19 May 2013. 217 Arshad Ali, Op Cit., p. 11. 218 “War on Terror Costs Pakistan $35 Billion: Reports,” Op Cit. 219 Sohail Ahmed, Op Cit. 220 Khurshid Ahmad, Op Cit. 221 Imran Ali Kundi, “Deficit Balloons to Rs. 1,761 Billion,” The Nation, 1 September 2012. 222 “Debt Policy Statement 2012-13,” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, February 2013), pp. 4-6. 223 Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), A History of Pakistan and Its Origin (London: Anthem Press, 2002), p. 267. 224 “Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan,” Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm (accessed 30 August 2014). 225 “Pakistan must not be allowed to promote export of terror, says David Cameron,” The Guardian, 28 July 2010. 226 Marco Mezzera and Safiya Aftab, Pakistan State–Society Analysis (Hague: Clingendael Institute, January 2009), p. 36.

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227 “Afghanistan and Regional Geopolitical Dynamics after 11 September,” The National Intelligence Council (Washington), Conference Proceedings (18-19 April 2002), p. 4.

Chapter – 07

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In the post 9/11 period, Pakistan has been at the frontline of the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’ to combat Al-Qaeda and affiliated militant groups in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and mainland Pakistan to stabilize Afghanistan and the region. The impact of the war on Pakistan is detrimental. Internally, the country is at the risk of sliding into a period of political instability. It is caught in an expanding economic crisis and is riven by extremism, sectarian violence and terrorism. On external front, the post-9/11 developments have brought

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the US-led coalition, India and pro-India Northern Alliance on Afghanistan stage to exert their respective influence for their interests, thereby constraining Pakistan’s ability to maneuver in Afghanistan and the region. This development has led Pakistan to transform its Afghan policy. To that end, Islamabad has shown its willingness to support Afghan-led reconciliation process and renewed American efforts for negotiating with Afghan insurgents. This ‘strategic shift’ in Afghan policy entails safeguarding Pakistan’s interests more vigorously, and these security interests revolve significantly around emerging US-India nexus in Afghanistan and will continue to shape the ‘AfPak’ region in the future. 1

The peace and stability in the ‘AfPak’ region requires a US response to Pakistan’s security concerns due to its centrality in the Afghan conflict. In this regard, ignoring Pakistan security concerns and letting it destabilize by ill-crafted US strategy towards Pakistan will have implications for its “destructive potential,” which include: sizeable youth with unemployment, vulnerable economy, political instability, growing militancy and terrorism. On the other hand, “well crafted” US political, diplomatic and security policies can benefit Pakistan enormously and help it to emerge as a stable and responsible state.2 But to achieve these objectives, Washington needs to stop viewing its relations with Islamabad through the lens of Al-Qaeda and Taliban. In other words, American interests go well beyond the ‘War on Terror’ in the ‘AfPak’ region. Therefore, an effective and durable US-Pakistan relationship could be developed on “more than transactionalism.”3

Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ has had an enormous impact on Pakistan’s political, strategic and economic interests, on the evolution of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies and on US-Pakistan relationship. This chapter will detail the potential challenges relating to preserving the basic fabric of the US-Pakistan partnership. The next part will evaluate Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy objectives and its policy to pursue these objectives in the framework of the ‘War on Terror’ since 9/11. This part will identify that in the post-9/11 scenario, Pakistan finds itself engaged in a ‘delicate balancing act’ between internal and external security threats and challenges. It will also assess constraints and limitations of Pakistan’s ‘balancing act’ in the ‘War on Terror’. The chapter will conclude by outlining as to how US-Pakistan engagement can be reoriented and offer policy recommendations towards a long-term, robust and stable US-Pakistan relationship.

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EVOLVING US-PAKISTAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

US-Pakistan engagement in the post 9/11 period has been strongly shaped by the ‘War on Terror’. Although President Obama promised to build an effective and enduring relationship with Pakistan, Islamabad has a growing feeling of disenchantment with the ill-crafted policies of Washington. Several trends and challenges beyond the capacity of Pakistani state will likely have an impact for Pakistan’s precarious path and its future policies which include: the US engagement with Pakistan and South Asia; India’s rise under American strategic umbrella in Afghanistan and the region, US-India nexus’ aggressive stance towards China and Beijing’s ultimate position towards Islamabad, the evolving US policy towards Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan, Washington’s approach towards Pakistan internal security and its nuclear programme, US budget concerns or policy shifts and the resultant aid cut for Pakistan, and the growing anti-Americanism across Pakistan. Each of these dimensions will be briefly reviewed.

a) US Engagement with Pakistan and South Asia The first major challenge Islamabad is facing in its engagement with Washington is the US policy in the South Asian region. American efforts to assist India to become a world power create anxiety in Pakistan. In this context, US-India cooperation to minimize Pakistan’s influence and primacy in Afghanistan has the potential to derail Pakistan’s campaign against militants. From Islamabad’s perspective, the US policies are bleak with regard to regional stability in South Asia as these policies ignore Pakistan’s legitimate security interests.4 United States may face an angry backlash from Pakistani policy makers, if it continues to ‘tilt’ towards India vis-à-vis Kashmir dispute and Afghan conflict.

Pakistan’s objectives regarding its eastern border are based on to deter an Indian conventional threat while at the same time alter the status-quo in Kashmir to ensure the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan.5 But the repeated US declarations that fighting Al- Qaeda is a “vital interest” prompt India to exaggerate Kashmiri insurgents’ links to Al-Qaeda, thereby legitimating her state terror tactics in Washington’s eyes. This Indian strategy has negative fallout on Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri people’s ‘right of self-determination’ in the post 9/11 scenario. In other words, without the resolution of Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan would remain in a “state of perpetual tension,” thereby preventing Islamabad to shift

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its focus from eastern border to its western border with Afghanistan in the battle against terrorism.6

More worrisome, United States wants to strategically position India in Kabul to contain both Pakistan and China. In this connection, India has gained strategic foothold for the post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan—when US and NATO forces are scheduled to exit—with a Strategic Partnership Agreement that was concluded on 4 October 2011 with US sanction. The agreement avows to strengthen trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. Most importantly, under the agreement, “India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF].”7 Though ISAF has transferred security responsibilities to 352,000-strong ANSF in all parts of Afghanistan, but Afghan security forces are unlikely to combat insurgents by 2014, when the US combat troops withdrawal is to be completed.8 From Islamabad’s perspective, this agreement jeopardizes Pakistan’s position in Afghanistan because Afghan security personnel trained by India will have a “natural affinity” towards New Delhi and it will pose ‘two-front threat’ to Pakistan in any future conflict with India.9 On the other hand, United States declines to encourage Pakistan’s offers to train Afghan security forces. Therefore, Pakistan sees the Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement through the lens of US-India nexus in Afghanistan.

The agreement was signed against the backdrop of US accusations over Pakistan’s persistent support to Haqqani network and Afghanistan’s allegations of Pakistan’s connection in the assassination of top-peace negotiators including ex-Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani.10 Following the assassination of Rabbani, President Karzai stated that Kabul will forge closer ties with the United States, European Union and India rather than negotiating with Pakistan- based Taliban. Pakistan fears that India will become “a larger player” in the Afghan reconciliation process as Kabul and New Delhi has signed a strategic agreement.11 In fact, to minimize Pakistan’s influence in any future political setup in Afghanistan, both United States and India sought to open up direct channels for talks with some Afghan Taliban in order to curtail Pakistan’s role in the future Afghan political negotiations. Pakistan’s military officials believe that Washington is deliberately implementing this strategy to neutralize or marginalize Pakistan. India now seeks “a bigger role” in the process of Afghan negotiation process.12

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According to a commentator, the Obama administration, which is struggling to bring Pakistan on board over the issue of negotiations with Afghan Taliban, can use the Indo-Afghan agreement as “an additional pressure point on Islamabad— to be part of the Afghan stabilization project or be left out in the cold as a trouble maker.” 13

A strong lobby in the US has suggested a powerful role for India in stabilizing Afghanistan. A prominent proponent of this option, Christopher Hitchens, who advocates siding with India, stated that Indians “have the same enemies as we do, they were supporting the Northern Alliance before we were, [and] they will always be there long after the Taliban have gone.” 14 Such calls have irked Islamabad, which demands the opposite.15 On the other hand are those that caution against such approach. Friedman opines that United States will need Pakistan to prevent an “intercontinental Al-Qaeda from forming again” in Afghanistan. Pakistan also sees this as being in its national interest. Interestingly, he argues that the US engagement with Pakistan may be used to “balance India while retaining close ties to India.”16 Michael O’Hanlon challenges the notion that New Delhi could be

“a substitute for Pakistan and calls this approach “an unwise gamble.” He notes that if Kabul continues to minimize Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, “the most probable outcome would be Islamabad waging a full-blown proxy war.” 17 It could be argued that if US prefers to go down that road in post-2014 Afghanistan, the whole region would be destabilized.

Apart from US policy to inject India into Afghanistan to minimize the role of Pakistan in that country’s geopolitical landscape, the US-Indian nuclear deal and the overall strengthening of relationship with India is also a vital component of American strategy to contain “more military, aggressive, forward-looking” China, which Pakistan regards as an all-weather friend. In a major policy speech in Indian city of Chennai on 20 July 2011, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pushed for a leadership role of India in Asia. She articulated: “India has the potential to positively shape the future of the Asia-Pacific.” On US policy towards Pakistan, She remarked: “Pakistan must do more to tackle terror groups operating from its territory being used for attacks that destabilize Afghanistan or India.”18

India and the US have moved significantly closer since then, undermining US-Pakistan ties. In June 2013, the visiting US Secretary of State, John Kerry described India as a “key partner” of the US “rebalance” in Asia and called for New Delhi to play a central role in the next Afghan

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elections in 2014.19 Nevertheless, whenever Washington and New Delhi “drew closer together,” Pakistan responded by getting even closer to China to counter Indo-US moves in the region. 20 US-Pakistan animosity in the wake of Bin Laden’s killing in May 2011 in Pakistan Garrison City, Abbottabad, could be tempting for Islamabad to move away from Washington and get closer to Beijing.21 Such shifts could result in a “four-power ‘Great Game’” with the emergence of two competing power blocs in South Asia, with the United States and India on one side, and China and Pakistan on the other. As a result, each block will strive to counter other block’s influence in South Asia. Unfortunately, if it happens, it will not be a happy prospect for the region. 22 b) The Evolving US Policy towards Afghanistan and Its Impact on Pakistan The US strategic partnership with India is not the only challenge that will influence Pakistan’s domestic and external affairs, the US policy towards Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan is also a crucial issue. Islamabad resents US ‘AfPak’ policy because Pakistan and Afghanistan are treated as though these are identical countries. It is not the case, however. As argued by General Musharraf, “Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized. Pakistan is not.” Moreover, there is an Indian factor and Kashmir struggle in the whole game.23 After 9/11 US tried to ‘de-hyphenate’ Pakistan and India, treating them as if they had no ties with each other. This ignored a variety of historical, cultural and geopolitical factors which connect the two countries. This strategy resulted in an incoherent policy towards Afghanistan. Removing the ‘War on Terror’ lens from Indo-Pak landscape could provide an opportunity to examine Afghan conflict as well as Kashmir issue.24 Several factors relating to US policy towards Afghanistan are important as described below.

De facto partition of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan Issue: First, Pakistan suspects that Washington has plans to have a ‘de facto partition of Afghanistan.’ Robert Blackwill, the US Ambassador to India, during 2001–2003 argued that the counterinsurgency strategy of the Obama Administration in ‘AfPak’ region would not succeed, given the increasing momentum and expansion of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Alternatively, he advocates “a de facto partition of Afghanistan along ethnic lines and pulling back NATO forces” to the northern Afghanistan. The US-led coalition together with Afghan army will ensure to prevent Taliban control of the north and west of Afghanistan. Hence, the Taliban would be “confined to the

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Pashtun dominated south and east” of Afghanistan. In this divided Afghanistan, United States would make sure that it would target Al-Qaeda anywhere with the help of drones, interdict Taliban incursions across Durand Line and end safe havens in FATA.25

According to a commentator, the US appears committed to the plan of administratively dividing Afghanistan into two halves; i. The north and the west region ii. The south and the east region. In this connection, “US had covertly supported Presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah in the 2009 election and is still busy strengthening him.” He hints that the US wants to “set up resistance within Eastern and Southern Afghanistan against the Taliban through distribution of money to buy up loyalties.”26 Saleem Safi mentions that “the US will incite the Taliban against Pakistan to teach Islamabad a lesson” for its support to Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The US would call the Taliban movement as a Pashtun-nationalist movement. Eventually, it will also urge Pashtun nationalists to side with the Taliban to establish a separate Pashtun state (Pashtunistan). 27

A ‘de facto partition of Afghanistan’ by the US-led coalition forces will increase ‘existential threat’ to Pakistan. Pakistan army will be over stretched to control the momentum of the Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas and Swat valley caused by the US operations against Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. Should a partition take place; it would result in the demand of Pashtun on either side of Durand Line to establish a separate Pashtun state. It will threaten the security of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, the Pashtun populated areas of Pakistan.28 It seems that India is also on board with the US for the ‘de facto partition’ of Afghanistan. A report in Indian Defence review concluded:

“A partitioning of Afghanistan into a Pashtun held South and East and a nonPashtun North and West will inevitably lead to the merger of FATA and KPK into a larger Pashtun homeland. The outcome will be strategically benefited for India.”29

‘Safe Havens’ for Pakistani Militants in Afghanistan: Islamabad has accused that Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, is allegedly providing sanctuary to Maulvi Fazlullah and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces of Afghanistan.

