Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles

Home , Lilia Shevtsova, Sergei Udaltsov, Sergei Yesenin, Time in Russia, Time of Troubles

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Carnegie Moscow Center Lilia Kramer J. Shevtsova and David

Moscow 2013 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles

Electronic version: http://www.carnegie.ru/en

This publication has been produced within the framework of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program of the Carnegie Moscow Center, a non-commercial, non-governmental research organization, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Car- negie Endowment for International Peace or the Carnegie Moscow Center.

The publication is distributed free-of-charge.

Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles / Lilia Shevtsova, David Kramer; Carnegie Moscow Center. – Moscow, 2013. 159 p.

ISBN 978-5-905046-21-6

This is a collection of articles published from 2011 through 2013 in the American Interest, Journal of Democracy, Current History, Diplomaatia, and Yezhednevny Zhurnal. Some of the articles were co-authored with David Kramer. The articles reflect on Russia’s current trajectory, its relations with the West, Western thinking about Russian civilization, modern authoritarianism and its Russian and Chinese incarnations, and the use of foreign policy for the preservation of authoritarian regimes.

ISBN 978-5-905046-21-6 © Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS

7 About the Authors

9 Letter to the Reader

12 What’s the Matter with Russia? Lilia Shevtsova

20 Russia is Awakening: Will It Implode or Transform? Lilia Shevtsova

32 Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova

41 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution? Lilia Shevtsova

54 Why Russia Doesn’t Hold Keys to Syria David J.Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova

58 Ukraine, Russia, and Two Horses Lilia Shevtsova & David J.Kramer

62 Obama vs. Romney: Who Would Putin Pick? Lilia Shevtsova & David J. Kramer

67 Goodbye, America! Lilia Shevtsova

90 After the Elections, All Eyes on Georgia David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova

94 The Next Russian Revolution Lilia Shevtsova 104 130 144 138 150 125 110 157 118 Germany andRussia:Germany TheEndofOstpolitik? Lilia Shevtsova “Russia” we’re talkingabout How WillRussia React to Obama, Round Two? which Itdependson About the Carnegie Endowment Carnegie About the Lilia Shevtsova The Agony Lilia Shevtsova ResponseA Realist’s to anIdealist David J.Kramer&LiliaShevtsova Here We GoAgain:Falling Russian for Trap the Lilia Shevtsova WorldRussia andChina:Isthe Ready for TheirDecline? Lilia Shevtsova&DavidJ.Kramer Who Have Not West Becomethe West... inthe The Crisis andHow Those ItAffects David J.Kramer&LiliaShevtsova MagnitskyAct Means What the Lilia Shevtsova&DavidJ.Kramer

6 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles About the Authors

Lilia Shevtsova chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Politi- cal Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. She is the author of “Putin’s Russia,” “Lonely Power” and “Change or Decay. Russia’s Dilemma and the West’s Response” (with Andrew Wood), “A 21st Century Myth – Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China” (with Bobo Lo), “Russia XXI: The Logic of Suicide and Rebirth.”

David J. Kramer is president of Freedom House, which he joined in October 2010. Prior to joining Freedom House, he served in the U.S. State Department in several positions, including as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Before joining the U.S. Government, Kramer was Associate Director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Letter to the Reader

On Russia and the West in Troubling Times

This is a collection of polemical articles published mostly in 2011- 2013 in the American Interest, Journal of Democracy, Current History, and Diplomaatia. Some of the articles were co-authored by David Kramer. The articles reflect on Russia’s current trajectory, its relations with the West, Western thinking about Russian civilization, about modern authoritarianism, and about its Russian and Chinese incarnations, and the use of foreign policy for the preservation of authoritarian regimes. These reflections introduce a broader and more dramatic theme: crisis, as it is experienced by an obsolescent political and social system, and as it is experienced by a system in need of rejuvenation. In essence, these essays present the reader with a snapshot of the historical period in which we live. The drama inherent in this period lies in the fact that the two predominant political and social models – authoritarianism and liberal democracy – are experiencing simultaneous crises. These crises are different in nature. Authoritarianism is undergoing a period of decline and decay foreshadowing its demise as a civilizational system. The symptoms of this demise have become self-evident in the case of Russia. While China’s authoritarian system still commands considerable social and political resources for self-preservation, there are growing indications that it, too, is gradually losing its vibrancy and resilience. Western liberal democracy faces a different type of crisis – a crisis of renewal, at the end of which the West should arrive at a more advanced form of social and political organization. If it indeed occurs, this would not be the first time such a transformation has taken place. Western civilization also underwent processes of evolution as a result of the crises of the 1930s and 1970s. With any luck, it will do so again as a result of this crisis. In other words, the present moment in global affairs is defined by a concurrent crisis of two civilizational paradigms. The fact that these crises are occurring simultaneously diminishes the chances of a successful exit from the authoritarian model. Russia is the first to suffer from this fact: Its system of personalized power is already bankrupt, but it the viewsexpressedhere somewhat some of the ing in.We donot yet know whenorhow erawillend.You this may find policies. West’sand the commitment to dimensionin its including anormative fate of globalauthoritarianism on the broader reflections the sect with “ Germany’s Obama’sforeign policy;and democratic recession;PresidentBarack presentglobal Georgian post-communistdevelopment; causes ofthe the of Ukrainianand twists andturns the to bloodshed there; stop the world’s andthe subjectsaswell: civil warinSyria inability other the case? the asisoften progress, impedes an environment their that than transitions to freedom, rather will create states a benignenvironment other canmake in which their sia’s system of personalizedpower? a newpolicythat Canitarticulate Westtion. Willthe beableto show way to the an alternative for Rus its way of law; to Iseeitasa test freedom andrule for Western civiliza whosesociety to isdesperatelyRussia find struggling asjusta country reinvent a merechange of leaders. itselfwith regimecannot at itstraditionalmodesof engagement; itsauthoritarian West the its relationswith cannot beimproved by having yet go another mechanisms; cannot besaved to by traditional authoritarian resorting world modern past.Russia challenges by of the toto returning the the we illusion that canrespond the andhealthy to dispense with necessary ata solution.Moreimportantly, step to first arriving is the itisboth problem analysis book.Recognizing presented the reading the in this itwould price pay ifitwerethe to remain miredinstagnationanddecay. society isusually pays lower price itselfoutof crisis toall, the bring than manner, in a positive we light.After of crisis then canlookatperiods model looklike? its mantleof moralandpoliticalleadership?Finally, new whatwillthe citation? How world longwillthe have to West wait for the to reclaim West willthe world past, what price andthe has in the pay resus for this bind. complicateseriously Russia’s exitfromitsauthoritarian Unitedeconomic conditionsin the States) areonly temporary, still they capitalist model(aswell modern associo projectandthe integration European state the of politically current demoralized?Buteven ifthe West, concepts,the isitselfintellectually embodiesthese and which a waysian society to find freedom, competition, of law when andrule system noother to about it: aspire to.finds How Justthink canRus If crisis once again breathes newlife into onceagainbreathes WesternIf crisis civilizationasit You astestimony era we articles fromthe arestillliv cantreatthese essays majority on Russia, touch of these manyWhile the take up Naturally, bookfocus mostly in this on Russia. Idon’tsee articles the reader willrememberto remain optimisticSo Ihopethe while end,society itselfin any isincapableof reforming If, in the other Ostpolitik. these subjects,however,” All ofthese inevitably inter naïve andsimplistic. Our ------

10 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Krasnovsky book design. for the production process,andYakov the through manuscript shepherding the preparation,Veronika manuscript her assistanceinthe Lavrikova for editing, LeonGeyer translation,Natalia for hishelpwith Bubnova for for to publication.Iamgrateful Daniel Kennelly, whohelpedwith determine ourfuture. willmostlikely which – ahistory history tail-end of an unfinished as the day trendsevolve or, perhaps, aswe becomewiser. essays Lookatthese outlook on sometrendsmay evolve ora year aspresent- in sixmonths great team who prepared this manuscript manuscript teamI would whopreparedthis great like the to thank

11 Letter To The Reader What’s the Matter with Russia? Lilia Shevtsova / Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2010

Postcommunist states have taken shape differently depending on the development paths chosen by the elites of the former communist countries. The Central and East European states have restructured themselves with liberal democracy as their foundation. By contrast, Russia and most of the newly independent states on former Soviet territory have reverted to various forms of personalized power. It seems to me that two circumstances ensured the integration of “New Europe” into liberal Europe: the ability of the elites of New Europe to reach a consensus on building their new states based on European standards, and the European Union’s readiness to accept New Europe into its fold. Paradoxical though it may sound, the very fact of Russia’s existence was invaluable in facilitating New Europe’s transformation. The drive to escape the former suzerain laid the foundations of New European nationalism, which united left and right and legitimized the former Soviet satellite states’ decision to set their course toward Europe – a destina- tion that they could reach only by taking the liberal-democratic road. Equally paradoxical, even as the New Europeans sought sovereignty from Russia, they were willing to cede some of their newfound independence to Brussels.

The West, in turn – acting not so much out of altruism 1 See Jacques Rupnik, as out of a desire to guarantee its own security – was ready “Is East-Central Europe to expand and integrate into its civilization the former com- Backsliding? From Democracy Fatigue munist countries that separated Old Europe from an inscru- to Populist Backlash,” table Russia still struggling with its own complexes. New Journal of Democracy 18 (October 2007): 17–25; Europe’s postcommunist history reveals an evolution that Béla Greskovits, “Is East- has not been easy. Essays published in the Journal of De- Central Europe Backslid- mocracy show that all the Central and East European coun- ing? Economic Woes and Political Dissatisfaction,” 1 tries encountered problems along the way. But these were Journal of Democracy 18 problems of how to put into practice the principles of liberal (October 2007): 40–46; Vladimir Tismaneanu, democracy. Nowhere was there ever a real question of aban- “Is East-Central Europe doning the European rules of the game. Backsliding? Leninist Russia’s circumstances could not have been more dif- Legacies, Pluralist Dilem- mas,” Journal of Democ- ferent: In Russia, the elite proved unable to reach a con- racy 18 (October 2007): sensus on the direction of the country’s transformation and 34–39. a credible antisystemic opposition nora contingent of prag shuttered hadneither windows world, to country the the openRussia’sSoviet long- threw leaderMikhailGorbachev late 1980sCzechoslovakia (1968). moment the in crucial when Atthe shaken by revolutions in Poland like (1956), those (1956), Hungary and state. foundations Moreover, of the the undermine USSR wasnot the Russian elite anythe feared attempt that regime would to liberalize the were mid-twentieth reversed, time century aseach of the “Thaw” “constitutionalautocracy” andNikitaKhrushchev’s with experiment ably endedin itsrestoration. AlexanderII’snineteenth-century Both citizen.” hourof the economist”and“the of the successfully to move hour nextstages to “the of liberaltransformation: the lawyer,”Having hadno“hourof the Russian society hasbeenunable on principles. than relying byon leadersrather rules, than ency rather lawyer.”of the Even Russian liberalshave beenguidedby politicalexpedi law. of rule of the hour Russia called“the never Dahrendorf hadwhatRalf importance in Europebroughtrecognitionofthe which Rechtsstaat, the a newidentity.forming state and fromembracing newvisionofthe a prevented country the only asa superpower, and,in sodoing, reiterated claimto greatness this of communism, anewRussian elite, Russia convinced canexist that fall the creatinga viciouscycle. After centralization,thus age further community.ternational encour in turn Theseaspirationsto greatness recognition of its great-power in a global missionandthe statusby the RussianIn order to centralizedstate itself,the perpetuate requires both expansionismandmessianicideology.been bolstered by territorial individual,andcentralizationof powerity over of the those hasalways in favor past. to of areturn the worked politicalfactors that of leadership;andcertain importance the proved processitself,which Russianformation for too elite; the great trans challenges the of the of history; influence Russia’s course:the of several elementshelpedto set game? confluence The of the rules the Russia’s elite, of New unlike Europe,not that have resolve to the change hopefor Russia? in a futuretransformation Andwhycase? Isthere did ance between in Russia’s opportunity inevitabilityandlosthistorical bal from breakingfreeof itspastcivilizationalparadigm?Whatwasthe transitiontoindependent states’ liberal democracy. Whatstopped Russia newly of the path the obstaclein andbecamea serious ditional matrix ing Russia power into great reverted itsorbit.Thisformer to its tra thus West newstate, andthe of the form neverthe even consideredintegrat ism. History hadutterlyism. History failed to prepare Russia, which matists capable of functioninginanatmosphere of plural Moreover, assaultson autocracy all historical in Russia have invari of liberalconstitutionalism, period Russia missedouton the state interests haveIn Russia, of the the traditionally taken prior 2

- - 1990), 79. Chatto andWindus, tion in Europe Reflections on theRevolu 2 Ralf Dahrendorf, Dahrendorf, Ralf ------(London: -

13 What’s the Matter with Russia? old system. the ing with of life. ThusRussian timewasnot society a hindrance to atthat break acceptedexactly an idealandaway democracy was, butthey itasboth liberaldemocracy. time supported the Many were unsureof what Russianfor public. About70percentof Russians change fromthe at munist Russia in autumn1991, Yeltsin Boris hada huge mandate decisive momentfordom andpoliticalpluralism. Atthe postcom road to conditionsconducive free on the tonone of the setting forth to transformation. transitionalsocietiesfrom other andbecame a tremendousimpediment madeRussia different people.Militarization eyesstate of the in the supercentralized modelhasbeenusedto justify the ment. The militarist war andpeace;itsstate simply couldnot existin apeacefulenviron between boundary byat home.Russia annihilating the hassurvived for enemy waragainstan external preparing orpursuingenemies either isconstantly hasalways in Russia.which beentemporary The country manent state of war. Thissituationwasmaintainedeven in peacetime, andreproductionof powera unique survival in aper modelfor the Russiafoundations of society developed goals.In short, to militarist very life of everyday subjugation ofthe in Russiatarization andthe hadto be severe Thosethreats mili enoughtoand external. justify the internal both reference imaginedthreats, towith real or(moreoften) type of state – anuclearpetrostate. bedfellows.comfortable Moreover, Russia hadto an unusual transform of collapse, anddemocracy-building andmarket didnot reforms make early(“no state – nodemocracy”).Inthe 1990s, midst Russia wasin the a preconditionofsuccessfuldemocratizationisstablestate that Dahl,andlaterRobert JuanLinzandAlfredStepan warned rightly Rustow, to proved reconcile. Dankwart simultaneous tasks difficult organized andithadto quickly builda newmarket economy. These on whose basisitsstateto andsociety radically principles were alter the integrated empire anditsterritorially – italsohad spheres of influence, Russia have to give upitspositionasan alternative civilization,its tion of anuclearsuperpowerimperialist ambitions.Not with only did Federation. Russian collapse ofthe liberalizationwould aboutthe bring further raveling USSR, only of the reinforced Russian fears elite amongthe that to come. Moreover, un triggered the which perestroika, Gorbachev’s outside world fromthe for changeshad beenclosedoff decades,for the the democratiza beena taskakintoThere hasnever the in history of Challenges TransformationThe All this, however,All this, isnot meantto Russia suggest possessed that state hasbeenlegitimized of the primacy Russian case,the In the ------

14 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the oldSovietof the declined to state leave that political the of Peoples’ Deputies,wasa vestige Congress the of these, for a monopoly fighting on power.legitimacy andeach One quired democratic two with newpoliticalinstitutions,both center of powerconstitution, itwasthe Russia.in a parliament because,accordingtowas morethan the of Peoples’ Deputies.Thisbody Congress monster – the Sovietyear collapse of the before Union, the of anunusualpolitical ing a nuclearsuperpower. Ihave emergence in 1990, in mindthe one of history, andovercoming systemic constraintsinvolved the reform in influence game,neutralizingthe of the new rules sensus aboutthe key preventedother Russian factor that elite the fromforging a con did not exactly helpRussia to adopt newvalues. a mixtureof with newRussian politicalclass(includingliberals),combined of the part 1980sin the and1990s. vision andofaclearagenda of The lack on the Europeplayed in Eastern counterparts their role that the pared to tackle no Russian cating Russia’s into state. transformation a rule-of-law Yeltsin, alas,was factor weakness Russian compli democratswerethe crucial of the the become democrats,even convinced democrats.” cratic system. nondemocratsof yesterday AsDiPalma putit,“[the] can nature,not least for an auto of ruinous themselves, appreciate the have shown. Democracycanbebuiltby pragmatistswhorecognizeand O. Hirschman a successful transition,asGiuseppeDiPalma andAlbert of democratically inclinedleadersandelitesa lack neednot prevent a numberofdemocraticprerequisites. lacked of which Eveneach respective countries, democratic transitionintheir helped to ease the Africa, national(andpersonal)interests. democracy asbestserving elites political leadersandother see a strong communistlegacy–ifthe societies, andin societies with in agrarian problematic countries, racy cantake andeconomically root in non-European,non-Christian, Korea, andTaiwan South Africa, have combined to prove democ that and politicalengineering.” conditioningfactors byity of transcendingthose politicalleadership prerequisites. AsJuanLinzhasputit,“We cannot exclude possibil the while compensating absence inRussia for of sometransformation the elite split, and various political forceselite dove split,andvarious into head first presidency. wasthe scene. The other TheRussian political history of history Effective leadershipcouldhave influence mitigated the After Boris Yeltsin Boris After waselected president,Russia ac wasan there to understand that It took mesometimeandeffort failuresof leadershipand There wasa timewhenIbelieved that The leadershipof Adolfo Václav Suárez Czechoslovakia, and Lennart Meri in Estonia Havel Meri in Czechoslovakia, andLennart naïveté Russian liberalsanddemocratswere, andthe illpre , neurosis,brashness,andsocialinsensitivity, 3 The EastEuropeanstates, India,South Suárez in Spain,F.W. deKlerk in South 4

- Press, 1990), 210. University of California Transitions An Essayon Democratic To CraftDemocracies: 1997), 408. bridge University Press, Crisis Democracy’s Victoryand 4 3 GiuseppeDiPalma, Axel Hadenius,ed., (Cambridge: Cam - - - - - (Berkeley: - - - -

15 What’s the Matter with Russia? top-down Russian governance, elite the isdiscreditingliberal principles. of law,to rule imitate the pluralism,andfreedom whilehangingon to vent andprolonguncertainty. clearchoices to classicRussianto pre to paradigm.Thisambiguity serves return the andto Westernize,on board liberalprinciples butitalsodoesnot want allows Russia hasfailed to take to operate zone.The country in agray as a bulwark againstliberalization.The hybrid natureof itsregime Russian elite of the to mobilize great-power efforts status curse), andthe liberal democracy, commodity factor (alsoknown resource the asthe Russian elite ability ofthe includes Russia’s to hybrid imitate regime,the Russian systemmized the of personalizedpower. West force the asa transformational in Russian affairs, legiti serving and failedto persuade Yeltsin than even to options. consider other Rather advice legal institutions.Instead, Western their with leadersfell short only later, whenitcouldbeshaped by newly developed politicaland law, of rule state basedon the andto move to on gradually privatization ganize newelections,adopt a democraticconstitution,andbuildnew and market-oriented Russia ifin 1991 hadadvisedYeltsin they to or first Theywouldreform. have beenmoresuccessfulin shapingademocratic economy emphasized whileneglectingto the ond, they push for political on Yeltsin hewould andbelieved guarantee that Russia’s transition;sec zation hadclosed. in 1993 a sweeping with planto window help Russia, the for democrati time U.S. Bythe PresidentBillClintontransformation. cameto power were unprepared for assistingRussia’s an ambitiousprogram to launch EuropeanandU.S.to Western leaders,however, adviceandinfluence. West, particularly responsive the madethem with which ing integration communityandbeyond. In addition,Yeltsinern andhisteam were seek West institutionsandon economicassistancefromthe tional financial 1990s, beginning. Inthe at leastthe Russia wasdependenton interna state buildingin Russia. in 1991 newregime and of the principles – to the on elite agreement were obstacles –atleastnot there noinsurmountable Beyond that, Russia’s for in 1991–93. transformation chances undermined that gress power game. Itwasthis betweenof the struggle Yeltsin Con andthe newrules neously to the consensuson build anewstate whilereaching became impossible for simulta dominance.It thus a dramatic struggle The elite’s copycatThe elite’s hindrance. In its attempts democracyisanother now? The answerWhy sodifficult ismanifold istransformation and allWestern leadersmadetwoIn truth, First,relied grave they errors: The West couldhave in developments madea difference in Russia, WestThe New the and Russia ------

16 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles dictable exercise. task ofbuildinganewpoliticalsystem a morefraughtandunprethe couldguarantee socialcoherencemakes that mechanisms and other moralcode” of a “deeply engrained lack Russia,In contemporary the andcommunitylife.” basis for strongsocialstructures isthe that moralcode butarounda deeply engrained around individualrights, essential coherence.” In hisview, Asiandemocracy couldbebuilt“not society to causingthe lose its without of political-institutional forms ism …couldbejettisoned relatively a variety easily andreplacedwith Asia, Francis Fukuyama wrote “traditionalpoliticalConfucian that of Southeast liberal-democratic transformation the In considering it would be,say, Asiancountries. Southeast for Chinaorfor certain to pursue anti-Western goals. Westin indecision whilecoopting the West’s andusingthe resources willallow endlessly that Russia a niche to andhopesto drift find crisis to postpone anexistential political classseeks the matic andrevanchist, Soviet collapse ofthe Union. the Simultaneously aroseafter dog that order status quo international force by the demandinga revisionofthe Russian attempt technique elite of the isthe The latest to survival rein classto leave ruling pastbehind. inabilityof the pointto the they a Medvedev “thaw.” ists dreamingof restoration andto moderates andliberalshopingfor to appealsboth traditional that acts outa “goodcop–badcop”script Presidentandnow–Prime Ministerand former VladimirPutin skillfully Westthe Medvedev tandemof PresidentDmitri in general. The ruling ing Europeanculture,itspoliticalsystem remainsaliento Europe and policies. Even of Europeandasshar asRussia regardsitselfaspart West, the while openly opposingWestern with allthe to a partnership asdemocracy.to disguise authoritarianism Abroad,Russia lays claim clear. isa desire Itspresentisfullof incompatibilities. Athome,there between Itsfuturedirectionisun epochs. civilizationsandhistorical again beingusedto justify personalizedpower. image Russia of hand, andthe asa “besieged other, fortress,” on the are anda specialdestiny.glory Daydreams being asuperpower, of one on the to foster Russia isfated massphobiasandneuroses,insistingthat for one moreobstacleto Russia’s emancipation.The politicalclasscontinues The continuingclaimtoRussia’s great-power modernization. statusis impression of an economicsuccessstory,the butin realityitprevents andmayThe commodity factor create Russian keeps economy the afloat freedom. For those observers whosee Russianin freedom. For development observers those Russia isincapableof living that times taken asconfirmation the liberalanddemocraticprojectissome The failureof the forIt may Russia well to Westernize bemoredifficult itself than Exercises in imitationarepresented aspragmatism.Butin reality, Russia seemsto be unableto stuck move orbackward, forward - 5

- (January 1995):(January 12. Journal of Democracy of Primacy “The - 5 - - - Francis Fukuyama, - - Culture,” 6

17 What’s the Matter with Russia? authoritarianism. prefer liberaldemocracy to they authoritarianism. respondents say that Westpeople in the enjoy. Today, between 62 and 68percentRussian of personal well-beingand burdensomestate the that andto experience tothemselves be Europeans.Theyincreasingly of acorrupt longto be rid to move toward Theyalreadyconsider Europeanstandardsandnorms. into account.The peopleofRussia are,however, increasingly ready incapable of comingtogether to regime to interests force take the their arestillpoliticallyability to of law; inactive follow they andseem rule the Russians ortheir should not overstate of ordinary political maturity the losingpower unreadinesstoelite’s risk political competition. through We Russian early the hasmoretoproject in the do with twenty-first century cause society wasnot yet defeat readyfor of Russia’s freedom,the liberal lifeprolonged ishistorically doomed. of asystem the that of oil.Together, high price the two these factors may have artificially Yeltsin wasmadepossibleonly pain ofthe return by the and reforms whose Medvedev-Putin last gaspofanauthoritarianism diarchy isthe West. of the of the those We period els matching the that may find – not upto merely rise Soviet back dards that levels, butinstead to lev able to provide whatsociety demandsof it: stabilityandlivingstan next stageto mightbe. what the to explain newaspectsofRussian life ortoinsufficient provide a clueas to tradition, mentality, are andculturetend to butthey be instructive, context. Attempts to understand Russia’s reference developments with level timeitdoessoata different cycles, andin a newhistorical buteach aimed to keep society entirely its straitjacketed. experiences Russia thus regime autonomy whenthe communistperiod, in comparison to the to seek itsown social advancein right salvation,isa significant it the to seize power.”you please,justdon’ttry Leaving society alone,giving own devices.The regimeappearsto population, “Doas be telling the towardleaves nevertheless society autocracyis a backsliding to that its for example, time.The Putinrestoration,point; a littlemorefreedomremainseach Successive to restorations its starting have country not the returned society toward driving openness. forward, greater Russia a littlefurther successive appearsto be. Each liberalizationmoves it often though dulum swingingbetween norisitcircular, andcounterreform; reform of apen is morecomplicated. path doesnot Russian tracethe history conclusion,butreality that My own mightseemto narrative confirm autocratic path. fromthe tocracy shoulditdepart andfacingonly ruin a fatalisticviewofRussia asdoomedto au explanations reflect of these mill. Both fority to itssystem the transform of governance isbutgrist inabil country’s the constant replicationof a traditionalmatrix, the as cyclical – fromliberalizationto again – oras restoration andback the early be If liberaltrendswere in the twentieth cutshort century Russian politicalregimewillbeun The timeiscomingwhenthe

has not taken Russia to entirely Soviet back days. Rather, it ------

18 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles minded Russia trappedin astate of decay isnot historically sustainable. nation androt, – animperially state collapse,or a liberalbreakthrough clear civilizationaldimension.Whatever Russia pursues –stag scenario andan un would a newgeographical configuration bea Russia with state. The result unraveling current the of the bring maywhich in turn lawyer,” “hour ofthe once againmissthe anda newcycle willbegin, is justaslikely happen,Russia will to screws. Shouldthat tighten the regime toward the crisis, a liberalizingexit.Infact,inrespondingto the in 2008 hasyet to hit Russia severely enoughto elite force to the move of law. old state rule intorequires the the onebasedon transforming survival Even their Russia’s to second-tierelite understand that isstarting global economic crisis that began that global economiccrisis to some predictions,the Contrary - -

19 What’s the Matter with Russia? Russia is Awakening: Will It Implode or Transform? Lilia Shevtsova / Diplomaatia, Special edition, May 2012

Putin’s return to the Kremlin will act as a powerful accelerator of revolutionary events, if only because his leadership means that the regime will not allow regime change. Have you ever seen how a tsunami begins? The first wave comes slowly and subsides, then another one dies in the sand, and another one… until, after a treacherous lull, the water rises high and crushes everything in its way. This is what Russia may have in store – the country has passed the fork before which other options might have been (at least, theoretically) feasible. Russia has once again failed to find a graceful exit from its centuries-long wanderings in the dark and is instead rushing along a familiar path of fury, rebellion, and revenge. Putin’s return to the Kremlin and the ruling team’s arrogant demonstration that they are prepared to rule indefinitely have buried all hopes of a velvet reform from the top, leaving Russia only one solution – pressure from below. Revolution has always been Russia’s way of cleansing the scene for another cycle of personalized power, each time in a more ruthless and predatory form. It is still unclear this time whether Russia can free itself from its historical trap and find another way out of its predicament. There is one certainty at least – the personalized power system is in decline. But many questions remain unanswered: will the agony end with rot that will sap the life of generations to come? Or will it implode? Will an alternative be found before the Russian Matrix collapses, or after it starts to disintegrate? And what price will Russians have to pay for the end of a phenomenon that has failed to bow out gracefully?

Victory or defeat?

For the time being the Russian chattering classes are engaged in more down to earth discussions. “Who won and who lost?” is the question that Russians continue to debate after the apparent ebbing of December’s tide of protest. The opposition community has trium- phantly claimed that the December Movement changed the country naïve look by makingthem authorities, the table with vitation to sit atthe ness; secondly, opposition memberswhoaccept to an in discredit the Western Obamaandother to awkward dine with them leaderswithout Kremlinbosses,makingitpossiblefora more civilizedimage of the This accessissupposedto goals:firstly, accomplish three to create talkshows. in carefully (andalways orchestrated taped)politicalTV presidentialandgovernmentto “councils”orto sit onthe take part society whohave beenallowed president, to attend the meetings with oppositionandcivil Kremlin, ofcourse)representatives(by the of the politicalandmediaarena,butonly of accessto forform the selected naturally, a presidential“filter.” comeswith this, “direct”electionof governors, law although on the of the form in the Kremlin from the opposition canenjoy gift amongthe another ochists same timekeep mas undertightcontrol.Meanwhile, everyone the the better) morethe andat – allowbe congratulated access(the everyone gun? JusticeMinistry‘s sights ofthe the micewithin party political arenawhilekeeping allthe bustle of the hustle and the Kremlin takes pleasurein watching the The fact that So whatshouldwe as Ilistened fanfares? to rejoicein,Ithought the andeven madeitmoreeffective. rule for arbitrary machinery intact the of electorallow formation blocs.The executive the hasretained branch to destroy underany any pretext, party Kremlin’s refusalto al andthe ability Justice Ministry’s the by permit, registrationof parties of the form The regimeisstillprotected in the of small fish. by castironbarricades Duma doencourageby politicalcompetition the – butamongdozens tion? Butbetween law approved party whom?The amendmentsto the canchange. Create Kremlin’s “liberalizationpackage” competiwhat the has beennorepression!Onwards toward futureconquests!”. leaders arebeingallowed television. onto Andmostimportantly: there the has beeninvited president andopposition the to in meetings take with part “Stop euphoria: opposition cannot urge, whining,” containtheir “the they conveningdiscussing the of aConstitutionalAssembly.” Someoptimists promisingto hold directelectionsforon political parties, governors, and liver say, liberalization.“Look,” they Kremlinisadopting legislation “the regime to rallies willforce de the pressurefromthe are readyto argue that Kremlin to to forever. stay the turned there gloomy, protests failure;Putinhasre the endedwith believingthat willbeforced down, majority to is back butthe authorities the and that regime. the sphere to into serve the authorities) the “adaptants” –people readyto by adapt gameoffered to of the any rules optimists sides.The optimists argumentsof both Let uslookatthe Who isright? the supposed thaw turned outto be ameasured turned supposedthaw evidenceof the Other should The Kremlinspindoctors whosuggested elegantruse this me.Icannot understand I have reactionbaffles this to admit that orlightweight; andthirdly, (whoIcall newconformists to bring ------

21 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? soon start to demonstrate Kremlin cannotsoon start moretoughness allow – the will authorities arsenal andthe state’s in the measures of influence areother For Kremlin’spromises, there whodon’tbelieve in the those promisesof liberalization. citizen” with “angry discontent of the the team decidedto ruling alleviate eve of Putin’sinauguration,the on the awakeningto the society. application: in Itisallaboutflexibility will have fewer authorities. the pretexts with for seekingfriendship ready to Medvedev, be tougher andlessambivalentthan opposition the Hopefully,have Kremlin, in the truth. yet Putinback this to with learn disappointments delayed; Russian oppositionandprotest the leaders hasprovedhopes. Meanwhile, hopesaremerely politicalhistory that byhopes willhave inciting survives beena successfor a regimethat target case, these and makingyourself the isthe of policebatons. Ifthis by streets takingto table than the change bysuch sittingaroundthe weakness andarereadyto embark on change. Anditisbetter to achieve haveprotesters own sensedtheir may authorities really the believe that protest energy behindthe willevaporate. time andthe next kitchens willstay in their they Otherwise, achieved something. people whotook streets to actually the the at leastsomeevidencethat DecemberMovement, isa naturaldesiretodemand of the find there regime hasnot met Kremlin. Inasituationwherethe a single the why have some of them beenwillingto enter into a dialoguewith test and movement for enthusiasm, grounds to have find beentrying aid ofcorruption? to the replicate itselfwith regime isonly able be,whenthe canthere againstcorruption of fight Itwould behardto whatkind corruption. be moreperplexed: fighting madam looked on. of innocence,asthe preservation el on the looked in abroth like they impression virgins,lecturing that dismiss the televisionlarge hasbeenunderstandable.Butonecouldhardly through protest out”to desiretoThe opposition andthe society leaders’ “reach at bazaar, same!” “Well, areallthe audience perplexed: leaving they the in somekindoffree-for-all opposition into participants the lessly turned Television, in return. nothing itsskilledpropagandists,haseffort with regime, butgiving moreliberalimagepossible!) creatinga much of the wouldwould a thing be have such timeagothat imaginedeven a short Medvedev listening attentively rally to leadersathisresidence(who the showed channels Dmitri TV have of winning.Theofficial nochance and allowed onto regime to wherethey itsplaying lure them the field, game Kremlin’s opponentshave toof the authorities’ play agreed the opposition in its embraces–hasbeenworking.to suffocate the Some authorities’ “all-enveloping”So far, –itsattempt approach authorities’ the the Russianresponse regime’s new in the isnothing In fact,there and oppositionfigures some of the Besides, Icanimaginethat pro Itisclearwhy oppositionandthe somerepresentatives of the Kremlin’s“embracing”tacticshasbeen exampleAnother of the - - -

22 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the institutional elements institutionalelements existence of the the population, coupled with of the elites and in broadsections ruling mindset of the mentality in the on budget handouts. depends socialbasethat paternalistically oriented of the support tee the sian nationalinterests. The petro-state resources to guaran stillhasthe to itsparasiticlifestyle for emerge, andtotal Rus with concern of lack hasallowed class on commoditiesthat rentier ruling the country of the future trajectory. Russian petro-state dependency isthe – the The first willdefinitely havelight several impacts that farreaching on Russia’s couldacquire a broadsocialbase. cal alternative that of aconsolidated politi lack leaders;andthe andtheir position groups op amongthe squabbles state; andinfighting hopeto the the ing with populistexpectations,still look people’s demoralization of society; the Russian statusquomaintaining the arewell known: deep-reaching the on for time.The key an indefinite economicandpoliticalconditionsfor system limpingsituation andcouldkeep Putin’sregimeandthe both to calm himdown. Butin Russia impressions canbedeceptive. patient seemsreadyto allow the hiskeepers moment, though, At the aroundhim. may hewilldestroy becomesoagitated that everything him. Butheisbecomingmoreandrestless.Andatsomepoint to silence him–ifcajolingrushed arereadyto willnot shackle helpthey where he has been kept for years, and tangled. His keepersdrugged have system hepersonalizes. Putin’sregimeandthe both for itisbecomingmoredestructive for itsarticulation, legal channels in society anger hasgrown, andwithout andfrustration dwindled, the reality. wave paradoxes the of protest Oneof the although has isthat andwhitewrong too viewdoesnot – ablack Russian make sensein the Theyare hasendedin failure areright? test movement century of the to crumble. could start itspoweralization couldonly disrupt house ofcards andthe vertical know Russianthey too system: well nature ofthe any the realliber Sovietand the lesson and elite fell the out.Putin’steam haslearned Soviet window of the Unionperience openedthe too far – Gorbachev to go on.Today’s liberal carnival this ex rememberthe Russian rulers the Russian state: functioning of the current empire former in the of the unitarian character of character unitarian The secondpowerful leftovers neo-imperial hindrance isthe of the factors arewellOther known by Iwould allRussia high observers. There aremany continueto Russian factors mitigate that the The patientmay have woken, buthecannot yet leave hospital the A political Not funeral? yet! Russian pro first the whosay that those mean that Does allof this the Russian the “Federation;” the stubborn attemptsstubborn ------

23 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? reform and modernization. andmodernization. whole ideaofreform of the mistrustful public morecynical and a nonliberal reality only made the liberal rhetoric set against authorities’ Meanwhile, the court. of the same timebeingpart look liberalwhileatthe hopefuls hopehelpedthe beginning,butthis very the out to myth. True, be justanother wasapparentfrom this Medvedev’sbecame animated presidency, during turned help of intellectuals? voluntary the re-emerged underliberalsloganswith rule 1990sof the new version of Russian whenthe personalized states legacy highquality”?) managed orthe to demonstrate “sufficient Balticwhy have new Europeanelites andpolitical classin the then the al elite remainto lingering legacyof Communism(but be analyzed: the intellectu demoralization of the The reasonsfor the and Linzdescribe. Schumpetercal class,” of whatboth by plain antithesis andlarge, isthe er, irrespectively of consequences.” pursuingthem mitment to … valuesorgoalsrelevantfor collectivity, howev without, quality means,JuanLinzmentionsamongseveral com indicators, “the highquality.”cal life and“shouldbeof sufficient in broaderpoliti people whotake part is,the of politics,”material that Schumpeter “humanof civilizational change. JosephA. calleditthe engine hasalways beenthe that minority” “thinking tual class.Itisthe “one nation.” the Russian-Ukrainian to “brotherhood” talk aboutUkraine,the and start Today, however, even Russian liberalsstop beingliberalswhenthey to build arealFederation end ofRussian neo-imperialism. willbethe stateselite other andisready proves ithasnoambitionto influence Russian The momentthe for survival. asitfights Russian Matrix of the logic hasalways beenthe policy abroadcouldincrease –atleastthis statistandneo-imperialist weakness a moreassertive internal through to regimehasstarted wane, itsdesireto compensateence of the for its mer. domestic influ I would a situationwhenthe in even argue that blood vessels for latter for beingthe the the and areasof influence, power great a desiretocannot preserve status reproduceitselfwithout Russian elite the haserasedimperialist longingfromitsmind. mean that instead morepragmaticmeansto to pursue itsagenda, find doesnot not in any idea ofSoviet casebeableto pursue the restoration, andtries Kremlin isnotasian Union readyandwould the (for what?).The factthat Eur Soviet Finlandization former building ofthe the of the space;andthe about NATO attempts expansionandthe to world force the with to agree laments Georgia;the hot warwith the UkraineandBelarus; wars” with Kremlinto continue talkingaboutits“areasofinterest;” “gas of the the personalized powerThere isonly the onereasonfor this: system The liberals’ hopesfor fromabove, reform The liberals’ which Russian intellec role andmentalityofthe factor isthe The third 1 Explaining what this Explainingwhatthis 2 The Russian “politi Press, 1997), p.421. Cambridge University Hadenius (Cambridge: tory andCrisis racy,” in and Future of Democ Victory Thoughts on the 1947), pp.290-291. andBrothers, Harper Democracy Capitalism, Socialism 2 1 JuanJ.Linz,“Some Joseph Schumpeter,A. - - - Democracy - (New York: - - - - - , ed.Axel

Vic

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24 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles West What doyou expectthe ing rubbish! to do– isolate Russia? Stop I would expectmy Western colleaguesto say: “Comeon!You aretalk toward Kremlin canbeheardfrom Russian liberalsanddemocrats. the of Western time,openlycal regime.For harshcriticism first policy the Russian oreven politi an openappeasementof the connivance with of Western isviewed Kremlin,which respectto as governments the with a blow to pro-Western policy moodsin Russia,morethe andmuch “malaise.” sonalized power Western system. Partly, current result ofthe isthe this alternative Russian to a per population,haslostitsroleasthe of the Westof the in helpingtraditionalRussia to survive. less divisive postures,as“radicals”or“idealists.” role The factor isthe issueareviewed to community, raise this bytried the prefers which to Thosewhohave guess, arereadytofor start. reasonsnot difficult regretfully,sis that, Russian liberalsnorWestern neither observers, state.itself in any kindof orderorbecomeamodern Caucasus as itis,Russia cannot get North the remains unresolved. With Caucasusproblem North Russia cannot solongasthe that transform itshold on power.izes orstrengthens iscleartoday that is Onething regime liberal ispresentnomatter the whether pieces couldfallapart seeds ofself-destruction. tains the surelya regional andeven con a construction a globalleader; such “paying same timepositioningitselfas to tribute” Chechnya, andatthe goesagainstallcommonsense,canlast: Russia which isconstruction, sanctioned anti-constitutionalcoup.Itishardto this believe that atrophy. The dictatorship Chechnya in amountsto Kremlin- of a form process ofstate the reflects regimesthere local sultansestablishtheir Russian fragility. state’s dence of the The Kremlin’swillingnessto let Caucasusis evi Kremlin pays North tothe “pacify” Chechnya andthe The price process ofdisintegration. state andhasalreadytriggered the Russian the undermines ity, that Kremlin’s policyof survival itisthe a development. opponentsarereadyfor such In real regime’s even the status quo upsetting couldleadto state the another collapse.Notthat public sectionsof the widespread fear amongvarious isthe tarianism radation of Russian politics. shadow deg old leaderin the of animitationone,butdeepenedthe the hasnot only cal plots that helpedto in recentRussian preserve history mostcyni resultsof Medvedev’s presidency:oneof the This isoneof the so irresponsible or so irresponsible trading ornegotiating nuclearweapons cuts?”Of course,not – Iamnot The fourth factor life helpingto of Russian prolong the authori The fourth However, hasdelivered recent Western that itislessthe crisis For Western part starters, eyes of asignificant civilization,in the analy factor serious isa phenomenonrequiring andfinal The fifth fromincompatible a state constructed civilizational that The risk naïve liberal critics liberal critics . The Russian oppositionandthe ------

25 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? Western world. the distorts viewof the but tomythology not Russian only survive Matrix helpsthe shape ofapost-Western(!) in negotiating the order.” and Moscow couldbecome“aparticularly usefularbiter between Western the orderandwhatever comesnext(!)” Russia maythat be“uniquely poised to help buildbridges Russianfor regime.Thus,Charles the believes Kupchan Western haveOther observers plans even moregrandiose of thought.” school modernization-democratization the mostprominentspokesmanabout Medvedev for as“the astute Western fell victimto. observers Brzezinskiwrote Medvedev even would president,which bea reforming mythology. hope that The mostpopularhasbeenthe whatresults? lastyears, butwith these policy throughout only, have beenattempting authorities the to pursue this for fairpresidentialelections? change, why with didhenot start would Besides,ifPutinreally have isready politicalhara-kiri. to perform andopenitto fair andhonestcompetition. degradation, They country’s to renounce itsmonopoly on power, main sourceofthe isthe which more effective. For to transformation succeed, Putin’steam would have needed. Russia not to autocracy needstransformation, reform, make the ized power system, andnot simply is a change of course andregime,that personal of circumstances, butinRussia’s caseitisa change fromthe Certainly, pressure previouscourseunderthe leaderscanchange their transformer,to become the why didhenot Russia transform earlier? would insist. True, can’tanswer question: ifPutinwasdestined they the fans ofRussia’s pressure oftough personalizedpower reality!”the the andiscapableof dexterouscould becomea reformer management under even ifheisunwilling hasto “Putinstill andtherefore be supported. society, within outreform, “new” Putin2.0willbeforced to the carry regime.Today current the mood pressure ofthe argue,underthe they sian elite andintellectual circlesto build newhopesfor change within who would pursueit,andpowerful interests Rus force entrenched the sponsible for politicalcrackdown. re Russian state control ofthe official “civil societies” underthe the dialogue between Kremlin, the by sham offered the to in that take part Obama administration No onecoercesthe a tacticaltrade-off. than itisnot rather – asastrategic“reset” that breakthrough assomething erly embracesof Kremlinleaders.Western leaderscanavoid presenting West Russia, the relationswith broth trade orsecurity canescapethe isan agenda formocracy andfreedom –this Russians. Butin pursuing Westof the donot expectWestern governments for to Russian fight de The West hasmadeitsown to Russian contribution economicarea in the idea ofmodernization As for the of anewstrategyFears andactors lack of imminent collapse,the 4 This 3 sity Press,2012), p.111. (Oxford: Oxford Univer the ComingGlobal Turn West, theRisingRest,and No One’sWorld:The 2012)Books, p.146. Power and theCrisisofGlobal Strategic Vision:America Zbigniew Brzezinski, tance ofsharedvalues,” impor toindifferent the Russia’s resourceswhile anxious to capitalize on politicians), some former men (not to mention Europeanbusiness ern West bypede driven the “commercial stam of the existenceadmitted the 4 3 Charles Kupchan, A. ZbigniewBrzezinski (New York: Basic ------

