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(KABUL Province) District Assessment NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA ISAF Joint Command District Assessments 100408 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA IJC District Assessments • Focused on Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts • Based on “Bottom-Up” RC Analysis and Inputs • Statistical Data to support Trends Development • Collaborative Supporting Analysis • Operational Assessment Process • Assessment Packet – Base Assessment Slide – Written Assessment – Data Charts – Other Supporting Material NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts Key Terrain Districts (80) Area of Interest Districts (41) Other ISAF Presence Unfinished Road NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA IJC Overall District Assessments Percentage of Key Terrain Districts Neutral 35% Sympathy for Sympathy for INS Not Assessed GIRoA Support INS 32% Population actively Population Population Population actively 0% Population neutral/on Not Assessed* 26% 7% supporting Govt and sympathizing w/ Govt sympathizing with supporting the fence Support GIRoA Security Forces and Security Forces Insurgents Insurgency 0% NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA District Governance Assessments Percentage of Key Terrain Districts Unproductive Dysfunctional 35% 23% Non-existent Full authority Unproductive Non-existent Not Assessed Emerging Emerging Dysfunctional 14% 24% Not Assessed Full Authority 0% 4% District Governance Definitions NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA District Development Assessments Percentage of Key Terrain Districts Minimal Growth Stalled Growth 38% 35% Dependent Population at Risk Sustainable Dependent Minimal Stalled Population Not Assessed Growth 7% Growth Growth Growth Growth at Risk 15% Sustainable No Data Available Growth 21% 6% District Development Definitions NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA District Security Assessments Percentage of Key Terrain Districts Dangerous Frequent Threats Environment 24% 29% Occasional Frequent Dangerous Unsecure Unsecure Secure Not Assessed Occasional Not Assessed Environment Environment Threats Threats Environment Environment Threats Secure 5% 7% 30% Environment 5% District Security Definitions NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA Key Terrain Districts and Areas of Interest P RC Province D Districts P RC Province D Districts D RCProvince District P D RC Provinc Districts 1 E Ghazni 1 Ghazni E Ghazni 49 Giro 1 C Kabul Bagrami E Khost 2 Khost (Matun) E Ghazni 50 Qarah Bagh 2 C Kabul Deh-e Sabz 81 C Kabul Bagrami 2 3 C Kabul Khak-e Jabar E Khost 3 Nadir Shah Kot E Ghazni 51 Waghaz 82 C Kabul Chahar Asyab E Kunar 4 Khas Kunar E Khost 52 Sabari (Ya‘qubi) 4 E Ghazni Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu) 3 83 C Kabul Deh-e Sabz E Kunar 5 Nurgal E Nangarhar 53 Chaparhar 5 E Ghazni Gelan 17 E Laghman 6 Mehtar Lam E Paktiya 54 Dzadran 6 E Kapisa Hisah-e Awal-e Kohistan C Kabul Kabul 4 84 E Laghman 7 Qarghah'i E Paktiya 55 Shwak 7 E Kapisa Hisah-e Dowum-e Kohistan 85 C Kabul Paghman E Nangargar 8 Bati Kot N Kunduz 56 Aliabad 8 E Khost Terayzai („Ali Sher) E Nangargar 9 Behsud N Kunduz 57 Imam Sahib 9 E Kunar Bar Kunar (Asmar) E Nangargar 10 Jalalabad N Kunduz 58 Khanabad 10 E Kunar Chapah Darah E Nangargar 11 Khugyani S Helmand 59 Musa Qal‘ah 11 E Kunar Sar Kani 5 E Nangargar 12 Mohmand Darah S Helmand 60 Now Zad 12 E Logar Baraki Barak E Nangargar 13 Kuz Kunar S Helmand 61 Sangin E Nangargar 14 Shinwar S Kandahar 62 Ghorak 13 E Logar Khoshi E Nangargar 15 Rodat S Kandahar 63 Khakrez 14 E Paktika Bermal E Nangargar 16 Surkh Rod S Kandahar 64 Shah Wali Kot 15 E Paktika Gomal E Paktika 17 Orgun W Herat 65 Kohsan (Kuhestan) 16 E Paktiya Sayyid Karam 6 E Paktika 18 Sharan W Herat 66 Zindah Jan 17 E Parwan Salang E Paktiya 19 Zurmat W Badghis 67 Qal'ah-ye Now 7 18 E Wardak Chak-e Wardak E Paktiya 20 Gardez S Helmand 68 Reg-e Khan Neshin 19 E Wardak Nerkh 8 E Wardak 21 Sayyidabad E Ghazni 69 Ab Band 20 N Balkh Charhar Bolak N Baghlan 22 Baghlan-e Jadid E Ghazni 70 Andar 9 21 N Balkh Chimtal N Baghlan 23 Pul-e Khumri E Ghazni 71 Muqer 22 N Balkh Dowlatabad 10 N Balkh 24 Mazar-e Sharif E Khost 72 Bak 23 N Balkh Sholgarah N Kunduz 25 Chahar Darah E Khost 73 Jaji Maidan 11 24 N Kunduz 26 Kunduz E Khost 74 Shamul (Dzadran) N Faryab Almar S Helmand 27 Garm Ser E Khost 75 Tanai 25 N Faryab Qaisar S Helmand 28 Lashkar Gah E Laghman 76 Alingar 26 N Jowzjan Faizabad 12 S Helmand 29 Nad 'Ali E Paktika 77 Giyan 27 N Jowzjan Mardian S Helmand 30 Nawah-ye Barakzai E Paktika 78 Mota Khan 28 S Helmand Baghran S Helmand 31 Nahr-e Saraj E Paktika 79 Sar Rowzah 29 S Kandahar Nesh S Kandahar 32 Arghandab N Kunduz 80 Archi 30 S Nimroz Khash Rod (OBT) S Kandahar 33 Kandahar S Helmand 