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Maulvi Fazlullah fled Pakistan military operations in Swat while Maulvi Faqir, Taliban commander of TTP-Chapter in Bajaur agency, escaped Operation Lion Heart (Bajaur) to Afghanistan.

The series of attacks in Upper Dir, Kurram Agency and Mohmand in June-July 2011 by a large number of militants especially supporters of Maulvi Fazlullah and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad is a case in point. Pakistan believes it to be the responsibility of ISAF/ NATO and the Afghan army to stop such raids into its territory. It is surprising to note that a militant group comprising 400-600 men could cross the border without being detected by the reconnaissance facilities of the US and Afghan army.30 It could be argued that such raids may have a tacit approval of Afghan and NATO forces. As opined by the then Information Minister of Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa Province, Mian Iftikhar Hussain that “NATO is either incompetent or complicit with the infiltrators.” 31

Up till now, the cross border raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan are on the increase. A report in The Express Tribune quoted a senior Pakistani official of the Defence Ministry, saying that US-led coalition forces established a Coalition Special Operation Force (CSOF) in Kunar and Nuristan to directly and indirectly attack security forces and civilians in the border areas of Pakistan.32 If NATO and Afghan forces failed to curb the cross border movement of Maulvi Fazlullah and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and their fighters, Pakistan security forces could intervene to stop them, escalating the border tensions. The continuity of such attacks will have the potential to destabilize the border areas and to strengthen Pakistan’s perception that the US has plans for a ‘de facto partition’ of Afghanistan.

Haqqani Network and End State for Afghanistan: Pakistanis are deeply concerned by the fact that Washington failed to bring about a sustained and successful strategy to stabilize Afghanistan.33 Pakistan does not want to see an “unenforceable” political configuration after NATO withdrawal in 2014 that will lead to increase political instability. Pakistan wants to avoid a scenario in Afghanistan where its own fragile internal security receives a further jolt from its western borders. This means that Pakistan must be “constructively involved” in any process of dialogue between Afghanistan, United States and Afghan insurgents.34 In this regard, Pakistan considers Haqqani network an important player in any negotiations to end the conflict and has kept “communication lines” with the group open. That is why, when Pakistan

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military launched its long-awaited operation against militants in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014, several press reports claimed that the Haqqani group militant were allowed to leave North Waziristan before the offensive began.35

Pakistan’s role to bring Haqqani network as stakeholders in the Afghan reconciliation process poses challenges for the US, given that the network “has been more important to the development and containment of Al-Qaeda and the ‘global jihad’ than any other single actor or group.”

Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton told Reuters in October 2011:

“We view the Haqqanis and other of their ilk as…..being adversaries and being very dangerous to Americans, Afghans and coalition members inside Afghanistan, but we are not shutting the door on trying to determine whether there is some path forward.” 36

It remains to be seen whether or not Haqqani network might reconcile with Washington and Kabul but concern for Islamabad at this point is, that whether the Haqqanis reappear in North Waziristan after the operation Zar-be-Azb is concluded. If this happens, Washington may take a unilateral action against the Haqqani network which would be enough to bring USPakistan relations to breaking point.

US Long-Term Security Presence in Afghanistan: Pakistan is deeply concerned about the US plans to keep long-term security presence in Afghanistan. In an interview with The New York Times, the US Commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen stated that “We would probably see some number of advisers, trainers, intelligence specialists here for some period of time beyond 2014.” 37 A US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is concluded by the new Afghan government in 2014, provides for a long term American military presence in Afghanistan. In this regard, Islamabad has expressed concern over Article 6 of the pact which deals with “external aggression” against Afghanistan.38 The “external aggression” is seen by Pakistan as presenting danger of unilateral strikes into its territory against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Earlier, David Sanger, in a June 2011 report in New York Times, quoted Bruce Reidel that the US needs Afghanistan as a “base to strike targets in Pakistan.” 39

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Islamabad is concerned that US long term military presence in Afghanistan will provide an excuse for the militants to continue their militant activities in that war-torn country and beyond. Hence, it has been unwilling to allow the US forces to retain long term security presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s firm stance on this issue is manifested when Pakistan refused to issue visas to a large number of CIA officers and closed the US drone base in Shamsi in the wake of 26 November 2011 NATO attack on Salala Check post in Mohmand agency, which killed 28 Pakistani troops and injured 13 others.40 Afghan Taliban also insist on the full withdrawal of all foreign troops as a pre-condition to becoming part of a political settlement in Afghanistan.41 c) US Approach towards Pakistan Internal Security The US covert intelligence and operations network in Pakistan has penetrated deep into the militant landscape. This network aims to create fissures in various militant groups and pit one group against another and against Pakistani security forces to achieve US covert objectives in Pakistan. On 27 January 2011, the acting head of CIA in Pakistan, 42 Raymond Davis killed two Pakistanis in Lahore, who were working for the ISI and chasing Davis because he “had crossed red lines.”43 The “debriefing” of Davis through two months of interrogation in Lahore shocked Pakistani army about the devastating consequences of the CIA’s clandestine operations in Pakistan. A senior police official revealed that “Davis’s job was to trail links of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda” in Pakistan. But investigations reveal that instead, Davis had established “close links” with twenty-seven extremists from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashka-e-Jhangvi. He was involved in “recruiting young people from Punjab for the Taliban to fuel the bloody insurgency” to give credibility to the American notion that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of extremists. 44 The ISI responded to such threats by restricting intelligence cooperation with United States. 45

The Davis episode lends credence to Pakistan’s military fears that US has plans to seize the nuclear weapons if these are “judged” to be “at risk” of falling into the hands of Al-Qaeda operatives or insiders from Pakistan’s security apparatus.46 Pakistan’s concerns were heightened following the US assault that killed Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011. After the Abbottabad attack, General Kayani called General Khalid Kidwai, who commands the Strategic Plans Division (SPD),47 to discuss the “additional steps” General Kidwai took to prevent any US pre-emptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Kidwai promised to “redouble efforts to keep his country’s weapons far from the long arms of the Americans.”48 The Army’s

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Corps Commanders in their 138th meeting also reaffirmed that, “unlike an undefended civilian compound, our strategic assets are well protected and an elaborate defensive mechanism is in place.”49

Moreover, Pakistan’s enhancement of its nuclear arsenal in order to deter India’s strategic and conventional capabilities has the potential to challenge testy relationship with Washington. Pakistan views that the “discriminatory” Indo-US nuclear deal will ultimately “degrade Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence” and therefore, opposes President Obama’s fresh drive to negotiate over the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of new Fissile material.50 Pakistan’s determination to build its fissile material set alarm bells ringing in United States. The Washington Post reported in January 2011 that Pakistan’s possesses more than one hundred nuclear weapons. The newspaper also revealed that Pakistan’s deployed weapons total more than those of India.51 d) US Budget Concerns or Policy Shifts US budget constraints or policy shifts vis-à-vis Pakistan might prompt Obama administration to reduce US expenditures and cut down aid programme in Pakistan, thereby frustrating Pakistani people. As tensions between Pakistan and the US on the issue of North Waziristan operation are on the rise, and as the US itself caught in its staggering debt crisis, the future of the US assistance programme to Pakistan seems increasingly uncertain. In November 2011, the US State Department issued a Status Report on Civilian Engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan which noted that US Congress has slipped back its 2009 commitment to “triple nonmilitary aid to Pakistan over five years.” The document noted that Civilian aid to Pakistan decreased from $1.5 billion in 2010 to $1.09 billion in 2011 and the aid programme in future remains “uncertain”, but reaffirmed that Obama administration is committed to “robust, multi- year civilian assistance to Pakistan.”52

There have been many proposals to make US aid to Pakistan “conditional” on more cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’. In August 2011, Wall Street Journal reported that these conditions are divided in four areas or “baskets.” These baskets included: obtaining of information from Osama’s residence in Abbottabad, cooperation in US-led campaign in Afghanistan, joint action against militants and terrorists, and “in improving the overall tone” in relationship, with each category having detailed ‘to-do’ lists. 53

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The US also wants Pakistan to ‘do more’ to stop the flow of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across its border into Afghanistan. On December 2011, the US Congress voted to cut Pakistan’s military assistance by $700 million until Congress gets “assurances” that Pakistan is supporting the US efforts to stop the spread of IEDs that Afghan insurgents are effectively using against US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials, on the other hand, declared that the aid cut shows that American “interests extend so far as its own foreign policy goals” and could lead to “renegotiate our terms of engagement” with the US. 54

Many US officials also argue that the aid cut deepens the perception in Islamabad that the US commitment of “establishing a broad strategic partnership with Pakistan is losing support” within Washington. In reality, from the US side, monetary assistance has long been upheld as the sign of American commitment and support to Pakistan. And while the real impact of aid on the economy remains invisible, symbolically a cut off in aid signals to Pakistanis “a US desire to pull back from the partnership.” Most US lawmakers contend that Washington is unwilling to “pull the plug on Pakistan in the immediate future.” The US frustration and complaints may continue and grow but these will not lead to freeze the overall assistance. 55 US officials are aware of the fact that multilayered US sanctions imposed between 1990 and 2001 “harmed US interests more than they curbed Pakistani behavior.” This shifts the “onus of political will and creativity from Islamabad to Washington.”56 e) Anti-Americanism across Pakistan Finally, a major issue complicating Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and broader US-Pakistan partnership is the growing and pervasive ‘anti-American sentiments’ across Pakistan due to misplaced US policies towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan witnessed a wave of anti-American feelings with the arrest and thereafter release of CIA Director in Pakistan, Raymond Davis, who gunned down two Pakistanis in Lahore. The rising anti-Americanism was reinforced by the drone attack in Dattakhel, North Waziristan, just a day after Davis’ release, which killed civilians. These sentiments further grew when the US Navy SEALS unilaterally raided in Abbotabad to kill Osama Bin Laden in May 2011. By and large, Davis, Drones and bin Laden cases emphasize the “simmering undercurrents” in US- Pakistan relationship.57 The main challenge for Islamabad is: how to keep a balance between preserving partnership with Washington and dealing with growingly anti-US sentiments in the

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country?58 It remains to be seen whether Pakistan is capable of rising to this challenge, but there is no doubt that anti-Americanism has the potential to adversely affect US-Pakistan partnership. It can be argued that the US has to share the blame for the current anti-US campaign in Pakistan. The CIA has been working closely with the ISI to cooperate in OEF since October 2001, but on the other hand, the US intelligence and security officials view the ISI with utmost suspicion as underscored by the US officials’ secret memos.59 Inter-Services Intelligence’s “characterization” by the US officials as a “terrorist organization”, has given most Pakistanis quite a shock.60 The accusations that Pakistan is ‘not doing enough’ to destroy militant sanctuaries provide ample ammunition to the anti-American feelings in Pakistan. Pakistanis view such accusations with deep suspicion and allege America of blaming their country to conceal for its failed strategy in Afghanistan while showing no gratitude of the contributions made by Pakistan in the ‘War on Terror’. In Pakistanis’ opinion, the Western media regret only about NATO-ISAF casualties in Afghanistan but remain quiescent about the heavy losses incurred by Pakistanis in fight against terrorism. The NATO attack on Salala check post on 26 November 2011 engulfed Pakistan in widespread anti-American sentiments. Pakistan’s public strongly demanded an end to Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led war and to permanently choke off all NATO supplies to Afghanistan.61

It is important to note that while United States and its Western allies hold Pakistan responsible for Mumbai attacks in 2008, they do not demand ‘vigorous investigations’ from India for its nationals’ involvement in the Samjhota Express train terror incident in which 59 Pakistanis were killed in twin fire-bombings in 2007. 62 Most importantly, killing of Head of the Maharashtra Anti Terrorist Squad, Hemant Karkare, who was investigating Samjhota Express incident, is suspicious. He was targeted during Mumbai incident and Ajmal Kasab was blamed for his killing. But in truth, Indian extremist organizations were upset at Hemant Karkare who had arrested Lieutenant Colonel Prasad Prohit, a serving Indian Army officer, for his complicity in the Samjhota Express incident and 29 September 2008 Malegaon blasts.63 Pakistanis view the strange silence of the US on such issues as criminal.

