THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 73 1-15 May 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The announcement of Oper- ed in Wardak (+25%), Following the wholesale 7 Northern Region ation Badar by the IEA dur- Khost (-50%), while most occupation of Waygal Dis- Western Region 15 ing the last period had little of the provinces in the trict in Nuristan in late overall impact on the opera- Western Region have rec- March, the IEA has contin- Eastern Region 18 tional context, though there orded varying degrees of ued to press it’s gains in the Southern Region 23 was a temporary surge in decrease. Kabul also con- province this period, with threat reporting in regards to tinues to report extremely large scale engagements 26 ANSO Info Page complex attacks countrywide. low levels of conflict related reported from Parun (the Not surprisingly, Kandahar incidents. provincial capital) and in the South was the only An NGO incident reported Bargi Matal, the site of sim- YOU NEED TO KNOW location to experience a man- from Faryab in the North ilar efforts last year. While ifestation of this reporting, in served to highlight one of the IEA have enjoyed de- • Sustained AOG attack in a bold, multi-prong and sus- facto control of large por- Kandahar City the most concerning trends tained attack against various in this region, the preva- tions of this province for • Deterioration of security in GOA facilities within the lence of illegal checkpoints some time, the introduc- Ghazni city. Otherwise, AOG inci- along the main routes. A tion of ANA reinforce- dent scope, volume, and type ments represent govern- • The IEA increases its efforts second NGO incident from remained within the trends the North, this time in Sar- ment efforts to disrupt this. in Nuristan, government previously identified this Due to its proximity to the responds in kind E Pul, also served to solidi- year, though there were a few fy the North's dominance in border, and the concomi- • Transition remains on standout exceptions this peri- NGO incident volumes. tant availability of willing schedule od. The third and final NGO fighters, it is likely that the IEA will be able to contin- Months of Helmand suprem- incident this period, this acy in incident volume re- time from Kunar in the ue its efforts into the short ANSO is supported by porting was broken this peri- East, marks the latest in a term. od as it recorded a dramatic series that has directly im- The timeline for the previ- decrease in reporting. This is pacted NGO clinics in this ously announced likely due to a variety of fac- province. While both key ‘transition’ plans remains in tors, including ‘fatigue’ (of parties to the conflict have place, set to take place in men and materials) after a been responsible for inci- the coming months. Of sustained period of high- dents, the latest comes as note, in most of the areas tempo operations, security the result of a search con- scheduled (i.e. Bamyan & force efforts at interdiction, ducted by ISAF (following Panjshir), this process will as well as the reorientation of a previous incident involv- result in little structural AOG resources towards the ing the occupation of a clin- difference in the composi- poppy harvest. Ghazni on ic during a clash) and could tion of the security forces the other hand noted a signif- have further negative impli- presently insitu and, from icant increase, bringing it cations as seen in similar an NGO operational per- back on line to achieve the circumstances from an inci- spective, will have a limited high levels recorded in 2010. dent in Logar earlier this impact on the overall secu- Other notable changes in year. rity dynamics as they are incident volume were record- presently understood. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 In counterpoint to the dramatic 40 AOG siege of Kandahar, Kabul emplacement on the Highway 30 remained calm. A sole case of remains extremely rare. For the 20 rest, AOG abstained from attack- corroborated AOG activity in- 10 ing IMF fuel convoys on the volved an IED discovery in Suro- 0 bi. Still, Operation Badar fell on Surobi side of the highway, while fertile land, at least in terms of an attacks were recorded in the effective information campaign. neighbouring Qarghayi of Lagh- The media announcement sparked man. Off the highway, the ANSF KABUL AOG KABUL Crime and IMF seized several sizeable yet another wave of spurious re- ed in possession of BBIED materiel. Two porting about AOG attacks to weapon caches (Uzbin, Manogai, Jegdalak) with weapon seizures NDS operatives reportedly sustained SAF inju- come though, in absolute num- ries during the operation (the encounter conse- bers, the momentum was seized representing one third of ANSF- authored operations. Besides quently proved fatal for one of them); the cir- by ANSF, who authored 80% of cumstances of the incident require further as- all incidents recorded. Surobi, these were mainly report- ed from Paghman, Bagrami, sessment. Surobi, the only district outside of Qarabagh and several districts in Criminal activity encompassed armed intimida- the planned security handover for Kabul City. tions, notably the explosion of a light magnetic Kabul this year, witnessed a rare ANSF arrest operations targeted IED against the residence of a retired ANP case of IED deployment on the officer in PD 2. In Abdurrahimzai of Musayi, highway in Puli Khaki. The pres- mainly criminal elements, while documented captures of AOG a less complicated hand-grenade method was sure-plate device was discovered opted to make a case. Karte Naw and Hoot and neutralized in the morning members remained rare. On 14 May, NDS released information Khel in Kabul City witnessed targeted assassi- hours of 1 May. In the past, nations and an honor killing, with another as- IEDs were sporadically deployed on a successful disruption of an AOG cell in the Khawaja Jam sassination (the escalation of a dispute) being by AOG against the ANSF & reported from the hills of PD 6. Abductions IMF forces on secondary roads, in Area of Paghman, during which three AOG members were arrest- for ransom, regular traits of previous reports particular within Uzbin, and IED this year, did not materialize this period.

GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 11th of May 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Two cases of AOG abductions 40 and a seizure of explosive materiel Of note, the Kashmir area in Baraki Barak witnessed a joint 30 by IMF underlined the develop- 20 ments in Logar. A 37% increase IMF-ANSF operation which in overall incident volumes has tracked down and intercepted a 10 been recorded, although AOG truck transporting up to 10 tonnes 0 activity remained constant with 10 of ammonium nitrate. AOG attacks captured so far. In On 6 May, an ANP officer was opposition to the events in Ward- abducted along with his vehicle in LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime ak, the security forces were effec- the bazaar of Puli Alam. Two days abductees and their whereabouts remain un- tive in the interdiction of IED later, his dead body was recovered known. attacks as all deployed devices from Chiltan Area. On the same were neutralized (5 devices col- day, 8 May, a party of 3 expatriate In regards to NGOs, the cases of abductions lected by ANSF, and one by (Turkish) engineers and a local remain rare, and have not resumed since 2008. IMF). The core of AOG attacks driver, employees of a private Out of 30 AOG-initiated cases of abduction indeed focused on the traditional construction company, got stuck recorded since 2006, three instances included close-range strikes against static in traffic on the highway north of NGOs (Zarghun Shahr in Muhammad Agha, and moving security targets (8 Puli Alam, while the road was Wazirabad & Qalai Sayed Habibullah in Puli cases, security forces without ex- blocked following an IED discov- Alam). All the cases pertained to the tempo- ception). AOG escalations con- ery. Taking a detour via the ill- rary abductions (and subsequent release) of centrated in Puli Alam (2 abduc- reputed Qalai Juma Khan – Babus NGO de-miners over the summer season tions and 3 close range attacks) section proved a disaster, as the 2008. In counterpoint, criminal abductions and Baraki Barak (2 close range party was immediately snatched targeted NGOs twice during September 2007 attacks and 3 IED deployments), from the road, presumably by lo- (in Qalai Ali Khan of Puli Alam & Shaikhabad whereas the IMF performed a cal AOG elements. Later on this of Baraki Barak). While the abductions, either dozen of arrests with a large ma- cycle, IMF conducted a follow up as attacks of opportunity, or for premeditated jority of incidents taking place in operation in Qalai Juma Khan, criminal or political motives, remain rare, they the population centers of Baraki reportedly leading to the arrest of nonetheless represent a key element of the Barak, Puli Alam, Charkh and several AOG suspects. As of the NGO operational environment in the prov- Muhammad Agha. time of writing, the fate of the ince.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 Absent this period, road-side rob- 40 beries nevertheless constitute the outliers, although Eshpushta (and 30 only established (though infre- the wider Do Ab Mikh Zarin) has 20 quent) pattern affecting NGO acquired a somewhat durable rep- 10 utation of being perhaps the only freedom of movement in the 0 province. The only event of sig- pocket within the province with a nificance in Bamyan was the NDS more frequent presence of AOG. operation in Ghandak Valley For access to Bamyan from Ka- BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime (Shibar District) and the subse- bul, both the Ghorband Valley road (via Shibar) and the Wardak quent arrest of a local resident for fered in tactics and intensity: while the Ghor- Road (via Jalrez and Hajigak) con- illegal possession of firearms. In band incidents pertained to IED activity (with tinue to host security incidents. opposition to April, May did not the devices usually emplaced overnight and confirm any lasting uptick of In both areas, the attacks have so mostly authored by IEA), the Jalrez road fea- far concentrated on the security AOG activity. The two AOG tured close-range combat and ambushes, with forces and their associates (such attacks in Espushta area of local accounts indicating a mixed AOG and as PSCs). For the last two weeks, Kahmard recorded in April (SAF ACG imprint along the road. The Ghorband against an ANP checkpoint on 12 AOG attacks in Ghorband were road is currently assessed as a less exposed axis largely at par with AOG strikes in April, IED against an IMF vehic- for NGO movement to/from Bamyan than Jalrez, although the attacks dif- ular patrol on 28 April) remain the passage thru Jalrez. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The conflict in the eastern dis- tricts of Kapisa (Tagab & Alasay The latter incident resulted in four 30 in particular) followed a slightly AOG casualties, reportedly in- 20 downward trend in comparison to cluding expatriate fighters from 10 Waziristan. Shatoray, on the Ta- the previous period, with both 0 sides taking a breath after the gab – Surobi section of the road, countless IMF & ANSF offen- saw an IED device detonate dur- sives earlier this year. In counter- ing defusal by a joint IMF-ANSF KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime point, AOG determination to es- EOD team. The northern access route to Tagab from Nijrab wit- calate the conflict this season tered earlier this year, of IEA efforts to recruit stood still. When engagements nessed the elimination by IMF of an AOG operative in process of local elements and train them in the facilitation did occur this period, they re- of road-side IED attacks against the ANSF mained lethal, often including emplacing an IED in Omer Khel, while in Lando Khel, three AOG and IMF. So far, the attacks have not been multiple casualties and protracted effective due to the technological shortcom- fighting. The safe passage of ci- were captured by a joint security force. ings of devices emplaced. Although a failed vilians, incl. NGOs, is often com- attempt, the case of an ineffective strike promised as the clashes do con- In Kohistan I, a low-yield RCIED against a white marked land-cruiser of an inter- largely missed an NDS officer verge on main access routes and national organization in Nawabad – Karezai in driving a white Toyota Hilux in populated areas in their vicinity. January demonstrated the risks of NGOs be- the Tape Malik Area in the late In the west, a recent emergence of ing mistakenly targeted by inexperienced AOG AOG IED activity (so far still morning of 11 May. Previously, recruits who, besides assembling the devices, IED activity in this part of Kapisa modest in terms of frequency and have also difficulties in identifying legitimate typically related to makeshift impact) seems to represent a trend targets. In this regards, the latest strike marked (often lethal) devices used in local in the making. a progress, as the attackers correctly identified Out of 13 recorded incidents (7 conflicts and interpersonal issues. and explored a routine NDS movement. Still, Since 2011, however, two IED AOG initiated in total), two were it is yet to be seen whether the IEA training blasts and three discoveries have AOG initiated complex attacks in and logistical efforts will materialize in IED been identified as devices au- Alasay (Jangalez, the strike includ- attacks of scale in the Kohistans. ed an IED) and Tagab (Sultan thored by AOG. The incidents Khel on the Tagab – Alasay axis). gave weight to the accounts, regis-

