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WWW.BNE.EU Russian retail investors piling into the stock market for the first time, but CBR worried about rising risks Estonian premier quits after Tallinn development scandal February 2021 Fears of authoritarianism as Kyrgyz populist wins landslide and backing for ‘Khanstitution’ Making Magnit great again Has Navalny started a revolution? SHELLING RUSSIA’S WHITE HOUSE IN 1993 What a real coup looks like Belarus’ IT industry The oligarch problem OUTLOOKS 2021 in meltdown p.35 p.42 p.24 ISSN 2059-2736 ISSN 2 I Contents bne February 2021 Senior editorial board Ben Aris editor-in-chief & publisher I Berlin 206 +49 17664016602 I [email protected] Clare Nuttall news editor I Glasgow +44 7766 513641 I [email protected] William Conroy editor Eurasia & SE Europe I Prague +420 774 849 172 I [email protected] ——— Subscriptions Stephen Vanson 7 London I +44 753 529 6546 [email protected] ——— COMPANIES & MARKETS 14 Russian petrochemical giant Sibur Advertising closes $11bn joint venture deal to 4 Hungarian official threatens build Amur Gas Chemical plant Elena Arbuzova to wage war on foreign with China’s Sinopec business development director I Moscow +7 9160015510 I [email protected] retailers ——— 16 Rio Tinto reports maiden ore 5 Hungary's largest bank reserve at Jadar project in Serbia Design merger granted exemption Olga Gusarova from competition scrutiny 17 Turkish hotels in fire sale art director I London +44 7738783240 I [email protected] 6 Foreign investors eye 18 Online video service ivi.ru starts bargains on distressed NASDAQ IPO registration procedure Please direct comments, letters, press releases Budapest hotel market, but and other editorial enquires to [email protected] owners won't budge 19 AFC CAPITAL: Uzbekistan’s stock market re-rating has much further All rights reserved. No part of this publication 7 Poland picks location for to run may be reproduced, stored in or introduced to any its Izera e-car plant, says retrival system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, production delayed until 21 Borsa Istanbul takes stock of its recording or other means of transmission, without 2024 new speculator express written permission of the publisher. The opinions or recommendations are not necessar- 8 Karachaganak partners 21 Ozon’s oversubscribed IPO brings ily those of the publisher or contributing authors, including the submissions to bne by third parties. pay $1.3bn to settle oil in $1.2bn No liability can be attached to the publisher for and gas fields dispute with these comments, nor for inaccuracies, errors Kazakhstan 22 Romanian tech entrepreneurs or omissions. Investment decisions or related actions taken on the basis of views or opinions expand into banking sector that appear herein are the responsibility of the 9 UK court freezes $5bn in reader and the publisher, contributors and related assets connected to fugitive 23 Slovakia to invest €1.2bn in parties cannot be held liable for these actions. Kazakh banker Ablyazov digitisation bne Intellinews is published by Emerging Markets Direct OU 10 Russian retail investors 23 Turkey hits Facebook, Instagram, piling into the stock market Twitter, YouTube and TikTok with Print issue: for the first time, but CBR second round of fines £4.50 /$6.75 /€5.90 . €499 / year worried about rising risks 24 Belarus’ IT industry in meltdown 12 EBRD investments reach Follow us on record €11bn in pandemic- 26 E-grocery in Russia estimated to twitter.com/bneintellinews struck 2020 reach $1.9bn in 2020, growing to $8bn by 2023 Sign up to FREE electronic version 13 Russian government to of bne monthly magazine OR buy sell First Channel TV 27 Government releases mandated a print subscription at broadcaster, but will keep phone app software list golden share bne.eu/subscribe bne February 2021 Contents I 3 13 66 54 COVER FEATURE 52 Montenegro’s special prosecution probes finance 70 28 Shelling Russia’s White House minister over €750mn in 1993 Eurobond issue 32 Storming parliaments: 53 Heavy flooding causes chaos New Europe's greatest hits in parts of Southeast Europe 35 The oligarch problem EASTERN EUROPE 40 OUTLOOK 2021 54 Making Magnit Great again 58 Fencing club memberships CENTRAL EUROPE surge following success of Russia’s answer to the 66 EBRD backs “success story” 44 Estonian premier quits after Queen’s Gambit hit mini- TBC as it cuts stake in Tallinn development scandal series Georgia’s largest bank to 5% 46 Czech Pirates and Mayors 59 Kremlin creating pro-Russia 67 Georgia’s political kingpin approve final coalition party in Belarus Bidzina Ivanishvili quits agreement for 2021 elections politics 61 Has Navalny started 47 Transparency International a revolution? warns of high corruption risk OPINION in CEE defence sectors EURASIA 68 Corruption steals back into 48 Poland and Hungary lift their the Russian political agenda blockade of EU budget and 64 Fears of authoritarianism as Mishustin and Krasnov coronavirus recovery fund as