ANSO Quarterly Data Report (Q.4 2010)

Jan 1st— Dec 31st 2010

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Q.4 2010

SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

Throughout 2010 NGOs were involved in 126 incidents in which 28 people were killed and an additional 33 injured. 22 deaths were attributed to AOG, three to criminals and an additional three died collaterally in IMF/AOG clashes. While these figures represent a 27% fall in the total volume of attacks from 2009 (172 cases) they also show an alarming 42% increase in fatalities. Of the deaths, 20 were Afghan nationals and eight foreign nationals, all of the latter dying in a sin‐ gle incident. Ten of the Afghan nationals killed worked for demining NGOs. Abduction by armed opposition grew by 7% with 74 persons taken in 30 separate cases. All of the victims were Afghan nationals and all of them were released without harm, often within three days. We assess that the primary motivation in AOG abduction of NGO staff is infor‐ mation gathering. One foreign national was abducted, and released, but that case was assessed as criminal. Of the sixty eight separate NGOs involved in all incidents ANSO noted no commonality or trend in their profiles (such as nationality, sector of intervention, funding sources) with the exception of deminers. It is clear that AOG have an opposition to this field of work, particularly in the southern provinces. In sum, a difficult year for NGOs in which deadly ambient violence posed as much of a threat as direct and deliberate strikes. Despite this there remains no evidence to suggest that AOG deliberately target NGOs (except deminers) or that we will not retain space for our operations. ANSO continues to ad‐ vise that transparent dialogue with all combatants is key to NGO safety going in to 2011.

The forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) fought a significant campaign in 2010 expanding the total volume of attacks by 64%, the highest annual growth rate we have recorded, and securing new strongholds in the North, West and East of the country. Their momentum would appear unaffected by US‐led counterinsurgency measures. The cam‐ paign grew increasingly complex with reports suggesting the deployment of parallel governance structures including courts, judges and administrators. Attacks remained focused on the IMF and Afghan Government, targeting personnel, resources and enablers (including hundreds of Afghan civilians) and expanded to include significant attacks on Private Development Companies for their role in supporting the IMF. The IEA will enter 2011 in a very strong position.

The International military forces (IMF) pursued their three pronged exit strategy (security, governance, development) with massive interventions in Helmand and Kandahar that achieved little other than to diversify and diffuse the insur‐ gency. New initiatives, such as the Afghan Peace & Reintegration Program (APRP), have resulted in a few hundred sur‐ renders but not enough to undermine AOG manpower. Village Stability Operations (the formation of irregular forces) are exacerbating tensions in the North and may be contributing to a below‐radar process of factional remobilization. The rapid recycling of APRP reintegrees in to irregular forces is of particular concern.

Looking ahead, we expect the impending IMF drawdown to stimulate further factional separation on all sides, as lead‐ ers jostle for the best starting position, however we do not expect this to result in significant conflict between factions, it will simply be an insurance policy against State collapse. The IEA will press their military advantage, exploiting the fractures that emerge with ‘transition’.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2011

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily re- flect the views of ANSO donors or partners. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 2

1.1 Trends in Key Battle Grounds

ANSO: AOG attacks in Helmand, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010 ANSO: AOG attacks in Kandahar, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010 400 450 400

400 350 321 348 350 300

300 246 250 239

Q1 Q1 250 200 218 208 Q2 200 Q2 178 200 Q3 164 Q3 Q4 143 Q4 150 143 150 132 124 113 109

100 100 60 47 46 50 50 28

0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

The US Strategy Review in December suggested the IEA’s momentum had been blunted in some areas and, while not specifically mentioning Kandahar or Helmand, given that those are their focus areas it is reason‐ able to assume that they meant there.

Our quarterly attack rate figures for each province (above) do indeed show a substantial reduction of at‐ tacks in both between August and December. Kandahar dropping by 50%, in contrast to the usual 20%, and Helmand dropping by 40% in Q.4, a trend not seen since 2006. This demonstrates that the IEA have turned away from the battlefield earlier, and in greater numbers, than before but it does not provide an explana‐ tion as to why. The pressure of US operations could certainly be a factor here, anecdotal reporting suggests many commanders felt the areas to be too hot and sought sanctuary in other provinces or Pakistan, but so too could other more benign factors like the early onset of Ramadan and the normal seasonal downturn.

