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Appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governor for Upper Nile Mapping Actors and Alliances Project in South Sudan An initiative of the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Project www.maapss.org Update No. 4 MAAPSS Update 9 February 2021 Appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governor for Upper Nile On 29 January 2021, South Sudanese conference in Juba for all the communities President Salva Kiir issued Republican of Upper Nile, after which a final decision Decree No. 05/2021, finally appointing the would be made on the new governor. The governor of Upper Nile, Budhok Ayang conference was to be stage-managed by Kur, and shortly thereafter, the deputy Kiir’s regime and designed to get Olonyi to governor, James Tor Monybuny. come to Juba. Olonyi refused to go, wary of the possibility of arrest or detention in While the governors of South Sudan’s the capital. In 2015, when Olonyi was still other nine states had been appointed by aligned with the government, and shortly 15 July 2020, a stand-off had ensued in after the assassination of his deputy— Upper Nile. The Sudan People’s Liberation James Bwogo—by Padang Dinka militias, Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), which was there were repeated calls for him to go to supposed to select the governor, had Juba, in what was a transparent attempt to nominated Johnson Olonyi, the leader of separate him from his military forces and the Shilluk Agwelek militia and the SPLA- enable his arrest; Olonyi resisted these IO [RM] commander for Sector I. His calls in 2015, and also refused to go to appointment would have been a red line for Juba in 2020, for the same reasons. the Padang Dinka military and political elite that had waged a successful campaign With the failure of the conference gambit, against the Agwelek in 2015–18, Kiir’s pressure on Machar rose at the arrogating control of the west bank of the beginning of 2021, leading to Machar White Nile and the contested state capital issuing an ultimatum to Olonyi by phone in of Malakal. They feared that Olonyi’s the week beginning 25 January: either appointment would give support to Shilluk come to Juba or the SPLA-IO [RM] will pick claims to this land. someone else as governor of Upper Nile. In order to keep the Padang Dinka within Following Olonyi’s reiterated refusal to go the government coalition, Kiir refused to the capital, Machar moved forward with Olonyi’s nomination as governor. Ateny selecting another nominee for governor. Wek Ateny, Kiir’s press secretary, accused Machar didn’t put his nomination to the Olonyi of being a ‘war monger,’ while Kiir SPLA-IO National Liberation Council reportedly pushed Riek Machar to choose (NLC), but rather conferred with a coterie another candidate. Machar, in contrast, of trusted advisors and family members, as worried that nominating someone else for has been his habit since the opposition’s governor would alienate the Agwelek, one return to Juba, a habit, moreover, reflective of the sole remaining military forces loyal to of Machar’s weakened position in South the SPLA-IO’s leadership in Juba, following Sudan: dependent on Kiir’s largesse, a wave of desertions that had ensued once Machar is almost as little a leader today as Machar announced his picks for the Taban Deng Gai was in 2016, following cabinet of the Revitalized Transitional Machar’s flight from Juba at the end of the Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) ARCSS. Machar’s side-lining of the NLC in March 2020. intensified scepticism about his choice within the SPLA-IO. The impasse in Upper Nile dragged on through the rest of the year. In December His choice for governor of Upper Nile, 2020, Kiir announced that there would be a Budhok Ayang Kur, continues Machar’s 1 Mapping Actors and Alliances Project in South Sudan An initiative of the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Project Update No. 4 www.maapss.org tendency in 2020, to make political him—as Budhok sells out to the appointments from within a narrow circle of government. family members and advisors: Budhok is from Kodok, the same town as Machar’s As of 9 February 2021, the Agwelek have wife, the Minister of Defence, Angelina not made an official statement. There is Teny, and they are cousins. widespread anger about Machar’s choice of Budhok, which was not approved by The son of the former Reth (king) of the Olonyi and the Agwelek, and is considered Shilluk (Ayang Anai Kur, 1974-1992), a rebuff not just to Olonyi but also to Simon Budhok grew up in an elite political family. Gatwich Dual, the Chief of General Staff of During the second civil war in Sudan, he SPLA-IO [RM]. In mid-January, Olonyi served first as commissioner for Kodok, conferred with Dual, who is