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40 This cycle opened with armed escalations of two local disputes exception of the southern Kajran 30 District. in Sangi Takht and Khedir. In the 20 first case, two families clashed The bazaar of Kajran actually over land in Joye Mirazar. One of hosted a single AOG-initiated 10 the individuals involved was shot attack, which took form of a brief 0 dead, whereas eight individuals night-time SAF engagement have been arrested by ANP. In against an ANP checkpoint (3 Bala Woyeer, the armed security May). The shoot-out left two DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime of a Khedir-based warlord escalat- ANP injured, sending once again ed a clash with the ANP detail a message of force to those who community in the vicinity of the ANP check- shortly after the police established show intent to interfere with spo- point, seizing the opportunity to consult with a checkpoint ‘threateningly too radic AOG passage. The IMF local elders on the situation. Reportedly, the close’ to the warlord’s residence. responded with a hearts and attractiveness of medical care outweighed the For the rest, the province re- minds offensive six days later, fear of AOG reprisals in the eyes of local resi- mained untouched by overt politi- when a special forces team made a dents, and the day was termed a success. cal or criminal violence with the mobile clinic available for the THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 A steady upwards trend for inci- 80 dent volumes (+25% over the security forces, their PSC associ- 60 ates and logistical providers, caus- previous period), and the ratio of 40 7 AOG strikes per 3 ANSF & ing 9 casualties among the person- 20 IMF interventions marked the nel. AOG experiments with IEDs reporting period. Nirkh and did not go smoothly though - two 0 Saydabad continued to host recur- premature blasts during the em- placement (one in Jaghatu and rent AOG attacks aimed at dis- WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime rupting ANSF-IMF movements another in Nirkh), claimed lives of 6 AOG operatives (5 and 1 re- along the highway, whereas signif- mobilizing the communities for more support. icant volumes have also been re- spectively). ANSF declared just one IED seizure (on the highway Voicing opposition to girls’ education was ported from the district roads in mentioned as a recurrent topic of the PSG Jalrez, Jaghatu and Day Mirdad, in in Saydabad), although an IMF- ANSF operation in Maydan Shahr tour, but also a point of discord between the addition to the DACs of Maydan leader and his constituency. Shahr and Chaki Wardak.. effectively targeted members of an alleged IED cell. Overall, IED GOA stabilization efforts focused on the de- The AOG surge maintained high deployment proved effective, alt- ployment of the ALP (reportedly with the volumes of close-range attacks, hough costly, on AOG side. With province’s APPF structures integrating into the although the most visible change additional training and dissemina- new program). Two specific traits have ap- has been noted in regards to IED tion of materiel, IEDs will likely peared since the early days of the initiative: the deployment. In comparison with gain in proportion within the Wardak version of the ALP builds heavily on the first four months of 2011 (12 AOG patterns of attack, eventual- the APPF platform (benefitting from estab- IED strikes in total, mainly in ly increasing the statistical likeli- lished organizational learning and trained ca- Saydabad), the first 10 days of this hood of NGOs to drive into an dres); and AOGs did not hesitate to promote cycle accounted for 9 IED blasts explosive device. the ALP among the targets of choice incl. in- alone which were also more equal- Besides the military operations, timidation of the communities in order to con- ly distributed between Saydabad tain the roll-out of the program. Local owner- and Nirkh districts (3 strikes re- the IEA leadership showed a reac- tive face with the PSG reportedly ship and the impact of the program on the spectively), Maydan Shahr (2) and grass-roots level is yet to be seen. Jaghatu (1). The blasts targeted touring the southern districts and

