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United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project Interview # 81 – Executive Summary Interviewed by: Barbara Nielsen Initial interview date: May 26, 2007 Copyright 2007 USIP & ADST The interviewee is an architect of Sudanese origin. In addition to his architectural work, he works with a variety of organizations to promote awareness regarding the conflict in Darfur and assist in the realization of peace throughout Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has provided for a stable peace between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM). U.S. involvement was critical in the development of the CPA. The United States exerted political pressure on the Sudanese government to engage in negotiations with the SPLA/SPLM. Still, the Khartoum government remains reluctant to implement certain provisions of the CPA. After 22 years of war, the SPLA/SPLM is rapidly transforming from a warring faction to a legitimate political party. The Sudanese government has used a technique of “divide and conquer” as a means to weaken the political influence of southern Sudan. It has employed corrupt mechanisms in encouraging SPLA/SPLM leaders, such as Riek- Machar and Lam Akol, to split off from the main faction. But other entities have largely succeeded in reuniting these groups. The United States, as well as certain Scandinavian and Christian groups, have played a key role in this process. Salva Kiir, Vice President of Sudan and President of the autonomous government of Southern Sudan, has also successfully promoted the unity of SPLM. While certain critics claim the CPA is too complex for successful implementation, the comprehensive and detailed nature of the agreement has assured widespread confidence in continued peace. The CPA has largely become a guarantor of the peace. The CPA constituted certain commissions to oversee its implementation. These commissions have achieved great success given the infrastructural challenges and an uncooperative Sudanese government. To some extent the CPA fomented an expansion of the Darfurian rebellion in 2003. Darfur lacked any representation at the CPA negotiations and if drafting process had included Darfur, the current conflict may have been avoided. CPA negotiations should have included the leaders of the three main Darfurian tribes – the Zaghawa, the Fur and the Massalit. United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project Interview # 81 Interviewed by: Barbara Nielsen Initial interview date: May 26, 2007 Copyright 2007 USIP & ADST Q: Share with us what you’ve seen as the positive consequences of having negotiated and implemented thus far the North-South agreement in Sudan. A: The North-South agreement is one of the successes of United States diplomacy. This is because they had big leverage on the negotiation process itself at that time, although officially the IGAD was leading the process. They are the ones who leading it, but we know that Senator Danforth was forthcoming in the negotiations. So that’s where I think the United State succeeded. They had the will, and all the parties had very good will on the peace process itself, so that is one of the successes and the driving forces to the success of the Naivasha agreement. Q: Certainly for the negotiations part. A: Not only that, but the Sudanese government as well, we know that sometimes they were reluctant to proceed with the negotiations, because there were the hold-outs in Khartoum who were not happy with the peace process and starting negotiation at that time. Yet, the United States exerted great pressure on the Sudanese government to accept and sit down with SPLA/SPLM. And fortunately the SPLA/SPLM leadership exerted good will to proceed with the peace negotiations, so that is one of the great successes. Q: If I understood you correctly, the Khartoum government was willing, under pressure, to sit down and negotiate this agreement. Now that the agreement has been signed, how would characterize the attitude of the Khartoum government toward its implementation? A: The Khartoum government is still very reluctant to implement the different items of the agreement itself. Yet, they are proceeding with the agreement. As I said, the other partner, the SPLM, they are coming along with the agreement and they have a great will in realizing peace in Southern Sudan, they are pushing ahead. The United States is still pushing ahead. Seeing that Senator Danforth at that time, when he was Ambassador at the United Nations, they had convened the Security Council in Nairobi, Kenya, just to help the peace process and help the Sudanese parties come to peace, and that is one of the great events for the peace process in general. Q: I can appreciate that peace is really important for human activity. Let’s look at that a little more in detail, with respect to say the SPLM. Do you feel that they have implemented the agreement? What kind of a report card grade would you give their efforts, in terms of how well they’ve done? A: For the SPLM, I can give them 95 percent. Because they actually transformed themselves from a guerilla or warring faction to a political body to an executive body, which is not an easy process. They have been in that war for almost 22 years, or 21 years. They have never assumed any political role in a civil society. So it’s very difficult to just in two years for a soldier to transform all their personnel into politicians to executives in the offices, to build a country with no infrastructure. Q: So you give them high marks for their efforts. A: Definitely yes. Definitely yes. Q: Some people have said that there are some problems along the lines of corruption. What would you say in that regard? A: That is understandable. If one knows the Sudanese government very well, the Sudanese government are professional corruptors. Q: So now we’re talking about the government in Khartoum? A: Yes. Q: Okay, professional corruptors. A: They are professional corruptors. Not only have they maintained the divide and conquer strategies since when they came to power, and that is where they divided all the Sudanese political parties -- not only that, but the warring factions in the South itself. They have divided them so many times. Fortunately we know that the friends of peace elsewhere, they have united some of those factions together, back together to the original. Seeing that the SPLM/SPLA itself we know that Riek-Machar, now the governor of Southern Sudan in Juba, he had his own faction split from the main SPLM/SPLA, as well as Dr. Lam Akol, now the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Sudan, he also split from SPLA/SPLM, the same tactic of the Sudanese government. We know that they have convened so many times in Germany in some areas to split them. Fortunately the United States, and the United States Congressmen at that time, played a big role in bringing all these factions together to the main faction of SPLA/SPLM. So seeing that it’s still the Sudanese government there and they are in the South, so they have their plans, and we know that they are very pro-active in corrupting people. So they have their plans ahead of the CPA, and that is one of their strategies. We know there is some corruption here and there, I understand that, but the peace process is going on. The peace partners are willing to go ahead, this needs to appear gradually, but not all at once. Q: That’s a good point that it will be a gradual transition and that some of the individuals that you mentioned, Riek-Machar and Lam Akol, there was an attempt then by the Sudanese government to corrupt them, to take advantage of the fact that they were split from the body of the SPLA. But that effort has not succeeded because others were able to bring them back together. There were other friends of peace you mentioned. Is that how it worked? A: Friends of peace, yes, from Scandinavia, for example. We know that there are some Christian groups, also with the good faith to realize peace in Southern Sudan. They have exerted a great effort to bring them together. Thank the Lord, yes they did. But still as I said, the Sudanese government is trying at any time, at any opportunity they can get, to continue their past strategies of divide and conquer. Q: Okay. Salva Kiir, who had to take over from John Garang, to what degree would you say he’s been able to carry out the vision of John Garang and again, how would you evaluate his strengths as the leader of the SPLM? A: Actually Salva Kiir is quite different from late John Garang. Yet he is a great leader. One of his strengths is his connection with the grass roots and with the field commanders, rather than the politicians and the thinkers. We know that the charismatic figure of the late John Garang has overwhelmed other leaders, yet Salva Kiir has formed his own personality. So that is where he succeeded in keeping the SPLM intact on all these crises. And we know that they are still fighting to realize peace with a very aggressive partner at this point, the Sudanese government. Q: It seems the SPLM is able to remain united, and that the leadership is coming, as you point out, from Salva Kiir himself. That’s very key. Some people have said too that the CPA, as it turned out, is overly complex. The criticism has arisen that John Garang felt it needed to be very detailed,,but that the result was just too much complexity for a successful implementation.
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