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Xi Jinping's Inner Circle
Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 1: The Shaanxi Gang) Cheng Li Like successful politicians elsewhere, President Xi Jinping assumed China’s top leadership role with the support of an inner circle. This group has been crucial to Xi’s efforts to consolidate power during his first year in office. Xi’s inner circle of confidants has smoothed the way for him to undertake a bold anti-corruption campaign, manage the Bo Xilai trial, and begin the process of crafting ambitious economic reforms. This series examines various power bases that make up Xi’s inner circle—individuals who serve as his hands, ears, mouth, and brain. This first article focuses on native-place associations, namely the so-called Shaanxi Gang, which includes the “Iron Triangle” grouping in the Politburo Standing Committee. Such discussion can help reveal the future trajectory of politics and policy-making during the Xi administration. The analysis of the positioning and promotion of some of Xi’s longtime friends provides an invaluable assessment of both Xi’s current power and the potential for effective policy implementation. Much of the current discussion about the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s power centers on the top leadership positions that he holds concurrently.1 Xi not only took control of all the supreme institutions in the party, state, and military during the latest political succession, but he also now chairs the newly established National Security Committee and the Central Leading Group on Comprehensive Deepening of Economic Reform—two crucial decision-making bodies in Zhongnanhai. There is now widespread recognition that the party leadership enthusiastically endorsed Xi’s comprehensive market reform agenda at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee held in November 2013.2 These big, bold, and broad policy initiatives ostensibly reflect Xi’s growing power and influence.3 Less noticed, but equally important, is Xi’s substantial reliance on an inner circle of confidants, especially his quick moves to promote longtime associates to key leadership positions. -
Avoiding Three Traps in Confronting China's Party-State
AVOIDING THREE TRAPS IN CONFRONTING CHINA’S PARTY-STATE CHENG LI EXECUTIVE SUMMARY foundation for decoupling. Some components of the initiatives have received bipartisan support. To navigate the current perilous and complicated Although American decision-makers and analysts situation in U.S.-China relations, the new have by no means reached consensus that the administration will need to move beyond disputes United States should end engagement with the over COVID-19 and partisan politics with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the prevailing objective of establishing a long-term, well-grounded view in Washington is that a new and more resolute strategy toward China, rather than adopting short- strategy is needed. sighted and sensational tactics spawned by an unbalanced and fatalistic outlook. This paper Proponents of decoupling in Washington have argues that the three prevailing policy objectives raised legitimate concerns about — and valid of the Trump administration — 1) the rhetorical criticism of — the CCP leadership’s merciless separation of the PRC from the CCP, 2) calls for crackdown on Uighur Muslims and political overthrowing the Communist regime, and 3) dissidents, unfair practices in the economic and containment of China’s “whole-of-society threat” technological domains, and aggressive behavior in — are conceptually contradictory, empirically the Asia-Pacific region. China has taken advantage misguided, and strategically self-deceiving and of the openness of America’s economy, universities, dangerous. The new administration should avoid and research institutions, especially in terms of these traps. Instead, Washington should prudently entrepreneurial and technological innovation. reassess the capacity and constraints of both Some recent U.S. -
Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized. -
Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”: a Law and Economics Perspective
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Volume 43 Number 2 Summer 2020 Article 3 Summer 2020 Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”: A Law and Economics Perspective Miron Mushkat Roda Mushkat Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_international_comparative_law_review Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Miron Mushkat and Roda Mushkat, Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”: A Law and Economics Perspective, 43 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 137 (2020). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol43/ iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delette) 5/1/2020 4:08 PM Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”: A Law and Economics Perspective MIRON MUSHKAT AND RODA MUSHKAT Abstract Pervasive graft, widely observed throughout Chinese history but deprived of proper outlets and suppressed in the years following the Communist Revolution, resurfaced on massive scale when partial marketization of the economy was embraced in 1978 and beyond. The authorities had endeavored to alleviate the problem, but in an uneven and less than determined fashion. The battle against corruption has greatly intensified after Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012. The multiyear antigraft campaign that has unfolded has been carried out in an ironfisted and relentless fashion. -
The Wen Jiabao Administration and Macroeconomic Recontrol
