The military situation in the Baltic States1

By Edgars Andersons

n literature, the are usu- nia and . The forests in the Baltic the Baltic States. Although the ally called “small” although their total States, especially in Latvia, can be regarded gives access to the Atlantic Ocean, one area is not that unimportant at all. It is as one of their great natural riches. Moreo- should pay attention to the fact that it roughly as large as two thirds of North- ver, the Baltic States are not as poor in belongs to the so-called border seas, which ern or the UK, it comprises mineral resources as commonly assumed. creates certain military difficulties. The about half of Japan or California and it An important factor in the Baltic States Baltic States are also a natural basis for is about one and a half times larger than was the development of an industry that international traffic routes in the air, on the area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium, was based on local starting substances, but railroads and roads. The land’s surface is the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Re- that later turned into a specialization in mostly very suitable for the creation of garding transport and commerce, the electrical engineering, precision instru- large-scale traffic connections.2 Baltic States are perfectly situated between ments, chemistry and similar branches. This However, the military situation of the Eastern and Western Europe. They are industry, especially in Latvia, could more Baltic States must be regarded as highly agriculturally self-sufficient. Slate in Esto- easily compete with the great powers on dangerous. They are in the northern sec- nia and waterpower in and es- the world market. The long coast of the tion of a long and narrow line of smaller pecially Latvia create optimal conditions Baltic Sea with its great ports, especially states that are an obstacle for the access for the industrial development and elec- , (Windau), Liepâja (Liebau), from the Russian territory to the Atlan- trification of these states. After World War (Reval) and Klaipeda (Memel), is tic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, and the Medi- II, even oil fields were found in Lithua- of considerable economic importance for terranean Sea. One should always be aware

113 of the fact that the , known The German Empire adjoined the Bal- for the areas of Petseri, Wilna, and Memel) today as the Union of Soviet Socialist tic States in the Southwest. Just like in were nationally quite uniform, whereas Republics (USSR), makes up one sixth the Middle Ages, it has been a serious threat Latvia’s situation in this respect was threat- of the earth’s total surface area. The situ- to the independence of the Baltic States ened. In the recent years, as much as 25% ation of the Baltic States was aggravated in modern times. But centuries-old expe- of Latvia’s population has been non- by the fact that the access to the Baltic rience has taught the Germans that the .6 Sea was most comfortable just in their Baltic “horn” – situated far in the North- Another negative factor was the centu- territory. This fact poses a serious threat east and under German rule – has always ries-old alienation between the Baltic peo- to the independence of the Baltic peo- been extremely difficult to defend and, ple and the lacking sense of community. ple as long as the Russian empire exists thus, constantly endangered in military Even while the Baltic States were independ- and the non-Russian peoples that are terms.4 Therefore, the opinion has devel- ent, little was done to remedy this situa- under Russian influence (about one half oped that a support of the bastion of the tion. Only when the threatening clouds of the general population) do not gain independent Baltic States and an encour- of World War II started gathering, the sovereignty. In the rear of the Baltic peo- agement of the right of self-determination Baltic people realized that they shared a ple – in the West – is the open sea. The of the Baltic people against the presump- common destiny. But then it was too late Scandinavian people on the other side, tions and the pressure of the non-Baltic to combine their powers on a large scale.7 remembering their sad experiences in the people (especially those of the ), In international literature one can find past, have always tried to stay away from would be the best solution for the Ger- the view that the independence of the the problems of the European continent man interests.5 Unfortunately, this under- Baltic States was just a short incident in and especially of the Baltics and to re- standing came to late. world history and that the Baltic people main in relative isolation on the An extremely unfavourable factor is did not play a part in political, economic Scandinavian Peninsula. However, the the small Baltic population. Only 6 mil- and military terms in the past. This opin- Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have lion people live in that area, among them ion is completely wrong. In the course of been able to stay at the coast of the Bal- an unusually high number of descendants history, the fact went unnoticed that the tic Sea for more than 4.000 years although of late immigrants such as Russians, , Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been they have lost wide areas in Northern and Germans, , White Russians, Swedish able to stay in their present areas of settle- Central .3 and others. and Lithuania (except ment for 4.000 to 5.000 years, that about

114 2.000 B.C. the Baltic people inhabited an also enlarged the area under their control rights.15 This mistake cost the Poles as well area that extended from the Ural to the several times until it stretched from the as the unfortunate peoples who were Oder and from Estonia to Central Po- Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, becoming the linked to them dear. land and that from the birth of Christ largest state in medieval Europe.12 The Although the German conquerors up to the sixth century the Baltic tribes, combined powers of the Poles and the saved the Latvians and Estonians from had reached a cultural peak that was quite stopped the advance of the becoming assimilated by the masses of the unusual compared to their neighbours.8 Tartars and the Mongols towards Europe, Slavs, connected them with Western cul- For several centuries, the Latvian and Es- saved several Russian areas from the Mon- ture and did not try to Germanise them, tonian tribes not only resisted the simul- golian yoke, slowed down the Germans’ they committed a crucial mistake in ex- taneous pressure of the Scandinavian and drive towards the East by beating the ploiting these peoples in the interest of Slavic tribes, but also started counterat- German Order in 1410, and absorbed the German squires and merchants ever more tacks into the areas of the Swedes, Danes Ottomans’ advance towards the Holy mercilessly. A deep rift opened up between and Slavs.9 The Baltic people showed unu- Roman Empire.13 Unfortunately, the the German immigrants and the native sual persistence and bravery and were Lithuanians lost their political and even people, a rift that weakened the bastion militarily successful against enemies that cultural independence to a considerable of and was hard to overcome. often were technically better equipped extent during the union with Poland, al- Although Latvian and Estonian units during the crusades. The Estonians’ fight though kings from the Lithuanian fought bravely under their own com- for freedom against the Swedes, Danes and Jagellons-Dynasty governed both states for manders, together with the German troops Germans lasted from 1191 to 122710 and several centuries.14 The Poles on their part of the Livonian League against the Rus- the resistance of Latvia against the com- made a historic mistake when they tried sian intruders in several battles, the bined German powers lasted even consid- to subjugate not only the people of the Livonian League fell apart. The conflict erably longer – from 1186 to 1290. The states they had conquered – White Rus- between the leading groups was to blame Order of the Brothers of the Sword was sians, and Latvians – but also for this. In the following centuries the destroyed and the was the Lithuanians, who were their allies and leading German social classes mainly tried severely beaten.11 much larger in number. The Poles were to defend their own interests and privi- The Lithuanians not only managed to not interested in a confederation in which leges and failed to unite the native people hold their ground against intruders, but these peoples would have had equal against the supremacy of foreign states.16

115 Although the local landowners sub- sian control, soldiers of these people were the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, when jected the majority of Latvians, Estoni- in Russia’s army and fleet, where they these countries were more or less under ans, and Lithuanians to serfdom, these gained ranks at the end of the 19th and control by their own people.29 Lithua- people did not lose their national and the beginning of the 20th century.23 Dur- nian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvian military spirit even under the most se- ing Napoleon’s invasion and during the emigrants took part in the American Civil vere conditions. The great Estonian re- Crimean War, there were purely Latvian War. The first victim of this war was the volt of 1343 against the Danish and Ger- navy and army units in fight against the Latvian Martiò¿ Buciò¿.30 During the man supremacy, which liberated the whole invaders.24 When the Lithuanians got Spanish-American War, Lithuanian emi- of Northern Estonia for a short period, under Russian control, the opposite hap- grants even sent their own military proved this.17 In 1372, the Lithuanians pened. Lithuanian units volunteered for units.31 All the above shows that the pe- conquered the Kremlin in .18 the fight against the Russians in 1812.25 riod of oppression that lasted for centu- During the Latvian and In the part of Lithuania that had fallen to ries could not suppress the national con- Estonian peasant armies operated.19 Units Poland, the Prussian army had two Lithua- sciousness and the instinct for truth, jus- of Latvian soldiers were among the troops nian cavalry regiments for many years.26 tice and soldiery among the Baltic peo- of Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland. The times of the Russian administra- ple. Latvians and Estonians not only had Latvian soldiers fought not only in their tion were nevertheless the hardest trial for training opportunities in the Russian native country, but also in Poland, Aus- the Baltic people. Several revolts, under- army and fleet, but were also able to gain tria, and the Netherlands and some sol- taken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithua- experience in the highest commanding diers and seamen even showed up in the nians against the local authorities of the positions. The Catholic Lithuanians were colonies of the Dukedom of Courland, Russian, German-Baltic and Polish land- not accepted as officers into the Russian in Africa and America.20 In 1560, the Es- owners and against the Russian adminis- armed forces.32 Instead the political lead- tonians even liberated a part of their tration, clearly show this. These uprisings ers of Lithuania had – due to the long country again for a short period of reached their peak in the great Polish- period of proud independence – the clear- time.21 During the Great Nordic War, Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and est and the farthest-reaching political goal: twelve Latvian infantry battalions and ar- 1863-186527 , the Estonian Mahtras War the restoration of Lithuania’s independ- tillery units fought on Swedish side.22 of 185828 , and the bloody revolution of ence. The part of the Lithuanian popula- When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus- all three Baltic people, but especially of tion that was under Russian control was

116 more strongly oppressed economically and to greater hopes among the Baltic peo- of incompetent and corrupt Russian gen- culturally than the other Baltic people. ple; the majority of the local leaders, how- erals. Right from the beginning of the Although the political goals of the Latvians ever, even then only hoped for an au- war, the soldiers showed excellent brav- and Estonians were not as far-reaching as tonomy of their peoples Only unusually ery, steadfastness, and contempt for death. the ones of the Lithuanians, these people big international changes could help the Observers of the Battle of Augustova com- were able to create a solid economic and Baltic people to gain the longed-for inde- pared the 20th Russian Corps, which was cultural foundation for greater self-deter- pendence. Extremely favourable condi- almost completely comprised of the Bal- mination and, eventually, for independ- tions were created by the , tic soldiers, to Napoleon’s guards. The suc- ence. 33 the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia, the cess of the Baltic soldiers was described as collapse of the German Empire, the right the Russians’ success by the press. Roughly The lessons of World War I and of self-determination of the people pro- 20.000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, and the fights for freedom claimed by the Entente and the wide- many Estonians fell in the name of Rus- spread economic and political prepared- sia’s glory, their people not gaining any Since 1795, all Baltic states, with the ness of the Baltic people for an independ- advantages by that.34 In the big rearguard exception of a small area in Prussia in- ent life. actions, however, two Latvian garrison- habited by Lithuanians, were under Rus- The Baltic region – just like in earlier battalions were able to draw attention; 70% sian rule. Except for the short period of great wars – became a battleground right of the men were wiped out.35 Napoleon’s invasion, the Baltic people did at the beginning of World War I, a fact Latvian politicians achieved the crea- not have the slightest hope of getting rid that did harm especially to Lithuania and tion of national Latvian light-infantry of the Russian control. A pact with Ger- Latvia. The native soldiers that were mo- units. From the 1st of August 1915 and many would only have meant strengthen- bilized in the Baltic area had to withstand onwards, they consisted of some battal- ing of the local German oligarchy. Be- the first advance of the German army, but ions, later of eight combat regiments and cause of the Polish weakness and lack of later also had to undertake the first inva- one reserve regiment that were combined understanding, the Lithuanians bitterly sion into East Prussia. Tens of thousands in two brigades, for a short period in regretted their co-operation with them of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sol- one division.36 These units, commanded during the revolutions of 1830 and 1863. diers were put into Russian units, where by officers, broke through the German The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise they fought bravely under the command front lines several times by using new tac-

117 tics and rescued Russian units out of hope- two Latvian regions – Livonia and sion to put up an Estonian division, less situations. Due to their bravery and Courland – get autonomy; Lettgallen did something they had really done already. successes they were so different from Rus- not receive it, and the whole area of Latvia In contrast to the Latvian brigades, who sian units, that they drew attention not was not united into one national terri- were pure infantry units, the Estonian only of Western military observers, but tory. After all, the Russian government division was allowed to raise an artillery also of the international press.37 Unfor- had to take into account the morale among brigade, a cavalry regiment and a techni- tunately, these excellent Latvian units were the Latvian units.40 cal unit.44 Maybe because the units were thirsty for glory and wanted to get atten- The Estonian political leaders were long formed so late, the commanders of the tion and thus let themselves get manoeu- in doubt whether it was worthwhile hav- Estonian division (in contrast to the vred into hopeless situations, paying a ing the Russian government draw up Es- Latvian commanders) managed to avoid high toll of lives during the offensive of tonian national units. They were afraid militarily and politically unnecessary July 1916 and the heroic offensives of that all Estonian units might be annihi- bloodshed and to prevent a distribution Christmas 1916 and New Year 1917. They lated in one single battle, whereas with a of the Estonian units across Russia after all led to negative reactions among the distribution of the soldiers along the the breakdown of the front. Some Latvian soldiers. The complete national-Latvian whole, long Russian front, there was hope units broke up; others were transferred units consisted of approximately 45.000 that the basis of the Estonian people to Russia, where, after the Bolshevik Revo- men. About 10.000 Latvian soldiers found would survive.41 Yet in the end, the opin- lution, they were forced to fight as a spe- their death in these units, e.g. during the ion prevailed that national units would cial division for the Bolshevik, while their defence of Riga in September 1917.38 All be necessary for the achievements of their home was being occupied by German together about 35.000 Latvian soldiers fell political goals. On the 21st of April, the troops.45 Later, an Estonian soviet-divi- in Latvian and Russian units during Word first Estonian infantry regiment was sion was formed in Russia.46 War I.39 The Latvian soldiers found a way formed.42 Due to the weakness and the As the representatives of the Lithua- of drawing the attention of the Russians retreat of neighbouring Russian units, this nian people abroad had demanded full and their allies to their victims, but the regiment suffered a great deal when de- independence right at the beginning of Latvian people did not gain any advan- fending its positions, just as the Latvian the war, the commanders of the Russian tages from these victims of World War I. regiments did.43 As late as the 19th of armed forces tried to prevent the forma- Only after the Revolution of 1917 did December, did the Estonians get permis- tion of the national Lithuanian units. The

