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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 73 1-15 May 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The announcement of Oper- ed in Wardak (+25%), Following the wholesale 7 Northern Region ation Badar by the IEA dur- Khost (-50%), while most occupation of Waygal Dis- Western Region 15 ing the last period had little of the provinces in the trict in Nuristan in late overall impact on the opera- Western Region have rec- March, the IEA has contin- Eastern Region 18 tional context, though there orded varying degrees of ued to press it’s gains in the Southern Region 23 was a temporary surge in decrease. Kabul also con- province this period, with threat reporting in regards to tinues to report extremely large scale engagements 26 ANSO Info Page complex attacks countrywide. low levels of conflict related reported from Parun (the Not surprisingly, Kandahar incidents. provincial capital) and in the South was the only An NGO incident reported Bargi Matal, the site of sim- YOU NEED TO KNOW location to experience a man- from Faryab in the North ilar efforts last year. While ifestation of this reporting, in served to highlight one of the IEA have enjoyed de- • Sustained AOG attack in a bold, multi-prong and sus- facto control of large por- Kandahar City the most concerning trends tained attack against various in this region, the preva- tions of this province for • Deterioration of security in GOA facilities within the lence of illegal checkpoints some time, the introduc- Ghazni city. Otherwise, AOG inci- along the main routes. A tion of ANA reinforce- dent scope, volume, and type ments represent govern- • The IEA increases its efforts second NGO incident from remained within the trends the North, this time in Sar- ment efforts to disrupt this. in Nuristan, government previously identified this Due to its proximity to the responds in kind E Pul, also served to solidi- year, though there were a few fy the North's dominance in border, and the concomi- • Transition remains on standout exceptions this peri- NGO incident volumes. tant availability of willing schedule od. The third and final NGO fighters, it is likely that the IEA will be able to contin- Months of Helmand suprem- incident this period, this acy in incident volume re- time from Kunar in the ue its efforts into the short ANSO is supported by porting was broken this peri- East, marks the latest in a term. od as it recorded a dramatic series that has directly im- The timeline for the previ- decrease in reporting. This is pacted NGO clinics in this ously announced likely due to a variety of fac- province. While both key ‘transition’ plans remains in tors, including ‘fatigue’ (of parties to the conflict have place, set to take place in men and materials) after a been responsible for inci- the coming months. Of sustained period of high- dents, the latest comes as note, in most of the areas tempo operations, security the result of a search con- scheduled (i.e. Bamyan & force efforts at interdiction, ducted by ISAF (following Panjshir), this process will as well as the reorientation of a previous incident involv- result in little structural AOG resources towards the ing the occupation of a clin- difference in the composi- poppy harvest. Ghazni on ic during a clash) and could tion of the security forces the other hand noted a signif- have further negative impli- presently insitu and, from icant increase, bringing it cations as seen in similar an NGO operational per- back on line to achieve the circumstances from an inci- spective, will have a limited high levels recorded in 2010. dent in Logar earlier this impact on the overall secu- Other notable changes in year. rity dynamics as they are incident volume were record- presently understood. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 In counterpoint to the dramatic 40 AOG siege of Kandahar, Kabul emplacement on the Highway 30 remained calm. A sole case of remains extremely rare. For the 20 rest, AOG abstained from attack- corroborated AOG activity in- 10 ing IMF fuel convoys on the volved an IED discovery in Suro- 0 bi. Still, Operation Badar fell on Surobi side of the highway, while fertile land, at least in terms of an attacks were recorded in the effective information campaign. neighbouring Qarghayi of Lagh- The media announcement sparked man. Off the highway, the ANSF KABUL AOG KABUL Crime and IMF seized several sizeable yet another wave of spurious re- ed in possession of BBIED materiel. Two porting about AOG attacks to weapon caches (Uzbin, Manogai, Jegdalak) with