TM September 11, 2017

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION SEPTEMBER 11, 2017 VOLUME XV, ISSUE 17 p.2 p.5 p.8 p.10 Pavel Felgenhauer Michael Horton Ariane Tabatabai Elizabeth Santoro and Avery Plaw Russia Seizes Oppor- Drone Warfare in Containment and Reaping the Whirlwind: tunity to Expand Yemen: A Catalyst for Strike: Iran’s Drone Drones Flown by Non- Drone Usage the Growth and Evolu- Program state Actors Now Pose tion of AQAP a Lethal Threat INTRODUCTION: DRONE SPECIAL ISSUE In this special edition of Terrorism Monitor, Pavel Fel- genhauer examines how Russia’s drone program, reliant Alexander Sehmer for the time being on Israeli technology, has expanded in recent years and how Moscow is using the Syrian con- The U.S. drone program has proved to be an efficient flict as a testing ground for its UAVs. Iran too has in- tool for targeting terrorist bases and eliminating militant creasingly deployed drones for both civilian and military leaders within the ranks of groups like the Taliban and purposes. Ariane Tabatab looks at Tehran’s use of UAVs al-Qaeda. After years of relative success, however, the for its own counterterrorism efforts and details the Iran- use of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is ian drone program, developed despite the imposition of entering a new phase. Other states are bringing their economic sanctions. own drone programs online, and the proliferation of civilian drone technology has opened the door to the For all the effectiveness of drones in counterterrorism use of UAVs by non-state actors. This special issue of terms, killing from afar cannot win hearts and minds, and Terrorism Monitor focuses on the concerns created by the resentment and anger stoked among local popula- such developments. tions by drone strikes is real. Michael Horton examines how the U.S. deployment of drones in Yemen has Criticisms of the U.S. drone program, which was helped to shape al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula stepped up under President Barack Obama, have con- (AQAP), aiding its recruitment efforts and forcing the centrated on the number of civilian casualties caused by group to adapt its organizational structure. drone strikes. The numbers have ranged markedly, but there have without a doubt been tragic incidents. Drone Meanwhile, as drone technology becomes ever more technology does, however, offer a far greater degree of commercialized and accessible, it is being adapted by precision than aerial bombing. It is also relatively cost- non-state actors with some success. Islamic State (IS) has effective and poses no risk to U.S. forces. As such, for all used drones to film its own attacks to post online along- the controversy and debate, drones appear set to re- side its bloody beheading videos as part of its propa- main a key plank of counterterrorism strategy. ganda efforts, and it has even managed to carry out 1 some deadly strikes. Examining this issue, Elizabeth San- toro and Avery Plaw discuss how non-state actors are Russia Seizes Opportunity to experimenting with drones to pose a potentially lethal Expand Drone Usage threat. Pavel Felgenhauer During the Russian war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and later the conflicts in Chechnya in the North Caucasus in the 1990s and 2000s, the Russian military went into battle without unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and appar- ently saw no necessity to acquire them. Instead, aerial reconnaissance and attack missions were carried out using manned aircraft, because, by and large, the oppo- sition in both Chechen wars did not have significant or effective anti-aircraft capabilities. Even so, Chechen rebels using Soviet Igla short-range man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) shot down a number of Russian aircraft, mostly helicopters. Some of these losses were painful, but Russian fixed- wing jets continued to carry out sorties in the North Caucasus with near impunity. It was not until after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 that Moscow began an effective UAV program. After a slow start, Russia is struggling to expand its drone capabilities. Once its attack UAVs — currently still in development — become operational, they are likely to be deployed to Syria for combat practice and assessment. Watched From Afar In August 2008, Russian forces invaded Georgia. Most of the Russian troops were from Russia’s Southern Mili- tary District and had experience fighting separatist/Is- lamist rebels, but going up against the more modern and better-equipped Georgian military was very different. The Russian military was victorious nonetheless, and the war ended after five days with a French-brokered truce, but it was in the conflict with Georgia that Russia's lack of usable UAVs was exposed and recognized as a significant deficiency that required immediate action. Looking back to 2010, General Vladimir Shamanov, the commander of the elite Russian Airborne Troops (VDV – Vozdushno-desantnye voyska), at present retired from active service and chair of the Duma Defense Commit- tee, told