118 first four Lithuanian battalions and two it was immediately disbanded.50 The Ger- critical times.54 Latvian units held the front squadrons were created as late as August man authorities did not approve of a and won the battles of Kasan’j, Orla, and September 1917.47 Many Latvian and formation of the Lithuanian self-protec- Perekop and others, that decided the out- Estonian officers were in the Russian tion units. As the Latvians were consid- come of the Civil War.55 Military observ- army, even in the highest ranks, but there ered to be the most radical, all men fit ers of the Entente and Germany acknowl- were only few Lithuanian officers. Towards for service that had been in the Russian edged the importance of the Latvian units the end of the war, Lithuanians were army were brought into prison camps.51 and tried to win them over. All of them, trained as officers in spite of their reli- The Latvian light-infantry units which however, made a crucial mistake because gious belief. Now there were some Lithua- were distributed across all of Russia were they regarded the Latvians as mercenaries nian officers among the lower ranks, but of greatest importance at the front of the that would fight in the name of anything there were virtually none in the higher Russian Civil War. To a certain degree, for money, but they did not promise in- ranks. Those soldiers who remained on this was also true of the Estonian Soviet- dependence and social justice.56 Two the Bolshevist side after the revolution units. These units showed extraordinary Latvian regiments and a Lithuanian bat- dispersed for the most part.48 bravery, discipline, and sense of respon- talion nonetheless fought for the allies in In February and March 1918, units of sibility in the fulfilment of military tasks the Far East, where they sustained heavy the Estonian division – in co-operation under the command of their own offic- losses, while the Estonian legion played a with the Germans – helped liberate the ers. They also very much differed from role in Northern Russia. later proclaimed Estonian Republic, but in the revolutionary Russian units, that – for When the German Empire collapsed, March the German military administra- the most part – were very undisciplined. the national governments of Estonia, tion disarmed the Estonian units; only 52 Some Latvian and Estonian officers that Latvia and Lithuania had the chance to badly armed militias remained.49 were cast away in Russia were also ap- start their work. Although Soviet Russia The Lithuanians did not do any bet- pointed to highest position in the armed had given up the Baltics in the Treaties ter. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battal- forces of Soviet Russia. They commanded of Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its govern- ion deserted to the Germans in the Rovno brigades, divisions, armies and even army ment nonetheless tried to re-conquer them area in the Ukraine. Until August, the groups and fronts.53 The Latvian Colo- after Germany’s breakdown. Germans used this battalion for garrison nel Joachims Vacietis was even in com- World War I was over. The right of duties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where mand of the whole armed forces during self-determination for the people had been

119 declared, and the had independence in principle, was too weak example was the Battle of Cesis (Wenden) been founded. But several small states, to influence the huge administrational in June 1919 against the Estonian and among them the Baltic States, still had to and military machinery, which for the Latvian troops. The German armies could fight hard to protect their independence. most part was led or influenced by peo- have gained the status of liberators of the The Baltic States were dragged into the ple that were in favour of imperialism. Baltic States, as it had happened in Fin- conflict between the communist and anti- Some of the German revolutionary forces land. But instead they earned the eternal communist powers, into the imperialis- on their part sympathized with or was hatred and suspicion of Estonia and Latvia. tic contest of several states and into the against any continuation of the war If the Battle of Cesis had ended with a attempts by the communist and anti-com- against Soviet Russia in the interest of victory of the German troops, this would munist Russian governments to get the the Entente. The latter did not promise have been reason enough for an occupa- Baltic States under their control again.57 any support for Germany’s victims nor tion of whole Germany by the armies of The proclamation of the independence just any kind of alleviation in the peace the Entente. We have to emphasize that the of the Baltic States was not sufficient. The treaty.60 The eighth and tenth German attack on the Estonian and Latvian troops Baltic States had to use their own armed armies were supposed to defend the Bal- was made although the German command forces in order to defend their national tic region until the Baltic States would be had given contrary orders. A disadvanta- interests. The leaders of the Baltic States able to defend themselves. But war-weary geous outcome of the Battle at Cesis would had to experience that the Western pow- and influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, have exposed the Baltic States to a com- ers ignored the right of self-determina- they retreated to the German borders and plete pincer movement by the Bolsheviks. tion that they themselves had declared58 dispersed.61 The voluntary units that took But the national forces won, and the Ger- and that they only took advantage of the their place got under the influence of man reputation was severely damaged.62 Baltic States in their own national inter- politically short-sighted and reactionary All of the above shows that the Baltic est and in order to get support for the people. After some successful battles against States could not rely on any declarations. anti-communist forces in Russia. Moreo- the Bolshevik forces that threatened not They really needed their own armed forces. ver, these leaders did not get any promise only the Baltic States but also Germany, Similarly, a strong co-operation was es- of a future independence of the Baltic these people manoeuvred the voluntary sential. people.59 The democratic government of units into the fight against the anti-com- When World War I was coming to an Germany, which approved of the Baltic munist forces in the Baltic States. The best end, only Estonia was practically able to

120 form a small army in a short period of the war. This situation was aggravated by The Baltic States, that were virtually time. The largest part of the forces, in- the negative attitude of the leaders of the foreign to one another, started some kind cluding the commanding ranks, had sur- German civilian government and of the of diplomatic co-operation, especially vived, but they were lacking arms and majority of the military commanders to- Latvia, Estonia and Finland, whereas money. The German help was very reluc- wards Latvian independence and the crea- Lithuania was only partially involved. But tant and small. The support by the Brit- tion of the national Latvian forces. These the newly formed military forces oper- ish fleet and the Finns was most impor- people were still influenced by imperial- ated independently from one another.68 tant, but nevertheless the Estonians had istic and colonial ideas.65 Yet, some remarkable examples of co- to rely mainly on their own abilities, their In Lithuania, the military units were operation should be mentioned as they resourcefulness and their toughness.63 better preserved, but they did not have always ended with important military or The majority of the Latvian soldiers any qualified officers, weapons, or money. political victories that gave the states in- were in Russia or in the German Pris- As Lithuania was right on the Russian- volved the same advantages and sense of oner of War camps. The Latvian troops German border and as Germany as well as security. The co-operation between the that were in Russia were supporting So- Lithuania was in conflict with Poland, the Estonian and the Latvian Northern Army viet Latvia and were opposing the Latvian German government agreed upon a par- in the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) in national government. The Russian Soviet tial support of the state of Lithuania. This June and July 1919 should be especially government did this. At that time, the support dropped when Lithuania made mentioned, although the neutrality of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces official claims for the Memelregion.66 Latvian Southern Group, which was un- of Soviet Russia was the Latvian Colonel All Baltic States were economically ex- der German control, was a negative fac- Joachims Vacietis, who was a Latvian pa- tremely weakened. Furthermore, Latvia tor.69 The Estonian army also covered and triot, but still was loyal to Russia’s Soviet and, to a large extend, Lithuania were very protected a part of the Latvian border in government, hoping to find support for much destroyed. Financial and economic the East until December 1919. In the sum- Latvia’s independence there.64 At first, support by the Western powers was very mer of 1919, it actively took part in the there were no soldiers, no weapons, and small and came under very unfavourable fights against the Bolshevik forces that were no money in Latvia. There was a very radi- conditions. Weapons and other armaments threatening Latvia.70 The Lithuanian army cal atmosphere among the population, material delivered were mostly worn out on its part held its ground against the who had suffered tremendously during and damaged.67 Bermont Army without any Estonian or

121 Latvian support for a long time and fi- units liberated Western Latvia, helped Soviet troops was the violent and short nally defeated it. This was in the interest with the formation of new Latvian troops sighted politics of the Soviet government of all Baltic States.71 Unfortunately, one from January until May 191975 and sup- and the aversion of the troops themselves has to point out the belated co-operation ported the Lithuanian army just as long, to fight against national forces. The larg- between the Latvian and Lithuanian ar- did not receive any compensation.76 est part of the Baltic soldiers mobilized mies in November 1919 in this connec- The fundamental help for Estonia by by the Soviets found ways of going over tion. The Lithuanians are not really to the English fleet from December 1918 to the national forces in order to con- blame for their late involvement because until January 1920 has to be mentioned tinue their fight together with them.78 they had to fear a possible aggression by as well as the support by English and Viewed in its entirety, another nega- 72 the Polish troops. Despite the fact that French naval units during the fights of tive factor was the insignificant mutual Poland did not recognize an independ- the Latvian army against the Bermont demands by the Baltic States to correct ent Lithuania, but was aiming at a Polish- Army in October and November 1919. the borderlines that were a disadvantage Lithuanian Union, Poland promised not The presence of the British fleet itself was to the common military and political to take advantage of Lithuania’s situation some kind of a guarantee and moral sup- outline.79 However, the Baltic States were during the threat by Bermont. Its army port for the independence fighters in the able to solve their problems rather early, even protected the Eastern border of Baltic States.77 Lithuania, while the largest part of Lithua- in 1920 and 1921. nia’s troops was involved in fights with The Russian Soviet government, who - During the wars of liberation of the Bermont.73 The co-operation between the at the beginning of the invasion – had Baltic States, only two attempts were made Latvian and Polish armies during the of- tolerated the formation of military forces to consolidate the action of the armed fensive in January 1920 against the Soviet by the Soviet governments in Latvia, forces. English General Frank. G. March forces was very successful. We have to stress Lithuania, and Estonia for political rea- initiated the first one on the 26th of Au- that Poland was the only big state that sons, later tolerated their disintegration gust 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troops of did not demand any payment for its because of new political considerations General Judeniè, the Estonian and Latvian help.74 and made peace with the national gov- troops, the anti-Bolshevik Russian-Ger- To be historically true, we must also ernments of the Baltic States. The real rea- man troops of Bermont as well as the emphasize that Germany, whose voluntary son for this disintegration of the Baltic Polish and the Lithuanian armies were

122 supposed to start a common offence bility in Lithuania. The interference in At the end of the war, the Estonian against the Bolshevik troops.80 The sec- politics by the army often created dan- national army consisted of 74.500 men ond attempt, initiated by British General gerous situations that could have ended and had 39 gun batteries, 10 tank platoons, Arthur J. Turner, was made on the 6th of with a catastrophe.83 Latvia and partly eight armoured vehicles, 28 aircrafts and January 1920 and was supposed to create Estonia, too, were negatively influenced 10 warships. During the war of libera- a military alliance among the Baltic States. by the integration of a part of their troops tion, the Estonian army lost 3.588 soldiers Representatives of the Estonian, Latvian, into the Latvian and Estonian Soviet di- (2.236 of them fell at the front) and had and Lithuanian armies agreed in visions of Russia. However, these divi- 13.775 injured.85 The Latvian army had – (Walk) upon regular meetings and the sions, which fought at the heart of the at the end of the war – 76.394 men, 91 standardization of war material, but a Red Army and won crucial victories over pieces of heavy artillery, 707 light and political agreement or a war alliance did anti-Soviet Russian forces that were averse heavy machineguns, five tank platoons, not follow this meeting in Valka. The to an independence of the Baltic States, eight armoured vehicles, five tanks and political leaders of the Baltic States missed indirectly helped to secure the independ- 19 aircrafts. It lost 3.046 men and had the unique chance to gain greater secu- ence of the Baltic States.84 Yet, one has to 4.085 injured.86 At the time, the Lithua- rity and international prestige for their keep in mind that the Baltic States had to nian army had 60.000 men in four divi- states.81 fear an attack by Soviet Russia through sions and three cavalry regiments, 48 pieces After initial misjudgement of what was the period of their independence. The So- of heavy artillery, 450 heavy machineguns, happening and short apathy in the his- viet government was only waiting for the four armoured vehicles, one armoured tory of the wars of liberation, one could right moment to consolidate its power railway train, and 18 aircrafts. During the witness a spontaneous growth and more in the Baltic States. Such favourable con- war, Lithuania lost 614 men, another 822 strength among the national forces. A clear ditions developed in 1939/1940 and then died after their injuries. There were 1.175 example is the formation of a national again in 1944/1945. injured and 154 invalids. 87 In World War army in Latvia.82 Estonia showed the Though poorly armed and their ac- I, the Latvians had lost about 35.000 men, greatest stability. Latvia showed the same tions often impeded by foreign politi- the Lithuanians approximately 15.000. The level of stability after it had overcome cians, the armies of all three Baltic States exact number for Estonia is not known. difficulties that originated from outer and were enormously successful on the bat- During the Russian civil war, the Latvians inner negative forces. There was less sta- tlefield. lost at least 20.000 men. The Estonian casu-