Moreover, intense pressure from America on Pakistan to renounce its support for Kashmiri freedom struggle with no “reciprocal pressure” on New Delhi to end terror practices in Indian-

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administered Kashmir creates deep impression among Pakistanis that the US is indifferent to the precious loss of lives of Kashmiri and Pakistani people.64 In fact, “outpolling India” in enmity is “no small feat in Pakistan,” however, the US misplaced policies and ill-crafted strategies towards Pakistan accomplished it, which itself is a very “worrying indicator.”65

Constraints and Limitations of Pakistan’s Balancing Act in the ‘War on Terror’ Pakistan decided to join the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’ to secure its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir, to protect its strategic assets, to recover its economy and to avoid an internal backlash. This decision, however, didn’t reflect a “structural transformation” in Pakistan’s policy. In reality “rather than restructure, Pakistan rebalanced.” It provided significant assistance to US-led coalition by targeting Al-Qaeda operatives and combating Taliban insurgents belonging to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, yet declining to target Afghan insurgents and other Pakistan-based groups fighting ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan to achieve its foreign and domestic policy objectives. In other words, Pakistan has tried to retain a ‘delicate balancing act’ in its relations with United States and with Afghan Taliban.66

A key Pakistan’s objective is to avoid an internal backlash for its decision to be a frontline state in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ from those quarters who strongly sympathize with Taliban cause. Pakistan is also worried that there is strong resentment inside military to Washington’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach towards Pakistan. Some military ranks see that USled war threatens Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir as Washington is heavily ‘tilted’ towards New Delhi. Khalid Aziz notes: “Operationally, sympathy for the Taliban cause creates the danger of leakage of battle secrecy.” 67 The connivance of some military personnel in the 2009 attack on General Headquarters (GHQ), and in the Mehran Naval Base attack in May 2011, reveal that there is a real threat of “possible fragmentation”68 of the military.69 This fear of fragmentation compels Pakistan military and civil leaders to evade targeting Haqqani network in North Waziristan. 70

Moreover, Pakistan is cautious that a full blown operation against ‘good Taliban’ such as Afghan Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami (HI), Haqqani network and possibly Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) would cause these insurgents to turn against Pakistani state. Pakistan’s concerns about a

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backlash were heightened when General Musharraf faced extreme opposition to send the army into the tribal region to kill and capture Al-Qaeda operatives and Afghan militants in 2002. The tribesmen saw Pakistan army’s incursions in FATA to capture or kill these “‘guests’ as a breach of trust.”71 With growing hostility towards military operations in FATA, Islamabad “concluded that defying the US pressure was preferable to launching an all out war against Afghan insurgent groups” in the tribal areas as such operation was perceived to unite militant organizations and many local tribes against Pakistani state.72 For that reason, Islamabad pursued a “segmented counterterrorism” approach whereby it disrupted Al-Qaeda network and some sectarian outfits but made peace deals with the tribes and local militant groups and remained “much more reluctant” to decisively purge Afghan Taliban fighting against US-led coalition and Karzai Government in Afghanistan.73 Even this “segmented” approach failed to avert a large number of “ideologically-motivated” tribesmen to embark on a “domestic insurgency,” which was fully joined by Punjab based militant groups after the Red Mosque operation in 2007.74

In effect, Islamabad policy of supporting the ‘good Taliban’ partly contributed to the resurgence of Afghan Taliban and “ultimately backfired in perfect symbiosis” of Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjab based militants.75 Islamabad has to recognize the political, economic and strategic constraints of its ‘delicate balancing act.’ It has to cooperate with the US-led coalition as a frontline state in the ‘War on Terror’, but at the same time, it has to avoid an internal backlash from Taliban sympathizers and rebels. Pakistan is, hence caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, United States and NATO officials criticize Islamabad for declining to cooperate wholeheartedly. On the other, Islamist extremists and TTP commanders, such as Maulvi Fazalullah rose in rebellion against Pakistani government for joining the US-led coalition ‘War on Terror’.76

It is true that Pakistan declines to target Afghan Taliban and some elements in the ISI are engaged to provide assistance to Taliban, but it is equally true that Islamabad has little control on all the militants and all the elements of Taliban insurgency. Punjab based militants particularly Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) are showing fission and fragmentation. According to Pakistani intelligence officials, LJ gave birth to eight small scattered groups to operate more effectively across the country.77 Dr. Mariam Abou Zahab

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warned that sectarian militants have the potential to destabilize the whole region due to the nexus between LJ and Al-Qaeda.78

As far as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba is concerned, the reality on the ground is much more complicated. Samina Yasmeen noted that LT split its strength into various factions, which had lost contacts from LT leadership as well as from the ISI. She stated that more problems could be created by targeting the LT leadership (referring to Hafiz Saeed, the leader of LT/JD). “You limit their ability to have some possibility of controlling those below. The risk of splintering increases.”79 In fact, the greater the splintering of militant groups, the greater the chances that Pakistan will be deeply embroiled in terrorism and militancy. Pakistan is engaged in an ‘earnest’ counterterrorism campaign against Al-Qaeda, TTP and various splinter groups of Punjab based militants (‘Punjabi Taliban’) and its army is overtaxed by fighting in various tribal agencies.80

Pakistan’s insurgency has cost 49,000 precious lives of civilians and security personnel, 81 has required the mobilization of nearly 150,000 troops on western border, and has cost its fragile economy about $102.51 billion between FY02 and FY14.82 In an interview with Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, President Zardari, said: “No country has made greater contributions and sacrifices in fighting terrorism than Pakistan…No-one should question our commitment or intentions in fighting the war.”83 In fact, Pakistan has reached a point where it cannot sustain the cost of war any longer, which has badly affected FDI, reduced exports and restricted growth. Yet, Washington’s transfer of CSF to Pakistan is very slow and problematic at a time, when Pakistan’s economic conditions are abysmal.84 Denying Pakistani security forces ‘resources’ (money transfer) mean that the US may remain unable to pull the levers to influence Pakistan army’s strategies in the ‘War on Terror’.85

According to Daniel Byman, Pakistan is a developing country and faces “structural problems” such as civil-military tension manifested by fears of a military coup, fragile and vulnerable economy and sectarian rifts in the society. 86 The structural weaknesses have a direct political impact that can aid an insurgency by hindering the crafting and the execution of a national counterterror and counterinsurgency strategies. The implications of such “structural weaknesses” extend “beyond the battlefield” and impact broader US-Pakistan ties.87

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To reduce the risks and costs of counterterrorism campaign in the tribal areas, Pakistan army requires some notion of support by the local population as well as the general Pakistani public. In early 2009, when the insurgency spread to Swat Valley and Malakand Division and the people recognized the threats from the “collusive aspirations” of TTP and TNSM militants, the public support significantly turned in favour of military campaign.88 In 2014, Pakistani Public also supported Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. Yet, there has not been a considerable shift in attitudes toward cooperation with the United States in the ‘War on Terror’ or “alignment” with its ‘strategic vision’ for ‘AfPak’ region and beyond.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan also limits Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy in the US-led ‘War on Terror’. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan recognizes the United States as the “source of all evils afflicting the Islamic as well as the non- Islamic world.” While religious hardliners consider US as “anti-Islam,” the moderate-liberal regard it as “anti-people.”89 These prevailing anti-America sentiments could prevent Pakistani military from adopting a “shared set of counterinsurgency practices” and a “broader strategic outlook” on combating Haqqani network to consolidate its gains against militants in the region. Ultimately, Washington should be realistic about its expectations from Pakistan army to “adapt” and effectively combat terrorists and militants.90

On another plan, Taliban are “draining the state’s political and ideological legitimacy while broadening their own.” This increases the gap between the state and its population. The majority of Pakistanis may not favour the Taliban’s “puritanical zeal,” but for many, Taliban’s assertion of being ‘jihadi’ or ‘Mujahedeen’ and their backing the idea of an “Islamic welfare state” wraps the Taliban in the “cloak of Islamic legitimacy.” This Islamic legitimacy has been “incubated” by Pakistan itself during Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and afterwards during Taliban rule (1996-2001). 91 Thus, at political and ideological level, it is now a mounting task for the state to “re-characterize this subverted discourse as illegitimate, terroristic or even anti-state.”92 It is this political and ideological dimension of the ‘War on Terror’ that is jeopardizing Pakistan’s security, because it generates ambiguity amongst Pakistani society, political circles and media about militancy, extremism and terrorism and how the state and society should respond to it effectively. It is unfortunate that Pakistan has failed to develop “a consolidated narrative” of the ‘War on Terror’: whether this is Pakistan’s war or America’s war.93

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Despite all these constraints and limitations of Pakistan’s balancing act in the ‘War on Terror’, Pakistan army’s successful military operations in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 put Taliban on defensive. Pakistan Army’s willingness to ‘capture and hold and build’ the area cleansed of the Taliban presence give evidence to the fact that Pakistan has the will and sufficient counterinsurgency capability to dislodge the Taliban from their strongholds in FATA and Malakand Division.94 In fact, Pakistan military operations have turned TTP insurgency into “an enfeebled insurgency.” 95

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Pakistan’s political, security and economic crisis have been exacerbated by ill-conceived and poorly crafted US strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is the “biggest stakeholder on the issue of post-2014 Afghanistan,” hosting 2.5 million Afghan refugees, having suffered and sacrificed the most after 9/11 with over loss of 49,000 precious lives and calamitous damage to economy.96 From Pakistan’s view, the longer the US-led coalition’s military operations in ‘AfPak’ region continue without an explicit political approach, the tougher it gets for Pakistan to manage its delicate ‘balancing act.’ Islamabad therefore, contends for “direct, meaningful and inclusive reconciliation efforts” with Afghan Taliban, Hizb-e-Islmai and Haqqani network.97

A pragmatic approach to bring peace and stability in the ‘AfPak’ region is a jointly develop Afghan reconciliation plan by the US and Pakistan that could end the Taliban insurgency, and initiate dialogue among the Taliban, Kabul, Washington and Islamabad. Such a plan would offer a realistic hope to Pakistan to send the Afghan insurgents back to their country to take part in reconciliation under well defined condition. In 2011, Hillary Clinton suggested that Taliban would have to “renounce violence ... abandon their alliance with Al-Qaeda, and abide by Afghanistan’s Constitution” for a peace process to work.98

But the growing ‘trust deficit’ between Pakistan and the US makes ‘peace and reconciliation’ plan very challenging. According to Ahmed Rashid, United States had “failed to convince the Pakistan Army to rein in the Taliban’s Haqqani network,” and Pakistan now feels it was

“being targeted by United States deliberately in retaliation.”99

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Following the unilateral US forces action in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011, the Joint Session of Pakistani Parliament asserted “to re-visit and review its terms of engagement with the United States” and stated that future cooperation in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ will depend on addressing Pakistan’s genuine security concerns.100 Pakistan’s Foreign Office also affirmed that Pakistan wants such ties with the US that are “free from ups and downs of a roller coaster ride.”101 US officials also acknowledge that Washington and Islamabad “recognize the benefits of partnering against common threats, but those must be balanced against national interests as well.” It is high time that both Islamabad and Washington agree to “realistic goals” to bring peace and stability to ‘AfPak’ region.102

It is worth noting that both Washington and Islamabad have toned down their expectations from each other. President Obama’s re-election in November 2012 for the second term reflected “a decisive swing” in support of political strategy to foreign policy matters,103 particularly Afghan conflict. Washington has reportedly limited its scope as far as Lashkar- eTayyaba is concerned, given that Pakistan continues to hunt down Al-Qaeda operatives and cooperates with New Delhi over the November 2008 Mumbai terror probe. This restored military and intelligence cooperation from Islamabad, will also receive a positive response from the US not to impose any stringent conditions on Pakistan’s economic and security assistance.104 In Pakistan, PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif has won May 2013 election and it has vowed to pursue political negotiations with Pakistani Taliban.105 However, when the peace talks collapsed, it provided the political support to Pakistan military offensive in North Waziristan, though reluctantly. Most importantly, Pakistan has shown its consent towards US labeling of the Haqqani group as a ‘Terrorist Organization’ in September 2012 and hence, to compel them to come to negotiating table. This change in policy has created space for Pakistan to get involved in the Afghan reconciliation process more vigorously.106 Nevertheless, Pakistan also realizes that it is imperative to focus to ‘secure’ its own territory from the spillover, as it does not rule out a ‘civil war’ in Afghanistan, in case if all the reconciliation efforts fail to produce results.107 In this context, a robust US- Pakistan engagement is critical for the stability of Afghanistan and the region. Nevertheless, the US should realize that Pakistan is not merely a tool with which Washington can “dictate” and execute its policy in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistan has its