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26 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles same time, this same time,this Butatthe assets to ithasgathered. the rights regime morerepressive,sion makes asitdefends the its decline.Thisobses regime’s factoranother speeding upthe agencies security – is especially amongpeoplefromthe incarnate. state abyss they the the regimesare not onlySuch butwillalsopullinto doomedthemselves interests atany corporatist price. – pursuingtheir onepurpose serve bureaucrats turned officers The Russian service Praetorian security Arabstates. of the institutionalarrangements army’s roleinthe the lands, in modernizing for imposing a scenario orderon civilchaos defines Realism, which Praetorian either own in commonwith regime. Thisregimehasnothing agencies havecurity not undercivilcontrol,butthey establishedtheir genes. Russia’s timein Forin their history, first the not se only arethe Theyhave orarecloseto them. repression special services from the forcement of peoplewhohave agencies, butismadeupprimarily come forget andlaw onefact: Putin’sregimereliesnot en security only on the of degradation. butarenot readyto see Russia toauthorities, return a Brezhnevtype hadbeensubmissive regimeeven to that by the tion of the socialgroups rejec of anger growth andthe Kremlinmeansthe toPutin’s return the stability. undermining butto further takechoice streets, to thus the interests leaves population canexpressitsvarious no the peoplewith which through of channels lack calm,butthe tions ensurean external proved how fragile“petro-stability” canbe.Tame, obedientinstitu ability, axiom. TheArabrevolutions doesnot 2011 of change the have Arabworldin the (for instance,SaudiArabia)demonstrate surviv somepetro-states commoditiesboombegan.The factthat before their petro-states didnot hasbefallenother manage that that to democratize system’saccelerates decay. the of decline same pattern the Russia fits cal) to justify itscontinuation.Thecommodities-basedeconomy also orideologi inheritance-based (inparticular mechanisms has noother legitimacy ofaregimethat Putin system erodethe of the trademarks 2011-2012 the asduring cratic institutions,such became elections,that itself.The Kremlin’sblatantmanipulationofdemo ods, isundermining system, in attemptingthe newchallenges usingoldmeth to deal with ToynbeeArnold hasgoneinto action: as“suicidalstatecraft” defined arenow that tem mechanism acceleratingitsdecline.The to stay afloat system, as corrupt security agencies lose their agencies security losetheir system, ascorrupt the dermines un repressive state’s machinery “commercialization” of the variables that have Russian that sys sofarhelpedthe variables Meanwhile, the statecraft Suicidal – – personal enrichment obsessionwith The authorities’ Russian system’s on the futurewe shouldnot In ourreflections 5 or Matrix Realism, but shares similarities with with Realism, butsharessimilarities orMatrix - - 2011. can Interest, “Army Guys,” and ClementM.Henry Interest, Egypt,” “Political Orderin 6 5 Robert Springborg Springborg Robert Francis Fukuyama, - - 6

The American May-June 2011. - - - - - May-June - - The Ameri -

27 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? gime nolonger works, andSkolkovo unlikely itselflooks re the old modelfor perpetuating the that vo only confirms tempt zone”in Skolko to establish aclosed“modernization requires a freesociety andfreeindividuals.The pitifulat potential. use of new generation technology Spreadingthe continuityandmonopoly hasalsoexhaustedgime’s its displays of grandeur.tion through popula typical logicofdictatorships, mobilizingthe ing the commitments. The KremlinunderPutinisfollowon such million peoplelivingbelow poverty linewould the take 22,9 with end. No responsiblegovernment in acountry World system hasentered the a dead Cup,isalsoa signthat Olympics soccer Sochi APECsummitandthe tothe the in mass extortion. andlaw enforcement agencies, engage authorities which the But even itstillcannot protect whenitplays rules by itselffrom the hostage system to andcanexistonly the ifitplays system’s by rules. the Putinera.Businesshasbecome would end ofthe be perceived asthe on power,of his total grip release Putincannot now their releasethem: plains why, having madeKhodorkovsky andLebedeva demonstration wielda stronghand!Thisex system’s fundamentalprinciples: of the system stage into ispushingthe decay. of itsfinal cies atitsservice agen andthe punity. between authorities the Thismutualbackscratching loyalty, for in return their ciple that itareguaranteed im whoserve those fundamentalprin Kremlin hasbuiltandwould regime’s the violate the power cleanout of personnelwouldthe edifice undermine vertical any that butrather andneedto dispel suspicionsagainstthem, crime areimplicated andevery in each authorities the reputation? Itisnot that own Magnitsky case,evengered regime’s attremendouscostto in the the perpetrators clearly stables?Whysave rank andfile fin their dothey the not clear of Putin’sRussia. key Why authorities characteristic the canthe law hasbecome agencies enforcementbusiness, andthe andsecurity that toto replace them. build anewinfrastructure post-communist regimeshave for use,whilethe noting unfit managed Soviet fromthe inherited eraarecollapsing,exploding,andbecom planes, trains,ships,mines,roads,andindustry USSR,to butthe the Russia today Itisironicthat thanks looming crisis. continuesto survive began to get involved in commerceandtrade). Ottoman andJanissaries Empire andthe Spartans fellSparta whenthe ability to effectively examples protect historical areillustrative: it(the the signof the The collapseof Soviet isanother infrastructure technical The useof Western re to technology help ensurethe passionfor costly megaprojects,from The authorities’ The Khodorkovsky andLebedevcasedemonstrates another of crime, intertwining isthe of degradation confirmation Another 8

------economy. to buildaneffective makes itimpossiblethis a businessperson)and is in sixpeopleprison businessperson, andone people indetention isa dent sourcesoneinthree (according to indepen feature oftoday’s Russia become adistinguishing against businesshas game. the Westernto of the rules Japanese abilityto adapt ness butfor onefact: the favor ofJapaneseunique been anargumentin restoration couldhave Meiji the samurai during 8 7 Theuseofforce Thesuccessofthe - -

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28 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the personalizedpower end ofthe the system, istoo early to say. regimeonly, end ofthe rative itwillbethe hasbegun.Butwhether or last chapter in Putin’snar to broader violence,itwillmeanthe turns Kremlin system. foundations Whenthe of the very in the cracks also the but of confidence, not lack only masks their of force, which threat the increasingrelianceon force, or authorities’ out. Onecanpredictthe change. logic ofpersonalizedpower the ship meansthat willnot allow regime events, accelerator ifonly of revolutionary erful becausehisleader – frombelow.way isleft Kremlinwillactasa pow to Putin’sreturn the fromabove. leader wantsitto) itselfgradually reform the So,only one to dramatic developmentsto keep ahead. country playing, doomingthe tin’s power team hasdecidedto ruling stake allithasand shows the that Russia’sin recent years elite. cannot The latest butworry roundof Pu have lostorwere either forced into a desperate power defense of their lives. who canstep for down The fate fearing their they rulers of without ly makes defended itimpossible andthis whoholditto for feel those sure inability to govern a freesociety. Amonopoly on power mustbeconstant andits to secure alifelong of confidence monopoly area signofitslack elite) isfreecompetition. of the team’sthat The Russian attempts ruling (including humanity hasdeveloped sofarto ensure continuedsurvival viable, butisalsosetting a trapfor itself.The mosteffective meansthat butitislosingitsresilience. can survive for itsown outside world. populationandthe still The Russian Matrix andbecomingdangerous threats organization respondingto imaginary into an inadequate turning Itrisks andbecomingrigid. ing itsflexibility The system, seenuntilrecently asa highly islos adaptable mechanism, column.” ange “fifth revolution” Motherland anddefend fromthe the “Or at homeof any the potential to fight opposition,whilepreparing attempting to stage keep the controlof Russia’s neighbors,andclearing Doctrine), a nuclearwar(seeRussia’s or evenclear strike Military fight The Russianto elite them. isbattlingNATO, to counter preparing a nu by creatingphantom challenges and imitatingresponses country in the role played by its“godfather,” Medvedev. to knows hollow have of successnow everyone the chance that much news that Putin wasseeking news that showed atthe enthusiasm noparticular RussianMeanwhile, elite the attempts to maintain balance Meanwhile, society. discontent isspreading through The public what? then and Crisis Anyway, agony to hasalready started logic of the work the itsway isquiteOne thing obvious:a system of autocracy cannot (even if makes classisnot society Russia’s it only of allthat ruling depriving ------

29 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? rity andwellbeingrity of itspopulation. Itcannot even secure challenges. Itisnotexternal ableto secu guarantee the state society’s authorities. alienationfromthe reflects electionsareunfair. that expressed certainty 1990s,now in the halfof respondents than and more than leadership country’s in the andcorruption are morethieves there that widened over last decade,52percentthink the gap between andpoorhas the rich that spondents think enforcement agencies asa hostileforce. 73percentof re representmillionsof people. in reality they may looksmall,but Thesefigures ing to in them. take part mass protests asa possibility, andonly 21percentarewill apparent calm.Only 25percentof respondents regard to country’s open protest mainreasonsfor the isoneof the willingness to turn endure andto than look for ways rather to survive “life51 percentof respondentssay ishardbutbearable.” that gainedover have last years,believe than although they the lostrather increased orstayed level. atitsformer Almosthalfof respondents in Russia has corruption that Around 82percentof respondentsthink for Putin’sneo-imperial course). publicsupport policy (reflecting exception the situation hasworsened of foreignthe in allareas,with situation inmany areasof life. the that MostRussianswith think of democratic freedom.” foundation “society shouldbebuilton the view that dents take the concentrated in onepairofstronghands,” while59percentof respon “power that Only 33percentof respondentsthink shouldbeprinciples. areshowing systemthey an ever anditsbasic clearerrejectionof the and histeam know problems. how to country’s solve the weak andincompetent people”and only Putin 23percentbelieve that interests or abouttheir peoplewho“arethinking aseither view them respondents no illusionsaboutPutinandhisregime –59percentofthe general policycourseshows peoplehave country’s that ment andthe of Putin’sgovern criticism mightensue.Buttheir that chaos the fearing arenot readytonomic problems,they let Putin’sratingtake a tumble, dency – andsolongaspeoplearenot yet ableto own solve their eco presi – the country isonly onerealinstitutionin the there realize that “Teflon president”phenomenoncanbeexplained:peoplein Russiathis lar feelings aboutit”(3percentdidnot know). were had“noparticu idea, and41 percentsaidthey not the happy with base),20percent coresupport Putin regime’s people make upthe (these 31 respondents approved percentof move in office: of the a new term Putin’s personal popularity ratingstillremainsrelativelyPutin’s personalpopularity high,but The Russian system cannot domestic and meet the andlaw stateThe publicperceive anditssecurity the Russian publicarenotIf the of Putinhimself, increasingly weary 11 People areshowing increasingdiscontent 13 9 this Allof this 10 - - - rossii. ru/18-10-2011/krizis-v- rossii. ru/18-10-2011/krizis-v- demokratii-v-strane. oluchii-naseleniya-i- ru/10-08-2011/o-blagop rym-prinadlezhit-vlast. rezhime-i-lyudyakh-koto yane-o-politicheskom- ru/03-04-2012/rossi putin-i-ego-tretii-srok. ru/07-10-2011/vladimir- 12 13 12 11 10 9 http://www.levada. This http://www.levada. http://www.levada. http://www.levada. http://www.levada. ------

30 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles not only a challenge for itssociety world butfor the aswell. a peacefulexitsolution.Thismakes political forces Russia canfind the agony faster system’s than isapproaching death Whatever case, the the cannot beexcluded. personalizedsystem in newpackaging eration of the abouta repeatof1991and publicdiscontent couldbring regen andthe The oldsystem’s spontaneouscollapse on liberal-democratic principles. to system build arealalternative before openly the disintegrates. sition activity. Russia willnot situationitispossiblethat manage In this constantly clamp down authorities on ordiscreditanythe signof oppo processmighthavepeople, butitishardto see whatprospectsthis when level intelligentsia, innovation-linked of the andyoung business, parts have yet to emerge. actors In theory, couldemerge such frommid- process political andsocialactors this readytoambitions. Butthe start sonalized power, of power integration the andbusiness,imperial geographical format. itscurrent in preserving prevails(includingliberalization),Russia willhavescenario problems solutionbutwould andrevenge. only turmoil deferrary Whatever the couldbea tempo to situation by mass repression,which turning the of protractedenter elite a period rot, willattempt oritsruling to freeze Russia chance, willeither opposition failstoto use this fragment. Ifthe for a politicalalternative establishment to emerge ruling andfor the willprovide Buta crisis a chance politicalandsocialcrisis. proaching end. system itwilldefend untilthe the meansthat which or friends, to pass itspositionsto its children establishmentisbusytrying ruling the contrary, areon,butunableto change it.Onthe they cidal path sui elite understandsthe a failure hastaken ruling place.In Russia the inabilitytoto perceive change outmodedinstitutionsbutalsotheir that elite: not failure ofthe simply signof decay inability isthe first their the sentatives prefer to outsideRussia. “goldenparachutes” store their explainswhy class,which itsnumerousrepre interests of itsruling the the Russian elite. cynicism ofthe Usually by the One canonly bestruck This would complicate greatly any attempts to based set newrules The only way to of Russia per transform isto old triad eliminate the Russia ap hasnomeansortimeto means that escape the All this ------

31 Russia is awakening: will it implode or transform? Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, March-April 2012

December 2011 will be remembered as a tumultuous month in Rus- sia, if not a seminal one. Observers both Russian and foreign were surprised by the December 4 Duma election, in which United Russia failed to muster 50 percent of the vote despite significant ballot box stuffing and voter fraud. More importantly, in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and dozens of other cities across the country, massive post-election protests caught most people – including Russia’s leadership – completely off-guard. Perhaps we should not have been so surprised. For several years, Russia has been stagnating, at least politically, and in turn the political system has degraded and society has become demoralized. Vladimir Putin, representing the antithesis of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, raised hopes for many Russians of a more stable and secure future. Indeed, most Russians were ready to close the books on the unhappy, chaotic decade of the 1990s. They longed for stability at home and recovery on the world stage, and Putin got credit for delivering both with the help of the second Chechen war and the soaring price of oil. But as Putin prospered from happenstance during his first two terms as President (2000–08), lately he and his own policies and judgments have suffered from it. The economy is stalled, neo-patrimonial corruption is rife, and assaults against human rights and sheer decency are on the rise. Above all, it seems, Putin’s little Potemkin village act with Dmitri Medvedev finally prompted a critical mass of Russians to take umbrage at being manipulated as though they were a bunch of gullible teenagers. When Putin announced on September 24, 2011, that he would reoccupy the presidency in March, according to a deal that had been worked out with Medvedev “several years ago,” that was the last straw. After the September announcement but before the December 4 election, Putin was booed by thousands of spectators at a sporting event. Medvedev became the brunt of jokes on the internet and radio and was widely derided for a staged event at Moscow State University. Weeks before the election, polls showed that large numbers of Russian voters were itching for a chance to voice their displeasure with the party in power. On December 4, they scratched the itch, despite efforts by president, he would have left office properlypresident, he would deemeda reformer. have office left No in 2008,andhadheimplemented while considered revolutionary them would offers have Such and easier registrationfor newparties. been of elected liberalization of electoral governors, legislation, turn the ning of asystemic hislegitimacyfor implosion, good. undermining begin couldbethe that a politicalstorm off couldtouch a Putin “victory” bottom noonecan predict.Even a politicalfreefallthe of which off touch isunlikely presidential election,which but notMarch impossible, could sian democracy, roundof the first in the Putin’sfailureto secure victory internet andsocialmedianowthe playing a novel, wild-cardrolein Rus torate) stillclingto Putin, hisoverall iseroding.With baseof support While large segmentsof society (between elec 30and45percentof the law of (not rule to to speak of its spirit). the immoralandcontrary both elections,toleratedDebauching for years, asbeing isnow characterized components of liberalpoliticalandcivillife:crucial moralityandlaw. active of society. andeducated part most percent.) Putin’sregimenow eyes of the standsdelegitimizedin the (Nationwide, results,United accordingto Russia official obtained49.3 Unitedpendent observers, Russia vote. securedbarely 30 percentofthe cian in Russia – Moscow andSt. Petersburg – where,accordingto inde of any politi survival for two the of the citiescrucial support has lostthe system heerected. Putinandthe He aura ofinvincibility surrounding the movement doesnot punctured fully mood) haspermanently capture the powers-that-be.”the policy promoted andthe by country in the state of affairs the tion with indignationoverto rigged election”and “accumulated their frustra the were they protesting 73percentsaidthat revealed to “give that vent massive protest who attended December24 the in Moscowof those ligentsia, – mobilizedasnever andyouth before. ALevadaCenter poll intel the so-called middleclass,journalists, population– the of the part most politically dynamic a sense ofresignation.Not time,asthe this and presidentialelectionswere general met even indifference, with media attention previousDuma on United during Russia. Similarefforts administrative abuses,andshowering andfavorable disproportionate other perpetrating denying oppositionparties, registrationto certain damage to to by limit the old tricks: resorting authorities nervous removal are.Evening palliatives of Vladislav the they Surkov, “gray the now, promisesseriously one takes these distract for the seeingthem In his final State UnionIn hisfinal re of the address,Medvedev promisedthe End of Illusions Even Russians moreimportant, seemto have rediscovered two itasa middle class class”(to describe The protest of Russia’s “angry ------

33 Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia democratic path even ifPutin andhisassoci willpursue democraticpath a country the strong. Russia’s recentpolitical awakening by nomeansguarantees that a year.economic problemswillbe exhausted within fundsnow beingused to andreserve most acute ameliorate rising, the tension iscollapsing,socialdividesaredeepening, ethnic is structure prosperity, effective governance, orgenuine security. Russia’s infra is rotten coreandincapableof providing to broad-basedeconomic the Russian Russian system regimeanditsleadership.The current of the wething doknow: nature Thereshouldbenomoreillusionsaboutthe plans.But one leadershipitselfhas nodefinite probably becausethat 2012–14 budget isearmarked for defense power andother ministries. expendituresin the out,especially 33percentof the givenbe ruled that doesnot cannot work, crackdown Ifthat scenario the domestic affairs. outsideforces againstmeddlingin Russia’s same timewarning at the of liberalizationwhile path West Kremlin isonthe suade the the that racy’s holdings,selective repression,anda diplomaticcampaign to per doesnot kleptoc endanger imitationliberalizationthat the struments: outa sustainedcrackdown. are reliableenoughto carry services rank-and-file security andthe the in military the about whether arequestionsin anemergency Andthere situationfor a longperiod. resources to maintain power the state lacks the also understandthat United interests in Europeandthe personal andfinancial States. They West,from the especially elite whenmany have individuals amongthe Kremlin needsto avoid the hand, somepointoutthat beingisolated in Moscow, anti-Western this arrival other Onthe confirms approach. new U.S.the Ambassadorto Russia, McFaul, Michael uponhis virtually revolution” in Russia. The state mediacampaign unleashedagainst “enemy”measures, andaccusethe West to instigate a “color of trying desperate to stay in power, screws, employ willtighten the repressive cloak ofdemocracytheater,come the many predict.Putin,even more ticular, will apparatus),a crackdown isinevitable.Off security the stolen aroundhim(inpar gainsforin corrupted, Putinandthose atstake somuch with sia’s imitationdemocracy?Somebelieve that, West Russia in both some wishfulthinkers andthe hadhoped. status quo, not the upendit,as presidency isto to preserve return the so many behindPutin’s Russian eyes. purpose Theyseeclearly the that democracy nolonger works sowell scales have now the fallenfrom that hawkish of imitating tendencies. The Kremlin’stime-honoredgimmick his replacement,Vyacheslav Volodin, isa Putinloyalist known for his appetite hungering for realchange, especiallythe of those given that Kremlin’s presidentialadministrationwillfailtocardinal,” sate fromthe authorities cannolonger effectively manipulate authorities RusWhat ifthe regime is very weak, however, regime isvery If the opposition isnot very the No onecanknow Russian for leadershipwilldo, surewhat the Most likely, combination of a in with Kremlin willexperiment the ------

34 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles has given nosign of genuinely Russian voice people. of the heedingthe shaken, clique, clique, though butthat ruling current the disgust with ballot box the orprotests streets, through have in the either voiced their neighbors by noting how ittreatsitsown people. Millionsof Russians, We truth: cangaugeto an original how a regimeislikely to treat its That isnolonger We possible,oratleastnolonger justifiable. areback Russia wouldsituation in hopesthat genuinely liberalizein duecourse. signsof domesticdeterioration anda declininghumanrights ignoring Kremlin while the engagementcould justifya policyoffriendly with early were the there post-Soviet noalternatives. During one period, Cold War, the During onecouldjustifya policyof simplynot enablers of policiesthat actingasfeckless cannot endwell. ButWesternthemselves. governments have a roleto least by play atthe uisite for realreform. question, disaster for outside,iswhether isa prereq Russians andthose society, of law. rule independentinstitutions,andthe practical The give mustfinally wayturies to empowers a system that Russian civil The monopolistic conception of power hasplaguedRussia for that cen and business,imperial ambitionsbebroken buried. andfinally of personalizedpower, triad the quires that merger between the power of separatism.Ultimately,battleground re avoiding scenarios such already lives outsideof Moscow’s controlandcouldbecomea renewed Caucasus,mostnotably state. Chechnya, The North of the integration system, implosion dis itmay of the the resultin the regime portends Russian Federationof the atrophy will.Ifthe orcollapseof Putin’s “for” anything. to sustain amovement having a platform without “against”something proteststhe may peter outsimply becauseitisinherently difficult centralized system Russian endorsedby constitution.Moreover, the over key leaderbutthe problemisnot the a particular that few grasp while peoplenowis that opposerigged electionsandPutinpersonally, go, as politicalanddigitalactivistAlexei Navalny Oncethey callsthem. of “swindlersandthieves,”simply powers party againstthe be,the that any politicalparty,support oreven democracy. necessarily Theyare nationalism andxenophobia country. in the Many protestors don’t of ultra- Thereisa strongundercurrent ates aretossed fromoffice. because itsown interests areimperiled. The West but a blindeye, cannot not of moralcharity turn outof aform if Russia’s future,to obvious, willbedetermined by state Russians the RoleThe of West the end,not allcitizensWhile Russians atwit’s themselves may find they go, there isnotelling whatwillfollow. go, there they problems Oneof the raison d’étât

because - - - - -

35 Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia permit largedecision to protest permit ralliesin Decemberas a positive step staying above fray, the whatever means.Someeven cite that Putin’s reset and Obama administrationto the staythe focused on preserving stands Russia’s needfor Western andcapital.Theyurge technology over elections, becausePutinsupposedlyand criticism under the set to Quite re a few realmodernization. expectthe “Putin 2.0”willlaunch world how whomthe quantity hope haslearned with to deal. Others optimism. newevidencefor Somesee known Putinasa to their find in Russia. men even welcomed news asaharbinger of benign predictability the presidency,nounced hisplanto to return the someWestern business version of ananti-Western, anti-democraticsystem. WhenPutinan top-down helpedto to legitimize a post-Soviet modernization approach of law.racy andrule Theyoverlooked Kremlin’s the reality that the ization” campaign, seeingitasa genuine readinessto establish democ andanalystsWestern were excited officials aboutMedvedev’s “modern for Russian leaders.Not andaffinity longago,most with chemistry” ber of Western to “personal leadersgobeyond demonstrate that their a num issues.The realityisthat to raise democracyandhumanrights mere reluctance only explainsthe Butthat a more pragmaticapproach. Council requires UNSecurity seaton the a permanent supplier with in Russia propernames? by their ety reluctanceto andoppositionforces. call things Whatexplainsthis crackdown on andsuppressionofcivilsoci Russian authorities’ the leadershaveern shown a reluctanceto about publicly raiseconcerns Clinton toyears, andBushadministrations,many the goingback West mer of 2011. sum in the on avisablacklist officials putsomeof those Department U.S. the Statepush, ledby DemocraticSenator BenCardinof Maryland, latestabuses, happenedbefore Dumaelections.Asa resultofthis the of 37-year-old lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, aswell humanrights asother involvedbans andasset murder freezesagainstRussian officials in the gei MagnitskyRule of Law Accountability Act,” callsfor visa which andin someEuropeanparliaments “Ser gress (andCanada’s)for the U.S. the U.S. Con did key The pushinboth membersof the Congress. law, of andrule Kremlin to respect humanrights tions callingon the as for interests. other The EuropeanParliament regularly adopted resolu Westsome positive signsfromthe valueswere that not beingsacrificed velopments fromitsforeign policy. Even were before December4,there doubt. No longerthe canwe pretend Russia’s to domesticde wall off The conclusionisclear: No of moreresets, nomorebenefit Even today, andanalysts try someWestern stubbornly officials To some,Russia’s statusasa major nuclearpower andenergy examples haveAlas, these exceptions West. beenthe in the For continue under Putin, despite recent hiccups over missile defense ------

36 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles with Russia.” path. authoritarian Russia has notship with sofarprevented Russia fromfollowing a more EU’s partner the Bush andObamaadministrations andthrough the OSCE. Engagement practiced by Councilof Europeandthe both of the athomeandcommitmentsRussia hasmadeasa member principles eliteRussia’s behave abideby leadersandthe liberal they andwhether Europeanspaceshoulddependon how Russia’s in the integration that of conditionality. principle just cooperationbutalsothe The latter means more,itmustinvolvein itself. What’s includesnot a range of actions that the European space. behavior.such cence anda signofweakness, lightto even engage asa green in more asacquies reactionto Russia’s of critical authoritarianism lack sees the Russia-Georgian warof August the 2008.The Kremlin in relations with Moscow, coolingin itsrelationswith vent a sharp lowest northe point whenRussia’s politicalsituationbadlyperiod, deteriorated, didnot pre 2000–08 Kremlin by downplaying the the during concerns humanrights sire to returntheColdWar Russia. commodating,” in dealingwith approach andfor a “pragmatic,”a values-based approach onemight even say “ac mythsusedto argue against a numberofthe challenging with starting direction ofamorevalues-basedpolicy.in the to an enormity.tributing The West allpoint hassomeoptions, andthey “pragmatic”aboutcon bad guys.Thereisnothing not behelpingthe ought to whatmodestleverage be clear: West With the has,itshould conclusion asfarWestern The regime survive. policygoes it helpsthe resetbullying elite only neighbors.The Russian willpursuethe if ruling increasingrepression,and simultaneously accusingitof posingathreat, West Russia fromthe closingoff gradually while model of survival: before,tic environment andhelikely than traditional to willreturn the tougherlesson. Putinandhisteam domes willbeoperatingin amuch bloodshed). embarrassing very and causingsignificant without (as ifhecouldhave doneotherwise “reset” hasbecomea means, unintentionally the on the be stressedthat Westthe arebetter were end of2008.Butitshould now they atthe than Russian West realityislikely in the onceagainto those teach a hard Myth Three:“ Myth Two:Myth One:C Myth WesternThere areseveral things governments canandshoulddo, Seven the Myths Challenging There is no denying that relations betweenThere isnodenying that Russia and integrate Russia into Engagement withRussiahelpsto integrateinto riticism of RussiareflectsRussophobiaand/orade Reset hasbroughtnormalization of theWest’srelations Engagement can be worthwhile butisnotEngagement an end canbeworthwhile West’s efforts to. The West’s avoid efforts antagonizing ------

37 Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia freedom ergy, againstitsneighbors. asweapons of influence Moreover, to use itsbountifulnaturalresources, especially itseeks en Westernthe elite andeconomicbuyouts. into cynicalpoliticaltrade-offs worldgimes aroundthe ( re to authoritarian advance democracyinitsneighbors,aidsother West, to the againstefforts corruption pushesback cal elite exports Georgians). Russia’s politi Euro-Atlantic community(justaskthe the hopingto bors, especially moreclosely integrate themselves those with West to the But itremainsa threat ways, in other aswell asto its neigh West the confrontation. no plansto attack norisitreadyfor a military andfreedom. against abusesof humanrights spites basicWestern andabdicates itsresponsibilities to principles stand nunciation of values-basedassessmentsRussia’s development internal West’s arenot Thus the re of onlydomestic affairs domesticconcern. its that OSCE, hascommitted principle itselftoof Europe andthe the Russia, Council of Paris. sinki Final by Charter joiningthe Act andthe national Covenant Hel on CivilandPolitical Rights(ICCPR),andthe in particular, European Convention Inter the on HumanRights,the conventions international argument contradictsthe Russia hassigned, sidesmaintain. both West,and the still wildly systems given different andsets the of values Union, a sustainablereset impossible isvirtually between today’s Russia détente Magnitsky legislationbecamealaw. reset ifthe rail the Justaslasting toeral in nature,apointreinforced de by threats Russia’s irrational reset arelikely gains of the to whom).Thusthe be ephem guess with andpreparesRussia foras a threat futurenuclearwars(onecaneasily continuesto view NATO doctrine Russia’s enlargement military Syria). and toward disregardhumanlife (Libya regimesthat underQadaffi andattitudes Arctic, tacticalnuclearweapons,neighbors, the terrorism, European security, missiledefense, energy, sovereignty the of Russia’s diverge they many on Kremlingrudgingly), issues: reset (the praise the sides attention problems.Whileboth frominternal to deflect threat tinues to use anti-Western image an sentimentto of outside construct West, the Kremlin con same timeitpursuesreset with the on. Atthe West, andso to in the study there, children buy property sendtheir they to reset integrate personally enablesthem the into Western society: elite violations.The Russian alsobelieve ruling sia on itshumanrights United by the agreement States Washington that Rus willnot criticize legitimacy. would reset astacit like the SomeRussian to officials define West, system side of the international Russian corrupt of givingthe Myth Six: Myth Five:Myth R FourMyth wasnever possiblebetween Western Soviet democraciesandthe . True, Russian system the gives peoplepersonalfreedom solong Russia isnotauthoritarian. Peopletherehave personal : Oneshouldnotmeddlein Russia’sinternalaffairs. ussia isnolongera threattotheWest Chávez Castros, Ortega, Assad)andlures Castros, Ortega, , the . True, Russia has This ------

38 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles lege of living,working, West. andbankingin the Passing Magnitsky- you you do not canenjoy privi engage abuses, then the in humanrights If Russian officials: conditionality with of principle afar isto pursue the ally West. into Russian the democracy from The best way to influence itself. Membersof Russia’s ability to elite integrate person treasurethe Westits abilityto prosper inthe dependson itsbehavior insideRussia Russian ments would to elite clearestterms the that demonstrate in the wouldthey representa parliament stemming fromfraudulentelections. by new Russian rejectingmembershipfor Dumadelegationsince the would strongsignalandgive renewed senda very life protestors to the Councilof Europe Assembly Parliamentary of the lines,the Along these Russianand broadenengagement civilsociety actors. with andother anyway,leaders (this, Medvedev) with Putinthan isharderto do with Russia’s with approach leaders alsomustavoid “personal chemistry” the European Union’s Westernone mustadmit,amidthe economiccrisis). tractive alternative to Russia’s personalizedsystem power of (hardto do, to role itonceplayed eyes restore of many the in the Russians asan at West Russia, the in dealingwith values-based approach shouldwork protests, else,shouldhave ifnothing ber’s destroyed myth. this eliteonly keep helpthe itspersonalizedpower modelin place.Decem it.Stereotypes comewith that aboutRussians’ immaturity perks and the on power limitsfreedomin ordertosian elite, maintain itsgrip which in Russian society’s inabilityto live Rus in a freeenvironment, but the in Russian The problemisnot genetic in the democratic principles? codeor Westlions of Russians livingin the seemto have notroubleabidingby or Kyrgyz, whohave mil pluralistic systems. How the allchosen isitthat Romanians,Russians Mongolians Bulgarians, areany lesscivilizedthan Russia to live upto commitments.Itisnot its international clearwhy excuses most insultingofallthe forThis isperhaps not the pushing for to force. defend itselfthrough try more likely regime will system becomes,the the the more brittle But the power anddiscreditsliberaldemocracy. only demoralizessociety further Westthe itselfin liberalslogans,Russia’s personalized andpackaging stupidities of,say,the Brezhnevism.In making useofcooperationwith dictatorship becauseitislessobviously repressive (so far) andlacks Putinism couldbean even bigger outright obstacleto democracy than as MikhailKhodorkovsky’s caseshows alltoo well. The problemisthat state, of the repressive meet fist the who actively authorities opposethe abusesof power. state’s andthe by rampant, corruption everyday Those stay freedomsareconstricted out of politics,butevenas they here,those rigging in rigging even whotake part bebroadened to include Russian officials like legislation,accordingly, legislationshould Such important. isvery dealing with Russia,By adopting Western conditionalityin dealingwith govern downBeyond mythsandexcuses knocking such not to take a more Seven: Myth Russia’s peoplearenotyetreadyforliberaldemocracy. ------

39 Doing Well By Doing Right. Some Mythbusting about U.S. Policy Toward Russia that surround it. surround that myths Russia old waysbling. So,too, andthe of dealing with shouldthe iscrum authorities legitimacy ofRussia’s current the understand that West, the in folding in Russia, ata frenziedpace,those like must those no longer remainan exceptional case.Whileevents in Russia areun Russia in democraticvaluesandrespectfor should humanrights. firmly Russia andpolicy, require a newapproach an authoritarian basedmore challenges posedby mistakes andunderstandingthe ing fromthose Middle East,itshouldnot toward keep makingthem Russia. Learn mistakes regimesin the itmadeforthe decadestoward authoritarian with democratic communityofnationscomestotus quo. grips Asthe protestssia, especially andvote in lightofDecember’s sta againstthe to what Putinmay think. contrary Moldova. AdemocraticbeltaroundRussia would bea sourceofstability, in Russia’sforms neighbors –above and allin Ukraine,Georgia,Belarus, to Russiamake re reforming an indirectcontribution by supporting elections andsuppressingdemocraticfreedoms.Finally, West the could the WestGovernments respectto Rus in the with neednewthinking ------

40 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution? Lilia Shevtsova / Journal of Democracy, July 2012 Volume 23, Number 3

The wave of mass protest set off by Russia’s December 2011 parliamentary and March 2012 presidential elections has put an end to the postcommunist status quo. The agony of Vladimir Putin’s regime is apparent, but we do not yet know if the death knell has sounded for the “Russian system.” This system, based on personal rule, the merger of political power with economic assets, and a statist-militarist model of self-perpetuating authority, might be finished. But it also may be the case that Russian society still has a long way to go before it can be said to have broken with this stubborn legacy of an authoritarian past. Moreover, what exactly will replace the system of personalized power? And will this replacement, whatever it is, appear on the scene before that system starts to unravel? No one can say. We can be certain, however, that Russia’s transformation will come only when its citizens bring sufficient pressure to bear, and also that Russia’s trajectory will have implications not only for the international order but for democratic prospects throughout the post-Soviet space. The normally placid surface of Russian political life erupted in turmoil on Decem- ber 5, 2011, when outraged citizens took to the streets of large cities across the country to protest the previous day’s balloting to fill the State Duma’s 450 seats. Thus began three months of open rebellion against the authorities. The “December Movement” began as a spontaneous public response to election fraud that favored the Kremlin aligned United Russia party (which is less a party than 1 The tricks that a bureaucrats’ union).1 Even absent manipulation of the Kremlin-run election vote count, the parliamentary elections fell short of be- commissions used in order to ensure United ing free and fair: Some opposition parties were denied Russia’s victory included registration and barred from taking part. Others, such as ballot-stuffing, doctoring results, using “carousels” Yabloko, were registered but then were denied the op- (people paid to go from portunity to run full fledged campaigns. Officially, United one polling station to Russia won 49.3 percent of the vote and 238 seats while another and vote for United Russia), adding the Communists received 19.2 percent (92 seats), the Just “dead souls” to the voter Russia party took 13.2 percent (64 seats), and Vladimir rolls, and using the police to drive independent Zhirinovsky’s far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia election observers away (LDPR) won 11.7 percent and 56 seats. But independent from polling places. call was“For Honest Elections!” –asloganmeant to unite 1980s) Theirmain activists of the human chains. forming (in a tacticborrowed Baltic-state independence fromthe along major streets in Moscow andSt. Petersburg, and outinto picketing,branching stagingautomobile protests twoafter decadesof somnolence.“Angry citizens”began 70,000 to 120,000 peopleatarally was a realturnaround a million peopletook streets to of Moscow, the butgetting record levels of 1990–91, the not reach whenupto half 5and10. 4,andMarch The numbersdid February and 24, many hadthought. than fragile andbrittle seemed stableandresilientnow stood revealed as more oughly government. had alienated Asystem fromtheir that foreign educated alike, urbanites realized that were thor Russian and observers, response only fueledit.Surprised toughof protesters. the fire, Butinstead of puttingoutthe ber 5 demonstration and none too gently hundreds arrested to its usualharshtactics.Policestuck Decem broke upthe atfirst Kremlin, which The mass discontent the shocked 46 percentoverall, andaslittle40percentin Moscow. heactuallyIndependent sourcescalculate won that around waswidespreadfraud. againthere 63.6 percent,though orintimidate to voters. won bribe which Putinofficially with andrepressive carrots sticks sion timeto financial premier to exploit apanoply of state resourcesrangingfromtelevi Putinhimselfmadeuseof hisstatusas andcontinuedrule. “victory” would legitimizehis that pearance of engaginginapoliticalstruggle to show realindependence. Khodorkovsky asan example whodare of whathappensto oligarchs imprisoned Mikhail more sowith Kremlin’s sealofapproval – allthe the Prokhorov, hewashardly likely to race without have the entering risked Just Russia party, hasbeena Putinally for years. Mikhail Asfor oligarch sinceYeltsin’s partners sparring days. Another, Sergei Mironov of the leader GennadyZyuganov andZhirinovsky) have beenconstantKremlin race. Twofrom the contenders handpicked (CommunistParty the of any potentially Putin’sopponentsandbarred chose dangerous rivals minister,a stint asprime drove pointhome.The Kremlinitself this 2012 top Putinto spot returned the after presidential election,which outcomes”cannot allowbut certain genuine competition. The March to rules elections. Asystem Kremlin’s approach basedon “uncertain the not possibly have 35percent. beenmorethan haveexperts proved in that, The outbreakof massprotests againstvote frauddidnot change These handpicked opponentswereThese handpicked supposedto ap give Putinthe the largestThe dates protests of the were December10 reality, the Kremlin party’s voteKremlin party’s share could 4 2 - 3 - 2011): 15.32. Democracy tarianism,” New Authori of the Ivan Krastev, “Paradoxes become Web-addled. See or country the left either most protest-prone had for dissentbecausethose and Russians unready Putinregimeresilient the found ties. Oneexpert authori feel aboutthe when asked how they not always truth tell the content –respondentsdo ofdis to detect rise the vey agencies alsofailed 73. Russian opinion-sur est plained,” “Neo-Feudalism Ex svobodanews.ru. Did Not Win,” atwww. title“InReality Putin the Alexander Kynev under Oreshkinand Dmitri independent experts the zeta.ru/topics/12.html. 4 3 2 Vladislav Inozemtsev, of Seeinterviews Seewww.novayaga 6 (March–April 2011):6 (March–April - American Inter - 22 (April 22(April Journal of ------

42 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the notion that they shouldbe content so they notionbegan to that tire ofthe world.bounds of oldmyths aboutRussia andthe People narrow the pastandstayingbased on lookingto within the of stability Kremlin’s offer of society the wanted morethan were to erode. Themostactive starting anddynamicsectors country foundations the of hisimplicit2008), the dealwith (between of Putin’ssecondterm last part 2006and By the ness, andgeneral government. stasison display in their high-handed official have cynicism, brazencorruption, witnessedthe among educated urbanites hasbeenbuildingfor sometimeas people catalysts. Putin’sregime protests’ Discontent causesfromtheir with the Medvedev.tri Yet noneledto mass opposition.We needto separate Yeltsin, two aspresident,andunderDmi terms Putin’sfirst during electionsbefore in post-Sovietbeen falsified Russia – underBoris society, endingitshopesfor “top-down” thus modernization. of Russian part most advancedor“modern” what mightbecalledthe graduates). are postsecondary are not exclusively arewell middleclass,butthey educated (70 percent The protestersincome levels, age andpoliticalorientations. groups, includes a widerange of discontented urbanresidentsacrossvarious ized Russian society. Movement’s baseisbroad,and The Decembrist need for sweeping principles. levelthe of first change atthe Russian system, society andthat wascomingtoing againstthe grasp movement the wasincreasingly signaledthat turn fundamental reform ers begandenouncingPutin’sregimeitself.The growing demandsfor er framework. however, Thingssoontook a deeperturn, andprotest personalized-pow the gamewithin of the demandinghonestrules with on power 1993 cemented in the Constitution –andcontented themselves executive system’s – the cornerstone upthe monopoly of bringing short tors presidential polling.Initially, for the stopped newDecembrists these demands for “comprehensive andindependentmoni politicalreform” elections.Subsequent ralliesaddednew 5) holdnewparliamentary all resultsfound to be fraudulent; and 4)register oppositionparties; head VladimirChurov andinvestigate allclaimsof vote fraud;3) annul 2)dismissCentralElectionCommission 1) free allpoliticalprisoners; onlinevoting, through listed demands: leaders,chosen five onstrations’ includingnationalists.The dem politicalcurrents, people fromvarious authorities as authorities staying outof politicsandrecognizing the make for let a livingin return them authorities long asthe Was sparked protests? itelectionfraudalonethat the Therehave Causes Impetus and imageThe massanger anddemoral of anapathetic the overturned 5 Putin’sregime,itseems,hasantagonized March 2012.March Intensifying,” Is Authorities tion with Lev Gudkov, “Dissatisfac with students. Interview or managers, journalists, cal specialists,middle astechni themselves protesters identified Center, mostofthe taken Levada by the 5 According to polls ------Izvestia, - 6 -

43 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? the faceanda blowa slap inthe to national dignity. silent People hitherto were being treated cameas personalplaythings likeoffices someone’s highest For country’s their revelation millionsof Russians, that this by hisyoungerwarm confederate, couldonceagain becomepresident. Putin,hisseatkept hadbeenplanningallalongto swap jobssothat they came on September 2011, 24, whenPutinandMedvedev announcedthat tion. The initialimpetus into a moodof disaffection action for turning never replacemoretraditional“real-world” of politicalparticipa forms onlineactivismcould mattered, itsoonbecameclearthat even though Russian state. control ofthe Allthis munities of opinion“outside”the could buildcom independentcommunicationtools,and other they newmedia governmentonline beganto antagonist. With asan see the political culture.Millionsof Russians whogot newsandinformation worldalso helpedto shape analternative viewof the andan alternative of open scorn. andmorerecently of mockery once-popular Putinanobjectfirst the to lives takechosen andprospects. Theyhave a freshlookattheir made tem atany cost.Unexpectedly, generation many have membersof this sys the placeswithin anddesireto conformism find by their struck decade in power, young Putin’sfirst Russianswith during whenIwas fear. Internet. Irecallmy of the disappointment rise The secondwasthe grown upunderPutinandwasfreeof Soviet complexes, nostalgia, and new prominenceofayounger wasthe had generationThe first that calm. surface the wastakingholdbeneath regimethat of hostility to the Sovietsonance to reject the system root andbranch. doublestandardsandcognitive itcausedpeoplefed dis upwith that declarationsandreallife gap between becamesohuge leader’s the the USSR from1964 the in 1982.who ruled till hisdeath Brezhnev’s day, In of LeonidBrezhnev, like that much ine change. Medvedev’s legacylooks unableto genu undertake wasata deadend,itsrulers country the that spreadingpublicawareness rot ate system,the deeperinto further the under Medvedev’s presidency, itsholdand only strengthened corruption in Putin’smodel.For talk ofmodernization allthe flaws high reliefthe – castinto closeto especially them oligarchs of the wealth andthat Putin andhisteam way reacted that tothe own it by guardingtheir of 2008– and to andeconomiccrisis better The financial themselves. improvements mightgive young that peoplea leg-upinlife chance anda basic security. Moreover, kinds ofsocial any Putinlacked senseof the noreven norprosperity opportunity neither pact couldguarantee them populace. Too of the much satisfied many this hadcometo see that bly for camea momentwhenPutin’sformula “socialpeace”nolonger inevita appeared.Butthere whenfrictions tion an essentiallubricant say ownership, on questions final having makingcorrup of property the Internet, itnotAs for only the madeorganizingprotests easier, but Two mood circumstancesalsoplayed in fuelingthe other a part ------