NGO Incidents the alleged Pakistani interferences in Afghani- PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 stan. Despite the strongly worded warnings to This Report Period 0 The sole incident recorded this the government by the prominent duo of Dr. period was linked to the police perpetrator managed to escape. Abdullah – A. Saleh, other strands of Panjshiri follow-up of the 19 April shoot Opposition voices from Panjshir, power-circles retain a strong representation out in Safid Chehr. With the per- rather than security incidents, within the current ruling elite, incl. the security petrator still at large, the course of claimed attention this period and forces. This level of accommodation of inter- investigation led NDS to a private materialized in several congrega- ests, and the restraint that the Panjshiri opposi- residence in Koh Jaon (Parun) tions held in Kabul. The killing of tion leaders have demonstrated so far, make and while the security force car- Osama bin Laden indeed set the the scope for violent protests linked to the ried out a search of the house, the tone of protests, with the leaders voices of dissatisfaction coming from Panjshir team came under an accurate SAF refuting both the current estab- quite limited. from a distance. As a result, one lishment’s attempts at reconcilia- NDS was wounded, while the tion process with AOG, as well as THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 The IEA campaign in the Ghor- 40 punished in a similar manner. band valley dominated the events 30 in Parwan, incl. cases of targeted The cycle concluded on 15 May abductions & killing, IEDs and with an RCIED blast against an 20 close-range attacks. ANP Ford Ranger in Shah Tut, 10 Shinwari. The number of AOG On 1 May, an ANP CP in Namak 0 attacks recorded since the begin- Ab came under AOG SAF, leav- ning of Operation Badar already ing two ANP injured while on the equals the amount of aggregated 2nd, AOG kidnapped two former PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime AOG incidents staged in Ghor- AOG fighters in Surkhi, Siygerd band over the first four months of (who had recently joined the Gov- tives, especially as Bamyan approaches the date 2011. ernment within the auspices of of the formal security transition. the APRP). On 4 May, an IED IEDs and RCIEDs, although des- A sole case of an RCIED strike against an was discovered at the Siyagerd tined for ANSF, constitute the ANP vehicle was also reported from Kotale DAC and on 7 May, a former Ja- main threat for NGO movements Basir Khel in Kohi Safi, constituting both the miati commander was taken by along the road to Bamyan. Re- first AOG attack and the first IED deploy- IEA members from a mini-van in spective to the Ghorband section ment this year for that area. In the central Daraye Khiski, north of the main of the Bamyan road, ANSO has parts of Parwan, AOG continued to harass the road in Siyagerd. His body was so far recorded 4 IED strikes in occupants of IMF and ANA bases with stand- discovered later on in Quli 2011, while an additional 5 IED off attacks as grenades, mortars and rockets Maqsud, further north in the (incl. 3 multiple ‘daisy chained’ appear in steady volumes and occasionally im- mountains, with gunshot wounds devices) have been discovered and pact inside the premises. IMF also attracted a indicating an execution-style kill- neutralized by ANSF. Further in direct attack (SAF) along the Parwan - Kapisa ing likely related to the fact that line, on 9 May, Shinwari ANP Road in Qalacha Sukhtar (Chaharikar). Prox- the commander was in talks with arrested an IEA IED-facilitator in imity to security targets in Ghorband and ANP to establish an ALP/pro- Darazgerd, shortly after his return around the bases in central parts of the prov- GOA militia in his area from a stay in Pakistan. Hinder- ince will likely continue to represent a major (Taykhan). After the execution, ing ANSF movements to/from external threat to NGO operations in the the IEA communicated locally Bamyan, will likely remain high on weeks to come. that any such attempts will be the priority list for IEA opera- THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 4 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 Perhaps the most notable security 40 incident in Balkh Province; Mazar security paradigm for the district, 30 -e Sharif (MeS) saw a rare rocket as these 2 incidents—occurring 20 within days of each other—mark attack on its airport (located in 10 the only AOG initiated security Nahri Shahi District) on May 0 11th. 2 rockets were fired from incidents on record in Nahri Shahi Nasiraband village (west of the this year. airport), with 1 of them impacting The deterioration of security in BALKH AOG BALKH Crime harmlessly outside the airport, Chimtal and Chahar Bolak dis- while the other detonated in an tricts west of MeS continued this curred in 2010. Although the district is still open area inside the airport, caus- reporting period, with reports not considered exceptionally insecure relative ing little damage, but exploding in surfacing from IMF that their se- to its’ neighboring districts, on May 3rd in close proximity to an IO helicop- curity forces are being engaged— Ghash village, an ANP officer travelling with ter. Nahri Shahi has typically regardless of unit size and teachers was stopped and robbed by 5 armed been fairly quiet, with this mark- strength—almost every time they individuals on motorcycles, all of them then ing only the 11th security incident enter either district (as opposed to being released unharmed. It is worth noting in the district this year. Although previously, when AOGs would that 4 of the 7 security incidents in Zari this an IED detonated on an IMF only engage “softer” targets, such year have consisted of armed robberies much convoy in the Puli Tasadi area of as foot patrols or low volume ele- like this one, the most recent of which oc- MeS, on the road towards the air- ments). ANSO recorded 6 attacks curred on March 12th, when armed individuals port as recently as March 5th of on ANP and ANSF targets in the- stopped and robbed a private vehicle on the this year, the last incident similar se districts this reporting period, Zari-Kishindih Road near Sair Qishlaq village. to this one in Nahri Shahi took which—while significant—does It seems likely that an armed group is operat- place on September 28th 2010, not represent an especially high ing regularly and effectively in Zari, with a when a single rocket (107mm) volume or new dynamic for these good chance that more robberies are occurring impacted a local residence in Qul highly AOG controlled districts. unreported, and that further sporadic robberies Muhammad Village AOGs operating openly in Chim- are likely to occur. (approximately 2 km northeast tal and Chahar Bolak continue to Rounding up security in Balkh, Khulm District from Camp Marmal). conduct regular operations to as- witnessed an AOG attack on an ANP check- In a second AOG attributed event sert their ability and control. point in Sayyad village on the 11th, and lastly, in Nahri Shahi this reporting peri- Zari District has shown an in- in a non-security related incident, a bus slid off od, a group of 10 AOG members crease in insecurity (like much of a road and into a canal in Samar Qandyan vil- riding 4 motorcycles entered the Southern Balkh—including Ki- lage in Balkh District on the 14th, tragically Shaharak villages on May 7th to shindih and Sholgara), with a 7th killing 21 people, as many as 15 of whom may extort money. It remains prema- security incident occurring this have been children. ture to assess any shifts to the year, up from a total of 2 that oc- THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Kunduz continues to show high 40 levels of insecurity—generally due to ongoing military operations 30 characterized by crime and attacks in Kunduz, the road is a “target 20 on IMF/GOA/ANP/ANSF tar- rich” environment for AOGs. 10 However, private construction gets—with 31 security incidents 0 this reporting period. This vol- vehicles are sometimes associated ume practically matches that of with the GOA and/or the general the previous reporting cycle (29), presence of international actors KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime who support the GOA. and represents a slight increase incidents this reporting period, including 3 over the 26 security incidents Outside of this, the rest of these separate IED strikes on IMF targets on May which were recorded over the 12 incidents in Kunduz took on a 3rd (1 in Zhadran Village, 1 in Kharoti Village, same period (May 1-15) in 2010. broad scope of activities—with a and 1 in the Hikhanum area) followed by 2 12 of the 31 incidents this period notable 3 AOG attacks taking joint search operations and 2 IMF night raids took place in Kunduz District place either in the Gortepa area or (both of these latter occurring on the 10th, 1 in (one more than occurred in on the road between Gortepa and Kharoti village—killing 3 and arresting 3 oth- Kunduz District the previous re- Kunduz (2 IED strikes on IMF ers—and 1 in Mama Khel village—arresting 3). porting period), with a further 10 targets and the ambush of a pro- 2 criminal incidents took place in Imam Sahib in Chahar Dara (as opposed to the government militia). Also of note, District, which—with the exception of 2 IMF previous reporting period, where AOG members entered a school operations—has seen only criminal insecurity the majority outside of Kunduz on May 1st in the Malarghi area since the beginning of April. Over this report- took place in Khanabad District). and burnt school properties, in- ing period, an unknown armed individual shot cluding 3 tents and some chairs, Perhaps most notable amongst and killed 5 AOG members in Kalbad area on before fleeing (no injuries report- these, an RCIED detonated on an the 9th, and in Majar Village, on the 10th, a ed). Attacks on schools have oc- Iranian construction vehicle along local civilian was abducted in what has been curred countrywide, although the main Kunduz-Khanabad road, assessed as likely the result of a personal dis- prominent speakers on behalf of in the Nawadabad Andrabi area of pute. Kunduz District on the 14th. The AOG groups have recently posit- Lastly, in the oft quiet Qalay-I Zal district, an blast caused some damage to the ed to the media that these attacks RICED detonated on an ANP vehicle in the driver and his vehicle. Although will be cut down significantly. Zulmabad area on the 10th (injuring 6 ANP IED detonations on this road are Lastly in the district, on May 6th and damaging the vehicle). Although Qalay-I not uncommon—the last one oc- an ACG attacked the National Zal has only seen 6 security incidents this year, curring on April 21st in the Ma- Bank, was engaged by the ANP, all 6 of them have taken place over the last larghi Area—it is less common for and escaped the scene. There are month and a half (April/May), and 2 others RCIEDs to target non-military no indications this was anything have involved the discovery and seizure of targets. The previous one deto- other than a criminal act. IEDs. nated on an ANA vehicle, and Chahar Dara witnessed 10 security THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 2 FARYAB This Report Period 1 50 2 illegal checkpoints, with an IN- 40 GO staff member being stopped district since April 2009, and it is 30 at 1 of them, headlined a report- significant that it occurred in the 20 ing period that was otherwise middle of the day. 10 strongly characterized by AOG Anecdotal reports have recently 0 clashes with ANP/IMF/PGM arisen that there has been an in- crease in AOG activity in Pashtun forces in Qaysar District. Qaysar FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime accounted for 9 of the province’s Kot and Kohistan, although this 20 total security incidents. has rarely been demonstrated in SO record for this district. The North (and At 1400 hrs on the 10th of May, incident reporting. Over this re- especially the ring road linking Mazar to May- an AOG set up an illegal check- porting period, Pashtun Kot wit- mana) continues to see a significant amount of point in Aqdara village (Sar-e Awz nessed the discovery of 2 IEDs illegal checkpoints such as this, many of them area) of Pashtun Kot, along the near Jar Qala village on the 8th, 2 appearing in locations where they had seldom Kohistan - Maymana road. The separate AOG attacks on check- (or never) been previously recorded. checkpoint lasted approximately points (1 on an ANP checkpoint The AOG stronghold of Qaysar—the most 30 minutes, during which AOG near Takhta Bazar on the 10th, volatile district in the province— was responsi- members searched private vehi- and 1 on an ANBP checkpoint ble for almost half (9) of the province’s total cles for ANSF/GOA personnel. near Khwaja Namosa on the 7th), security incidents (20) with 7 ANP/AOG One of the vehicles searched had and on the 11th, an armed clash clashes—some of them with local militias in- an INGO national staff member erupted—again in the Takhta Ba- volved, as well as 1 attack on an IMF patrol as a passenger; however, the staff zar area—between ANSF/IMF (where air support was called in) and an IED member was able to avoid being and an AOG. There were 5 secu- discovery. Of particular note amongst these, questioned and searched because rity incidents total for the district on the 1st in Chilgazi village, an AOG attacked AOG members believed he was this reporting period, which is an ANSF convoy, resulting in 1 AOG and 1 sick. Aside from him, the AOG equal to the 5 per month it has civilian death and injuries to an additional 2 manning the checkpoint was ask- seen every other month so far this AOG, 1 ANA, 1 ANP, and 2 civilians ing all passengers to dismount year. It is yet to be determined if (including 1 child). Civilian casualties on both from their vehicles to be checked. this level of insecurity will contin- sides remain a source of strong contention. ue throughout the entire month. This underscores the importance Outside of Qaysar and the illegal checkpoints, of NGO staff members maintain- Prior to this, an illegal checkpoint Dawlatabad, a district with a known AOG ing situational awareness at all occurred along the main ring road presence that has seen significant activity this times, and pre-constructing plans on May 1st in Khwaja Sabz Posh year, contributed to the province’s insecurity and mitigation measures during District. The checkpoint stopped when 2 AOGs were killed by the IED device risk assessments for situations at least 4 civilian vehicles in the they were emplacing when it detonated prema- such as these—especially with area before ANP deployed to its’ turely, and—elsewhere in the district—an illegal checkpoints becoming in- location and engaged the armed AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint wounding creasingly more prevalent personnel conducting it. This is (amongst others) 3 local civilians and an ANP. throughout the North. Although the first AOG initiated incident in not along the main ring road, this Khwaja Sabz Posh this year, and is the first illegal checkpoint in the the first illegal checkpoint on AN- THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 Takhar continued to display a rel- 40 atively low level of general insecu- lowing these (but not necessarily 30 rity this reporting period, with related), an arrest was made of 2 20 only 11 security incidents record- AOG suspects during a search 10 ed. The majority of these inci- operation in PD#3 of Taluqan 0 dents (7 of 11) occurred in Ta- (Golaey Bagh area) on the 10th. luqan District, which is notewor- The final 2 incidents in Taluqan TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime thy as it is the location where consisted of interpersonal dis- most NGOs in the province are putes and/or ACG crime. resulted in the arrest of AOG members), and 2 based in or operate out of. 4 of Outside of the 7 incidents in Ta- of those 4 (both this one and an incident on these 7 included the discovery or luqan, the other 4 incidents in the February 19th in Jilo village) involved RCIED detonation of explosive devices. province consisted of 3 search detonations. While this does not pose a signif- Taluqan City’s PD#1 bore the operations (run by ANSF, 2 in icant development and/or trend, nor suggest brunt of the above mentioned 4 Darqad District—where weapons that Baharak is suffering from intense insecuri- incidents, with a jerry can full of were seized and 1 arrest made— ty, it is likely that AOGs have some established explosives (possessing no trigger) and 1 in Chah Ab, which resulted presence in the district, as they are responsible discovered and seized in a culvert in the arrest of a drug trafficker) for every recorded act of insecurity there, in Sarakhi Shash area on the 3rd, a and an RCIED detonation on an which demonstrates a significant level of con- small IED detonation—likely ANA convoy in Baharak. Alt- trol. prematurely—also in a culvert hough Baharak District in Takhar The growth or deterioration of security in approximately 2 kilometers north (not to be confused with the vola- Takhar Province remains fluid, and will contin- of the city in Charasyab area on tile district in Badakhshan) has ue to be a situation that requires further moni- the 4th, and on the 7th, a small only witnessed a total of 4 security toring and assessment. IED was discovered and defused incidents this year, all 4 have been in the Chaman Sarwali area. Fol- AOG related (3 of them AOG initiated, and 1 an IMF raid that