123 alties were high in number, as well. Lithua- In their resistance to the nians also fought in the British and The Situation of the Baltic States and, later, to , the Baltic American units that fought for the En- after the War of Liberation States defended the goals of the League of tente in Siberia. Nations and remained their members up This overview shows the military spirit In the first decade of independence, to the last day of their independence.90 and the absent fear of death among the the leaders of the Baltic States were some- The political leaders of the Baltic States Baltic people. It also shows that, because what optimistic about their military situ- tried to forget that they had not been of the unfavourable geographic situation ation. They had full confidence in the accepted into the League of Nations in and the historical conditions, the Baltics League of Nations and believed that the 1920 only because the other states feared lost a great part of their “national strength” people of the world seriously wanted peace that due to their prominent geographi- in the battle for the interests of foreign after the extraordinarily destructive and cal situation, they might have to help powers, without gaining a real advantage bloody World War I. They also were fully defend the independence of these states.91 for their own states. Considering the overall confident not only about the treaties made, In 1921, at last, the majority of the mem- political and military situation as well as but also about the self-interest of the great bers of the League of Nations had the the conditions that were unfavourable for powers, which would not allow for one courage to accept the Baltic States into the independence of the Baltic States, one state or a bloc of states to gain control their number.92 The lack of a common has to say that the Baltic politicians and over the Baltic States.88 spirit and courage was typical of the ac- their military leaders were very successful The leaders of the Baltic States did eve- tions of the League of Nations during its and showed extraordinary competence in rything imaginable to foster peace, over- entire existence. It was paralyzed by the securing the independence of the Baltic all co-operation and disarmament. They exaggerated egotism of its member states States. Their co-operation could have been not only signed, but also ratified all in- and by the lacking intention to seriously more extensive, but we have to admit that ternational treaties that had these goals.89 co-operate and support peace. The mem- the Baltic States were not really able to It was not the fault of the Baltic States, bers soon realized that they had to rely help one another as they all had to suffer but because of the egoistic interests of only on their moral, economic and mili- from the collapse of the economy that the great powers that all these treaties re- tary power. Thus, the smaller states always the World War I and the exploitation by mained not more than paper and were emphasized their complete neutrality in the occupying powers had brought about. not brought to full life. cases of conflicts.

124 The hopes that the League of Nations nomic ties with them, it was clear that the Union as well as Baltic organizations in would guarantee the Baltic States’ inde- loss of the Baltic coasts was very painful, Russia repeatedly promised the re-intro- pendence got smaller. Yet, the leaders of not only because of political prestige, but duction of the soviet system in the Baltic these states believed the victorious pow- also for practical reasons. The Gulf of Fin- States by revolutionary means. 96 ers of World War I would be able to main- land, which also meant the Russian part Spies, saboteurs and political agitators tain their leadership position for a long of the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice for were continuously pouring across the time and that it was in their interest to six to seven months of the year. During borders of the Soviet Union into the support the independence of the Baltic these months, the navy as well as the mer- Baltic States. This could not lead to good States, directly or indirectly.93 chant fleet of Russia were captives of the relationships between the Baltic States and But the Baltic States were mistaken in ice and they could not be stationed in the Soviet Union, although the latter had this respect, as well. They viewed with con- the ports of the Baltic States. It was very been the first one to recognize the inde- cern the disagreement among the UK, inconvenient for a great power to be de- pendence of the Baltic States and had France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well as pendent upon the small Baltic States for waived all claims to their territory.97 their economic and even military compe- the transport of goods, especially as it really The Baltic States’ fear of the Soviet tition and their lacking co-operation. had to fear that these states might soon Union was later somewhat calmed by the However, the two biggest potential threats be under the influence of hostile great fact that the most extreme groups were to the Baltic independence, Germany and powers or power blocs.95 removed and those in power wanted to the Soviet Union, were weak due to war Another concern was the aims of the avoid wars as long as the social system was and revolution, a fact that somewhat less- world revolution declared by the Soviet not consolidated and the armed forces ened these worries. Until 1933, the Baltic Union. A seventh of the Latvian popula- were not ready for an offensive.98 States even saw a democratic Germany as a tion as well as a large number of the Esto- The growing military power of Nazi guarantor of the independence.94 nians and Lithuanians had remained in the Germany was a real concern as well as its The gigantic neighbour in the East, the Soviet Union. Among these Baltics, the aggressive ideology and its open efforts Soviet Union, caused the greatest concern. flames of hate against the democratic gov- to expand which also were aimed at the Although the Baltic States did everything ernments of the Baltic States were fanned Baltic States and Eastern Europe in gen- to give the Soviet Union convenient us- and the Communist Information Bureau eral. From 1933 and onwards, military age of their ports in order to build eco- (COMINFORM) supported by the Soviet planners in the Baltic States had to reckon

125 with an invasion from the East as well as est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the same vented the possibility of a far-reaching from the West. in Germany and Poland in France. To- co-operation.102 At least there was some hope that the wards the end of World War I, the Brit- Representatives of the UK admonished neighbouring quarrelling powers would ish were without doubt interested in a the Baltic as well as the Scandinavian States not allow each other to take up its posi- support of the efforts undertaken by the repeatedly during the first post-war years tion in the Baltic region, but would rather Baltic States to reach independence in to build closer political and military con- keep it as a kind of a buffer zone between order to weaken their enemy, Germany. nections, but all in vain. It did not only each other, at least as long as they did not Moreover, they wanted to create possibly seem to be unwise, but also dangerous to intend any open conflict.99 long-lasting chaos for their potential com- make treaties of military support with The self-destructing policy of the West- petitor Russia, no matter whether it was several small states that did not get along ern powers and the real, ideological, de- Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik.101 Later, the with one another.103 The British did not mographical, and military weakness of UK supported the Baltic States only to want to get involved in the meaningless Poland, the “fifth European great power”, prevent the Soviet Union from invading quarrels among the Baltic States, but they created real concern among the leaders of Europe through their territory and in used them, especially Estonia, as recon- the Baltic States during the last years be- order to tie them to itself economically. naissance base against the Soviet Union.104 fore World War II. In Latvia and Estonia, From the point of view of the UK, After the emergence of the Third Reich they did not fear any military conflict the Baltic States were too far away, geo- of the Nazis, the British were aiming at a between Lithuania and Poland because of politically too endangered and economi- confrontation between the latter and the the Wilna conflict. Still, the latter was a cally too unimportant. British military Soviet Union, hoping both totalitarian senseless hindrance to a political and mili- bases in the Baltic region would have been powers would destroy each other with- tary co-operation of all small states situ- in constant danger. They would have been out the UK getting involved.105 When it ated between Germany and the Soviet right in the border zone of Russia and got fully clear that the German policy was Union and to a concept of some kind of Germany, far away from the British Isles, more dangerous for the Western powers defence system in an obviously hopeless and their access would have been very than the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantly situation.100 complicated because of the “closed” char- approached the Soviet Union shortly be- During the first post-war years, Latvia acter of the Baltic Sea. The missing agree- fore the war to induce Germany to come and Estonia regarded the UK as its strong- ment among the Baltic States also pre- to an agreement with the Western pow-

126 ers. In this connection, the idea of a guar- to leave Poland and the other East Euro- nia off politically against Poland. Although antee for the Baltic States was initiated by pean states to their fate.108 Lithuania felt safe from further aggressions the Soviet Union. This suggestion was Nevertheless, there was some exchange by Poland because of its co-operation with dangerous for the Baltic States due to sev- of information between the general staffs those ones, Germany and the Soviet Un- eral suspicious conditions. The UK and of France and the Baltic States. Several ion did not help Lithuania re-gain the France were virtually not able to give Latvian officers were trained at French Wilna area nor did they plan to protect guarantees for the Baltic States as Germany military academies, and most of the Latvian Lithuania from potential further lay between them.106 war ships were built in France.109 But that aggressions by Poland. Germany’s only The interest of France in the Baltic was all. intention in case of a Polish attack was to States was different from The British. Both In the first post-war years, Latvia and take back the Memel region that it had powers were political and economic com- Estonia refused to enter a military alli- lost to Lithuania in the Treaty of Ver- petitors. As long as Germany did not go ance with Poland as long as the latter did sailles.112 The aggressiveness of Nazi Ger- directly against the UK economically, the not settle the conflict with Lithuania in a many in the question of re-gaining the latter was interested in a relatively strong way that satisfied both states. Because of Memel region put an end to the close mili- Germany as a useful business partner. that, Latvia and Estonia were not even tary co-operation between Germany and However, it was France’s interest to keep indirectly integrated into the French sys- Lithuania.113 With the Soviet Union, the weakened Germany down as long as tem of military alliances.110 Lithuania did not maintain any military possible and to build up a group of new Latvia and Estonia did not directly co- co-operation at all. It only bought a cer- allies under the leadership of an enlarged operate with Germany militarily, but the tain number of expensive field guns.114 As and strengthened Poland east of Germany German military literature and German the Western powers were not interested in replacing of Russian, which was lost as an military know-how were used to a large an obligation to defend the East European ally. Moreover, France tried to get back extent. states and the League of Nations was not a the enormous amounts of money invested Lithuania had close connections with safeguard for safety and peace, the only in Russia by putting pressure on the Germany for some time concerning mili- option was a regional military bloc. There state.107 Should it have been possible to tary supply and the qualification of high- were two realistic possibilities: a neutral come to a direct agreement with Germany ranking officers.111 For a long time, Ger- Nordic bloc of the Scandinavian and Bal- or the Soviet Union, France was prepared many and the Soviet Union played Lithua- tic States, or a defensive alliance of all states

127 from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea its orientation shifted towards Scandina- the beginning 1930s. The highest officers that had a common border with the So- via. Finland’s politicians regarded the of Finland, Estonia and Latvia visited each viet Union.115 Baltic States as more endangered than their other several times and observed military To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian- own state. Finland is so far up north that manoeuvres. In individual cases, Estonia Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solu- it cannot have the linking function that and Latvia took advantage of the lately cre- tion. This bloc would have been situated is so characteristic of the Baltic States. ated Finnish armaments industry.118 Except completely north of the Central European Historically and politically, Russia had for Lithuania, the Baltic States did not make area of conflict between Germany and the considered Finland to be an autonomous use of the highly developed Swedish arma- Soviet Union, and the problems concern- entity already previously. Moreover, it ments industry. Economic considerations ing territory between Poland and Ruma- would not see the crucial necessity of hav- were the reason. Sweden did not need the nia on the one hand and the Soviet Un- ing bases in Finland if it could have them products of the Baltics; thus, the expen- sive weapons and ammunition would have ion on the other would not have affected in the Baltics. In case of a war, the Gulf of had to be paid cash, which the Baltic States it directly either. But the politicians of Finland, which separates these states from could not afford because of their financial the Scandinavian states were of the opin- Finland, would have made an alliance with difficulties. The British as well as the French ion that the Soviet Union would soon the Baltic States difficult. The united na- demanded that the Baltic States should buy try to take up its position on the Baltic vies of Finland and the Baltic States were weapons and ammunition primarily from coasts again and thus absolutely refused also too weak to keep the strong Soviet their states if they wanted to sell their goods to enter into any kind of connections navy in the Eastern part of the Gulf. But in the UK and France. However, mostly with the Baltic States. The Scandinavian especially, the Finns feared a co-operation used and very old weapons were sold to states felt quite safe in their isolation as a with Poland, which they regarded as a dan- the Baltic States. In case of a war, there peninsula and in their long-lasting tradi- ger to their security. That is why Finland would have been no hope of securing a tion of neutrality.116 Therefore, Finland wanted to get as close as possible to the continuous supply with spare parts and and the Baltic States had only one op- neutral Scandinavian bloc and refused to ammunition from these countries. The traf- tion, to come to an agreement among each co-operate militarily with the Baltic fic with Sweden was much less disturbed other and to find a better solution. Until States.117 Only Finnish military observers and safer.119 1922, the orientation towards the Baltic took part in general staff meetings of the For military protection, the Baltic States was predominant in Finland; then Baltic States and Poland in the 1920s and States either had to join together or they