44 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles a common program have on acommonprogram inability to kept frombecoming agree them fondly rememberedYeltsin competing years, andtheir ambitionsand un antisystem opposition’sleadersareseenasrelicsfromthe most of the Moreover, yearseasy given of economicgrowth. Putin’sassociationwith a basewould building such have – not that base of publicsupport been system. This“antisystem”the oppositionhasfailedto acquire a broad canaccuratelyof an oppositionthat besaidto be outsideoreven against part on the movement result offrustration measure, the hasbeenthe view,the game.In some dirty politicsisa widespread in Russia, that getting a better it. dealwithin Russians, about protest system than may the belessabout transforming asGazprom.For middle-class such these corporations cy orbigstate-run provider state to bureaucra the itsroleasa service middle classlives off Things may not besosimple of the in Russia, wherea sizeableswath economicagency grow. settings andprosperity astheir in authoritarian andpoliticalliberty class citizensbecomea force for self-rule greater work the associated of SamuelP. with middle Huntington positsthat system. Amodelof democratization the class wantsto go inchanging seem ready. aredoubtsabouthow Russian Thentoo middle there farthe civicleadersandmany for which urbanprotestersself-sacrifice donot of courage Kremlin willrequire a degree and the confrontation with transformative potential. cost ofsappingtheir Moreover,but atthe open The vagueagenda maypart.) have protests’ helpedto base, broaden the cabinet head ofastate-owneda former minister andthe company took even wassofuzzythat ideologicalplatform demonstrations’ (The first moderate-friendly by avoiding seeasexcessive whatthey politicization. movement’s evolution.in the Theyhave to protests keep tried the tion of civicleaders.Theseleadershave played an ambiguousrole dignity ascitizens. and rights state respecttheir the component aspeopledemandthat lier, Russian protests the sincelate 2011 have manifested a strongethical out in May 2012). “Arab Like the protests begana year ear Spring” that it would(though later dosowhena newroundofdemonstrationsbroke legitimacy, Kremlin couldnot simply the protests breakupthe by force openly andlawfully discontent. Worried aboutits expressingtheir accompanyingpolitical process,andthe for fraudgave grounds them authorized to in the The elections gave take chance part peoplethe Kremlin. of Putinanddidnotgrown in the wantto weary see himback been buildingupover into readinessfor timeturned openprotest. had that tongues. couldnolonger The fury holdtheir they decided that difficult years difficult the through for embers ofdiscontent keeping burning the credit a powerful still deserve leadersandgroups force. Thatsaid,these big citieshadalready the didnot realizethat The authorities preserve its civic roots flows from The protest from movement’s itscivicroots desireto flows preserve The Russian for “drive fore dignity”broughtto new genera a the - - - - -

45 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? cosmetic “liberalizing” bills with of cosmetic Duma apackage Medvedev “liberalizing”billswith sentthe bearhug. Movementwould Decembrist official in asuffocating wrapthe provinces anyway)more in the that in favor approach of a“soft-kill” ing legitimacy. to save system’sfrantically rapidly trying whatever of the wan wasleft were were them new.and desperationthat driving were The authorities crediting itsleaders.Thesetacticswere familiar, aggressiveness butthe opposition whiledis to split the regime-sponsored panels,andtried by to inviting PutinandMedvedevpublic figures meet them orjoin with handouts,soughtto coopt various opinionleadersandpopular offered targetedhand, they repression morecarefully. other, the With they composure one andbegandamagesoon regainedtheir control.With worse demonstrators by insultingnames.The authorities callingthe down.it cracked andapparently Shocked confused,Putinmadematters worst the possibleway Kremlin initiallydiscontent, chose to the react– tial to raise arenewed roundof popularprotests nextlevel. to the have poten blood,andthey the in their authorities ditional fear of the of newleaders.Theynolonger a coregroup have tra the brought forth protests, generation the this During outhouse. longer in Putin’sstuffy stage,generation generation a wastakingthe unwilling to live any for change andwere willingto pursue it.Theprotests showed a new that need the grasped authorities the hope that includingthe gin to crumble, ing upitsdelegitimization.The protests saw oldillusionsandtaboosbe systemto of personalizedpower, the shakingitsfoundations andspeed blow toof public indifference politics. Themassdissentdealtaserious proteststhe didchange Russia’s politicalclimate andmarked end the appetitethe for politicizationwasmissing.Yet in justafew months, and,aswe leadershiporclearprogram, havewas nounified seen, to abouta change of system actually orregimein Russia. bring There MovementRussian rebellion.First, Decembrist never the chance hada itsbreath. what itneededwasto catch made nosenseandwould movement have the paralyzed only when left To same demandswould have the streets continuetakingto with the failedto demand. meet a singleDecembrist The authorities was fizzling. presidential election,however, protest the agenda itbecameclearthat 4,2012, March the involvement rallies.After position’s crucial first in the in placesoquickly wasdueabovemechanisms antisystem allto op the of Putin’s clampdown. Movement’s abilityto The Decembrist put its Putin’s team decidedto deemphasize hadbeenused force (which Long usedto society an apathetic andunprepared for any serious We first candraw twenty-first several century’s conclusionsfromthe A Movement’s Achievements Limits – and ------

46 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Russia underczarsandcommissars trapped for centuries haskept paradigmthat statist-militarist on the fallen back The Kremlinhas approach. seem like a winning long-run of desperationanddoesnot stabilitysmacks undermine could status quo that ing to by maintain the doingthings of how are.Try Kremlin’s resourcestruly limited the For Russian isa sign boathimselflike the Putinto this rock and usingproregimeprovincials to intimidate dissenters. kovych capital provinces – ofchampioning againstthe the ViktorRomania’s Yanu Nicolae Ceausescu andUkraine’s step – borrowedKremlin’s decisionto risky take from the clearly camethrough in the worry serious The authorities’ system of personalizedpower. very regime butthe only the type of behavior becomesa key to tool save for trying not “besieged fortress” the legitimacyisundermined, as their hold on powerhis team now their watching irreversibly slippingaway reality isnotusual pragmaticways. Putinand sosimple. Butthe With election campaign andwould not keep Moscow fromhewingto its Kremlin’s rhetoric of an the atfacevalue.Instead, itwasalljustpart hastened notes, to add reassuring onecouldnot suggesting take that Putin’sown with views. fits since anti-Americanism of propaganda worked past,itwillwork in the now more so – andallthe kind ifthis team. Itsspindoctors that ruling seemto think the bothered claimshasnever such of evidenceto support liberal opposition.The lack supposedly enemy Kremlin’seyes U.S.-financed hasbeenthe in the for enemiesathomeandabroad.The main a search refrain andlaunch old “besieged fortress” repeatthe feel pressed,they authorities when the new. anything Kremlin couldnot comeupwith the Asalways in Russia, Russian to honorandindependence.Here,too, preserve a noble struggle wasin fact againstthem fight regime’s “color revolution,” the andthat were foreign puppets West andhirelings,paidby the to foment another participation. for their numberof itsowngreater – mostofwhomwere supporters beingpaid an even square another Kremlin would with the fill could besurethat protesters a citysquare, Ifthe they filled same thing. lin version of the held an automobile protest, would Putin’ssupporters stage a pro-Krem Kremlin wouldan event, the immediately follow opposition suit.Ifthe puttogetherto Decembrists shout “For timethe cleanelections!”Every demonstrators – usually bussed-instate workers streets – into the protest own beganparroting slogans,sendingtheir pro-Kremlin thorities on power. team’s tightgrip ruling no prospectof jeopardizingthe elite hasnot found a newmeansofgoverning. Instead, itis alike. Twenty Soviet Russian the years collapse,the after Western by taken Putin’snewaggressiveness aback observers Decembrists Kremlin kept the Through itall,the insistingthat - - candidates. to exclude independent tightly so as “filtered” wouldthat bedirectyet elections gubernatorial also suggested ideaof the activities.He on party ing tightstate controls coalitions, andby keep to harder for form parties byparties,” makingit numberoftiny “sofa the opposition by multiplying the fragment andcripple sions designedto further also containedprovi of proposedamendments ter, yet samepackage the toeasier for regis parties law toparties make it political- amending the 6 Medvedev proposed 6 Au - - - - -

47 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? spread ofsocial lossof oldculturalties andthe in the arereflected these society’s deep-seated All atomization, demoralization, anddegradation. is a champion of Russia’s claimto great-power status).SodoRussian gia – stillaforce in somequarters – mitigates politicaldiscontent (Putin of nationalism hasitslimitsand may get outof hand.Imperial nostal political exploitation the that Kremlin worries passions, even ifthe can directpopular provide authorities into which a promisingchannel Caucasus)seemsasifitmay North ticularly fromthe migrants internal opposition. Nationalistsume the antagonismtoward non-Slavs (par event to of acataclysm. threaten in the con Squabbles andinfighting canescapeRussia topdowns elite’s members know they – andthe that protests crack andthat canbemettrouble isstilla longway with off ideas that money into the state The elite coffers. reassuresitselfwith ized power cankeep going.The commoditiestradecontinuesto pump system glance,onemightget of personal the impressionAt first that the confrontationbetweenstage Kremlin andsociety in the hadbegun. the sistance aimedatoccupying citysquares. Anewandmoreantagonistic time, protesters police andinvented the fought of re with new forms brutality, with them roundingupanddetaining hundreds. For first the dispersed to protest authorities Putin’sinauguration.This time,the vites joinedby capital’s streets visitors citiespouredinto fromother the sphere of calmwasdeceptive, however. of Musco OnMay 6,thousands accomplished pointandwhatitshoulddonext.The atmo upto that of self-assurance. Theoppositioncamp wassplitover whatithad both air customary their surface) beganto regain (atleastonthe thorities Russian au societymath, andconfusedasthe appeareddisoriented team. Russian ruling the connivance with dependson how Westrium willingthe isto keep upitspolicyof tacit a viablenewequilib Kremlin succeedsinreaching elites. the Whether lives Western comfortable Russian of makethe possiblethe tiesthat balance between anti-Western anditsneedto aggressiveness maintain civilization nolonger works. toern The Kremlinhasstarted seek anew ously controllingsociety andprojectingan image of belongingto West wave showed onceseemingly effective meansof simultane this that shouldhave a system that within beenjunked protest longago.The to locked keep itsownway same timetrying of life country whileatthe hasintegrated into itselfcomfortably a political elite a Western that enemies andfanninga climate of civilconfrontation. to prolong itsholdon power trying to by battling imaginary goingback Yet We contradictions arestriking. all,about the aretalking,after In March 2012, tide ofprotestIn March the seemedto subside. Initsafter Too Late for Reform ------

48 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles however, top” remainspopularamongsome fromthe “modernization layers of manipulationandintimidation? Sadly, underthick been buried and mediahave into a circusandindependentcourts has beenturned betaken whenparliament corruption asfighting rational” steps such mean liberalization.Andhow most basic“economically caneven the control andmonopoly power over economy the cannot by definition isunderstood of state to that mean astrengthening of “modernization” economy the for whatresults?Any years,ernizing notion butwith have beenworking authorities cal liberalizationin itswake, the on mod willeventually politi economicmodernization bring some liberals,that idea, favored a fairpresidentialelection?Asfor the by with he not start it. ButwillPutinstep aside?Andifheisreadyfor realchange, why did to fair andhonestpoliticalcompetition wayshift to canopen the curing Only a transformative degradation. country’s main sourceofthe is the The Putinteam’s monopoly back. on powerat holdingtransformation autocracy top” moreeffective only current “fromthe makesreform the Sofar,not justa coursecorrection. proves Russia’s experience that entirepersonalized-power of the overturning Russia system, needsisthe it earlier? Certainly, leaderscanchange courseunderpressure,butwhat of Russian transformer society,to become the why didhenot transform wants to Yet or not, besupported. andmusttherefore ifPutinisdestined he whether outreform himselfforced to “Putin2.0”willfind carry that become a force argument isnow for change. Hencethe beingheard regimemightsomehow current to the convince that themselves trying tions, powerful interests in elite entrenched andintellectual circlesare nature of politicalchange anditsimplicagies, andunsureaboutthe liberalization?Fearful, newstrate even lacking without to lose territory example Chechen show Russianot the hasalreadyeffectively that begun Russian Republic itsliberalization.Andyet,in the willnot survive does incompatible segments(Chechnya, for example) whosemembership Russiais not includes remainsa “half-frozenempire” groundless: that fear “isjusta smallerUSSR.” this warn, sia,” One mustadmitthat they asMikhailGorbachev’s collapse, much it morelikely. any Liberalsfear realliberalizationwillleadto that state make abouta blindrevolt that frombelow dothings evenworry asthey prospect ofanyand feel change. atthe Elites terror andintellectuals power system. The mostvulnerablesegmentsofsociety state clingto the and change-averse state bureaucracy. of civic dignity. weight huge sheer inertial of the isalsothe Andthere hold broadsegmentsof Russian fromactivismon behalf society back family breakdown, plague Russia andearly and – that malemortality ills – signaledby murder, highrates of alcoholism,abortion, suicide, Russia into a colderversion of LeeKuan Yew’s Singapore. deluded Russian liberalswhoseemfascinated idea ofturning by the We fear personalized plays role that in the shouldnot the underrate perestroika policy did.“Rus ------

49 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? these questions sooner than we questionsto soonerthan think. these We arereborn? whole even asthey may have answers fragment country state and the Will the citizensbeforced to pay?down? willordinary Whatprice “Russianeven system” asthe degenerates andbreaks a hard landingnot only probablebutprobably nastytoo. make more they Kremlin, the hangon totightly the they more cometo the a badend,” although of “authoritarians theme on the ers donot want to variation become another rul Russia’s current Hosni MubarakorMuammarQadhafi. were on power, drawn: Loseyour grip andyou endup like andconclusions Arab Spring the Kremlin during late in the of assets butalsolossof freedomoreven life. Lightsburned relinquishing politicalcontrolcouldmeannot only loss years team, atleast.For next tenfor ruling to the fifteen the decision “noting Russia’s to problemsisthe give uppower” dev himself declared, the team wantsto hold onto itsmonopoly forever. AsMedve implosionmake bloody. this Kremlin shows his to Putin’sreturn the that of asudden implosion. The Kremlin’sreadinessto use violencecould Yet a refusalto threat update – anembraceofstasiswillincreasethe system breakdown, not unlike whathappenedto communism in1991. liquidatingquo itsbasis(personalizedpower) without to threaten cause system’s decline,butattemptsis speedingupthe to status update this politicalorder.current status quo The paradox proppingupthe isthat West prove donot even sustainabilityof the believe they that in the of assets form stored elites in the maintainin the the that en parachutes” expense ofsociety “gold atlarge; atthe interest the groups entrenched well-being, nora senseofcivicdignity. The system works only to satisfy The system guarantees personalsecurity, Russians neither noreconomic cosmetic changes cannolonger hidea morefundamentalrigidity. “Russianadaptability system” of the hasbeenexposedasan illusion– hasalreadybegun.The allegeddists cannolonger that stave a crisis off tactical maneuvers and the thorities’ makes any impossible, realreform limited even sectors. in these The au monopoly on power The authorities’ of law andindependentcourts? to rule competition,monopolies andopeningthem the andwithout further. doingaway Buthow sectors without doyou these with reform spread andonly then andagriculture, aseducation,healthcare, such shouldbeginin selected reform areas claimthat path” “gradual of the Supporters reform. belief in“gradual” steaming alongasusualisthe Russian the whothink mythdeartoAnother those Questions remain:CanRussia asa nation-state survive team’s main instrument forteam’s resolv main instrument myths spread by Kremlin propagan

or somehow stay Titanic - - - Folks,” Ilichev, December “The power.”their SeeGeorgy “procedure to perpetuate popular voting into a have turned authorities the that percent agreed and54 rights”; people’s state didnotthe respect factthat tests “wasthe pro main reasonfor the the 46 percentsaidthat Moscowthe protests; of respondentssupported percent rossii. Around44 vlasti-i-obshchestva-v- cheloveka-interesakh- ru/17-11-2011/o-pravakh- ta-i-v-podderzhku-vputi. sii-chast-1-mitingi-protes dopolnenie-k-prezentat vybory-prezidenta- ru/24-02-2012/ can keep 8 7 Seewww.levada. See www.levada. Novaya gazeta, - - - 11 - - -

50 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles to drag onfor a whilelonger. protesters Even amongthe top mayregime, anda change of facesatthe allow things tem of personalized power current justthe isdeeperthan may bea palacecoup.Thesys – orthere ership reshuffle exitanda lead on hisvoluntary may agree able, hiscohort state for relieson the survival. that time) aswell traditional Soviet populace asthe industrial same itatthe system butwhoserve the issueswith their business interests butalso“system liberals”(whomay have in particular. Putin team’s rule the Theseincludenot only system in general the and an interest in preserving with elite andpopularlevelsstill powerful the atboth groups severalwill require waves morethan of protest. Thereare actcouldtake sometimeand final And yet regime’s the situationfor anyno stability”isa precarious leadership. problemsmount.“No change andas economicandfiscal andmay of key loseyet socialgroups port moresupport waspossible. newturmoil that Russia would a coupd’etat, that and56 percentsaid experience thought be a calmyear, feelings andreported of foreboding. Nearly 21percent December 2011 survey, about61 percent were 2012 surethat would not team. ests. Only ruling 23percenthada positive viewof the desireto retaintheir power, defense major of andthe inter corporate the percent said that country,” interests of the the while63 with “areconcerned thorities people.” well-being Just19 au the of ordinary the percentsaidthat survey, in power those with only 5percentsaidthat concerned “are did. they coincide, whileonlypercentsaidthat 24 interests of power the saying that holdersandsociety atlarge didnot Center in October 2011, around68percentof respondentswere already taken Levada by asurvey In the system of personalizedrule. tin andthe againstPu moredangerousnew andmuch tsunami. Opinionisturning harbinger of a silence couldbethe confrontations suggested the that felt noonehadsolutions. they sia,” but35percentsaidthat “best solutionsfor felt Rus Putin hadthe they of respondents saidthat 2012default: Levada Center, In aFebruary pollby the only 14percent have atleastby behaved accept Putin’scontinuedrule, asifthey of drowsy onceagain.People oblivionwassettling over country the state “normal” could have the impression comeaway that the with leadership and a newsavior. personal demise of The the and intellectuals, onecandetect a longingfor charismatic the postelection wake protests,Looking atRussia of the in the one End ofThe Russian Matrix? the If Putin’s personal grip on powerIf Putin’spersonalgrip isnolonger sustain authorities are concerned with their own their interests, with are concerned authorities 10 sup The regimehasalreadylostthe 8 March 2012 In aMarch - - - - 7 9 The May In alate- nastupayushchem-godu. ozhidayut-rossiyane-v- ru/29-12-2011/chego- rym-prinadlezhit-vlast. rezhime-i-lyudyakh-koto yane-o-politicheskom- ru/03-04-2012/rossi dvizhenii-liga-izbiratelei. proshedshikh-vyborov-i- rossiyane-o-chestnosti- levada.ru/04-04-2012/ were fair. Seealsowww. presidentialelections the believed they said that polled percent ofthose 2012,March only 15 taken in In a survey derzhku-edinoi-rossii. vystupleniyakh-v-pod i-aktsiyakh-protesta- moskvichi-ob-oppozitsii- levada.ru/19-12-2011/ 2012. Seewww.January 10 9

See www.levada. See -

www.levada. ------

51 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? country isreplete powerful with rent-seeking country levels, the elite andpopular the problem. Atboth will faceanother agents well appearandgirdthemselves Russia for struggle, of state control.Yet reach space beyond the even ifchange openmoreautonomous society to pry and by spurring by arousingmoreand widerresistancein response, backfire will ning to regime efforts appear morelikely such that Today,position fromgainingstrength. however, itisbegin clampdowns anddiscreditingcampaigns prevented op the Sovietfrom the past. Until recently, Kremlin’s constant the vation, andfromamongyounger farthest people – those ticularly in sectors linked strongly andinno to expertise intelligentsia,levels media, andbusiness,par of the the not-so-distant middle future.Theycouldemergein the fromamongthe agents of change the may for appear hopethat grounds offer months yet emerged. Yet we have stirrings witnessedfromsociety the in recent actors kindof sustained,organizedpressurehave readyto this exert not Powerful pressurefromsociety willbeneeded. The politicalandsocial powerer of that businessinterests, andneoimperial ambitions. with of personalizedpower,democratic isto old triad eliminate the merg the to liberal democracy.sia’s path of personalized power iscomplicating to Rus appear civilized,andthus is indirectly “Russian (andin somecases,directly) system” helpingthe Yetlence in Russia isunsurprising. West, the by itssilenceandpassivity, ownfacing their malaiseanddysfunctionalityhave for nostomach turbu ThatWestern itsdomesticlegitimacycrumble. it watches governments more soas Putin regime–allthe sourceof legitimacyfor the a significant predictable change. The West’s tacitapproval, oratleastacceptance, is prefer a stableifundemocraticRussia of un to throes a Russia in the model dressedupin anovel guise. old complex isthis military-industrial basedon the industrialization” subjugation ofsociety.in order to legitimize the Putin’sgoalof a“new to Russia imaginedthreats existence points to of realor(moreoften) the protectorates. of statismthat form The secondpillarisa militaristic Caucasus)underRussian tutelage North asdefacto asthe regions (such Russian Federation,ity of the putative needto andthe keep its“alien” Soviet EurasianUnion, indivisibil creation ofthe the “nearabroad,” the Moscow’s perceived post- needto throw itsweight the aroundwithin Putin andhisteam by play emphasizing on this Russia’s globalrole, political classandsomesegmentsofsociety. retains a holdonthe that neoimperial, Russia-as-superpower isthe mentality The first are three. be an extended anddramaticprocess.Thatsystem’s remainingpillars ized-power Russia could hasbeensuffocating for system centuries that The only Russian way system to the into transform more something apprehension ofWestern pillaristhe governmentsThe third that 11 - - - - Times, Magnitsky Act,” Jackson-Vannik the with mir Ryzhkov, “Replace President Bush;”Vladi U.S. offormer [was] that and hisinnercirclethan advantageous to Putin more policy ismuch Putin. Obama’sRussia of are solidsupporters andBerlinregime: “Paris Russian to the approach mainWesternof the becoming openly critical 11 Russian liberalsare March 20,2012. March - - - - - Moscow -

52 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles structure that itembodies. that structure how to get institutional itsafely together the buried with legitimacy isdead,butitnot yet gone.The problemis any hopefora leadership styleandtypeofregimewith hasnofuture.Putinismas system of personalizedrule the cal sun –asense,sharedacrossbroadlayers of society, that to unravel.starts impasse system before current peaceful ways the outof the political classandsociety donot have timeto find much sian system’s accelerating,andRussia’s demiseiscurrently Howeveritself in newpackaging. Rus may be,the that of 1991 personalized-power andseethe system regenerate abouta repeat collapse andpublicdiscontent couldbring The oldsystem’s spontaneous eral-democratic principles. would complicate attempts to basedon lib set newrules to ten system years, may the simply This beginto fall apart. nextfive regimefailtotive appear inthe current to the Russia isnow in araceagainsttime.Shouldrealalterna be. itmightotherwise cess moreintense andviolentthan pro revolutionary change couldmake that attrivial cosmetic efforts of fakeit isopento new interests. liberalizationand born Frustrations system sothat to the displace rent-seekingstakeholders andrestructure stance. circum opposition appeardiminviewofthis tem pragmatistsandthe realization ofa“pacted Hopesfor transition”between the sys services. security team anditsdependenceon the ruling knit natureof the close- tional asliteral streets. andwaged isthe Then,too, in the there over system’s futuremay andinstitu the metaphorical benot somuch “battle” the disturbing possibilitythat Thisraisesthe and deadlocks. constitutionalandpoliticalmeansfor resolvingconflicts erately lacks forto it. fight existing system andcanbeexpected fromthe benefit that groups Moreover, postcommunist elites have the delib builta system that There is something newtodayThere issomething Russian politi underthe 12 Revolution only answer mightbethe question to of how the - - - - tion process. transforma hinder the Their hesitationsmay developments isunclear. rolein future hence their government ship; the are still not ready to leave “system liberals” the that html. Thisrhetoric shows nedostatki-lechatsya. news/bazovye-nashi- http://akudrin.ru/ be evolutionary.” See processshould “the that same time,hestressed he declared.Butatthe political competition,” political freedomsand system. “Weof the need has becomeatough critic minister Alexei Kudrin Formerstarted. finance team may have already Putin’s tial dissentwithin 12 Theprocessofpoten ------

53 Putinism Under Siege; Implosion, atrophy, or revolution? Why Russia Doesn’t Hold the Keys to Syria. The West may be using the Kremlin’s intransigence as an excuse to do nothing David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, July 11, 2012

It is difficult to decipher whether those who argue that Russia holds the keys to the solution of the Syrian crisis really believe it or are using Russia as an excuse to do nothing. The recent Syrian Action Group meeting in Geneva clearly showed that the Kremlin is not moving closer to the position of the United States and other powers. Tremendous time and energy have been wasted in trying to lure Russia closer to the view that Assad needs to go. Over and over again, Russian officials have made clear that they are not interested in helping find a real, as opposed to imitation, solution to the Syria problem. In a July 9 meeting with Russia’s diplomatic corps, Vladimir Putin reconfirmed that he has not changed his position on Syria, reiterating his familiar mantra on the “political solution” and “dialogue,” which barely masks his support for Bashir al-Assad. Continued Russian arms sales to the murderous Assad regime should be crystal clear evidence of which side Moscow favors in the conflict. Before going any further, however, let’s be clear what we mean when we say “Russia,” vis-a-vis Syria or any other likeminded tyrant, for that matter. After all, it is Putin and his ilk who support and provide lifelines to such leaders around the world, whether it is Lukashenko in neighboring Belarus, Assad in Syria, or Chavez in Venezuela. Such support comes from the Kremlin, not Russia writ large, and certainly not from the Russian opposition or Russian civil society. It is critical to draw such a distinction. With that clarified, let’s look at why Putin and the Kremlin have staked the position they have on Syria. What are the Kremlin’s motives for its obstinate defense of Assad? Conventional wisdom offers several explanations. For starters, there are sales of Russian arms to Assad. About 75 percent of Syrian weapons come from Russia, and Syria is the fourth most lucrative market in the Russian arms trade, with $700 million delivered to Damascus in 2011. Then there is Russia’s small naval base at Tartus, the last Russian base in the Mediterranean. Syria is the last Soviet-era bastion and client state left in the Middle East, and the Kremlin does not want to lose it. Syria is also a gateway to Iran. Then there is Putin’s suspicion of the West Arab Spring, Arab Spring, isstilla nightmarefor Putin)andthe that (a scenario Orange context Revolution the of reasons.In the in Ukrainetarian forand rejectionof any humani including intervention intervention, sovereignty,tal and“unbreakable” commitmentto non-interference, welfareit ismorefocused on itsown itison the of others. futurethan people,for Syrian the of lin hasshown suffering utter to indifference the West.limits on the Krem Sadly, the things, processof doingthese in the strategy,survival andtoward Russia canstillimpose demonstratingthat geared toward Kremlin’s the bolstering became an arenaofconflict positions. Accordingly, MiddleEast Kremlin’s lastclientstate in the the andWestern American the to at leastundermine dorse itsstance,ittries team world Russian can’tforce orpersuadethe ruling Ifthe toreach. en Russian personalizedpowerthe system needsto demonstrate global andreproduceitself, type:In order to preserve regimesof this other world. from differs of the Thisishowparts Russian authoritarianism order wherever possible – inRussia’s own neighborhood other orin American the andundermine Kremlin hasto contain America tions, the works. Tomechanism reproducepersonalizedpower globalaspira with behaviordislikes issimply orphobias,this how Kremlin survival the of Putin’spersonallikes or McFaul. randomnora reflection Neither endlessharassmentof U.S.play in the Ambassadorto Moscow Michael hasbeenmost vividly fora. on dis Councilorin other Thisswitch rity United the to States block UN Secu andseeks anti-Americanism atthe towhenever vocal Kremlin switches andwherever possible.Thus,the Russianactively for Matrix. foreign the policymeansto itlooks support 1999), atany timeafter has beenchallenged more other morethan the problemsathome(andsincelastDecember,gime isconfronted with it enemy Russiathat to into turn a besieged The morePutin’sre fortress. attemptsthe to consolidate society by seekingoutan enemy and using legitimation by superpowerimitation),and aspirations(oratleasttheir pillars:personalizedpower, a statusquo by supported three serve its Kremlin isto for pre the tin’s domesticagenda. The domesticpriority a liability for Russia. tor, even ifheis especially in Russia’s so-calledsphereof influence), to save matter Kremlin istrying Assad(orfor any that dicta the other discover it,we systemic explainwhy mustlookto factors the that Moscowresolved without andhispersonalparticipation. later. world Putinalsowantsto globalproblemscan’tbe remind the that andaskquestions policyfirst to resist American and hisknee-jerk reflex the Russian systemis indirectly fragilityof the and Putin’s a nodto the Kremlin’s concept of sovereigntythe guarantees itsfuture(afact that All this is true, but there is something elseatwork issomething butthere aswell. istrue, ToAll this The Kremlin’s survival strategy revolves concept of toThe Kremlin’ssurvival aroundthe This translates United in concrete the to terms States blocking of Pu Here we foreign policyisan instrument mustrecognizethat ------

55 Why Russia Doesn’t Hold the Keys to Syria beginningLaurent Fabius Geneva meeting wasthe the declared that alsosoundedhopeful.French Foreign Geneva talks Minister the after Clintonof a transitionpower of State Secretary Hillary in Syria. Obama and accepted idea with the histalks his viewof Assadduring Putinhadshifted announcedthat Minister David Cameronhurriedly Los Cabossummit,UKPrime the side.During has comearoundto their is,“managed opposition.”of “opponents”– that dialogue” meanscarefully selected peopleappointed to role play the meaning.In Russia, “political opposition hasaspecific Assad andthe to force outAssad,even ifitwere to change itsposition. tant. Moreover, leverage Moscow arenosignsthat hassufficient there consul of MonicaLewinskyasa marriage services like dependingon the metaphor: ToAdam Garfinkle’s dependon Putinto save situation is the Russiantransition” doesnot politicalvocabulary. existin the We liked him outwould Kremlin’s attitudeto power. contradictthe A“managed isunlikelythis to work, for Assadisbeyond redemption, andpushing to leavesuade Assadeither orto behave in a morecivilizedway. Alas, powerwhen hebelieves that belongsonly leader. to the endorse a peacefultransfer of power opposition leader to the fromthe Thisiswhy Putinmustweaken Putinwillnot West’srule, the influence. Kremlin’s controloverRussia situation. To andthe the his strengthen Middle East,oratrocities,geopolitical isabout goals.No,in the Syria of anunraveling threat in itself.Noris not isitaboutthe aboutSyria U.S.” the forThis iswherewe Putin’sregime, with Thus,Syria, differ Kremlin’s major “Democracycan’tbetransferred. the headache: firmed makov, St. Petersburg atthe World reaf EconomicForum lastmonth, Former countries.” Ministerfairs of other Russian Yevgenii Prime Pri af internal of politicalpressureandto in the intervene an instrument “Russia willopposeattempts as concept to human rights of use the “responsibility to protect” tothe civilian life. in case ofthreat of all (expandedin 2005)–first rope andChapter UNcharter VIIof the West the Council of Eu mands that forget of the principles aboutthe to states!” other rules West: to the is in essenceawarning “You have to dictate noright your concept sovereignty this true of itsneighbors.Inshort, recognize the conceptherence to of “spheresinterest,” Kremlin doesnot the the Ironically, seemsunthinkable). a scenario itsad if such in declaring Western were broughtdown interference, MubarakandQadaffi (even on Russian in Egypt soilsimilarto orLibya,nario those where,through regime). Focused Kremlin wantsto avoid on sustainingitself,the a sce concept of “totalIndeed, the sovereignty” Moscow meansthat de belief of WesternWhat isreally Putin puzzling is the leadersthat politicaldialogue”betweenThe Kremlin’scallfor a “solutionthrough The West, however, Moscow hopethat willhelpper clingsto the Putin hasopenly confessed hismajor regardingSyria: concern ------

56 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles in fact belookingfor excuses to do nothing. Westernmascus.” Ifthe powers continueto may keys, wait for they such keys “Russia to has the arguingthat Da to proceed without right the Putin. with modities. Sadly, West the to mighteven play a tradinggame agree such com of Syrian privatization oil transitroutes anda centralroleinthe like concessionsover things andendingwith sian andEurasianaffairs demandslike “don’tmeddle”in Rus with ments couldbelong,starting The listofpossibleentice Russian Matrix. the Kremlin to strengthen the insideRussia. hisown purposes as itserves only solong end;heisa friend to the sad represents.Putinisnofriend does not careaboutAssadpersonally; rather, careaboutwhatAs they same time. pretending atthe anddisagree to agree howtion. Andithaslearned to two drive horsesin opposite directions, livesstronger or itsown position:Itdoesnot careaboutSyrians’ reputa gamehasa much a solution.TheKremlininthis and ishelpingto find ble inclinations.The Kremlinpretends ithasleverage that over Damascus an excuse for aswell West’s doingnothing, asa demonstrationofthe no Assadregimewindsupbeing respectto the The Kremlin’s obstinacywith andpretend Russia arelookingfor ison board. a breakthrough, that they Pretend!” in agameof“Let’s Westernare takingpart leaderspretend that evidentrelish. plays with leverage andwould not allow himto enjoy role ofaspoiler, the he which WesternPutin’s acceptance of the would planfor Syria leave himwithout saying. don’tunderstandthat Kremlin istruly Orperhaps they what the Moscow Assadshouldgo? andthat never saidthat Geneva talks, of the somepowers that results statements effect to the “misinterpret” the or whoshouldberemoved frompower?” Have missedLavrov’s they to decide for nationswhoshouldbebroughtto right other powerthe global mediaannounced. the Annan’sunitygovernmentof Assad’s end.Russia plan,” “supports Really? Why not listen “nobodyhas dothey to Putin’s mantrathat “responsibility to protect”Of course,the provision West gives the But Putinwould to perhaps play agree alongifdoingsocouldhelp Kremlin willnever betray the meanthat Assad?No. Putin Does this Concert” “Syria One can’tavoid all the sidesin impression that the Western don’thear(orreally optimists wantto either hear) ------

57 Why Russia Doesn’t Hold the Keys to Syria Ukraine, Russia, and Two Horses Lilia Shevtsova & David J. Kramer / The American Interest, August 21, 2012

Nearly twenty years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski famously said, “Rus- sia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both… Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine sub- orned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.” Uninterested in becoming a democracy, today’s Kremlin has not given up the hope of regaining a facsimile of its old empire, with Ukraine at its core. To be sure, the Kremlin today is pragmatic enough to understand that it can’t revive the corpse of the USSR (though Georgians may beg to differ), but it would like to create the Eurasian Union – a new version of “satellites along its periphery.” Russia’s leaders sure have a strange way of pursuing this agenda, as illustrated by the most recent meeting in July between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine. Vladimir Putin kept his host, Viktor Yanu- kovych, waiting three hours – not due to any dramatic circumstances but out of sheer rudeness. Putin left Moscow late, but then, to add insult to injury, after arriving in Crimea he stopped first to meet with a bunch of bikers. Only after that did he make time for an official visit. Such appalling lack of diplomatic etiquette was a direct slap in Yanu- kovych’s face, an intentional gesture of both impudence and intimida- tion (albeit one Putin has made to other foreign leaders and CEOs). Big Russia was teaching Yanukovich and Ukraine a lesson – or so the Russian leaders thought! This incident demonstrated not only the personal animosity between the two leaders but also the mutual suspicion and distrust that plagues the relationship between the two states. Russia’s leaders never hesitate to remind Ukraine who the big boy on the block is – a strange way, to say the least, to win over friends and allies. Indeed, one should not underestimate Moscow’s ability to alienate potential partners through its arrogant, aggressive approach to foreign policy, especially when its immediate neighbors are involved. Of all the states in Eurasia, Ukraine is the most important test of the Kremlin’s neo-imperialistic longings and of Russia’s readiness (or not) to be a modern state. It is also is a test of the West’s interest in expanding its normative principles eastward, which can best be of wanting to be absorbedby Moscow, senseof pursuing the butin Ukraineintosought to another, turn smallerRussia sense – not in the Yanukovych Ukrainian path, leaders. Butinstead of pursuinga truly country. expense ofthe interests atthe own leadershave pursuingtheir tion. Ukraine’s beenpreoccupiedwith have popula and isnow opposition)that disappointed greatly the in the Orange days the wasin charge during in charge now one that andthe andan invitation fortarianism Russians same. to do the toward West the blow itwould Kremlin’s authori for bea crushing the ifUkraine –especially a democraticUkraine–movesunderstands that globalaspirationsandsatellite Kremlin itself without states. Indeed, the ways Russian to can’treproduce politicalsystem, energize the which for new search ing gasto Kremlin isthe for Europe). Moreimportant the Stream, of South Ukraine islessessentialto Moscow start forthe carry Nord Stream gas pipeline(infact,after Ukrainian assets and andthe cajole, andintimidate Kievinto “rejoining”itsorbit.Thisgoesbeyond Ukraine.Thatiswhy Kremlin willpressure, without the can’t beformed Sovietthe Kiev, Union without couldnot survive today new alliance the joinRussia. ItneedsUkraineas an anchor.and Belarus 1991, Asin when leverage. Eurasian Union entityifonly Kazakhstan Butthe serious isn’ta legitimacyand for finding Kremlin’s instrument regionisthe role in the na. The EurasianUnion isnot a newPutinhobby. StrengtheningRussia’s to are compensate international seeks to erosionby the for turning that Kremlin agenda. power on for Ashisown the to grip erode,Putin starts siveness importance toward isnodoubtaboutUkraine’s Ukraine,there statehood. of their tory, family ties,language, andmany birthplace Russians seeKievasthe same. Theyarelinked object ofitsattention by ifitwishesthe his the asking creates first in Russia a longingtothat embrace without such “family.”ble reconstitutionof the region in the country Thereisnoother possi aboutUkraineandthe think liberals stop beingliberalswhenthey Moscow’s “Slavic again.Even fold, brothers” reunitingthe many Russian Kievwillcomelimping into back andhopethat andtribulations trials Those feelings have not goneaway, asmany Russians lookatUkraine’s twomore than decadesago;to many Russians, itwaslike losinga limb. society atlarge resented having to recognize Ukrainianindependence for a newidentity.ing search Russian elite of the and part Asignificant based on ademocraticpath. advanced ifUkraineitselfdemonstrates a desirefor deeperintegration top, rife with corruption, butpretending corruption, top, with rife area:controlled fromthe gray Putinism on aUkrainianscale. Thishasmeantkeeping Ukraine in a For Russia, in Moscow’s Ukraineisimportant desperate andongo Yanukovych cameto power Orange Ukrainianstiredof their after one the leaderships (both Ukraine hasitsown different drama,with While today’s aggres Kremlindoesnot demonstrate overt, military ------

59 Ukraine, Russia, and Two Horses asian space,not simply in geopolitical butfor terms civilizationaldevel owntheir borders. problemsliesnot in Moscow answer butwithin country’s the to their tolerance out.For forthat poorleadership isrunning many Ukrainians, suggests Ukrainiancivilsociety that throughout isa stirring but there politicalleadersof allstripes, with population istiredandfrustrated the to future. Closeto insist onfreeelectionsandabrighter eight years later, Kremlin willallowthe Yanukovych two to ride horses. doesn’t care.The policyofbalancingisover, Europenor becauseneither acquisitive instincts.Yanukovych orjust failsto understand this either relations – andbewillingto help buttressUkrainefromMoscow’s Westif itisdemocratic,for willthe only then beinterested in deeper independentonlypushes himdown same road.Ukrainecanbetruly the Kremlin’s satellites asthe anddependents. them: andLukashenko Kremlin hasBelarus exactlyshenko, whereitwants the sovereignty andeconomicassets to Russia. Luka- Even ifPutinloathes of Belarusian essentially Kremlin’s hostage, givingupparts in turn the betweenance hiscountry EuropeandRussia andimmediately became to dictatorship, Byturning Lukashenkoin Belarus. losthisabilityto bal wanted to extract morefromhisUkrainianpartner. viewed dealasevidenceof weakness this on Yanukovych’s and part until 2042 –only insatiableappetite. whetted Russian Putin Bear’s the SeaFleet for Black 25years, another for ued useof Sevastopol’s the port Russia Medvedev Ukrainegranted contin – inwhich President Dmitri 2010 The April Russian counterparts. then- Kharkiv dealsignedwith vicissitudesof Russia’sto leadership. the similarbehavior.with Heinstead gets West ostracizedby the – andleft its overall Yanukovych, sizeandimportance. however, doesn’tget away Councilseat,itsenergyresources,and weapons, Security itspermanent way. other justlookingthe most part, butalso,for the agreements WestPutin’s, the respondedby delaying freetradeandassociation tostarted clamp down on freedoms andhisbehavior beganto resemble viewed SowhenYanukovych isoften asa headache. ing Ukraine,which andwaninginterest integrat in crisis financial inward becauseof the push-and-pull fromMoscow.the interests Instead, have Europe’s turned interested istruly in havingthat Ukrainemove toward Europeto counter West.the To Yanukovych a trick, succeedatsuch needsto have a West national scene –onemoving toward West the away andanother from two inter same timeriding horseson the to be ademocracyandatthe Moreover, West Ukraineisfor Europeandthe key Eur to the the outin Maidan of Ukrainiansturned In 2004,hundredsof thousands Yanukovych’s clampdown on democraticactors andinstitutions Yanukovych Lukashenko’s shouldtake heedof Aleksander fate YanukovychOn top of allthis, hasshowed poorunderstandingof his Putin canget away hisbehavior becauseof Russia’s with nuclear ------

60 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles his country. atstake. hopeUkrainiansociety Let’s recognizeswhat’s West for the to Kremlin’s thumb, him and willbecomeshutoff under the governor elections, hemay province of another end upasthe the to rig IfYanukovych place to start. electionsarethe Rada andthe path, tries democratic needto topendence andcontrolof itsassets, return the they inde Ukrainian elite wantsto country’s Ifthe guarantee their an effort. Kremlin, too. The Westand the consequences of such muststressthe plan would a outcomeaheadof time;such pleasePutin their termine Yanukovych,more important. following Kremlin model,wantsto de the power.as a normative asa powerfulserve test abilityto for present itselfonceagain Europe’s a concrete senseof belongingand,down road, membershipwillalso the by to offering return conditionsfor a democraticpath external Ukraine’s democratichopes.Creatingfavorable stimulusfor itsneighbors’ erful most pow again,itwillactasthe opment. Ifa democraticUkrainerises This makes Ukraine’s parliamentary elections this October even electionsthis parliamentary This makes Ukraine’s - - -

61 Ukraine, Russia, and Two Horses Obama vs. Romney: Who Would Putin Pick? Lilia Shevtsova & David J. Kramer / The American Interest, September 11, 2012

In his speech accepting the Republican nomination for president, Mitt Romney vowed to take a hard line in dealing with Russia. “Under my administration,” he said, “our friends will see more loyalty, and Mr. Putin will see a little less flexibility and more backbone.” Earlier in the campaign, Romney had cited Russia as “our number one geopolitical foe.” The party platform endorsed at the Republican convention calls for passage of legislation that would impose a visa ban and asset freeze against Russian officials involved in gross human rights abuses: “Russia should be granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations, but not without sanctions on Russian officials who have used the government to violate human rights. We support enactment of the Mag- nitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act as a condition of expanded trade relations with Russia.”