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own strategic and economic interests, sources of insecurity, domestic political constraints, and geopolitical imperatives,108 which dictate its counterterrorism strategy in the ‘War on Terror’. As noted by the former Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, on national seminar on Deradicalization in June 2011:

“Our counterterrorism Strategy is home-grown and indigenous in character and based on dictates of environment. We are following a “4 D strategy” at National level i.e. Dialogue, Deterrence, Development and Defeating the Terrorist’s Ideology and Mindset.”109

United States must realize that “sustainable change in Pakistan can be brought about from the internal political dynamics, economic growth and through the ‘struggle’ of Pakistani people.”110

Pakistan faces enormous challenges in the years ahead. Despite fears that the state of Pakistan will collapse, the future is not as bleak as projected at all. Pakistani institutions are still able to function, though weak. The military remains disciplined, possesses command and control on sizeable nuclear arsenal and shows commitment to protect the state against internal and external threats.111 The judiciary is becoming gradually more “assertive” and vows to uphold the rule of law and supremacy of the constitution.112 Pakistani media is increasingly becoming influential and powerful. Civil society is vibrant, dynamic and “empowers people to thinking independently.”113

Above all, the people of Pakistan have shown a remarkable resilience in addressing some of the daunting challenges; the population is against forces of extremism and terrorism and is ready to fight for their political and economic rights. The way the people provided support and assistance to millions of IDPs in the wake of Swat operation is a glorious testimony to their resilience and to their commitment to the country.114 With rising understanding of supremacy of the constitution, powerful and free media and vibrant civil society, Pakistani state is not bound to fail or collapse. Yet, there is a high potential for reform and development in the country. Maleeha Lodhi argues that Socio-economic changes over the past decade have “created a larger, more politically assertive middle class, and engendered a stronger and more connected society. Once politics catches up with these changes the foundation would be laid for a functional and responsive state.” 115 She suggests “electoral and political reforms” to

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increase the political participation of common Pakistani people in order to bring political and economic stability in the country.116

Yousuf Nazar, a political economist, believes that “Disengagement, Realignment, and Empowerment” are the best policy options for Pakistan. He writes that Islamabad can transform itself into a functional polity if it disengages itself from domestic and international conflicts and realigns its foreign and economic policy from the West to the policies pursued by East; particularly China, Iran, Russia and most importantly India, and “empowers its people through genuine and not ‘manipulated or rigged or hijacked’ democracy.”117

It is worth noting that Pakistan possesses a significant amount of “international goodwill, even though this has yet to be translated into concrete pledges of assistance.” Pakistan is a ‘Pivotal State’ and its geo-strategic importance means that the continued existence of a stable and functional Pakistani state is in the interest of the neighbouring, regional and extraregional countries.118 Pakistan’s precarious path will be driven by internal, regional and global factors, and United States, must play a “supportive role.”119 A long-term US-Pakistan partnership ought to recognize Pakistan’s promising and beneficial role in Afghanistan and South Asia, and should acknowledge Pakistan’s growing relationship with China, Iran, India, Central Asia and even Russia. Below are detailed political, strategic, internal security and economic recommendations towards a long-term, robust and stable US-Pakistan relationship. These recommendations also offer Pakistan to emerge out of this quagmire and move forward.

POLITICAL:

• Pakistan needs consolidating democratic process and strengthening the civil and democratic institutions. • Washington should continue to engage with the broadest spectrum of Pakistani political parties, nongovernmental organizations and civil society. The US should take steps to engage with Islamic political parties such as JI and JUI, as this will help the cause of democracy in Pakistan and forestall these parties from adopting harsh anti-American posture. People-to-people contacts between the two countries should be pursued vigorously.

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• Pakistan’s engagement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ needs to be more transparent to Pakistani people in order to fill the trust gap between Pakistani government and its people in the ‘War on Terror’, particularly in case of US drone campaign. Pakistani and US civil society and media should increase communication platforms in order to engage in open dialogue and discussions focused on sensitive issues regarding US-Pakistan engagement in ‘War on Terror’ and peace and stability in the ‘AfPak’ region. • Pakistan must integrate FATA into ‘mainland Pakistan’ so that people in FATA can move from being “administered populace” to “participating populace” involved in political and democratic decision-making processes.120 The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) needs to be eradicated gradually. On 13 August 2011, President Zardari signed amendments to extend the Political Parties Order 2002 to the tribal areas and to do away with some extreme aspects of the FCR.121 Earlier, in April 2009, FATA political, administrative and judicial reform package was articulated which is a step in the right direction. 122 Pakistan should take further steps to implement the reform package.

POLITICO-STRATEGIC:

• Islamabad should make its security concerns clear to Washington that Indian strategy to destabilize Baluchistan and the tribal areas through its consulates in Afghanistan is unacceptable, and continued Pakistan’s cooperation for the US-led ‘War on Terror’ depends upon US support for a Pak-India agreement in Afghanistan. • Pakistan should extend its support to a broad based Afghans-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. At the same time, Islamabad should encourage Afghan Taliban to disown Al-Qaeda, to end insurgency, to accept Afghan constitution and constitutional government, and to ultimately participate in Afghan political process. An important step for political negotiations would be the establishment of a ‘Taliban office’ probably, in Turkey or a Gulf country such as Qatar, to support their “transformation into a political actor from a fighting force.”123 Washington should also initiate a dialogue with Islamabad focusing on issues such as Islamabad role in reconciliation process with Taliban and the role of the ANSF to bring stability to Afghanistan.

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• Besides, supporting Pashtuns, Pakistan should get engage in dialogue with other influential ethnic groups such as Tajik and Uzbek in Afghanistan. In this regard, Pakistan has offered Afghanistan to train the Tajik-dominated Afghan National Security Forces. This would also help Islamabad as well as Washington to put in place a broad based government in Afghanistan as part of political process. • The US should persuade Kabul to recognize the Durand Line. By doing so, Washington would not only improve Pak-Afghan relations, but also strengthen US-Pakistan ties. • Pakistan should also ensure complete transparency in terrorist probes that involve terror acts of non-state actors operating from Pakistani soil against Indian interests. The existing ‘Joint Anti Terrorism Mechanism (JATM)’ provides the most obvious mechanism to do so.124 US should also stress upon India to investigate and bring to justice those Indian perpetrators who are involved in Samjhota Express terror act, attack on the Indian parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attack.125

• More calculated and vigorous efforts by the US with both India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute would strengthen US- Pakistan relationship. The United States could assist by facilitating communication and sustaining dialogue on Kashmir.126 At the same time, Pakistan must dismantle all Kashmir focused militant groups to break the stalemate on Kashmir dispute.

PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL SECURITY:

• Pakistan must confront the various insurgent and terrorist groups especially in tribal areas, southern Districts of Punjab and Karachi to emerge as a modern Islamic and responsible nuclear state on the world stage. A counterinsurgency campaign is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political” process. 127 Dismantling militant network will initially require determined military action to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, followed by political and socioeconomic instruments to consolidate the military gains. For political reconciliation process to be successful, the militants must “submit to the State, its Constitution and the Rule of Law” and end violence. Pakistan’s Islamic parties such as JI, and JUI-F can play an effective role in reconciliation process. 128

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• Pakistan should distinguish counterinsurgency operations from counterterrorism, and the need to develop counterterrorism forces in Pakistan to tackling terrorism on the longer term with greater effectiveness while relieving the army from this debilitating task. 129 • Pakistan has to pose effective ideological opposition to the extremists and militants. This will require carefully crafting a national consensus to override radicalism and to bolster the rule of law. Initiating an “open and sustained public dialogue” 130 on these issues is essential to remodel Pakistani society through the state educational system and media to offer “Intellectual resistance” to religious extremism and militancy. • Deradicalization programmes must be improved to diminish religious militancy and sectarian rifts. Deradicalization will also need revising the curriculum in public schools, as well as in madaris networks to revitalize the moderate and tolerant vision of Islam.131 • In tribal areas where security forces have recently cleared the Taliban and other militant groups, it is particularly important for the government of Pakistan to strengthen capacity of the local administration. United States should offer assistance and training for local civilian institutions in tribal areas and Swat valley. • Pakistan should adopt a comprehensive strategy to cope with the sectarian organizations particularly LJ. Sectarian extremism and violence should be stopped to increase the harmony of various communities in the country. • Pakistan should enhance and strengthen efficiency and accountability of law enforcement agencies. It should augment police, military and intelligence services coordination.132 The government should give NACTA greater autonomy to make it an effective organization for countering extremism and terrorism. • Pakistan needs surveillance capabilities, communication systems, night vision, transport and transport aircraft and protected vehicles to rapidly deploy its forces in remote and difficult terrain of tribal areas.133 United States support remains vital in this regard. • Pakistan’s evolving counterinsurgency strategy is based on to target hardcore Taliban insurgents and negotiating with ‘Moderate’ Taliban while all together protect civilians. American training and assistance efforts should also focus on the respect for human rights in Pakistan. It is, therefore, utmost important that the US should end the number of potential targets of commando raids and drone strikes in order to prevent civilian casualties.

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ECONOMIC:

• A US development strategy in Pakistan should be designed and implemented separately from its strategy in Afghanistan. This strategy must focus on economic assistance issues in Pakistan rather than ‘AfPak’ region. The development strategy must be “shockproofed” against the unavoidable crises in the volatile US- Pakistan relations.134 • The US needs to finance only such infrastructure, education and health projects that are included in the government’s development programme. It should co-finance these projects with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.135 • US investors should be encouraged through Export-Import Bank loans and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees to participate in Pakistan’s energy development plans including hydroelectric power and natural gas, both of which are relatively abundant in Pakistan.136

• Textile and apparel products are the “lifeblood of the Pakistani economy” but constitute less than 0.2 percent of US imports due to high custom duty of more than 10 percent.137 Washington needs to lower tariff on Pakistani textiles and apparel to assist the economy in order to sustain the huge cost of the ‘War on Terror’. • The legislation for the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) project aims to expand duty-free access for certain exports from Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as areas affected by the 2005 earthquake. This legislation is pending in the US Congress. The Congress should enact the legislation to promote bilateral trade and economic relations. • Pakistan should pursue a campaign of ‘soft power’ in Afghanistan aimed at development of this war torn country. In this context, Pakistan should develop more robust trade ties with Afghanistan.138 The Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) signed in October 2010 committed both the countries to increase bilateral trade to $5 billion by 2015. The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement came after a June 2010 Afghan Agreement to send small numbers of Afghan military officers to undergo training in Pakistan.139 Steps such as these are in the right direction towards economic development of the region. • Jundullah has to be fought and defeated in Pakistan to have huge prospects for expanding economic ties with Tehran and security of proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.140 The US

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must remove pressure against Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline that could be extended to India (Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, IPI) in order to encourage more robust economic linkages between India and Pakistan.141 Of course, US support is also required for the success of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project. • By improving coordination with Pakistani NGOs and institutions, Washington can use aid money more productively and can see its assistance make an actual, lasting impact on the lives of the people of Pakistan with significant benefits for American national security.142

• Finally, a novel framework for economic growth prepared by the Planning Commission of Pakistan in May 2011 emphasizes economic growth through innovation, creativity, entrepreneurship and investment climate.143 The US can play a crucial role in the implementation of the new growth framework to strengthen economy.