128 had to seek co-operation with the strong- Poland’s ally during the wars of liberation. There were only two alternatives left: a est neighbour of the Soviet Union, Po- But Poland’s action against Lithuania, military union of Estonia, Latvia and land, and its ally, Rumania. Such co-opera- whose historical capital and wide border Lithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia. tion would have dragged the Baltic States areas it had occupied in 1920, as well as the For many years, Lithuania demanded that automatically into the Polish border dis- threat posed to the Lithuanian independ- a military union of the Baltic States be putes with Germany and the Soviet Un- ence in general and the territorial claims pointed mainly against Poland. But Latvia ion, and further into the conflicts in the against Latvia forced it to avoid closer re- and Estonia rejected this demand. Poland Balkans and the border disputes of Ruma- lations with this state.120 could have been the only source of some- nia and the Soviet Union. On the outside, Theoretically, Lithuania and Poland what reliable support against an attack by Poland was a big and powerful state, but were even at war and in 1926, and Lithua- Germany or the Soviet Union. Until 1933, on the inside, it was unstable and weak. A nia was the only one of the Western Lithuania was also little interested in a large part of the Polish territory was not neighbours of Russia to conclude a non- closer union of the Baltic States as it re- ethnically Polish, especially along the bor- aggression treaty with the USSR.121 Po- garded Germany and the Soviet Union as der with the Soviet Union. Only two thirds land protected Lithuania against a pos- natural allies against Poland, which of Poland’s population were Polish, the sible attack by the Soviets with its terri- Lithuania considered to be its main en- rest was composed of the Ukrainians, tory that was stretched towards the north emy.123 White-Russians, Germans, Lithuanians and along Lithuania. But the military lead- A military union of Estonia and Latvia Jews. Only five percent of Poland’s border ers of the Baltic States did not have a was the only option left. And so it was; was common with friendly Rumania. With high opinion of the big Polish army but this union was not a very important the latter, Poland did not even maintain because of its old-fashioned organization. fact, as we will see later.124 In the long line very close relations although a military From a strictly practical point of view, of neighbours of the USSR, each state convention had been concluded. Every- Estonia would have been willing to ap- considered itself to be less endangered than where else Poland bordered the hostile proach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania’s the others for some reasons. For each state states: Germany, the Soviet Union, and neighbour refused to do so. Because of its own, often egoistic, interests were more Lithuania, with all of which it had border Latvia’s opposition, the project of a mili- important than the common ones. The disputes. The border with really neutral tary alliance between Estonia, Latvia and feeling of a common destiny and a com- Latvia was 106 km long. The latter had been Poland failed.122 mon region was still poorly developed.

129 with broad marshlands and large wooded 4,8% Jews, 3,2% Germans, 2,5% Polish, Latvia’s Military Situation areas and further along the Düna, which 1,4% White Russians, further Lithuanians, would also have been an important natu- Estonians and others. The minorities had After the overview of the indeed un- ral hindrance in case of a German inva- a complete cultural autonomy and in the friendly general situation, we have to take sion.126 Latvian army their sense for Latvian citi- a closer look at the military conditions Concerning food and clothing, Latvia zenship was strengthened.128 The Latvian in each of the Baltic States. Latvia was self-sufficient. But it was completely army was comprised of 2.200 officers and (65.791,4 km2) was the largest of the Bal- dependent on foreign states for fuel and 23.000 sergeants and other ranks in 1938. tic States; it was situated in the middle of heating, disregarding the large supply of The yearly draft of troops was about 13.500 this group of states. With regard to popu- wood and the electrification started in the men, but it decreased during the last years lation (1939: 2.001.900), it was in the sec- last years of Latvia’s independence. Latvia’s of independence. The police had only ond place. The common border (1939) industry was the most developed of all about 3.100 men, the border guard had with the friendly Estonia was 374,6 km Baltic States. The metallurgical industry, about 100 officers and 1.100 men. Only long (19,94%), the one with the hostile the car-parts industry, precision engineer- the militia reached 35.000 men. Accord- Soviet Union 351,3 km (18,66%). The ing, the manufacture of appliances and ing to the US information, the trained common border with Poland was 105,9 instruments (e.g. the world’s smallest cam- reserves had about 17.000 men, whereas km long (5,64%), and the one with era “Minox”), aircraft and ship construc- the untrained reserves were 20.000. In friendly Lithuania 570,4 km (30,3%). The tion in Riga and Liepaja and the arsenal theory, Latvia could deploy an army of coast was 479 km long (25,46%), which in Riga have to be named. The latter built 200.000 men, but in reality only 130.000 one fourth of the overall length.125 Any guns, machine guns as well as infantry- to 180.000 could be armed. In times of natural obstacles, disregarding small riv- and artillery-ammunition. Latvia also pro- peace, 10 out of 1.000 inhabitants of ers, lakes, marshland, and small woodlands, duced mines and anti-submarine weap- Latvia were members of the armed forces, did not protect this state boundary. In ons.127 the ratio for the militia was 28 out of case of an invasion by the Soviets, the 75% of Latvia’s population were 1.000 citizens. These figures changed from defence was planned to really start in the Latvians, the rest was made of several na- year to year, of course. Latvia was divided middle of the state, along the line Pededze, tionalities who were represented only in into 15 defence regions. During the last Lake Lubahn and Aiviekste (Ewst), an area small percentages (1938): 10,6% Russians, years of independence, the troops were

130 supposed to be mobilised within three ments mentioned above, the heavy artil- regiments also received 47-mm Böhler anti- days (i.e. 72 hours). lery regiment, the anti-aircraft regiment, tank guns and 7-cm Skoda infantry guns. In times of peace, the armed forces had the special artillery section, the tank pla- Further, they were equipped with 81-mm four infantry divisions, which comprised toon regiment and the coastal artillery Stoks minelayers. Each regiment had in- 12 infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment were under the control of the telligence and sergeant companies; some regiment. Each infantry division had one Chief of Staff of the Artillery concern- also had bicycle and ski companies. The field artillery regiment. The Infantry Regi- ing the training, weapons and organisa- cavalry regiment had five squadrons and ments 1, 2 and 3 and the Courland Artil- tion. The Staff Battalion, which corre- one heavy machinegun squadron, the re- lery Regiment belonged to the First Di- sponded to elite troops in other armies, mount squadron, two bicycles squadrons vision, whose headquarters was in Liepaja was an independent unit. All naval forces and one battery, all together 1.200 horses (Liebau). The Second Division consisted were united in a squadron under the com- and 1.200 men, four cannons, English Lee- of the Infantry Regiments 4, 5 and 6 as mand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Enfield 7,7-carbines, Madsen light well as the Livonian Artillery Regiment. Fleet. machineguns and Vickers heavy This division’s headquarters was in Riga. In times of peace, an infantry regiment machineguns. During the experimental The Third Division consisted of the In- had two battalions – 50 officers, 700 ser- stage, there also were bicycle battalions fantry Regiments 7, 8 and 9 and the geants and men, the enforced regiments and motorcycle companies that were in- Zemgal Artillery Regiment. The Fourth had three battalions – 80 officers, 1.220 tended to be army equipment in war. Division had the Infantry Regiments 10, sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war, Each artillery regiment had two units 11 and 12, the Cavalry Regiment and the each regiment would have been enlarged with two cannon batteries and one how- Lettgal Artillery Regiment. Its headquar- up to three battalions. The weapons con- itzer battery; thus the whole regiment had ters was in Daugavpils (Dünaburg). The sisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 guns, six batteries with 24 cannons – six howit- Technical Division consisted of the Engi- Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers- zers. All regiments had English 18 (8,38 neer Regiment, the Tank Regiment (later Bertier heavy machineguns, all with cali- cm) cannons and 4.5" (11,43 cm) howit- the motorized brigade), the Air Force bre 7,7 mm. The production of light zers. English 13 (7,62 cm) and Russian 75 Regiment, the Intelligence Unit, the Tank machineguns of the type “Bren” had been mm (M-02) cannons were in reserves. For Platoon Regiment and the Coastal Artil- started in the state. They were more use- war times, three units (35 cannons) and lery Regiment. The four field artillery regi- ful in combat. During the last years, the one to two anti-aircraft batteries (four to

131 eight cannons), which was 40 to 44 can- ment had five batteries (20 guns), one bridge- and the pontoon-company. The nons altogether, was intended for each field search light battery and one auxiliary ship. intelligence battalion had four companies. artillery regiment. As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6" The air force regiment had three units, The heavy artillery regiment consisted Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti- 100 to 150 aircrafts in three destroyer of three units, including the anti-aircraft aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regi- squadrons in Riga, one reconnaissance batteries that were separated into an inde- ment had 500 men. Moveable railroad squadron in , one long distance pendent anti-aircraft regiment. In the heavy batteries were in preparation. The anti- reconnaissance squadron in Krustpils and artillery regiment, there at least 30 heavy aircraft regiment had 15 batteries – Rus- one naval fighter wing in Liepaja. guns – English line guns 47, Russian 42, sian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti- The Latvian navy had one minelayer English 18 Pound Port, English 6" and aircraft guns. It had about 1.000 men. Anti- gunboat, two minesweeper-minelayer Germany 152 mm howitzers. Except for aircraft batteries were also formed for all boats, two submarines, one auxiliary sub- the German howitzers, all guns were out- divisions, but the Third. marine and some motorboats. A mine- of-date. Out of the four platoons of the The Autotank-Regiment had six ar- layer yacht (3.000 tons), four submarines Tank Platoon Regiments, three were in moured vehicles, two heavy, one middle- and twelve hydroplanes were planned. Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and one in Riga. weight and six light tanks as well as 18 There also was an observation system. With regards to material, six tank platoons tankettes (a small tracked reconnaissance The border guard brigade had five and 6" Canet ship guns were intended for vehicle). Altogether six armoured vehicles battalions and one speedboat. The self- two batteries of railway artilleries. and 27 tanks. Moreover, it had 40 trans- defence organisation was divided into 19 The overall firepower comprised: six port cars and 15 motorcycles. For times self-defence regiments and consisted of cav- 10,5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), ten 77 mm , of war, each division was supposed to alry and motorcycle-units with a tankette, three 12 pound howitzers and five 6" Canet have three tankettes (21 altogether). In one railroad-self-defence regiment, one Guns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft guns and 1938, the regiment was restructured into aircraft-self-defence regiment as well as sev- 36 heavy machineguns. In times of peace, a motorized brigade with five battalions eral self-defence units. 12.000 were in this the regiment had 40 officers and 245 ser- in three motorized groups. Furthermore, self-defence-organization, too. The aircraft geants and other ranks. motorized anti-tank units were planned. self-defence had 24 aircrafts. In contrast In the sea fortress Daugavgriva The engineer regiment consisted of two to the other Baltic States, the self-defence (Dünamünde), the Coastal-Artillery Regi- battalions and 500 men, including the organization in Latvia was not subordi-

132 nate to the Department of War, but to Should the Soviet Union attack, one their centre - by using the natural defence the Social Department. Nevertheless, 150 battalion and one company of the Sev- line in the marshland around the Lake active officers and 100 sergeants worked enth Regiment in Vilaka and Liepna, one Lubana and the widespread forests in the for the military training in the organiza- battalion and two companies of the Ninth north. Should the Fourth Division still tion.129 Regiment in , and Karsava, be able to move east if necessary, the com- Of all Baltic States, Latvia had the best one battalion and one company of the mand of the Third Division could easily traffic network. In 1940, there were 1.880 Tenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later in lose connection to the Regiments 7 and 8 km of avenues, 9.621 km of first-class roads, Kârsava and Dagda, would have been de- that were further north. To subordinate 7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles, 3,466 km fence units. Together with three to four these regiments to the Third Division after of railway tracks, 294 locomotives, 11 battalions of the border guard and a the arrival of the First and Second Divi- motor wagons and 6.684 wagons. Further, mounted battery these forces would have sion at the front would have been very there were three large seaports and several had to defend a front line of 200 to 260 problematic. A retreat of the Fourth Di- small ones. In 1940, the Latvian merchant km from the Estonian border to Piedruja vision along the left bank of the Daugava fleet had 89 steamers, 7 motor ships and and Semgallen respectively. Thus, real de- into the area of the Aiviekste would have seven sailing ships, altogether 103 ships fence was not planned, but just resistance been highly alarming, too. The Second with 120.676 net tons. The civilian avia- to stave off the enemy. Division was supposed to operate east of tion system had a large number of train- The Fourth and Third Division with Rezekne. The fourth mobilization plan ing and sport planes as well as two mid- the First Cavalry Regiments, but without had three prepared alternatives: A, D, and dle-sized passenger aircrafts.130 the Infantry Regiment 12 and 8 were sup- K. Alternative A intended a deployment For times of war, Latvia planned to posed to cover the mobilization of the of armed forces for a defence against an operate with 130.000 men in seven divi- forces and the occupation of the defence attack by the Soviet Union, whereas op- sions, two regiments of special cavalry line Malupe – Pededze – Litene – Lubana tion D planned the same if Germany at- squadrons, three motorized brigades, – Varaklani – Livani – Dauavpils and to tacked. Alternative K consisted of simul- three to four bicycle battalions, three to withdraw to the line Pededze – Lake taneous defence against the Soviet Union four special artillery units, and one fleet. Lubana – Krustpils. They were supposed and Germany. A supplies division and one garrison unit to accomplish that by following the Esto- Option A had been worked out in all would have been in reserves. nian troops with their left wing and – in details; option D had been prepared rela-

