1 THE PROTESTS IN : INSIGHTS FROM AND THE WESTERN VIEW

THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW

EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE

Vilnius, Lithuania August, 2020 THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 2

ANDREI YAHORAU Senior analyst of the Centre for European transforma- tion. Master of Political Science. A. Yahorau graduated from Belarusan State University, department of political science, and holds a master’s degree in political science. He has been working in the political research area since 2001. Andrei Yahorau is one of the founders of the only specialized political science magazine in Belarus “Politi- cal sphere” (Palitychnaja Sfera) and he is the magazine’s deputy editor. Since 2005 he has been an expert and the head of analytical group of the Humanitarian Techniques Agency.

Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime, tained and severely beaten, and the beatings established as a result of a constitutional and torture continued at places of detention. coup in 1996, is currently facing the most se- The authorities’ goal was to quickly suppress rious political crisis in all the years of its ex- the protests; their tactics, however, produced istence. After the cynically rigged election on effects opposite to those intended. People on 9 August 2020, masses of people took to the the streets began to respond to the violence streets of their cities to protest. The official- by confronting the police. On the second day ly announced results of the election in which of protests, that is, on 10 August, protesters Lukashenko won 80.1 % of the vote, while his began erecting barricades in the streets of main rival, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, received Minsk; in some cases, the confrontation be- just 10.1 %, radically diverged from the views of tween police and protesters lasted for several the majority of . The gap between hours. The violence continued over the next the apparent number of supporters of change two days; the number of detainees exceeded and the election results triggered mass pro- 7 thousand people, and two people died. tests. In the entire history of the country’s in- Large industrial enterprises (BelAZ, Grodno dependence, the authorities have not encoun- Azot, BMZ, MTZ, and others) joining protests tered anything similar, neither in terms of the on 11–13 August, as well as protests ex- number of protesters, in terms of geography, panding in geography to almost 50–60 cities nor in terms of the duration of the protests. forced the authorities into temporary retreat. On the evening of the first day of the protests, On 13 August, Natalya Kochanova, chairper- that is, on the evening of 9 August, the author- son of the upper house of the parliament (un- ities responded with unprecedented violence til 2019, she had been the head of the Presi- against the protesters. For the first time, rub- dent Administration), announced the release ber bullets, stun grenades, and water cannons of some of the detainees (and they began were used against them. Protesters were de- to release them) and called for de-escala- THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 3

tion. Street violence temporarily stopped, but in the event of increased instability indicates protesters organised mass flash mobs and the instability of his position. This situation formed solidarity chains. The symbolic ac- creates enormous risks for the independence tions of women in white, lining up along the of Belarus. At the same time, the provision of streets in many cities, were particularly strik- such assistance by Russia will critically un- ing. It was noteworthy that street protests dermine the existing pro-Russian sympathies began to spread to residential areas of large of Belarusians. The protests do not have any cities, visually present everywhere. This re- pronounced geopolitical orientation: they duced the effect of state propaganda, which cannot be called pro-Western or anti-Russian. sought to represent the protests as protests The masses of people only take to the streets of a small number of people, to nothing. to demand Lukashenko’s resignation and the appointment of new elections. By the sixth and the seventh day of the pro- tests, the number of enterprises on strike had Until now, the issue of political representation grown to two dozen enterprises, including of protesters remains a significant problem. major industrial giants. A partial erosion of The symbolic trio, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the vertical power structure began. Belarus Veronika Tsepkalo, and Maria Kolesnikova, state TV workers joined the strike; heads of who actually represented the united forces some state institutions, Belarusian ambassa- of change during the election campaign, fell dors to Switzerland and Slovakia expressed apart after the departure of Svetlana Tikha- their support for protesters. On Sunday, novskaya and Veronika Tsepkalo. The po- 16 August, mass rallies were held in Minsk litical leadership vacuum created problems and most cities of Belarus. After eight days of with regard to the political representation of protests, the number of protesters grew from protesters, who had no established demands tens of thousands to about 500,000 people in for several days. It was only on the fifth day the capital and, probably, to 1 million people of the protests that the headquarters of Ma- in the whole country. The geography of the ria Kolesnikova, as well as Svetlana Tikha- protests expanded to almost all cities. novskaya herself publicly announced their demands to the authorities, which, in short, What is happening in Belarus can surely be were as follows: an end to the violence, the re- called a democratic revolution. However, lease of all political prisoners, the resignation a radical change in the situation in favour of Lukashenko and the appointment of new of protesters has not yet come. Lukashenko elections. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya stated the continues to control central and local author- need to create a Coordination Council, which ities, as well as national security, defence, had to include representatives of citizens’ or- and law enforcement agencies. Not a single ganisations and associations. Such a Coor- high-ranking official has yet sided with pro- dination Council could become a representa- testers, and no cases of law enforcement of- tive body of protesters and a potential group ficers refusing to carry out orders have been capable of negotiating with Lukashenko on recorded. Lukashenko’s appeal to Russia and his resignation. Vladimir Putin with a request to refer to the CSTO mandate and to provide security as- On 14 August, an extraordinary meeting of sistance to Belarus in suppressing protests EU foreign ministers, convened at the initia- THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 4