Some of the recommendations put forth here are no ‘panacea’ for Pakistan’s complex crisis, yet they are crucial for the long-term sustainability of US-Pakistan relationship and restructure the engagement in the region beyond the shadow of the ‘War on Terror’. If United States abandons Afghanistan and Pakistan again, those extremists in Pakistan who dub US as “an untrustworthy ally” will become strong. US-Pakistan re-engagement will be a delusion in the future.144

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END NOTES

1 Alexander Evans, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 4 (August 2011), pp. 64-65. 2 Moeed Yusuf, “Assessing US Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan,” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 5 May 2011, pp. 19-27. 3 Alexander Evans, Op Cit., p. 70. 4 C. Christine Fair, “Addressing Fundamental Challenges,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2011), p. 102. 5 Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 192. 6 Javid Husain, “Deadlock in Pakistan-India Talks,” The Nation, 2 March 2010. 7 Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Indo-Afghan Strategic Treaty: Implications for Pakistan,” No. 148/2011 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 2011), p. 2. 8 “Talking to the Taliban,” The Economist, 22 June 2013. 9 “Implications of the India Afghan Strategic Deal and US-Iran Tension on AfPak Region,” Could be read at: http://politact.com/vantage-point-analysis/implications-of-the-india-afghan-strategic-deal-and-us irantensionon-afpak-region.html (accessed 22 October 2011). 10 Farhat Taj, “India-Afghanistan alliance: implications for Pakistan?” Daily Times, 8 October 2011. 11 See “Afghanistan India Strategic Deal and Haqqani Network,” 6 October 2011; http://politact.com/vantage- point-analysis/afghanistan-india-strategic-deal-and-haqqani-network.html (accessed 9 October 2011). 12 Tanvir Ahmad Khan, “Balancing Interests in Afghanistan,” The Express Tribune, 5 June 2011. 13 Bibhu Prasad Routray, Op Cit., p. 2. 14 Cited in Malou Innocent, “Pakistan: Washington’s Blind Spot in Afghanistan,” Foreign Service Journal (September 2010), pp. 40-41. 15 In a cable released by WikiLeaks, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is quoted telling US Senator John Kerry in February 2011, that “to gain Pakistan’s trust India would have to decrease its footprint in Afghanistan.” See Jyoti Thottam and Gurgaon, “Afghanistan: India’s Uncertain Road,” TIME, 11 April 2011. 16 George Friedman, “US and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies,” STRATFOR, 21 June 2011. 17 Michael O’Hanlon, “Don’t Turn to India,” Wall Street Journal, 15 November 2011. 18 Sajjad Shaukat, “US Designs to Destabilize Asia,” Pakistan Observer, 25 July 2011. 19 “John Kerry Urges Bigger Afghan Role for India; Hyphenates India & Pakistan, “The Economic Times, 24 June 2013. 20 Malou Innocent, Op Cit. 21 “China-Pakistan Alliance Strengthened Post-bin Laden,” Dawn, 15 May 2011. 22 Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan and the New Great Game,” The Express Tribune, 16 January 2012; See also Malou Innocent, Op Cit. 23 “SPIEGEL Interview with Pervez Musharraf: Obama ‘Is Aiming at the Right Things’.” Der Spiegel, 7 June 2009. 24 Stephen Cohen, “Failure in AfPak: How the US Got It Wrong,” The National Interest, 15 July 2011. Amy Zalman and Jonathan Clarke, “The Global War on Terror: A Narrative in Need of a Rewrite,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 23, Issue 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 101 - 113 25 Robert D Blackwill, “Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De facto Partition is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1 (January/February 2011), pp. 42-50. 26 Saleem Safi, “US Plans for the Region,” The News, 25 September 2010. 27 Ibid. 28 Khalid Aziz, “A Plan for Afghanistan’s Partition,” The Express Tribune, 9 November 2010. 29 Major General dhruv C Katoch, “Will Pakistan Implode,” Indian Defence Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January-March 2011), pp. 150-151. 30 Najmuddin Shaikh, “The Obama Speech and Its Consequences for Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, 23 June 2011. 31 Qaiser Butt, “Pak-Afghan Commission: Upper Dir Incursion to Figure in Talks with Kabul,” The Express Tribune, 8 June 2011.

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32 Qaiser Butt, “International Forces behind Dir, Chitral Attacks,” The Express Tribune, 29 September 2011. 33 C. Christine Fair, “Addressing Fundamental Challenges,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., pp. 102-103.

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34 Alexander Evans, Op Cit., p. 65; See also Mariana Baabar, “Pakistan Quietly Preparing for Civil War in Afghanistan,” The News, 11 July 2013. 35 Saeed Shah, Safdar Dawar, Adam Entous, “Militants Slip Away Before Pakistan Offensive,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2014. 36 Amir Mir, “Haqqanis Sidestep US Terror List,” Asia Times, 15 October 2011. 37 Alissa J. Rubin, “US General in Afghanistan Says Troops may Stay Past 2014,” New York Times, 20 December 2011. 38 Ali Hussain, “Pakistan Supports US-Afghan Pact,” Business Recorder, 2 October 2014. 39 David A. Sanger, “Drawing Down, with a Vigilant Eye on Pakistan,” New York Times, 22 June 2011. 40 “Pakistan Stops NATO Supplies after Raid Kills 28 Troops,” Dawn, 26 November 2011. 41 “Afghan Army Chief: ‘Pakistan Controls Taliban’,” BBC News, 3 July 2013. 42 Rob Crilly, “Raymond Davis ‘was acting head of CIA in Pakistan,” The Telegraph, 22 February 2011. 43 “Did Ray Davis Shoot Two Pakistani Agents?” ABC News, 9 February 2011. According to a Dawn report, these ‘red lines’ include: “No foreign boots inside Pakistan; no expansion of ISAF/NATO mandate to cover Pakistan, no expansion of drone attacks into Baluchistan, no contact group on Pakistan and end to vilification of ISI.” See “FO Reminds Washington of ‘Red Lines’,” Dawn, 24 December 2010. 44 Qaiser Butt, “CIA Agent Davis had Ties with Local Militants,” The Express Tribune, 22 February 2011. Worst still, Davis was also said to be working on a plan to give credence to the American notion that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not safe. For this purpose, he was setting up a group of the Taliban which would do his bidding. 45 M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan Confronts US Afghan Strategy,” The Hindu, 27 April 2011. 46 In January 2010, it was revealed that the US army “was training a crack unit to seal off and snatch back Pakistani nuclear weapons” in the event that “militants would obtain a nuclear device or materials that could make one.” See “Elite US Troops Ready to Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks,” The Times, 1 January 2010. 47 The SPD’s functions include formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. 48 Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Pentagon’s Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” National Journal (Washington), 9 November 2011. 49 See http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1736 (accessed 27 May 2011). 50 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy,” New York Times, 31 January 2011. 51 Karen De Young, “New Estimates put Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal at More Than 100,” The Washington Post, 30 January 2011. 52 “Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement,” United States Department of State, November 2011, pp. 2-5. 53 Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman,” US Links Pakistani Aid to Performance,” Wall Street Journal, 15 August 2011. 54 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Downplays Proposed Freeze in US Military Aid,” Voice of America, 15 December 2011. 55 Moeed Yusuf, “The Binding Factor,” Dawn, 12 December 2011. 56 C. Christine Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating US Relations with Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 167; In May 2012, a US Senate Committee blocked ‘$33 million aid’ to Pakistan for ‘the 33 years of a prison sentence’ given to Dr. Shakil Afridi to help CIA locate bin Laden. Pakistan’s Foreign Office responded by stating that US “should respect its “legal process.” See Chris McGreal, “US cuts Pakistan’s Aid in Protest at Jail for Doctor Who Helped Find Bin Laden,” The Guardian, 24 May 2012. 57 Calling the drone attack in Dattakhel, “a violation of human rights,” General Kayani stated that “such acts of violence take us away from our objective of elimination of terrorism.” Rajshree Jetly, “The

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Raymond Davis Case,” ISAS Brief No. 191 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, 28 March 2011), p. 3. 58 Ibid. 59 Imtiaz Gul, “ISI–Again under Fire,” Weekly Pulse, 29 April 2011. 60 M. K. Bhadrakumar, Op Cit. 61 “Nationwide Rallies Condemn NATO Strikes,” The Nation, 28 November 2011; Asad Kharal and Saba “Protests Underway across Pakistan against NATO Attack,” The Express Tribune, 28 November 2011. 62 George Perkovich, “Stop Enabling Pakistan’s Dangerous Dysfunction,” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011), p. 13. 63 M Hali, “India’s Self-Inflicted Terror Attacks,” Pakistan Observer, 21 July 2013. 64 George Perkovich, Op Cit. 65 Varun Vira and Anthony Cordesman, “Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability,” (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 2011), p. 126. 66 George Friedman, “The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 3: The Pakistani Strategy,” STRATFOR, 15 February 2010. 67 Khalid Aziz, “Dangers of the Afghan War,” Dawn, 10 June 2011. 68 Ibid. 69 On 20 May 2011, the Mehran Naval Base in Karachi was attacked by six terrorists. ‘With military precision, they made their way to where two new US supplied Orion P3C maritime surveillance aircraft worth 36 million each were parked. There, they destroyed the planes with rocket-propelled grenades, and then took cover near by buildings. From here, they held off security farces for over 16 hours, killing a dozen before they were finally cut down.’ During a briefing to Pakistan’s National Assembly, Deputy Naval Chief confirmed that “the attackers had inside help.” See Irfan Husain, Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West (Maryland: Arc Manor, 2011), p. 214. 70 Khalid Aziz, Op Cit. 71 See Moeed W. Yusuf, “The US-Pakistan Relationship and Finding an End State in Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 9 (September 2010), p. 8. 72 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 73 Ibid. See also Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 12-14. 74 Moeed W. Yusuf, Op Cit., pp. 8-9. 75 Robert M Cassidy, War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001- 2011 (Virginia: Marine Corps University Press, 2012), pp. 70-71. 76 Maleau innocent, “America and Pakistan: Partners with Diverging Interests,” The Huffington Post, 8 May 2011. 77 Zia Khan, “The Fission of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” The Express Tribune, 17 November 2010. 78 See Address delivered by Mariam Abou Zahab to the International Conference on “Securing a Frontline State: Alternative Views on Peace and Conflict in Pakistan,” (Marriott Hotel, Islamabad: Organized by Center for Research and Security Studies, 08-09 December 2011). 79 “Can Pakistan Take on the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba?” Daily Times, 22 Jun 2009. 80 Shibil Siddiqi, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: History and Geopolitics in a Regional and International Context: Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy,” (Toronto: Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2008), p. 54. 81 Mudassir Raja, “Pakistani Victims: War on Terror Toll put at 49,000,”The Express Tribune, 27 March 2013. 82 Sardar Sikander Shaheen, “Pakistan Lost Rs 8,264 Billion in ‘War on Terror’,” Daily Times, 3 June 2014. 83 “$70bn loss Suffered in Terror War: Zardari,” Dawn, 1 November 2011. 84 Omar Waraich, “US Funding Cut may Do More for Pakistan’s Generals than for Washington’s Goals,” TIME, 13 July 2011. 85 Daniel Byman, “Friends like these: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), p. 111. 86 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 87 Quoted in Robert M Cassidy, Op Cit., p. 79. 88 Ibid., p. 89.

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89 Bahukutumbi Raman, “Visualising a Shared India-Pakistan Future,” in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., p. 176. 90 Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA,” (Washington: New America Foundation, April 2010), p. 11; Robert M Cassidy, Op Cit., p. 79. 91 Shibil Siddiqi, “Report: Pakistan’s Ideological Blowback,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 25 June 2009. 92 Shibil Siddiqi, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: History and Geopolitics,” Op Cit., p. 39. 93 Salman Siddiqui, Op Cit. 94 Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “New Strategies in Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Operation in South Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue: 37 (3 December 2009), p. 5. 95 A. Khan, “Conceptualizing AfPak: The Prospects and Perils,” Asia Programme Paper ASP PP2010/01, Chatham House (January 2010), p. 24. 96 “Pakistan Termed Biggest Stakeholder in Post-2014 Afghanistan,” Op Cit. 97 Moeed Yusuf and Huma Yusuf et al., “Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, July 2011), pp. 2-3. 98 Anatol Lieven and Maleeha Lodhi, “Bring in the Taliban,” New York Times, 22 April 2011. 99 Ahmed Rashid, Op Cit., p. 2. 100 In December 2011, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Hina Rabani Khar stated that Islamabad is “re-assessing” its engagement with the US and the “renewed terms of engagement” with the US-led coalition will have a “clear mandate of the public and parliament of Pakistan” so that, Pakistan could build robust ties with the US without harming its own interests. Ayaz Gul, Op Cit. 101 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan to Resume Full Spectrum of Ties with US: FO,” Dawn, 19 January 2012. 102 Moeed Yusuf, “The binding factor,” Op Cit. 103 Arif Ansar, “Outlook for US-Pakistan Ties,” Pakistan Today, 31 December 2012. 104 “What’s Behind the Restoration of US Pakistan Security Ties?” POLITACT, 30 November 2012; See at: 2012; http://politact.com/pdf/issue-brief/whats-behind-the-restoration-of-us-pakistan-security- ties.pdf (accessed 2 December 2012). 105 “Nawaz Sharif Calls for Taliban Talks,” Dawn, 20 May 2013. 106 Ibid. In June 2013, the US has agreed that a formal rejection of Al-Qaeda, by Afghan Taliban would now be a “negotiating aim” rather than a precondition for talks with Taliban in Doha (Qatar). The deal on talks with the Taliban in Doha was partly brokered by Pakistan and the Amir of Qatar after ‘months of diplomatic spadework’ also involving Germany, Norway and the UK. See Dan Roberts and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Peace Talks: ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ Negotiations to Take Place in Qatar,” The Guardian, 19 June 2013. 107 Mariana Baabar, Op Cit. 108 Mahrukh Khan, “Pakistan-U.S. relations: A New Chapter, a New Theater,” Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol. XXX, No. 1 & 2 (Spring & Summer 2010), p. 19. 109 “Concluding Remarks by the Prime Minister on National Seminar on DeRadicalization,” Press Information Department (PID), Government of Pakistan, 6 July 2011. 110 Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future,” Asia Society (May 2011), p. 53. 111 Shuja Nawaz, “The Clash of Interests and Objectives,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., p. 156. 112 “Judiciary will Ensure Supremacy of Constitution, Says CJ,” Dawn, 29 July 2012. 113 Ahsan Iqbal, “Rising Pakistan,” The News, 11 March 2011. 114 Tariq Fatemi, “Looking Ahead,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.), Op Cit., p. 120. 115 Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan: Beyond ‘The Crisis State’ (ed.), (London: Hurst & Company., 2011), p. 4. 116 Ibid., p. 350. 117 Yousuf Nazar, Balkanisation and Political Economy of Pakistan (Karachi: National News Agency, 2011), pp. 197-198. 118 Sunjay Chandiramani, Marc Finaud et al., “Pakistan and South Asia’s Security Nexus: Scenarios for the Future,” Geneva Papers 11, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (2010), pp. 59-60. 119 Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future,” Asia Society (May 2011), p. 53.