133 tively thoroughly. Option K was only would have received one unit of heavy retreat to Lithuania and a following in- outlined in rudiments as a co-operation artillery and a certain number of recon- ternment in Germany was planned.131 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet naissance flight hours. Positions were sup- Neither Latvia nor the other Baltic States Union appeared to be hardly imaginable. posed to be taken by the fifth day of believed that each single one on its own According to option A, the main mobilization, which seems to have been or all together would have to fight with- forces should be deployed on the line too optimistic. out any support by a great power. This Skrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene- Option D comprised the defence hope was partly based on active support Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni- against Germany. The main idea was to by one or the other great power. Treaties (Rogovka)-Tilþa-marshes north of Tilza- deploy the armies some kilometres north or even plans, however, for such a co- Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, with of the southern border of the state as operation did not exist with any great other troops covering them. After this protection by the Lithuanian army was power, not even with neighbouring Po- deployment, the following was planned: expected. Plans for cover did not exist, land. Military observers of the great pow- either a defence on this line, an offensive but those for fortification did. The forces ers classified the Latvian armed forces to in order to re-gain the third of Lettgall were supposed to operate in two division be behind the Finnish and Estonian forces lost during the mobilization or a retreat groups, whereas the cover units should regarding the degree of readiness. Soldiers to the line of the Lake Lubahn in order remain at the eastern border. and line officers were considered to be to prepare the decisive defence battle. The Option K existed only in outlines. Three good to very good. Their endurance and First Division Group (three divisions) divisions were supposed to operate towards courage were praised, but brutality that would have operated on the right and the south, four towards the east. had been supposedly noticed was criti- the Second Division Group (two divi- After the ceding of military to the cized. The assessment of higher officers sions) on the left. The border between Soviet Union in 1939, a fifth mobiliza- was altogether bad, with some remarkable these two division groups would have tion and defence plan was worked out, exceptions. Reasons were old age, insuffi- been the northern bank of the Lake but now a defence of the state was almost cient training, lacking initiative and bu- Lubahn-Karsava. The Supreme Com- impossible. According to options A and reaucracy. Regarding supply and weapons, mander would have had two divisions in D of plan 4, a further defence of the Latvia’s army was considered to be better the areas of , Barkava, Lubana and Daugava line was provided for. In case of than Estonia’s, but worse than Lithuania’s. at his disposal. Each division an attack by the Soviet Union, a further In the opinion of the US observers, the

134 divisions that would have had to be de- border was even 3.449 km long (84,3%).133 coastal border was virtually impossible. ployed after the beginning of the war The section between the Gulf of Fin- The navy and the coast batteries alone could have moved to the front as late as land and the Lake Peipsi was relatively easy could defend Tallinn, which was also pro- 30 to 60 days after the proclamation of to protect, the Narva River being a natu- tected by several islands. With the help of the mobilization. Active divisions could ral obstacle. The area north as well as south the Finnish fleet, Estonia could close off have reached the front within 24 hours. of the river is marshy and wooded. Only the Gulf of Finland between Tallinn and The morale and composure of the Latvian a seven to eight km broad gap along the Porkkala with a mine belt.134 army were rated high. Thus, success was West-East railroad and the avenue was eas- Concerning food and clothing, Esto- expected not only in defensive, but also ily accessible for a potential enemy. The nia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situation in offensive battles.132 chain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsi concerning food was not as good as in and the Lake Pleskau was a great advan- Lithuania or Latvia. Slate (about 5.500.00 The Military Situation in Estonia tage. Regarding defence, the area south tons [sic]), out of which petrol and ma- of the Lake Pleskau was less favourable, chine oil were produced and which was Regarding the area (47.549 km2) and but not hopeless. The area is sandy and also used as fuel, was an important natu- population (1939: 1.133.917), Estonia was without any transport routes. In the mid- ral resource. the smallest Baltic state, but its borders dle section, there was a deep valley in a Regarding the ethnic composition of were the longest. The common border with north-south direction that could be used the population, Estonia was the most friendly Latvia was 374,5 km (9,4%) long, for defence. The marshy and wooded area uniform. 88,2% of the population were the one with the hostile USSR 258 km of the Lida and Vruda Rivers extended Estonians, 8,2% were Russians, 1,5% Ger- (6,3%), of which 145 km went across the widely. Should these positions be lost, the mans, 0,7% Swedish, and 0,5% Latvians.135 84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi, Estonian army could retreat to the line Usually 0,98% to 1,2% of the population a further two km across the endangered Pjusa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the were in the armed forces. The number of Mehikoorma Strait and across the Lake 9 km wide middle section between Petseri those drafted was 12.000 men, but it de- Pleskau, which was hardly smaller than the and Pankjavista being the most endan- creased in the last years. In earlier years, Lake Peipsi. The coastal border comprised gered. Furthermore, the Estonians could the armed forces consisted of 14.000 to 1.159 km as the crow flies. Because of the retreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-Emajõgi 17.000 men, but in 1938 there were only many bays and 818 islands, the coastal River-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the long 11.358 men (1.358 officers). The police

135 had 1.200 men, the border guard 1.200 try Regiment, the Second, Third and division, two brigades with two infantry men, and the self-protection units 60,000 Eighth Infantry Battalion, the Partisan regiments each were planned. The normal men. According to the Intelligence Serv- Battalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regi- personnel strenght of a division in peace- ice of the USA, the total number of peo- ment, the Third and Fourth Artillery time was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and ple organized, including police, border Group and two tank platoons belonged 2.500 men. In peacetime, the regiments guard and self-protection unit was 51.000 to this division. The staff of the Third had two battalions each; in wartime it men, including reserves 121.000 men and Division was in Tallinn. The defence coun- would have been three. The weapons of including untrained reserves 161.000 men ties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saare the infantry were outdated: Russian 7.62- (14,2% of the population). The whole state belonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, and mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen light had three defence districts (correspond- Tenth Infantry Batallion and the Partisan machinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Rus- ing to the number of divisions in times Battalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, the sian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre of peace) and eight defence counties (cor- Fifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment, 7,62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There were responding to the number of brigades in the Engineer and Intelligence as well as also English 7,7-mm Lewis light times of war). the Guard Battalion were in this division. machineguns in reserve. The arsenal of the In times of peace, the Estonian army At the beginning of 1940, the Fourth War Department started to standardize the had three infantry divisions. The staff of Division in Viljandi and Pärnu was cre- calibre to 7,69 mm. Towards the end of the First Division was in Rakvere and ated. the independence, the equipment of the comprised the defence counties Narva and The First and Fourth Infantry Regi- infantry was to be infantry guns and anti- Võru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment, ments were active units. Each regiment tank weapons. Experiments with heavy the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion, had 2.000 men. The recruits were trained mortars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank rifles the First and Second Artillery Group and in independent battalions that were sup- from Solothurn, with anti-tank cannons two units of the Tank Platoon Regiment posed to be transformed into regiments from Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and with in Taps belonged to this division. The in case of war. Half of the staff and line heavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetall staff of the Second Division was located officers of these regiments were already were undertaken. In Võru and Narva, there in Tartu (Dorpat). The defence counties actively serving. In case of war, there would was one anti-tank battery. of Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga were have been 14 infantry regiments, each one The First Cavalry Regiment was in under its command. The Seventh Infan- having 3.331 men (107 officers). In each Tartu. It had three sabres, one

136 machinegun, and one skiing and bicycle into eleven field, six heavy and 17 coast Schneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger- squadron, one combat vehicle company guard batteries. The division-artillery was man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howit- (six armoured vehicles and six tankettes) organized in artillery groups. The First zers (the latter from Schneider, 1909). as well as a technical unit. The weapons Division had the first artillery-group (four Horses were used to tow all guns. Towing were: English Ross-Enfield-Mid. 14 rifles, batteries) in Olgino and the second group vehicles were still in an experimental stage. calibre 7,7 mm, six heavy machine guns, in Rakvere – heavy artillery and material According to Estonian information, 16 light machineguns and the weapons of for another four batteries. The third ar- the coastal artillery had ten batteries: one the combat vehicles. In case of war, the tillery-group (with four active batteries 30,48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20,32 cm regiment would have had to operate to- in Petseri) and the fourth group belonged (8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two gether with Latvian units in the area of to the Second Division – two batteries in 152,4 mm batteries in Äigna, two in Laura between Boberikova and Vöborka. Tartu and one in Võru. The fifth artil- Naissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cm As a quick retreat was planned for the lery-group of the Third Division, with batteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artil- Latvian army at the beginning of the war, material for four new batteries, was un- lery had three batteries with twelve guns, the Estonian cavalry might have been able der the command of the Fourth Divi- one searchlight and one chemical defence to hold the connection between the sion that was to be created. In its place, a company. Latvian and the Estonian armies. The First new, sixth group was created in Tallinn In the last years, the tank regiment and Cavalry Regiment was the basis for the (Reval). This group was supposed to have three tank and armoured vehicle compa- Second, which would have been deployed towing vehicles, which did not arrive by nies, one transport company, one train- in Tartu at the beginning of a war. the beginning of the war. Thus, old Rus- ing company, and two batteries were de- In the Estonian army, there were five sian guns had to be used. ployed. One regiment had four old heavy artillery units. The first and the third Each battery had four guns or howit- English tanks Mark V, twelve old light group were active units. According to the zers and 90 men (four officers) with 60 Renault-17 tanks, six modern Polish TK 3 League of Nations and to information horses in peacetime. Most guns were out- tankettes, twelve self-made Crossley-Austin from the German defence, Estonia had dated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902, armoured vehicles. In reserves, there were more than 70 field guns and 60 heavy English 84 mm and French 76 mm can- several heavy armoured vehicles of the type guns besides anti-aircraft guns and infan- nons, English light howitzers, calibre 114 Garford. There were about 400 men. In try guns in 1938. The artillery was divided mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons from 1924, Estonia still had two tank platoon

137 regiments, later only one with 350 men. pany. The intelligence battalion had three submarines, four motortorpedoboats, The regiment had one heavy broad-gauge intelligence and one sergeant company. four gunboats (two on the Lake Peipsi), armoured railway-train with one 152 mm, The base for the Estonian navy was two patrol boats (one on the Lake Peipsi), two 119 mm, two 105 mm cannons and Tallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea and one customs cutter, five icebreakers, four four heavy-machine guns, two light broad the Peipsi Division, the coastal artillery and hydrographical ships, five tenders and one gauge and one narrow-gauge armoured the garrison administration, altogether tug. Altogether the tonnage was 5.200 railway-train, each having two 76 mm can- 2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastal tons, not including the icebreakers and nons, eight heavy machineguns and six artillery). Initially, the fleet had two heavy those ships that belonged to the sea route light machineguns. destroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats administration.136 The Estonian merchant The air force consisted of three air (two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers, fleet had 304 ships (143 steamboats, 60 divisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn, two mine boats, two patrol boats (one on motor ships and motor sailing ships as as well as of the sea-air division in Tallinn the Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, three well as 101 sailing ships) with 214.000 reg- with auxiliary units. Each division had vehicles of the hydrographical service, five ister tons.137 two reconnaissance squadron and one tenders and one tug. The largest part of In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal with destroyer squadron with nine aircrafts each, these ships was old and worn-out. The units for machineguns, artillery, optics, the sea-air division had one reconnaissance maintenance of this fleet demanded tre- foundry, smithy, handguns, electronics, squadron (six aircrafts) and one destroyer mendous resources. carpentry, leather goods, and much more. squadron (four aircrafts). Altogether, there In 1933, the Estonian government sold Ammunition for rifles and artillery was were 54 reconnaissance and 27 destroyer the two heavy destroyers and agreed upon produced there, reserve grenades were aircrafts as well as 10 sea aircrafts, together a programme for the development of a transferred and army rifles as well as light 91 units, but 125 when counting the train- new fleet. Two submarines, eight patrol and heavy machine-guns were produced ing aircrafts. In 1937, there were 540 men boats, twelve torpedo boats and ten speed- for the self-protection units.138 in the air force. boats were planned. As funds were scarce, The number of cars in 1940 was 3.618; The engineer battalion had three engi- the programme was cut down to two U- there were 2.476 trucks, 285 busses and neer companies, each single one having minelayers, four motortorpedoboats, and 1.401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steam one gas-war, railroad, search light, trans- twelve bombers. During the last years of and 22 electrical and motor locomotives, port, work, training, and sergeant com- Estonia’s independence, the navy had two 529 passenger and 5.633 goods wagons,