Hunkering Down: The Wen Jiabao Administration and Macroeconomic Recontrol Barry Naughton Introduction On April 26, 2004, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened and agreed to strengthen macroeconomic contractionary policies dramatically. A blizzard of meetings and activities ensued, which included the imposition of significant administrative controls over investment and land use. Within four days, the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC)—the former State Planning Commission—issued an urgent directive ordering the suspension and reinspection of thousands of investment projects. These steps represent a dramatic reorientation of Chinese macroeconomic policy. They have a significant political impact, bringing new leaders into the core of the economic decision-making process and shifting overall economic policy in a slightly more conservative direction. Of course, these measures also have a very important economic impact. If they do not represent a step backward, they at least indicate that existing approaches to economic policy, those in place through the first year of the Wen administration, have failed to achieve their objectives. In this piece I first describe the most important policy measures instituted; then I trace these measures’ political implications and conclude by discussing their economic implications. Background During its first year in power from March 2003 to March 2004, the Wen Jiabao administration had a relatively smooth experience in economic policymaking. Economic growth was strong and accelerating, powered by rapid export growth and the brisk development of new domestic markets. It is true that the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis thoroughly disrupted the economy and government in spring 2003, and worries about economic overheating have been present from the first day of the new administration. -
Curriculum Vitae CHENG LI EDUCATION 1992 Ph.D. (Political
Curriculum Vitae CHENG LI EDUCATION 1992 Ph.D. (Political Science) Princeton University 1989 M.A. (Political Science) Princeton University 1987 M.A. (Asian Studies) University of California, Berkeley 1985 B.A. (English Literature) East China Normal University, Shanghai CURRENT POSITIONS 2014-present Director, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 2009-2014 Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 2007-present Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. WORK EXPERIENCE 2003-2009 William R. Kenan Professor of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton NY 2006-2007 Visiting Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 2005-2006 Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 2004-2006 Chair, Asian Studies Program, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY 2002-2003 Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC 2001-2002 Acting Chair, Department of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY 1999-2003 Professor, Department of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY 1997-1999 Associate Professor, Dept. of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY 1992-1997 Assistant Professor, Dept. of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY 1993-1995 Fellow, Institute of Current World Affairs, Hanover, NH 1991-1992 Instructor, Department of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY BOARD MEMBERSHIPS 2016-present Adviser, SupChina Advisory Board (A New York-based media company dedicated to covering all the news about China) 2013-present Editorial Board Member, The China Report (India) 2012-present Director, the Board of Directors of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations 2012-present Member, the Executive Committee and the Nomination Committee of National Committee on U.S.-China Relations 2014-present Co-Chair, the Issues Committee, Committee of 100 2012-2015 Trustee, Institute of Current World Affairs, Washington D.C. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement June 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 39 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 46 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 48 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 55 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 60 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 June 2008 The Main National Leadership of the PRC -
Institutions of Democratic Governance
1 INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE The Chinese Communist Party Asserts Greater Control Over State and Society In China’s one-party, authoritarian political system,1 the Chinese Communist Party maintains what one rights organization calls a ‘‘monopoly on political power.’’ 2 The Party plays a leading role in state and society,3 restricting Chinese citizens’ ability to exercise civil and political rights.4 Observers noted that the central role of the Party in governing the state appears to have strengthened since Xi Jinping became the Party General Secretary and President in November 2012 and March 2013, respectively,5 further ‘‘blur- ring’’ the lines between Party and government.6 In March 2017, Wang Qishan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Com- munist Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) and the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said that ‘‘under the Party’s leadership, there is only a division of labor between the Party and the government; there is no separa- tion between the Party and the government.’’ 7 During the Commission’s 2017 reporting year, under Xi’s leader- ship, the Party demanded absolute loyalty from its members,8 di- recting and influencing politics and society at all levels, including in the military,9 economy,10 Internet,11 civil society,12 and family life.13 Furthermore, the Party continued to exert power over the ju- diciary,14 undermining the independence of courts and the rule of law in China, despite legal reform efforts.15 In September 2016, the State Council -
College of Charleston
College of Charleston POLI 345.01 Politics of China Dr. Guoli Liu Fall 2021 Express II Maybank Hall 111, Monday and Wednesday 4:00-6:45 pm Office: J. C. Long Building, Room 229, 9 Liberty Street Office Hours: Please email me to make appointment for ZOOM meeting Telephone: 843-953-5883; E-mail: [email protected] COURSE OBJECTIVES This course examines contemporary Chinese politics (1949-present) with an emphasis on the era of reform and opening since 1978. What are the crucial problems in Chinese politics? How have the Chinese people and political leaders confronted them? We begin with an introduction of China’s tradition and revolutionary transformation. The main focus of the course is on political reform and socioeconomic change in the post-Mao era. China’s politics from Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernizations” and xiaokang shihui (well to do society) to Hu Jintao’s harmonious society, and now Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” has been focusing on achieving modernity. After four decades of hard work and rapid growth, China is approaching modernity. In addition to having a rapidly growing economy, China is experiencing profound sociopolitical changes. We shall examine whether the Chinese can build a dynamic market economy in an increasingly globalized world economy, create social harmony in a society with growing tensions, and maintain political stability while avoiding stagnation and decay. What we face is a most challenging prospect that will affect not only the fate of 1.4 billion Chinese people but also the future of world politics. We are going to study China in comparative perspectives. -