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120 Personal communication with a FATA Secretariat Official, (Peshawar), 12 July 2011. 121 “FATA’s Integration,” Dawn, 15th August 2011. 122 The proposed reforms envisage ‘lifting of restrictions on political activities,’ curbing ‘the unlimited powers’ of the Political Agent, ‘excluding women and minors from collective responsibility law,’ creation of ‘an appellate tribunal,’ economic development of FATA and ‘providing audits of funds received and disbursed by the auditor-general.’ See Ali Hussain, “Zardari urged to implement reform package for Fata,” Business Recorder, 10 March 2011; Qaiser Butt, “Security Establishment Hinders FATA Reforms,” The Express Tribune, 27 April 2011. 123 “A German-led initiative with backing from Qatar” arranged “several meetings” between a Taliban mediator and American officials in Doha, Qatar. After much delay, the US “had agreed to announce at the December 2011 Bonn” conference that “there would be an exchange of prisoners between the US and the Taliban as a confidence building measure and the Taliban could open a liaison office in Qatar” for further peace talks. ‘The Taliban contacts made through Germany and Qatar need to be involved with the ‘core group’ which consists of US-Pakistan-Afghanistan.’ See Ahmed Rashid, “The US-Pakistan Relationship in the Year Ahead,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (18 January 2012), p. 4. 124 Touqir Hussain, “US Relations with Pakistan: The Need for a Strategic Shift,” Policy Brief No. 14 (Washington: The Middle East Institute, May 2008), p. 8. 125 Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson has asked the Indian government to “explain its position and bring forth facts about the revelations made by the former Indian government official,” Satish Verma, who has accused Indian government of “orchestrating” the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001and the 2008 Mumbai attack with the objective of strengthening counterterrorism legislation. See Kamran Yousaf, “Govt Seeks Delhi Input on ‘Staged Attacks’,” The Express Tribune, 19 July 2013. 126 Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 26-27. 127 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1st Indian Ed.), (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 55-56. 128 Personal communication with a Senior Military Official, (Peshawar), 15 November 2011. 129 Ikram Sehgal, “No Easy Strategy,” The News, 1 July 2010. In contrast with counterterrorism operations, which focus on the “sporadic but ruthless use of force” against terrorists to degrade their capabilities, the goal of counterinsurgency operations is “to undermine public support for the insurgency and to build the capacity of the local government” through a variety of means, including the use of force but also involving the provision of security to population, good governance and development. For details see Michael J. Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go together?” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010). pp. 342-343 130 Ibid. 131 Hassan Abbas, Op Cit., p. 16. 132 Hassan Abbas, Op Cit., p. 16. 133 Personal Communication with a Senior Military Official, (Peshawar), 15 November 2011. 134 Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai et al., “Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the US Approach to Development in Pakistan,” Center for Global Development (27 June 2011), p. 10. 135 Ishrat Husain, “Building Ties without Aid,” The News, 14 February 2012. 136 Ishrat Husain, “Pakistan-US Economic Ties,” Dawn, 8 April 2009. 137 Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai et al., Op Cit., p. 27; Pakistani Textile exporters cannot compete in the face of zero percent duty for Bangladesh and less than 10 per cent tariff for Sri Lankan and Indian exports. See “US to Set up Reconstruction Opportunity Zones,” The Express Tribune, 14 September 2011. 138 Islamabad has started a number of development projects in Afghanistan such as building of roads, schools, hospitals. It is also providing training to Afghan nationals in different sectors. Rizwan Zeb, “Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May 2006), p. 74. 139 “Pakistan has Vital Stake in Afghan Peace: Zardari,” The News, 25 December 2010. The agreement allows “Afghan trucks to carry goods to Pakistani ports like Karachi or as far as Indian border posts, while Pakistani trucks could travel into Afghanistan.” See Mark Landler, “Afghanistan and Pakistan sign

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a trade deal, representing a thaw in relations,” New York Times, 18 July 2010; “Pak Committed to Future of Afghanistan: Gilani,” The Nation, 8 December 2010. 140 Raja Karthikeya, “Jundullah a Wedge between Iran, Pakistan,” Asia Times Online, 7 August 2009. 141 A report by Pakistan Policy Working Group in United States also suggests that the US should recognize that the IPI would not “undermine international efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, the pipeline could help to stabilize the region over the longer term by providing Pakistan and India with a mutual economic interest.” See “The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan,” A Report by Pakistan Policy Working Group (September 2008), p. 22; Available at: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistan-policy-working-group-next-chapter-united-states-pakistan/p17413 (accessed 15 September 2009). 142 S. Akbar Zaidi, “Who Benefits From US Aid to Pakistan?” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011), p. 14. 143 Ishrat Husain, “Shared Growth,” The Herald (Karachi), July 2011; See also Ijaz Kakakhel, “NEC Approves New Growth Strategy,” Daily Times, 29 May 2011. 144 Alexander Evans, Op Cit., p. 70; Shuja Nawaz, Op Cit., p. 20.

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APPENDIX-A

GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON 19 SEPTEMBER 2001

Following is a partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech asking the people of Pakistan to support his course of action.

“My dear countrymen, Asslam-o-Alaikum:

The situation confronting the nation today and the international crisis have impelled me to take the nation into confidence. First of all, I would like to express heartfelt sympathies to the United States for the thousands of valuable lives lost in the United States due to horrendous acts of terrorism. We are all the more grieved because in this incident people from about 45 countries from all over the world lost their lives. People of all ages old, children, women and people from all and every religion lost their lives. Many Pakistanis also lost their lives. These people were capable Pakistanis who had gone to improve their lives. On this loss of lives I express my sympathies with those families. I pray to Allah to rest their souls in peace.

This act of terrorism has raised a wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United States. Their first target from day one is Osama bin Laden’s movement Al-Qaeda about which they say that it is their first target.

The second target are Taliban and that is because Taliban have given refuge to Osama and his network. This has been their demand for many years. They have been demanding their extradition and presentation before the international court of justice. Taliban have been rejecting this.

The third target is a long war against terrorism at the international level. The thing to ponder is that in these three targets nobody is talking about war against Islam or the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan is being, asked to support this campaign. What is this support? Generally speaking, these are three important things in which America is asking

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for our help. First is intelligence and information exchange, second support is the use of our airspace and the third is that they are asking for logistic support from us.

I would like to tell you now that they do not have any operational plan right now. Therefore we do not have any details on this count but we know that whatever are the United States’ intentions they have the support of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in the form of a resolution. This is a resolution for war against terrorism and this is a resolution for punishing those people who support terrorism. Islamic countries have supported this resolution. This is the situation as it prevailed in the outside world.

Now, I would like to inform you about the internal situation. Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. The decision we take today can have far-reaching and wide- ranging consequences. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan’s integrity and solidarity....On the other hand, we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized.

….Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighbouring country. They offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any alliance with the Unites States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there. What do the Indians want? They do not have common borders with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government.

It is very important that while the entire world is talking about this horrible terrorist attack, our neighbouring country instead of talking peace and cooperation, was trying hard to harm Pakistan and defame Islam. If you watch their television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India ‘Lay Off.’

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Pakistan’s armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets. Make no mistake and entertain no misunderstanding. At this very moment our Air Force is at high alert; and they are ready for ‘Do or die’ Missions.

My countrymen!

In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unbearable losses. What are our critical concerns and priorities? These are four; First of all is the security of the country and external threat. Second is our economy and its revival. Third are our strategic nuclear and missile assets. And Kashmir cause. The four are our critical concerns. Any wrong judgement on our part can damage all our interests. While taking a decision, we have to keep in mind all these factors.

The decision should reflect supremacy of righteousness and it should be in conformity with Islam. Whatever we are doing, it is according to Islam and it upholds the principle of righteousness. I would like to say that decisions about the national interests should be made with wisdom and rational judgement.

….When there is a crisis situation, the path of wisdom is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision. There is no question of weakness of faith or cowardice. For Pakistan, life can be sacrificed and I am sure every Pakistani will give his life for Pakistan.

…But at this time one should not bring harm to the country. We cannot make the future of a hundred and forty million people bleak. Even otherwise it is said in Shariah that if there are two difficulties at a time and a selection has to be made it is better to opt for the lesser one. Some of our friends seem to be much worried about Afghanistan.

I must tell them that I and my government are much more worried about Afghanistan and Taliban. I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the entire world is against them. I have met about twenty to twenty five world leaders and

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talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban. I have told them that sanctions should not be imposed on Afghanistan and that we should engage them.

I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of our friends accepted this.

Even in this situation, we are trying our best to cooperate with them. I sent Director General ISI with my personal letter to Mullah Umar. He returned after spending two days there. I have informed Mullah Umar about the gravity of the situation. We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and Taliban.

This is my earnest endeavour and with the blessings of Allah I will continue to seek such a way out. We are telling the Americans too that they should be patient. Whatever their plans, they should be cautious and balanced: We are asking them to come up with whatever evidence they have against Osama bin Laden; What I would like to know is how do we save Afghanistan and Taliban. And how do we ensure that they suffer minimum losses: I am sure that you will favour that we do so and bring some improvement by working with the nations of the world.

At this juncture, I am worried about Pakistan only. I am the Supreme Commander of Pakistan and I give top priority to the defence of Pakistan, defence of any other country comes later. We want to take decisions in the interest of Pakistan. I know that the majority of the people favour our decisions…We have not compromised on national honour and integrity and I shall not disappoint you on this occasion either. This is firm pledge to you. In the end before I take your leave, I would like to end with the prayer of Hazrat Musa (A.S)( Prophet Moses) as given in Sura-e-Taha: “May Allah open my chest, make my task easier, untie my tongue so that they may comprehend my intent.”

May Allah be with us in our endeavours. May Pakistan live for long.”

Source: Washington Post, 19 September 2001; See also http://www.gritzie.com/Musharrafaddress-9-19-01.htm (accessed 15 June 2010).

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APPENDIX-B

GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON 12 JANUARY 2002

Following is a partial transcript of Pakistan President Musharraf’s televised speech on 12 January 2002.

“I begin in the name of God, the most Beneficent, and the most Merciful

Pakistani Brothers and Sisters!

In my view there are three problems causing conflict and agitation in our minds. They include; first the Kashmir Cause, secondly all political disputes at the international level concerning Muslims and thirdly internal sectarian disputes and differences.

…..Let us take the Kashmir Cause first. Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world knows this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir. The Kashmir problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the United Nations resolutions. We have to find the solution of this dispute. No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October 1 and December 13. Anyone found involved in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly.

Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country. Our behaviour must always be in accordance with international norms.

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On this occasion, as President of Pakistan, I want to convey a message to Prime Minister Vajpaee: If we want to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and bring harmony to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully through a dialogue on the basis of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Solving the Kashmir Issue is the joint responsibility of our two countries. Let me repeat some of the observations made by you, Mr. Vajpayee, some time back, and I quote: “Mind-sets will have to be altered and historical baggage will have to be jettisoned. I take you on this offer. Let us start talking in this very spirit.

Now as Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, I wish to convey another message. The Armed Forces of Pakistan are fully prepared and deployed to meet any challenge. They will spill the last drop of their blood in the defence of their country. Let there be no attempt of crossing the border in any sector as it will be met with full force. Do not entertain any illusions on this count. I would also like to address the international community, particularly the United States on this occasion. As I said before on a number of occasions, Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestation. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world. Now you must play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of lasting peace and harmony in the region. We should be under no illusion that the legitimate demand of the people of Kashmir can ever be suppressed without their just resolution. Kashmiris also expect that you ask India to bring an end to state terrorism and human rights violations. Let human rights organizations, Amnesty International, the international media and U.N. peacekeepers be allowed to monitor activities of the Indian occupation forces.