138 three radio stations, six commercial the Gulf of Finland and up to the line Haapsalu. However, the US observers as- airplanes, eleven ports, twelve airports. The Mustvee-Oudova, where the section of the sumed that the Estonian army would not total length of the railway system was 1.702 Second Division began. 50 steel-concrete be completely ready for war fewer than km. First order highway were 2.531 km bunkers were erected at the endangered seven to 10 days after the beginning of long, second-order highways 8.168 km.139 spot between Riigi and Kulgu. The staff the war. In case of a war, 100,000 men in eight of the army had calculated that the Sovi- The Seventh Regiment, the Third Ar- brigades and in the navy were supposed ets were able to move three to four divi- tillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment, to be mobilized. The amount of uniforms sions to the Narva front within seven days. one anti-tank company, one armed-vehi- and equipment was sufficient, but the The active units of the Estonians were able cle and tank company, one tank platoon weapons were generally bad and outdated. to take their positions already on the first and the Second Air Division were sup- The Estonians relied on the competence day and to repel the attack by the enemy posed to be at the front of Petseri. These of their scouts, who would have discov- for the next three days. Although the forces would have had to defend the line ered any movement of Soviet troops to- Soviet air force might be able to attack Lake Pleskau-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, then wards Estonia early. They also believed in main targets, they would not be able to for five days the line Piussa-Petseri- the ability of their defence county offi- confuse the decentralized Estonian system Pankjavitsa-Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare- cials to conscript the soldiers within one of mobilization. The regiments would Vastsellina-Misso. They also would have to 24 hours. have gathered by train, by car, and had to watch the movements by the en- The First Infantry Regiment and the through night marches. They could have emy on the Latvian territory. In the south, First Artillery Group were in Narva, been mobilized within three days, and there were no fortifications. Instead, ar- Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, two within the next two days they would al- tillery and entrenchment would have had tank platoons were in Tapa, and one squad- ready have been at the assembly points. to do the job. The enemy was expected to ron was in Rakvere. These forces had to On the fifth day, the Infantry Regiments need five to seven days to move three to reinforce the border guard units, to oc- 1, 5, and 4, the First and the Second Ar- four divisions and tank and artillery units cupy the line of defence along the Narva tillery Group would have reach the front, from Pleskau to Ostrov. In order to ab- River, to close off the river crossings at the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be in sorb the offensive, the Estonians would Narva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo and Vasknarva, Rakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn, have had the Kaleva and the Põlva-Sakala and to observe the enemy’s movement in and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of Regiment at their disposal on the sixth

139 day, the Second Kuperjanov Regiment landing crafts. To prevent any provoca- sidered a German attack on Lithuania to from Pleskau to Misso, the Seventh, tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonian be possible; they also thought that Latvia Eighth and Third Infantry Regiment, the fleet could have laid out its mines only might be endangered. But even shortly First Cavalry Regiment, the Fifth, Fourth after the start of clashes. The underwater before the World War II, they were con- and Third Artillery Group, the Sixth In- minelayer would protect the area around vinced that for the next ten years Ger- fantry Regiment close to Ape, and the the island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar and many was not interested in an occupa- Ninth Infantry Regiment in the area of the minelayers on the line Äigna- tion of the Estonian islands as a base for Pärnu-Mõisaküla. This would be all Porkkala. With support by the Finns, their actions against the Soviet Union.140 Estonias forces. another mine belt in the area of Estonia’s military planners saw danger only As the Soviet Union had only very weak Suursaar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar could in an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regarded forces on the Lake Peipsi (some landing have been laid out, while submarines and its other neighbours and Poland as its natu- crafts), the two gunboats of the Estonians a large Finnish armoured vessel (with 8" ral allies and hoped for a German inter- and three more sent by the base in Tartu artillery) would have offered protection vention, but it did not expect any help could have defended the shore line rea- during the operation. from Western European powers. The Esto- sonably well for two to three days, espe- At worst, the Estonians would try to nians were worried because the Finns cially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma, retreat to their capital and to fight a final avoided any relationship with the Baltic where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pleskau battle of despair, or to flee to their is- States to protect the Eastern borders and meet each other. Local self-protection units lands. According to calculations of Ameri- sought protection in the Scandinavian would have supported the war ships. can observers, the ammunition lasted for bloc. The Scandinavian States publicly pro- In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navy about two weeks of fighting. But suppos- claimed that they did not wish to get into could not compete with that of the So- edly the army could defend Estonia only any kind of relation with the highly en- viet Union. Nevertheless, it was widely one or two weeks if no other states than dangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Es- known that the Soviet Navy Command Latvia supported them. tonians were worried about the unsteady was afraid of the strait between Aegna In case of an attack from the Soviet foreign policy of Latvia. Estonia’s military and Porkkala. Soviet submarines could Union, Estonia intended to co-operate with planners doubted whether Latvia really pass this strait in order to sink Estonian Latvia, something it did not want to do intended to resist any ultimatum or an supply vessels, and ships could lower in case of a German attack. Estonians con- open invasion. Estonians were especially

140 worried by missing fortifications of Latvia’s to be a potential force not only for de- Memel region (2.848 km2). Germany did eastern border and by the Latvians’ plan fensive, but also for offensive actions.142 everything possible to keep the idea of to retreat to the line Pededze-Lake Lubahn, separatism alive in this region. Because which opened the whole southern front The Military Situation of the lost, nationally mixed Wilna region of Estonia and virtually destroyed its de- in Lithuania (32,441 m2), Lithuania was technically at fence system. There were also problems with war with her second largesy neighbour, a direct co-operation under common com- With a population of 2.575.300, Poland.143 mand. Until the abrupt change in the Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Its Concerning food supply, Lithuania was Latvian military command in 1940, Esto- area (55.670 km2) was the second largest. not only self-sufficient. It even exported nia’s military command did not rely upon The length of the border was 1.367 km. food. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Latvia’s preparedness and ability to com- Lithuania did not have a common bor- however, its industry was not very devel- mand the armed forces under modern com- der with the Soviet Union, but 525 km oped. bat conditions. The Estonians believed that (37,7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km The population was more uniform than in case of a co-operation, the Latvian Su- (20,5%) the dangerous German Reich, and in Latvia. 80,6% were Lithuanian, 7,15% preme Command would try to use the Es- only 570,4 km (41,8%) bordered friendly Jewish, 4,1% German, 3,04% Polish, 2,3% tonian army not to defend its own coun- Latvia. The border regions were mainly Russian, 0,7% Latvian, 0,2% White Russian, try, but Latvia.141 completely open, except for a small sec- etc. 80% of the population were Catholic, Western observers all agreed that the tion from Zarasai till Giedraiciai in the in contrast to Lithuania’s northern neigh- Estonian army was the best one of all Bal- northeast, where a wide range of lakes was bours, who were mainly Lutheran.144 tic States although it was most poorly situated, and another section in the South- In 1939, the army of Lithuania con- armed and had the shortest training for west, where the Nemunas River formed sisted of 24.000 men (1.100 officers, 500 soldiers. The Estonian officers were be- the natural border to Germany. In the war administrators, 1.400 sergeants). On lieved to be highly qualified, the Esto- coastal area, the Lithuanian part of the the average, 1,25% of the population were nian soldiers were said to be tenacious, Courian Spit was separated from the rest in the armed forces; 13.000 to 17.000 men brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co-op- of Lithuania by the German part and the were drafted each year. The police had eration with the armed forces of the great Courian Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithua- 4.000 men, the border guard 3.500 men, powers, the Estonian army was regarded nia had only limited sovereignty in the and in the self-protection units there were

141 55.000 men. In theory, Lithuania could machineguns and Maxim M. 08 heavy years of independence, there were no for- have mobilized up to 250.000 men. Out machineguns. There were experiments with tress artillery and no tank platoons of technical and financial considerations, Stokes-Brandt trench builders, infantry anymore, as they were deemed impractical. only 120.000 to 135.000 men were sup- guns and anti-tank guns. One infantry In Kaunas there was a tank battalion posed to be mobilized. regiment had 2.279 men. with twelve light French Renault M 26/ The Lithuanian army consisted of three The cavalry brigade with headquarters 27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes made infantry divisions; a fourth division was in Kaunas had three regiments: The Hus- by Skoda as well as one tank car company being formed. The First, Third and sar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regi- with twelve armoured vehicles made by Fourth Infantry Regiment as well as the ment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and the Renault and Landskrona. First and Second Artillery Regiment be- Dragoon Regiment in Taurage, later in Each of the three divisions had one longed to the First Division in Panevezys. Vilnius. There was also a unit of mounted engineer battalion. An intelligence battal- In the Second Division, whose headquar- artillery, three bicycle companies and one ion was also planned for each division, ters were in Kaunas, were the Second, tank car company. Each cavalry regiment but until the end of the independence Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment and had about 1.000 men. there were only two such battalions. the Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth, The field artillery had about 120 guns The Lithuanian army had the strong- Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regiment in 10 units. These guns were mostly out- est air force of all Baltic States. A part of and the Fourth Artillery Regiment were dated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 and the reconnaissance, training and destroyer in the Third Division, whose headquar- Russian Putilow M. 02 75 mm cannons. aircrafts (of the type “Anbo”) was pro- ters were in Siauliai. Towards the end of The heavy artillery had 48 barrels in six duced in Lithuania. The air force had eight the independence, only one artillery unit units. The weapons were 155 mm and 105 air stations and four landing strips at its had been deployed in the Fourth Divi- mm howitzers made in Germany. In re- disposal. It was divided into reconnaissance sion, which was being formed in serves, there were also English 127 mm and (three squadrons), destroyer (four squad- Kedainiai. French Schneider guns, calibre 155 mm. rons), bomber (one squadron) and The infantry weapons were mostly out- The anti-aircraft unit had 150 modern Swiss traininggroups (two squadrons) and had dated, but some kind of modernization Oerlikon 20 mm and 12 old English 75 schools, workshops and supply units. A part did take place. The army had 7,9 mm mm cannons from Vickers, modern sound of the planes was out-dated, but in their Mauser-Mod. 24 rifles, Praga light detectors and searchlights. During the last place modern machines were obtained. In

142 1937, 795 men served in the air force; in est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuania an active unit; then it was transferred to 1939, 80 active and 30 reserve aircrafts – had only 1.526 km of railroad and 1.481 Telsiai. 110 aircrafts altogether – existed. km of solid roads. It had 205 locomo- Until 1935, the mobilization plans con- The fleet had only one patrol boat that tives, 313 passenger and 4.351 goods wag- sisted of mobilizing the units within one could lay mines and six armoured cus- ons, 1.765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 busses and week after the beginning of the war (12 toms boat. Six submarines, several speed- 619 special cars. The merchant fleet con- days according to the US information). boats, minelayers and coastal batteries were sisted of only 11 ships with 10.299 regis- Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralization planned. But the loss of Memel destroyed ter tons. Moreover, Lithuania had only of the mobilization and thus shortened these plans for armament. two ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) and the time span to 24-72 hours. Weapons The weapon factory Radviliskis had Sventoji. In the whole state, there were and clothing were divided among the mo- produced rifle, machinegun and artillery only two radio stations, in the last year bilization points. A quick modernization ammunition since 1938. It also repaired just one.146 of the equipment now also took place. rifles and completed orders of the air In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Although Lithuania sought to reclaim force. Lithuania really had only one friendly the Wilna region from Poland, its plans In contrast to Latvia, the self-protec- neighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon with for war against Poland were of completely tion organization in Estonia and Lithua- a direct attack by Germany or Poland and defensive nature. Just as defensive were nia was subordinate to the War Depart- with an indirect attack by the Soviet Un- the plans for a resistance to potential at- ment. Lithuania’s self-protection unit was ion through Latvia or Poland. In case of tacks by Germany or the Soviet Union. divided into 12 infantry regiments and a war, Lithuania could only operate with The Lithuanian army hoped for a sup- one dragoon regiment. There were also five infantry divisions and two cavalry port by Latvia in these two cases or even engineer, intelligence, air and sea-self-pro- brigades. Active units were the First Regi- for an active involvement of the Western tection units that were partly motorized. ment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurage powers. The defence plans against Poland Plans that included the training of self- and Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninth and Germany had priority, those against protection members for the partisan war in Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Their the Soviet Union were of second impor- were not realized.145 stock was enlarged and they were rein- tance. The Lithuanian Army Command Concerning traffic routes and means forced by artillery. Until 1939, the Sixth hoped to be able to fight for two weeks of transportation, Lithuania was the weak- Regiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also without foreign support.