Monthly AOG Incident Comparison: 2006-2011 (as of 11 May 2011) 1400

1200

1000

Jan 800 Feb Mar

600 Apr May

400

200

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 Baghlan Province remained rela- 40 tively quiet this reporting period, and resulted in the deaths of 3 30 with only 10 security incidents males, 2 females and 2 children, 20 (dipping slightly from the previ- along with the arrests of 5 AOG 10 ous reporting period—which rec- suspects. Night raids have been 0 orded 11—and the one before criticized for a number of reasons that, which recorded 15). 4 of including how they are carried TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime these incidents were of little sig- out, the legitimacy of targets, and nificance to the NGO communi- the potential for civilian casualties. (suffering only 14 security incidents in all of ty, with 2 of them consisting of At this time it is unclear how or 2010, with only 2 in May of 2010). It is un- peaceful demonstrations concern- why the 7 individuals above were clear at this point (although likely) whether this ing governance issues, and 2 the killed or how many of those 7 operation was undertaken in response to this result of interpersonal disputes. were assessed as “legitimate” tar- recent spike, and whether it will have a lasting However, IMF night-raids— gets (as opposed to collateral loss- effect on security in the district. As operations which continue to be a source of es). At present, IMF continues to in AOG strong Baghlan wind down, further contention with the local popula- operate using night raids as an assessment will be needed to see whether it tions countrywide—made up 4 of “essential” part of their military will result in a lasting effect on security in the the security events, with 1 taking strategy. province, or—as has often been the case else- place in each of Baghlani Jadid, Although—and likely, because— where in the North—whether AOGs will Dushi, Tala Wa Barfak, and Daha- Baghlani Jadid and Burka have mount a new series of operations to re- na-I Ghuri Districts. There was seen the brunt of recent establish their continued presence and capabil- also an IMF operation in Baghlan “Operation Nowruz” military ac- ity. History seems to point to the latter. Old City (Baghlani Kuna) with air tivities, Dushi District has recently Lastly, on May 9th in Puli Khumri, at the support that took place on the 1st, surfaced as a flashpoint for inse- Talashi checkpoint along the Puli Khumri- allegedly resulting in the capture curity, with an uncharacteristic 10 Dushi Main Road, a Pakistani national was of an AOG commander. incidents occurring in April 2011 caught with a vehicle containing a large cache The night raid in Dushi stands out that included abductions, roadside of weapons and ammunition. The driver was amongst these 4. The raid took attacks and illegal checkpoints in arrested and an investigation into where the place on May 2nd in a local resi- what had historically been one of weapons came from and were going remains dence in the Gharchishma area, the quieter districts in the region ongoing. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzjan saw significant security 40 incidents this reporting period, ring road. Fayzabad District has 30 with Fayzabad District in particu- witnessed only 6 security incidents 20 this year, but 5 of them have in- lar witnessing a spike in road inse- 10 volved road insecurity, with 3 of curity that included 3 security inci- 0 dents along the Shibirghan – these 5 taking place in the Ko- kaldash area (this IED discovery, Mazar Main Road (notably, all of JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime them taking place after 1700 an IED discovery on April 20th, hours). and an illegal checkpoint on ity to carry out operations in the area. In that March 25th). It appears likely that Amongst the above, on May 9th, vein, 2 attacks took place in Qush Tepa; 1 on an AOG is operating in the area, an IO contracted truck was travel- May 4th when an AOG attacked an ANP CP although whether this spike will ling this road en route to Mazar-e in Turkman Qudoq Village, and 1 on May 9th, be temporarily—as a result of Sharif after conducting a food where a large number of AOG elements at- Operation Wahdat’s activity in the drop when it was attacked with tacked a newly established pro-government South—or more permanent—as SAF. No injuries were reported militia (PGM) checkpoint located around Na- there are anecdotal reports that and the vehicle was able to con- wabad Abdul Rahman Pahlawan village. The the AOG may have ties with tinue on out of the hot area. On resulting engagement from this latter incident groups from Chimtal/Chahar Bo- the 5th, an IED was discovered became relatively extensive, with ANSF de- lak districts in Balkh—requires and defused in a culvert in the ploying to the area to support the PGM de- more assessment. Khona-Kokaldash area, and on tachment, and over the course of the attack, the 7th—in Sedarakht and Gorjak With the recent completion of IMF air support called in as well. When the areas—AOG launched simultane- Operation Wahdat (the ANSF led, attack was over, it was reported that 11 AOG ous attacks on 2 checkpoints us- IMF supported operation in the members and 1 PGM member were killed and ing heavy weapons and SAF. An Tri-Provincial area), activity has 9 AOG members and 1 PGM commander ensuing 3 hour long fire fight re- begun to increase in the districts injured. The establishment of PGMs in AOG sulted in no casualties. These 3 where the operation occurred. strong areas continues to be a sensitive subject incidents in a district not known This is likely the result of AOGs for AOGs operating in those areas, and PGM to be particularly insecure shows a operating out of those strong- checkpoints are often the first ones targeted. level of activity not previously holds which were targeted striving seen along this segment of the to reassert their presence and abil-

TRAINING NOTICE: ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in the Northern Region in May. Please note that the two training courses are separate and take one whole day each to complete. At present we are soliciting interest for the training to be conducted in provinces other than Balkh so if you are interested, please provide an email to the address provided below detailing your NGO and the province in which you would like training to be conducted. Full registration information will be provided shortly which will detail what provinces have been identified for the sessions. Contact Person: Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi: [email protected].

THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 3 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 Sar-e Pul Province continues to 40 show signs of deteriorating securi- villages. These attacks occurred 30 ty in both the widely known AOG after GOA/IMF statements that 20 strongholds—such as Sayyad— Operation ‘Wahdat’ had cleared 10 and the historically more operable Sayyad of AOGs. Typically, 0 areas, such as Sar-e Pul. This re- AOG elements in the North have responded strongly to such state- porting period it was Sayyad that SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime saw the most insecurity, despite ments by launching operations to the conclusion of Operation demonstrate their continued pres- March 29th when at least 8 AOG members on Wahdat, which aimed at clearing ence and capability. motorcycles entered the area before being en- out some of the AOG presence in While Sayyad District remained gaged by ANSF. Although this was the first the district. Most notable in Say- the center of insecurity in Sar-e established illegal checkpoint along the Sar-e yad, in Shah Toot village on May Pul Province, Sar-e Pul District Pul – Shibirghan road since March 18th, other 9th a group of armed men tempo- also suffered insecurity when an insecurity along the road has occurred during rarily detained an NGO local staff AOG established an illegal check- the lapse, including most recently an April 10th member for an hour before he point along the main Shibirghan- AOG ambush and killing of an ANP officer en was released after the intervention Sar-e Pul road near Zaka village. route to his duty station in the Sayed Abad of elders on his behalf. The checkpoint lasted approxi- area. Also in Sayyad, in the Khwaja mately 15 minutes, during which Anecdotal reports from the area had proposed Yagana area on May 3rd, an AOG AOG members searched private that Kohistanat was witnessing an increase in ambushed an ANP convoy. Dur- vehicles for ANSF/GOA employ- AOG presence, and this may be beginning to ing the ensuing fire fight, 1 ANP ees. ANP deployed to the area show, with incidents such as the AOG abduc- was killed and 9 others were in- but—typical to such check- tion of a local elder from Shahnawaz Village jured. The AOG eventually se- points—the AOG withdrew be- on May 3rd. The individual was released after cured an ANP machine-gun and fore their arrival. This marks the a ransom was paid on the 8th. Lastly in a few subsequently burnt their vehicle. 7th illegal checkpoint along this incidents of note in Sozma Qala District, on Lastly in the district, on May 6th stretch of road this year (with a May 9th, AOG members entered Tapa Surkhi in Khwaja Chargonbat and Khwa- further 3 incidents where AOGs village to collect Ashur (religious dues) from ja Yagana Villages (the latter the were reported loitering in the vi- the local civilians before they were chased out same as the above ambush) AOG cinity of the road, likely with the by ANSF forces, and an AOG abducted 3 lo- attacked ANSF positions in a fire intent to set up an illegal check- cals from the village, but released them later fight that lasted for almost 3 con- point). Zaka village in particular after the intervention of local elders. secutive nights. Eventually, ANSF has witnessed a large amount of was forced to withdraw from the insecurity in the past, with the area and the AOG captured the most recent incident occurring on