Now we come to the second problem, which causes confusion in our minds and is of our particular concern. It relates to conflicts involving Muslims. Our religious leaders involve themselves in such conflicts without giving serious thought to them. I don’t want to talk at length on this. It is for the government to take a position on international issues. Individuals, organizations and political parties should restrict their activities to expression of their views. I request them to express their views on international issues in an intellectual spirit and in a civilized manner through force of argument.

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Views expressed with maturity and moderation have greater convincing power. Expressing views in a threatening manner does not create any positive effect and anyone who indulges in hollow threats is taken as an unbalanced person by the world at large. I would request that we should stop interfering in the affairs of others. First, we should attain the strength and the importance where our views carry weight when we express them.

Now we come to internal decisions. The third issue causing conflict in our minds relates to sectarian differences. As I have already pointed out that writ of the Government will be established. No individual, organization or party will be allowed to break the law of the land. All functioning will be in a regulated manner and within rules.

Now I come to the extremist organizations. Terrorism and sectarianism must come to an end. I had announced a ban on Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad on 14 August last year. On that occasion, I had pointed out that Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP would be kept under observation. I am sorry to say that there is not much improvement in the situation. Sectarian violence continues unabated. We have busted several gangs involved in sectarian killings. You would be astonished to know that in year 2001 about 400 innocent people fell victim to sectarian and other killings. Many of the gangs apprehended include people mostly belonging to Sipah-e-Sahaba and some to TJP. This situation cannot be tolerated any more.

I, therefore, announce banning of both Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP. In addition to these, TNSM (Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi) being responsible for misleading thousands of simple poor people into Afghanistan also stands banned.

This organization is responsible for their massacre in Afghanistan. The Government has also decided to put the Sunni Tehreek under observation. No organization is allowed to form Lashkar, Sipah or Jaish. The Government has banned Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-eTaiba. Any organization or individual would face strict punitive measures if found inciting the people to violence in internal or external contexts.

Our mosques are sacred places where we seek the blessings of God Almighty. Let them remain sacred. We will not allow the misuse of mosques. All mosques will be registered

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and no new mosques will be built without permission. The use of loudspeakers will be limited only to call for prayers, and Friday Sermon and Vaaz. However, I would like to emphasise that special permission is being given for “Vaaz” (Sermon. If this is misused the permission will be cancelled. If there is any political activity, inciting of sectarian hatred or propagation of extremism in any mosque, the management would be held responsible and proceeded against according to law.

I appeal to all Pesh Imams to project the qualities of Islam in the mosques and invite the people to piety. Talk of obligations towards fellow beings, exhort them to abstain from negative thoughts and promote positive thinking. I hope that all Nazims, Distt. Police officers and Auqaf Department officials will take quick action against violators of these measures.

On Madaris, a detailed policy will be issued through a new Madressa Ordinance. The Ordinance will be issued in a few days. I feel happy that the Madressa policy has been finalized in consultation with religious scholars and Mashaikh. I have touched on the merits and shortcomings prevailing in the Madaris. Merits have to be reinforced while shortcomings have to be rooted out. Under the Madressa policy, their functioning will be regulated. These Madaris will be governed by same rules and regulations applicable to other schools, colleges and universities. All Madaris will be registered by 23rd March 2002 and no new Madressa will be opened without permission of the Government. If any Madressa (religious school) is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity or possessing any types of weapons, it will be closed. All Madaaris will have to adopt the new syllabi by the end of this year. Those Madaris which are already following such syllabi are welcome to continue. The Government has decided to provide financial assistance to such Madaris. The government will also help the Madaris in the training of their teachers. The Ministry of Education has been instructed to review courses of Islamic education in all schools and colleges also with a view to improving them. So far as foreign students attending Madaris are concerned, we have set rules for them. Foreign students who do not have proper documents would be required to comply with the formalities by 23rd March 2002 otherwise they can face deportation. Any foreigner wanting to attend Madaris in Pakistan will have to obtain required documents from his/her native country and NOC from

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the government. Only then, he or she will get admission. The same rules will apply to foreign teachers.

Some Ulema were of the view that some poor people who come to Pakistan for religious education should not be deported to the countries of their origin. I agree that this is a genuine demand but such people should regularize their stay in Pakistan through their respective embassies. As I have said, all such activity has to be regulated and the writ of the Government must be established.

With a view to ending conflict, I have explained to you at great length the three areas causing confusion in our minds. Making rules, regulations and issuing ordinances is easy but their implementation is difficult. However, I feel all the measures I have announced are of utmost importance. We have to implement them. In this regard, the law enforcement agencies including police must perform their duty.

We are introducing reforms in the police with a view to improving their efficiency. A great responsibility lies on their shoulders. I have directed the police to ensure implementation of the steps announced by the government and I have no doubt they will be motivated to perform their duty. After reforms we expect they will be better trained and equipped to discharge their duty. Rangers and civil armed forces will be in their support. We are also taking steps in consultation with the judiciary for speedy trial of cases relating to terrorism and extremism. Anti terrorist courts are being strengthened and necessary orders will be issued in a few days.

Apart from these issues, I would also like to inform you, my brothers and sisters, that we have been sent a list of 20 people by India. I want to clear our position on this. There is no question of handing over any Pakistani. This will never be done. If we are given evidence against those people, we will take action against them in Pakistan under our own laws. As far as non-Pakistanis are concerned, we have not given asylum to any one. Any one falling under this category will be proceeded against whenever one is found.

My brothers & Sisters,

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Pakistan is an Islamic Republic. There are 98 percent Muslims living in this country. We should live like brothers and form an example for rest of the Islamic countries. We should strive to emerge as a responsible and progressive member of the comity of nations. We have to make Pakistan into a powerful and strong country. We have resources and potential. We are capable of meeting external danger. We have to safeguard ourselves against internal dangers. I have always been saying that internal strife is eating us like termite. Don’t forget that Pakistan is the citadel of Islam and if we want to serve Islam well we will first have to make Pakistan strong and powerful. There is a race for progress among all nations.

We cannot achieve progress through a policy of confrontation and feuds. We can achieve progress through human resource development, mental enlightenment, high moral character and technological development. I appeal to all my countrymen to rise to the occasion. We should get rid of intolerance and hatred and instead promote tolerance and harmony.

May God guide us to act upon the true teachings of Islam. May He help us to follow the Quaid-e-Azam’s motto: “Unity, Faith and Discipline.” This should always be remembered. We will be a non-entity without unity.

….. May Pakistan live for long.”

Source: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/2002Jan12.htm (accessed 15 June 2010).

APPENDIX-C

TEXT OF PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY (3 NOVEMBER 2007) DECLARED BY GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF

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“Whereas there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, [improvised explosive device] IED explosions, rocket firing and bomb explosions and the banding together of some militant groups have taken such activities to an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan;

Whereas there has also been a spate of attacks on state infrastructure and on law enforcement agencies;

Whereas some members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism thereby weakening the government and the nation’s resolve and diluting the efficacy of its actions to control this menace;

Whereas there has been increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in the government policy, adversely affecting economic growth, in particular;

Whereas constant interference in executive functions, including but not limited to the control of terrorist activity, economic policy, price controls, the downsizing of corporations and urban planning, has weakened the writ of the government; the police force has been completely demoralised and is fast losing its efficacy to fight terrorism and intelligence agencies have been thwarted in their activities and prevented from pursuing terrorists;

Whereas some hard core militants, extremists, terrorists and suicide bombers, who were arrested and being investigated were ordered to be released.

The persons so released have subsequently been involved in heinous terrorist activities, resulting in the loss of human life and property. Militants across the country have, thus, been encouraged while law enforcement agencies subdued;

Whereas some judges by overstepping the limits of judicial authority have taken over the executive and legislative functions;

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Whereas the government is committed to the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law and holds the superior judiciary in high esteem, it is nonetheless of paramount importance that the honourable judges confine the scope of their activity to the judicial function and not assume charge of administration; Whereas an important constitutional institution, the Supreme Judicial Council, has been made entirely irrelevant and non [text missing] by a recent order and judges have, thus, made themselves immune from inquiry into their conduct and put themselves beyond accountability;

Whereas the humiliating treatment meted to government officials by some members of the judiciary on a routine basis during court proceedings has demoralised the civil bureaucracy and senior government functionaries, to avoid being harassed, prefer inaction;

Whereas the law and order situation in the country as well as the economy have been adversely affected and trichotomy of powers eroded;

Whereas a situation has thus arisen where the government of the country cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution and as the Constitution provides no solution for this situation, there is no way out except through emergent and extraordinary measures;

And whereas the situation has been reviewed in meetings with the prime minister, the governors of all four provinces, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee chairman, the chiefs of the armed forces, the vice-chief of army staff and corps commanders of the Pakistan army;

Now, therefore, in pursuance of the deliberations and decisions of the said meetings, I General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, proclaim an emergency throughout Pakistan. I hereby order and proclaim that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This proclamation shall come into force at once.”

Source: Daily Times, 4 November 2007.

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APPENDIX-D

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE JOINT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT ON 14 MAY 2011

Following is the text of the resolution unanimously passed by the Senate of Pakistan and the National Assembly, in a Joint Session held on 13-14 May 2011, considered the situation arising from the unilateral US forces action in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011.

“After an in-depth discussion, including presentations made on the relevant issues by the Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence, Director General (Military Operations) and Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Operations), the Joint Session of Parliament resolved as under:

Condemned the US unilateral action in Abbottabad, which constitutes a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty;

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Strongly asserted that unilateral actions, such as those conducted by the US forces in Abbottabad, as well as the continued drone attacks on the territory of Pakistan, are not only unacceptable but also constitute violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and humanitarian norms and such drone attacks must be stopped forthwith, failing which the Government will be constrained to consider taking necessary steps including withdrawal of transit facility allowed to NATO/ISAF forces;

Determines that unilateral actions cannot advance the global cause of elimination of terrorism, and the people of Pakistan will no longer tolerate such actions and repeat of unilateral measures could have dire consequences for peace and security in the region and the world.

Reaffirmed the resolve of the people and Government of Pakistan to uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and national security, which is a sacred duty, at all costs;

Affirmed the resolve of the people and state institutions of Pakistan to safeguard Pakistan’s national interests and strategic assets and, in this context, underscored that any action to the contrary will warrant a strong national response;

Expressed its deep distress on the campaign to malign Pakistan, launched by certain quarters in other countries without appreciating Pakistan’s determined efforts and immense sacrifices in combating terror and the fact that more than thirty thousand Pakistani innocent men, women and children and more than five thousand security and armed forces personnel had lost their lives, that is more than any other single country, in the fight against terror and the blowback emanating from actions of the NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan;

Called upon the Government to ensure that the principles of an independent foreign policy must be grounded in strict adherence to the principles of policy, as stated in Article 40 of the Constitution, the UN Charter, observance of international law and respect for the free will and aspirations of sovereign states and their peoples;

Further called upon the Government to re-visit and review its terms of engagement with the United States, with a view to ensuring that Pakistan’s national interests are fully

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respected and accommodated in pursuit of policies for countering terrorism and achieving reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan;

Affirmed the importance of international cooperation for eliminating international terrorism, which can only be carried forward on the basis of a true partnership approach, based on equality, mutual respect and mutual trust;

Affirmed also full confidence in the defence forces of Pakistan in safeguarding Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and in overcoming any challenge to security, with the full support of the people and Government of Pakistan.

Reaffirmed the Resolution passed by the Joint Sitting of the Parliament on National Security held on 22 October 2008 and the detailed recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security in April 2009.”

Called upon the Government to appoint an independent Commission on the Abbottabad operation, fix responsibility and recommend necessary measures to ensure that such an incident does not recur. The composition/modalities of the Commission will be settled after consultations between the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition.

Source: http://www.aaj.tv/2011/05/text-of-unanimous-resolution-passed-by-joint-sitting- ofparliament/ (accessed 18 May 2011).

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APPENDIX-E

PRIME MINISTER’S STATEMENT TO THE PARLIAMENT REGARDING 26 NOVEMBER 2011 NATO ATTACKS

Following is a partial transcript of Prime Minister’s Statement to the Parliament in the wake of 26 November 2011 NATO Attacks

“Honourable Speaker, Members of this August House,

I wish to take the Parliament into confidence on the government’s position concerning the 26 November NATO attacks on Pakistan Army border posts in the Mohmand Agency. The situation arising from the 26 November attacks has direct implications for Pakistan’s security, sovereignty and territorial integrity and, therefore, requires careful consideration by the Parliament.