143 In case of an invasion by the Polish or First Infantry Regiment and the Third ever, there was no doubt that they were Soviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas- Dragoon Regiment to that place.147 suitable for a defensive war. The opinion Nevezis was planned, later to the Dubysa Western observers did not judge the that the Lithuanians would be more fit River. With its high banks, this river was Lithuanian army in friendly terms. They for a partisan war than the other Baltic almost the only natural obstacle in the regretted the unusual influence of poli- peoples is interesting. Observers viewed inner country. A defence line with bun- tics and chauvinism in the Lithuanian the extraordinarily frequent change of the kers also existed there. In case of a Ger- officer corps. According to their judge- War Minister, the Supreme Commanders man attack, a retreat to the Dubysa was ment, many high-ranking officers of and the Chiefs of Staff as well as the in- planned, as well. The retreat to the Dubysa Lithuania were political creatures that were trigues in the army undertaken by vari- after an attack from the East would have incompetent to fulfil their tasks and were ous political groups negatively. All of this meant the giving up of the largest part of not interested in their completion. Posi- not only influenced the officers’ morale, the state and a simultaneous opening of tive changes in the command of the but also the morale among the soldiers in the southeast front of Latvia. In case of a Lithuanian army could only be noticed an unfavourable way.148 Polish or Russian attack, a retreat towards in the very last years of independence. In As a gap in the defence system along Germany after the loss of the Dubysa-line contrast to the other armies of the Baltic the border with the Soviet Union had was intended. During a German attack, States, the Lithuanian soldiers’ quality was developed due to the politically independ- the Lithuanians wanted to retreat into the judged to be only satisfactory, the main ent line of Lithuania, it can be assumed Latvian territory after the loss of the reasons being the low education and in- that western military observers regarded Dubysa-line. sufficient training. Nevertheless, the sol- this aspect as highly important. Nobody, During the last two years of their in- diers were regarded to be tenacious, physi- however, blamed Poland. dependence, Lithuanians started the en- cally strong, modest and especially suit- largement of the peacecorps. The Infan- able for the partisan war. Although eve- The Military Co-operation of the try Regiment 3 was intended to be the ryone acknowledged that the equipment Baltic States basis for a fourth division in the region of the Lithuanian army was more mod- Kedainiai-Raseiniai-Seredzius. When the ern than that of the other Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia were the only states Wilna area was regained in 1939, the they still assumed that this army could in Northeast Europe that had concluded Lithuanian army command transferred the not be used in offensive actions. How- a military alliance. This alliance was based

144 on the traditions from the war of libera- Latvia was really very meagre. There was – cation of the Soviet Union. A military tion. The basis of this alliance was the to a small extent – an exchange of officers union of the Baltic States was considered treaty of 7th of July 1921, which was ex- to learn about the military training of to be possible reason for an attack by the tended in the treaties of 1st of November the other state, to establish connections, Soviet Union. Yet, there are indications 1923, and the 17th of February 1934. The and to learn the language of the neigh- that at the time of the creation of the alliance was of a defensive character. The bour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large, Baltic Entente in 1934, it was in the inter- Estonian-Latvian defence treaty of 1934 common army and navy manoeuvres of est of the Soviet Union to have a Baltic gave similarly interested states the oppor- both states took place, but were not re- military bloc between itself and emerging tunity to join.149 On the 12th of Septem- peated in the following years. In individual Nazi Germany. This view changed later, ber 1934, all three Baltic States – Estonia, cases, the three Baltic States exchanged of course. From 1933 on, the Baltic States Latvia, and Lithuania – came together in weapons or sold them to one another. To also avoided to provoke Nazi Germany, the Baltic Entente, but the treaty only a small extent, the arsenals of all three states which did not want to see a Baltic mili- consisted of a general co-operation among also co-operated. tary bloc come into existence. The Ger- the states and regular conferences of the During the whole period of their in- man diplomatic representatives repeatedly Foreign Ministers, but not of military co- dependence, the Baltic States were not able pointed out the hostile relationship with operation.150 Estonia and Latvia categori- to agree upon common defence plans in Lithuania because of the Memel region cally refused to conclude a military treaty case of a threat. The single interests of to Latvia and Estonia, and tried to use with Lithuania before the latter had solved each state seemed to be more important the disagreement between Latvia and Es- its conflicts with Poland and Germany. than the common interests. Each Baltic tonia by showing itself as the understand- However military treaty was not con- state hoped - for little convincing reasons ing and benevolent great power to the cluded when Lithuania was forced in - that it would be able to prevent the loss latter. Poland too repeatedly pointed out March of 1938 to re-establish diplomatic of its independence, even if one or both to Latvia and Estonia that it did not want relations with Poland and when it lost of the others had already lost it. Western any military agreement of the Baltic States the Memel-region to Germany in March observers pointed out the extraordinary with Lithuania. Therefore, all three Baltic of 1939. fear that showed in all foreign policy ac- States tried to remain absolutely neutral Despite the existing military treaty, the tions of the Baltic States. Each Baltic state and even weakened their conditions to military co-operation between Estonia and had the strong wish to avoid any provo- the League of Nations (refusal of the ob-

145 ligations of the members of the League tion of security. The great powers took little was done to foster mutual respect of Nations mentioned in Article 16). care not to reach any military agreements and friendship as well as the development A Baltic bloc could have mobilized an with the individualistic, small Baltic States, of a co-operation. Such efforts came too army of 550.000 men, which would have which were not connected to one another. late, were too small and too “official” to been a remarkable force even on an inter- Of course, the question arises how reach larger parts of the population. Much national scale. One has to remember that much the Baltic States could have co-op- more could have been done! neither the Soviet Union nor Germany erated militarily and what they could have Each Baltic state had a different national or Poland, because of the constant threat done to foster such a co-operation even language. There was no common lingua to their borders, would have been able to before a treaty had been concluded. The franca. Older generations were partly able turn their complete forces or just a part answer is: a lot! to communicate in Russian, to a small ex- of them against the Baltic States under It is a sad fact that the Baltic States – tent also in German, but in Lithuania in any conditions. The Wilna and the Memel during the whole period of their inde- Polish. It would have been perfect if the problems were tricky and dangerous, but pendence – felt very foreign to one an- citizens of the Baltic States would have a military union of the Baltic States could other and that they really did not know understood the language of the other two have been formed because of the interna- each other. It often happened that the states, but this was virtually impossible. tional situation without being influenced Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians Because of the geographic situation, it was by threats of certain states, threats that treated each other not only with benevo- important for the population of the Bal- were not serious anyway. Among the peo- lent humour, but even with sarcasm. Un- tic States to learn international languages, ple, self-confidence, unity, and power are fortunately, the latter happened a lot on making it even more difficult to learn the rated higher than the splitting up of an international level, during talks between languages of the neighbouring states in forces and the idea of neutrality. Western representatives of these people and those addition. Sure, there were people that spoke observers have made many ironic remarks of the great powers. Measures that sup- these languages, but they were only few. about the extreme individualism of the ported mutual learning of history, cul- After the war, the Baltic States stressed their Baltic politicians, about the exaggerated ture, and economy of the neighbours independence from Russia and Germany emphasis on solely nationalist interests, started late and remained small. There was and their attachment to Western Europe. and about the inability to co-operate in almost no enlightenment about the com- Thus, Russian or German were rejected as the common interest and for the protec- mon fate and the common goal, and very the first foreign language. However, they

146 could not decide which of the western lan- and were unfit for broader economic co- lems. But weapons were a very great prob- guages, English or French, should be cho- operation. Estonian slate could have partly lem. They had been acquired during the sen as the first foreign language. So, Eng- solved the fuel problem, but the quarry- struggle for liberation in insufficient lish and French were taught at the same ing started too late and was too little. amounts. They consisted of different sys- time, German being the second foreign Regarding fuel, the Baltic States were de- tems, were for the most part out-dated, language. School graduates, however, had pendent upon Poland and even more so and partly even defective and without only acquired basic knowledge in these lan- upon the western powers, which on their spare parts. guages and did not normally use them in part were far away from sources of raw The weaponry had to be standardized everyday life. The majority of the high- material. Latvian waterpower also remained and modernized. If the three states had ranking officers could also communicate unused for common economic measures. acted together, it would have been easier, in Russian, but the younger ones hardly Without any effort, a standardization more convenient, and also cheaper. Be- understood the language. On the other of the organization of the armed forces cause of political and economic combi- hand, the majority of the older officers – could have been implemented, as well as a nations, the governments of the Baltic with few exceptions – spoke neither Eng- unifying of ranks, badges, etc., but noth- States and their troops did not co-oper- lish nor French, and a large part did not ing happened. ate, though. The weapons of the armed speak German, either. An agreement on a Each of the Baltic States spent about forces of the Baltic States were, thus, vary- common foreign language that could have one fifth of its budget on weapons and ing and made up of very different sys- been used for mutual communication in daily needs of the armed forces. These tems, which also limited the possibilities the Baltic States would have been highly amounts were tiny compared to the pur- of a co-operation extremely. Not even an necessary. Scandinavians understand with- pose aimed at, but they were tremendous agreement on the standardization of am- out difficulty all their languages; never- for the small states that had suffered a lot munition was reached. The Estonians used theless they all can also communicate in and had to do it without any interna- Russian ammunition; the Lithuanians English and mostly in German. tional help, especially when compared to used German, and the Latvians English During the whole period of independ- the larger and luckier countries. Thus, the ammunition. In case of a war, the ammu- ence, the Baltic States did not develop an resources had to be used wisely. The sup- nition supply would have been very lim- economic union. The small states even ply of the armed forces with uniforms, ited, In Estonia’s and Latvia’s case even competed with each other economically towing machines and food posed no prob- impossible. If the three states had been able

147 to agree on common ammunition for light not need. Moreover, Sweden demanded if the Baltic States hoped to co-operate weapons, they would have become inde- payment in cash. The UK and France, on with some great powers, which then would pendent from foreign states at least in this the other hand, threatened not to take have taken over the command, of course. respect and would have saved a lot of products from the Baltic States if weap- There were no treaties between the Baltic money by producing the material needed ons were not bought from them. Usually, States and the western powers nor any plans in their own state. In addition, they could the Baltic States received only out-dated for a potential co-operation in wartime. have helped each other out. Finland pro- weapons for a price that was at least twice There were arrangements between Latvia vided foot artillery and mine-throwers. The as high as for the English and French and Estonia for a potential common su- Baltic States, with nearly double the popu- forces. Lithuania also bought a few weap- preme command in wartime. But questions lation, could have accomplished that even ons from the Soviet Union, but their guns of prestige and about the military qualifi- more easily. During all years of its inde- were also out-dated and very expensive. The cation as well as political considerations pendence, Lithuania built fairly useable Baltic States also feared to have relations and memories from the war of liberation training and destroyer aircrafts. Latvia did to a state whose political leaders supported were brought up. Estonia regarded its su- so during the last years of independence. elements that were aiming at their even- preme command as more competent, which But the Baltic States did not co-operate in tual incorporation into the Soviet Union. western military observers confirmed in this respect either, but wasted resources in The weapons became more and more com- their evaluations. The Latvian forces, on mutual competition. plicated and more and more expensive, the other hand, would have been nearly The supply with heavy weapons had making a close co-operation between the twice as strong. The Estonians had a low to be concentrated on states that were ac- Baltic States essential. In 1939, a modern opinion of the long-time Latvian War cessible most conveniently in terms of English destroyer already cost a fortieth Minister, who had not supported them in traffic and from which spare parts could of the whole budget of the Latvian War the Battle of Cesis (Wenden) and in times also received in wartime. Sweden would Department. Today twice of the annual of peace had not cared about the comple- have been the best choice. Due to eco- budget of 1939 would be needed to buy tion of his military knowledge, but - ac- nomic considerations, the Baltic States one single supersonic aircraft, to say noth- cording to several observers – wanted to ordered nearly no weapons in Sweden. ing of missiles. become supreme commander. The Estoni- The latter had few economic relations to The question of a supreme command ans also remembered how they were forced the Baltic States, whose products it did in wartime was also important. It seems as during the war of liberation to hold a