currently in and then in National Security in Khartoum, Megenis, on the Sudan-South Sudan where he had occasion to form border, next to Upper Nile, and it was connections with many of the National agreed that neither man should go to Juba. Congress Party (NCP) figures that now Both men rejected the possibility of another play a central role in Kiir’s regime. With the nominee for the post of governor of Upper end of the second civil war, and the signing Nile. Dual and Olonyi have conferred of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, before; both feel alienated by Machar’s Budhok served as a state minister in leadership and his concentration on the Malakal. Since the beginning of the current enrichment of his family and friends at the civil war, Budhok has been loyal to Olonyi. cost of the SPLA-IO [RM] as an Like Jokino Fidele, Olonyi’s former right- organization; both have evaluated before— hand man and the former SPLA-IO [RM] in 2015 and again in 2018—whether the governor of Fashoda state, Budhok is a time was right to split from the SPLA-IO political figure, without any military support [RM] and create a new group. of his own on the ground. While Jokino Fidele switched sides, joining the While the forces of the two men constitute government, Budhok has been an the most important military parts of the important political advisor for Olonyi over SPLA-IO [RM], a new alliance will do the last two years, as one of the SPLA-IO nothing to change the calculus on the [RM]’s delegated members to the ground: the government coalition achieved Technical Boundary Committee of the an overwhelming military victory by 2018, Independent Boundaries Commission, and and there is no regional appetite to supply as one of Olonyi’s representatives a new rebellion in South Sudan. Both Dual negotiating with Machar and Kiir in Juba in and Olonyi are cognisant of the history of 2020–21. commanders who, upon leaving the SPLA- IO [RM], have found themselves consigned Budhok, in Juba at the beginning of to the pile of history, far from the richesses February 2021, will return to Malakal only of Juba and the emoluments of the peace with Machar, after the government agreements. Neither man wishes to suffer formalizes all state-level and county level the fate of Gatdet or Tanginye, appointments in the country – something commanders who broke away from the the government claims it will do by SPLA-IO earlier in the war, only to find February 15. For the Agwelek and Olonyi, themselves remote from power, and the danger is that Budhok will be a without the means to mobilize significant Potemkin figure, powerless within a support. Padang Dinka administration that controls land rights in Malakal, and that Olonyi will According to figures close to both men, be once again deserted by a political figure their approach—for now—is likely to be in whom he trusts—like Fidele before cautious. For the Agwelek, in particular, 2 Mapping Actors and Alliances Project in South Sudan An initiative of the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Project Update No. 4 www.maapss.org any reaction to Budhok’s appointment will However, a more likely consequence of the wait until it becomes clear how much appointment of Budhok and Monybuny is power he will have, and whether he has the total exasperation of the Shilluk entirely sold out to the government. The population with Riek Machar and the selections of state and county-level SPLA-IO [RM], and this feeling may, positions will be watched keenly, as a conversely, drive some Shilluk into the barometer of Budhok’s power, and the hands of the SPLM. Over the last few choice of Malakal county commissioner, in years, Kiir’s regime has proved expert in particular, is likely to be highly contentious. exploiting weaknesses and divisions in the According to the agreement between the SPLA-IO [RM], including most notably in signatories of the R-ARCSS, the Other Maiwut county, Upper Nile, and in the raft Opposition Parties alliance will nominate a of defections from the opposition in March- commissioner for Malakal, SSOA for April 2020. Machar’s appointment of Panyikang, and the SPLM for Fashoda. Budhok may play into the government’s hands in this sense. While Panyikang The appointment of James Tor Monybuny county and the south of the west bank of as the deputy governor, however, is the White Nile remains firmly loyal to unlikely to assuage Agwelek concerns. Olonyi, Kodok—Budhok’s birthplace—has While in theory the South Sudan already been the site of government- Opposition Alliance (SSOA) should have backed Shilluk resistance to Olonyi, and in selected the candidate for the position, it the north of the Shilluk kingdom that was instead a government appointment, resistance to Olonyi is likely to come.
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