The Government of Pakistan strongly condemned these attacks, which were violative of the principles of the UN Charter and international law. We also conveyed to the United States and NATO that these attacks were totally unacceptable and constituted a flagrant breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The [Defence Committee of the Cabinet] DCC reiterated the resolve of the Pakistani people and Armed Forces to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity at all costs.

In accordance with the Resolution of the Joint Session of the Parliament of 14 May 2011, The DCC decided to close, with immediate effect, the NATO/ISAF logistics supply lines.

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The DCC also decided to ask the United States to vacate the Shamsi Airbase within fifteen days. The base has since been vacated.

The DCC decided that the Government will revisit and undertake a complete review of all programmes, activities and cooperative arrangements with the United States/NATO/ISAF, including diplomatic, political, military and intelligence.

The DCC also decided that the Parliament shall be taken into confidence on the whole range of measures regarding matters relating to Pakistan’s future cooperation with the United States/NATO/ISAF.

The Federal Cabinet, at its meeting on 29 November, also condemned the NATO/ISAF attacks and termed them as an assault on the sovereignty of Pakistan. The Cabinet unanimously endorsed the statement and the decisions of the DCC emergency meeting.

The Cabinet decided that Pakistan should not participate in the Bonn Conference due to the prevailing circumstances. It was also decided to request the National Security Committee of the Parliament to deliberate on the issue and submit its recommendations for consideration by the joint sitting of the Parliament.

An Envoys Conference was convened in Islamabad to evaluate the regional security situation; examine policy options; and, in particular, to make recommendations on redefining the terms of cooperation and engagement with the United States, NATO/ISAF. The conclusions and recommendations of the Conference have been submitted to the Government and also shared with the National Security Committee of the Parliament.

Let me emphatically state that there can be:

- No compromise on Pakistan’s sovereignty. - No compromise on Pakistan’s legitimate interests. - Pakistan’s territorial frontiers will be defended at all costs.

I would also like to reiterate that Pakistan, as a peace-loving country, remains committed to promoting stability and peace in our region, in particular Afghanistan.

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As a country that has suffered from terrorism, elimination of terrorism and militancy remains a high priority for the people and Government of Pakistan. In the past, we had extended every cooperation to members of the international community in the counter- terrorism domain. However, the terms of our cooperation certain well-defined redlines. These include the following:

- Sovereign equality and mutual respect. - No unilateral actions inside Pakistan or against Pakistan. - No transgression of our territorial frontiers.

As a responsible state, Pakistan will continue to uphold and promote the cause of regional peace and stability. However, in doing so we shall ensure that our legitimate interests are not only recognized but fully accommodated. This fundamental point of principle needs to be understood by our international partners. It is a matter of immense satisfaction that the entire nation is united at all levels to uphold Pakistan’s national dignity and honour and to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

We now await recommendations from the Parliamentary Committee on National Security. Future course of action will be decided by the Parliament. Thank you.”

Source: “Prime Minister’s Statement to the Parliament Regarding November 26, 2011 NATO Attacks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 15 December 2011. http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article.aspx?id=1030&type=3 (accessed 19 December 2011).

APPENDIX-F

TRIBAL LASHKAR FORMATION

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Date Agency/District Details

January 2008 South Waziristan Tribesmen raised a force of 600 to fight Al-Qaeda and foreign fighters. January 2008 Orakazai 15,000 men were raised to drive the Taliban out.

September Khyber 3,000 armed men, laid siege to the training camps 2008 set up by Taliban near the central Shagai village, and forced them to surrender or leave the area 2008 Bajaur Salarzai tribal Lashkar comprising 4,000 men chased out militants from their area. 2008 Kurram Tribesmen captured Bagzai area, then reclaimed Char Dewal and Jalmai, clearing area of Taliban. September Buner After an attack on a police post in Kingargalli 2008 village, villagers formed Lashkar to patrol the area and defend their villages, and eventually confronted and killed 6 Taliban in the area. June 2009 Dir In response to a suicide bombing of a mosque during prayers, about one thousand residents rose up and attacked militants and their supporters, which numbered about 200-400. August 2009 Swat A grand laskhar formed at Tehsil Kabal in Swat to purge the area from militants. a March 2010. Bajaur Salarzai lashkar killed one Taliban and arrested nine others and set ablaze 130 Taliban houses in Bajaur. have announced Rs. 2 million fines for any local helping or providing shelter to the Taliban, and warned that violators’ houses would be set on fire. b Source: Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment,” (Washington: New America Foundation, September 2009), p. 39; a “Grand lashkar raised in Swat Valley,” The Nation, 7 August 2009; b Hasbanullah Khan, “Salarzai lashkar sets fire to 130 Taliban houses in Bajaur,” Daily Times, 9 March 2010.

APPENDIX-G

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CONSOLIDATED BUDGET FOR FATA SDP (2007–15)

Sector Budget (Million Rupees) 1

Years 1-5 Years 6-9 Total Human Education 15,604.00 12,041.00 27,645.00

Development Health 8,300.00 5,400.00 13,700.00

Water supply and sanitation 2,385.00 1,655.00 4,040.00

Rural development 1,335.00 515.00 1,850.00

Natural Agriculture 5,815.00 4,300.00 10,115.00

Resource-Based Livestock and poultry 1,195.00 790.00 1,985.00

Forestry 4,230.00 3,320.00 7,550.00

Fisheries 435.00 250.00 685.00

Communication Irrigation, water and power 5,450.00 3,613.00 9,063.00 s and Roads and bridges 27,825.00 6,955.00 34,780.00 Infrastructure Physical planning & housing 1,000.00 405.00 1,405.00

Industry 2,025.00 1,395.00 3,420.00

Economic Mining 3,310.00 2,040.00 5,350.00 Development Commerce and trade 36.00 10.00 46.00

Skills development 419.00 210.00 629.00

Tourism 285.00 140.00 425.00

Cross-cutting Such as Poverty and Equity, 960.000 460.000 1,420.000 initiatives Environment, Gender issues, Institutional capacity, Research and Development

1 Note: When the SDP was originally published, the exchange rate was approximately 60 Pakistani Rupees to 1 (US Dollar) USD, which made the total cost of the strategic plan equal to $2 billion USD. At the July 2014 exchange rate of 97 Pakistani Rupees to 1 USD, total cost of the strategic plan equal to $3.2 billion.

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FATA SDP total (2007–15) 80,609.00 43,499.000 124,108.0 Source: “FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007-2015,” (Peshawar: Civil Secretariat FATA, 2006), p. 112.

APPENDIX-H

DIRECT OVERT US AID APPROPRIATIONS FOR AND MILITARY REIMBURSEMENTS TO PAKISTAN, FY2002-FY2014 (Rounded To The Nearest Millions of Dollars)

Programme FY2002- FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 Account FY2014 or FY2007 (est.)f Total, (req.) Account 1206 42 131 d 139 d − − − − 312 − CN 81 54 47 43 39 1e e 265 e CSFa 5,678d 1,019 685 1,499 1,118 688 h 10,687 h FMF 1,268 298 300 294 295 296 * 2,751 300 IMET 9 2 2 5 4 5 * 27 5 INCLE 248 22 88 170 114 75 * 717 74 NADR 43 10 13 24 25 n/a * 115 n/a PCF/PCCF − − 400 700 800 452 − 2,352 − Total 7,369 1,536 1,674 2,735 2,395 1,517 * 17,226 398 Security- Related CSH/GHCS 127 30 34 30 28 − − 249 − DA 256 30 − − − − v 286 − ESF 2,033 347 1,114 1,292 919 905 * 6,610 766 Food Aidb 133 50 55 124 51 96 63 572 − HRDF 17 − − − − <1 * 17 − IDA 120 50 103 232 145 54 * 704 − MRA 42 − 60 91 43 12 * 248 − Total 2,728 507 1,366 1,769 1,186 1,067 * 8,686 577 Economic- Related Grand 10,097 2,043 3,040 4,504 3,581 2,584 * 25,912 975 Total

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Sources: K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt US Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, April 2013), pp. 25-26.

Abbreviations:

1206: Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, global train and equip)

CN: Counternarcotics Funds (Pentagon budget)

CSF: Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget)

CSH: Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or GHCS, from FY2010)

DA: Development Assistance

ESF: Economic Support Funds

FMF: Foreign Military Financing

HRDF: Human Rights and Democracy Funds

IDA: International Disaster Assistance (Pakistani earthquake, flood, and internally displaced persons relief)

IMET: International Military Education and Training INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security) MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance (also includes Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance or ERMA) NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-terrorism assistance)

PCF/PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF overseen by the Pentagon, PCCF overseen by State)

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Notes: a. CSF is Pentagon funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations; it is technically not foreign assistance. b. P.L.480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs. c. Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 and FY2004 ESF allocations to cancel a total of $1.5 billion in debt to the U.S. government. d. Includes $75 million for FY2008 and $25 million for FY2009 to train and equip Pakistan’s Frontier Corps as authorized by Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181). e. This funding is “requirements-based;” there are no pre-allocation data. FY2012 Overseas Contingency Operations funding is not included. f. FY2013 estimates are currently unavailable as the Administration has yet to determine how the sequestration will be calculated and because there are no FY2013 funding levels from which to calculate the across-the-board reductions. g. The FY2013 Defense Authorization approves $1.65 billion in additional CSF for all U.S. coalition partners; the accompanying conference report limits FY2013 CSF for Pakistan to $1.2 billion.

APPENDIX-I

325

FATA DISPLACEMENT CRISIS: HOSTING AREAS & AREAS OF ORIGIN

Source: “North-West Pakistan: Massive New Displacement and Falling Returns Require Rights-Based Response,” Report by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council (June 2013), p. 2.

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NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Abbasi, Ansar, and Anjum Shakeel. “US Involved in Espionage near the Kahuta Nuclear Site,” The News. 22 October 2009.

Abbas, Hassan. “Lessons and Challenges for Pakistan,” The Hindu. 24 November 2009.

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Bagchi, Indrani. “India worried as Afghanistan, US look towards Pak for solution,” Times of India. 25 December 2012.

Bhadrakumar, M. K. “Pakistan confronts US Afghan strategy,” The Hindu. 27 April 2011.

Burki, Shahid Javed. “Pakistan and the new Great Game,” The Express Tribune. 16 January 2012.

“CIA exploited intelligence leads given by Pakistan,” The Express Tribune. 3 May 2011.

Hussain, Zahid. “Kayani spells out terms for regional stability,” Dawn. 2 February 2010.

Ignatius, David. “A quiet deal with Pakistan,” The Washington Post. 4 October 2008.

Iqbal, Ahsan. “Rising Pakistan,” The News. 11 March 2011.

Javed, Bassam. “AfPak review: same wine in old bottle,” The News. 25 December 2010.

Katulis, Brian, and Aakif Ahmad. “Shock absorbers for US, Pakistan,” Boston Globe. 25 February 2012.

Khan, Zia. “The fission of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” The Express Tribune. 17 November 2010.

Lamb, Christina. “Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijacks,” The Times. 17 January 2010.

Lamont, James. “US focuses on Taliban’s border ‘post office’,” Financial Times. 12 October 2009.

Lodhi, Maleeha. “Time for peace talks,” The News. 24 May 2011.

Margolis, Eric S. “Pervez Musharraf had little choice,” Daily Times. 2 October 2006.

Mumtaz, Hajrah. “Reforming the Unrepentant,” Dawn. 10 January 2010.

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Musharraf, Pervez. “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” The Washington Post. 1 June 2004.

Nelson, Dean. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bases Targeted by Al-Qaeda,” The Telegraph. 11 August 2009.

“Pakistan and the United States: Caught in the middle, The Economist. 22 September 2001.

Perlez, Jane. “US push to expand in Pakistan meets resistance,” New York Times. 5 October 2009.

Peters, Gretchen. “Pakistan takes hunt for Al Qaeda to cities,” Christian Science Monitor. 29 October 2002.

Rana, Muhammad Amir. “The Punjabi Taliban,” Dawn. 9 July 2010.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. “Re-orienting Pakistan,” Daily Times. 28 September 2008.

Sanger, David A. “Drawing Down, With a Vigilant Eye on Pakistan,” New York Times. 22 June 2011.

Scahill, Jeremy. “The Secret US War in Pakistan,” The Nation (New York). 23 November 2009.

Sethi, Najam. “Pakistan’s Afghanistan paradigm,” The Friday Times. 5 February 2010.

Syed, Baqir Sajjad. “Proof of RAW involvement in terror acts given to India,” Dawn. 22 July 2009.

Waraich, Omar. “Why Pakistan Must Widen Hunt for Militant Base,” TIME. 13 October 2009.

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. “Are We Losing to the Taliban,” Newsline. 30 May 2009.

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WEBSITES

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH09Df02.html http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ20Df05.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8485077.stm http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/main/2011/08/18/feature-02 http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/realigning-pakistans-security-forces/p19660. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm

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