However, regardless of which explanation one prefers when you put the quarterly data in its annual context, which to us is a much more valid analytical period as it captures a full operational cycle rather than just the tactical to & fro, it becomes completely irrelevant. Over the full year the IEA expanded their attacks in both provinces, Helmand by a whopping 124% and Kandahar by a more conservative 20%, suggesting that in the bigger picture their capacity to conduct attacks has improved substantially. In light of this the deep down‐ turn could just as easily be interpreted as an early winter reprieve, after an intense summer fight, and would not represent any longer term degradation of capacity. If the 2011 spring offensives sustain, or build on, the level of violence achieved this year then it will be a sure indicator that the surge operations achieved little. If they do not then the US conclusions, in those provinces at least, will be validated.

To borrow a phrase from the global warming debate...keep your eyes on the climate, not the weather. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 3

1.2 Irregular Armed Forces

Irregular armed forces ANSO: Districts with official Irregular Force programs (VSO/ALP)

(militias) continue to be plus ISAF “Key Terrain”, correct at Sept 2010 (last info available) Darwaz

Khwahan

Shighnan Ragh stood up in an uncoordi‐ Chah Ab Shahri Buzur Qarqin Shortepa Fayz Abad Khani Kaldar Mingajik Mardyan Imam Sahib Rustaq Wakhan Andkhoy Chahar Dawlat Abad Khwaja Baharak Archi Khwaja Du Ko Nahri Shahi Ghar Khulm Qalay‐I‐ Zal Chahar nated and opaque man‐ Balkh Qaramqol Taluqan Fayz Bolak Kunduz Aqcha Kalafgan Abad Mazari Sharif Khan Abad Ishkashim Marmul Chahar Dara Kishim Dihdadi Bangi Jurm Dawlat Abad Chimtal Farkhar Shibirghan Chahar Hazrati Sultan Ali Abad Chal Sari Pul Kint Baghlani Jad Ishkamish Zebak Shirin Tagab ner and constitute an Sholgara Burka Aybak Baghlan Darzab Sayyad Sozma Qala Warsaj Khuram Khwaja Sabz Maymana Nahrin Almar Wa Sa Kishindih Khost Wa Fir Sangcharak Kuran Wa Mun Dara‐I‐ Suf Dahana‐I‐ GhGhori Bargi Matal Pashtun Bilchiragh Dushi Kot emerging security threat Qaysar Ruyi Du Ab Andarab Hisa‐I‐Awali Murghab Balkhab Khinjan Kamdesh Kohistanat Mandol Wama Kohistan Tala Wa Barf Salang Panjsher Muqur Kahmard Hisa‐I‐Duwum Nari Koh Band Jabalussaraj Gulran Kohistan Ab Kamari Ghorband Nijrab Kushk Jawand Nuristan Asad to NGOs. Two official pro‐ Yakawlang Shibar Mahm ud Raqi Shekh Ali Dawlat Shah Chapa Abad Qadis Chaghcharan Bagram Alasay Dara Pech Qalay‐I‐ Naw Istalif Qa r aba gh Alishing Alingar Marawara Bamyan Guldara Kalakan Kohi Safi Tagab Narang Surkhi Parsa Sirkanay Mir Bacha Kot Chawkay Shakardara Dara‐I‐Nur Kohsan Mihtarlam Lal Wa Sarja Dih Sabz Khas Kunar Hisa‐I‐ Kuz Kunar Injil Awal Jalrez Paghman Surobi Karukh Bagrami Qarghayi Zinda Panjab Kabul Jalal Abad Chishti Shar Kama Goshta Jan Chahar grams are active, the Vil‐ Markazi Bihs Musayi Surkh Rod Hirat Obe Nirkh Asyab Khaki Jabbar Chaparhar Lal Pur Hisarak Bati Kot Day Mirdad Muhammad Rodat Pashtun Zarg Agh Shinwar Azra Ghoryan Guzara Shahrak Waras Nazyan Dur Day Kundi Puli Alam Dih Tulak Achin Baba Khushi Jaji Bala Baraki Farsi Barak Lija Mangal lage Stability Operations Adraskan Shahristan Nawur Jaghatu Charkh Pasaband Zana Khan Jani Khel Jaji Maydan Gardez Saghar Bahrami Ghazni Sabari Bak Shah Taywara Kajran Dih Yak Zurmat Shwak Gizab Nadir Shah Kot Tere Andar Jadran Mata Shamal Mando Zayi Zayi Khan Qarabagh Nika Gurbuz (VSO) run by US Special Shindand Khas Ziruk Tani Pur Chaman Sar Uruzgan Sharan Shahidi Hass Chora Giro Hawza Anar Dara Baghran Gayan Muqur Ab Urgun Band Omna Tirin Zarghun Bala Buluk Dihrawud Kot Shah Gelan Khak‐e Safid Barmal Gulistan Forces and the Afghan Dila Pusht Rod Kajaki Shahjoy Naw Zad Nesh Gomal Qalay‐I‐Kah Bakwa Nawa Farah Mizan Qalat Waza Khwa Shib Koh Shah WaliWaliKot Ko Washer Sangin Ghorak Local Police (ALP) led by Shinkay Tarnak Wa Ja Shamulzayi Wor Mamay ISAF Key Terrain Girishk Lash Wa Juwa Khash Rod Nad Ali Atghar