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 5 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 Badakhshan Province in general 40 remains home to some of the abducted a former Jihadi com- 30 most permissive environments for mander on May 9th. Although it 20 NGOs in the North, with low is widely postured that Kishim 10 level violence against GOA/ANP District has an active AOG pres- 0 targets and incidents based on ence, these 2 incidents mark the shifting power dynamics and in- first AOG attributed security inci- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime terpersonal disputes making up dents in the district this year. In the incident with the DCOP from the majority of manifested insecu- contrast to the 2 that took place over the entire Tagab, which occurred in the rity. Baharak—the most volatile previous year (2010), and only 1 in 2009. The Yakh Darab area along the Ki- district in the province so far in general indication in the area continues to be shim – Tagab main road, the ANP 2011—remained quiet this report- that a local Jihadi commander is at odds with responded to the attack shortly ing period, with Kishim (one of the DCOP, and has taken to mounting low after the ambush occurred, and no the few districts in Badakhshan level assaults on the DAC to put pressure on casualties were reported. In terms with a known AOG presence) him, as well as on the GOA to remove him. 4 of existing grievances against this displaying some of this periods’ of the 7 incidents in this district have been DCOP, Tagab is not known to be more significant insecurity. Kuran attacks in the DAC, with the most recent oc- an AOG hub, and has only seen 1 Wa Munjan continued to see vio- curring on April 3rd, when unknown individu- security incident this year—when lence in the District Administra- als fired an RPG at a Government Clinic. As an unknown individual hurled a tive Center (DAC), as previously has been the case in Baharak District, the de- hand grenade into a private resi- noted, likely the result of politics struction of government property in DACs is dence in Kawara Village on March and existing grievances. often used as a means to gain attention with 22nd. Kishim witnessed its’ 7th and 8th the hope that the GOA will give in to pres- security incidents for the year In Kuran Wa Munjan, an armed sure/intimidation and be forced to deal with when AOG members ambushed group shot 4 RPG rounds at the the offender. Kuran Wa Munjan, the southern the District Chief of Police ANP headquarters in the DAC at -most district in Badakhshan, remains of politi- (DCOP) from Tagab District on 2200 hrs on May 2nd. This marks cal importance to both the province and re- May 5th at 2000 hrs and then—in the 7th security incident in Kuran gion, as it separates Badakshan from the more a separate incident—an AOG Wa Munjan over the first half of AOG heavy provinces of Eastern Afghanistan. this year, which stands in stark

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 The AOG presence in Herat 40 Province was again evident in the investigate the incident, an armed 30 eastern and the southern portions clash ensued. Of note, AOGs 20 this period with AOG activity focused their activities in 2011 on 10 expected to increase during the the western part of Obe, the area summer months, particularly in where Servan is located. In Pash- 0 such areas known to be problem- tun Zarghun, AOG kidnapped an atic. The Darzak area, between ANP officer in Kurti Khaja Vil- HERAT AOG HERAT Crime Kushk and Kushki Kuhna in the lage and established an illegal Zeyarate Dorahi area and an IED was discov- north-east saw the discovery of checkpoint in Dasht-e-Nayzan ered in Senawghan Area. two roadside IEDs on the main Area (close to Obe) on 12th of road between both districts, as May, searching for GoA employ- Although Herat City itself remained relatively well as a direct fire attack against ees. Intimidation measures, espe- quiet, AOG nonetheless showed their presence an ANSF poppy eradication team cially in Pashtun Zarghun, are around the city; however, without causing ma- on 14th of May. In the Shore likely to continue. jor damages or casualties. An ANSF search operation was conducted south of the citadel Arabha area of northern Kushk, In the south, IEDs were the ma- from 11th – 12th of May, after 25 BM1 rock- one civilian was killed and another jor concern during this period, ets were discovered in Injil District, which six wounded by an IED on a sec- particularly affecting the Herat- were reportedly on their way to Herat City. As ondary road on 2nd of May. Re- Kandahar Main Road and the an IDF attack in the direction of the Regional portedly, AOG informed locals main road to the Shindand DAC. ANP Training Centre in Guzara on the 2nd of before to avoid the area. One day Of note, the vast majority of May demonstrated, such attacks have to be later, a premature IED detonation IEDs targeted ANSF. On the expected particularly around the airport. How- inside a house killed three AOG Herat-Kandahar Main Road in ever, IDF attacks remain still infrequent with members as well as four children Adraskan, an IED detonated in only two such attacks recorded since January. in Kushki Kuhna. Khaja Uryan and explosive devic- In regard to IEDs, a device targeted an ANP In the central-eastern Obe and es were discovered in Rodgaz vehicle on the main road in Sarjangal area of Pashtun Zarghun Districts, AOG while on the same road in Shin- Guzara during the night and IEDs were dis- showed their continuing presence dand District, an IED hit a PSC covered in Ferqa area (District 6) on the Herat despite ANSF/IMF operations vehicle in Khaja Reg. On the - Karukh Road as well as on a secondary road during the previous period. On main road to Shindand’s DAC, in Rawzabagh area. Although further AOG the 8th of May, an IED detona- IEDs exploded in Khaja Uryan related incidents in and around Herat City tion killed a local civilian on a sec- (close to Adraskan) as well as the ondary road in Servan Village of should be expected, they are not likely to in- Obe and when ANP arrived to crease on a large scale. THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 The overall number of incidents 30 in Farah Province increased slight- point in Pusht Koh Area as well ly, though these remain lower as an illegal CP on the Farah – 20 than the number recorded for the Qala-I-Kah main road in Mulla 10 first period in April. Of note, Lalo village on 4th of May, 0 although the number of ANSF/ searching for GoA employees. An ANA officer was abducted at this IMF operations is the same as in FARAH AOG FARAH Crime the first two weeks of April, they illegal checkpoint and killed later increased from 13% to 41% com- on. In addition, several ANSF/ covery of three roadside IEDs. In addition, pared to the overall number of IMF operations further confirm a ANSF/IMF conducted an operation on the incidents. higher level of AOG presence in main road to Anar Dara. Khaki Safed, which the area and suggest that more is The emerging trend of increasing was also quite affected by AOG activity during expected in these usually quieter AOG activity in the western dis- the last month, saw a direct fire attack against districts. tricts of Farah Province contin- an ANA checkpoint in Diwar Sorkh Area on ued. Qala-I-Kah District was Apart from the west of the prov- 11th of May. Hostilities in both districts are again in the focus, accounting for ince, Pusht Rod saw fewer inci- expected to continue. 25% of AOG activity and 43% of dents compared to the beginning Worth noting is that direct fire attacks signifi- the recorded ANSF/IMF opera- of April. However, a direct fire cantly prevailed over IEDs, whereas IEDs tions during the first half of May, attacks against an ANP check- have been the main concern during the cycles indicating at least a temporary point in Durahi/Massaw Area and before. If this is connected to the recent west shift of AOG – ANSF/IMF hos- several incidents in Saj Village shift of AOG activities, where there might be tilities to the western part of were recorded. Saj Village saw an still room for a stronger AOG engagement Farah. The district saw a direct ANP operation on 7th of May, remains to be seen and it is likely that this will fire attack against an ANP check- followed by an IDF attack against change again during the next weeks. an ANP checkpoint and the dis-

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 3 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 Although Ghor province saw 40 slightly more incidents than dur- Pasaband, which witnessed the 30 ing the previous reporting peri- most AOG activity in Ghor in 20 ods, the province generally re- 2010, ANP conducted a search 10 mains still quiet with only eight operation on 5th of May in Na- 0 incidents out of which three were horak village, seizing a small AOG/ACG initiated. amount of AP mines and ammu- GHOR AOG GHOR Crime Sharak District, which already saw nition. In Taywara, where AOG daytime ACG activity during the seem to be a more active this year, addition, Tulak District saw a direct fire attack second half of April, witnessed a AOG attacked an ANP check- on an ANP checkpoint in Gaw Kush srea in roadside robbery on 9th of May at point in Yakhan Ulya area on 7th the early morning on 12th of May. This is the approx 1000 hrs in Maidanak area of May and forced the ANP to second AOG initiated incident this year after on the main Herat – Chaghcharan abandon the post, with the AOG an IDF attack against the DAC on 30th of Road, where ACG stopped a local occupying the post for a period April; however, AOG activity remained infre- transport vehicle and robbed the before withdrawing. Of note, the quent in the district 2010. Yakhan Ulya area hosted three passengers. Although robberies Chaghcharan City remained calm apart from similar incidents at the end of last remain infrequent, further inci- two unconnected incidents in Familyha area in year and further AOG activities dents of such kind need to be ex- District 2. On 3rd of May, the head of the targeting ANSF in the area – es- pected. Counter Terrorism Department for Ghor pecially around ANP CPs – are The southern parts of Ghor Prov- Province and his brother were shot and killed, therefore not unlikely. Altogeth- ince, which usually see most of reportedly due to a personal dispute. In addi- er, AOG related incidents in the the AOG activity, still remain rela- tion, ANP stopped and searched a vehicle, southern parts are expected to tively quiet with two recorded discovering around 20-30 kg of explosives, increase in May/June as has been incidents during this cycle. In which were being transported in the vehicle. the case the last two years. In THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 Incident numbers during this re- 40 porting period decreased com- tactics were shifting to the em- 30 pared to April or March, though placement of IEDs after the 6th 20 are on a similar level as May 2010. of May. A trend that already 10 emerged during the last reporting This might be a temporary effect 0 of the significant number of air- period was also evident the first strikes during the previous report- two weeks of May: IEDs focused ing periods, especially in April. on the main road connecting BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime Muqur, Murghab and Qala-I-Naw However, it is likely that incident AOG presence. In Dara-E-Boom, close to the numbers will increase again with but also on the main roads to dis- trict administration centres in border with Murghab District, ANSF/IMF the AOG spring offensive, an- arrested six AOG members while in Ghal nounced at the beginning of May. Ghormach and Muqur. Kotale Khaki area (located between Qala- Charkh, north of the main road from Qala-I- A signal in this regard might be Naw, two AOG members were killed and an- the first recorded incident at Sab- I-Naw and Muqur) also saw an IED discovery, but most affected other one wounded during an ANSF/IMF zak Pass on the Qala-I-Naw - He- operation. Apart from these AOG influenced rat Main Road this year, where was the main road between Muqur and Murghab districts with areas; ANP also arrested an AOG member in AOG attacked on an ANP check the district centre. Other operations took post. Sabzak Pass – not least due four incidents, focused in Mangan and Doshori. place in Sange Atesh area and Sahra Arab as to its convenient geographic posi- well as Majnon villages of Murghab, and tion – is known for its AOG/ Although no airstrikes were rec- Doshori Absharha area of Muqur, which is ACG presence. In addition, orded during this reporting peri- along the main road to Murghab. Of note, nine AOG activity was quite visible in od, ANSF/IMF operations con- days later ANSF/IMF discovered three road- the historic hotspots Murghab, tinued. Qadis District saw three side IEDs in the Doshori area, demonstrating Muqur and Ghormach. Whereas operations targeting AOG mem- the reactive processes between ANSF/IMF direct fire attacks were prevailing bers between the 7th and 9th of and AOGs. at the beginning of May, AOG May in two areas known for their