A week later, the Democratic Party platform criticized Romney’s comments on Russia and defended the Obama administration’s approach to dealing with Russia: The Cold War mentality represented by Mitt Romney's identifica- tion of Russia as “our number one geopolitical foe” ignores the very real common interest we share with Russia in reducing nuclear stockpiles, stopping additional proliferation by countries such as Iran and North Korea, and preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. The President's “reset” policy toward Russia has produced significant cooperation in these areas, as well as in Russian support for the Northern Distribution Network that supplies our troops in Afghani- stan… At the same time, we are candid with the Russians when we disagree. The administration will not put aside our differences but will raise them directly with the Russian government. And we will continue to strongly criticize Russian actions that we oppose, such as their support for the Assad regime in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin wasted little time weighing in with his reaction to the two candidates’ views. In a recent interview, Putin praised the Kremlin’s relations with the Obama administration, notwithstanding ongoing differences over missile defense: U.S.From the perspective, Putin’scrackdown athome –exemplified by globalpyramid. helm ofthe BushandPutinatthe ium with U.S.-Russian era ofthe beginning ofanewera:the worldthe condomin Washington wasto with mark waron terrorism tin, partnering in the advice ofhiscloseadvisers.For even againstthe 9/11 Pu to attacks, the Bush’sresponse and “saw supported hissoul”andPutinsoonafter summerof 2001,in Ljubljana the whenBushlooked into Putin’seyes of Georgia. Thingsbetween to PutinandBushgot a goodstart off W. Bush administrationplummeted following Russian invasion the George end ofthe relationsatthe Kremlin, especiallyner for after the tostarted crumble. itspositionhas team even today asevidencemountsthat issurvival, key domesticgoalfor itsdomesticgoals,andthe to Putin’s achieving outside world the agenda. areinstrumental The Kremlin’srelationswith tial candidates: namely, onewillhelpitpursueitsown which domestic lems for him?Not necessarily. Would by Kremlin gosofarasto not help hischances the creatingprob to blast Romney:a chance better.”to for the change much same time,Putindidn’tpassup Atthe his neighbors’ affairs were steady affairs responsiblefor decline. ence in hisneighbors’ the in October 2003of MikhailKhodorkovsky arrest the – andhisinterfer Trade Organization.Therehave beenmorereasonsto be optimis World U.S., memberof the by the Russia hasbecomea full-fledged Russia-U.S. relations.We have new START signedthe treaty. Backed Medvedev have way to on the madea lot strengthening of progress over“I believe last four that years the PresidentsObamaand It didn’ttake bilateral longfor relationshipto the sour, however. PresidentObamaproved term, In hisfirst to be awelcome part U.S. itassessesthe by presiden which The Kremlinhasonecriterion Russia would meanthat preferDoes allthis to see Obamareelected? someone to be anenemy.” to lead anation,especially a superpower U.S., like the proclaims arenawhena politician,personwhoaspires international on the astools of U.S.segregation domesticpolicy. same effect Ithasthe same asusingnationalismand arenaisthe international on the behavior hewasobviously wrong,becausesuch that I alsothink extent motivated election raceandrhetoric, by the but “As for Mr. isto Romney’s a certain position,we this understandthat Obamaas“anhonestperson whoreally wants Putin alsodescribed accumulated quite a lot of positive experience.” words, In other of weapons andothers. we of mass-destruction have nonproliferation in the andorganizedcrime, in combating terrorism cooperation tic aboutourbilateral relations:ourstrengthened ------

63 Obama vs. Romney: Who Would Putin Pick? prime minister paradoxicallyprime gaineddomestically by to returning anti- then-Russian the Putindid,though to reset keep goingmorethan the may havein turn, created an impression in Moscow Obamaneeded that asoneof itstop foreign policysuccesses.This, administration officials trol over property). accessionwould Kremlin madesurethat not hamper the itscon that fact accessionismoreambiguousdueto the on Iran (Russia’s WTO of its own: New START Afghan transit,the Treaty, anda resolution to be clear,administration – although, U.S. the didaccomplish goals rhetoric. Obama how The Kremlinquickly the learned to deal with Medvedev’s modernization Dmitri well for then-President assupport imitationdemocracy, legitimacyforseeking international their as Kremlin apresentasRussianinadvertently leaderswere handingthe Russiadesire to wound build consensual,“win-win”relationswith up establishment: tration, a viewlikely Russian official sharedamongthe positive attitudetowardcussion Club,explainsthe Obama adminis the butdownplayedof his key foreign policypriorities humanrights. dispelled, however, “reset” one asObamaandhisadvisersmadethe suspicionswerepresident would those continuepushingvalues.Quickly new American the ciously Russian feared by that leadership,which the USSR. collapse ofthe since the sunk relationsbetween Moscow andWashington lowest to their depth in May Third Reich 2007).the The Russian-Georgian warin August 2008 – even speech hisreference 2007 United to Munich the Statesary as to Russiathreats in 2004andhisFebru (recallhispost-Beslanremarks Putin later skillfully usedto his advantage external in playing upthe of NATO that eastward,andmissiledefense were sources offriction the UkraineandGeorgia,expansion color revolutions in neighboring the U.S. Kremlin’s perspective,From the for the invasion of Iraq,support By 2010, Russia reset wasbeingtouted policywith the by Obama stanceandhis normative Obama’s unexpected rejectionof the White Houseof betrayal.”ing the designed not of accus to Republicans opportunity give another the election campaign a nodto andaremainly the morethan nothing matter are on this statements beingmadeby administrationofficials sition leaderswasunassuming.The isolated andopenly low-key againstoppo measures recently taken Russian by authorities the The U.S.of democracy andhumanrights… targeted responseto the tempering U.S. of Russia bysignificant the on issues of itscriticism Cold War… reset policywaslargely The successof the dueto the ideology-driven end ofthe foreign policyin U.S. sincethe history most realisticandleast Obamaadministrationispursuingthe “The Suslov,Here ishow Dmitry pro-KremlinValdai a memberofthe Dis Largely unknown Kremlin, Obamainitially to wasviewed the suspi ------

64 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles insight: foreign Fyodor policycalculations.Russian Lukyanov expert this offered lessprominently in U.S.Russian coolerandfigure relations willbemuch Korea andon nuclearnonproliferation.”Afghanistan, North on Iran, needMoscow’s whileAmericans support much House very White of the [Russia] support doesnot need the country this to WTO, Alexei Pushkov admission Duma official said,“ . after andthe experts leadingKremlinforeign policy Asoneof the Russia needsAmerica. needsRussia morethan America Kremlin believes that cases, the Kremlin pretexts U.S. ney givingthe In both to hold upthe asa threat. down Rom athome,orwith Kremlin cracks way other whilethe the Obamalooking Romney one:with ora first a second Obamaterm paying any price. to down maintain bilateral tieswhilealsocracking athomewithout not provoke President,enablingit retaliation undereither American will itsnewassertiveness Kremlin mightconcludethat sia. Thusthe Rus as a Presidentandwantto of confrontationwith avoid risk the standing histough rhetoric asa candidate, would bemoremoderate better newKremlin’sdomesticagenda.fit in the reset, Romney of Putinandthe may hiscriticism actually tionship. With typeof rela one. AndObamaislesslikely for this to justification offer – namely, America typeof relationshipwith a different a moreassertive will betempted Russia to willpursue into turn “besieged a that fortress” reset anymore. team leader ofthe Russian Instead, ruling need the the Kremlin doesnot emy situation,the system. to In this the perpetuate for Soviet to an en search Thisisa return the traditionof the America. powerhas to come fromagreat representsan aliencivilization: that To sohardto look macho! tries an elite that threat lookconvincing, the would orneighbor; that behumiliatingfor country or froma normal Kremlin (realorimagined)can’tcomefrominside for the The threat for requires an enemy. a search which demands justification, in turn, to This, Kremlin to repressive in orderto turn survive. the mechanisms athomehasforced growing problemsandfadingpopularity periencing administration’s linkage. rejectionof relationship becauseof the in the all, hasnot prevented Putinfrombehaving paying badly any without price isa tendency to of which avoid part Kremlin. Thereset, upsetting after the since, to Putin, Obamaisby now hostage almosta to his own reset policy, would optionObama term Kremlin’s preferred – especially seemto be the logic,a second histraditionalistbase.Bythis sloganscourting American in Putin andnot Kremlin.The moment when the Medvedev in the same content isimpossible.“Reset-2 the Not with becausewe have day, end ofthe At the election, U.S.- regardlessof who winsthe either Kremlin couldbehappyThis leadsusto with conclude the Romney,Still, Kremlinpragmatistsmightassumethat notwith Yet Russian realityismorecomplicated. the Putinisex The factthat ------

65 Obama vs. Romney: Who Would Putin Pick? What willworld G- politicsin this European powers void the anytime in this that aregoingto soon. fill itisnot clear ongoing eurocrisis, the morepassivemuch role.Andwith to andnow in Libya, a Syria, a shift Maliisevidenceof crises roles in the The Obamaadministration’sreluctanceto takeabout them. leading worldworld, restofthe isthinking shouldcare whatthe Americans missioninthe about their leadersthink asAmerica’s Nevertheless, United electionoutcomein the States. on the will have any influence Russia norPutin neither someunforeseencampaign.” crisis, Barring “Russia is taking center United stagethinks in the States presidential Kremlin-sponsored site RussiaToday.com,the ishallucinating ifhe for Bridge,writing presidentialelections!Robert didate in America’s itpreaches. values andprinciples care aboutthe does to America Russiansend a strongsignalofsupport liberalsthat less of ballots have the into actualpolicyafter beencastandcounted. Regard campaign rhetoricopposition ismindfulthat doesn’talways translate Obama administrationhasopposed,Russia’s the Magnitsky Act, which againforplatform evidenceof this: win, would adopt a tougher linetoward GOP Putin’sKremlin.Seethe Republican candidate, the shouldhe rhetoric, opposition hopesthat the Forand legitimizationof Putin’srule. now, basedon Romney’s early of Obama’s reset policyfor itsdownplaying concerns of humanrights Russian opposition, there tends Russian view to opposition,there be acritical Among the – Russiaboth andAmerica.” test for second Obamapresidencycouldbecomeaserious tions, the toterests anticipa of two sidescoincidedhaspassed…Contrary You mightwell can Putinhasa preferred askwhocareswhether Sergei Republican by endorsementof the While heartened the democracies.” of modern ranks in the fullparticipation to their better, The Russian peopledeserve ist regimein Belarus. aswe look East; neighborswhileprotecting last Stalin andbullying their the Middle tyrantsin the Republic of Georgia,alignmentwith of the press, andinstitutionsofcivilsociety; unprovokedthe invasion havethey beenfollowing: suppressionof oppositionparties, government path to leaders oftheir “[W]e urge reconsider the the who wins the election, passage of 0 world looklike? the Magnitsky legislation wouldthe - - - -

66 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Goodbye, America! Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, October 9, 2012

My title, “Goodbye, America!” is taken from a song in the super popular Russian flick Brother 2 (the 2000 sequel to the also popular post-Soviet crime film, Brother). The film’s protagonist, Danila, accom- panies his brother to Chicago, where he tries to “do justice,” becoming involved in a series of encounters with different types of Americans, both good guys and bad ones. By film’s end, Danila’s brother has decided to stay in America, preferring to go to an American jail for murder rather than to return to Russia, but Danila himself leaves America with no regrets and returns home. The movie, a box office hit in Russia, symbolized the idea that Vladimir Putin’s Russia was “getting up from its knees” and putting an end to Boris Yeltsin’s “pathetic years,” in which it envied the West and attempted to imitate it. Danila returns to Russia convinced that he will surely find “truth and power” there. The ending was pure Putin. No wonder the Russian president later quoted a line from the movie: “Power is where the truth is.” So truth and power are in Russia and not in America. The movie depicts a whole slew of feelings and emotions that Danila, a young, affable Russian street gangster, experiences toward the only superpower remaining after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those feelings include: sarcasm; a sincere, almost childlike astonish- ment and bewilderment upon coming into contact with the confusing America; respect for America’s might and majesty; and the conviction that nevertheless Russia has something that America does not. In a word, the movie depicts a simpleton’s patriotism: “We still have it better than you guys.” There is no explanation of what exactly is better, but this undefined “something” provides the basis for feelings of self-confidence – the very same contradictory feelings residing deep in many Russians’ hearts today. To be sure, American movies about Russia are no less simplistic: full of samovars, caviar, matryoshka dolls, Russian mafiosi, and bum- bling spies. There is no shortage of stereotyping, for that matter, in any country’s popular media. But the fuller truth is that there is a multitude of Russian attitudes toward America, because there are now, in the post- Soviet period, many different Russias. There is the Kremlin Russia, power ( Russia’s claimsof Russian world Matrix: endurance of the role asa great existence conditions for and create the the lowing that principles sian civilization. testify existence to of a distinctive that developing the Rus – principles Russian state the distinctive is alongwhich setlies in the of principles tions between United the States andpresent-day Russia. The problem manyStates autocracies. relationswith friendly hasrather into hostility. Yes, United regime,butthe Russia hasan authoritarian However, principles. different shouldnot automatically this translate developed isobvious;Russiasystems. around Thatmuch andAmerica pointto in value differences Others in areasofmutualconcern. another abilityto one cooperate their and Indiadonot andtrust interfere with between, differences butsuch say, areright, they tion; in part, America alienation? Somewillsay itisculture,politicalmentality, andtradi reason for this aliencivilizations.Whatisthe spiritually different, other, representtwo Russiaon the andAmerica completely nevertheless interests, onehand,andAmerican moment,on the sian interests of the Rus andunofficial between orevenprochement, official agreement, the way out? sofar, of society recognizesbutfromwhich, a substantial part itseesno – aplightthat itselftrappedin dead endRussia finds the characterize its system drama.How isa civilizationalandhistorical elsecouldwe whatisnow canbenodoubtthat happeningto RussiaAnd there and Russian drama. rolein the playness to significant a do so,Americans “Russian willingnessorreadi Regardless Matrix.” can callthe of their ditional Russian system predicated on personalizedpower, we which tra the meansof preserving combineto the oneof to form America stance toward policies relatedfor the Russia. andthe Thismeans that mestic scene.Moreover, factor hassystemic American significance the factorsmost important in itsforeign policybutalsoasa factor its do in tional system, Russia not continuesto only view America asoneof the Soviet collapse ofthe Union bipolar interna the 21 years andthe after factthat, we a generalward America, the phenomenonin canobserve andpoliticaldiscourse. in official also an even vaster Russian publicspace,whosevoice isseldomheard in many voices different nationalist oppositionsspeaks aswell. Thereis country. and toward andtheir liberal, left, The Russia Americans of the feelings down display into breaks varying segmentsthat cal class,which politi ruling Russia of the Thereisthe of itspropagandaofficials. those voice its leader(Putin’svoice, of in the for now), speaks which aswell as Whatever attitudes ofRussia’s politicalclassorsociety the to This Russian “distinctiveness” fol or “uniqueness” isbasedon the There aredeep-seated impossibility reasonsfor of closerela the Please pay attention beinga possibilityofrap here:Despite there derzhavnost’ influence and satel ); expansionism; spheresof influence ------

68 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles principal distinctive characteristic of personalizedpower. distinctive characteristic principal the remains United that of the States militarism for the wasa justification solidated Soviet post-Stalin society in the era.The nuclear containment con slogansthat wasoneof the functional role.“Overtake America!” enemy.of an internal Stalin’s United heirsassignedthe States same the aswell terms, asworldgoals in militarist creation expansionandthe hierarchy of Russia’s helpedhimto formulate the asa rival ing America Hav into a factor Matrix. America for sustainingthe of turning art the war,policy wasmostactively the practicedafter asJosefStalin perfected lished policy of Unitedto the States. respect Kremlinwith motives dominate other in the that neutralize the society. Trade and cannot andeconomiccooperationaresecondary for consolidatingRussianrow mosteffective instruments – isoneofthe canbeplayed Kremlin todaythat upby the butplayed down tomor derzhavnost’ world’sto the top-tier powers and also provides foundations for their stillbelongs country their to feeling hold onto that an opportunity the global players. Conversations Washington with give Russian leaders myth ofRussia asa superpowerthe andto key appear to be oneofthe kind. of this affirmation for self- an opportunity Russian world Matrix the affords in the that competitionthe canbeimitated. The United States only country isthe power, other ence. Ifoneisn’teven sameleagueasthe playing in the to distance oneselffromit,andto compete itfor world with influ to similar world a compare oneselfwith power, power, to contain that requires oneconstantly maintaining existingspheresof influence it. sionist propsto support doesnot require Chinese one,which overtlythe andexpan aggressive systems like, for instance, authoritarian fromother different sian Matrix politicsaretiedtogether andexternal Rus internal – makesin which the way – the characteristic Thisspecific authoritarianism. vation of the world preser Kremlin’s world justifythe claims;the claims,in turn, personalized power of its the Kremlin sustainsitselfby virtue in the in areciprocalrelationship.Thus, Theyareintertwined them. without cansurvive Russianis nobasisfor authoritarianism concludingthat stillapply world. and,asof yet, into principles other the there Butallthe canbebrought ideas that outof Kremlin hasrun of communism; the enemy. fall impulse the exhausted itselfwith missionary of The principle for a foreign constant search andthe outreach; lite states; missionary the United betweenible in switching and rejectionof the dialoguewith Little has changed since then. The Kremlinhasbecome moreflex Little haschanged since then. United the Playing States off to estab attain systemic goalswasthe United the Relations States with allow Kremlin to maintain the context, great-power keepingIn this upone’s appearancesand – that isto say,claim. Managed – that anti-Americanism emotions the Sovietthe Union even before World War II. However, this ------

69 Goodbye America! alternative to and pri represents the tional liberal community that interna force the of driving because itisthe status quo, primarily the them. a meansofmodernizing than order rather have a meansof protecting always statehood beenprimarily andinternal pretations areallowed bureaucracy, in the policies asexternal inasmuch century, 16th ifnot the 19th like a relicofthe bureaucracy looks foreign service spheres, the working policy economicandinternal in the regimeofficials son to the statefunction collectively values.In compari guardians ofarchaic asthe of independentanalysts) (excluding narrow group a very cy andexperts cies arenoexception. However, bureaucra foreign in Russia, service the liberal democra everywhere; institutions are conservative foreign service course, Of whowork field. of those in this as well conservatism asby the traditionalism in Russia’s foreign policycompared to spheresof life, other survival. sake of geopoliticalthe ambitions;now Kremlin’s geopolitics isabout the has comewhenRussia cannot to afford engage in geopolitics justfor foreign policyissuesto extent a fargreater simply The time to survive. Kremlin willexploit Putin’s regimebecomemorepronounced,the for diminishing publicsupport instabilityandthe In fact, asinternal status quo. the more limited mainly scopeandisfixated on preserving foreign policyhasa much power country’s decline,the isin terminal in itsSoviet Matrix jectives incarnation.) of the World” ob asdirectorindirectmeansof attainingthe policies –served world of the “Third socialistsystem, the preservation expansion andthe communist for drive the the nuclear standoff, the risks, security the Soviet time ofthe – Union,the foreign buteven policypriorities then roomfor wasfargreater on foreign maneuvering policyissuesat there way, (Bythe that. Iamnotobjectives arguingwith andinstruments. ithasitsowntics isnot politics,that simply of internal an instrument stancetowardregime’s America. personalized cooperationchange the sues canchange it,norcansuch of U.S.-Russianunchanged. Andnodegree cooperationon tacticalis hasremained West, Matrix intointegration the essence ofthe butthe of resources,aswellto Russian quest a lack elite’s asthe for personal United the States confrontationwith to due reject itspoliciesofmilitary States, asdictated moment.Moscow by itsneedsof the wasforced America plays Kremlinpoliciesof maintaining a keyAmerica rolein the statusquo greater isalsobeinghelpedby of the the The preservation Today whenRussian civilizationbasedon traditionalpersonalized analysis poli by external this saying that with One may disagree How Enemy the Chosen Is

century. liberalnoreven Neither competing inter ------

70 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles are generated (and financed) externally is more expedient, though it are generated externally ismoreexpedient, though (andfinanced) enemies internal the appearance.Believingthat reasons forternal their arein own, would there appearon their as this meanthat and rivals one. The Russian regime cannot acknowledge enemies internal that external projections ofthe arethe for enemiesthat to internal search Itallows Kremlin Russian Matrix. the sustainability ofthe tant for the its “enemy numberone.” late isalsoan expressionofnostalgiafor Soviet the America Union and Russian politicalmentality.in the a stancetoward And,of course,such image an such of America Soviettion of the traditionin preserving Russian personalizedregime.To onecanseea continua a degree, alien liberalcivilization. unite by whenthreatened the but they Russia caseof disputes andBelarus), (asin the be embroiledin fierce states canalso Kremlin. True, a hostile civilizationby the authoritarian can work alongsideRussia West, to contain the isviewed which as paradigmand lies elsewhere.Chinaoperates underan authoritarian reason why Kremlin Chinadoesnot for embodya systemic the threat between Soviet the Unionconflict 1969). andChina,in crucial Butthe hasalreadybeenonepost-warboundary balls(there not throw soft force in responseto provocation. Moscow Chinawill understandsthat an enemy,ness. Chinacannot besuch essentially becauseitmay use cially, willnot allow itselfto be provoked Kremlin’s aggressive by the has to exist areally powerful enemy, a large cru state, butonethat, to maintain the Balticstates.possible to But on the single outPoland again,orpick Ofcourse,onecanhissatpetty enemieslikeMatrix? Georgia.Itisalso model.Youing preservation enemy may of ask:whocanbethe for enemy. an external search Kremlin’s long-stand Thishasbeenthe more itlosesitspositioninsociety,the more intensive the willbeits geopoliticalfar to team Russia’s ones. than ruling – challenges by is,value-driven aremoreimportant civilizational – that itlives inside a “besiegedthat fortress.” Thisparadox goesto show that reason forica, not givingRussian impression China,isthe society the main objectfornot deterrence andcounteraction. China,isthe Amer Kremlin prefers West tothe see the major Thus,America, asthe threat. of major Thiswouldas the threat. have logic the beenconsistent with weakening the Russia, sharesborderswith an emerging China,which paradox, however: Onewould have Russia would thought perceive Onecannot helpbutnote following Matrix. the challenger of the mary lin recently declared Western-sponsored NGOs “foreign agents,” thus Kremlin bosses sincerelymay The Krem believe well the this. be that realpolitik right powerful right enemyHaving external the isextremely impor of systemic enemy profile of the the perfectly fits Thus, America vulnerabilitiesand Kremlin sensesitsinternal The morethe . Butno!Despite having growing suspicionsof Beijing, derzhavnost’ spirit and greatness, or its imitation, there oritsimitation,there andgreatness, spirit ------

71 Goodbye America! States asa continuationofSoviet form. policies, albeitin amodified inside itsown domain. West the Western butthat shouldfollow principles principles, these society. West Thisisnot to the say that should“make” Russia follow Russianrupt elite of favorable conditionsfor into integrating Western cor andwould would the Matrix deprive that ceaseto legitimize the can, however, to pursue apolicy Theycantry doatleastone thing: possible for a numberofreasons.The Western liberal democracies Thisisim of domestictransformation. degree ship dependson the of politicalconditionality, principle the member accordingto which sia. Thiswould bepossibleonly EU andaccepted ifRussia joined the evolution internal of Rus aboutthe couldbring approach a different Kremlindoesnotacquiescent imply treatmentof the Ihope that U.S. the “reset” policy.That iswhathappenedwith West takingadvantage of the Kremlin starts the for itsown survival. and relying on engagement only may point atwhich leadto missing the system isnot itisinsideRussia. the external; Notforming realizingit The impetuslar pointsin time,butitcannot Matrix. alter for the trans Westwork the problemsin Russia’s relationswith outspecific atparticu regime andforce old dogmas.Engagement ittothe may reject the help liberaldemocracieswillsoften andcooperationwith partnership that isa systemiclitical formation) factor, for hopes arenogrounds there uponEuropeasa limped States po andpathetic Kremlinlooks (the doitsoccupants. lie. In fact,neither power. We donot yet of Kremlin’srecklessness know boundaries wherethe West mitment to waging waragainstthe his whenitcameto preserving claninto Europedidnot dampention of MuammarQadaffi’s hiscom Unitedits slidetoward the States. confrontationwith The personalintegra Kremlin andwillstop byto the escalation ofanti-Americanism prevent the be Russian elite West. of the into personalintegration the helps with Itwould between issues interest of to containmentanddialogueon the it. Thelatter to a balance strike Korea. Russiato The regimeistrying into turn North an enemy The Kremlindoesnot only cannolonger want approach. bethe United by the financed States!naturally those The mostdangerous axiom Iamdescribing. “agents” are the confirming naïve However, into America policies ofcontainingandtransforming the Kremlin’s stance towardI have United the the alreadydescribed of America Thinks Political Pro-Regime Class the What I would like West’s to note my of the herethat constantcriticism West containment ofthe the Provided and,primarily, that Unit the think, however, to think, West into integration the this isgoing that

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72 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles nation-state and thus isitsenemy.revival asa nation-state andthus nationalism Whilethe opposesand fears Russia’s America nationalists areconvinced that the seem to have globalexpansion.However, fewer America’s issueswith Unitedpicious of the States. Russian In contrastto imperialists, they the stance toward bastion ofcapitalism. the isunlikelyanti-capitalist orientation to hostile allow to revise their them United the Statesdispleasure with by itsembassy. right The radicalLeft’s heexpressed factthat ralliesandisproudof the pated in anti-American popularradicalrepresentatives. Heactively partici Left’s ered oneof the Sergei Udaltsov, left. on the Front”start leader, “Left the canbeconsid Kremlin. of the that than quitetors of aneven of anti-Americanism, kind often moreaggressive havenationalism andimperialism – they always beenconsistent conduc Kremlin’s for the long-timemouthpiece Ragozin, nationalists like Dmitri Just Russiaally; party, the Kremlinsatellite; a moderately and left Communist Party, asthe system, Kremlin’s perennial such of the the pragmatism before hisfeelings. master, their than limit ofhisrhetoric whocanseethe forward andputs between andPutin, however, them morestraight aremuch they isthat States, The only summeduphisPraetorian difference Guard’sdoctrine. United helashedoutatthe in which speech, are. Putin’s2007 Munich importantly, isfarmorepowerful they that than dislike everything they and,most expressesviewsaliento theirs; that everything mistrust they cannot influence; they Theyaresuspiciousabouteverything psyche. unambiguously. Read Putin’sstatements andyou willunderstandtheir itatheart. with agree team, dis even ruling ifthey of the anti-Americanism the to soften areunlikely Kremlin willsit),sothey (ifthe suspicionsof America with 1990s. the ready during Theyarealways atthe them characterized andhopesthat enthusiasm former the it. Butsystemic liberalslack favorably view America majority andwishto of them cooperate with The vast free marketfor authoritarianism. the butwhoalsosupport feelHow aboutAmerica? parts doitsdifferent Kremlin circles,however. the The Russian politicalclassiswiderthan pro-American, Russian nationalismremainsgenerallypro-American, hostileto Ameri Russian former satellites Europewaspro-Westernof the in Eastern and liberals whostand is,the discusssystemicLet’s liberals –that The nationalists, for their part, have own part, their reasonsforThe nationalists,for beingsus their The positiontaken by anti-systemic forces interest. isof greater Let’s Opposition the What Thinks arepart is,forces that – that and right systemicAs for left the The power took elites over that Russian regimelookatAmerica the ------

73 Goodbye America! dealing with Rus to dealing with team Obama’sapproach couldnot helpbutsupport Kremlin. Russia’s ruling the orirritate mightunnerve that anything course oftacticalcompromise,Obama decidedto avoiding pursue the out Obama’s “reset” Kremlin’s fears. policysoonalleviated Itturned the are incapableof innovation. forcesespecially However, that amongthe unknown times.The alwaysand a harbinger causes fear, of difficult of policy combininginterests andvalues. quite a few Obamawould believed that definitely representa new type Russian liberalcommunity, in the a chord These words struck in which of ourpolicies,” hewrote Audacity heart of Hope.” in “The should bethe newwaysto . . to find promote standardsandprinciples freedom.“The Healsowon admirationby hisattemptsric. their (atleastrhetorically) simplisticwillingness to idealismof “regimechange” reject the rheto attracted Russian liberals,andnot liberal opposition,by only his the Obama growing Kremlin’sauthoritarianism. constraintsforexternal the in general, Western Russia. wasto Thisformula create relationswith “ghetto” and, for expected a newformula American Obamato find personasitsleader!Noelected a black wonder Russian liberal the of itself wasviewed Aworld asa globalbreakthrough. superpower gainednewhope.Hiselectionin and liberals, oratleastmostof them, to notice Putin’stightening of screws. by increasingly frustrated Washington’s grew but they attempts not waron terror, American the of They approved Kremlin’ssupport of the United perception of the als found confusedin their States. themselves Yeltsin’s absolute power. anti-systemic Bush-Putin years liber the In the seemedinadequate, support orwhenitwasdirected atsustaining this sure on Yeltsin Theywere to them. unhappy follow when with through Unitedthe States to in Russia actively reforms andputpres support earlyington. In the 1990s, Russian liberalsanddemocratsexpected liberal opposition. majority KremlinandRussia of the respectto comprise the the with States. However, Washington’s with whoaredissatisfied those policies of democracy, posturetoward United critical the explainstheir which European model the position’s liberalcamp. Someliberalssupport op sent atiny general andhave moodin the minority on the noeffect a symbolofliberaldemocracyrepre ing. ThosewhoconsiderAmerica doexist)may (yes, evolve they view of America. stripes in their idea, however, outthe rule nationalistsof liberalanddemocratic that of Soviet-type outside world. suspicionswhenitcomesto the Icannot game, retains fair share a of the acceptmoderate liberalrules supporters its ca. Thisisunderstandable:Russian fact that nationalism,despite the most interest liberal opposition’sviewsisthe The evolution of the For Kremlin, Obama’selectionunderstandably cameasa shock the opposition White House,the the Obamaentering Barack With expectationsof Wash changes in their One canactually tracethe ------

74 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Kremlin code. to heed the problems. Even ifPutinwere hewould Obama’sgoodfriend, still have emy to distract Russian world society and the fromRussia’s internal for necessitates an en searching of which survival the Matrix, of the ity andhisattitudetoward itwasstilldictated logic by America, the Putin’sbehavior explainedby can bepartly hispersonal Although alternative. the Obama isa moreacceptable candidate than for them Republicans fact that despite playing hands of the the started into the U.S. The Kremlinessentiallythe presidentialelectionapproached. spot as hewasputtingObamaon the perfectly understandingthat patience. America’s complete it took trying fulladvantage freedomof action,which of,thus Russian couldbedisregarded.Meanwhile, society Moscow that enjoyed Russian were roughnessandassertiveness directed at merely a ruse Washington andthat wasgoingallright hadto pretend everything that way other around!”Aparadoxicaland not the situationdeveloped: told Obama:“Wethat couldcarelessaboutyou. You dependon us, Faul, new U.S. the ambassadorto Moscow, wasan intentional gesture Washington.paradigm with Mc The Kremlin’sharassmentof Michael resetfast andgleefully of commitmentto demonstrated the itslack tially becamea hostage quite of his“reset.” this The Kremlingrasped Russianpolicy initiatives. perspective, Asseenfromthe Obamaessen end of2011,by the failure ofoneObama’skey foreign signaledthe reset policy. Russian of the architect roleof the Medvedevhe let assumethe Dmitri reset routethe atany time –hishandswere free.Itisnocoincidencethat to makea chance known, histepid viewsof America couldabandon reset. Putin,whohasneverof the beenitsadvocate andnever missed issuesbutwere criticism on other could not unanimousin their agree inside Russia, even opposingones,were disappointed reset. by They the political forces different were very inevitable. It soon became evident that between tual grievances diverse andAmerica Russian politicalgroups systems other. alientoAmerican each Soonerorlater, coolingandmu makeit couldnot deep-seated Russian eradicate reasonsthat and the developments. has always to strived discussion ofvaluesanddomestic eliminate the Westis exactly the whatPutin’sregimewanted: In itsdealingswith it ing “linkage” between foreign policyanddomesticdevelopments. That sia, sinceitwasbasedon arejectionof“ideology,” aswell ason ignor as far as relations with Russia are concerned. Theseleaderscould Russia areconcerned. up in asfarrelations with allWestern trap that strategic leadershave failure,exposed the ended history as another Western asanother will godownThe reset saga,which in history end of2011,At the Putinbasically to returned anti-Americanism, The coolingof U.S.-Russian becameunmistakable relations,which The reset tacticalgainsfor sides,but both hasresulted in certain ------

75 Goodbye America! without some grounding. Such leadingWestern Such somegrounding. politicians andformer without West. accusations arenotinterests in the these Onemustadmit that Russian moneyandlobbying Kremlin’s dirty for for the laundering projects. For West instance,the isblamedfor creatingmechanisms Kremlin’scorrupt in the directparticipation escence butalsothrough state in Russia, creationof amafia not only of its acquiin the by virtue West openlycians andoppositionwriters accusethe of collaborating Leadingliberal politi issharp. past.The criticism for in the cized them criti Left nationalists andthe the leader, that samethings very for the earlier, were but they justa few). policies these criticized Kremlin (someofthem the of connivance with policies andEurope’s in previous years: America’s Theyopenly criticized couldnot beganto have do whatthey liberals asthey imagineddoing image. The pasttwo years have marked pointfor non-systemic a turning old illusionsandremake itspublic the with opposition tofor part the ica in particular, Itwashightime willnot masssupport. provide itwith West, relianceon the public moodandunderstandsthat andAmer the project ofRussia’s transformation. to the undertake West the understoodfinally that haslimited abilitiesandisnot ready only rely on itsown na The strength. West waitingfor helpfromthe itcould ing itthat wasfutile,andthat opposition by convinc finally the benefited spellof disenchantment this ButIwillhazarda guessthat as symbolsof hypocrisy andindifference. West, regime beganto view the America, fected the andprimarily with to play game. a macho as weakness in Washington, aswell Moscow asa signthat couldafford rhetoric. democracyandhumanrights The Kremlininterpreted this with not to aggravate Putinandhisteamcontainment element),stilltrying respect to Russia its course of tacticalrealismwith (albeitlacking Washington to andreturned anti-Americanism, tarianism stayed on its targettion into the of growing publicanti-Americanism. opposi the Kremlin butalsoturning not only the embittering backfire, ready for. Moreover, of democracyinRussia even could cautioussupport world West, of the wasnot the economiccrisis, throes alreadyin the political oppositions.The secondwould create a foreign policyissuethat public discontent in Western societies andprovide ammunitionto their and unmanageable would partner. approach inevitably cause The first could condemnMoscow an unpredictableor they andbefacedwith (security, to areimportant them issues that energy,ation on the trade); stillexistin Russia and,bydoms that doingso,ensureMoscow’s cooper a blindeye to turn Moscow’s limited free either very trampling the on West, the UnitedAt times,liberalscriticize andthe States asits Today Russian opposition,includingitsliberalsegment,senses the were segments ofsocietyThe Russian that disaf oppositionandthe end of2011,When, by the escalatingauthori Kremlin started the ï ve ones that harbored such hopes harboredsuch ve onesthat ------

76 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles American sideis American Russian] relations, the of People’s Freedom:Party-Party ment says: policiestowardon American Russia. Westto aswell. the butitscorruption not Russia onlyto itsraw exports conclusion that draw materials the MikhailKhodorkovsky Matrix. ration in sustainingthe wasentitled to improvetrying itsimage. Theseareallinstancesof Western collabo work andwriters Russian experts for regime,for the ern instance,by elite West. Russian into ruling the conditions for the integrating West WesternRussian government governments officials. create favorable leaders. Western involved companies in businessdealsthat participate viewed oreven personally in Russia controlledby ascorrupt Russian tally are nontransparentRussian that state orsemi-state corporations wereLord Robertson orstillaredirectly involved activities to of in the leaders asGerhard Schroeder, SilvioBerlusconi, Paavo Lipponen,and For AndreiIllarionov, an independenteconomist,inbilateral [U.S.- hypocrisy.” asa policyofdoublestandardsand can only allof this interpret situationin Russia. We human rights the with concerns America’s would Magnitsky Act, which voice Congress’ to obstruct tion tries AndwhatdoesObamado?Hisadministra blatantly anti-American. and missiledefense stillremain.The Kremlin’spoliciesbecame from a few tacticalcompromises? on Iran,Syria The disagreements policy ofpragmatism.Andwhatcouldheaccomplishfor aside the Obamaopted questionsto of democracyandhumanrights. raise the Bushtried toAt least,Clinton itsreforms. help Russia tried with BillClinton andGeorge policiesof the W.American Bushyears. has removed positive fromhisagenda pointspresentin the allthe “Obama’s policy According to Vladimir Ryzhkov, Republican leadersof the oneof the Russian people.”represent the Putindoesnot Putindictatorship andalsorecognizethat ity of the for Assad.To real berelevant,any Obama policy mustconfrontthe away, isnot goingto butthat happen, asshown by Putin’ssupport Putin's shadow. Now White HouseishopingRussia the justgoes was basedon afallacy, Medvedev morethan wasanything that “I donot believe Obamahasa Russia policyatalltoday. His‘reset’ Kasparov, politicalmove Solidarity leadersof the Garry oneof the listenLet’s to take Russia’s andtheir leadingpoliticiansandwriters a clean slate.’ administration American [...] The behavior of the from relationsand‘start Russian-American to the offer ‘reset’ the KGB“The joy guyscould barely containtheir andsatisfactionat vis-à-vis Russia is very weak Russia isvery andineffective. Obama constantly retreating all issues. on allissues. ------

77 Goodbye America! sociologist, says: democratic andliberalforces Former in Russia Sovietthe andthe nottury. all.Thisbehavior makes itextremely Butthat’s clearfor whole cen for almostthe them hascontrolled andterrorized that have system beendreamingof setting freefromthe themselves post-Soviet peoples the in states, of the who of hopes andefforts regime of KGB mobsters andbandits.Itisalsoa surrender officers, Russia’s modern to the der of Russian hopesandefforts democrats’ ment. Itisa capitulation.complete andunconditionalsurren cannot even becalleda retreat. Itisnot even a policyofappease means are justifiable, including deception, blackmail, etc.” includingdeception, blackmail, means arejustifiable, to endany phrase attributed to Lenin). Theybelievedto this the that (to as‘useful idiots’ resort Americans tobut appropriate treat the prestige andprotecting itsgeopolitical interests, itisnot only lawful Russian world sake regime’s for of increasing the believed the that power require it.Essentially, majority overwhelming of Russians the interests atany maintaining of can bebreached momentshouldthe naked promisesof two these unprincipled governmentsdoubts that Few political spectrum). of Russians in Russia acrossthe jority had approved andconsideredunquestionably vast ma successfulby the contrast to his economicandsocialpolicies,foreign policyis (in country the stanceto maintain legitimacywithin American interests. an Putinbadly sphereof American neededsuch in the Kremlin pledged itscooperationoratleast its non-opposition the Iraqiwar, of the etc. In exchange, aftermath acceptance of the war inAfghanistanandasilent problemsasthe solution of such West toacceptable the callsfor partner a quick in asituationthat superpowerhistorical position.Thisstatusmakes Putina tentatively statusof amajorclaims to the statesman whorestored Russia to its – Putin’s regimeandaccept – atleastsuperficially authoritarian Putin’s promisesto refrain fromcriticizing areAmerica’s them is based on afew assumptions.ministration. The agreement Among ad between new American cynical actof tradeoff Putinandthe policy asa purely ‘reset’ practically here)perceive nodifference the is public atlarge (there opposition andthe the both that “I think The presidentof LevadaCenter, LevGudkov, whoisan independent itsgoals.” with conditions set Russian by regimeandcanonly the beconsistent laboration between two governments the isonly possibleunder post-Sovietadventures in the states andbeyond. [...]Today col the KGB to regimereceives newshady engage blanche a carte in the Russian enemies.Asa result,the mortal their of ranks joins the pastandthus forces of the againstthe struggle in their support evenUnion moral fromnow USrefusesto them offer that on the ------

78 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles benefit of U.S. benefit tactical goals. for the goalisbeingshortchanged this expansion ofdemocraticvalues,then goals canbesaidto be the ing advantage of Washington strategic Ifoneof America’s to survive. Kremlin istak Kremlin to achieve tacticalgoals,whilethe using the policy tois skillfully achieve itsgoals.Washington usingAmerican is In reality, Russian gameof survival, elite, the long-practicedin the deliberately Kremlin’s game.Thisisnot playing how the ithappens. United the States that donot think is critics sharpest America’s Kremlin andyourout to system!” legitimize the Of coursenot! Even exaggerate. aremistaken andwhatthey andseewherethey thinkers statements Russian by opposition of the the merits and debate the excessively emotional case,we andunsubstantiated. In this candiscuss not America. becomes“whoiswinning?” ForThe question, time being, then, the ruling elite hasillegally accumulated.ruling [...]Thosewhocometo Bo in exchange for safe havens West in the Russian assets for the the cargotransitto Afghanistan military American simple bargain:the peelisremoved lofty isreducedto onceallthe a ‘reset’ “This For Andrei Piontkowski, an independentpublicist: “You arewrong,” claimsmy colleague.“We American arenot The above statements arepretty blunt.You are they may think State andWhite Housepragmatists.” Department occurstoin case ofRussia’s question the breakupisnot that the nuclear weapons. nuclearweaponsthe Whatwillhappento these Sovietwhen the Union collapsed,Russia assumedcontrolover Soviet Union, itspalette changing fromtragedy to farce. However, breakup trajectory of the ing it,Putin’sregimeisrepeatingthe trap. Infact,by obliteratingthe democracy in Russia andby pilfer in exchangevictories US didn’tnotice for dubiousconcessions,the US ColdWar the allowing Putin’sregimeto democratic bury perspective.tegic mid-term losseseven Whileconveniently in the stra suffering US starts moment,the expediency ofthe the with rality isquite aptly rationality. calledlong-term Having replacedit world areaaswell.the pace inthis Butmo leaderwassetting the of valuesinworldportance politics.Quite naturally, as America lastten years declined im “The have by the beencharacterized Finally, George Satarov, independentpublicist,argues: another pillagingof Russia.” to the accessory Western USand other governments become of the the countries [...]Bycovering upRussian criminals, beneficiary ings andistheir alsoguaranteesRussia. foreign safety elite’s America hold of the is actingasan accomplice of Putin’skleptocracy isdestroying that lotnaya Square America andSakharov Prospectunderstandthat ------

79 Goodbye America! feet law, passage of this on the itwillbecomeyet reason for another administration isdeliberately the dragging its outthat ered. Ifitturns did not wantto get involved Russian oppositiongath Putin,the with 2012, law administration stillhasnot the beenpassed. American The asof October Kremlin. Itisdisappointing that, the will avoid irritating willbe developed legal mechanism in away that the outthat not rule passed, andhow itwillwork. SomeRussian oppositionmembersdo society. Of course,alot dependson how Magnitsky Act is quickly the regimesanda moralebooster for Westerncontaining authoritarian for an effective instrument – isboth – Russia, in particular countries from“contaminated” of corruption exportation to curb the trying phase in Western policies toward Russia. Therecanbenodoubtthat expressions of publicapproval of U.S. recent years. policiesin farrare, andthus first, is happeninghere.” viewsareamongthe Such to understand what arestarting SoAmericans ourcrooks. to support U.S. hasdecidednot State Butatleast,the Congress the Department. goodisto U.S.“Of course,nothing be expected of the presidentand wouldhas beendiscussed,they discover viewsmoreorlesslike this: Russiantake websites a lookatsomeofthe Magnitsky Act wherethe followsociety that events. international IfWestern would observers segmentsof Russian opposition andother the of both Americanism anti- the billhaseven hassoftened beendrafted this factthat very the way, MagnitskyAct. Bythe of the opposition’s active and fullsupport the West. ambitionsandinterests elite’s in the of containing the Hence best option opposition now would the sia, the believes bea policy that West the believed that shouldaiddemocraticdevelopment insideRus West andthe views of America areevolving. Whileitwaspreviously alternative Russia. for a possibledialoguebetween Western emerging civilsociety andthe hope issuesof democracy andvaluesoffers with opinion isconcerned Western factthat public Kremlinregime.The very evolution of the of the Westernthose of trendsinRussia and parliamentarians whoarecritical opposition respectsWestern same time,the publicopinionand At the least, play in Russia’s development not islikelier to than be negative. Westernof oppositionists now role that believe governments, the at West development. rolethe Alot outlook on the country’s plays in the ments of Russian society. needsto be discussed. Thisisa problemthat West andadvancedseg mostprogressive the of the have trust lostthe of Washington United the past. This indicates States that in the and were critical andleft right while only a handfulofliberalsonthe administration American liberal camp the in Russiaof the criticizes Thus far one thing isclear: Russia’sThus faronething oppositionhaschanged its today development important Another isthat a broadsection The discussionover Magnitsky Act hasusheredin anew the RussianOne may opposition’s the note directionin which another - - -