81 Kajaki 31 S Uruzgan Deh Rawud S Kandahar 34 Daman W Herat 82 Obeh 32 S Zabul Tarnek wa Jaldak 13 S Kandahar 35 Maiwand W Herat 83 Pashtun Zarghun S Kandahar 36 Panjwa'i 33 W Badghis Ghormach S Kandahar 37 Spin Boldak 34 W Badghis Murghab S Kandahar 38 Zharay 35 W Badghis Qadis Key: S Zabul 39 Qalat 14 36 W Badghis Muqur S Zabul 40 Shah Joy P = Province W Herat 41 Herat 37 W Farah Bakwah (OBT) W Herat 42 Injil 15 38 W Farah Bala Boluk W Herat 43 Karukh RC = Regional Command 39 W Farah Farah W Herat 44 Nizam-e Shahid 16 W Badghis 45 Ab-e Kamari 40 W Farah Pusht-e Rod D = District AI E Kunar 46 Sar Kani 41 W Herat Kushk-e Kohnah AI E Logar 47 Baraki Barak AI W Badghis 48 Murghab NATO/ISAFNATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED REL REL GIROA GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA District Assessment Model Population Population Neutral/On Population Population Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively Supporting w/ Gov‟t w/ Insurgents Supporting Gov‟t & Security Insurgency Forces District Assessment (Overall assessment based on Governance, Development, Security) Population actively Population Population Population Population actively supporting Govt sympathizing w/ Not neutral/on the sympathizing with supporting and Security Govt and Security Assessed* fence Insurgents Insurgency Forces Forces * An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas; or areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment. NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 141955DAPR10 9 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA Doctrinal District Assessment Concept Overall Assessment of the District Interagency Commander’s Commander Reports Assessment Brief Comments Overall Rating Staff Discussion w/Unit Input Routine Data Reports (CIDNE) CCIR /Assessment Reports Subjective Data (Commander & Objective Data (Quantitative) Unit knowledge of Environment) NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA Doctrinal District Assessment Definitions District Assessment (Overall assessment based on Governance, Development, Security) Population actively Population Population Population Population actively supporting Govt sympathizing w/ Not neutral/on the sympathizing with supporting and Security Govt and Security Assessed fence Insurgents Insurgency Forces Forces District Governance Definitions Full authority Emerging Unproductive Dysfunctional Non-existent Not Assessed District Development Definitions Sustainable Dependent Minimal Stalled Population Not Assessed Growth Growth Growth Growth at Risk District Security Definitions Secure Occasional Frequent Dangerous Unsecure Environment Threats Threats Environment Environment Not Assessed NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA As of: 081955DAPR10 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED REL GIROA District Overall Definitions Active Support • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that a super-majority (>70%) of the population for Gov’t accepts legitimacy of GIRoA or of traditional local governance structures not actively in opposition to GIRoA. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that open, active support for GIRoA is routine. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that a large majority of individuals are satisfied with conditions in terms of their Personal, Community, Food, Health, Economic, Political security. Sympathy • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that the majority of population (>50%) accepts for Gov’t legitimacy of GIRoA or of traditional local governance structures not actively in opposition to GIRoA. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that most support for GIRoA is passive but INS enjoy little support or tolerance. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that the majority of individuals are satisfied with conditions in terms of their Personal, Community, Food, Health, Economic, Political security. Neutral/ On • Environmental Conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that the population is divided with respect to the Fence legitimacy of GIRoA. < 50% accept legitimacy of GIRoA, or majority is neutral or uncommitted. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that little active support for either GIRoA or INS is evident. • Environmental conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that less than half of individuals are satisfied with conditions in terms of their Personal, Community, Food, Health, Economic, Political security. Sympathy for • Environmental Conditions in district with respect to Governance, Development and Security are such that the majority of the population (>50%) rejects Insurgency legitimacy of GIRoA, or aligns with anti-government elements.
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