ANSO REGISTRATION INFORMATION:

Please note that both the ANSO email and SMS distribution lists are updated once weekly, every Sunday. The registration deadline is on the Thursday of every week, therefore, any requests submitted after this will not be updated until the following week. As well, NGOs are requested to provide their registration documentation (or to request the same) directly to the Operations National Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi, at the following email address: [email protected]

THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 7 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 While the volume of conflict inci- 80 dents rose considerably in er of AOG reach into the provin- cial capital was the motorcycle- 60 Nangarhar during this report peri- 40 od, a significant portion of this borne IED that detonated on the 20 increase comprised reporting of main shopping road that runs be- the ANP’s poppy eradication tween Mokharabat and Talashi 0 campaign, with approximately 710 squares, which injured 8 and killed 1: the IMF convoy 30 metres acres of poppy field destroyed in NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime Sherzad and Khogyani; of note, away from the detonation was the there were no attempts to eradi- presumed target. Three IMF raids operationally connected to those also occur- cate poppy in Achin this period, in the city, two in Zone 3 and one ring just over the border in Khyber Agency, unlike last period. However, even in a mosque in Zone 2, detaining where similar numbers of tankers were de- after subtracting these eradication a total of 10 suspected AOG stroyed in recent weeks. The IED campaign efforts, the volume of incidents members, was an indication of the also impacted elsewhere in the province, with clearly indicates that the provincial IMF’s awareness and active ef- the most notable event the MIED that deto- conflict continued to intensify, forts to combat this AOG reach nated on the vehicle of the CID provincial with key dimensions comprising into the heart of the city. deputy chief in the Daman area of Bihsud, a) an escalating IED campaign, Outside the provincial capital, injuring an ANP officer and the deputy chief’s especially along Highway 7, and b) there was a marked increase in son. a rise in IMF operations, particu- attacks on fuel tankers on High- A second dimension of importance has been larly in Chaparhar. way 7, between Jalalabad and IMF operations, registered at an increased rate First of all, though, in spite of Torkham, including what appears and 2 of which have led to accidental killings expectations that the IEA’s Oper- to be a new IED cell operating in of innocents. In Chaparhar, known to be a ation Badar announcement would the Torkham area aimed at target- stronghold for approximately a dozen small lead to some spectacular and/or ing tankers working for the IMF. AOG factions with allegiances to the core suicide attacks against IMF or In Bati Kot, there were two direct IEA, an increased AOG presence led to 5 sep- ANSF, this particular dimension attacks on fuel tankers, both at arate IMF operations between May 1st and of the conflict did not manifest dawn and one killing the driver, May 3rd. They cumulatively led to 10 suspect- itself. However, it remains a while an IED detonated prema- ed AOG members detained, and during one standing concern, and there were turely in the area of a petrol sta- operation in Solozu, a firefight led to the death signs of ongoing AOG intent in tion, indicating it too was aimed at of 7 AOG fighters. Other operations occurred this direction. For example, on fuel tankers or their support infra- in Khalis Family Colony, Bati Kot, Sherzad’s May 5th a BBIED operative car- structure. In Muhmand Dara, two Tutu village, and two in Sorkh Rod, one of rying his vest in hand was stopped IEDs hit tankers in the Canal 27 which killed a 12 year old girl after a reported at the ANP CP next to the ANA area on separate occasions, while misidentification. Finally, on the 13th an oper- barracks and JAF, and detained by ANP and ANBP disrupted two ation in Hesarak DAC area led to the mistaken the NDS. Moreover, on the same vehicles transporting sizeable killing of a 15 year old boy; large community afternoon NDS hooded two indi- caches of IEDs – magnetic and protests the following morning at the DAC led viduals in a crowded market in remote controlled – at the Tork- to an escalation of force incident in which 4 Jalalabad’s Zone 1, for suspected ham border crossing, demonstrat- protestors were killed, demonstrating clearly involvement in AOG activities. ing that the IED attacks taking the negative consequences of fatal IMF mis- Another, more powerful, remind- place this side of the border are takes. THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 6 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 Kunar continued to be a volatile, 150 highly kinetic environment in tion Badar, although the pattern 100 which the AOG-IMF/ANSF con- was not significantly different flict remained the dominant form from the normal picture of the 50 provincial conflict. of insecurity, with AOGs making 0 further gains in pressuring the In the western corridor of Chapa security forces and dominating Dara, Manogai and Wata Pur, territory. There were also further there continued to be a significant incidents affecting NGO clinics, number of direct AOG attacks on KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime which again involved IMF. This ANSF and IMF targets, although of outsider interference, not just that of for- time, in Khas Kunar IMF Chapa Dara was relatively quiet – eign forces. In Wata Pur, meanwhile, an searched a clinic on multiple occa- likely because a significant num- armed group shot and killed an influential sions due to suspicions that AOG ber of AOG fighters had travelled AOG commander on the 1st, another vivid members were being treated in to Wama to take part in the at- indication that we are likely to see growing them, with on one occasion tempts to seize Nuristan’s provin- conflict between AOGs as their vying for smashing the door and windows cial capital (see Nuristan). In greater influence in their post-IMF areas brings to gain entry, and confiscating Manogai, the ANA came under them into conflict with each other. property. If similarly targeted by repeated attack, although they did IMF, NGOs are advised to raise not suffer any casualties in the In the northern part of the province, Gha- the issue immediately with ANSO. engagements – the only deaths ziabad was particularly insecure, with both a Khas Kunar was also home to reported were of 2 AOG fighters. high number of AOG assaults (6) on ANA further abductions and targeted However, AOG members did OPs, in the Jalala and Shaheed Barialay areas, killings during the period, similar abduct an ANP policeman in the and two separate mass abductions in Jalala, to the pattern of incidents record- Tanteel area early in the period. one of 16 assorted GOA officials and civilians, ed there before. Perhaps most significantly, a fire- and the other of 25 clerics – the latter evidence of an increasingly extreme approach by local In other developments in the fight erupted between AOG AOGs, who in the previous period also vio- province, Asadabad came under members and community mem- lently assaulted members of the clerical com- an elevated level of assault early in bers in the Bar Kandi area, report- munity. In Nari there were 4 assaults on ANP the period – the PRT was repeat- edly because of local opposition and IMF targets, while in Bar Kunar there edly mortared on the 1st and 4th, to AOG CPs and their theft of were 4 IDF attacks on IMF and ANA facili- while the prison and ANP HQ valuables during their stop and ties. In the central belt of Narang, Marawara were also attacked on the 1st. searches; this is not an uncom- and Sirkanay, finally, there were approximately These, as well as attacks on 5 sep- mon occurrence in the more 20 direct AOG assaults on ANSF targets, arate district ANP HQs across the mountainous communities of demonstrating that AOGs continue to re- province on the 1st, were thought Kunar and Nuristan, and is excel- establish quickly a strong presence in these to be connected to the com- lent evidence for how strong local areas after recent IMF operations. mencement of the IEA’s Opera- communities can oppose all types THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan continued to record con- 40 certed efforts by the IEA and af- der, in an area known as a training 30 filiated foreign AOGs to formally camp and staging post, against 20 seize territory, with Bargi Matal AOGs known to have been pre- 10 and the provincial capital Parun sent there in the weeks and 0 the key contested prizes this peri- months before. The fighting re- od. First in Bargi Matal, on May sulted in 4 ANA injured, 25 AOG