80 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Matrix to survive. Matrix stereotypes helpthe that societyany isstillcaptivated good.In short, Soviet by the mythology and doesnot wishRussia that leasta country very number one,” oratthe is“enemy America gime andasa resultissusceptible myth that to the re publicisan objectofconstantmanipulationbymajority the of the lens.The vast a deformed through atAmerica political class,itlooks the post-Soviet peoplearenot readyto eraandthat discard. appearedin the politicalmentalitythat elementsof the isoneof the that sian audienceto come around.Thisargumentwould destroy stereotype a ismorelikelyAmerica to fear a weak Russia, butyou willnot get Rus the second issue,youAs for may face that the arguetillyou arebluein the life denieshumanbeingsdignityandrights. in astateand dignified that of anormal an abstractcompensation lack fordiscussion alsoserves the nore the “soul,” isprobably to an unconsciousattempt which the ig part on their whenRussian civilizationisdiscussed.Russiansarises love to discuss want usto be strong.” The question of “soul”andhow italways to define have don’t can besummedupas“they second as“they nosoul,” andthe like andfeedto a guineapig(!).” them be gracious ov We ironicallycan befriends… “Russia remarks, andAmerica have and creative day. classto this Grebenshchik The Russian starBoris rock hassquat.”America Asimilarmoodhovers over Russian intellectual the poet SergeiHaving the visited Yesenin America, uttered, “We have soul, country.” “Disgusting...Difficult in America, arriving after grumbled complexes.ity, allmixed inferiority andarrogance, in with mockery a wish for Russia to somehow – admirationandhostil resembleAmerica viet other, attitudetoward on onehand,suspicion,andthe America: So the sentiments. The prevailing sentiments,perhaps, mirror tradictory Soviet collapse of the Unionthe 1991, in con and today expressvery they upon Intellectuals group ceasedtoabout America. exist asaunified to global arena. Russia’s posturein the aggressive obstacle to itsrepressive norisitan obstacle stiffening mechanisms, United reasonto the Kremlin another believegive States that the isno United opposition to of the step States.the upitscriticism Itwillalso ties of agiven Western democracy. isa distinction there Nevertheless, guish between Western andcannot peculiari appreciate countries the And now Iwillsay a few words on how Russian intellectuals feel In fact, the Russian mass consciousnessdoesnotIn fact,the usually distin How doesRussian society atlarge like relate Much to America? Think? Society Does What And aregenerally The first circles,there two America. In these issueswith day, in the Back Russian operasinger great Feodor the Shaliapin cruelty and soullessness of cruelty the system that they live they in. systemThe that the - “soul” “soul” ------

81 Goodbye America! to Lev Gudkov, whosaidexclusively essay: for this of life in Russia. characteristic Kremlin’s demandsisapermanent the to satisfy public moodchanging the time. Whenitcomesto America, Therefore, positive attitudestoward canbereversed at any America isaliento atany us inanyAmerica moment. case,itcanbecomea threat subject to change. Whateverrelations are“normal.” existsisour“normalcy,” isnot andthis our meansthat we other each that arenot atwarandaredealingwith besides,Russia canalwaysbeen thus; The fact standupto America. ica isan enemy, andenemiesarenot to Butithasalways be trusted. good. The contradictionisobvious,butithasanunderlying logic.Amer or relationsasnormal Russian-American described surveyed of those world. same time,almost47 in the to control allcountries Atthe percent second only fighters. to Chechen United consideredthe Statespolled saidthey enemy to be the of Russia, In recentyears, about 40percentof those resistU.S.that influence. Meanwhile, upto 31 percentadvocate countries closerrelationswith 13 of morethan rarely percentof respondents. getscountries support the ing to Levada Center, polling by the between rapprochement two the accompanied by a desireto draw closerandget to know it.Accord hegemony. EuroperesistsAmerican based on abeliefthat good feelingsa matter toward of fact,the European Union the areoften comprised anywhere from40percentto 56 percentinrecentyears. As viewedpolitical course:respondentssaying positively they America have Kremlin’s in reactionto the andconstantly fluctuates is morecritical tively attitude toward United in arecentpoll.Incontrast,the the States positively: European Union 63to viewthe posi 78 percentsaidthey tual knowledge. Generally, European Union Europeandthe areviewed to moreto ac propaganda than between thanks EuropeandAmerica, garded itcompletely.” percent were readyto pay some attention rest disre to it, andthe only one percentof respondentswere interested reset, seven in the bureaucracy.for regime’s him andbelongto the Even in 2009, back Putin’ssystem, vote whosupport issue,mostlyinterest those in this ests arenot related. Only seven percentof respondentsexpressed national inter reset policyandthe the that and sixpercentthink promotes Russia’s nationalinterests; seven percent say itdoesnot, know reset policyisallabout; what the it ninepercentbelieve that Levada Centerby in May the 2012, 78 percentof Russians donot away andisnow forgotten. virtually According datacompiled to the “As world rhetoric situation inthe ‘reset’ went changed, the allthe evolutionAs for of perceptions the by Russian society, let merefer Since lastcharacterization. There canbenoillusionsasto this United the About 73percentof Russians States saidthat seeks Any positive attitudetoward isabstract,sinceitnot America ------

82 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles steady growth of suspiciontoward steady growth Why?trend willstill bethe America. followed andviceversa. by growing Yet anti-Americanism, major the – weakening publictake on America tuations in the anti-Americanism United the fluc pragmatic agenda States, with onemight expectfurther jeopardizingits feelings thus fromincreasingtooanti-American much, brakes to andputtingon the preventaccelerating itsanti-Americanism RussianKremlin’s rhetoric evolution regime. of the andthe ed States. Thisevolution of publicviewswasanaturalresultthe need totalked Unit work aboutthe the on buildingcloserrelationswith Thus, in 2012, polledsaidso,while only 18 35percentof those percent ChinaandIndia. shouldincreaseitscooperationwith country their tions “willbeimproving.” Unitedthe States in apositive light,andonly 15 rela percentsaidthat saw FOM of Russians data,only center’s saidthey one-eighth survey summer of 2012,negative” ones.In the Russian accordingto one ofthe percentexpressed“mostly positive”44 viewsand40percent“mostly Unitedof the States, while29percenthada negative view. In early 2012, end of2011,at the 56percentof respondents hadapositive opinion Russian public.According amongthe toAmerica Levada Center polls, scapegoating, isaccompanied spike by in negative the feelings toward willresultin morefrequent andthus needsto be justified, anism that United States to a harshauthoritari hascontinued.The Kremlin’sturn age to returned of America-bashing. an all-too-familiar program wasin demandagain,andRussian television threat coverThe American “besiegedhave strategy. to Kremlin returned fortress” the grown: the asfriendly, them tense, 7percentdescribed and6percentasneighborly. relationsascool,12percentcalledthem time 33percentcharacterized approved same reset.percent of respondentssaidthey Butatthe of the Unitedthe States hadimproved. For instance,in October 2011, about58 reset didnotcase, the leadRussians to relationswith perceive that areviewed states that United asan alternativethe to the States. In any closerrelationswith time supporting reset policywhileatthe the port to about.Thereissomecognitive nothing dissonancehere:People sup understand little they something reset policiessupport the porting image as“enemywill accentuate of America the numberone,” as Simply to regime a morerepressive because, asitswitches mode,the While discussing this data,Iwould sup While discussingthis like those to stress that Kremlin hasto constantly the alternate between that Considering Act? How Kremlin the Will The LevadaCenter Russians pollsalsoindicate believe that that regardtoIn 2012, the escalation ofsuspicionandcautionwith the suspicions toward UnitedThere isa clearreasonthat the States ------

83 Goodbye America! to isfollowed, power second scenario to mass violence? Ifthe andresort cling cannolonger maintainit?Or willthey they understandthat they to lose poweris starting gradually. to give agree itupwhen Willthey personalized powerbeen guardingthe Praetorian Guard regime.Butthe forces holdingpower; security tatives of the functionhadalways their It ishardto say. The Russian system hashadno precedentfor represen was Yeltsin’s of self-preservation. method his immunityfrompersecutionandwere alsoready to use force. This siloviki, over reins, heandhisfamily handed them the keep to grasping the Yeltsin In contrast,whenitbecameclearthat on to them. couldnot powerand the decidednot to to bloodshed to structures resort hold time in Russian history, army reins ofthe a leader whostillheldthe democratically elected newRussia. government For of the first the decidedto voluntarilyMikhail Gorbachev handover hispowers to the Soviet breakup ofthe behave Union, point ofitscollapse?Atthe atthe a bout ofrecklessness. Unitedthe donot readyfor States. looklike they’re Kremlinofficials would Kremlin into directconfrontationwith emerging that pushthe game,Ihave stage of the But atthis a hardtimeimaginingsituation Moscowthat isreadyto act decisively to protect itsspheresof influence. States, Georgiagetting beating. Itwassupposedto with demonstrate the United proxy the gia in August 2008.Thiswasa bonafide warwith Actually, once:in Geor Moscow hasalreadyengaged a conflict in such United the States. with open confrontationoreven a limited conflict traditionalist basewoulddate Kremlin to the require engage the in an However,chine. onemay need to envision consoli a situationwhenthe allowing invest America, Americans in Russia?with in Ulyanovsk? Why doesMoscow continueitseconomiccooperation an enemy, how canRussia even talkaboutNATO’s creatinga supply hub is questions:an increasingly IfAmerica hardtimeanswering certain tain a working Washington. relationshipwith The Kremlinishaving need tocontradictions between main andthe hisanti-Americanism lose controlover tools. Putinisalreadyconstantly these forced to resolve istakingon alife of itsown. regime maymechanism Atsomepoint,the status quo domestically.the scapegoating survival the fact isthat Butthe interests outsideof Russia corporate butalsoundermine their only harm leading superpower, the to with provoke couldnot sincethat conflict interested undercontrol.Theydonot in keeping seek anti-Americanism of self-preservation. logic Matrix’s on Russia. isthe Such tricks plays dirty that country the Kremlin is staffed with pragmatistswhoare Let with mereiterate: Kremlin isstaffed the How willPutin’s askourselves question:But let’s another How regime willthe So far, ma anti-American Kremlin hasbeenableto contain the the the oldKGB representatives of the the apparatus,whoguaranteed siloviki Kremlin starts losing power? Kremlin starts react whenthe - - - - -

84 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Russian attitude toward the In 2010–11, America. logicinfluences ternal ing Russia’s stancetoward America. for would me to imagine asituationthat make ita key factor formulat in attitude,butit ishard on this U.S. policymay alsohave influence certain attitude ofRussia’s societying the andpoliticalclasstoward America. decisive politicaldevelopmentsia’s internal factor willbethe in inform sian paradigmchange: relationsbetween Unitedtrustful the States Rus andRussia, shouldthe As of now, Icanforesee reasons: a few such cautiously,reasons for treatingAmerica of suspicion. a grain even with willlikely game,there remain society of the accepts democraticrules earlycrats of the 1990s. onein which best-casescenario, Even in the Russian demo first asdidthe America with not seekclosefriendship Unitedthe States asa desirable partner. Anewregimewould probably willview are not regimethat likely of another formation to result inthe probably won’t foreseeable whilethey future, occurin the Matrix, of the out. ruled West, United the the with particularly States, with cannot be conflict vec the no drasticgeopolitical mighthave changes that influenced in U.S. were policytoward shifts there nosignificant Russia. Therewere Russian Matrix Falls Russian Matrix the If the lastfew years Russia’s of the demonstrates in that The experience logic ofRusAs you assumption cansee,Ioperate the underthe that in more may bearfruit aresomeseedsthat same time,there At the fall Kremlin, andeven the of Putin’sregimefromthe The departure • • • • • • • rience into buildinga politicalsystemrience in Russia. politicalexpe American towardgravitating the incorporating breakthrough; to achieve a modernization America Russian with politicalclassfor of the drive partnership the of instabilityinChinaspillingover threat intothe Russia; tions anda desireto take over Russia’s Far East –orotherwise geopolitical aggressive ambi China with of arising threat the America. toward with partnership would of broadeconomicinterests that propelRussialack andtoward a nationalisticbent; left to a nation-state with the ifRussia turns of anti-Americanism inevitablerise the of Russian Gaullism; ship – similarto French sentimentstoward a form America, agendasuspicion of America’s andrefusalto accept itsleader power, arehardeven which for liberalsto forget; role,andjealousytowardhistorical world’s the only global retention of derzhavnost’ relics, memories of Russia’s former relics,memories ------

85 Goodbye America! to attitude. a friendly itisturning notan unhealthy attitudetoward that although America, of society27 isrecovering part from percent saidso. Thisindicates that ple of Hiroshima,Nagasaki, Iraq,andYugoslavia felt.” Butin 2011, only “Americans andnow know peo they deserved, whatthe got whatthey in recent years, however. In 2001, polledsaidthat 50percentof those Septemberof the 11 tragedy. gloaters hasdecreased The numberof these schadenfreude ings of arejected lover. Thesefeelings manifested in the themselves not, to draw attention to oneself, to get even words, feel – inother the towardindifference Russia generates unconsciousor a desire, whether complex. reaction andreinforces The growing American itsinferiority sian society painful isstillinterested generates latter’s in America the aboutit. thinks Russian society ishardly interested in what,say, Pakistan orAustria politicalcommunity. American to the Thatisunderstandable.Similarly, longer foreign a factor policy. in American interest Nor particular isitof Kremlin morecritically. Romney ifhetreatsthe up preferring skepticism toward White Housepolicieson Russia isgrowing, may end “number onegeopolitical foe.” However, Russian opposition,whose the ill-conceived Russiapublicized andcertainly statement isAmerica’s that “reset” policy, hestressesthe fact that the aswell asRomney’s widely Mitt Romney? The respondentswould Obama,given probably choose propaganda. ficial Kremlin’s of byto the win. Thesepollresultswere directly influenced to become Presidentin2008,while15 percentwanted JohnMcCain Ronald of Russians Reagan. (27 Almosta third percent)wanted Obama H. W. Bush,while10 relations under Russian-American percentchose were bestunderClinton; same aboutGeorge 11 attheir percentsaidthe relations Russian-American 28percentof Russiansvealed saidthat that Democrats,while11 percentsaidRepublicans.with The samepollre itwaseasierto 2008polls,39percentof Russiansto deal saidthat the in power United in the States, Republicans orDemocrats?According Russian logicof self-preservation. regime’s of the Thesechanges were classintensified. a corollary ruling of the Unitedto the anti-Americanism States moresuspiciousandthe grew respect tor of Russia’s Kremlinpoliticswith policies.Nevertheless, American observers often ask:whowould often Russians like observers toAmerican see Radar the Russia Off Is The very fact that America haslostinterest in Russia America whileRus factthat The very Admittedly, Russian elite or publicattitudetoward isno America Whom doRussians White wantto Housetoday, see inthe Obamaor the aftermath aftermath Russian publicin the of somesegmentsthe - - - - -

86 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles class (oratleast someof itssegments, for sure) willonceagainconsent Russian ruling the outthat ing leadersandregimes.It cannot beruled the isnot likelytin’s regime,which to last beyond 2018. As a matter of fact, of Pu that margin ispretty substantial.Itisfarmoresubstantialthan imploding. The Russian starts system’s Matrix safetya while before the West the ishappy.that understands.Andeveryone Kremlin understands imitation game;the understands itisplaying the The Westgeopolitical understands everything. concessions. Everyone listening itmustmeet litany to to of demandsthat the pay for Russia’s Kremlin’s globalpower itistakingthe andpatientlythat claimsseriously to Russia. moderatedemocracies canstay on their Westthe time.Thusonecouldget Western impression atthis that the stability in Russia (sofar)andisnot interested in confrontationwith successfully.” I wouldfollowing: addthe Putin’sregimeismaintaining nuclear safety, globalissues.Andwe andother areneutralizingit for ustoportant neutralize Russia asa spoilerwhenitcomesto Iran, ington’s policiestoward in nature.Itisim Russia areinstrumental might say, “Sowhat!Russia globalplayer, isnot a serious andWash andclumsypoliciestowarding of America itunderany regime. nity. basemay leadto an expert inadequate The lossofsuch understand Russian politicalcommu anditspoliticalprocessesin the on America feelings areonlythese growing stronger. Westthe However, latest emerges crisis. fromthe present time atthe liberal community, the are transientandwillpass,atleastwithin as Hopefully,of growing disenchantment. disenchantments of these both modelisalsoa source EU asanormative same time,the role. Atthe ton’s policiestoward leadership Russia causesresentmentof America’s Washing capitalismand,to extent, a greater with American-style with inevitably resultin globalinstability. hand,disillusionment other Onthe hegemony will to world’sing of American multipolarity andthe drift weaken the understanding that isan one hand,there role. On the to drive maintain itsgloballeadership itisAmerica’s ward America, the Russian Federation. fragmentation of the realm, accepting the graphic more limited a geo albeitwithin Matrix, reproduction of the to the Russian ruling elite has learned to elite Russian has learned ruling factor that still engenders contradictory feelings stillengenders to is a factor contradictory that If there “Let’s Pretend!” gameof “Let’s candragon for this quiteIt seemsthat The West couldcontinueto imitation game,pretending play the observer an American cheerlessUpon reflections, readingthese withoutMoving Direction loss ofexpertise the There may beonemore causeof concern: prolong the realpolitik Matrix’s life byMatrix’s chang course with respect coursewith ------

87 Goodbye America! mational strategy world, to the promotion itwastied to even the though to get engaged. Westthe not to lose faceandjustifyitsinaction whenitwasnot ready allowed that support all,itwasthis of Assad.After support stubborn now West Kremlin understandsthat the the owes Russia for Moscow’s of enjoyingcent chance a favorable climate. external Even moreso, autocracy.serve ithasa de Kremlin realizedthat Asa result,the – to isintended react to to America violence that pre and primarily moralandpoliticaldamage. enormous mocracy hasalreadysuffered to of his own stop strength people,liberalde Assad’sdestruction the Moscow ultimately isthinking aboutsaving West itself.Even ifthe finds asitfocuses on saving all,itisclearthat, Basharal-Assad, vival. After sian personalizedpower for sur regime willlater usein itsstruggle Rus concept of absolute the and the sovereignty means that willbethe Universalties andthe Declarationof HumanRights.The Autocrat’s Law of absolute sovereignty, trea deniesfundamentalinternational which “Autocrat’s Law.” The West Kremlin’s concept the hadto put upwith legitimatingthis Councilto refrain fromaction,thus UN Security the allowed Chinahidingbehindit)that Kremlin (with In fact, itisthe to remain inpower expense ofdestroying own atthe their people. of autocrats protecting right thus the conflict, not to the in intervene to West force civil warinSyria the to exploit the (albeittemporarily) weakenednew life Today, in the Matrix. elite Russian isable ruling the toto breathe isdesperately maneuver Kremlin,which trying to the arelimited. one has,andresourcesthat dated agenda of Western no takes society timethat asa whole.Andthis Moreover,single presidentialterm. onehasto contemplate consoli the to operate well on atimecontinuumstretching span ofa beyond the Butwhenitcomesto post-Soviet Russiahorizon. andthe space,onehas new presidencybeginsandwillagainbelimited bythe a four-year strategy stopsall the atNovember 2012. Then,creatingan agenda for period, of somedistantfuturestrategy? In this who couldbethinking own a presidentialelectionfastapproaching, problems.Besides,with doeshave consequences of itsdecline.America the a fairshareofits and Russian Matrix future ofthe time orenergy–to assess the the lacks itpromotes. system normative that the realintentions becastinto will America’s doubt; itwillalsoundermine of its mission,continuesto in an imitationprocess,not participate only conceives of itselfasaworld leaderandviewsvaluepromotion aspart ingly resemblesRussian only globalpower roulette. the IfAmerica, that It is understandable for America toIt isunderstandablefor be reluctant–orto it America feel that contemplateBut let’s increas consequences of agamethat the time when America presented an exampleThere wasa timewhenAmerica of transfor becamea litmustest abilities ofWestern forSyria the regimes – Western the hiatusgives that someroom It comesasnosurprise ------

88 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the regime it’s dealing with. dealingwith. regimeit’s of the transience challenge andrecognizingthe at leastunderstandingthis by most dramaticchallenge in Russian history the society copewith in its stability. ItcouldhelpRussian path: another Oritcouldchoose prolonging itin itsdecay. by merely Matrix believing Itcanhelpthe painful itsagony willbe. of its lifecycle. No oneknows andhow how civilizationwilldepart this end the beginningto truly approach its oldskin.Only now Matrix isthe peaceful process –perhaps shedding becauseit was simply Matrix the may proveturn feet to be acolossuswith clay. of in itsown China,which society; bordersa rising anda stateern that multiplesegmentsof West hasbeenableto a state corrupt that tory; a nuclear-weapon terri state stillcontrolsenormous here;a state that all,we declinecouldbedramatic.After aretalkingabout fallout of this geopolitical the willinevitably Russian decline,andthat Matrix the visionshouldbea realizationthat elementsof this ment. Oneof the dimension)anda newvisionofglobaldevelopincluding a normative power West capableof proddingthe toward a new strategy (hopefully only globallationism. We remainsthe America understandthat not hinderus!” would besayingservers world’s to the leadingliberaldemocracy, “Do ten Russia’s years oppositionandindependentob thought agothat a favorable climate Kremlin. Whowould international for the have by in ourquest transformation creating for this be a stumblingblock, so anyway, rather, even ifittried!); we wantitnot not to obstruct, to (it couldn’tdo assist usinourdemocratictransformation America of decline.Inanyat all,especially in aperiod event, we donot expect cy fromRussia, we have doubtsasto itcanbevalues-oriented whether self-affirmation. of international “reset” policy, the what itdidwith becamefor itan instrument which to use any haslearned of realisminitsown form Matrix favor. Thatis realism.The Russian pedalof Niebuhrian istration keeps pressingon the to avoid Obama admin to beingaccusedof returning Bush policies,the in itsefforts Itappearsthat characteristics. attractive neoconservative egy, itsless revives foreign values-oriented policybutwithout onethat strategy today. The world strat willnow American expecta different aid-oriented of America’s history Plan. Thereisnoneedto repeat the Marshall of course,to the economicinterests. I’mreferring, of American Russian Itcancontinue to Matrix, help the hasa choice. America Soviet The collapseof the Union outto be asurprisingly turned We to to to return iso persuade America areby nomeanstrying whenweHere Ishouldconfess that, follow foreign poli America’s ------

89 Goodbye America! After the Elections, All Eyes on Georgia David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, October 17, 2012

For a small country located in a very tough neighborhood, Geor- gia has not received lots of attention since 2008, when Russia invaded the country and declared South Ossetia and Abkhazia independent. And with the world’s attention focused elsewhere (elections in the Unit- ed States, the humanitarian disaster in Syria, the challenge of Iran), many might have missed an extremely important development within the past two weeks – namely, Georgia’s parliamentary elections, in which President Mikhail Saakashvili’s party not only suffered defeat but readily accepted the results. The implications of this election cannot be underestimated. Through this election and pending peaceful transfer of power, Georgia has made several great strides toward establishing democracy and the rule of law in the most precarious of situations inside what the Kremlin still sees as its “sphere of interest.” Indeed, what happened in Georgia stands to become a role model for Eurasia. Both Russia and the West deem Georgia important, albeit some- times for different reasons. It serves as an energy transit corridor for Azerbaijani oil and gas, an interest Russia and the West share. But on the issue of integration with the West, Moscow and the West differ sharply. Under Saakashvili, Georgia has aggressively pursued closer ties to, and eventual membership in, NATO. The 2008 war with Rus- sia brought Russia’s relations with the West to their most trying point since the break-up of the USSR. And the color revolutions, which began with the Rose version in Georgia in 2003, heightened the Krem- lin’s paranoia that a similar uprising was being planned for Russia, too. That’s a lot of high-profile attention for a country of less than four million people. Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party not only lost the elections to the Georgia Dream party; it got clobbered, losing by some 15 percent. A constitutional realignment of power in Georgia that shifts greater power to the prime minister and parliament had fed specula- tion that Saakashvili would switch jobs and “do a Putin” (that is, move to the strengthened premiership after the elections). The election results made that impossible, however, and instead billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvi- is soalienasto be incomprehensible, ifnot suicidal. power notion an election for of surrendering voluntarily Putin the after determination to Kremlinonto stay his Georgiannemesis.Indeed, in the cling to power,” Putinpredicted election, projectinghisown before the some day, newteam. will should society “He[Saakashvili] sour on the leaves a rational modeofbehavior possibility of his return that openthe election wasnot option. an the Instead, hepursued results orrigging the different? top any notionpreservation of nationalinterests. WillIvanishvilibeany have and oligarchs provenIn Ukraine, the personalenrichment that be? moralandpoliticalprinciples viduals govern, andwhatwilltheir toand equality positions ofpower? electoligarchs How indi willsuch begs a question: Why of justice a strongethos dopoorsocieties with to power. in Georgia,itisIvanishvili’srise of oligarchs; rise the This Rose Revolutionthe in Georgiaisnow over. we countries, see In both in Russia. reforms dar’s Yegor lower of success,aswith pain andthe chances out isthe the Gai duration. The longer more drawn andmoreindecisive the are reforms, its shorter butthe pain oftransformation, bigger the are,the technocrats other.on the freedom anddemocracy, whowantjustice, onehand,andthose on the ment amongtwo whowantpolitical segmentsof society: different those leader.even relying on anauthoritarian No provoke wonder they resent by buildinga liberaleconomy democracy andpopulism, andafraidof crats usually don’tpay attention to much institutions. Theyareabsorbed governments.and CentralEuropean(post-communist)reformist Techno destiny societies. of almostallEast Thishasbeenthe piness amongtheir andunhap triggerfrustration that reforms painfulstructural finish they aredoomedtoprevious transitions:Liberaltechnocrats leave power after axioms establishedby the 2003Rosevictors Revolution of the confirms ity That makes whathappenedin Georgiaeven moreimpressive. past. of the streakof decentelectionsisathing Ukraine’s that concerns year, ones for parliament andthe October on 28,have raisedserious larly peacefultransfer of power, October butlocalelectionsin of that confounded pollsandexpectations. fer of power almostimmediate results andSaakashvili’s acceptance of the country. minister of the new prime Thispeacefultrans li willbecomethe ment. Andyet in Moscow, quite a few Geor Russian liberalsblamed the former. the other with The defeat andthe Saakashvili of start . Let’s Eurasia region,only Ukraine,in earlyIn the 2010, hashada simi certain proofof certain both Georgia offers Georgia’s electionproves more radical axiom,too: another the Saakashvili’s acceptanceSaakashvili’s of defeat achieve could becomehisgreatest For following Saakashvili, Putin’sorLukashenko’s by ignoring path Orange in Ukraine, RevolutionJust asthe isa distantmemory axioms aswell as unpredictabil ------

91 After the Elections, All Eyes on Georgia the first (after Moldova (after and moreuneasily first dition, Georgia willbeoneof the fromSoviet Eurasiaregion,in a departure andpost-SovietBut in the tra inclinations. systems minister canacton authoritarian in such prime the under VladimirMeciar, have Viktor shown Orban’sHungary) that peacefully toward (Slovakia system. Somecountries a parliamentary willmove country the elections holdspromisethat behaved the during waylize power Nonetheless, Georgians the – orpossibly justgridlock. between competing the sidesorattempts new leadersto by monopo the includinga tugofwar cohabitationperiod, this during bets areoff dency whilegetting accustomed new opposition.All to becoming the presi losers willremaininthe policies,the their anddefine rule their presidential electionsa year fromnow. Aselectionwinnersseekto build powerful less powerfulof the the parliament presidency, with until is,cohabitation French modelof governmentone year – that of the to ponder.) agenda? (Thesearebitter questions forandhistechnocrats Saakashvili were Georgiansto vote a vaguedreambutnoclear with for party a emergence a strange of such the opposition?How unhappy orirritated spawned that rule regime.WhatwasitaboutSaakashvili’s current the and incompatible interests, united largely antipathytoward by their conflicting with movement groups this mixof various isa temporary into disappointment,even turning nightmares.Besides, dreams risk nist traditionto basisof adream.Moreover, consolidate peopleon the Georgian Dream,soundsawfully Soviet Itwascommu andMarxist. feedsagent? suspicions:The nameofhismovement, Thisuncertainty ability to govern. Ishebeholdento Kremlin, orhisown Russia andthe is an enigma:We don’tknow how to score hisrealgoals,agenda, or Ivanishvili andcharisma, isallcharm of said call.WhereasSaakashvili for to Saakashvili resign asPresident,followed by retraction quick a orpopulistdirection?Witnesshisearlymove call in anauthoritarian is relatively unknown politically. andinexperienced WillIvanishvili and makingmistakes. regime wasproneto overplaying a realopposition,the itshand Without an opposition.Thisdemonstrated yet of such axiom: another benefits the er, opposition,nordidhefully hefacednoreal,constructive appreciate States. Yet for several in that, comingto years pow hewasunlucky after to West, have for Georgiafromthe securedsupport United especially the a crackdown. through toit isbetter a defeat achieve “victory” than such to go through Yet liberal Pinochetism. Russian adherentsof the the proves history that can’tbeallowed property proved peoplewithout to vote!” that lamented gian presidentfor voters’ abidingby the democraticverdict. “Georgia In retrospect, Saakashvili was both lucky and unlucky. lucky In retrospect, wasboth Saakashvili Hewaslucky Another areaof unpredictabilityAnother two looms.The sideswillhave Now for the unpredictability new Georgian prime minister . The newGeorgianprime - - - - -

92 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the north willbeworking it. to north undermine est neighborto the patience, understanding, and assistance from the some hopingfor pray failurewhileothers for success.Georgiawillneed regionwillbewatching, coming together the in asa nation.Everyone of short nothing canafford locationandsize,they good. Given their know democracyentailsworkingprove they that greater for that the a new chapter, butitsnewleaders andsoon-to-be newoppositionmust balancewillbeeven hardertothis for strike Ivanishvili. West, the in interest in Georgiaflagging mercy ofPutin’swhims.With the West.succeeded andhaseven antagonizedthe Increasingly, at heisleft pressure?Yanukovichbrace. WillIvanishvilibeableto resist such hasnot on Ukraine. Putin’sKremlinwillwantGeorgiato to return Russia’s em any dialoguemeansconcessions,aswe have Russia’s pressure seenwith while improving Moscow. tieswith trap: For Kremlin, Buthereisthe the Georgia’spro-Western new Georgianleaderinpreserving the trajectory target perfect gia isthe posturing. for macho andobjectsforweakening, bullying. lookfor threats Geor external they power fear their following authorities Russian tradition:Whenthe the to justify itsincreasingly asitseeks repressiveassertive domestictrends, focusing moreon Russia. The Kremlin,meanwhile, isbecomingmore Unitedand the States hasreduceditspreviousinterest in Tbilisiwhile itsown atmosphere.Europeisdealingwith crisis, international friendly note of whathappens. Kyrgyzstan) Georgia’sneighborswillbetaking experiment. to begin this Of course, Georgia begins its experiment in acomplicatedOf course,Georgiabeginsitsexperiment andun These unpredictable Georgiahasopened areasnotwithstanding, The lastareaof unpredictability involves balancing actfor the West, because its larg - - - -

93 After the Elections, All Eyes on Georgia The Next Russian Revolution Lilia Shevtsova / Current History, October 2012

“With an elite that seeks only to protect its own interests, and without any alternative force in society, crisis is the only thing capable of stirring the swamp.” 1

Recent developments in Russia demonstrate that the society is awakening, and that the country sooner or later will face a moment of truth, as it did twice in the past century when it had to solve a dilemma: whether to de-hermetize or to reproduce its system of personalized power that can only push the nation toward disaster. In 1917 the Russian Revolution produced a new incarnation of the country’s traditional matrix of personalized power, statism, and imperialism in the form of communism, which succeeded in becoming a global alternative to liberal democracy. In 1991 the country’s elite instituted a different model of the Russian Matrix by dumping the Soviet Union and communist ideology. Personalized power in the communist disguise existed for 74 years. The new-old Russian system consolidated during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitri Medvedev has started to show cracks after 21 years. The challenge the nation faces today is existential: Either the society succeeds in transforming the system of personalized rule that suffocates it, or Rus- sia will lose its energy and end in rot or implosion. There is only one way out of this civilizational trap, and that is through pressure from below. But will the new Russian revolution be a transformational “velvet” one, or will it again create a more predatory form of rule?

To the Bitter End

Russia has always been a land of paradoxes. Is it not 1 Lilia Shevtsova, a paradox, after all, when democrats bring an autocrat “Russia XXI: The Logic of Suicide and Rebirth” to power and then protect him from competition, as Rus- (Carnegie Moscow sia’s democrats did in 1989–91 in supporting Yeltsin? And Center, 2013, http:// carnegieendowment. was it not a paradox when, in the 1990s, the West assisted org/files/RussiaXXI_ Russia in its reforms only to discover later that in reality it web_Shevtsova.pdf). the past,arepur in the than neo-imperial ambitions,albeitin milderform on a commodityeconomy andpatron-client relations.The Kremlin’s andreliance and economicassets, neo-imperial ambitions,militarism, system retains itskey features: personalpower, a merger between power of regime change. how a process elite system haslearned to through ruling continue the system, Putin.The Russian only elite the without to ruling preserve the tin regimewould give anewleaderin bidby way to onewith another Pu the event of increasingpublicdiscontent, outthat itcannot beruled nature.Still, team’s (sofar)monolithic in the ruling count, too, on the of any change. Itcan politicalclassandof segmentssociety wary of the of alarge part It enjoys support the has resourcesto prolong itssurvival. leadership’s legitimacy,urban populationto recognize the regime still the educated of the refusal by in Russian much citiesandthe frustration interests, mentality,game, entrenched andhabits. For mounting all the sonalized power of the rules allof itsinstitutions,informal system with powertheir bitter end. untilthe for arereadyto today’s fight to survive, authorities too oldandflabby Soviet hadgrown unlike elite,of Putin’s Russia the which isthat, ruling fragmentation. Sofar, between difference Soviets’ the declineandthat the society. willmanage to avoid country the Therearenoguarantees that and anda growing gapbetweencal system’s degradation authorities the Soviet politi by final years, the logic ofthe characterized to repeat the politicaloreconomicreform. outeither his team isnot goingto carry Putin himselfwillnever voluntarily give uphismonopoly on power, and year leavescy this nodoubtsasto where Russia isgoing:Itproves that presiden to itself.Putin’sreturn the system couldmodernize thoritarian presidency,the itwould au have the hopesthat only prolonged illusory liberal rhetoric. held Medvedev figure Butwhether orsomeother have to preferred see Medvedev stay in power, for heatleastemployed of Russian Western liberals,justlike the politicalestablishment,would models convenient to many West. Russia in both andthe Agoodnumber trend.) this not undermine protests classin the of 2011–12ticipation of somesegmentsthis does emergence a middleclass.(Thepar of the tion of democratizationwith disprovingtus quo, politicalscientistSamuelHuntington’s thus associa sta state, defense middle class,tiedasitisto takes of the the upthe the West?capitalism stillhostileto the Now isyet paradox there another as andcorrupt asan oligarchic had helpedto remodel personalizedrule assertive in assertive features, reflected region. These, together itsmilitaristic with post-Soviet a sphere ofinterest to in the preserve efforts sued through Despite this year’s andpreviouschanges of wrapping,Russia’s year’s Despite this per regime ofPutinandhisteam,It isstilltoo orthe early the to bury Russia isstarting Kremlinmeansthat toIndeed, Putin’sreturn the itsparadoxes continuesto amaze with andtoThe country destroy ------

95 The Next Russian Revolution policy of Western has beenthe respectto governmentsportant the with West. political“malaise”in the current However,a result ofthe more im personalizedsystem. role ofalternative to Partly, the lost the is this Russian population Western of the part civilization has of a significant traditional Russia to helpsthe keepoften going. For eyes the in starters, eyes Russians. of in the also discreditliberal-democratic norms anddirection,but zone”devoid of clearprinciples reproduce a “grey to speak onbehalfofliberalismanddemocracy. right the Theynot only to monopolize same timetrying capacitieswhile atthe in different government the system andserve “systemic the liberals”operate within of liberal democraticchangeing blow in Russia. chances These to the system most crush delivered the the willingnesstoerals, by serve their intelligentsia of the in itstraditionalroleofbearermoralcriteria. Together, of personalizedrule. service in the gravediggers arethe they itself asa democracy. Somehave becomepropagandistsandexperts a stand inoppositionto a newpersonalizedpower system disguising intellectuals Mosthave disoriented. has left beenunwilling to take gence of autocratic of anewform power Yeltsin the during presidency failureto since1991. embark on a newpath country’s of the emer The intelligentsia maincauses moralized state of the hasbecomeoneof the in all societies de engine ofchange. In Russia, hasalways the beenthe to transformation. path two obstacleson the inside. Iwould emphasize outside orthe the fromeither threats rious of se lack any Russia’s the changecollapse,andfinally that willbring alization of society, fear population, the the abilityto state’s bribe the demor liberalopposition,the formidable of lack arethe Among them liberalismisalien. for which an enemy. government life helpto of aregime Liberalsin the prolong the cal elite hasintegrated personally West, into the yet West itviewsthe as supplying appendage for The Russian moredeveloped politi countries. power,petro-state isstilla great that yet role ofacommodity- plays the lating a combinationofincompatible components. Russia isa nuclear population whilemanipu of the alive outto by groups different reaching obsolete twenty-first century, in the butitsleadershave to keep learned it mocratization morecomplicated. Russia’s civilizationalmodel mightbe regimesandmake itsde Russia’s government authoritarian fromother rhetoric defense-heavy andin the federal budget, arewhatdistinguish the West, role ofthe Asecondobstacleto isthe which transformation lib intellectual class,the factionsof the mostimportant One of the intellectual class,which role andmentalityofthe isthe The first Several factors Russian other alsohelpto Matrix. reproduce the TacticsSurvival ------

96 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles will resort to forcewill resort ordertoin protect itself. interests to make entrenched regime of threats itonly morelikely the that emergence system and the of the degradation situation,the hands. In this history, institutionshave people fromthese taken power own into their tions of repressionwasincivilianhands.Now, timein Russian first for the ing Russia’s autocracy, institu controlof the Putin period butbefore the posed toward asa tool violence.Violence hasalways for served perpetuat provincial mostarchaic predis level – andisthus services’ from these – indeed, secret by services peoplefromthe is a praetorian regimerun for outof mildermethods sustainingitsposition. gime hasrun re same level the of violence,indicates the that albeitwithout proach, to Stalinist- justify violence.TheKremlin’sadoption of the Maoistap ety in astate “besieged idea of constanttension fortress” andusedthe tactic tested pastbyto Stalin the in the andMao,whomaintainedsoci in society). Essentially, groups different arereturning authorities the for “enemies”andfomenting search confrontationbetweening to the to by regime to repression anduseforce return turn (inparticular the liberalism, as some hoped, growing public discontent creates pretexts for forcing with Putininto than experimenting state. Rather depend on the ing to submit, andtossing that favors groups populist-oriented to the intellectual unwill elite,litical communityandthe intimidatingthose to Western of started be openly critical policytoward regime. the be readyto accommodate it.No wondereven Russian that liberalshave West the elite, laws andthat international willalways couldconstrainthe giveand even Russian criminalization to society no believe grounds that tempts to Russian politicalclassinto Western society. Western acquiescence andat of the personal integration helpthe ers, andpublicrelationsagencies that includes politicians,bank class”that a powerfuland hasoffered “service society, elite for a corrupted West machine the into a laundry hasturned Russian systemthe (hopefully unintentionally). eyes of Russian In the West the of legitimation that provides form regime, isanother for the co-optationPolicy by have Forum, of their which becomeinstruments Valdailin’s staged “operas,” asthe such Yaroslavl Clubandthe Global personalizedrule. country’s tion” – provide legitimationof the European Union’s “reset” for andthe Moderniza “Partnership America’s Western of the latestminded Russians, coursetoward turns the Russia – regime. Forone of connivanceoreven appeasementof the many liberal- of Russian society most advancedparts regardas the Kremlin, which West. the desirefor with personalintegration political class’s tradict the Korea would andintotoward isolation,which status ofaNorth con the repression would steppingPutin isaware upthe take that Russia toward repression.It nature determines itsdrift very The regime’s po The Kremlincontinuesitsoldtacticof co-opting membersof the Krem The roleof Western in the politicians,pundits,andjournalists ignore the Russian brazen behavior, elite’s of lack accountability, ------

97 The Next Russian Revolution hybrid of a petro-state nuclearweapons with andneo-imperialist a new sourceof enrichment. team with ruling whileproviding the support solidate traditionalists’ idea hasbeendreamedup just to con the orwhether industrialization, a Stalin-style Kremlin actually possibilityof such believesthe in the isstillnot cleariswhether that clans.The onething ruling of the novate. Huge sumsinjected into pockets itwillonly endupliningthe 1960s in the stuck anddevoid of anycratic structure incentive to in areunlikely to be prepared. services enforcement andsecurity law corrupt country’s the blood,a taskforrequire which sheddingmuch dictatorship would underoutright because forcible reindustrialization dictatorship. Today any attempt such isdoomedto fail, andnot just fromabove, canberepeatedindustrialization only a modelthat under rowing from Stalin’s outforced policyarsenal.Stalin in histimecarried base.Thisisyet bor militaristic state’s another time reinforcing the same whileatthe should spureconomicgrowth plex. Asheseesit,this com wave military-industrial centered aroundthe of industrialization for personalloyalty to Putin. holdof stateclans to assets grab andtake over assets private in exchange The Kremlinisquite unabashedly allowing authorities. to particular the close outby groups regions),aswell carried those asnewprivatizations from guarantee hispersonalcontrolover main commodityflows the Far wouldand the that answer directly East(acorporation to Putin and suggestion to toa bizarre manage establish astate corporation Siberia ideas discussedhasbeen top. Amongthe clans atthe dividends for the hugetection. willbring The Kremlinhasbeenlookingfor projectsthat andguaranteeits disposalto itsassets’ futurepro gain maximumprofit power. tactic. Thisleaves only society survival astheir pressuring their would costingthem cannot begina liberalizationprocessthat risk West,cal reactionfromthe Putinandhisteam have noway They back. a criti even situation in Russia. iffacedwith The problemisthat, the limits ofWestern willingnesstoshow tolerate Kremlin the countries’ the violations.Ifitwere suspected of humanrights enacted, itcould officials whodiedin policecustody,attorney would impose sanctionson Russian Sergei U.S. namedafter Magnitsky,a measure inthe Congress a Russian is to avoid Western Russian elite. rejectionof the Magnitsky Bill, The itcannot limits beyond goifit which the hasto find The Kremlin thus Whatever case, whatisemerging in Russia today the isa weird isa closedandbureau Russia’s defenseThe factisthat industry – anew ideafor Putinhasalsoraisedanother self-preservation to timestillat make team useof the istrying ruling Meanwhile, the Profits Maximizing ------

98 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles tury’s bloodiestrevolutions. tury’s for whatwouldtwentieth liberalization set cen becomeoneof the off latein Russia nineteenth century, in the andin 1917 hopes unfulfilled emergence ledto reforms of terrorism the government’s czarist of the limited nature subsequent the disappointment.Discontenttheir with movements in Russia hasalways followed hopesfor liberalizationand radicalization ofprotest the context that in this remembering worth opposition isgrowing moreradicalandisreadyfor revolt.the Itis to behave decently. impatient within minority same time,the Atthe attemptsates’ in dialogueandconvince them to authorities engage the circumstance ismoder band.The other PussyRiot punkrock of the endedin convictions for summerthat members one this asthe such of 2012, opposition,andpoliticaltrials continuedpersecutionof the on society, in repressive legislationadopted summer in the reflected attempts to screwsitself yet authorities’ tighten the again.Oneisthe hasnottion andnot happenedyet. justa change of leadership. Butthis need for politicaltransforma sian history, public realizingthe the with would pointin Russystem this mark hasto a turning be restructured, not onlylems arepoliticalandthat doesPutinhave whole to go, butthe ical oppositioncanconvince roots provincial of itsprob the Russia that polit doindeedmerge two asone.Ifthe what willhappenifthese flows two mighttakethese roadsintersect place,and atsomepoint,whenthis on whether futurewilldepend greatly The country’s parallel paths. Russia willenter a stage of severe degradation. regimeoreven dictatorship, way or toopen the a newauthoritarian an alternative fallcould doesnot If such Putin regime’s emerge, the of putting together system of government. a planfor the transforming and of apoliticalforce form winning publicsupport capableof in the in 2018. The bigissuefor Russia today isto build asystemic alternative endsunlikely which presidentialterm, to hiscurrent last longer than outfor public moodheisTime Putin.Judgingby isrunning the country.a modern past for waysthe to prolong itslife isstopping Russia frombecoming West. the to itseyes searching war with hybrid Still, regimewith this toThe Kremlin isnot expand nationalbordersorto preparedeither go ambitions.True,and militarist ambitionsareonly imitative: these ruling Itisabsolutelying protest ruling surface. clearnow the to the that Today, Medvedev’s hasplayed bring in fake modernization a part Two way system for to circumstancesopenthe the reproduce Until now, politicaldissentandsocioeconomicprotest have followed Protesters’ ProblemsThe team’s survival? current How tacticsprolongthe longcanthese ------