tive of Poland and Lithuania, stated that the tlement are positive initiatives, although the presidential election in Belarus was not free acceptability of such a scenario for the Belar- and fair; however, it did not call the sitting usian authorities remains unclear. president illegitimate. Ministers also agreed The forced stay of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in on the need to sanction those responsible for Lithuania creates opportunities for the Lithua- the violence, repression and falsification of nian government to establish direct contacts election results. Taking into account the un- with her. Taking into account the absolute derstandable EU desire to increase pressure necessity to support Tikhanovskaya in Lithu- on the Lukashenko regime, it should be rec- ania, as well as the necessity of humanitarian ognised that there are controversial aspects support for victims of repression and symbol- with regard to a sanctions decision as well. ic solidarity with protesters, official Lithuania, Sanctions cannot have immediate effects on nevertheless, should avoid public alliances the development of the current political crisis, with Tikhanovskaya. Such actions will have and they are only of symbolic importance. a negative effect on the development of the More decisive EU involvement in the current situation in Belarus, as they could provide situation is necessary, including the follow- Belarusian and Russian propaganda with an ing: extensive measures of diplomatic pres- additional reason to present the events in Be- sure on sector ministries in cooperation with larus as inspired by the West. the EU; temporary suspension of assistance programmes, including programmes of inter- Now, for the first time in a quarter of a cen- national financial institutions (WB, EIB, EBRD) tury, the situation in Belarus is in the hands and international organisations (UNDP, WHO); of the Belarusian people. The victory of the creation of a working group on the current sit- democratic forces has never been so close; uation in Belarus, including representatives however, it is too early to write off the Lu- of EU institutions, ministries of foreign af- kashenko regime. Today, two choices remain fairs of EU countries, international organisa- for Lukashenko: negotiations with protesters tions (CoE, OSCE), as well as Belarusian civil or the announcement of a state of emergen- society representatives and representatives cy. In the second case, the consequences will of expert organisations. The proposals of be unpredictable for the country. Lithuania and Poland to mediate in crisis set- THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 5

EDWARD LUCAS Edward Lucas is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was formerly a senior editor at The Economist. Lucas has covered Central and Eastern European affairs since 1986, writing, broad- casting, and speaking on the politics, economics, and se- curity of the region. A graduate of the London School of Economics and long-serving foreign correspondent in Ber- lin, Vienna, , and the Baltic states, he is an interna- tionally recognized expert on espionage, subversion, the use and abuse of history, energy security and information warfare.