3rd ANA commandos, supported fighters killed, and 5 (Swati) AOG NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime by IMF SOF, were helicoptered fighters detained. The ANA left into the Awla Gul area in IMF air late in the period, and there were lasting all day – leading to the death of 4 AOG assets from where they initiated a reports of AOGs slowly re- and the injury of 3 ANP, an important success clearing operation against a heavy gathering in Awla Gul and else- for the significantly outnumbered ANP. The AOG presence, including locals, where in the district. fighting broke out again on the 11th, and ANA Punjabis, Arabs, Chechens, and Given the presence of ANA in air assets carrying an NDS QRF were also sent recently arrived Swatis – who had Bargi Matal, AOGs shifted their that morning to assist the ANP in Wama. One come to assist in what appeared to focus to Parun, the provincial cap- of the helicopters crashed while attempting to be the imminent seizure of Bargi ital, midway through the fortnight. land, leading only to minor injuries, and at the Matal DAC. While the Nuristan After attacking ANP CPs in the time of writing neither side had gained a signif- Provincial Governor asserted that Saparigal and Qalaigul areas on icant advantage against the other. In both this operation was a response to May 3rd, in which four AOG and Bargi Matal and Wama, fighting is likely to cross-border infiltration in retalia- 2 ANP were killed, a large massed break out again repeatedly in the coming tion for the killing of Al Qaeda force of approximately 400 AOG weeks, and as such, NGOs working in Nuri- chief Osama bin Laden, the facts fighters started attacking a large stan need to remain alert to this possibility. indicate otherwise: the fighting ANP OP in the Eshtap area on took place far away from the bor- May 10th, with the engagement

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 0 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 After last period’s notable increase 40 the Highway during the period. in conflict incidents in Laghman, 30 this period saw volumes fall On May 5th AOG attacked an 20 slightly, with a notable calm pre- ANP convoy in the Tangi area, vailing in Alishing. However, it while a number of rockets were 10 also marked the second suicide fired at the ANA base in the 0 bombing in the province this year, Kheirokhel area, which was also with a BBIED operative on a mo- the site of an attack on a fuel torcycle detonating his vest at the tanker on the 13th. LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime Qarghayi DAC, targeting an IMF In Mihtarlam, an elevated number clearing operation; we can expect that Bad convoy visiting district GOA offi- of IED discoveries was recorded, Pakh will see a steady increase in AOG attacks cials there; it killed 3 civilians, in- in the Adizai, Bibi Haji, Katal and in the coming months. Finally, in Alingar two jured 2 ANP and wounded or Kanda villages. Other than that, IMF vehicles were struck by IEDs in separate killed an unknown number of however, the provincial capital incidents, while one discovery also occurred. IMF, thought to be 2/3. Also in was quiet. In Bad Pakh, AOG As such, while the BBIED was an important Qarghayi but on the Kabul- fighters attacked an ANA CP and demonstration of the ability for AOGs to con- Jalalabad Highway, a number of fired 3 rockets at the new ANP duct the occasional significant attack in the attacks were seen, consistent with HQ, consistent with the expected province, the provincial security situation was the pattern of elevated targeting pattern of AOGs returning to the relatively permissive during the first half of seen on the Nangarhar section of new district after the recent IMF May. THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 2 KHOST This Report Period 1 150 In an unusual development, inci- dent volumes in Khost, the most area, which missed its target and 100 kinetic of the border provinces, instead only killed the driver and fell by approximately 50% from injured 9 passers-by. Bak was even 50 roughly 150 to 100, during the quieter, likely a result of the very first half of May. However, com- high level of IMF operations dur- 0 paratively, the province remained ing the previous period, with two the leader in security incidents, further operations recorded that KHOST AOG KHOST Crime including witnessing one NGO detained a total of 6 AOG fight- incident in which 21 demining ers. The only recorded AOG in- style complex attack on the main GOA facili- staff from a local NGO were ab- cidents were 2 IED discoveries, a ties, and ANSF were on elevated alert, but ducted en masse while clearing remarkable near-total absence in nothing of the sort ultimately materialised. IEDs from a worksite in Tani an ordinarily highly insecure prov- IED incidents were also down approximately right on the border with North ince, which suggests, as in Sabari, 30%, with only 8 discoveries and 7 detona- Waziristan. Mass abduction inci- a marked operational effectiveness tions, one of which killed a policeman. Per- dents involving deminers working on the part of the IMF, although haps the most worryingly security trend in the in a border area are not uncom- its durability as always remains an provincial capital is the increasing prevalence mon, and it was only the ANP’s open question. of IED detonations in commercial buildings quick reaction time, as well as as- Neighbouring Tere Zayi was a and bazaars, the damage from which could cut sistance from campaign soldiers, little more kinetic, with two effec- substantially into the local economy and is al- that managed to prevent the tive IED strikes on ANBP, injur- ready generating greater fear in the city, with AOGs from exfiltrating the de- ing a cumulative total of 6 police- business hours curtailed and trading occurring miners across the border; in the men. There were also 4 IDF at- at a lower level. Also recorded were 5 IDF clash which led to the recovery of tacks, 3 on the Chargoti IMF base attacks on IMF facilities in the Sahrah Bagh all deminers, 3 AOG fighters were and 1 on an ANBP CP in the and Kundai areas, none of which caused any killed. DAC area, as well as two brief hit- damage. In Sabari, last period’s drop in and-run SAF attacks, one again on Outside of these primary areas of conflict, a conflict incidents, particularly the Chargoti facility and one on small number of kinetic incidents were record- from the AOG side, continued to an ANBP base in the Babrak Tana ed, the most significant of which were two hit- be a feature, with IMF operations area. In the other key border dis- and-run attacks on the Musa Khel DAC and a comprising a slight majority of tricts, Gurbuz and Tani, apart firefight between AOG fighters and an Afghan recorded events; in all, 20 AOG from the aforementioned tempo- Security Guard in the Spera DAC, which led to fighters were detained in 9 opera- rary mass abduction, 4 hit-and-run the ASG being injured, one of his assailants tions, while 2 direct and 2 IDF attacks on security force targets being killed and the other wounded. In all, attacks on IMF targets were also were recorded, and Gurbuz saw then, on current trends it appears that persis- recorded, with just one leading to one IED injure a local GOA offi- tent IMF operations may take the edge off an IMF soldier’s injury; as such, cial, but beyond this the districts AOG activity in the coming weeks and the momentum in Sabari remains were below average in incident months, although the provincial situation re- with the IMF for now. There volumes. mains fragile enough that a concerted AOG was, however, an SVBIED attack In Khost City, threat reports cir- push from North Waziristan could tip the on a joint convoy in the DAC culated concerning a Kandahar- scales in their favour without major difficulty. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 0 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 The conflict in the restive Zurmat, 80 home to the increasingly powerful and as such remain broadly off 60 AOG faction the Mansur Net- limits for humanitarian actors. 40

work, significantly intensified dur- Elsewhere in the province, the 20 ing this period, and was the main most significant incident was a 0 driver behind the substantial in- rocket attack on the provincial crease in overall provincial inci- ANP HQ in Gardez City, on the dent volumes. Comprising almost evening of the 14th; one rocket PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime half the total registered conflict landed in the facility, injuring 2 events in the province, Zurmat’s ANP policemen. This is the se- Jani Khel DAC at night for a short period. district insecurity was character- cond incident involving an attack Also in Jani Khel, ANP arrested 8 AOG fight- ised by a new but unsuccessful on a provincial government head- ers, including 3 Pakistanis, in two separate op- IED push by local AOG units, quarters in the past month, after erations, one of which was a response to the particularly in Rahman Khel, alt- the IED which detonated at a side DAC assault the previous day. A final incident hough all but one of the 10 at- gate of the governor’s office in of note in Jani Khel was the temporary abduc- tempted IED attacks was disrupt- late April, and demonstrates the tion of 4 tribal elders in the Mia Khel area, ed by a vigilant IMF; the one that persistent ability of AOGs to pen- who were beaten up by their abductors and did detonate, a car either rigged as etrate into the provincial capital. then released. Subsequently, the Mia Khel sub an VBIED or filled with IEDs for While no other incidents were -tribe announced they would oppose all AOG transport, did so prematurely and recorded in the capital city, the in their area, in the latest of a series of AOG killed both occupants. There wider capital district experienced 2 missteps in the border region which have led were also 6 kinetic engagements other notable incidents, a prema- to their loss of support amongst local commu- between AOGs and IMF, includ- ture detonation in the Ghafoor nities. ing one which attacked an IMF Khel area of the Kabul-Gardez EOD team as it was defusing an Highway, and one SAF attack on In the Jaji DAC area, AOG fighters conducted IED in Rahman Khel, but most the ANP in Ibrahim Khel. 3 IDF attacks on the IMF base in the area. were ineffectual, with just one Given Jaji’s position as a key infiltration route In the northern border districts of IMF soldier and two ANA sol- into Logar from Kurram Agency, this tactic is Chamkanay, Jaji, Dand wa Patan diers wounded across all incidents. likely a means to keep IMF busy as AOG and Jani Khel, security incidents IMF conducted two operations, fighters conduct their movements away from were low, with no BBIED or one in the Kolago area which the DAC. Finally, in the southern district of complex attacks recorded. There killed 5 AOG fighters but also 5 Shwak on the 14th, four AOG fighters includ- were 2 kinetic engagements initiat- civilians, including 2 women and 2 ing a mid-level commander were detained in a ed by AOGs, in Chamkanay and children, and one in Shahak which clearing operation during a night raid in Sori Jani Khel, with the former leading led to the detention of 3 AOG Khel. As such, although Zurmat’s insecurity to the death of one ANP police- members. In all, given Zurmat’s escalated considerably, and signs of persistent man after he jumped from his position as the heartland of the AOG capacity were evident, the provincial Ranger to engage the AOG fight- Mansur Network, we can expect security situation remained relatively predicta- ers and stepped on an IED; in the that it will be home to the majori- ble in the first two weeks of May. latter, AOG fighters attacked the ty of this year’s provincial conflict, THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 1 200 This Report Period 0 Kandahar continues to face a pan- 150 sult of less sophisticated and more oply of threats, though AOG ef- 100 forts at the close of last year into indiscriminate victim operated the opening months of this one devices. This is also the result of 50 have been focused on IED related the sheer volumes of devices de- 0 incidents, attacks against ANP ployed, as this period there were a posts, and targeted the killings of further 47 IED discoveries in 17 ANSF/GOA personnel. separate incidents. The standout KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime was the discovery of 21 separate In this period, 2 ANP and a local devices during an operation in Shura member were executed Zhari District, indicative of a Governor’s Compound. Numerous suicide while in transit, while a third ANP standard AOG tactic of ‘seeding’ vectors were utilised (both body borne and was abducted. In addition, one an area with IEDs in order to vehicle) as well as VBIEDS. SAF and RPGs local elder was hung under suspi- hamper security force freedom of were also utilised against the variety of targets cion of ‘spying’, though this hap- movement. which, beyond the Governors Office included pened in Maruf District so the the NDS Headquarters, various ANP posts, Of course, the key element for exact circumstances remain a bit along with an ANCOP base. It is likely that this period was the prolonged, murky. this attack was the manifestation of the IEA multi-pronged attack that oc- For IEDs, there were at least 9 Operation Badar announcement and it is not curred within Kandahar City. strikes against security targets, surprising it occurred within Kandahar City, a AOG fighters managed to contin- with a further 2 affecting civilians. long term centre of gravity for the IEA with uously engage security forces for This is a regular occurrence in the Kandahar Province proving the most mature almost 30 hours, with an initial use of this tactic, typically the re- and resilient theatre within the wider conflict. primary effort focused on the