Maywand Lashkar Arghistan Naway i Gah Maruf the Ministry of Interior Kang Bara Daman Chakhansur Panjwayi VSO (former LDI/CDI) Zaranj Reg (see map for districts). Spin Boldak ALP Garmser

Shorabak However, ANSO has re‐ Chahar Burja Reg

Dishu ceived numerous reports of other irregular groups spontaneously forming outside of these programs, for instance in Faryab, Balkh and Takhar (but there could be others), that then seek retroactive sanction for their mobilization. While the subject is complex, the early concern is that ir‐ regulars are actually coalescing around political/ethnic leaders, in a low‐intensity arms race, stimulated by the need to preposition ahead of the impending IMF withdrawal. If confirmed, which 2011 will show, then this aspect of the COIN strategy will be deeply at odds with efforts to form a strong central State.

The phenomenon seems most acute in the North where we suspect the fractured ethnic landscape gives rise to a more imminent sense of danger when the neighbor’s suddenly re‐arm and don a badge of State legitimacy. In Kunduz recently, competing irregulars, loyal to opposing Jamiat/Tajik and Hezb‐i‐Islami/ Pashtun commanders, have engaged in armed conflict over territory and taxing rights. In other provinces locals have reported being robbed or assaulted and some claim the Arbaki even have links to the armed opposition. These developments are really of concern. The official response suggests that ultimately all irregulars will be brought under the control of the MOI with the ALP program, however this seems highly unlikely given the level of unauthorized mobilizations already occurring. The genie is out of the bottle.

In the short term the main risk to NGOs is simply that of the introduction of new armed actors to the field. We have not yet seen an Arbaki kill an NGO worker (although we suspect we have seen some robberies and maybe an abduction) but it will only be a matter of time. In the long run, irregular forces could pose a significant obstacle to lasting peace in the country (by delegating State legitimacy) and leave NGOs negoti‐ ating a complex, and shifting, patchwork of competing authorities. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 4

PartPart 2.2.

NGONGO TRENDSTRENDS

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 5

2.1 General NGO Trends

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 ‐ 2010 (Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions) 25

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

A total of sixty eight NGOs were victimized in eighty eight separate AOG attacks this year (above), 14% down from the previous year. 51 one these were rated as ‘serious’ including abductions and kinetic attacks. The rate of attacks per month fluctuates significantly and with no obvious correlation to the rate of general conflict. A long term downward trend remains visible, between the peaks of 2008 and 2010 for example, likely reflecting incremental changes in NGO behavior rather than AOG intent or changes in demographics. The data still solidly supports the conclusion that NGO’s are not broadly or routinely targeted by AOG otherwise this would be visible in this data set. Exposure to crime (below) remains low, an additional 38 incidents, and has been dropping over time. Armed robbery is the main concern.