Kyrgyz populist wins target the institutional landslide and backing for profiteers ‘Khanstitution’ SOUTHEAST EUROPE 70 The controversial recipe for 65 Fallout from execution of building up Albania 50 ‘Lost hope’ on Turkey’s jobs dissident journalist scuppers market threatens Erdogan Iran-Europe business forum 72 Uzbekistan is being transformed, but where are 51 Arrera Automobili aims to the democratic reforms? launch Albania’s first supercar 74 NEW EUROPE IN NUMBERS 4 I Companies & Markets bne February 2021 Former cabinet chief Janos Lazar openly calls for protectionist measures against foreign retailers at a conference on December 4. Hungarian official threatens to wage war on foreign retailers Tamas Szilagyi in Budapest ultinational retailers in Hungary may be bracing the next 7+2 years, thousands of billions of forints will have for a tough period after former Prime Minister’s to be made available for agriculture, he added. Hungary MOffice leader Janos Lazar argued that Hungary should follow the examples of Poland and Slovakia, which should pursue an openly protectionist policy to crowd out have a higher share of processed food made locally. multinational retailers. Hungary has already reintroduced a progressive sectoral tax hitting larger companies, while Lazar said that it would be in the national interest of Hungary sparing local retailers operating with franchise models. to dominate this market. Agriculture is one sector of the economy that has not benefited In numbers this would mean boosting the share of the from regime change or accession to the European Union, Lazar Hungarian-owned processing industry and domestically said at an online agricultural conference organised by the produced food consumption to 80% each, leading to an 80% Portolio business website on December 4. share in contribution of the sector by local producers. Despite funding coming from the EU during the last two seven- Foreign retailers under pressure year budgets, agriculture is lagging behind. "We are a country Earlier this year, the Court of Justice of the European Union that exports raw materials and imports finished products," (CJEU) ruled that Hungary’s progressive sectoral tax on said Lazar. retailers in Hungary is compatible with European Union rules. A few weeks later Hungary’s parliament approved a turnover- The next EU budget cycle is Hungary's last chance to be a self- based tax for companies. The tax exemption applies only for sufficient country with a strong food industry, he argued. Over annual revenue of HUF500mn (€1.38mn), or less. www.bne.eu bne February 2021 Companies & Markets I 5 Due to its progressive nature, the windfall tax is targeted its leading position with HUF740bn in sales last year down at multinational firms while local retailers (CBA, COOP) 2.8% from 2018. operating with a franchise model would be spared from the heavy burden. Tesco had 112 hypermarkets, 35 supermarkets and 55 convenience stores in Hungary. Spar saw its sales rise 10% The rate for turnover between HUF500bn and HUF30bn is to HUF680bn. The two largest local retailers COOP and 0.1%, between HUF30bn and HUF100bn is 0.4% and over CBA were ranked fourth and fifth with annual turnover of HUF100bn turnover the tax rate is 2.5%. HUF643bn and HUF538bn respectively, a modest 2.6 and 2.1% annual growth. The Orban government introduced windfall taxes for retailers in 2010 but was forced to withdraw it three years later after Analysts said that squeezing out multinationals would not solve an infringement procedure by the EU. The case was brought efficiency problems faced by Hungarian retail chains. Employers to the EU court, which ruled in favour of Hungary. Of the top would also feel the impact of a possible ownership change and possibly not to their advantage, a trade union leader said. Lazar, a once-powerful member of the Orban government, “We are a country that exports has stepped back from national politics in 2018 after his raw materials and imports unexpected loss at a mayoral by-election in his hometown of Hodmezovasarhely. He won his district in the 2018 finished products” parliamentary election. For a long time Lazar portrayed the image of being the "nice guy" of Fidesz, willing to accept criticism and ready for a compromise. ten retailers, only two are Hungarian-owned. The last few years had seen a surge of hard-discount chains. Aldi, Lidl In rhetoric, he occasionally unleashed criticism of the and Penny had pursued an aggressive strategy in building government’s policies. He was appointed by Orban as up their market share. commissioner for protecting non-smokers and earlier this year he was picked to lead the Hungarian Tennis Federation German hard discount chain Lidl became the second-largest after a corruption scandal. player in 2019 with a whopping 25% y/y increase in revenue to HUF685bn, which ranked it second behind market leader With such proposals many analysts say that Lazar is pursuing Tesco.
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