99 The Next Russian Revolution Yeltsin the process.Asduring to liberal-minded resist this ficult period, itincreasingly dif regime willfind agenda. Liberals whoopposethe liberal general public willbesuspiciousof the more the regime, the of an urbanminority. Ironically, Putin’s liberalsserve longer that the have failedto get voice masspublicfeeling andremainthe in tune with Putin’stime Liberalsduring foundations forthe a newauthoritarianism. laid that outso-called“liberalreforms” carried whenthey chance this late 1980ssia in the andearly 1990s, butYeltsin andhisteam wasted in Rusbased on classicalliberalismhaditswindow of opportunity values.Consensus andperhapsbe dominated by left-liberal left-wing ment genuinely broad support. have wantto move give ifthey to the make leftists concessionsto the far, protest liberalsdominate will the movement’s leadership,but they to pointof view, even liberals’ others, to the andto So work them. with stage movement’s to leadersare ready atthis listen new left-wing the ate change. For populistslogansandeven anti-Western alltheir outlook, society. classwilliniti People have ruling the beenpatiently hopingthat it. system into andfeel within grated the comfortable sectionof intellectuals, by whohave a significant inte authorities the Today,are of popularuprisings. for to fears justify support serve these personalizedsystem, afraidasthey to side ofthe forcing take them the always beentypicalfor intelligentsia liberalsandfor the in general, working liberals andtechnocrats fears havethe Kremlin. Such for the team partner. butalso wave ruling ties’ not justthe The leftist worries old CommunistParty, authori mood rejectsthe hasbecomethe which trendwillbecome.Thisnewleftist stronger force, this andthe through to suppress it Kremlin willtry more the provinces,spreads to the the protest the movement. discontent increasewithin The morethe on the of political life. main politicalforces leader-basedment by to the renounce the model stitution soasto do away excessive with presidentialpower; andagree con freeandfairelections;revisionof the game through of the rules the need to system change on the regime andthe opposedto the groups The main preconditionsare:consolidationandconsensusamongall protestthe movement to usher inaprocessofpeacefultransformation. protest aboutchange, butsomepreconditionsareneededfor canbring personal powerthe only system social isstillin place.Thismeansthat willnever voluntarilygroup renounceitsmonopoly on power solongas Ifandwhena futureprotest wave takes place,itwillmostlikely desire toFor avoid Russian time beingthe the upheaval pervades populistsentimentsare Recent andleft-wing events show leftist that Liberals and Leftists ------

100 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles into Europe. to build aliberaldemocraticsystem andcontinue Russia’s integration willcomplicate Putin regime,butitsradicalcurrents efforts ing the isclear: Itwillworkfull of contradictions.Onething atundermin of law andcompetition. rule the among Russian nationalistssupport nationalism isstillanti-Western. same time,however, Atthe moderates whileRussian post-communisttransformation, pean dimensionduring Polish, Baltic,andUkrainiannationalismhada pro-Western and Euro moderate elementswillendupdominating. oraggressive the whether regime, butitisnotmightbecome,and yetthe clearhow influential into Russianagenda. a force nationalismisturning opposing In short, liberals’ on the isnota time whenconstitutionalreform yet a priority to Russiatutional reform transform republicat into a parliamentary Russiaof transforming into Caucasus. a nation-state andrenouncingthe question totions. Russian raise the nationalistswere first amongthe system itsneo-imperial ambi in general Putin regimeandthe with the empire-state openly to opposes of the one that andpersonalizedrule, undergone an evolution notion froman imperial version, the basedon country.nant force in the Atleast,not yet. Russian nationalismhas Westthe fear? Recent events domi show nationalismisnot the that nearfuturealmostimpossible.its re-emergence in the knellfor Russia liberalismin contemporary andmake death sound the would side,this authorities’ onceagaintakes the liberal minority If the is, freeandfairelections. democratic process,that and endorsingthe illiberalforces regime, outoffear mightgainpower, that the supporting between similar choice couldfacea liberal minority is comingwhenthe Yeltsin, time regime.The way paving for the thus today’s authoritarian eyes toclosed their toa communist return power, team and ruling corrupt the supported havethat emerged. rights property assets andreviewingthe of re-nationalizing privatized would country, forces issue that inevitablythe raisethe andleftwing isdamagingfor between regimethat dilemma of choosing the a corrupt facing themselves intellectuals andpoliticianscouldonceagainfind status quo areintent on maintainingthe authorities all,ifthe itself, after cannot renew economic, social, andgeopolitical decline.Acountry current trendscontinue, Russia willinevitably current headinto If the or Decay Crisis The futuredevelopment likely of Russian nationalismisthus to be Moderate nationalistshave need for consti begundiscussingthe liberalsand country’s the WhatisitaboutRussian nationalismthat Yeltsin’sDuring time,many democratically mindedpeople,fearing election fraud that secured a election fraud that second victory for a second victory - - - sick sick - -

101 The Next Russian Revolution power. excessiveto enact constitutional amendmentscurtailing presidential parliament ora constitutional conference the wouldAnd either have wouldand fairelections,which needto be immediately organized. non-systemic opposition.New the lawswith would have to ensure free would needto ally authorities themselvesdate. Pragmatists amongthe tion begins.Anti-regimeand anti-system forces would needto consoli liberaltransforma itin apeacefuldirectionandensurethat to channel But ifan explosiondoestake place,a set of conditionsisneeded base. support authorities’ and erodethe political class the couldcausedissensionwithin against citizens.Crisis ment couldswell andlaw enforcement agencies couldrefuse to use force inability to situation undercontrol.Themassprotest keep the move executive power authorities’ the becomeimmobilized,underscoring wegrowing studentactivism,andsoon.In afull-scalecrisis couldsee government, scandalsin cow would capital, corruption that paralyze the blackouts in Mos streets, electricity population andclashesinthe the cashpayments streets. broughtpensionersinto with the benefits in 2005,whenadecisionto replace social asback such part, thorities’ in time would require au a tippingpoint,perhaps a stupid actonthe exacerbatingfactors into convergeof these motion andmakingthem political class,andexecutivethe power ends upparalyzed. Setting all build up,signsof splitsemerge within widens,localconflicts thorities gap betweenbecomes increasingly au politicizedandthe it andthe livingstandardstake urban population a steepsee their downturn, the publicsector fallto workers $70 abarrel, prices state dependenton the if,for Russia example, a crisis couldheadinto oil such country? the large status quo. to the threaten sufficiently arenot Russian yet boatbutitseemsthere the waves rock that ripples swamp. Sofar, the isproducing capableof stirring only crisis thing the its own any interests, alternative andwithout force in society, is crisis only to seeks protect an elitefor of politicallife. that newforms With to society look attempts strength the the to processandfinds stop this Russia mine whether road ofendlessstagnationorwhether takes the Russia into a liberaldemocracy? system undera newguise,orwould ittransform authoritarian of the what consequences? Wouldwith continuation explosionleadto the this byit beinterrupted socialandpoliticalexplosion,ifso,when goes beyond any timeframewe canadequately measuretoday? Or will Willitbea lengthy processof decaytake that placeisstilluncertain. indefinitely andstamping outdissent.Butexactly how declinewill this key willdeter factor isthe that Socioeconomic andpoliticalcrisis crucial importance for importance The moodin Moscow Russia’s future. is of crucial useof violence against unjustified tippingpointscouldbethe Other andwhatwould meanfor a full-scalecrisis, this What couldset off ------

102 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles so farhasfailedto answer Russia’s challenge. futurewillsay a lot, role ofaWestern too, try’s aboutthe civilizationthat couldjeopardizestabilityacrossEurasiaandEurope.The coun ripples becomea zone ofturbulencewhose to ten years would country see the The most likely Ihave scenarios outlined for Russia over coming five the intactoldempire. stillpartially collapseof the for a newspiralinthe regionsto secede fromRussia.these In any case,we needto be prepared borderswould of external unclear, make lack itharderfor their though Caucasus, for example. The futureofTatarstan andBashkortostan isalso belong to civilizations.Oneonly North different needsto look atthe regionsthat a singlecountry to maintain within difficult will bevery problem.It willbea serious integrity – itsterritorial or transformation mutiny. anddestructive into ruthless end upturning down of slow situation,popularprotests a path collapse.In this could society, andcynicismspreadthrough mistrust country could pushthe actasrestraintsareeroded,andtotal andtaboosthat moral principles Thisatmosphereof continueddecay, itssurvival. threaten in which way toing in this emergence prevent would of analternative the that class hasdeliberately to deepen demoralizationinsociety, chosen hop ruling in a state “controlleddecline.” of indefinite Whatismore,the stillhave disposal to country keep enoughresourcesattheir the thorities way forto the itsrepresentatives smooth to leave Russia for abroad. failing regimenot to to violence, orby the resort helpingby warning Westcollapse mightrequire the to ways, help inother for example democracy promotion policies.Rather, oldsystem’s atsomepoint,the Thisisnotsia’s transformation. aboutoutdated Western assistanceand of political competition. opposition forces basis by to the prepare for on the transformation effort require convergence not justthe of several trendsbutalsoconsistent Itwould optimistic scenario. game.Thisisthe of the under newrules would timeitwould political boundaries begin,only this takethe place anti-system anda newroundofdrawing coalitionwould the up fallapart All this wouldAll this inevitably befollowed by a newstage which during No matter Russia’s whatform implosion, trajectory takes – crisis, Unfortunately, Russia ismoving in adangerous direction.The au Dangerous Direction isa favorableJust asimportant environment international for Rus - - - -

103 The Next Russian Revolution How Will Russia React to Obama, Round Two? It depends on which “Russia” we’re talking about Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, November 9, 2012

The question posed by my title doesn’t quite hit the mark. Just as one cannot really speak of a single “America,” there is no one “Russia” anymore but rather several Russias. But while each different Russia has its own interests, attitudes and moods, there is something that unites them all with respect to America: The United States is on all of their radars. All of the various Russias hope to use the United States and its policy to serve their own domestic agendas. (In contrast to this, Russia largely fell off America’s radar after the fall of the Soviet Union.) How, then, will the various Russias react to the renewed Obama presidency? Let’s start with the official Russia – that is, Vladimir Pu- tin’s Kremlin. Along with David Kramer, I have already discussed what the Russian establishment and Putin’s regime could have expected from either possible election result on November 6. I will only add here a couple of brushstrokes to that landscape now that we know the results of the election. Moscow’s official rhetoric and actions over the past year – that is, after Putin officially returned to the Kremlin – allow us to conclude that the Kremlin’s position on the United States would have been based on the following premises no matter who America hired as boss in the White House: • America is weak. It is teetering on a “fragile foundation” and will continue to decline. The United States today can no longer continue as a world leader, and its ongoing fall from grace will give Russia more room to maneuver on the global scene. • America needs Russia more than Russia needs America. The United States needs Russian help on Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Central Asia, nuclear issues, and counterbalancing China. All of these issues put the Kremlin in a stronger bar- gaining position with respect to Washington. • America’s decline and European stagnation demonstrate that liberal democracy is in crisis. This fact justifies the Kremlin’s decision to return to the idea that Russia represents a “unique civilizational model.” • America is bogged down by domestic problems. It is turning its focus inward, thus making it less prepared to react that itsdomesticenemieshavethat poppedinto own existence of their Putin’s team, like itsSoviet to predecessors, can’tafford acknowledge strategy, enemiestoo. external with itstruggle alsonecessitates that survival isan essentialelementof this its domesticenemies,which with globalarena.The Kremlin’s struggle stancein the aggressive toand mustreturn old Soviet inevitably leadto practicesthat a more to repression, Kremlin mustturn the Thislogicdictates that survival. today ever, morethan Putinregime’s logic ofthe by isformed the domestic problems.The Kremlin’sattitudetoward United the States, a President Romney isnow academic. tive one.Atany question rate, of how the Moscow would have treated we areonly talkingabouta rhetorical here,not difference a substan itwould Obamathan have Romney, with with approach a softer but of how PresidentObamaplays hiscards.To besure,Moscow willtake Putin’sKremlin. handin itspoker gamewith its current Obama administrationto continue toThat iswhyexpectthe play they to ignore Russia believe, neither norto hecouldafford perts confront it. his “reset” past.Even “reset,” ifObamawanted ex to the rethink these respectto Russia, will meanundermining positionwith assertive which PresidentObamacanhardlybelieve beexpected that to take a more update andpro-Kremlinexperts of this Kremlin architects the signs that globalization projectonitsownintegrated into Thereare the terms. desiresto idea ofRussia bedate asan independentcivilizationthat the to update itsforeign policystance.Thatnewstancewould helpconsoli hostile “abroad.” And neither Poland nor Georgia will suffice Poland hostile “abroad.”by norGeorgia willsuffice Andneither the accord; rather, enemieshave these to have beenboughtandpaid for The Kremlinmay asa booninitsproject viewa secondObamaterm For Russia, foreign policyhasalways beena meansofsolving However, above-mentioned the key premises holdindependently • • • too to for important be ignored. globalsecurity lin’s foreign Anuclear-armed policyarchitects. Russia ismuch Russia neednotworrythatAmericawillignoreit hardliners. the is readyto use revenge policy, too, asa meansofappeasing sion of Russia’s Moreover, foreign policydoctrine. Moscow updated ver in the newfound willbereflected assertiveness gameto Washington. of the to rules dictate the The Kremlin’s tablish a moreassertivepolicytowardtheWest. The Kremlin shouldusethisperiodofAmericandeclinetoes Kremlin. the not to irritate cence andwilltry Washingtonmeans that willcontinueitspolicyof acquies ism andpopulismmorethanitwillfearPutin’smachismo. The Obama administrationwillfeartheriseofRussiannational Washington’s itsbark isworse itsbite. criticism; than toward Kremlin’s turn to repression.Moscow the candismiss Moscow has Krem , say the That ------

105 How Will Russia React to Obama, Round Two? But I nevertheless wonder how suggestionsBut Inevertheless canbecombined with these defense area(like, orin an arenafarfromimportant an say, Arctic). the a new“reset” couldbeimplemented:that in aEuropeanjointmissile ways, process?Thereareother perhaps, in this to become apartner ready IsAmerica two commoditiesandcorrupt. kindsof things: exports ard a few guesses…Khodorkovsky Russia comesto mind. Hesaidthat “umbrella” of Putin. aredoingnow,if, assomeof them personal seekshelter underthe they puzzle: ifU.S. investors – to Kremlin’s rules operate agree accordingthe as Russia’s key enemy? external Thereisperhaps oneway to solve this businessesto feelpect American welcome United ifthe States isnamed How domesticinvestors canoneex already driving country? out of the bureaucracyis andpredatory to Russia whena corrupt how to flock Moscow isinterested in broadeningitseconomicties. for cooperation.Lavrovwill definitelybesomeground hasstated that There ithasaboutwhatsupports. clearer aboutwhatitrejectsthan moment itisnot clear.in practice? Atthe Putin’sKremlinhasbeen mantra willbeto reset.” “reset the mean question The is:Whatwillthis elections weredating moodoncethe over. ity, Kremlin would asbefore, to return the a moreaccommo andthat, wasmerely injectionof hostil a temporary this Many hadassumedthat Kremlin’s electioncampaign. for an enemy” the “search during the formally endedlastyear, becamea tool for whenAmerica inciting way other around.The reset the needsRussiaington morethan that itisWash Kremlin’s conviction that the hasstrengthened a fact that – beenforced itsback tothus react clumsily Kremlin’sturning to the now asconventional accept this chiks” wisdom. embrace,really isoverof awarm Even many anddonewith. “reset of course: Thereset, asa policyoftacticaltradesandanimitation were right, ago.Andthey both reset months the self to be donewith reset isover.” “the bluntly declaredthat Putinhadalreadyshown him reset? the Obama willdoasherethinks what cooperates Butisthis pragmatically in areasofmutualconcern. presidenthasto wield aharshrhetoric American evenrole the ashe of whoitsleaderis.True,one, irrespective into in orderto this fit mustbepublicenemy America number dictates that survival regime’s adversary. isa worthy Putin ened America) logic ofthe Thus,the hasbeen “raisedfromherknees.” (even Onlythat a weak America Russia. enemy, The external rather, foe mustbea of aRussia worthy ideawould enemy; very behumiliatingforas an external indeedthe UnitedBut whatcouldthe States Onecould haz expectin return? But how capital,technology, canoneexpectAmerican andknow- wrong assumption.This wasthe From now Kremlin’s on,the However, Obama administrationfailedto andithas notice the this, In September 2012 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Affairs Lavrov ------

106 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Obama ad Kremlin blastthe Kremlin’s repressive Let the machine. the State cooperation on tacticalissues.Let blast affect the Department icism seriously, doesn’t itasmereempty instead that considering ritual Washington andMoscow crit not cansilently to agree other’s take each sidestoward policypushesboth preach” typeof behavior. another Both previousoptimism andillusions.The “don’t meddleanddon’t of the embraces, anditallows for a colder, morereticent relationship,devoid (“yes, we butwe aredifferent, cancooperate”) doesn’trequire warm West, andthe other.hand, andAmerica on the The newphilosophy untilrecently dominatedgame that relationsbetween Russia, on one and even to work Kremlin. for the game, of the demonstrated itsreadinessto Kremlin’s rules accept the West;integrated into Western the because the establishment has third, Russian elite second,becausethe has beenpersonallyrope arein crisis; more favorable today. andEu becauseAmerica first, Theybelieve this, personalizedpower of the system iseven survival for the chances the we doitnow? Soviet the Union, Kremlin leadersaresaying,it with sowhy the can’t We to Western country did influence. the same timeasitclosesoff the goal),even at current OECDisthe (the into globaleconomicstructures West the tinue cooperatingwith whenitcomesto Russia integrating Kremlin wantsto con the Russia. that Thatmeans,in effect, within Westlin wantsthe to tolerate itsreproductionof anti-Western hostility quite Soviet well nature ofthe despite regime.Buttoday Krem the the cooperation between Soviet the Union West andthe wasdeveloping past, circathe Council of Europe). ket,” of the principles “responsibility to protect” andthe the principle, Helsinki “bas the of non-democraticstates (amongthem affairs internal in the influence legitimizeexternal that quite norms a few humanrights of total principle sovereignty,the would which meanforcing itto reject to force Washingtonlin willtry West (andthe in general) to endorse Krem the meansthat Council).The secondprinciple Security ing in the wherepossible,orto playAmerica a spoilerrole(justasMoscow isdo Moscow entailsthat attempt principle The first to deter rule. preach” “don’t meddleanddon’t around two containmentandthe principles: willbebuilt itsupdated respectto strategy America assured that with its key threat? for an enemy, Kremlin’s search the oritsdetermination to make America the new game.Moscow of the of real action,could becomepart ing, short ministration for its“imperialism” and“hegemony.” Thismutualscold Kremlin’s actionsandrhetoric, the Having onecanrest watched In this context, there isnoneedfor context, Moscow there In this to imitation play the team actually believes Kremlin ruling that the I have that a hunch a KremlinattemptIndeed, Iseein allofthis Soviet to to return the detente period, when economic, cultural, and security wheneconomic,cultural,andsecurity period, ------

107 How Will Russia React to Obama, Round Two? the Russian opposition). It is very strange, Russianis definitelyno heroto not opposition).Itisvery the ful of Washington White nomatter House(Obama who occupiesthe Putin regime,anditismistrust the resetRussia by with isfrustrated the ideologies.This different with of groups includesa variety tion, which we Washington shouldaskourselves what price ispaying for that? Obama administration, Russianship between regime andthe current the comingyears we relation Ifin the warming witnessa rule. don’t preach” Washington were to prove itselfreadyto “don’t meddleand abide by the open tensionremains in place.Thereisoneway couldbeeased:if the sonalized power for an enemy”) “search relieson the system, which per is, the (that Russianal suspicion,orfor Matrix atleastaslongthe orimpossible to stop.it gainsmomentum,canbecomedifficult once which, logic ofmutualmistrust, same timeitcan’tcontrolthe the West isnot dependson the Butat readyforwhich that. for itssurvival, confrontation.The rentierclass, tensions pointof serious upto the options.retaliatory limited basisof U.S.-Russianthe Kremlin’s relationsalsolimitsthe Russian how Thus aquarium. in the community haslearned to survive be madeto Not suffer? necessarily. U.S. Andin any case,the business ment of U.S. Would diplomatsandjournalists. U.S. businessesalso U.S. harass fromdealingwith organizations,orthe opposition groups new Russian treasonlaws asthe prohibiting such well-worn gimmicks, would tacticsbe?For wouldthen, itsretaliatory they include starters, Nunn-Lugaring the Cooperative What, Threat Reduction program). tive USAID tactics(for instance,kicking outof Russia anddiscontinu Kremlin willretaliate.the Lately, Kremlin hasdeployed the preemp of Russian that domesticdevelopments,up criticism onecanbecertain to legitimize itself. strategically. Kremlin’s attempts the West Itwillstrengthen to use the abilityto think America’s anditsgoals.Itwillundermine of America moresuspicious opposition (anddemocraticforces countries) in other Russian cynicism.Itwillmakeers willtake the asproofof American oth tion andproducinga “non-ideological”areaofpolitics,which reputa normative America’s undermining dimension of politics,thus same timeitwillhave Itwillwaterthe effects. down “values” other the relationship fromfreezingsolid.Butatdiplomacy willprevent the today faction,which Party” viewsPutinastoo liberalandsoft. fundamentalists, Russia’s a basisfor ownform consolidatingthe “Tea Westernand democracyrecord.The abilityto ignore these lamentswill will continueto ignore U.S. of itsworsening criticism humanrights Tactical cooperationbasedon “don’tmeddleanddon’tpreach” We opposi Russia mustn’tforget Russia: of the the Other aboutthe The mostlikely we of mutu probabilityisthat willfacea longperiod elite to Russian would raise ruling the hardly try But besidesthis, Magnitsky Act andbeginsto U.S. passesthe rampIf the Congress ------

108 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles its final term. of its final ity to Think Big,andto well push itsconceptual end horizons beyond the administration not a willingnessto buta capac make tacticaltrade-offs willemerge soonerorlater.that second Obama This demandsfromthe will not totally new Russia relationsbetween andthe undermine America agony hasentered phase, of its terminal the a regimethat tem, andwith life of anobsolete orwillitprolongthe formation, system? cooperationhelpRussia’s trans possibility ofcooperation,butwillthis the are heldhostage to domestic developments. True, doesnot preclude this outside world the Russia’s Russian each relationswith system meansthat of the The growing crisis andoppositional,arein agreement. sias, official ture of U.S.-Russian any optimism. relationswith Rus Hereagainboth presidential election. won’t next when itwillcome?Andifdoes,certainly comebefore the enough to whoknows cooperate. future Russian Asfor turmoil, the abroad.Really:throughs why aboutRussia? bother The Kremlinissmart itsgazeinward andisnot isturning readyfor America anythat break anew.willing andableto think wallsays Butsofar, on the writing the into law) administration isatleast willbea litmustest for the whether strategy on Russia? (ifitispassed The Magnitskybillanditsmechanism meddlingandpreaching! American too, woulddowithout rather position hardly wantsU.S. it, interference in domesticRussian affairs; West. the Russian operates elite in andthrough The op that corrupt the to contain shows itwillatleasttry but only in onecase:ifAmerica that certainty. moods?Possibly, new Obamapresidencychange these Willthe Russian statusquothe of top-down outof afear of change andun rule wantsto preserve roots; America different itistriggeredby a beliefthat Kremlin.To official has the opposition’s suspicionofAmerica besure,the to Russian mention rare,for oppositionto the line upinany positionwith The only hope is that U.S.The only hopeisthat a decaying engagement Russian with sys And soherewe Russian side,hardly are:Onthe anyone fu viewsthe Will Washington underPresidentObamabereadyto pursue anew ------

109 How Will Russia React to Obama, Round Two? Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik? Lilia Shevtsova & David J. Kramer / The American Interest, November 13, 2012

Germany’s role in the ongoing euro crisis is a reminder of its economic superpower status in Europe. But Germany plays another leading role: defining European policy toward Russia. Brussels and other Euro- pean capitals often follow Germany’s lead when it comes to dealing with Russia. And with the United States distracted with its recent election and other priorities, and with the reset not what it used to be, Germany’s role in defining the “Eastern strategy” – and specifically the agenda toward Russia – is likely to increase (even if Berlin tries to keep a low profile). Until recently, the German-Russian relationship was viewed as the model of a happy, albeit weird, marriage of incompatible bedfellows. No longer: German public opinion has grown increasingly critical of Vladimir Putin’s regime and its clampdown on human rights and the political opposition. While this shift in public attitude has not had a major impact on the official Berlin line, it has reinforced the push by some Bundestag deputies, especially the German Greens, the only party that has consistently raised the issue of human rights in Russia. But things have started to change in Berlin. This summer the Ger- man special envoy for Russia on behalf of the ruling coalition, Andreas Schockenhoff, prepared a critical motion on Russia (“The Civil Society and Rule of Law in Russia”), which sought to clarify Germany’s position before the high level Russian-German government consultations and annual meeting of the St. Petersburg dialogue in November. According to Sueddeutsche Zeitung, however, the German Foreign Affairs Minis- try, headed by the Christian Democrats’ partner Free Democrats and its leader, Guido Westerwelle, substantially edited the motion. In fact, the ministry rewrote the key points, significantly altering the main message of the motion. See for yourself. Schockenhoff’s motion started with the following: “The German Bundestag seriously worries that Russia will be facing stagnation instead of progress on its path toward building an open and modern society due to the deficit of rule of law, investments and innovation.” the GDR, Gauck ap an eye GDR,Gauck on.Ahighly respected in the freedomfighter of “Europeanization.” on apath Erler, Gernot leading Russia expert, whohasspoken aboutRussia’s being views of their to feel fromthe uneasyandaredistancing themselves accommodatingattitudetowardmore than Putinpersonally, have started SocialDemocrats,known “appeasement.” German for Even their the toward Moscow, Russian oppositionhasviewed the as a positionthat previoussoftness to fromtheir ing coalitionstarted distance themselves rul Kremlin;membersof the respectto tougherfor the linewith a much Kremlin. taneously whohave bolstered of the those beenmore critical and heavy-handed interference escalated emotions in Berlin andsimul to be accommodatingtoward Moscow. clumsy The Russian ministry’s outto even be too whoseweremore! Thisturned much for those trying anyworld itwasnot Schockenhoff goingto anddeclaredthat deal with Arab in the Russia waslosinginfluence that assertion Schockenhoff’s wasespecially byderous accusations.” offended The Russian ministry matter,into the making “slan of indignantly accusingSchockenhoff itsnose of Foreigncomplicated stuck Russian Affairs Ministry whenthe status quoto between maintain the Moscow andBerlin got even more wants government that German the of part rent Russian regimeandthe to political elite avoid tries where the scandalsatany price. completely upside-down. Thisprovoked a mini-scandalincountry motion intent of the the of Foreign turned Affairs Ministry German the motion legislative isnot history, unheardof inGerman tary case in this society. andthe between authorities the Whiletweaking a Parliamen cally active gap butenemies,” citizensnot broadeningthe aspartners, viewpoliti Russian “authorities the that assertion and erasedanother apathy a lot country,” of Russians arereadyfor activismin their greater phrase, “AfterThey alsotook outthe years of managed democracyand didnot Parliament’s like mentionof civicactivisminRussia. the istry anddemocraticRussia.”economically modernized Apparently, min the andRussia Germany are“interestedphrase that in apolitically and seemingly alsotookpation. The Foreign innocuous outthe Ministry globalproblemscouldbesolved Russia’s onlystating that partici with diplomatsaddeda line more:German one. Butthere’s German the of Foreign not Russian by Affairs, Ministry wasrewritten the this think energysupplierin Europe.” Onemightalmost crucial . andisthe largest two world statethe through continents stretches in the that andEurope. of Germany keyRussia andessential partner is“the mer Stasi “hunter” andtireless pro-democracyadvocate whoexposed pears to have noillusionsaboutwhat ishappeningin Russia. Asa for Foreign Affairs changed that to of Foreign say changed that that Affairs Ministry The German German President Joachim Gauck is worth keeping isworth Gauck PresidentJoachim The positionof German Consequently, Greenswhowere itwasnot German calling only the cur of the between arecritical Bundestag circlesthat This conflict ------

111 Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik? object way expectations.” became the Germany in this He admitted that could to avoid antagonizing Russia, expense ofraisingfalse “even atthe it Berlin’sregarding Russia. Hedescribed goalasdoing everything Merkel wrote delusions beginning ofthe period, aboutGerman the in Russia asanywheretrue else. endaredelayedhoped. Butallhopesin the disappointments.Thisisas newanddemocraticRussia – orsomembers embodiment ofthe the Bundestagprovoked in the speech a standingovation asherepresented in September Recall that 2001,low Europeanpath? a normal Putin’s Putincouldbepersuaded to fol hopethat Putin eraenduresin the early emergedthe during idealism(orisitromanticism?)that German in Russia. Perhaps rule authoritarian leaderswouldGerman sidewith Soviet Union don’texplainwhy have it.Butthese to something do with man feelings Second World of guiltfor the War andinvasion of the peccable democrat,” did. as Schroeder Russian Kremlinan “im autocrat don’tcallthe in the Kremlin, andthey commercial interests in Russia have Putin’s love with escapedthe affair motivated with by countries commercialandeconomicinterests? Other of developmentshas becomeincreasingly insideRussia? critical Isit public opinion Kremlin even asGerman the suit of closerelationswith change. than into morecontinuity “Merkelization,” turned Scroederization reflecting ures, drawing a stark contrastto herpredecessor. Butto a large extent, positive impression civilsociety whenshemet and oppositionfig with visittowould Russia end; on herfirst aschancellor, shemadea big, Angela Merkel’s to power rise Schroederization hadmany hopingthat would that annoyanything Kremlin; we the mustbeclosefriends. meantavoiding which name “Schroederization,” timeacquired the er’s Gerhard Schroed approach.” Thispolicyduring normative tion of the basedon commoninterests andtotal as“closepartnership rejec define mainstream. of the expandandbecomepart ranks their Kremlin. Now lineareseeing callingfor the a morecritical those with courage “general tothe course”for stand upagainstthe partnership anda handfulofmarginalpoliticianshad political minority only the viewstoward changing Putin’sRussia. Before, litical classreflecting po German andamongthe country is a newmoodemerginginthe only meeting note. their sofarendedon achilly on aregular basis,after to Putin meetThat may with bewhy appearsto be innohurry Gauck KGB former the GDR,have agent basedin the in common. nothing andPutin, communistsecret former police,Gauck of the crimes the What we precedent.There areseeingunfold iswithout in Germany Gerd Koenen, “DerRussland-Komplex,” in hisbook, published at The complicated between history andRussia Germany andGer Why policy over pur years clungto hasGerman stubbornly the the Until recently, Berlin pursuedapolicytoward we Russia that would ------

112 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles der external influence; they eventually they collapsed! influence; der external Sovietcommunist system and the Union didnot un change gradually West the its dialoguewith (andespecially West The global Germany). socialist“Commonwealth” life of the through it helpedprolongthe policy,In retrospect, outcomes ofthis judgingby the onecansay that communist system proved beginning;the very to be unreformable. the Warsawand the wasdoomedfrom pact.Thismodelof transformation would coordinate creation ofabodythat betweenideas wasthe NATO systems both woulda hope that converge. Oneof BahrandBrandt’s alsoincluded geopolitical which system rapprochement, through possibility ofprovokingthe communist positive change insidethe Ostpolitikwasbasedon anidealisticpremise:development, Brandt’s egy wassoonappliedby West Soviet to Germany the Union. change involving The same strat “many rapprochement. steps” through out,” Bahrexplainedin 1963, of gradual justifyinga newapproach mustberuled policyof allornothing GDR. “The andthe of Germany relationshipbetween Federal of the the was normalization Republic largely early in the continuedby 1980s. HelmutSchmidt Itsmaingoal late 1960s/early in the Rapprochement” through 1970s, was which of “Change doctrine basisof Bahr’s his closeadviserEgonBahron the to “Ostpolitik,” formulated by in history Willymust goback Brandt and will bea motor for investments.” key of gas”and“Germany Europeandistributor willbethe “Germany tions elsewhere.Putinknewhow to play to ego,saying Germany’s that Itisdoubtfulhecouldhave friends. developed rela of German such and lived for several GDRhelpedhimbuildhisnetwork years in the German fluent Putinspeaks fact that erator of Gazprom.Indeed,the EuropeanGasPipelineCompany,tive North director of the op the and Konrad Adenauer, Stasi andformer like MattiasWarnig, execu as AlexanderRahr, whohappily compares Putinto Charles deGaulle speakers Kremlin andmembersofPutin’sbusinesscircle,such for the and elite have punditry becomeloud German representatives of the isan obviousexample,Former ChancellorSchroeder butseveral ment have beenco-opted Kremlin’s expandingnetwork. into the politicalandbusinessestablish German membersof the Influential differentiate between Kremlin. large Russia writ andthe elite can’t ruling questionNo German of why isthe lessimportant the would a manner. conductitselfin such Europeancountry a great such of Russia’s “world question of why ambitions.” begsthe Koenen’s thesis a “gas for pipelines”deal suggested by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs policytoward key elementsof Brandt’s oneof the Russiathat was Perhaps to answers find. questions the to arenot these sodifficult Schroederization emerged from Brandt-Bahr’s Ostpolitik.Recall emerged fromBrandt-Bahr’s Schroederization While easingtensions between globalcompetitors wasa positive situation. Indeed,one to explain the isn’tsufficient But even this ------

113 Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik? totalitarian or authoritarian Kremlin but totalitarian orauthoritarian the relationship not with wanting Russia of Europe.” to be part aboutGermany sensitiveness. It’s the our history, rivalries, wars, the the Erlerexplained Gernot in 2005.“Ithasgot ourgeography, to do with hastoocrat, Germany Russian have leader,” the a goodrelationshipwith a policymay Such not belimitedHimmelreich. to one party, however. mocracy, andcivilsociety,” humanrights Joerg wrote expert German stand andaccept quickly Russia’s deviationfrom Western modelsof de a policy toward by isdriven Russia a deepinclinationto that under basis for “Schroederization-Merkelization.”the Kremlin andformed the in relationswith slightestof even chill the prospect shuddersatthe East Committee). Thisgroup the Ausschuss, lobby Ost- (centered commercial andindustrial aroundthe but the includednot foreign only policybureaucracy that the ing group of Germany.” energy security the herteeth, in ordernot give toclenching Putinhertwo damage cheeks, cellor,” wrote Russian systemthe of personalizedpower. Chan German current “The same supporting whileatthe agenda (mainly itsenergypriorities), economic hasdualmeaning:ithelpsto German solvereincarnation the problem for Germany, Soviet andhelpingthe system Itsnew to survive. acknowledged energy by easingtensions, itsarchitects): solvingthe of outcomes(not necessarily time,Ostpolitikhada “triad” Brandt’s These area logicalfollow-on Willy same Ostpolitik.During fromthe EU’sagenda for of the Russia. becamepart that ship for Modernization” of “growing closerby interweaving” andinitiated “Partner Germany’s concept Bundestag)developed the SocialDemocratfactionin the of the HelmutKohl. ning with leadersbegin German hasbeenrepeated with rapprochement” through emergence of itssuccessor,and the Russia. philosophy The of “change Soviet collapse ofthe Union the survived man-Russian relationsthat foundation of Ger Bank)becamethe fromDeutsche support financial NATOthe alliance. Soviet of the Union lobbiedMoscow’spartner andoften interests within times. Gradually, Federal the Republic becamea trusted of Germany allowedthat two the sidesto global tensions talk despite of those the of communicationbetweencial secret channel Moscow andWest Berlin energetically buildup ofaspe idea andeven orderedthe the supported Andrei Gromyko hisvisitto Hanover during in 1969. LeonidBrezhnev Gazprom and Ruhrgas (with Gazprom andRuhrgas roleof (with crucial “Gas diplomacy”andthe view is that Germany shouldhave Germany The counter a viewisthat to a good such “Regardless of whoischancellor, Dem SocialDemocratorChristian hasa longtraditionofpromoting SocialDemocraticParty “The OstpolitikemergedFrom a solid lobby in Germany Brandt’s Leading SocialDemocratFrank-Walter Steinmeier head (currently Frankfurter AllgemeineZeitung with bitter irony, with “hasto, ------

114 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Heinrich Vogel.Heinrich Hereiswhathesaid: politicalanalysts, mostthoughtful country’s sia, we to one ofthe turned condolenceswhenhedied. even expressofficial Kremlin never forgave the escalation.” this, After Havelther anddidnot danger growing of fur and unbearablepressureandthe “in light ofthe award hadto cancel the group German the Embarrassed, ing hisprize. Havelof trustees. soonfollowed andannouncedhe wasreturn them berg University, EdgarWolfrum, stepped down award’s board fromthe Cem Ozdemir, aswellprofessor fromHeidel asa prominenthistory GreenParty, leadersof the oneof the amongthem statt Deutschland, in Russia, boardof Werk andbeyond. membersof the Several German Enough said. side Viktor Zubkov, of Putin. of Gazpromandaconfidant chairman symposium along commissionof the steering of the asco-chair served award announcement,he Stasi. time of the the Atthe connections with government coming undersuspicionof having buthadto resign after Maizière Vaclav selectioncommittee de wasLothar of the Havel. The chairman have “Quadriga” beenHelmutKohl,ners of the MikhailGorbachev, and toward future(!). Amongpreviouswin Great, hebuiltapath the the because,like Peter bookof history a specialchapter in the deserved Putin prize, According “Quadriga.” organizersof the tocial prize, the man organizationWerkstatt a spe decorated Putinwith Deutschland excessive Germans’ lovesia) dueto certain for Putin.In 2011, Ger the has helpedRussia becomemoreEuropean. for Russian machine money. Europeinto a laundry turning None of this Russian elite corrupted into Europeand to the Europe by incorporating haveity, Putin’sRussia closer helpedin bringing efforts German the Russia closertobringing aim.” Europe “hasbeenourlongterm real In actively promoting businessin Russia, likes to say againandthat scandals. ruption key in cor of gas inEurope,ithaspaidasteep distributor price ing the Russia’s borders.For example, hassucceeded in becom whileGermany arenot effects limited to Andthe inside andnorms. of European rules existence of personalized power very the in Russia meansa rejection sonalized power, Russia of Europe,” willnever because become“part Russia’s system asgoodrelationswith of per relations” aredefined Aslongas“good Russian two different. societywith – andthe arevery instant success of ‘market-democracy,’ alleged destiny the of man alwaysbeen… The vastmajority were of Germans skeptical about nolove-affair“No, between it’s Berlin andMoscow, itnever has To toward moodsin Germany changing Rus help usunderstandthe Fortunately, award society, provoked the in German an outcry butt ofjokesMeanwhile, (atleastin Rus has becomethe Germany hasbeen EastCommittee, which of the Klaus Manhold,chairman former East German whowasa cabinet minister EastGerman in Kohl’s, a former ------

115 Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik? Social Demo oldhabitsdie hard,representatives of the in asign that Russian opposition onalllevels society.” of the the same time, Butatthe Russian leader had“disappointedthe many whohadhopes”and “scared tone.to Theirrepresentative, change their Erler, Gernot admitted that of law state.” rule foundationsin defense of the of the a wayare behaving voice in such in Russia, shesaid,“can’traisetheir Kremlin, mentioningSiemensandDaimlerinparticular.the Thosewho companies wereGerman for paying getting bribes juicycontractsfrom received applausewhenshepointed Beck, outthat sentative, Marieluise leaving Russia.” creative class and“the population.” Instead,of the we seecapitalflight tion projectsin Russia couldbeimplemented support the only with “allmoderniza Kremlin notion repeatingthat of “modernization,” the .creates Heblasted ourdeepestconcern.” cies aredeepening,this repressive tenden whenthe of law areundermined, rule ciples of the words, saying prin when“democraticfreedomsarelimited, whenthe didnot mince debate, AndreasSchockenhoff the in Russia. During Wolfgang of politicaldevelopments criticism voiced Gehrcke) sharp Party, exception Left representative the of the of the Bundestag (with tions. OnNovember German 9,representatives in the of allkey parties to Theywanta clearperspective engage Russian for courts. their turn in Russiaofpredictabilitywhenthey andlack corruption Bundestagin 2013. aboutelections to the isworrying Thisgroup and even middlesizedbusinesseswhoarekey next to winning the able potential attracted sizeablerealinvestments big fromGerman ma. Over the GDR. former the having nineties. to Theyknewfirst-hand integratekind in the Even usually accommodating SocialDemocratswere forced were Greens. Theirrepre most critical the debate, the the During As Vogel’s astute analysis have reveals, to Germans started ask ques law,of the of freedom.” responsibilityanda spirit rule for answers. only with comesin apackage Modernization Russian peoplewillcontinuecalling in charge asthe heat on those state again(ashehaspromised)willcauseadditionalindustrial tions, however, whenandhow heintends to make Russia a leading next wallby yelling againstthe athim.Asking ques his country on whatever aislewillnot stop sideof the Mr. Putinfromdriving towards past. Obviously politiciansin Germanytics, forward the obvious courseofRussianlin by poli speakingoutagainstthe politiciansannoying Krem of economic relations,i.e.German the call‘politicization’ aboutwhatthey peoplearealsoworried these not But a happyment butsofarPutin2blewit.It’s partnership. a true dilem Democratsin BerlinThe Christian arecaughtin a true last twenty years, the Russian market its undeni with ------

116 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles German leadership. tive dimensionbutalsoa newmodelof German sia couldnot only becomea test abilityto of Germany’s adopt a norma willhavethis an impact on Germany. Indeed,a new policytoward Rus cozyrelationshipbetweenof the many EuropeanleadersandPutin.All European media by the criticism for sanctionslegislation,andsharp Kremlin’s actions,growing support the Assembly of Europecriticizing Parliamentary in recent resolutionsofthe gime mustend,asreflected Putin’sre connivancewith isa sensethat elsewhere in Europethere isnot limited frustration to Germany; rising Putin’s Russia. Indeed,this itspolicytoward with society’s growing frustration can’t ignoreGerman tactical agenda? Time leadership isapparent: willtell, the butonething elite readyto abouta short-term German go beyond thinking Is the to formulate a newpolicybasednot only on interests butvalues,too? meet cooperation.WillBerlin againfor beready discussionof their Kremlin.haveting in the to be sensitive to our criticism.” KGB former noted, guysfrom the Beck sit tion, too. “The AsMarieluise among itsown civilsociety, butamongRussian civilsociety andopposi governmentmay andleadershipnot restore German only respectfor the Kremlin and the relationship with suffocating to fromthe free Germany attempt serious first PutinistakingRussia. the in which Thismarks direction aboutthe isincreasingly worried political spectrum across the politicalestablishment German lution were the cast,meaningthat Russia in Germany’s policy. a shift and marks No votes reso against the debate significance took the great placeatallisof factthat very less, the deputieswere Nonethe German not satisfied. most critical mise, andthe bilateral relationship. possibilities of the tin’s abusesmay limit the andconcluded: constitute a crackdown on humanrights lin actionsthat exchange of views.” crats urged “not Germany to “equal Russia teach” andcontinuethe “The Bundestag notes with particular concern that sincePresident that concern Bundestag notes particular “The with On November Bundestag resolutionmentionedindetail Krem 9,the In mid-November, andRussia delegationsfromGermany will result ofcompro emerged wasthe resolution that end, the In the words,The Bundestag, inother unequivocally Pu concludedthat itscritics.” governmentand set on a confrontationalcoursewith the litically engagement active critical citizens,increasingly criminalize have collectively beentaken which increasedcontrolover exert po legislative andjudicialmeasures toVladimir Putin’sreturn office, ------

117 Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik? What the Magnitsky Act Means David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, December 18, 2012