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006‐2010 (Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic) 12

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC APR APR APR APR APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 6

2.2 Category of NGO Incidents 2010

Abduction was the most com‐ ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks on NGO, full 2010 mon form of AOG attack on NGOs this year (right, 30 cases) accounting for 35% of 5% 7% 11% 4% the total, significantly up from IED 11% Rocket/Mortar 21% of the total in the fourth 12% quarter of 2009. To date, all 74 SAF/RPG victims have been released. Abduction (cases) Small arms fire events (9 15% Threats/Intimidations 35% Facility Arson/Ransack cases), mostly in the form of Theft Vehilce/Supplies roadside ambushes, also Illegal Check Post dropped as a percentage, down to 11% from 19% in 2009 but, as this category of attack accounted for 12 NGO fatalities, it remains a serious threat. The murder of 10 NGO staff in one incident in Badakshan is included in this count. Four of the nine roadside ambushes targeted demining NGOs. IEDs (7%) continued to plague NGO road movement with six strikes occurring, killing 10, with four of these being assessed as deliberate and two accidental. Three of the deliberate IED strikes targeted demining NGOs. In 2009, IEDs made up 8% of the total attack profile. Lesser events, like threats (15%) via phone or in person, theft of vehicles or sup‐ plies (11%) and the ransacking/burning of remote offices or project sites (12%) made up the remainder of the annual profile. The data confirms what was laid out in greater detail in Q.3, that serious attacks on NGOs by AOG are in decline. See page nine for discussion on motivations.

Armed robbery (10 cases) re‐ ANSO: Composition of criminal attacks on NGO, full 2010 mained the most prominent form of crime against NGO

(right) at 29% of the total but is 6% also down from 52% of the to‐ 29% 26% tal (25 cases) of 2009. Of this Handgrenade year’s cases, seven occurred at SAF remote facilities and just three Arson Abduction (cases) on the road. An additional four 6% Threat/Intimidation 24% 9% robberies were attempted but Armed Robbery failed. Criminal homicide (SAF) remained a concern with three killed and six injured in armed attacks by criminals. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 7

2.3 NGO Serious Incident Map 2010

ANSO: Location of Significant Attacks Against NGO @ Q.4 2010

IED Strike

SAF/RPG JAWZJAN BALKH KUNDUZ BADAKSHAN

SAMANGAN FARYAB BAGHLAN

BADGHIS PARWAN BAMYAN KABUL WARDAK HERAT NANGAHAR GHOR DAYKUNDI GHAZNI KHOST

URUZGAN FARAH ZABUL PAKTIKA

HELMAND NIMROZ KANDAHAR

The location of kinetic attacks against NGOs (see map) does ANSO: NGO staff killed per cause, countrywide, 2010 not demonstrate any particular geographic concentration or 10 trend. Attacks occurred in prov‐ Targeted Killing inces with dramatically different IED on Deminer 7 underlying levels of conflict Command Wire IED (accidental) 2 (from safe to highly insecure) and with both high and low lev‐ Collateral (IMF fire) 2 els of AOG presence. The un‐ Gunfire on Deminer 2 known variable is the population density of NGOs themselves. Civilian Homocide 2 The number of people killed per Collateral (AOG fire) 1 attack type (right) shows that while deliberate targeting still Pressure Plate IED (accidental) 1 accounted for the majority of 0246810 deaths, collateral fatalities are a growing cause for concern. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 8