how, when he was deploying paratroopers in Abkhazia to invade Georgia, his force’s movements were monitored by an Israeli-made Georgian UAV (Hermes 2 450) that hovered constantly overhead and which his By 2011, Russia had begun to operationally integrate troops failed to shoot down. these into its armed forces. By 2012, the Uralskiy Zavod Grazhdanskoy Aviatsii (UZGA) in Yekaterinburg began According to Shamanov, heat-seeking Igla anti-aircraft producing, using Israeli-provided components, the For- missiles failed to register the UAV as a target because of post UAV, which is a Russian-assembled licensed replica its low-emission engine. The 30mm guns of BMD-2 air- of the IAI recon UAV Searcher II, together with Israeli- borne combat vehicles, designed to hit aircraft at alti- designed command/control and communications tudes up to 2 kilometers (km), failed to reach the craft equipment. because it was hovering at 5 km. Shamanov found him- self more or less in the same position as some Pashtun The Forpost has been the backbone of successful Russ- tribesman, hopelessly brandishing a gun at the sleek ian military UAV operations in Syria and Ukraine. Accord- high-tech threat hovering above and watching his every ing to defense ministry sources, the Israeli-designed move with impunity (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Forpost is still today the most potent operational Russ- Obozreniye, June 4, 2010; EDM, June 10, 2010). ian UAV with the biggest payload (up to 70 kilograms (kg)) and the longest flight endurance (around 18 hours). The Georgians were not ready to resist massive Russian By contrast, the Orlan-10 UAV, used by Russian forces in simultaneous invasions in both South Ossetia and Abk- Syria, can carry only a 5 kg payload (vedomosti, June 7, hazia, but the UAV reconnaissance gave the Georgian 2016). leadership prior information about what was coming, while the Russian commanders who lacked UAV’s were Ukraine Becomes a Turning Point unsure about the exact location of enemy forces. In August 2014, Russian forces effectively used recon When the Shamanov-led paratroop force crossed the UAVs to turn the tide of battle in the eastern Ukrainian ceasefire line on the Inguri River from Abkhazia, it en- region of Donbas. Ukrainian government forces together countered no armed resistance. The Georgian forces with volunteer battalions were stretched thin, attacking faded away, successfully hiding their more modern the Russian-supported separatists in an attempt to sur- heavy weapons and waiting for Western diplomatic ef- round the two main rebel-held cities — Donetsk and forts to stop the invasion. Lugansk. The rebel pro-Russian forces seemed to be in disarray, but just as the collapse of the Donbas rebellion Developing Drones seemed immanent, some nine elite Russian tactical bat- talion groups (TBGs) crossed the border into Ukraine The Russian defense industry is still very much reliant on and radically changed the course of the battle. The Cold War era Soviet weapon systems, and the develop- Russian authorities have not denied the presence of ment of "new Russian weapons" is in many cases the Russian military personnel in the Donbas, but claim they result of the modernization of old Soviet hardware, or are volunteers on leave from active service (otpuskniki). the development and production of Soviet-designed systems that originated in the 1980s. Russian air force jets were not deployed to provide air support for the August 2014 invasion, but UAVs were In 2010, Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin, then the used to supply intelligence about the deployment and defense ministry chef of armaments and first deputy de- movements of the Ukrainian military, which had no effec- fense minister, was given sweeping powers and money tive UAVs and was unaware of what the Russians were to procure Western defense technologies and expedite up to. the production of weapon systems that had been un- available in the USSR. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force stopped flying pilot- ed recon and air attacks over the Donbas after the Rus- Popovkin publicly ridiculed attempts by different Russian sians introduced Buk surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to companies to make UAVs and oversaw the signing of a the combat zone and shot down a number of Ukrainian number of contracts to buy Israeli-made UAVs from the aircraft. The Ukrainian forces found themselves pinned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Corporation. down and decimated by heavy howitzer and multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS) fire to the south-east of 3 Donetsk in Illovaysk and the south of Lugansk. The tar- In Syria and in the Donbas, Russian UAVs have been geting intelligence was being provided by Russian used exclusively on reconnaissance missions. Russia UAVs, primarily by the Forposts. does not have any attack UAVs and cannot perform stealthily pinpointed UAV attacks, which have become Ukrainian forces suffered heavy casualties and were something of a U.S.

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