Sergei Magnitsky was a 37-year-old lawyer who was beaten, deprived of vital medical attention, and left to die in a Russian prison nearly a year after uncovering a massive fraud allegedly committed by Russian officials to the tune of $230 million. The very people whom Magnitsky implicated in the fraud arrested him in 2008; a year after his murder, several of these officials were promoted and awarded, adding insult to the fatal injury inflicted on Magnitsky. Magnitsky’s client, Hermitage Capital head Bill Browder, launched a full-court press to seek justice for his lawyer in the West in the absence of any possibility for justice inside Russia. Browder recounted Mag- nitsky’s riveting story to members of the U.S. Congress and anyone else who would listen. Fortunately, two Congressmen, Senator Ben Cardin (D–MD) and Representative Jim McGovern (D–MA), did listen, and they followed up by leading the campaign to adopt the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which was approved by the House in a 365–43 vote November 16, and by the Senate with an equally bipartisan landslide (92-4) on December 6. The Act will deny visas to and freeze the assets of those in the Russian ruling elite implicated in Magnitsky’s murder and other human rights violations and corruption. Various polls in Russia show support for the legislation by a ratio of more than two-to- one among those familiar with it. In targeting sanctions against corrupt and abusive Russian officials as opposed to the whole country, the Act resonates with the many Russians who are fed up with these kinds of problems in their country. The next critical step is to get European countries to adopt similar measures, which would have an even greater impact on those Russians who like to travel and do business in Europe. There will likely be international ramifications to the approval of the Magnitsky Act – especially if it gets applied to other abusive of - ficials elsewhere around the world; Senator Cardin strongly supports such an extension of the law’s reach. The Act is also bound to influence the Russian-American relationship – if not today, then in the future. If not implemented aggressively, the legislation risks ending up as yet another piece in the “Let’s Pretend” game that the West has long been playing with Russia and other authoritarian states. (Indeed some not changed: The West Russia would stillhopedthat democratize, and modelhad essence ofthe contingent Butthe on itstransformation). Transformation”tion through West, the Russia (integrating with but liberal democracy, model appeared, known a modified as“Integra Russian regimehadlittlein common with the more evidentthat cooperation in buildingRussian democraticinstitutions.Asitbecame tion by moving ittoward West), the West’s implied which the active (promoting Russia’s approach Integration” transforma tion through many zigsandzags.The Westgone through adopted “Transforma the and updates itto apply itto today’s Russia. to The MagnitskyAct premise behindJackson-Vanik emigrate. takes the right citizens’ of most favored limited their nationtradestatusifthey approved Jackson-Vanik the amendmentin 1974 to countries deprive U.S. the Congress Helsinki Accords, them, fore andconsistent the with mistake. Longbe hasfixedthat Magnitsky Act, Congress In passing the actionswould broader relationship. such edge not the affect that knowl lightto engage abuses,secureinthe a green in humanrights age between interests andvalues.Thismistake essentially gave Putin notion of link itwasabandoningthe Russiareset that policywith of law) in transitionsocieties. rule institutions (elections,parties, building ofdemocratic the supported states andcivicorganizationsthat Westernlated philosophy into the the democracy promotion of with European Council’slegalframework. OSCEandthe Itwastrans of the matternot internal of acountry. merely isa key the part Thisprinciple are humanrights accordingto which HelsinkiPrinciples, tance of the almostuniversal accep in the Thisrecognitionwasreflected doctrine. cally, Western of key principle itwasrecognizedasthe foreign policy Westthe linkage inconsistently only pursuedthis rhetori andoften foreign policymodelof linkage between interests andvalues.While early-to-mid-1970s, Helsinki processof the the West the created a new nitsky factor” andpoliticalcontext. in abroaderhistorical During manner.tion in aserious legisla Obama administrationimplements the the must seeto it that seekingto demoralize Westerncorruption society. U.S. The Congress Western the world forces for of authoritarian the andsignala victory affecting outcome.)Thiswould deepcrisis hope for this exposethe Europe. it would in Russia’s into participate democratization andintegration the USSR, Western collapse ofthe Since the policytoward Russia has OldThe Ways Russia with of Dealing Regrettably, Obama administrationannouncedearly the on inits To Act, we of the have significance “Mag understandthe to see the ------

119 What the Magnitsky Act Means following possibility ofsolvingthe problems: the Sovietpracticed by the Union. policies ofconfrontationandcontainment the far moreeffective than hasbeen of corruption exportation West the the through fromwithin doing, impacted Western foreign policies.Undermining the countries’ or“imitationdemocracy”states and,in so elements fromauthoritarian a segment ofWestern interests of corrupt society the beganto serve fromRussiato post-Soviet andother European countries) states. Thus, West to the of corruption (especially exportation it hasfacilitated the Russiantive globalone.Second, stage society on the both andon the West’sconsequences. First, the norma reputationasa ithastarnished Russia on issuesofeconomicsandsecurity. with advantageousanyone partnership the undermining wantto risk wasa mistake.Putin (early asdemocraticreformers Nor did in hisrule) Western belief inYeltsin the politicianwaswillingto admit that and “collective” Westthe itcouldn’tveer embarked fromit.No path, on this interested Moreover, in Russia’s demoralizationanddegradation. once in Russia.of reforms Many Russians West beganto view the ascynically want any!” imitation The West in the reducedto participation wasthus of many isdemocracy,” Russians. “Ifthis we “then don’t thought, they Westerners eyes wound notion of democracyinthe updiscreditingthe new Kremlinone-manrule, decade, andby the openly supporting racy in Russia, anddislocating whento most Russians itwasa terrible 1990s of the period asa timeofdemoc the eral slogans.Bydescribing system of personalizedpowerwas revivingthe guise oflib underthe movingsia hadstarted toward 1990s. democracyin the In fact,Russia the erroneous assumption Rus erroneous that These hopeswere in the grounded turning point,sinceitallowsThe “Magnitskyfactor” a turning for marks a Turning as Magnitsky Point The West’s to Russia approach imitationof anormative hashadtwo • • • • West and itsagenda by standingupfor principle. arenowin Russian societies andother that suspicious of the overcoming andanti-Western anti-Americanism sentiments model; authoritarian to the liberaldemocracyasan attractive back alternative bringing West; into personal integration elites’ the their resources andhindering external gimes by limitingtheir re authoritarian sustainability ofcorrupt the undermining West;Russia andthe demoralization of politicalelites in both andthe corruption, ciety imitation,external issue ofnormative by confronting the aspectin Western a normative roleof so primary the restoring ------

120 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles the popular Echo Moskvywebsite popularEcho asfollows: billon the of the usually quite United suspicious of the States, reacted passage to the Magnitsky.in seeing itreplacedwith Russian internet users,whoare of Jackson-Vanik lifting moreinterested the butwasmuch supported segments, have Magnitsky Act. Italso the overwhelmingly supported Westand the asa whole. United for both the a newapproach, States Thisindeed marks Branch. Executive wishes ofthe textbook againstthe – albeitapage turned foreign a newpageto policy in the turned universal values,Congress Magnitsky legislation.Nonetheless, by linkingeconomicintereststhe over frustration Dumavent their in the Kremlin anditslackeys as the companies nearterm, roughsailingin RussiaAmerican may in the find PNTR, Kremlin. Thus,even for with the came asan unwanted surprise Western Magnitsky Act accompanying harangues.Itwasthe PNTRthat a familiarandconvenient Kremlin with excusethe for itsconstantanti- Vanik amendmenthaslongbeena non-issue.Infact,itprovided boostto an important offers U.S. businessesacross sectors.” it needsto compete in Russia's growing market. Passage of Russia PNTR andpredictability certainty U.S. the vides the businesscommunity with to say:had this “We welcome today's pro Senate historic actionwhich U.S. of the Russia BusinessCouncil, chairman CEO of Alcoaandthe and orimposing or humanrights sanctions.KlausKleinfeld, chairman most businessesaregenerally not interested in promoting democracy isunderstandable,in that of PNTRstatus,which granting ments on the Senate vote,Still, the business communityfocused after itscom the Magnitsky. would PNTRwithout they not support made itclearthat ness lobbiesto get number ofkey PNTR,sincea membersof Congress busi onlyping oppositionto way American Magnitsky wasthe for the front.Drop creditfor pushingon that deserves WTO, a member ofthe pect of losingequal accessto Russia’s markets onceRussia became businesscommunity, Russia. The American with motivated pros by the traderelations(PNTR) normal permanent of granting ment andthe Act Jackson-Vanik haditnot beenlinked repealof the to the amend regimes. use Western authoritarian interests to andtheir secure their countries eliteslectures on buildingdemocracy);itisaimedinstead who atthe societies nolonger regimes(inmostcases,these need authoritarian live societies under that the Itdoesnot intend to influence influence. entirely different format of Western an entirely format The MagnitskyActdifferent signifies WORKS. Ifwe Kremlin’s hype law, notice allthe around the itmeans act the certainty: about Russia with . . butIcansay onething politicians sincerely care American the “Of course,Idoubtthat As noted above, Russian society, andespecially itsmostprogressive For Russian government, the however, Jackson- repeal ofthe the To beclear, likely Congress would not have Magnitsky passedthe ------

121 What the Magnitsky Act Means was approved: bill the totions. The Russian after say hadthis Foreign right Ministry viola humanrights measurestoand “asymmetric” combat American to Kremlin hasalreadystarted prepare “symmetric” But, justin case,the law, the constantly with it. voiced itsdisagreement willbeableto thwart has White House,which the put it,perhaps hopingthat Russian official and renderitmerely symbolic.“Baloney. Itwillchange nothing,” asone new law steps the to willtake block allnecessary countries and other have impact. greatest the Schengen signal,butapproval Zonewouldsend an important in the must abideby it.Passage UK,Norway, in the andCanadawould also Schengen Agreement of the allcountries in effect a similar law sothat EUshouldpass Therefore, a Schengen Zonememberof the exports. in Europe aswell, main recipientof Russia’s corrupt sinceEuropeisthe tion mustbedeveloped further. First andforemost, ithasto be adopted amazing. of in Russia short arenothing of support less andnegative levels Act, propagandacampaign these againstthe only Kremlin’s relent nitsky Act, 4.5percentagainst.Given with the hasa largely granted, Mag (which, the liberallistenership) supported Unitedthe States. Moskvy Around95.5percentof listeners Echo of Russian andeven public,whoareusually hostiletowardthe reserved Magnitsky Act, an incredibly among the highlevel of support support According to a recentLevadaCenter poll,39percentof Russians reason to exist.”of the U.S. you, to the Putin’sgang deprive Senate,“Thank for trying samewebsite:Here isonemorepostingon the job!” dida great of how timethey we .this aretreatingthem all.Whateverafter nameswe andregardless arecallingAmericans arenot INVAIN, efforts THERE MUSTBEAREASON. Then,these spond.” However, look pathetic. efforts their Russian sidewillhave the to re development relations: of Russian-American opponents of normal adherence to law. international We have to reiterate hyperactive consistent lineof Russiaprincipled, in world in favor affairs of strict vindictive isonly desireto the U.S. get there the Congress even for absurd… of the theater in the performance sanctions againstsomeRussian citizens,isthe false pretenses visa andfinancial underthe introducesthe which of Representatives United of the States approved legislation, the United decisionof the States“The Senate following House the donors”in Russia same time,itisquite “corruption At the clearthat However, “Magnitsky factor” for to the work, itspracticalapplica It looks like that behind ridiculously biased approach taken in biasedapproach behindridiculously like that It looks - - - - -

122 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles assets in dollarsandU.S. banks! Russian elite to corrupt keep of the their right are in factdefending the stances known elite anti-American munists andother groups for their Russian elite.pressure on the com isoutstanding:The The irony of this United the States factthat to exert very outrage tries atthe press their to retaliation ex againstAmerica communists, support like the Others, abilityto remain connected West. positionsandtheir to the financial Act isquite all,somefear itwillendanger understandable. After their dealerViktor Bout. notorious arms asthe such of Russian citizens, human rights guiltyof abusingthe officials American to Russia, be bannedfromentering alongwith andabuse them children measures: For example, parentswhoadopt itcallsfor Russian American its own anti-Magnitskylaw, version itsown of the retaliatory carrying law waspassed.The Russian the step Dumaisendorsing retaliatory after United meatproductsfromthe States.on certain Thisconstituted itsfirst date Putin’sregimewillbeingto crumble. consoli of mutualloyalty connivancethat principles andpermissive the weakness. The regimecannot punishoneifitsown members;otherwise The logic ofpersonalizedpower doesnot allow regime to display the problem. more serious here.Thereisa onlyness isnot culprit the elite? Russian The Kremlin’spoliticalshortsighted ruling bers of the West the point that feltto ithadto the adopt sanctionsagainstmem to escalate Magnitsky’sdeath lin allow situation surrounding the contrary.evidence to the rest issimplyand the Apparently, “intrigue.” farhehasfound no thus Washington hepursues, that that same policyformula the works within policy;heevidently dimensioninto thinks can includea normative their gain.” The Russian leaderdefinitely doesnot Americans believe that Russian-U.S. for somedomesticpolitical relationsshouldbesacrificed is mostlikely ButIdon’tunderstandwhy a domesticpoliticalintrigue. ently sincerewhenhesaid,“Frankly speaking,Idon’tunderstand.This as a“purely act.” political,unfriendly TheRussian leaderwasappar readiness to protect violators Russian atany humanrights cost. andshow responsible for a person’sdeath their those with themselves failedto see itsabsurdity:Theyidentify Perhaps, authors statement’s the itwasaccusedof. samethings ataccusingitsopponentsof the great policy will complicate partnership with Russiapolicy willcomplicate on issueslike with Iran,Af partnership to adoption foreign approach of a newnormative the whofear that those This statement isquintessentially Soviet, Soviet for the Union was The MagnitskyAct hasitsdetractors West, in the aswell asamong Magnitsky classto the ruling Kremlinandthe The reactionof the adoption, Act’s Moscow aboutrestrictions the warned Right after Why Krem arises: didthe froth A naturalquestion amidstallthis On December13, Magnitsky Act PresidentVladimirPutinblasted the ------

123 What the Magnitsky Act Means who seekjusticefor hisdeath. shouldgotoAnd creditfor people like that Sergei Magnitskyandthose West the factor” somehopethat willovercome offers malaise. itscurrent West by the in approach toward Russia willactually be. The “Magnitsky anti-Western sentiments. and spike in anti-American andthe towardsia’s turn authoritarianism lost itsoverall visionandforesight of politicaldevelopments amidRus to Russia West hasdiscredited the in many Russians’ minds.The West Kremlin. the with rolein dealings andrevivinga morenormative adjusting itsapproach Westfor in Russia civilsociety the suggest andhumanrights that is July, Bundestagspeakingout German anda recentresolutioninthe Parliament Dutch European Parliament last fallandin the in the this for similarlegislation unanimous backing U.S. the in the Congress, MagnitskyAct. passagein Russia of the whosupport includingamongthose isstillouton that, politics.The jury normative The question Western iswhether diplomacywillbeableto move on to expense ofstrategic failures. comeatthe tactical successes,butthese plomacy nolonger involves The West strategic thinking. may boast its of Westernmay not isnoloss:current yieldimmediate di results.Butthis andstereotypesal methods andmove on to a multi-step diplomacythat does make itmorecomplex. The West willhave to abandon itstradition Magnitsky Act irrelevant. the and companies engaged Kremlin– whowillwork in PRfor the to make businesses,legalandpoliticalconsultants, – banks, exports corrupt whoaredirectly implicatedThere arealsothose to in catering Russia’s burner. back shouldbeputon the oneisnegotiating with of a country politics internal the ing processora “transactionalrelationship,” andthat Westerndreaming. Theybelieve that foreign policyshouldbea bargain asromantic approach normative gerian-style realpolitikwilldismissthe energypolicy,ghanistan, Syria, of Kissin andsoon.Staunch supporters The comingyear willbekey to determining how change systemic the realist approach bearsout,the experience last decade’s As the Magnitsky Act for the support overwhelming Nonetheless, the West’s into the Magnitsky approach foreign policy the Incorporating - - - - -

124 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles The Crisis in the West... and How It Affects Those Who Have Not Become the West Lilia Shevtsova & David J. Kramer / The American Interest, January 18, 2013

A year ago, the world was abuzz with talk of the euro crisis and the feared disintegration of the European Union. By the end of 2012, the discussion has shifted to the crisis of the liberal democracy model itself. The debate is no longer “Keynes vs. Hayek” or expansionary vs. austerity fiscal measures. At the heart of today’s debate are the systemic problems affecting Western civilization. The current political process, which has been a cause for ever- increasing concern, can be called the “Crisis Triad.” On the one hand, we are witnessing a conflict between a dynamic, ever more aggressive global capitalism and the system of liberal democracy that took shape in the aftermath of World War II, which was somewhat revamped in the 1970s. On the other hand, we can point to a conflict between political and economic mechanisms on one side and post-industrial social structure and social aspirations on the other. The existing liberal democratic political institutions can neither halt the growth of social inequality nor guarantee social justice and legitimize the technocratic decision-making of the ruling elite, which is becoming increasingly distant from society at large. While American society is at least accustomed to social inequality at some level, Europeans have proven to be totally unprepared for the decline of the welfare state. The European crisis also turned out to be especially severe, insofar as the European community, which claims to be the only “normative power” in the world, has shown itself incapable of using normative values to preserve social stability or solve the social problems of the past decade (such as demographic decline, an aging population, migration, the failure of multiculturalism, and others). In the 1970s, the West, and the European countries in its midst, were able to overcome economic crisis with the help of neoliberal instruments and by limiting the role of the state, thus unleashing free market forces. But it is precisely the neoliberal cure that is under attack today. All attempts to resolve the crisis through economic or technocratic means delegitimize the process of governance, since they are not supported by many voters. European society is losing faith in democratic institutions because they are failing to secure social the onlytive globaland Europeansuperpowers. leadersof the Neither ily talkingaboutPresident ObamaandChancellor Merkel, respec the newchallenges? We upto the minor adjustments,rise arehereprimar sis, andwhoarenow attempting itpragmatically to through deal with leaders whowere central issue.Canthe not cri preparedforas the the harderto previous ones.Leadershipemerges overcomemuch the than democratic model. ways hassofar beenunableto liberal to find which recast the thought, Western of crisis capitalismreveals political the for authoritarian port insideRussia isdeclining.Still, resurgencePutin’s support of sup the Putin’s Russia occasionally isalsocited admiringly, too, there, though unrest,andheavy-handednesstion, socialandethnic authorities. by the corrup problemswith what itwaseven a year country’s ago,given the “ChinaModel”isnot quite talkof the gimes. TheiridealisChina,though re seek to negate liberaldemocracyby heapingpraiseon authoritarian quiet for they mantras.Quite many often, their years, areagainchanting model,whohadbeen of this capitalism.The supporters authoritarian not readyfor multipolarity. world;of maintaining itshegemonic rolein the world meanwhile, the is leadershipisalsogrowing lesscommitted toAmerican and capable current too:States. the crisis angleto Thereisan international the Unitedyama presentsa cogent in the argumenton “politicaldeadlock” only today. itarenot causesforto the concern redefine Francis Fuku- administration'sability current in the of faith of capitalism andlack Anglo-Saxon The failureofthe model crisis. 2008financial cause of the in self-regulatingmarketcomplacency andfaith forces were a major surely Aseveryone remembers,American concerns. alleviate these governments even their less. on EU economicdecisions,enduptrusting EuropeanUnion;of the however, people, unableto have the any impact disintegration andprevent the crisis would overcome fiscal help them the this have hopethat in somecasesto resorted limiting democracyinthe ropean society, merely a bureaucraticappendage. Europeanpoliticians backsliding. in recent years ithasseenserious movement, democratic reform forefront of the but wasatthe country generala stark trend.Even illustrationof this in communisttimes,that provides salvationin astrongman.Hungary extremism, andseetheir “transition fromdemocracy.” to People nationalism and areturning transition to democracy,the we have now begundeliberatingon the Unified Europeprojectisdeclining.Wherewefor the oncediscussed credibility.liaments, andgovernments arelosingtheir The support par future.Thus,parties, novisionof the stability andareoffering The current crisis of liberalismasmodelandideology appearsto be crisis The current Under conditions,we for these areseeinga resurgence of support An ostensibly improved United situationin the States doesnot In addition,EUpower have structures becomealienated fromEu ------

126 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles world, the itsdemocracypromotion specifically policy.fluencing Can a far morepainfultransitionto freedom. existence and,moreover, willbethreatened, illiberalsocieties willface defense spending.Thusif Western civilization losesitsappeal,very budgetsthe willhave of Western sincethey to countries, increase their as wasMubarak’sEgypt. situationwillstrain Thisdeteriorating external West to regimeswillbeasfriendly the environment. Not allauthoritarian societies willhave a negative impact on Western civilization’sexternal processesin illiberal andundemocratic celeration of transformational saying, us?”We “Sowhat?How affect willthis de would the reply that West Somein the by concerns may dismissthese from authoritarianism. West’s discrediting ofthe modelwillhardly exit facilitateBut the their game. of the readinessto new rules acceptnal processesandtheir the societies conditionsdependson inter willovercomethese current their a model acrossmany segmentsof illiberalsocieties. Ofcourse,whether West society the areleadingtopost-industrial disillusionment with as ability to post- provide economicstabilityandsocialjusticein the both West on the back itself. impacts willreflect willbenegative onesthat sooner orlater, West the global willbeforced No to doubtthese do this. world impactsand staminato of itsillnessonthe assess the aroundit.But 1970s), of the West economiccrisis the of the strength the seemsto lack bestowed term dour assessment “malaise” (the uponPresident Carter’s itsown andtotalitarian societies? Preoccupiedwith authoritarian affect status quo. to maintain the Western efforts the current elite’s We shouldnot forget change overcoming contradicts through that crisis Western force “transformational” in the is goingto community? be the who latter case,then Ifitisthe for newdecision-makingmechanisms. search only role leadersplay comeby in the reducingoreliminatingthe change will past,orwhether asithasin the efforts, leaderships’ from the Western change in the questions: the politicalsystem whether willcome will toand demonstrate implement the it.True, we stillargueover some change, aswell readinessto West’s set ason their the collective agenda need for andsystemic abilityto normative realize the will reston their asresolve. such Theirultimate success special personalcharacteristics leadership,” callsforcapable of demonstrating“transformational which responsibility. We Merkel soonwhether willseevery andObamaare of avoiding ismerely form another and pragmatism –which strategic to areclearly avoidboth trying it,instead pursuinga policyofretreat wishedforglobal andpan-Europeanresponsibilities.Neither it,and need to orfor assume the crisis current was readyfor the of them ers themselves cannoters themselves own solve their problems?The answer should be democracy promot agendademocracy promotion whenthe beon the Western the in modelof situation undermines The newhistorical of liberaldemocracyanditsin crisis the It isalreadyevidentthat prompts of liberalism All this question: another How crisis doesthe - - - - -

127 The Crisis in the West... and how it affects those who have not become the West American invasion of Iraq. American distorted by the Sovietsubstantially weakened breakup ofthe Union the andbeen after dimensionto normative words, foreign policy, of the a return has which “New – inother Balance”of interestsshould bebasedon the andnorms outside worldthe – to a newforeign policyparadigm.Thisparadigm Westthe way mustleadto liberaldemocraciesengage changes in the need to Western reformat the foreign policy. in crisis The internal own societies of their sourcesof corruption. ern same timecleansingWest elites whileatthe authoritarian corrupt the Magnitsky Act may the to create influence a newmechanism are there, will anddetermination Provided newexperiment. ample the of this Russia. tofor The deal with a newmechanism Russian future:Western bleakassessmentof the rather elites arelooking mation forward. will not allow to create stimulito them external press Russia’s transfor liberaldemocracies the of crisis in a morerepressive Second, the form. alistic regimestillpossessesa lot of resourcesandcanreproduceitself an awakeningvolving such couldbedramatic.First, Russian person the the of freedom outweigh gains. the World ocratic recession,” asdemonstrated by Freedom latest House’s wave” of democratization;today we of a“dem refer regionin terms to the were fourth they even dubbed“the in Eurasia seemedsopromisingthat abyss. The movements authoritarian Russia into the fromslidingback lest we forget, type –didnot prevent oligarchic politicalpluralism –ofthe framework have the countries of politicalpluralism.But remainedwithin Georgia, and(lessso)Kyrgyzstan – were these alsodashed,although latter especially enjoyed ifthe tarianism, Western support. challenge of traditionalauthori challenge to replace the pose a serious tain. Anti-Western could Islamicdemocracyorauthoritarianism a decidedly West, isfarfromcer undesirableresultfor the that though Western revolutionsdisillusionment with couldyield policies,these stage.crisis Actually, to factors dueboth opposition’s internal andto the WestFor asthe Arab revolutions its occurred instance, the wasentering post-communist “velvet”the revolutions. The picture islesscleartoday. 1970sin the West and1980s, in the progress coincidedwith whenthe democratic awakeningand the of illiberal societies. Thiscouldbeseen working in illiberalsocieties. yes, butWestern alreadyfaceincreasingcomplications philanthropists gradual awakeninggradual of rise of liberaldemocracies between rise correlation the There isa certain The West’s reputational decline brings up another concreteThe West’s upanother goal: reputationaldeclinebrings a newunexpected factorNevertheless, isemergingalongsidethis West of the in sequence with crisis arrived the The irony isthat High hopesfor post-Soviet “color”revolutions in the states – Ukraine, report, which reveals consecutive which a seventh losses yearreport, in which Russian society. However, in scenarios further Magnitsky Act isan ex Freedom in Freedom in ------

128 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles solve its “Crisis Triad.”solve its“Crisis before itadopts willallowof death a system that itto successfully re civilization: Itwillhave itsown shadow to walk through valleyof the game.Apparently, of the old rules same fateject the awaits the Western willhave is,they toof tears” – that make in orderto tough re choices societies willhave “valley these the saidthat to go through Dahrendorf Europe,Ralf of Eastern from communistsystems countries for the possibleexits sibly Whilepondering painfulbutmeaningfulreform. political eliteswill force liberal democraciesto in pos the undertake liberal democraciestoward renaissance.Only an obviouscrisis this modelhasto intensify current order to in prod of the Perhaps crisis the civilizationsfor doother prolongingitslifecycle.better than chances tion. moment, however,the opposite developments direc aregoingin the of accountabilityto citizens. At andmechanisms cratic participation a more regulated economy, not novel to mention the demo of channels Europeandemocracyhasto devise a“newsocialcontract”and that gration,” years followingDemocrats builtin the World War Disinte II”(“Europe’s SocialDemocratsandChristian brand ofdemocracythat is fromthe in doing soitwillhave italready to become even that moredifferent EuropeanUnion], of the but crisis andthe eurocrisis [the crises these is moderately optimistic both too: “Europeandemocracywillsurvive accountability willprevailover it.” PhilippeC.Schmitter oneswithout is, however, political societies with that reasonto an important think uncertainty, West, healsoexpresseshopefor the “there concludingthat abouthistorical warning cal decay” (p.482).Buthaving this offered alwaysnecessarily phenomenon ofpoliti remainsuccessfulgiven the Order,” “asociety says momentwillnot successfulatonehistorical that ofPolitical future. Francis Origins Fukuyama,mistic aboutthe “The in Some seasonedanalysts of politicalevolution arecautiously opti Let us hope that Fukuyama is right, that Western that FukuyamaLet civilizationhas isright, ushopethat Journal of Democracy , October 2012, believes p.45).Schmitter ------

129 The Crisis in the West... and how it affects those who have not become the West Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline? Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, February 11, 2013

When Russia and China come up as subjects in the media and in political and academic discourse (as they frequently do), they are discussed in terms of bilateral relations, as a segue into a discussion of regional and global politics, as authoritarian threats to the West, or as examples of attempts at authoritarian modernization. Ever since Bobo Lo and I endeav- ored to compare Russia’s and China’s roads to modernization (see “A 21st Century Myth: Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China”), I cannot help feeling that a comparison of these two civilizations and their centralized states, as they both look for an appropriate response to the Western democracies, would reveal not only the dramas of un- democratic societies and an understanding of the limitations of modernization efforts by top-down governments, but also the challenges that the West faces – challenges that it is, to date, incapable of assessing correctly. Observing the authoritarian experiments of these two serious global actors (although one of them has been weakened), as well as their search for an appropriate international role, has made for interesting view- ing, revealing several paradoxes: first, the paradox of stability covering up a deeper instability and impending upheavals; second, the paradox of economic growth that is most likely only a brief respite before a pre- cipitous fall; third, the paradox of outward displays of force that conceal inner weakness and disorientation. These paradoxes illustrate that there is a conflict between perceptions and reality in these two authoritarian states. The only question is to what extent they are the results of con- scious distortions of reality as opposed to naïveté or unwillingness to accept inconvenient truths. Were Arnold Toynbee alive today, a comparison of Russia and China would provide him with ample material for his theories on the rise and fall of civilizations. Perhaps, Samuel Huntington would have revised some of his conclusions on reform from the top and the role of the middle class in modernization. I hope, too, that Francis Fukuyama will have a chance to compare the modern evolutions of Russia and China, and their systems’ struggles for survival, in the upcoming second volume of “The Origins of Political Order.” There were of Sparta perhaps two those similarcasesof militarism: geopolitical aims.Historically, specialcase. isa very Russia’s militarism existence to of apowerful justify the centralizedstate with fluence need for spheresof in andneo-imperialism. Theseassumethe rism, power to a great resorting agendawithout ( elite orfromsociety impulses from the asa whole. form arising beenbenton destroying hasfor centuries any that into re a Leviathan moral taboos.Russia’s all-powerful bureaucracyhasturned predatory ithasalways beenbasedon absoluteernance, power, unrestrainedby Russian (atleastin Asia).Asfor traditionof gov the countries of other envy isthe bureaucracythat hasmadeforple of meritocracy an efficient leadership. The princi on authoritarian moralchecks China hascertain to Confucian influences, ones.Thanks ditions of despotism, butdiffering comefromlongtra countries circumstances.Both external to changing to governance, approach ideology, in their differ they andadaptability regimesare repressive, models.Whileboth and Chineseauthoritarian ety’s freedom. by state limiting soci survives the centralized state model,in which the challenges, arecontingent on Russia’s andChina’ssuccessfulexitfrom pects for liberaldemocracyto formulate foreign policyequal to these superpower, itsdebtor. perception. Moreover, United ithasmadethe States, world’s stillthe only question of howed States the to with adapt to itspolicyto struggle this ration andisnow treated asa futureglobalsuperpower, Unit forcing the an enemy. West of consolidatingitselfby rejectingthe path andtreatingitas on the now ithasembarked that is unclearhow Putin regimewillsurvive, the iswhathappening).It this don’tevenpoliticians often recognizethat Western foundation normative of liberaldemocracy(infact,the the areundermining of powerful that pro-Kremlinlobbying structures intointegration Western society. creation hasledto Thisintegration the personal of its elite’s form liberaldemocracies,in the been spongingoff Westable to use the guarantor asan important of itsstability. Ithasalso fall ofcommunism,Russia’s personalizedregimehasbeen Since the this. to exploit liberaldemocracy, have andboth beenquite successfulatdoing More importantly, systems haveconcern. found a way authoritarian both worldhave andthe on globalsecurity economy only isnot causefor the centralizedstate.two Russia The impact modelsof the andChina that ruler’s disposal.Relics ruler’s population into an armyatthe the turned that Aztec Empire.and the These involved life of everyday a militarization these The West future ofthese aboutthe shouldbeparticularly concerned The Russian personalizedpower cannot reproduce itself matrix Thus farIhave beeninterested between in differences Russian the Regional andglobalstability, as well pros ourassessmentsof the West’s the admi force of economicmight,Chinaearned Through the derzhavnichestvo ), milita ------

131 Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline? power framework. or aninability to create economy personalized- a high-tech under the preventing problemsand laborshortages economicgrowth; graphic personalized power fueledthe resourcesthat system; demo of the sence of asystemic alternative to absolute power; depletion gradual Russian ab state: the of the Several crisis factors about the may bring itsstateit willhave andgeographic integrity. a hard timepreserving Unlesstries. years, Russia’s nextten declineisreversed to in the fifteen between main difference cline. Herein,Ibelieve, two liesthe the coun economic growth. jump-started its economicfreedom, which greater offers country the cal pluralismandfreedomof expressionsarefarlessdeveloped, but prospects didnot extend monopoly to on power. the In China,politi those prospectsfor greater politicalpluralism,although had offered cal andeconomicfreedomin Russia andChina.Until recently, Russia itplayed Sovietrole that in the Union 1980s. in the symbolic rhetoric, of its rolehasbeenreducedto that reminiscent of the retains communistideology,of clan interests. WhileChinastillofficially toterms be succeededby a newsymbolofpower new moderator anda limitsforestablished term itsleaders:Theymuststep down two after nomenklatura. Butmoreimportantly,and the Chinese system has the balance ofpower the amongelites betterership arrangement reflects The collective lead of personalizedrule. return arenosignsof the there to aunique Russian civilization(“Russia’s specialpath”). claims aspirations,coupledwith tion of pragmatismandgreat-state past.Nowadays of the Kremlin’s ideologyisaweirda thing the concoc Soviet legitimated the The communist ideologythat Union isalso Soviet demise of the Union. the with egated ashheapof history to the wasrel collectivePutin. Nevertheless, leadershipwasa modelthat cantake force a leaderhostage that mayerful – afate yet that befall especially given weakened individualauthority, bureaucracyisa pow state. However, actson behalfofthe that of apersonalized authority factormight) into for a crucial consolidatingsociety. might(asopposedto economic issue ofmilitary the life andturning might) doesnot involve population initseveryday mobilizingthe itsmilitary to strengthen canbeappliedto term China’s efforts the (ifindeed asdoesRussia. Chinesemilitarism of spheres influence same kinds the eign policyanddoesnot openly aimatconstructing to revive them. stillexistin today’s militarism Russia,of such andPutinisnow trying much morecautiousforAs farasIcantell, Chinaconductsa much Finally, Russian state the andpoliticalsystem arein a state of de of politi Bobo Lohasdrawn in degree attention difference to the collectiveAs for leadershipremains in power, China,sofarthe and dominance by the ischaracterized Russian authoritarianism ------

132 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles same thing a year ago buthas Kremlin wassaying same thing preciselythe the more democratic,” says Nathan aboutChina.Itshould benoted that segments of society. regimelikes to “The talk aboutmakingitself elite populist (even the of someliberals!)andof the support to the end ofitslife cycle, the thanks tions andhabits,stillhasnot reached system of personalizedpower,limits. Butthe of institu asan aggregate its Putin regimehasalreadyreached the a step ahead,believingthat itslimits,” AndrewNathan.In Russia,na isapproaching writes we are regime Chi in authoritarian resilience ofthe the that Tiananmen crisis 1989 any consensusisstronger essays. timesincethe than “The of those between two similarities Letto me quote the countries. the a couple Journal of Democracy 2013 January issueof the discussion publishedinthe the and finally Pei, BoboLo,AndrewNathan,Scobell,Yu Liu,DingdingChen, by Francis The articles Fukuyama, China experts. Minxin asthe narios same sce same languageanalysts anddiscussingthe arespeakingthe beganto fail. matrix old the Russian to personalizedregimeafter elitethe rely chose the on resultingin areversion In pointoffact, toown one-man rule. survival, China’s clansystem of collective leadershipwillbeunableto ensure its Soviet population ofthe Unionas the outthat was.Itcannot beruled systemits middleclassarenot archaic asamenableto living underthe new generation and of China’syouth the that especially considering Soviet last stages of the confrontation atthe Union, the plosive than society.of post-industrial may prove moreex The Chineseconflict between an antiquated conflict system ill-suited challengesthe for the late 1980s, facedin the Gorbachev whenhewasconfrontedthat with indeed, Chinawillbeforced to look for conundrum a way outof the extensive potential Butsooner orlater, for growth. soon perhaps very owes ithasnot yet factthat itseconomicsuccessto exhausted the its framework. Thus,in many respects,Chinaplace underan authoritarian cantake society that its transitionto – atransformation an industrial society. to an industrial from an agrarian Chinahasyet to complete Russia wastransformed then, Stalin’s Back during industrialization. Russia 1930s hadto challenges that confront inthe the confronted with state.a rule-of-law tion willresultin anewdictatorship foundations orwillcreate for the itself. However, new Russian itremainsto revolu the be seenwhether fromabove.formed Itrequires a joltfrombelow – pressurefromsociety Russian system the cannot ortrans demonstrated bereformed that coercion. Perhaps China is also approaching the limitsof its“democra coercion. Perhaps the China isalsoapproaching since stopped playing Pretend!” its“Let’s gameandhasclearly opted for Moreover, pasttwenty events of the years the have conclusively In any case,my we readingson Chinasuggest that Russian liberal stageChina isin adifferent of development. The Chineseare andthe Washington Quarterly (2012) alltestify ------

133 Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline? dared to similarin Russia... do something Asof yet,test on freedomofspeech. government noone has restrictions local of the staff largest city,China’s third entire about14million people, the numbering of publicprotestin terms for andyearning freedom. Guangzhou,In of discontent asRussia. However, Russia China may soonsurpass moreyears similarlevels of calmbefore itissaddledwith to fifty thirty development. trendsinto accelerate alignmentevenmunication, arebringing asthey meansof socialization andcom modern the open borders,alongwith ences in development andpoliticalmodels.Perhaps globalizationand apparentdiffer similarproblemsdespitestates their areexperiencing Naturally, situationbegets question this of whycentralized the these same conclusionsmakesto onewonder the whereit willalllead. same questions andcoming askingthe analyzing Chinastarted parts andourcounter we, Russian which liberalexperts, the neity with simulta sounds a lot like Russian politicaldiscourse!The surprising between fear hope for This revolution of politicalreform. the andthe resilience”anditsfutureasa contest of it asacase“authoritarian counter West’s to run the viewdiscuss deepchanges in Chinathat ing in China;Russia, we same question. arediscussingthe tion keeps saying. ChengLideliberates on possibletriggers for upris an instead Russian for transition.Thatisexactly a quick opposi whatthe to opt Chinashouldshungradualism inChina,andthat is anon-starter well bea discussiononRussia. Tiancheng Wang “gradualism” says that leadership?) power. their undermine Chinese (ButamIperhaps wrongaboutthe will whowillset arenot in motion that kamikazes reforms authorities states in both haveexperiments Russian proven andChinese the that reforms.” No serious hopefor The authoritarian that: and pushthrough Russian andChineseleadersareboldenoughto take on vested interests West states, “The mounting problemsofboth writes, the musthopethat The question trigger. isonly aboutwhen,andwhatwillbethe change iscoming. andthat cracks, system hasirreparable know the that sians. We willcollapse.Butwe don’tknow do exactly wheneverything come,” for Rus say BoboLoandAndrewNathan. The sameistrue both will explode. sia, we constantly dwell on ourown timebombs,wondering whenthey future.”today In Rus in the willgooff containsmany timebombsthat “China’sapparentgoodrecordcy” imitationtalk.AsFukuyama warns, “No oneisableto say for surewhether, when,andhow change will Incidentally, itmighthave Chinahas seemeduntil recently that Minxin Pei, AndrewNathan,ChengLi,Yu Liu,andDingdingChen The The Center Charles for EuropeanReforms’ Grant,analyzing Journal of Democracy Southern Weekly ’s recentdiscussionon Chinacouldjustas newspapertook streets to to the pro ------

134 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles sorts. But what can one do: mystifications, even Butwhatcanonedo:mystifications, of sorts. International” tarian ples to be followed Western andalternatives to – an“Authori the path to two areexam prove these countries trying that andbooks, articles Russian to andChinesemightin their describe effort expended somuch consequences of itsdecline. aboutthe to worry “duo” shouldstart authoritarian of the rise aboutthe recently worried “endgame” indeedappearscloseathand.Thosewho the quickly that musing ofanidealist.However,the recent events have unfolded so titleas Diehl.Many prediction embodiedin this treated the Jackson headline ofa2012Endgame,” readsthe pointment? West will the Whatprice yet paycountries! disap for another suffering of China.Itisasifwe rise wereand the discussingcompletely different on mantras inpraiseofRussia’s stability, itsrevivalasa new“center,” foreign policyanalysts andWestern businessinterests seemfixated points of socialupheaval, andinevitabledeclinecollapse,Western endof resilience,tipping Russia in both andChinatalkof the experts so-called U.S.as evidencedby the “pivot to Asia.” itisinexorably belief that becominga successfulglobalsuperpower,the expected attitudetoward ittothey be, their Chinaisstillpredicated upon trajectory Russia’s of development the fromwhat isdifferent alize that lytical respectability. Andeven asWestern politicianshave begunto re completelyhow illusionswithout itsformer to break with losingallana assumptions. Now, West to repression, the Putin’sturn after hasnoidea respectto Russia,tion” with andeven today arebuiltaroundthese they U.S. for Moderniza EU “Partnership tion in the “reset” policyandthe Western program. Medvedev’s reflec policiesfound modernization their Dmitri butitalsosupported andRussia’sreforms democratic progress, Not Western only didthe Yeltsin’s successof establishmentbelieve in the West.to the Nor Arab Spring. were liberal democraciesreadyfor the the fall ofcommunismwere Europe andthe likewise a totalern surprise collapsing.The anti-communistrevolutionshad alreadystarted in East Soviet West of the instance, the Union integrity believed even in the asit trendin Westerna worrisome politicalandintellectual discourse.For as a whole.Thedisconnectbetween realityandperception hasbecome of China isnot unique United to the West States; of the itischaracteristic continuingrise of China.” The beliefinthe continuing rise mised on the U.S. the elites,”registered with andU.S. policytoward Chinastill“ispre have problem:“China’sdecliningfortunes Minxin Pei not highlightsthe able, especially if they reflect traditionalstereotypes. reflect able, especially ifthey not sosubtle ones,always canfeel create pretty illusionsthat comfort this context. Hereishow in this concern There isa causefor serious Of course,Ifeel who somemeasure of sympathy authors for allthe in ChinaandRussia Face ComingCollapse:Authoritarians “The Asdomesticpolicy causesconcern. There isonemoreissuethat Washington Post columnby ------

135 Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline? same with respectto China same with of doingthe sentiment, but itwillstop short dispute in 1969). The elite in Moscow isbusyprovoking anti-Western viet Union confrontation over andChina didhave a territorial a military So the suddenly fact that decideto take the on China (notwithstanding tions dysfunctional. institu Councilmember would international Security rendercurrent even affects onewould that developments, reactto whena crisis these in borderareas.Itishardtomight actrecklessly imagine how world the failures. If the tention from their for enemiesin orderto external distract at sentiments andsearching have of provokinga matter countries of fact,both a history nationalist classlosesitsmonopoly on power. ruling no longer applieswhenthe As tempted to a foreign prolong itslife incursion?Commonsense through Beijing Won’t alsobeginsitsfallfromgrace? Chinese regimebe the Butwhatif entire regionalarchitecture. Russia’s fallwillchange the itdecidesnot case, to Even Chinaandthat intervene. in this terrifies control isalreadyquite Russian drama tenuous). the Let usassumethat Far andthe of Siberia East(this it losescontrolover vast territory the simplest scenario. imagine the would twoof a declineandcrisis entailfor these globalpowers. Let us 21stcentury.of the We today consequences canhardly fathom whatthe challenge most crucial is not outto readyfor be the whatmightturn unfavorable circumstances. the external oversuccessful transformations vastcivilizationalspaces,given such West. in the crisis Anditishardto the expect of China) coincidedwith caseof Russia (andprobablyid declinein the a slower case onein the revealedgradually it.Onemorenote The processesofrap of warning: has other to conceal itsinnate whilethe doesn’t even assertiveness, try statescentralized civilizations?Both are nuclearpowers; oneof them worldto the of orderon itsown, crisis whatcanbesaidof the in a given country. to a balancedviewof what ishappening form diplomaticrituals observe China? Evidently, itisnot enoughto listen to leadership rhetoric and United the Statesin which to silently a globalcondominiumwith agrees “co-evolution,”ing China’smight,andin callingfor a Sino-American opposite direction.Whatifheisalsotooin the optimistic in describ Aswe of modernization.” to aperiod know, Russia hasbeenmoving last Russian a transitionfromphaseofconsolidation electionmarks vedev asRussian president,Kissinger praisedRussia’s evolution: “The Med electionof Dmitri regard.Not the can bewrongin this longafter Even Henry Kissinger, politicalanalysis,Even international of Henry guru the However, Moscow in acrisis would itisalsohardto imagine that Russian state the fails to itself.In itsagony, reform Imagine that West globalpoliticalordermay bedismantled,andthe The current coulddeala blow Russian Matrix impending of the crisis If the federal center loses control, local elites two