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 300 Quite surprisingly, AOG incident 250 levels dropped off dramatically Sangin and continued with a series 200 this period following a extremely of ineffectual IED strikes. While 150 active and kinetic 3 months. This frequent, direct attacks against 100 can be partially attributed to a IMF/ANSF patrols also continue 50 refocusing of efforts to the poppy to be relatively ineffective, more 0 harvesting as well as the opera- akin to harassing fire than an at- tional realities that require periods tempt to actually inflict casualties. HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime of resupply and reorganization Security forces continue to find following extended periods of almost double the number of composition within the city. ANSF have al- activity. In addition, IMF have IEDs that actually detonate, along ready assumed de-facto control for the city, continued high levels of activities, with seizing various small scale with IMF in support, so the actual shape of primarily in the districts in which caches. The exception to this was transition will be more perceptual than any- the Helmand River flows (as this the seizure of 110kg of poppy and thing. numerous IEDs in a sole incident. is where the population is concen- Overall one should expect an increase in inci- trated). The pending transition for Lash- dents and kinetic activity as the month closes From an incident perspective, the kar Gah continues on track, as the poppy harvest will also come to a close period opened with a suicide at- though one should note that will and AOG will be able to once again focus their tack against a police post in not likely result in any significant efforts on the conflict. structural changes in the force THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 Although absolute levels of con- 100 flict in Paktika remained lower character of Pakistan-based target- than Khost during the period, the ed suicide attacks, it likely indi- 50 offensive posture of the AOGs cates that the Wana-based AOG operating there and the intensity commander most likely responsi- 0 of the engagements recorded in ble is not fully in harmony with the past fortnight signify that the the tactical parameters the IEA province has again been the most have laid out. PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime violently contested battleground This incident, and the intensely in the southeast. Not only did the kinetic character of the remaining curacy, killing 6 and injuring a further 2 AOG number of conflict incidents rise incidents, does not bode well for fighters. In Mata Khan, an AOG-IMF/ANSF by roughly 15%, but a high pro- the security of the province in the engagement killed one AOG fighter, while in a portion of the total incidents were coming months. Of those other separate ANA operation in the Mata Khan of a ‘stand-out’ nature. incidents, a significant number of DAC, 2 suspected BBIED operatives were Most significantly, on May 1st a both AOG-initiated attacks and arrested, attesting to the ongoing threat of sui- BBIED operative conducted a IMF operations resulting in sub- cide attack in the province. IDF attacks also targeted attack in Shkin bazaar, a stantial rates of killed and wound- registered, with the same quantity, 13, as in last key urban area in southern Barmal ed. For example, of the 20 other period, although none caused any reported on the primary route by which the AOG-initiated direct assaults on damage or casualties. main South Waziristan AOG IMF and ANSF targets, of which The IMF side was similarly eventful, with 8 commander and his faction run half occurred in Yahya Khel, 5 significant operations, 3 of which occurred in cross-border attacks into the resulted in multiple AOG deaths. the border areas of Barmal, as mentioned province. The target of the attack In Jani Khel’s Ingul village, an above a key AOG infiltration route from was the head of a local communi- AOG-ANP firefight killed 6 South Waziristan. On May 5th, a joint IMF/ ty shura, who was killed alongside AOG fighters, while in Urgun, an ANSF operation supported with air assets tar- 3 civilians, with 12 further civil- exchange of fire between AOG geted and killed 10 AOG fighters in the Man- ians injured. The attack was de- and a joint patrol led to the death gaky area, including Pakistanis and Russians, clared by the IEA to be a notable of 10 Pakistani AOG fighters, who were infiltrating into Afghanistan in two success in their new Operation including their field commander. vehicles. Similarly on May 14th, 10 fighters Badar campaign, which was an- In Yahya Khel, Bambi village saw were killed in IMF airstrikes in the border area. nounced as starting on the 1st, the a protracted engagement which In separate operations in the Dila, Omna and day it occurred. However, while resulted in 3 AOG fighters, two Yahya Khel DACs, IMF and ANSF killed 1 in line with their stated intention policemen and one ANA soldier and captured 2, killed 2 and captured 2, and to target local leaders aligned with killed, and 6 opposition fighters arrested 11 respectively. In Yosuf Khel’s the GOA, it was unusual in its arrested, including 3 who were Mashkhel area meanwhile, 6 AOG fighters taking place in a crowded bazaar wounded. In Gayan, a hit-and- were killed in two separate operations on con- area, given another stated inten- run attack on the district’s main secutive days. tion, that of avoiding civilian casu- IMF facility led to an IDF re- alties; more closely resembling the sponse from IMF of unusual ac- THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 Incident levels in Ghazni have 200 spiked dramatically this period, AOG leadership with limited almost reaching par with the en- GOA presence and influence. In 150 tire volume recorded in April. addition, the bazaar in Andar has 100 This falls in line with the trends of been closed for almost a month 50 last year when their activity surged and there is an ongoing embargo 0 in April as well, leading to a con- of mobile phone service in siderable peak in June. There Qarabagh. All of these speak to GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime have been no significant changes the extent of AOG influence and in force configuration there (on control over the population. (cache seizures, presence patrolling) and night either side) to suggest that this Structurally, activities within raids with the view of disrupting the persistent won’t be the case again this year. Ghazni follow the standard form, AOG networks. Much of this activity is focused on with IEDs, attacks against supply As Ghazni was identified as the Centre for Ghazni City (the provincial capi- convoys on both primary (Hwy 1) Islamic Culture for 2013, it is likely that this tal) as well as the districts in the and secondary routes, and small province will continue to be hotly contested south and west of the province. scale attacks against ANP check- terrain with the impetus on the government to These are standard operational points on the same. Of note, an dramatically improving access and security in areas which help create a contigu- attempted suicide bomber was light of this upcoming event. Security will be a ous space (through to Uruzgan intercepted this period, marking key element in the preparation for this event, and Zabul) to allow for an unim- the first suicide attack related inci- as large sums of money have been pledged for peded flow of their supplies. To dent for this province this year. large scale rehabilitation and construction pro- illustrate, Nawa District at the Despite AOG efforts to contain grams. While AOG will likely contest any such extreme south of the province, security forces to the vicinities of efforts, the impact such efforts will have on and wedged between Zabul and their facilities, IMF and ANSF their local support remains unclear due to the Paktika, has been reported to be have been active, primarily in the Islamic nature of this event. completely under the sway of form of low level operations

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Instability along the highway con- 80 tinues to be a primary element of the large scale local response 60 forced a reversal, though wide the conflict within Zabul. While 40 attacks and IEDs are common scale local discontent has not sur- 20 along Hwy 1, recent AOG efforts faced within Zabul as of yet. to restrict access along secondary However, it is likely only a matter 0 routes are a growing concern. An of time before this does occur. At present it is unknown what the ongoing IED campaign has had ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime an effect on the local population, impact of the above efforts on forcing them to resort to alternate, local livelihoods will have on the prosecution of the conflict, though the full less convenient, routes of travel AOG acceptance levels, though extent of their influence over the larger IEA and is also forcing a limitation on the IEA have demonstrated elements is unknown. the use of vehicles due to the fear enough political savvy to under- Lastly, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration of hitting such a device. stand the implications. However, Program has opened their office in Qalat Along with this, the ongoing the recent kill/capture of foreign (populated with elders from Qalat District), AOG embargo of the mobile fighters north of Qalat this period though the local population is reserved in their phone networks continues, en- (reportedly aligned to Al Qaida) assessment of the future effectiveness of this compassing the entire province indicates that there are groups program. Primarily, there is concern that these and now extending into it’s third operating in this province who are efforts will be targeted (as in other areas), a straight week. When similar ef- less focused on the concerns of concern that is inline with AOG operational forts were attempted in Helmand, the local population and more on directives announced this year. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Samangan Uruzgan NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Nimroz Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we contact: do not know enough [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 nificance of the inci- ANSO is managed by an NGO dents occurring Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) there. feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us [email protected] understand the prov- ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) ince better, please Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 contact us. ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / ANCOP-Afghan Nation- al Civil Order Police / AOG- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Armed Opposition Group / Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised mili- tias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghani- stan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Ex- plosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA) / APRP-Afghan Peace and Re- integration Program