148 considerable part of the Latvian front al- supreme command started to put really not the only one, the “regional guilty”. though their forces were urgently needed highly qualified and gifted officers into The Scandinavian States as well as the states somewhere else. The fact that the Latvians leading positions only during the last year in the Balkans had to learn the hard way were in an extraordinarily unpleasant situ- before the catastrophe. They would have during World War II. At any rate, the ation had been forgotten. The Latvians on been able to command troops under armies of the Baltic States had a great moral their part had the suspicion that Estonian modern combat conditions. Names shall meaning for the strengthening of the na- supreme commander would try to use the not be mentioned in this article. tional self-confidence of the Baltic people Latvian forces mainly for the defence of The Baltic States shared a common fate. and posed a considerable threat to a po- Estonia, whereas the Estonians thought the The militarily advantageous situation tential attacker. Latvian supreme commander would use the would have come up for them in connec- Estonian forces mainly for the defence of tion with a democratic and liberal Russia 1 Offprint from Acta Baltica 1969, INSTITUTUM BALTICUM. Latvia. The defence plans of both states were in their back, as many Western observers 2 For a general overview, the following sources diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, the pointed out. But such a situation did not can be referred to: Royal Institute of International plans provided for a co-operation between exist. If the Soviet Union threatened Eu- Affairs (London), The Baltic States (London: Ox- ford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, La Baltique the Latvian Eighth Dünaburg Infantry with rope, only a common resistance of all (Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, Die its Fourth Battalion and the Estonian First European states would evoke hopes for Zentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besonderer Cavalry Regiment at the beginning of a deliverance. In the opinion of the Rus- Berücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreibund-Problems war. sian and Western observers, the individual Lettland, Estland und Litauen (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921). 3 United States of America National Archives, Shortly before World War II, the Baltic States were militarily dead losses, Record Group 165 – Military Intelligence Divi- Lithuanians did not raise any objections but joined together they would have been sion (Hence: USA, N.A., R.G. 165) – General Analy- that a Latvian general would command a significant enemy. Much could have been sis. 4 Already during World War I did Theobald the combined forces of the Baltic States, done to consolidate this defence power von Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Ger- but the Latvian government did not want within 20 years, but almost nothing hap- man Reich, comment on General Ludendorff’s to be politically connected with Lithua- pened. External factors are partly respon- project of the annexation of the Baltic territory, nia. Thus, the question of a common su- sible for this, but to a large extent the pointing out the difficulties such an incorpora- tion would implicate. preme command remained unsolved. leaders of the Baltic States have to take 5 Such views were already met with response in Western observers pointed out that the responsibility, too. The Baltic States were German Reichstag-discussions from 1916-1918. See

149 ed. Andersons, Latvijas vçsture 1914-1920, Stock- versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146, November 16, 1968. holm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272- 229, 309, 311. 35 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 47-49. 273, 286-287. 21 Dunsdorfs, 1500-1600, pp. 127, 129. 36 Ibid., pp. 78-85, 92-93. 6 Royal Institute, pp. 30-38. 22 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Latvijas vôsture 1600-1710 37 Ibid., pp. 90-92, 96-97. 7 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Entente (Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159- 38 Ibid., pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225. – The Initial Phase”, Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés à 165. 39 Ibid., p. 225. Kaarel R. Pusta (Stockholm: Publication du Comité 23 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Mûþîgais latvieðu ka?avîrs 40 Ibid., 186-189. des amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence: [Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia: 41 Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 [Estonia’s Fight Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente – The Initial Generâïa Kârïa Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192; for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: Vabadussõja Phase. Edgars Andersons, Latvieðu cîòas vçstures notikumos Ajaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525- 8 Marija Gimbutas, The Balts (New York: [The Latvians’ Fights in the course of history], in 526; E. Andersons, 1914-1920, p.207. Frederick A. Präger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172. LAIKS, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967. 42 Ibid. 9 Ibid., pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, A History of 24 Edgars Andersons, “Krimas kaºš Latvij┠43 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral Latvia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, [Crimean War in Latvia], in Ceïa Zîmes, No. 9, [General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi, 1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, The History of March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp. VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31. Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co., 450-455. 44 Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Depart- 1952), pp. 31-32. 25 Jurgela, pp. 385, 394. ment of Education], Eesti Maa, Rahvas ja Kultuur 10 Uustalu, pp. 32-48. 26 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December [Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17- 11 A. Bîlmanis, pp. 53-83. 20, 1963. 19, 34-37, 62, 268. 12 Constantine R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian 27 Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456. 45 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 225-226, 276- Nation (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute, 28 Uustalu, pp. 109-110. 277, 301. Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145. 29 Bruno Kalnins, De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp 46 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 123-124; Johannes 13 Ibid., pp. 146-160. [The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stock- Tipner, Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920 14 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 229-250. holm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42. [The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army], 15 Ibid., pp. 265-352. 30 Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal inter- Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22. 16 Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, Latvijas view on November 21, 1968. 47 Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234, Vçsture 1500-1600 [Latvia’s History 1500-1600], Stock- 31 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December 268, IV, 182-190. holm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184. 20, 1963. 48 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209. 17 Uustalu, pp. 54-56. 32 Ibid. 49 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34. 18 C. R. Jurgela, p. 100. 33 Ibid. 50 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209. 19 Dunsdorfs, Spekke, 1500-1600, pp. 41-42, 67- 34 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 34-38; Pulkv. 51 Ibid., pp. 226-226. 73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680. [Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grînsbergs, letter from Janu- 52 Ibid., pp. 257-260, 301-309. 20 Edgar Anderson, The Couronians and the West ary 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter from 53 Ibid., pp. 310, 592. Indies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni- April 17, 1963; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, interview on 54 Ibid., p. 307.

150 55 Ibid., pp. 586-591. The Initial Phase, p. 44. (Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 56 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten, 69 Ibid., pp. 43-44. Division des relations internationales et de Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918, München: Oldenbourg, 70 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 553, 556, 568. l’éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de la 1966, pp. 240-241. 71 Ibid., pp. 506-536. Conciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732; 57 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 624-626. 72 Ibid., pp. 536-537. Frank Percy Crozier, Impressions and Recollections 58 Edgar Anderson, “British Policy Toward the 73 J. Þukauskas, Jonas Steponavièius, Lietuvos (London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246. Baltic States”, Journal of Central European Affairs, kariuomené, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotoms 82 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 566-567, 584, Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283, 285- kraðto pajegoms remti [Lithuania’s Army, edited 615. 286. by the Association for the Support of the Armed 83 Ibid., p. 600. 59 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 475-494, 499- Forces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; Konstantinas 84 Ibid., pp. 586-592. 500. Þukas, Þvilgsnis i praeiti [Look into the Past], Chi- 85 Ibid., pp. 566-567. 60 Ibid., pp. 343-346. cago: Terra, 1959, p. 394. 86 Ibid., p. 584. 61 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 277-278. 74 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 568-575. 87 Ibid., p. 615. 62 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 394-398, 406- 75 Ibid., pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414, 88 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany, 414, 427-441, 456-471. 434-441. Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D 63 Ibid., pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, “An 76 Forschunganstalt für Kriegs- und 596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; Latvju Enciklopçdîja, Undeclared Naval War”, Journal of Central Euro- Heeresgeschichte, Darstellungen aus den Stockholm: Trîs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108- pean Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41- Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps 109, 528-529. 50. [Research Institute for War and Military History, 89 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56; 64 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 367-376. Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of German Fçlikss Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ [The Change of 65 Ibid., pp. 352-363. Troops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittler Times], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349- 66 Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos deðimtmetis 1918- u. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159, 374. 1928, Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias Lietvuos 161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208. 90 Bîlmanis, pp. 386-387. Nepriklausomybés 10 metu saukakatuvéms 77 Edgars Andersons, An Undeclared Naval War, 91 League of Nations, The Records of the First As- komitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania pp. 43-78. sembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex 1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for the 78 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 404-406, 445, 6, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, The League of Preparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithua- 552. Nations. A Chapter in World Politics, London: nia’s Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; Karo Archyvas 79 Edgars Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente – Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102. I [War Archives], pp. 140, 161-; Friedrich Janz, Die The Initial Phase, pp. 50-51. 92 British Documents, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715, Entstehung des Memelgebietes [The Origin of the 80 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 732-737; League of Nations, Records of the Second Memel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge, First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Wood- Assembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting, 1928, pp. 59-60. ward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M. pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ 67 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 490-492. Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73, [The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191. 68 Edgars Anderson, Toward the Baltic Entente – 81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 Les Problémes de la Baltique 93 Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

151 try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pçteris Kaòeps, letter 101 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 276-289. ion, 1927-1934”, Lituanus, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967), from March 24, 1962. 102 Edward W. Polson Newman, Britain and the pp. 6-8; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. 00/105; Germany, 94 Edvards Virza, ed. Z. A. Meirovics, Riga: Z. A. Baltic, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224- Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777, Meirovica piemiòas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp. 226; John Duncan Gregory, On the Edge of Diplo- E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76. 85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, “Meirovica macy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928), London: 113 Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11, ârpolitikas orientâcija [Orientation of Meirovics’ Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88. 1964. Foreign Policy], in Sçjejs, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp. 103 United States of America, Department of State, 114 USA, Nat. Arch., RG, 165, DD 21/8, from 235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United September 20, 1935. D 595311-12. States, Russia, 1918, Washington, D.C.: Govern- 115 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 95 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24, ment Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849. 1962. 104 1962. Interview with the leader of the former intel- 116 Ibid. 96 Latvijas PSR Zinâtòu Akademija, Vçstures un ligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, Jerþy 117 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 37, 49-50; materiâlâs kultûras institûts, Latvijas PSR Vçsture, Niezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) on Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 1962. III [Scientific Acadamey of the Latvian SSR, Insti- July 11, 1964. 118 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/ tute of History and Material Culture, History of 105 Ibid. 119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. the Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiòð, Riga, 106 Jânis Ritenis, “Great Britain and the Baltic 1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685 1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn, States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talks 736; Latvijas Saeima, VIII Session, 10th meeting, Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, der of 1939”, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Depart- kol. 354-355; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomâtija, pp. 132, Bolschewismus und die Großmächte [The Origin of ment of Politics, University of Adelaide, Febru- the States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism and ary 1966. 133, 139, 217, 220. 119 Great Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, Werner 107 Cap. Jerþy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11, Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, Philipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien 1964. 1962. 120 Universität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen, 108 Ibid. Ibid. 121 1956, pp. 127-128, 163. 109 Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11, USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102; 97 Latvijas PSR Vçsture, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245, 1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E. Leonas Sabaliûnas, “The Politics of the Lithua- 247, 249, 156-258, 274; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. pp/ 377014-16; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomatija [Secret Di- nian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926”, 18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N. plomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; USA, Lituanus, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101. 00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860. Nat. Arch., R. G. 165. 122 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Of- 110 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Un- 1962. fice, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516. ion, 1920-1927”, Lituanus, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966), 123 Edgars Andersons, 1927-1934, pp. 17-19, 22-28. 98 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24, pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48. 124 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 356-357, 1962. 111 Col. Edvîns Mednis, letter from March 11, 42-44. 99 Ibid. 1964. 125 Latvia Country and People, ed. Jânis Rutkis (Stock- 100 Ibid. 112 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Un- holm:: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

152 126 Lt. Col. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19 Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92. 27, 1967. and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. Roberts 142 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6. 127 Ibid. Riks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kârlis Ercums, 143 Anicetas Simutis, The Economic Reconstruction 128 Latvia Country and People, pp. 302-303. November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvîds Strazdiò, No- of Lithuania After 1918, New York: Columbia Uni- 129 USA, Nat. Arch., Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621- vember, 1962. versity Press, 1942, pp. 15-16. 74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut. 130 Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; Latvijas Tirdzniecîbas 144 Ibid., pp. 12-14. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May Flote [Latvia’s Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; Former 145 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/ 5, 1967; League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book Minister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from Feb- 6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen Stasys 1938 (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publi- ruary 15 and March 10, 1963; Air Pictorial, 1957, Rastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4, cations, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938, pp. 254-257; H. Volck, “The Irbîtis Line”; Eng. K. 1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. Mikas IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow Taschenbuch des Heers, Irbîtis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967. Reklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964; Ausgabe 1939 [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edi- 131 Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alikšauskas, “Lietuvos tion] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; Latvija i ejo armija August 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; USA, kariuomene” (ms., 1958) (Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. Pçteris Nat. Arch., RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, Foreign 146 Royal Institute, pp. 191-194. Kaòeps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut. Office, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers). 147 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641- Jânis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963; 132 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/ 342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12, Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Plûmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisa- 6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5. 1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12, tion); Col.-Lieut. Jûlijs Íikulis, letter from January 133 Villibald Raud, Estonia, New York: The Nor- 1959. 13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen. dic Press, 1953, p. 33. 148 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/ Voldemârs Skaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962; 134 Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966; 6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2. Gen. Eduards Kalniò, letter from August 20, 1962; USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, S. 2503-118. 149 Ibid., 2584-67/2; Sîpols, Dzimtenes nodevîba Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963; 135 Raud, p. 34. (Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141. Col.-Lieut. K. Zîverts, letter from February, 1963; 136 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar 150 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/ Capt. Adolfs Blâíis, letter from August 26 and Lipping, correspondence from 1966; USA, Nat. 1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93. October 19, 1963; Capt. Kârlis T. Dakteris, letter Arch., RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1; from April 29, 1967; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, letter 2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1. from July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pçteris Dzçrve, let- 137 Raud, pp. 73-76. ter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963; 138 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, Estonia - passim. Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962, 139 Raud, p. 76. and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis, 140 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; USA, Nat. letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967; Arch., RG 165, November 20, 1937. Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hâzners, January 31, 1967 (con- 141 Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807, nection); Col.-Lieut. Jânis Rucels, August 3 and 411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, Mana mûþa 16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kârlis Irbîtis, April atmiòas [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

153