Belarus is not just a black hole in human say in Estonia or Latvia in the early 1990s). rights terms: a country where torture, ab- Nor is it “like Ukraine” or “like Moldova”. It is ductions, forced confessions and grotesque like Belarus. election-rigging are commonplace. It is also a Nothing tried by any country has really black hole in terms of the outside world’s pol- amounted to a policy. The objectives are un- icy. In the years since independence, and par- ticularly since Alyaksandr Lukashenka won clear. Are we actively backing the opposition, the last free presidential election in 1994, or just trying to constrain the regime? Do we Western countries have tried many approach- really want a democratic political upheaval es, ranging from friendly engagement with in Minsk? Is the main priority to keep Belar- the authorities in Minsk to vehement con- us from being annexed by Russia? What level demnation and sanctions, and lavish support of risk are we prepared to take? What politi- for the opposition and independent media. In cal and economic resources are we willing to between come long periods of neglect. These devote to achieve success? These questions attempts to deal with Belarus are sometimes have lacked answers for thirty years. pursued with determination and in unison but In the meantime, Belarus itself has changed. more often dilatorily and raggedly. Traumas, whether of the Second World War, The level of knowledge about Belarus in most or the intense Sovietisation of the 1960s and Western capitals – Vilnius is a big exception – 1970s, are part of folk memory, but no longer is stunningly low. Lurid scenarios attract the of people’s lived experience. Public expecta- most attention, regardless of their plausibili- tions are higher: the stability and paternalism ty. One mistake is to overestimate the signif- that once chimed with the popular mood now icance of the linguistic divide. The difference chafes. Belarusians want dignity, respect, between Belarusian and Russian is for most truth and justice. They also want their well-ed- people not a matter of political principle (as, ucated, industrialised country to aim higher. THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 6

Much of that could be said about Russia too, persecuted and do everything possible to which is why the events of the past days in circumvent the regime’s censorship. We can Belarus are so terrifying for the Kremlin. The place the perpetrators of repression on sanc- opposition in Belarus cannot be dismissed as tion lists. We should take time too to reflect Soros-financed fanatics, waving foreign flags on our past mistakes. at the behest of foreign paymasters. The po- That should bring us to the immediate focus litical conflict does not pit a “western” orien- of our policy: Russia. The real reason why the tated slice of the country against an “eastern” West’s Belarus policy is so ineffective is that one, which is how many Russians viewed the it has to accommodate the Kremlin’s imperial revolution in Ukraine in 2014. This is the bot- pretensions. Since the unification of tom against the top. A whole country is in re- and first expansion of NATO and EU member- volt against arrogance, brutality, lies, humilia- ship in the 1990s we have chipped away at tion and waste. this ghostly aftermath of the Soviet empire. Outsiders can show their support for the Belarus is now the only country in which the strikers, demonstrators and detainees. The outside world accepts that Russia has some proposal by Lithuanian journalist Andrius kind of special, privileged status. Only when Tapinas to recreate the “Baltic Way” human that changes and the Kremlin understands chain of August 23rd 1989, but from Vilnius to that any interference in Belarus will bring an the Belarusian border, is a particularly com- immediate and costly penalty, can the Belaru- mendable one. We can offer asylum to the sians win their freedom, at home and abroad. THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 7

CHRIS MILLER Chris Miller is the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is also Assistant Profes- sor of International History at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research examines Russian politics, foreign policy, and economics. His most recent book is Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia which has been reviewed in publications such as The Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest and the Times Literary Supplement.