2.4 NGO Abduction Map 2010

While Q.3 data indicated that abductions would sky ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Year, 2008‐2010 ‐rocket in 2010, the last quarter rates slowed suffi‐ ciently to being the annual total in line with last 74 80 69 year, 74 cases compared to 69 in 2009. Still abduc‐ 70 tion remained a major concern effecting many or‐ 60 51 ganizations. The general profile remained consis‐ 50 40 tent throughout the year with little violence dis‐ 30 played in most cases, the average detention period 20 falling to just 3 days (down from 6 weeks in 2007) 10 0 and all victims being released unharmed. The soft 2008 2009 2010 nature of most cases would suggest they are better referred to as ’illegal detentions’ conducted for the purpose of information gathering rather than abductions for political advantage. We expect ‘detention/abduction’ to remain a prominent risk for NGOs going in to 2011, as AOG seek to control and understand new battle spaces, but, given the lack of violence this year, perhaps one that could be reinterpreted as offering opportunities to open dialogue and encourage acceptance.

ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Province , full 2010

BADAKSHAN

JAWZJAN KUNDUZ BALKH 2 1 TAKHAR1

SAMANGAN FARYAB17 BAGHLAN6 SAR‐6E‐PUL

BADGHIS PARWAN KAPISA LAGHMAN BAMYAN 5 KABUL WARDAK 7 NANGAHAR HERAT 10 7 GHOR 6 DAYKUNDI GHAZNI2 KHOST

URUZGAN

FARAH Province # NGO Staff Abducted in 2010 PAKTIKA Faryab 17 ZABUL Wardak 10 HELMAND NIMROZ Herat 7 4 Kabul 7 KANDAHAR Ghor 6 Baghlan 6 Sar‐i‐Pul 6 Kunar 5 Kandahar 4 Ghazni 2 Balkh 2 Takhar 1 Kunduz 1 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 9

2.5 Motivations

While not an area that lends itself to ANSO: Assessed motivation of AOG attacks on NGOs precise analysis, the question of AOG motivations in attacking NGOs needs unpacking. We assess that all serious Accident/Collateral Deliberate & Hostile Seeking Influence Intel Gathering incidents this year, meaning the 21 12% cases of kinetic attack plus 30 cases of abduction, have fallen in to one of the 14% following four categories:

1.Information Gathering: We asses 10% that at least 64% of serious incidents, 64% including all of the AOG related abduc‐ tions, have been committed for the purpose of systemic information gath‐ ering, or in NGO parlance ’actor map‐ ping’. This explains why 100% of victims have been released without harm and often within 48hrs. In this light, it would be more accurate to refer to most events as ‘investigative detentions’ rather than abductions and to see them as the IEA version of, albeit involun‐ tary, civil‐military coordination offering an opportunity to open dialogue.

2. Accident/Collateral: We estimate that up to 12% of serious incidents (six of the 51 cases reviewed here) are sim‐ ply accidents resulting from the volatile and fluid environment. Within this category you can find mortars and rock‐ ets, fired by IMF or AOG, that fall short and hit NGO offices, command wire IEDs that mistake a target and pressure plate IEDs that simply blow up the first person that drives over them. All accidents illustrate the importance of avoiding combatants, both in terms of perception and location, even though some events would not have been mitigated by any measures. Increased IMF & AOG offensives have created more ambient violence.

3.Deliberate and Hostile: Without doubt the purpose of some attacks is precisely what it seems to be, to kill or in‐ jure NGO staff. Of the 51 cases under review here we assess that eight (14%) fall in to this worst of categories but, more alarmingly, seven of these targeted demining organizations. This reflects a clear and direct opposition to the work of deminers. The eighth case involved the murder of ten NGO staff in Badakshan by a non‐local armed fac‐ tion. In this case religious extremism, expressed as a desire to kill non‐Muslims, was assessed as an underlying cause essentially divorcing the murders from the surrounding political context. The common thread in all cases is that the NGO staff are killed for their direct characteristics with the attack being an end it its own right.