The Regulatory Regime of Food Safety in China, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-50442-1 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY Abels, Gabriele, and Alexander Kobusch. “Regulation of Food Safety in the EU: Changing Patterns of Multi-Level Governance.” In Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance. University College Dublin., 2010. ACFSMC. “Charter of All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (ACFSMC).” Xinhua Net, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/ 2004-12/27/content_2385266.htm. ADB, SFDA, and WHO. The Food Safety Control System of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing: ADB, 2007. Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Center. “Major Responsibilities of Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Center.” Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Center, http://www.aqsc.agri.gov.cn/zhxx/zzjg/ 201012/t20101228_73068.htm. Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Supervision Department of MOA. “Major Responsibilities of Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Supervision Department of MOA.” Agricultural Products Quality and Safety Supervision Department of MOA, http://www.moa.gov.cn/sjzz/jianguanju/ jieshao/zhineng/201006/t20100606_1532739.htm. Anagnost, Ann. “From “Class” to Social Strata”: Grasping the Social Totality in Reform-Era China.” Third World Quarterly 29 (2008): 497–519. Anderlini, Jamil. “Chinese Police Cracked the Case of Adulterated Lamb.” Ftchinese, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001050268. Anonymous. “China Is Working on the Methods to Detect Gutter Oil.” Beijing Times, 19 September 2011. ———. “The Ministry of Public Security Cracked Down a Major Case of Gutter Oil.” The Beijing News, 14 September 2011. © The Author(s) 2017 259 G. Zhou, The Regulatory Regime of Food Safety in China, Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-50442-1 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ansell, Christopher, and David Vogel. -
Agenda and Speaker Bios
Informing and Strengthening Policy ENGAGING ASIA 2010: Th e Future of U.S. Leadership Friday, September 17 | Th e Phoenix Park Hotel | 8:45 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. 8:00 a.m. Registration and breakfast FEATURED PUBLICATION 8:45 a.m. Welcome and Introductions Power Constrained: Sources of Meredith Miller, Th e National Bureau of Asian Research Mutual Strategic Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations, by David 9:00 a.m. MANAGING STRATEGIC SUSPICION IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS M. Lampton Moderator: Michael Wills, Th e National Bureau of Asian Research Th e U.S.-China relationship is fun- Speakers: David M. Lampton, Th e Paul H. Nitze School of damentally stable and will remain Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University so for the foreseeable future. Hav- ing said this, however, the essay Cheng Li, Th e Brookings Institution highlights four sources of mutual strategic mistrust that, if insuffi - 10:00 a.m. Coff ee Break ciently attended to by Washington 10:15 a.m. THE FUTURE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP and Beijing, will metastasize. 10:15 a.m. U.S. Security Policy in Asia Th ese sources are: (1) defi ning the Speaker: Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy challenge of U.S.-China relations in such a manner that there is no 11:15 a.m. U.S. Economic Policy in Asia “win-win” solution, (2) miscal- Speaker: Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary of State for culating U.S. and Chinese power, Economic, Energy and Agricultural Aff airs (3) desires in China to “change the game,” and (4) challenge and 12:15 p.m. -
China NIS 2006
National Integrity System Transparency International Country Study Report China 2006 National Integrity System Country Study Report Author Yong Guo, Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China The National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report of China is part of a 2006 series of National Integrity System Country Studies of East and Southeast Asia made possible with funding from: Sovereign Global Development The Starr Foundation The Council for the Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency United Kingdom Department for International Development All material contained in this report was believed to be accurate as of 2006. Every effort has been made to verify the information contained herein, including allegations. Nevertheless, Transparency International does not accept responsibility for the consequences of the use of this information for other purposes or in other contexts. © 2006 Transparency International Transparency International Secretariat Alt Moabit 96 10559 Berlin Germany http://www.transparency.org China 2 National Integrity System Country Study Acknowledgements This study is funded by TI, without whose support and knowledge sharing we would never have had the chance to evaluate China’s integrity institutions using the NIS framework. It is coordinated by the Anticorruption and Governance Research Center, Tsinghua University. Ran Liao, Program Officer from the TI Secretariat, introduced the concept of the National Integrity System and the TI Source Book 2000 to China in 2001. This made us familiar with this excellent theory on analysing a country’s anti-corruption institutional framework. Prof. Angang Hu, Dr. Wenhao Cheng and Dr. Jianming Ren from Tsinghua University read the early draft of the report and provided important suggestions and comments.