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136 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles expect it,anditcouldbeeven we bigger than think. Big Oneinadvance,becauseitmayready for comewhenwe the least itisbetterpotential earthquakes, to California upheavals. get Aswith blow would the of these that soften mechanisms to find in order to try Councilwillalso begin to fragment. UN Security tained by the cameaboutasa resultofWorldorder that War isstillmain IIandthat space.The world of that disintegration Eurasian spacemay trigger the two vast failure of the nuclearsuperpowersconsolidated the the that fallinggiants?In any event, clashof the indirect causeofthe come the nuclearpowers? orboth to be in either a systemic Couldthey crisis Korea. How Pakistan, Afghanistan, orNorth wouldreactcountries, they Central Asian actors capitals,other may – the in both stoke fire the jing leadershipwould loseitsmind.Buteven ifcommonsenseprevails for fear of retaliation. Today itseemsequally Bei the improbable that The West today, contemplating needsto futurescenarios start these - - -

137 Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline? Here We Go Again: Falling for the Russian Trap David J. Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, February 21, 2013

Nearing the end of his second term, George W. Bush sought to sal- vage Russian-American relations with a visit to Sochi in April 2008, but then a few months later, Russia’s invasion of Georgia brought the bilateral relationship to its lowest point in twenty years. President Obama came to office intent on repairing the relationship and working together with Moscow on a range of global issues. At the start of his second term, however, despite four years of the reset policy, Obama, too, faces a very strained relationship with Russia. True, the United States has made its mistakes. But the current state of Russian-American relations stems mostly from the Kremlin’s creation of imitation democracy and its attempts to exploit the West and anti- Americanism for political survival. The Kremlin’s imitation game has complicated American and Western policies toward Russia and forced the West to pretend, just as the Russian elite does. The “Let’s Pretend” game allowed both sides to ignore core differences and to find tactical compromises on a host of issues ranging from the war on terror to nuclear safety. This concerted imitation has also had strategic consequences, however. It has facilitated the survival of Russia’s personalized-power system and discredited liberal ideals in the eyes of Russian society. It has also created a powerful pro-Russia Western lobby that is facilitating the export of Russia’s corruption to developed countries. Despite numerous U.S. attempts to avoid irritating the Kremlin, relations between Moscow and Washington always seem to end up either in mutual suspicion or in full-blown crisis. That is what happened under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, and that is what happened after Barack Obama’s first term in office. Each period of disappointment and rupture in relations, which has always been preceded by a period of optimism, has been followed by another campaign by both Moscow and Washington to revive relations. Who is behind these campaigns? For a quarter of a century, it has been the same consolidated cohort of experts in both capitals, most of whom have serious and established reputations and vast stores of experience. (There are a few new additions to the cohort, but they walk in lockstep with the old hands.) After every new crisis, these experts implore politicians on both signed with Washington.signed with banon adoptions Anditsresponseto the It stayed silentwhenMoscow ithad opting outof agreements started ambassador washarassedin Moscow. American way other asthe the non-governmental organizationsfromRussia.and American Itlooked U.S. outthe Kremlin kicked Agencythe for Development International ton soughtto avoid not to Kremlin andchose upsetting react when the USSR. Thus,Washing collapse ofthe situationsincethe sia’s internal worst processthe deterioration in Rus in the foreign policies,ignoring Obama team decidedtothe completely separate Russia’s domesticand under Obama,only worse. tion, orcivilsociety. hardenoughhascontinued Thatfailureto push back opposi media, the Caucasus,the North on Putin’s crackdowns on the anywhere of itstwodid not pushback nearhardenough in either terms Bush administration the time.The realityisthat that government during bors. We were – andoneofus(Kramer)worked wishthat true U.S. in the toward asdemocracyandpolicytoward Russia on issuessuch itsneigh administration took a “finger-wagging, patronizing”approach lecturing, to introduce astrategic approach. efforts Kremlinwillundermine of the breakdown, criticism to the ostensibly their contribution believingthat push to enlargethe NATO. explanationsoverlook Butthese Kremlin’s the Kremlin; or the U.S. frightens which fairs; the missiledefense program, to Washington’s them tions attribute meddlingin Russia’s af internal causing massive West. problemsfor the believe Russiathey cannot beignoredbecauseitcouldactasa spoiler, rather,cause itcouldbecomean engineofsocialandeconomicprogress; to Russia be treated“strategists” deserves differently be maintainthat None of these ment of relationsandcooperationincreasingly difficult. Putin’sactionsandbehaviorcircle, even have though develop made the policymakers; never for seemto somereason,they prod Putinandhis addressonly Washington approach tions. Proponentsof this andWestern Russia anddowngrading againstignoring rela same oldwarnings the newbutsimply presentnothing approach Those advocating repeat this banner of“strategic cooperation.” timeunderthe relations,this American begotten campaign another to forge yet Russian- newerain another reset policyhas same Kremlintrap.Thedemiseofthe are fallingfor the regime. authoritarian created a corrupt, lin. ThusU.S. Kremlin way other administrationslooked asthe the cludes encouragement to avoid would Krem issuesthat antagonizethe Western on the sidein big.” time,“bigthinking” sides to Each “think summary of Putin’s malevolent onRussia actions.) forspecial report a summary (SeeFreedom waspathetic. by House’s of Russian Americans orphans movieLike the its term, beginning of its term, notion of “linkage” atthe In rejectingthe George W. the whoclaimthat strategists arethose Among the Bush Strategists wholookfor explanationsfor previousfailures in rela Groundhog Day , this ishappening allover, this again.We ------

139 Here We Go Again: Falling for the Russian Trap the energyarea(like Exxon Rosneft, joint projects in the Mobil, andBP), on missiledefense, expansionof trade, OECD, agreement cension to the ing. Ourcolleagues,however, seemto focus assistingin on Russia’s as function internal state’s guarantees froman interest the derived that interests.tal long-term In fact,any strategic foreign policy interest is gic” in relationto promotion politics implies fundamen of a state’s the logue” between United the States andRussia? To “strate term us,the affairs. internal merely a country’s abusesarenot repressionandhumanrights state that man Rightsthat Universal Council ofEuropeandthe outlined by DeclarationofHu the West the principles Kremlin that shouldabandonthe the with agree they Thusoneismeantto understand that willbackfire.” sian affairs “Russians willtake andmeddlingin Rus careof businessthemselves, Washington, gic dialoguewith itin mildterms: characterize butthey 21stcentury.in the political process;valuesshouldnot bea prerequisite for cooperation Most importantly, Russian U.S. internal of the the shouldnot bepart how United andpoliticiansdefine the Statesexperts should behave. and to guarantee “mutual”investments. Thatishow pro-Kremlin the to missiledefense abandon its“threatening” system, to expand trade, to stayand not affairs, outof Russia’s meddlein internal neighborhood, ment. Washington isurged to concept accept of total the sovereignty minister down minister andmembers of parlia to of foreign the affairs prime president andthe Kremlinfromthe ington by in the everyone of weekly form comein the ultimatumsto WashThese grievances Post to 15 betterwill agree the op-edin relations?In aFebruary gies ispointless. working on newstrate relations;otherwise, in Russian-American crisis day itwascreated.from the sia CivilSociety Working itshouldbenoted, Group,which, wasa failure nore, Washington correctly, albeitbelatedly, U.S.-Rus fromthe withdrew facebecame too obvious to Kremlin’s slapsinthe ig Whenthe offended. Unitedthe States, whileWashington itcouldnot to get dideverything number ofnuclearweapons. Obamato reduce the ating with his crackdown athomeaslonghepretends to be interested in cooper hecancontinueto Putin. Thissignalsto get Putin that with away with controlagreement arms State another Union in reaching of the speech, hehasshowndevelopments, though interest, includingin hislatest , Stephen CohenatleastlaidoutRussian listof grievances. leaders’ do everything in itspower Moscow seemedtoIn short, do everything to provoke President Obamahimselfhassaidabsolutely aboutthese nothing “strategicWhat doourcolleaguesproposeassubjectsfor dia the Some strategists Russian domake take mentionof the on strate Why strategists Kremlin tell don’t the usunderwhatconditionsthe We have answer an to question find to of why isa new the there Washington ------

140 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles survival. Missile defense Kremlin’s strategic isnot interests, amongthe survival. let alonea question of Russia’s Kremlin’sstrategicter survival, of the context, compromiseissue. In this on missiledefense isnot even a mat Kremlin’sattemptis moreof the to force Washington to give in onthis missile defense posesto that Russia threat The constant allusionsto the scaleof Russia’s nuclearforces. the on – not threats threats terrorist security, isexpressly to defend anditspurpose Iranian or againstan missile defense projectdoesnot the compromiseexperts, Russia’s will never allow it. Kremlin system arealiento – the the that means of introducingprinciples Itwillnever beginby from within. shouldstart Modernization ernization. mod country’s not the Kremlin’s survival, results andwillonly helpthe a decadenow.more than same OECD willyieldthe Russia’s joining the of law in Russia cause ofrule – justasithasfailedtothe do inChinafor membershipwillnot members holdRussia advance to account, WTO itwillabideby. rules which andchoosing it ispicking Unless WTO other Russia isalreadyindicating that WTO, already becomea memberofthe nization for EconomicCooperationandDevelopment (OECD)?Having for example, Orga purpose, of Russia’s joiningthe the about? What’s topursuit of strategic question: talk dialoguebegsanother Whatisthere needed transformation? anti-Westerncorrupt, regime,orpossibly country’s even suffocatethe of Russia’s personalized, Would survival to dialoguecontribute the this a question: shouldaskthemselves ing aboutstrategic dialogue,they talk ing universal timeourcolleaguesstart valuesandinterests. Every United by constraining the survives States West andthe frompromot United the States valuesthat hostile to the promotes. system Thus,the outsideworld)consequently representsitto state the by that the are Moreover, system embracedby (and the values andprinciples the to by repressive atany resorting to methods. cost,primarily survive personalized-powerarchaic system. Thissystem’s strategic interest is lizational vector attempting andisthus by to to returning an survive years, hasnot allthese found itscivi after Putin system, which, the tween U.S. areaboutworking and Russian they societies; with rather country. for either partnership proper spheresofstrategic areindeedthe debate these aboutwhether havethat beenmentionedmany timesbefore. Thereisa legitimate donot introducenewideas.The rest alsorepeatsubjects most part the provinces. Pacific words, proposalsfor In other andthe these Siberia a joint pivot region,andhelpingRussia Asia-Pacific develop to the the Kremlin’s foreign policy tactics, which arean extension Kremlin’s foreigna matter policytactics,which of the Westsince itdoesnot the believe warwith ispossible. Rather, itis What aboutmissiledefense? According to Russian independent Russia’sGiven politicalsystem United that ishostileto the States, areas involve noneof these beclearthat cooperationbe But let’s ------

141 Here We Go Again: Falling for the Russian Trap approach dis not an approach for whatitis not. such Onehasto understand that to work Russia. for Butonehasto whatitisand with approach take this thinking a new administrationwillcome to office which States after end ofObama’ssecondterm, cando,atleastuntilthe West best the Thiscooperationmay Unitedpartnership.” bethe andthe arelimitsto a regimelike what canbeaccomplishedthere Putin’s. with aswell. aretop Russian Evenbecause they priorities so,however, there is andproliferation, morecanbedonebutthat tion itcan;on terrorism two Russia hasprobably of those, first coopera providedOn the allthe andproliferation. Korea, terrorism, fromIran,North threats ing with Unitedest” to the all,remainsfocused States. on deal after America, East. States Far andthe andEuropeabout assistancein developing Siberia isRussian society’s canwethis main goal.Only United then talkto the interests?providing and Russia for hasto itselffirst, corrupt transform elite caresonly about country’s provinces andPacific whenthe Siberia or, plainly speaking,steal it.How West canthe helpRussia develop its – Kremlin elite country for to the funnel moneyoutofthe opportunity state,for orfor the society? strategic? Andisitstrategic turn make the Doesthat them. might bring tocome a raw appendage Asia materials turn to Asia? Thisiswhatthe aside fromraw andweapons IsRussia materials readyto exports? be to Asia remainunclear. turn of the region WhatcanRussia to offer the consequences summit, whilethe the for wasappropriated running that whopocketed money those the benefited Pacific to the billion). Thisturn $50 hasalreadyreached Winter costofwhich Olympics the in Sochi, Potemkin struct itwillrepeatfor villages nextFebruary’s (aperformance up costing$22billion.The summitdemonstrated Russia’s abilityto con APEC summitinVladivostok, ended by which Pacific hostingthe to the aremoreof apassingfad.Russia hasalready“turned” cooperation, these itshouldbe. than in Russia willalways bemoredifficult of law takes won’trule root – andthat happenunderPutin –investment interests Kremlin. Until of selectcompanies the andthe serve countries age (like Exxon). case, callsfor expandingtradebetween In this two the Severstal andLukoil) orarereadyto work Kremlin’s patron underthe have either market decidedtopanies that penetrate American the (like of trade matters only com Russian of to andAmerican a selectgroup level trade between of two The issue paltry sia, given the countries. the plays Kremlin’s hands. defense, into asa threat the West,of its domesticpolitics.Holdingupthe missile andspecifically United of trade,the In terms States for Rus partner isnot a serious such “strategic cooperation” willneverPursuit of such leadto “strategic It ishardto imagine how ideaswould allthese beof “strategic inter Arctic isanother the Provided state ispreserved, Russia’s corrupt popular ideasofajointpivot andArctic As for Asia-Pacific the to the it right way knows right the ------

142 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles proach that does not ignore the normative dimension. normative doesnot ignorethe that proach projects. We await moreconvincing argumentsinfavor ofastrategic ap Kremlin andallows itto itsPotemkin legitimizeandperpetuate village dialogueplays handsofthe into their the Theyshouldrealizethat trix? Russian life Ma ofthe prolongingthe canwithout doing whatthey strategic vectorscountries’ to andlimitthemselves amodest agenda, asa “strategy.”interest andpassitoff strategic itsown able to orpersonal interest replace this with corporate mine itsstrategic interest toward United the States. No force other willbe objectives.of such WhenRussian society isready, itwillbeableto deter staples very arethe which in valuesandprinciples, should begrounded end in disappointment. be presented differently, for doingsowillmerely produceillusionsand strategic two vectors. incompatibility of the countries’ the Itshouldnot instead,let itrepresentstacticalcompromises alonepartnership; amid ColdWar. momentsof the difficult is not a strategic But this approach, Unitedsia andthe States most cooperated the on issueseven through No, of course not. Rus Russia whilePutinremainsin office? logue with so itisbetter to have nodialoguealtogether. to acknowledge valuesmustbereckoned with, latter that aresorry the canbeavoided, approach normative while the that think former But the to foreign approach normative policy. “pessimists” opposethe and the strategists actually the representtwo samespecies.Both subtypesof the two have glance,these groups views,butthey to different do so.Atfirst to anyway, meddle inRussian affairs will try willnot allow sothey it argument we above. fromthe describe different Theybelieve America between United Russia andthe States. However, reasoningisquite their can benostrategicsays dialogue,let there alonestrategic partnership, in Moscow. isespecially influential that Thisgroup group another tual situationin Russia. ac relationsandthe real problemsinRussian-American tracts fromthe the West, strategists of in the is cohort there influential Besides the Why can’t the strategistsWhy acknowledge can’tthe two incompatibility ofthe the If Washington isreadyto pursue anoverarching strategic objective, it United the States meanthat Does ourcriticism should have nodia ------

143 Here We Go Again: Falling for the Russian Trap A Realist’s Response to an Idealist Lilia Shevtsova / The American Interest, March, 2013

I am pleased that David Kramer and I have managed to attract our opponents to discussing Russia and U.S. policies with respect to it. I am even more pleased that Thomas Graham, whom I consider one of the most subtle and thoughtful Western analysts of Russia, responded to our article. Paradoxically, Graham’s response, entitled “In Defense of a Strategic Approach to Russia”(http://www.the-american-interest. com/article.cfm?piece=1394), as well as his other thoughts on Russia, provide additional arguments in support of our position. We can only thank Graham for helping us to justify our views. Essentially, Graham’s essay is a manifesto for a foreign policy school of thought that we will call, using his term, the “American strategists.” The “strategists” determined Washington’s policy toward Russia during President Obama’s first term and will most likely continue to do into his second term. It is important to enumerate the ideas held by this school, since they reflect the way a large segment of the American political establishment looks at foreign policy. First, Graham’s main argument: that U.S. Russia policy should demonstrate “hard-nosed, consistent commitment to American interests”. One cannot agree more with this. Indeed Russia’s policy toward the United States should also be based on commitment to Russian interests. I will not argue with Graham’s definition of American interests. It is not a topic for a Russian citizen to opine on. But Graham somehow forgot to define American interests with respect to the outside world, apparently believing that these interests are clear enough on their own. Well, not to me. I would like to know to what extent the United States is committed to the preservation of the current world order and its post- WWII institutional architecture. I would like to know to what extent the United States is willing to support its reform. I would like to know whether Graham believes that continued support of the current model of liberal democracy is in America’s interests. Or, perhaps, he, like several authors of The American Interest and other critics of this model, thinks it should be revised. Graham does not discuss these issues. Hav- ing promised to clarify “America’s long-term national interests,” he immediately proceeds to define the mechanism of Russian-American Century Foundation, “ResurgentThe Century Russia andU.S. Graham Purposes,” convergence aboutthis forGraham think of interests? In his2009report – namely,there convergence atleasta partial of interests. Whatdoes of hot pretend.” airandgamesof “let’s Therehasto be some“there” in Washington. presidency, quite frustrated a few periods expectations of which both Medvedev’s andduring “reset” period, the was on fulldisplay during This skill itspartners. comes to shaping expectationsanddisorienting operator smoother whenit Kremlin isamuch expectations.” Andthe gander; goose isalsogoodfor Moscow the the willalsoseekto “shape and Machiavellian tacticsgohandin hand.However, goodfor what’s on Iran. Well, ispolitics,Isuppose,andunfortunately politics this United the States support (orplaysbelieves along)itwillin turn this Georgia to Russia; itcansimply pretend itisdoingso,andifRussia that United the tells States usthat doesnot have necessarily to sacrifice Russia to advanceourgoals.” act inways words, In other that Graham atmosphere andshapingexpectationsto persuade means “creatingthe whatis“linkage” outit supposedto then mean? Itturns if not that, Georgiato Russia in exchange“sacrificing on Iran.” for But itssupport word by quid this hedoesnot proquothat meana crude – for instance, “an inescapable component of U.S.-Russian relations.” Heassuresus mentions“linkage,” agenda. is American The author which to the States itcannot to ussomething offer. offer United conclusionandstop expectingthe this reconcile ourselves with letan antiquated us isindeedwhathemeans,then statusquo. Ifthis a rearguardactionto andrenewal,not preserve fighting ing progress claim to be aworld leader. all,beinga leadermeanssupport After United the States case, then isthe cannot main goals.Butifindeedthis modelof liberaldemocracyshouldbeAmerica’s current quo andthe global status the preserving believes that author the can concludethat of globalpolitics.Thus,we fundamental principles need to the rethink Buthesays of the nothing andsoforth. terrorism;” ing international spread ofweapons combat bility; preventing the mass destruction; of Unitedthe States global stage: “Maintainingstrategic faceson the sta isimpossible?countries any sustainablecooperationbetween that interests somuch two the interests areremainsunclear.these contradictRussian Whatifthey interests.” bestadvancesAmerican Butwhat that tion andindifference balanceof cooperation,competi creation ofthe of cooperation, butthe ultimate strategists’ goalisnot sakerelations: “the cooperationfor the terests and shared threats.” He subscribes to opiniontoday:terests a different Hesubscribes andsharedthreats.” wrote U.S.-Russian that cooperation “willhave to be builtonsharedin A reader might retort here that a strategic agendaA readermightretort herethat cannot consist Graham’s nextargumentelaborates on hispragmaticapproach Actually, later challenges in hisessay Grahamdiscussesthe - - - - -

145 A Realist’s Response to an Idealist West’sgists also“remember” the failure to promote democracyin Russia onedoes nothelp to system a understand well. reform that The strate as Grahamadmits,itishard to onecannot understand Russia, andthat dimension into U.S. foreign policy. Theirfears belief that, stem fromthe – namely,hensive approach aboutanother normative the incorporating “shaping expectations”? really berelying capacityfor Canthey only on America’s tradeoffs? for are limited opportunities skepticism” there ... with and admit that at least)acknowledge have they “to that treattalkof sharedinterests (asrepresented by Kremlin whenthey Graham, the with partnership UnitedRussia andthe States...” stilldivide stark in values,interests differences andoutlookthat the situation, for exacerbates hesymbolizes “Putin’sreturn the with): years.” Iwillquote Icompletely Graham’sconclusion(which agree willstrainwhatever hasbeenrestoredreturn over trust past few the andPutin’s grow elusive, absenceof trust, particularlywill thus in the have easy trade-offs alreadybeenmade....Compromise the is that to U.S.-Russia transactionalapproach of the relations....The problem to acknowledge will steadily “Putin’sreturn limits lay that barethe in article ing anda commongoal.” However, 2012 time ofhisMarch-April by the a commonstrategic obstaclesto understand reaching insurmountable areno “there of evolution, Grahamclaimedthat definition Using this tem willevolve toward openness,pluralismandeffectiveness.” greater sys between “the opposition.” government Hestressedthat andthe the positive Russian dialogue evolution” politicalsystem of the and“the TASS, waspossible.In earlyactional approach ITAR- 2012, with in interviews in his 2009report? “mutual give-and-take” andthe policyhecalledforactional approach framework? Doeshestilladvocate continuingPresidentObama’strans how twoshared interests” doesheenvision of the parties, hisstrategic traditional spheresof “sharedinterests.”their Washington’s andMoscow’s in what areconsidered differ interests truly Graham then goeson to examples citeGraham then proving specific how much for effective cooperation.” problem andsalienciesfor create nationalinterests obstacles that in assessmentsofthe shared interest differences reveals significant skepticism.cooperation with Acloseexaminationof any alleged strategist basis for .treatstalkof sharedinterests “The asthe I understandwhy “strategists” Grahamandother may feel appre “strategists” hopefor the a successful strategic How that isit,then, Not longago,Grahammighthave trans that the stillbelieved that Graham acknowledgesGiven “supposedly that in the differences Business Gazeta, The

American Interest andVoice hetalked about“avery of America, (“Putin, the Sequel”), hewasforced(“Putin, the ------

146 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles anti-Americanism in Russian growing society tideof anti-Americanism stem – andwhy the Telegram.” We needto understand why typeof dialoguedidnot this “Long of exchange in the formula cisely Kennanwasdescribing the toworld Kremlin isreturning pre the and, mostof all,fromAmerica, tofects.” isolate Russian Bytrying civilsociety outside fromitstiesto the ef of permanent anddearth superabundance of vodka andspeeches visitsandfunctions, with of closely shepherdedofficial channels to arid “Actual manifestations of Soviet respectwillberestricted policy in this on “cultural collaboration”between two the states, Kennanwarned, 1970sthe and1980s. Allow meto quote time.Reflecting Kennanthis U.S.-Soviet typesof initiatives of the smack these dialoguefrom that we same time,itmustbepointed out shouldfoster Butatthe them. to people”initiatives. No exchanges. oneobjectsto these Ofcourse, “people- exchange businesscontacts,andother programs, influence: Russian regime! corrupt anddon’tlegitimate the of our struggle, we that Russian way liberalsexpectfromit:one thing Don’tstandin the Westto freedom. Ifthe isatleast isnot challenge, there readyfor this create a foreign willfacilitate policycontext Russia’s that transition West the Itisof coursedesirablethat itpreaches. that norms practice the West Iadvocatemative the dimensionthat entailsmerely that should has longsinceexhausted itselfandbecomecounterproductive. The nor old “democracypromotion” formula the Graham.Ibelievepage that with precede “strategic way dialogue,” other around. not the it.Iwouldtegic understandingwould dialogue”with have that thought cannot understandRussiathey attempt even asthey to engage in “stra words, politicalanalystsKennan uttered stilladmitthat these American Russia.temporary However, decadesafter allthese that itisperplexing eracouldbestillappliedtoA lot con of Kennan’sconclusionsfromthat ago. were a half-century as they morethan as shrewdandthoughtful foreign interferencecandolessgood.” life. deepest andmostintimate constitute processesof national the that advance toward dignityandenlightenment in government arethings 1951Kennan’s Spring ing to history. rewrite dimension forof a normative foreign policy, strategists areattempt the democracy.mon with Itisasif,in anattempt rejection to justify their 1990s; a Yeltsinin the supported they in com hadnothing regimethat States West andthe didnot actually promote democracyin Russia recollection:The United 1990s. particular in the that Butlet mecorrect a sharp deterioration of Russian-American ommendations, resulted in asharp rec strategists’ included allof the President Obama’s policies,which WestThe strategists wantthe oldways to to return of exerting the However, asfor Kennan’sadvice“not to interfere,” same Iamon the Graham isfond of quoting George Kennan.Thistimehequotes There isnothinglessunderstandableto foreigners,inwhich Foreign Affairs essay: “The ways essay: people by “The which Even today words these remain ------

147 A Realist’s Response to an Idealist should not becalled“strategic.” Moscow.ing with We to prove aremerely tactical dialogue trying that assistance andjobsecurity. Potemkinnew paradigmandrely on such village dialogues for financial whocannot functionin the countries andpoliticiansin both experts the isbasedon imitationstrategy? Perhapsgic dialogue”that needed for it’s onesdid.Whoneedsa “strate prior same waydoomed to allthe end the obvious? Thisdialogueis restatingthe But shouldIspendmorebreath for cooperation.” long-term aresolidgrounds there whether termine Russia Act does! morethan needs this America of corruption. Kremlin’sexport to the ciety by creating barriers But ThomasGrahamknows better Ido. allof this that of MikhailKhodorkovsky’s theft assets.effectively legitimizedRosneft’s intermediaries) andExxon Mobil(brokeredneft by someinfluential interests. Wetheir deal between the areoutraged Ros fact that by the proximity companies KremlintoAmerican exploittheir to advance the herein Russiarivals,” we how aremorepreoccupiedwith Russian and Act asa way of gainingacompetitive advantage over commercial their of law. “Russians willbetempted argument that Asfor the to use this United the rule States itcaresaboutthe demonstrated hasfinally that itbelieve Russians that whoarefamiliarwith the contrary; Quite the not in any way of law.” wrong message “sendRussians aboutrule the Kremlin’s propagandists.TheAct by does the arguments putforward the Uniteding the States. Western-orientedthe segmentof Russian to society criticiz hasshifted that Graham shouldbeworried machine. Kremlin’scorruption in the Unitedthe West States), the cog believingthat hasbecomejustanother West of the arecritical (primarily regime,andthey current the with faster-growing segmentof Russian society. Thesepeopleareunhappy aboutan even hand,heshouldalsobeconcerned other sia. Onthe aremany peoplein today’s such there hand, Grahamisright; Rus one situation ismorecomplex.and failedleaders.” Onthe Herethe agents of beingbrandedAmerican orlinked to marginal forceswary who atany rate Kremlin’s games. arebusy playing the strategists, Russian oppositionneedsnohelpfromthe answer the that to Iwould avoid “marginal”Russian oppositionfigures. supporting hearsWestern strategistsoften Headvisesthe analysts repeatthem. andKennan’sadviceto strategists’ a tee?the relations. How have administration follow couldthis happenedifthe Graham is also concerned that moreandRussians “are that Graham isalsoconcerned addressingsinceone byA few remarks Grahamareworth other David Kramer andIdonot urge Washington to stop cooperat In conclusion,Grahamcallsfor “highlevel strategic dialogueto de Magnitsky Act so willhelprehabilitate whole, the American On the Magnitsky Act, As for Graham’soppositionto the it isinlinewith ------

148 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Kremlin’s Russia. but the wantto have they isnotthat strategic Russia dialoguewith asa whole, Russia the shouldalways rememberthat Americans ent conundrum? ety, for a way isundergoinga painstakingsearch outof itspres which isalsorespectful,understanding,andsensitive tobut that Russian soci to envision takes interests a foreign into policythat accountAmerican power in their to avoid willdoeverything Indeed oneexpectsthey it. pro-Western segmentwillsurely role. opposeRussia’s assumingthis interests. for AndRussia’s advancingAmerican for beingan instrument sion ormisdirection.ButIwillbeblunt: The Kremlinwillhardly settle Grahamfor isdefinitelybetter illu hiscandor;should thank this than not bea tragedy interests.” – aslongitadvancedAmerican We outcomewould audienceby “that saying hisAmerican that comforts about! now condosin Miamito all,they have worry beachfront After their pragmatically. Korea. Russia Itdoesn’twantto into North turn another Cold War West assoonthe stops cajoling it.The Kremlinelite thinks moreover, to itwould Russia believe to issuicidal,that return the that and respectof Russia’s pro-Western constituency. Itwould befoolish, United hand,the other States dimension, on the would trust regainthe were always goingto be complicated anyway. normative the Byreturning Kremlin willcomplicate Butthings U.S. the things. the relationshipwith We dimensioninto normative introducingthe understandthat A final thought: Why thought: isitstillimpossibleA final analysts for American strategic dialoguemayGraham concludesthat fail.However, he - - -

149 A Realist’s Response to an Idealist The Agony Lilia Shevtsova / Yezhednevny Journal, February 5, 2013

One should not belabor the obvious: that Putin’s regime has exhausted itself. It would be far more productive to discuss whether the regime’s agony will bring an end to the autocratic system as a whole, and whether it will provoke a split within the ruling elite.

Putin as a Gravedigger for Autocracy

Recent history of democratic revolutions reveals three ways in which authoritarian leaders and dictators have attempted to maintain their hold on power once it started slipping away. Some tried to imitate democratization; this was taken as a sign of weakness and only intensified popular demand for change. Others cautiously introduced some change, hoping to re-legitimize their rule by holding elections and allowing some degree of political pluralism; none of these authoritarian leaders have been able to convince the people of that their sudden urge for liberalization was genuine, and once the changes were underway, the regimes usually collapsed. The rest wasted no time on charades, immediately turning to repression; these authoritarian and dictatorial regimes had a chance to prolong their lives under certain conditions. One of the conditions was a change of leader. This lent some air of legitimacy to authoritarianism. Another was external conflict or even all- out war, which consolidated society (albeit only for a while). Leadership changes and cadre reshuffling helped to preserve the Chinese regime in 1989 when it resorted to violence. The Greek and Argentine regimes also used military force – the former in Cyprus in 1974 and the latter on the Falklands in 1982 – thus drawing out their political deaths, but not for long. Incidentally, neither Putin’s regime nor the Russian autocratic system needed the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, but if that conflict had occurred today, they would have been able to make use of it. We are undoubtedly witnessing the death throes of Putin’s regime. Russia is exhibiting textbook symptoms of regime decline: the Kremlin is unable to maintain the status quo but it is also powerless to initiate change; it turns to repression to preserve its power; it is unable to relate (The Kremlin itselfapparently hasnoanswer question.) to Thissit this timecomes. crunch are willingto go to regime whenthe defend the repressive measures.Italsoisn’t clearhow power farthe structures to achieve it. aura canhardly becomea SupremeRuler, to even bloodletting ifheturns andhissacred Maoist-Stalinist lines.Aleaderwhohaslosthis charisma top revolution modeledalong fromthe bureaucratic andanti-oligarchic Putinappealsto himasa resultofananti- will onlylation that support popu charges. Butthe or wasdefending himagainstthose of corruption story in this main character regime wasaccusingthe the clear whether fair involving Defense former Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov. Itwasnever likely to become a new Stalin orMao.Thiswasdemonstrated af by the class.From whatwe ruling havemembers of the seenof him,Putinisnot not only to leading andmosttrusted spill bloodbutalsoto banish the Guard. Butto absolute be legitimated leader, asthe hehasto be ready ing to society directly, Praetorian bureaucracy andthe bypassing the of him either. Theoretically, hisdemiseby to appeal cheat Putinmay try majority, segmentsof society arenot archaic particularly fond butthe are to be putinplace.Putinhaslongbeenrejected dynamic urban by the game of the quished power new rules by the bureaucracyifthe structure “systemcannot liberals”andbourgeoisie, satisfythe whoareto be van playing a dominantrole),sinceheisnot tough cial services enough.He spe power the interests of the bureaucracy(with corporate the structure makes itharderfor a newstatusquo to emerge. Putincannot guarantee leaderandhisteam, which People this associatetin’s rule. failureswith Todayshrinking. system callsfor reproduction ofthe an endto Pu the israpidly Putin’spersonalbase,which broaderthan social baseismuch society system’s atlarge. and membersof the politicaland Indeed,the investedof those personalizedpower in the elites regime,includingboth traditions,andinterests mechanisms, of aggregate This system isthe autocratic interests system of the itself. the lin willclashhead-onwith allow a regimeto survive. such outside world the will with conflict onlyrecord suggests military that power by swappingimitation democracyfor repression?The historical regimes.CanPutinmaintain decline anddemiseof authoritarian on the vised to read Toynbee, Huntington, orFukuyama, whowrote extensively countdown Putin regimehasalreadybegunaread final for the the that over power Thosewhoharbor any asinheritances. doubts andproperty concept to of Russia’sa return the uniqueness); italsoattempts to hand for an enemy, search fundamentalism,the Russian Orthodox tarism, and past (mili by challenges andrespondstoto diggingupthe them modern he can resort to aswell violence, cannothe canresort lastlong.Theseuncertainties, a regimeleader isnot orto surewhether uation, in which what extent So far, Kremlin hasnot decided how the faritiswillingto go with If Putinisnot Krem readyto measures,histenure take in the these ------

151 The Agony American adoptions, dubbed“Herod’s banon American of the critical surprisingly system liberalshas once againbeenreignited).the Some ministers were between statists and the economy conflict the (the is to be donewith past.Itsmembersargueover of the what tion hasindeedbecomea thing would pave way for the Russia’s own “pact” or“roundtable.” hasinvested elite, believing ittion, which the itshopes in asplitwithin This conviction Russian hashadsomeimpact liberalopposi on the for democratictransformation. most successfulscenario position isthe op a “pact”between conviction to pragmatists andthe that the rise the gave Africa) Spain,andSouth in LatinAmerica, 50 years (primarily past crats canbecomedemocrats”).The democraticrevolutions of the last wave famous sloganfromthe of democratization:“non-demo the oldregimewouldof the initiate (hence democratictransformation anti-system cases,members opposition.In other class to the ally with ruling classes.In many the cases,a fewin old ruling pragmatistsleft on power. constitutionally monopolyappeals callingfor granted abandoningthe sian society only whenaccompanied “Down autocracy!” by the with for a newczar.throne Thisslogancanactually for bea net Rus benefit Kremlin to “Down Putin”sloganin orderto the clear apath the with One presumeswe to willsoonseeforces privatize insideRussia trying couldcometo powerfist” in Russia. autocratic andhelpto rule preserve place. Butifheleaves before a new“iron an alternative system arises, cantake country genuine the of Kremlin before transformation the the how with to organize hisdeparture. cerned perceptiveinner circle –atleastthe ones –surely mustnow becon have in his closeto Putin andthose to Thusthose pay whenhedeparts. classwill ruling the price the Kremlinisalreadyhigherthan in the to keep The price Putin understands this. classcertainly The ruling system. the Putin presidencyisbeginningto undermine er hand,the nowtive energetically courts Committee, andthe promote. oth Onthe Investiga Duma, the the repressive that mechanisms the also launched byfounded transition to force. post-Putinismandinitiated rule He the authorities. to confront the chance the uncertainty, somesegmentsof itareemboldenedby itandenergizedby system itself.Moreover,dations andthe while society asa wholefears foun regime’s the fear undermine of whatviolencemayas the bring, one hand,he one.On the a contradictory Putin’s roleisthus Russia’s ruling corpora unanimity ofRussia’s ruling the factsindicate that Certain resultedA numberof successfulglobaltransformations fromsplits Should We Hope for aSplit Elite? The Within a paradox.This possibilitypresentsuswith Putinhasto leave ------

152 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles is likely to cling to power a transitionto an isolationistmilitary through elite ruling sian elite willinevitably top. of the leadto Part a coupatthe system. exist outsideof the oppositionwouldteam have Second,structured would to that?) agree to would Kremlin ruling they losepower (Who in the scenario. underthis of law wouldown state – apositionthat cutagainsttheir interests, since pragmatists would the have creation ofarule to the be readyto support trigger change, atleasttwo provided that preconditionsaremet. First, separate ensues.Thissplitcould agendas,their andpoliticalstruggle classactually Russian splits,itsfragments define streets, ruling to the the rebelliousthoughts. ine anyone Kremlin harboring insidethe were, Andeven ifthere emergence itishardto figures. imag of such the tin’s team. Sofar, couldfacilitate isalsonooutsidepressurethat there like Spain’sAdolfofigures a result ofincreasedpublicactivism. old regimeemerged as the whocamefromwithin reformers All of the framework regime. pearance of radicaloppositionoutsidethe of the sulted onset frompublicdiscontent, of power the ap paralysis, andthe classhave ruling always the beenaccompaniedsplits within by orre to Itisimportant note programs. reform that their publicwith to the states havetarian previously induceddiscontented to appeal groups MikhailProchorov. classof authori oligarch ruling the Divisionswithin for instance,circlescloseto Finance former Minister Alexei or Kudrin areaccompanied of Putinfrom, by things publiccriticism when these framework the allowed stillfallwithin warnings regime– even by the elite. callingfor Compiling change andissuingstrongly reports worded rest ofthe cate Kremlin andthe a durablecommitmentto oppose the classdonot indi protests necessarily ruling in the by membersof the discontent, andeven participation class?Agitation,grumbling, ruling West.between Kremlin andthe the clout;its international itwillnolonger beneededasan intermediary Kremlin whileprojectingaliberalimage butwillalsolose the to serve non-power the regimewillnot onlythat the segmentof losea chance outside world, to the to means eventually which country closethe powertion of the bureaucracy. to repression isbound drift The regime’s and system liberals,whohave eleva aggressive longbeenunhappy with oligarchs the isunpopular with repressive authoritarianism evident that for resources.Finally, fight clansareengageddifferent in afierce itis Law.” quieted (Thecritics down quickly, rather however.) In addition, a mobilized traditionalist baseandisalready moving toward repressive seemsmoreprobable becauseRussiadictatorship. has Thisscenario Rus the conditionsis not split within met,If atleastoneof these the Let usimagine,however, sets in,peopletake a socialcrisis that toHow Russia dowe today? observations apply Thereareno these foreshadow Russian impendingDoes allof this splitin the the Suárez or South Africa’s F.W. Africa’s orSouth deKlerk in Pu ------

153 The Agony the ground enough so that enoughsothat ground facts onthe an alternative canchange the for such creation ofandpopularsupport alternative. In fact,only the only distract Russian society fromfocusing on creatingananti-system if a splitdoesoccur. top expectations of asplitatthe The unjustified Russiasian elite willhave orhopethat an easierexitfromautocracy a clearly trend. defined complicates does extent greater to than socialtransformation a much interest. We alsosought to any demonstrate imitation typeof that further. Atany rate, outof pureacademic we scenario alludedto this system of law liberalswouldthe state discreditfreedomandarule even Praetorian dictatorship. The royalist the Russia than coupstaged by political funeral. toPutin didnot savor comeback to attend histriumph butrather his roof. However, the jobapproval ratingsarestillthrough President’s the enon. Ostensibly, we have same leader, the an unchanged Kremlin,and clearly term phenom changed itscourse.Putin’scurrent illustrates this ally, has river to twice,especially same river ifthe enter the itisdifficult drive, while the former andisnot likelyannals of history to be repeated: Chubaishaslosthis Soskovets (Yeltsin’s exceptional over Korzhakov- courage. spectacularvictory the Chubais’s hasbeenknown groups for of which neither andtechnocrats, garchs Praetorian Guardonceagaintriumphing over joint team of oli the a new Putin.Thenitwould to square beback squad one:another of the lookingfor regimewould iswhenthis start public), andthat from the “Yeltsinor later the 2”regimewould have to of all be defended (first could beexpected to generate Yeltsin-like another regime.Butsooner protection. Therefore leader’s a coupstagedthe by system liberals in Russia transitionsocietiesboth andin other have always sought futureandwell-being.their system consequences areunpredictable of opposingthe hand, the for regime undera newleader, other have past?Onthe asthey donein the system. Whythe would placein an autocratic they, their canfind ifthey Putinregimearehardlyhave preparedto of the oppose beencritical actionsandrhetoric, In both system evencal crisis. liberalswho those of law event state rule ofasocialandpoliti in the fordecide to the fight would they suddenly hopethat recorddoesnot much offer Their track even ifheisforced to leave Kremlin. the willpersist Putinset structure in motion, that andthis structure to the ing elite willstay in power. touch final would Thisscenario addthe rul cannolonger the guarantee that authoritarianism policies. Also,soft How system liberalroyalists likely the willstage isitthat a coup? All told, oneshouldnot bet on anear-future Rus the splitwithin Paradoxically, iseven system worse liberalcoupscenario the for bourgeoisie andliberaltechnocrats It shouldberememberedthat siloviki Praetorians have become more aggressive. Actu ) team in 1996 in the haslongbeenburied ------

154 Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles sian transformation from other democraticrevolutions. fromother sian transformation class.Mostlikely, ruling Rusof the willdistinguishthe difference this Theycannot members position’s terms. doitasmerenonconformist op democratic roundtable –butonly on the ever) in the canparticipate Kremlin’s the classbeginto look for ruling lifeboats to membersof the leavecertain Titanic top class(not brass,how the ruling . Somein the - - -

155 The Agony

About the Carnegie Endowment

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with headquarters in Washington D.C. The Endowment was created in 1910 by prominent entrepreneur and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie to provide independent analysis on a wide array of public policy issues.

More than fifteen years ago, the Endowment launched the Carnegie Mos- cow Center to help develop a tradition of public policy analysis in the states of the former Soviet Union and improve relations between Russia and the United States. It thereby pioneered the idea that in today’s world a think tank whose mission is to contribute to global security, stability and prosperity requires a permanent international presence and a multinational outlook at the core of its operations.

In 2007, the Carnegie Endowment announced its New Vision as the first multinational and ultimately global think tank, adding operations in Bei- jing, Beirut and Brussels to its existing offices in Moscow and Washington. As in Moscow and Washington in the past, the defining characteristics of the global Carnegie institution will continue to be political independence, first rate scholarship combined with high level experience in government and other sectors, sustained, first hand, expert collaboration across borders, and unrelenting focus on constructively affecting real world outcomes. There is a clear demand for such an organization in today’s world, with its ever increasing interdependence and the interlinked nature of global issues.

Through research, publishing and discussions, the Endowment associ- ates – in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut and Brussels – shape fresh policy approaches. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations among governments, business, international organizations and civil society, focusing on the economic, political and technological forces driving global change. The Endowment uses its experience of research and discussion at the Carnegie Moscow Center as a model to develop its transformation into the first international research network. Tel.: +7(495)935-8904;Fax: +7(495)935-8906 16/2 Tverskaya, Moscow, 125009,Russia MOSCOWCARNEGIE CENTER http://www.carnegieendowment.org E-mail: [email protected] Tel.: +1(202)483-7600; Fax: +1(202)483-1840 Ave.,1779 Massachusetts NW, Washington, DC20036,USA ENDOWMENTCARNEGIE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE http://www.carnegie.ru E-mail: [email protected]

158 About the Carnegie Endowment

Crisis: Russia and the West in the Time of Troubles Lilia Shevtsova and David Kramer

Design Barry&Brom Design Bureau Designer Yakov Krasnovsky Typeset Yuri Mosyagin

Carnegie Moscow Center 16/2 Tverskaya, Moscow, 125009, Russia Tel.: +7 (495) 935-8904; Fax: +7 (495) 935-8906 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.carnegie.ru

Publishing house “Press Club Service” 127322, Moscow, Miloshenkova St., 10, office 96 [email protected]

Sent to print: 15.04.2013 Format: 170x240 mm Paper: offset Printing: offset Print run: 700

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