weapon seizures NDS operatives reportedly sustained SAF inju- come though, in absolute num- ries during the operation (the encounter conse- bers, the momentum was seized representing one third of ANSF- authored operations. Besides quently proved fatal for one of them); the cir- by ANSF, who authored 80% of cumstances of the incident require further as- all incidents recorded. Surobi, these were mainly report- ed from Paghman, Bagrami, sessment. Surobi, the only district outside of Qarabagh and several districts in Criminal activity encompassed armed intimida- the planned security handover for Kabul City. tions, notably the explosion of a light magnetic Kabul this year, witnessed a rare ANSF arrest operations targeted IED against the residence of a retired ANP case of IED deployment on the officer in PD 2. In Abdurrahimzai of Musayi, highway in Puli Khaki. The pres- mainly criminal elements, while documented captures of AOG a less complicated hand-grenade method was sure-plate device was discovered opted to make a case. Karte Naw and Hoot and neutralized in the morning members remained rare. On 14 May, NDS released information Khel in Kabul City witnessed targeted assassi- hours of 1 May. In the past, nations and an honor killing, with another as- IEDs were sporadically deployed on a successful disruption of an AOG cell in the Khawaja Jam sassination (the escalation of a dispute) being by AOG against the ANSF & reported from the hills of PD 6. Abductions IMF forces on secondary roads, in Area of Paghman, during which three AOG members were arrest- for ransom, regular traits of previous reports particular within Uzbin, and IED this year, did not materialize this period. GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 11th of May 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Two cases of AOG abductions 40 and a seizure of explosive materiel Of note, the Kashmir area in Baraki Barak witnessed a joint 30 by IMF underlined the develop- 20 ments in Logar. A 37% increase IMF-ANSF operation which in overall incident volumes has tracked down and intercepted a 10 been recorded, although AOG truck transporting up to 10 tonnes 0 activity remained constant with 10 of ammonium nitrate. AOG attacks captured so far. In On 6 May, an ANP officer was opposition to the events in Ward- abducted along with his vehicle in LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime ak, the security forces were effec- the bazaar of Puli Alam. Two days abductees and their whereabouts remain un- tive in the interdiction of IED later, his dead body was recovered known. attacks as all deployed devices from Chiltan Area. On the same were neutralized (5 devices col- day, 8 May, a party of 3 expatriate In regards to NGOs, the cases of abductions lected by ANSF, and one by (Turkish) engineers and a local remain rare, and have not resumed since 2008. IMF). The core of AOG attacks driver, employees of a private Out of 30 AOG-initiated cases of abduction indeed focused on the traditional construction company, got stuck recorded since 2006, three instances included close-range strikes against static in traffic on the highway north of NGOs (Zarghun Shahr in Muhammad Agha, and moving security targets (8 Puli Alam, while the road was Wazirabad & Qalai Sayed Habibullah in Puli cases, security forces without ex- blocked following an IED discov- Alam). All the cases pertained to the tempo- ception). AOG escalations con- ery. Taking a detour via the ill- rary abductions (and subsequent release) of centrated in Puli Alam (2 abduc- reputed Qalai Juma Khan – Babus NGO de-miners over the summer season tions and 3 close range attacks) section proved a disaster, as the 2008. In counterpoint, criminal abductions and Baraki Barak (2 close range party was immediately snatched targeted NGOs twice during September 2007 attacks and 3 IED deployments), from the road, presumably by lo- (in Qalai Ali Khan of Puli Alam & Shaikhabad whereas the IMF performed a cal AOG elements. Later on this of Baraki Barak). While the abductions, either dozen of arrests with a large ma- cycle, IMF conducted a follow up as attacks of opportunity, or for premeditated jority of incidents taking place in operation in Qalai Juma Khan, criminal or political motives, remain rare, they the population centers of Baraki reportedly leading to the arrest of nonetheless represent a key element of the Barak, Puli Alam, Charkh and several AOG suspects. As of the NGO operational environment in the prov- Muhammad Agha. time of writing, the fate of the ince.
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