After Belarusian President Alexander Lu- responded by slashing U.S. diplomatic rep- kashenko stole his country’s presidential elec- resentation in Belarus and restricting many tion on August 9 and violently cracked down other ties. With Minsk suffering Western on citizens who protested, the U.S. govern- sanctions and condemnation, Russia saw ment declared that it was “deeply concerned.” an opportunity for greater ‘integration’ via But what is the U.S. prepared to do? Wash- institutions like the customs union and the ington is in a bind. Since Lukashenko earned Eurasian Economic Union. In Moscow these his reputation as Europe’s last dictator, the institutions were openly discussed as tools U.S. has been torn between two often contra- to bolster Russian influence. Lukashenko re- dictory goals. On the one hand, Washington alized Russia’s intentions, but isolated from condemns Lukashenko’s government for sup- the West he had little choice but to sign up. pressing its opponents and abusing its popu- Belarus nevertheless sought to limit its re- lace. On the other, the U.S. wants to support liance on Moscow by welcoming Chinese Minsk as it tries to maximize its room for ma- investment in industries from railroads to neuver vis-à-vis Moscow, which continues to technology. He signed an agreement allow- see Belarus as within Russia’s rightful sphere ing visa-free travel between the countries of influence. The uncomfortable reality for and welcomed Chinese People’s Liberation Washington is that past efforts to support Be- Army troops to march in Belarus’ 2018 Inde- larusian democracy have often risked pushing pendence Day Parade. China has lent Belar- Lukashenko further into Moscow’s arms. us hundreds of millions of dollars and coop- During the years after 1991, U.S. policy to- erated with Minsk on missile development. ward Belarus has prioritized democracy and Huawei has built up its presence in Belarus, human rights. The U.S. has condemned Lu- too. Minsk no doubt hoped that its burgeon- kashenko’s sham elections, supported civil ing friendship with Beijing would let it push society groups seeking to build democratic back against some of Russia’s more intrusive institutions, and imposed sanctions on Be- demands. China, meanwhile, was keen to ex- larusian leaders complicit in abuses. Minsk pand its influence in Eastern Europe. THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 8

For many years the U.S. mostly ignored other free elections oust a dictator that they con- great powers’ growing influence in Belarus. sider a friend. If Lukashenko manages to Lukashenko’s abuses made it almost impos- hold on to power, he will be more dependent sible for American diplomats to do business on Russian (and China) than ever before. The with him. Even Russia’s annexation of Crimea fact that the EU is preparing new sanctions and war in the Donbas prompted only a partial on Minsk only intensifies Lukashenko’s de- rethink in Washington. The State Department pendence. quietly explored improving ties and began to For a Secretary of State focused on great rethink sanctions after the war broke out. Yet power competition, Belarus poses a dilem- little actually changed after 2014. ma. Pompeo has “strongly condemned” the When the Trump Administration came to pow- violence police used against protestors and er, it declared that competition with Russia declared the election “not free and fair.” Some and China would be America’s primary foreign in Congress are demanding that the U.S. can- policy goal, implicitly relegating questions of cel plans to send an ambassador to Minsk. democratization to a secondary position. In Yet having been all but absent from Minsk for February 2020—a time when Russian discus- over a decade the U.S. lacks the deep under- sion of forcibly integrating Belarus had grown standing of Belarusian politics that is present louder—Secretary of State Pompeo visited in neighboring countries such as Lithuania Minsk, offering to supply oil to Belarus. “Your and Poland. Unlike in Ukraine 2014, when it nation should not be forced to be dependent comes to Belarus the EU looks likely to play on any one partner for your prosperity or your the leading role in forging the transatlantic security,” Pompeo told Lukashenko. response.

Fast forward half a year, and the door that The U.S. finds it impossible to ignore the types Pompeo had cautiously opened for Lukashen- of abuses that Lukashenko has made stan- ko has slammed shut. The Belarusian dicta- dard features of Belarusian politics. But the tor has visibly lost whatever popular support impulse to focus on great power politics at he once enjoyed. Yet it is not yet clear that a time of heightened concern about Russian Lukashenko is leaving. His “victory” in the and Chinese power is deeply rooted in Wash- August 9 presidential vote has already been ington. The risk is that by trying simultaneous- recognized by Russia and China. And neither ly to support democracy while opposing Rus- of the world’s two authoritarian great powers sian and Chinese influence, the U.S. could end has any interest in watching a movement for up accomplishing neither. THE PROTESTS IN BELARUS: INSIGHTS FROM MINSK AND THE WESTERN VIEW 9