4.Influencing Populations: Also known as ‘effects based operations’ (or EBO), these are the types of attacks where the NGO is not targeted for its own sake but rather acts as a means through which to influence the surrounding population. Essentially the inverse of winning hearts and minds. We estimate that just 10% of the attacks (5 cases) fall in to this category with most of these being non‐fatal attacks on schools or health care facilities where the pur‐ pose was to punish the community (by denying access) for supporting ‘un‐Islamic’ activities and drive them to‐ wards a condition more favorable to AOG presence. The fact that the schools were run by NGOs was irrelevant, that they offered free education to young women was not.

In conclusion we suggest that deliberate attacks on NGOs, for who they are and what they do, are actually ex‐ tremely rare, with the notable exception of deminers. However, even benign scrutiny by AOG, whether deliberate or mistaken, can easily leave an NGO bloodied or worse. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 10

PartPart 3.3.

StateState ofof thethe ConflictConflict

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 11

3.1 AOG Initiated Attack—Countrywide

ANSO KEY DATA: Monthly Attacks by Armed Opposition Groups, 2006 to 2010 (Significant kinetic attacks only, does not include criminal activity. Includes all AOG cooperating under the IEA umbrella (HiG, LeT, HQN, TTP, IMU etc) )

1600 1541 ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010 ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010 1400 64% 64% 53% 48% 53% 1200 48% 41% 41% 1093

1000

786 800 2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010 2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010 634

600 533

405 400 335

200

JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC APR APR APR FEB APR FEB APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Consistent with the five year trend (above) attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were 64% higher than 2009, the highest inter‐annual growth rate we have recorded (see inset graph above). If averaged, the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per day, every single day of the year. In September this rate jumped to more than 50 attacks per day, or 1,541 opera‐ tions, as they ramped up their efforts to disrupt parliamentary elections that month. The year followed a familiar pat‐ ter with Jan/Feb starting slow, as AOG remobilize from the winter retreat, followed by seven solid months of expan‐ sion and a rapid de‐escalation back to December. The final month closing out at 47% higher than December 2009.

Although provincial level data (p.12) shows that each province per‐ ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks, 2010 formed differently, taking the national data as a whole we consider Suicide this indisputable evidence that conditions are deteriorating. If Attacks losses are taken in one area they are simply compensated for in an‐ 1% other as has been the dynamic since this conflict started. Indirect Fire More so than in previous years, information of this nature is sharply 45% Close divergent from IMF ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting Range improvements. We encourage NGO’s to recognize that, no matter 54% how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of this na‐ ture are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion, ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 12

3.2 AOG Initiated Attacks—Per Province

ANSO: AOG Attacks Per Province, 2009 to 2010 comparison and % of change.

PROVINCE 2009 2010 % Change SAR‐E PUL 23 81 252% GHAZNI 461 1540 234% PAKTYA 180 491 173% PAKTIKA 379 897 137% HELMAND 620 1387 124% GROWTH BAGHLAN 101 222 120% TAKHAR 65 140 115% FARYAB 137 293 114% SAMANGAN 10 21 110% AVERAGE BALKH 88 182 107% KHOST 478 906 90%

URUZGAN 196 356 82% ABOVE NANGARHAR 295 504 71% PARWAN 52 83 60% FARAH 162 256 58% JAWZJAN 48 74 54% BADGHIS 239 356 49% LOGAR 188 263 40% ZABUL 259 353 36% LAGHMAN 149 195 31% GROWTH WARDAK 414 511 23% KUNDUZ 292 355 22% DAYKUNDI 19 23 21% KANDAHAR 970 1162 20%

HERAT 227 254 12% AVERAGE KUNAR 1318 1457 11% KAPISA 116 126 9% GHOR 83 84 1% KABUL 177 146 ‐18% BADAKHSHAN 43 35 ‐19% NIMROZ 135 108 ‐20% NURISTAN 85 64 ‐25%

BAMYAN 22 4 ‐82% DECLINE

This table provides raw AOG attack rate data per province for 2009 and 2010, plus the percentage growth rate, per province. The average referred to is the 64% overall growth rate countrywide. Notable is that of the 10 provinces in RC‐North six of them saw above average growth from 107%‐252%. As a bloc, the provinces of P2K (Paktya, Paktika & Khost) plus Ghazni saw the sharpest deterioration with an average 158% increase of attacks across all four. Only five provinces saw less violence than last year with one being the capitol. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 13

3.3 AOG Initiated Attacks—Insecurity Rating

ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, December 2010 (Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2010 indicated in map)

BADAKSHAN 35 JAWZJAN 74 KUNDUZ BALKH 182 355 TAKHAR 140

SAMANGAN FARYAB 293 21 BAGHLAN 222

SAR‐E‐PUL 81 BADGHIS 356 PARWAN KAPISA 126 LAGHMAN BAMYAN 4 83 195 KABUL 146 WARDAK 511 HERAT 254 NANGAHAR 504 GHOR 84 DAYKUNDI 23

GHAZNI 1540 KHOST 906

URUZGAN 356 Extremely Insecure FARAH 256 PAKTIKA 897

ZABUL 353 HELMAND 1387 NIMROZ 108 Highly Insecure

KANDAHAR 1162 Moderately Insecure

Deteriorating

Low Insecurity

The most important and notable trend of the year was the AOG offensive in the North which concen‐ trated on disrupting main supply routes, killing Government personnel and exploiting ethnic and political tensions to obtain a foothold. The offensive was initiated in early February from strongholds in Dahana‐i‐ Ghuri and Baghlan‐i‐Jadid but soon spread to encompass large areas of Kunduz, Takhar and even Badak‐ shan. Today Kunduz district is the focus of the most sustained attacks. On the western flank, AOG devel‐ oped an impressive campaign in Faryab which by now has established resilient pockets in Jawzjan and Sar ‐E Pul. In the East Paktya, Paktika & Khost dramatically destabilized with two of the three seeing triple digit growth rates. The reported relocation of the Haqqani headquarters from Waziristan to Kurram no doubt supporting this trend. Ghazni surprised by surpassing Helmand, Kandahar and Kunar in attack rates, the majority of which occurred in just two districts Andar and Ghazni. This will be critically con‐ tested terrain in 2011. No surprises in the South as AOG put up a respectable resistance to the enhanced US pressure, doubling the attack rate in Helmand although mostly in the form of victim operated IEDs. In the West displaced AOG turned up in Farah and Ghor bringing instability, particularly to Pasaband and Taywara in the latter province. Going in to 2011, the AOG position looks strong. ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 14

3.4 Conflict Related Fatalities

ANSO: Conflict related civilian fatalities, by AOG/MF, 2008‐2010 ANSO: ANA, ANP, IMF fatalities, 2009 ‐2010

2500 2500

2000 2000

1500 2027 1590 1500 IMF 1290 ANP 1612 1000 1547 1000 ANA

500 465 464 401 500

0 2008 2009 2010 0 2009 2010 Conflict related civilian fatalities grew by 18% this year (above left), to a total of 2,428 persons killed, with 17% caused by IMF and 83% caused by AOG. The lead‐ ing cause of death was roadside IED strikes (below) with 820 people dying this way, 58% of them in the Southern provinces. This reflects the increased volume of ‘pressure plate’ (VOIED) devices utilized as AOG sought stand‐off strike capability against overwhelming IMF numbers. The IMF have succeeded in reducing both the volume and percentage of fatalities caused by them, although IMF airstrikes killed a comparable number to AOG suicide attacks. Within the security forces*, the ANP still account for the majority of fatali‐ ties (above right) with a roughly 5:1 ratio against ANA/IMF deaths. (*ANSO’s ANSF/IMF fatality figures indicative only)

ANSO: Leading causes of civilian collateral fatality, 2010

EOF (IMF) 39

Indirect Fire (AOG) 98

Ground Op (IMF) 149

Airstrike (IMF) 213

Suicide Attacks (AOG) 230

Ground Op (AOG) 687

Roadside IED (AOG) 820

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Page 15

Acronyms: IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, Taliban); Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH/HiG), Lashghar-e-Taihba (LeT) IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF) ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army) IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb) IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop) SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

REPORT ENDS

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