Mosquitoes to Wolves The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller GARY ROBERT LESTER Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama August 1997 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lester, Gary Robert, 1947– Mosquitoes to wolves : the evolution of the airborne forward air controller / Gary Robert Lester. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 1. Close air support—History. 2. Close air support—Case studies. 3. Air war- fare—United States—History. I. Title. UG703.L47 1997 358.4¢142—dc21 97-18377 CIP Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix PREFACE . xi 1 EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . 1 World War I . 2 Between the Wars . 5 The American Experience, 1918–42 . 7 World War II . 9 Notes . 12 2 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE . 15 Early Navy-Marine Close Air Support . 15 Close Air Support in Korea . 16 Air Force Philosophy in Korea . 18 Navy/Marine Air in Vietnam . 22 Notes . 23 3 KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE . 25 The Fight for Air Superiority . 26 Phase One—Retreat to Pusan . 28 Phase Two—Advance to the Yalu . 29 Phase Three—Second Retreat . 29 Phase Four—Main Line of Resistance Stabilized . 29 Phase Five—Air Pressure for Peace . 30 A Substitute for Artillery . 30 Close Air Support in Korea . 31 The Extemporized Air War . 32 The Need for Airborne FACs . 33 iii Chapter Page Command and Control Support . 37 6132d Tactical Air Control Group . 38 6147th Squadron Organized . 38 Immediate Air Requests . 40 Mosquitoes Assigned to Divisions . 40 Mosquito Mission Expands . 41 The 502d Tactical Control Group . 41 Notes . 43 4 MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA . 45 The Role of the Mosquito . 45 Forward Air Controller Equipment . 47 Visual Reconnaissance . 49 The Tactical Air Control System . 50 Mosquito Mellow . 52 Strike Control Procedures . 53 Problems Encountered . 55 Forward Air Controller Training . 60 Notes . 62 5 KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR . 65 The Argument for Interdiction . 65 CAS along a Stabilized Front . 65 Radar-Controlled Air Strikes . 66 Communications Upgrades . 66 T-6 Upgrades . 67 Operation Thunderbolt . 67 Operation Ripper . 69 Communist Losses in the First Year . 70 Strategy Changes . 70 Pathfinder Operations . 72 The Truce Ceremony . 73 6147th TCG Deactivated . 74 Joint Air-Ground Doctrine . 74 Post Korea . 75 Notes . 78 iv Chapter Page 6 VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS . 81 Wars of National Liberation . 81 Developing the Counterinsurgency Force . 82 Farm Gate . 82 Command Structure . 89 Air Operations in 1962 . 90 Air Operations in 1963 . 94 Air Operations in 1964 . 98 The Gulf of Tonkin . 101 New Demands . 102 Notes . 104 7 VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS . 109 FACs Come of Age . 109 FAC Aircraft . 110 Personnel Requirements . 114 Seventh Air Force . 115 504th Tactical Air Support Group . 116 Increased Manning Requirements . 117 Qualifications . 118 Rules of Engagement . 120 Locating the Enemy . 121 Visual Reconnaissance Process . 122 In-Country Operations, 1965–72 . 125 Employing the FAC Force . 129 Navy Participation . 132 The Battle of Khe Sanh . 133 The Tet Offensive . 134 Cleared in Wet! . 135 Notes . 140 8 EXPANDING MISSIONS . 145 Night Operations . 145 Air Operations in Laos . 150 USAF Controllers in Cambodia . 160 Notes . 164 v Chapter Page 9 THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS . 167 Out-Country Operations, 1964–65 . 167 Commando Sabre . 171 F-4 “Phantom” FACs . 181 Notes . 195 10 VIETNAMIZATION AND AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL . 201 Vietnamization and Close Air Support . 202 The South Vietnamese Air Force . 205 Cambodia . 207 Lam Son 719 . 210 Interdiction in Route Packages I and II . 212 The 1972 Spring Offensive . 213 Linebacker . 214 Notes . 221 11 A PERSPECTIVE ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . 225 Interservice Cooperation . 225 Airpower in Regional Conflicts . 233 Conclusion . 239 Notes . 241 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 243 INDEX . 263 Illustrations Figure 1 Korean Peninsula . 27 2 Vietnam . 83 vi Photographs Page T-6 “Mosquito” . 35 C-47 “Mosquito Mellow” . 39 Farm Gate Aircraft—T-28 . 85 Farm Gate Aircraft—B-26 . 85 Farm Gate Aircraft—A-19 . 86 Farm Gate Aircraft—C-47 . 86 O-1 “Bird Dog” . 97 O-2 “Skymaster” . 112 OV-10 “Bronco” . 113 F-100 “Misty” . 171 F-4D . 181 F-4E . 188 RF-4C . 189 A-10 “Thunderbolt II” . 231 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK About the Author Lt Col Gary Robert Lester was born in Bristol, Connecticut, on 3 August 1947. He retired from the US Air Force in 1992 after a 23-year career. He accrued three thousand hours as an F-4 weapons systems officer flying F-4 Phantom II fighters. Colonel Lester served two combat tours in Southeast Asia as a “Fast-FAC.” Beginning in 1981, he flew operational test and evaluation missions for advanced weapons and aircraft systems and was an instructor at both of Air Combat Command’s test centers. He completed his career as director, Tactics and Test Division, 79th Test and Evaluation Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. After retirement, Colonel Lester served as associate assistant professor of World Civilization at Okaloosa-Walton Community College and associate assistant professor of American History and Western Civilization for Troy State University, Florida Region. Lester holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Wichita State University (1969), a Master of Public Administration degree from Golden Gate University (1985), and a PhD in history from Florida State University (1994). He is also a graduate of Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. ix Colonel Lester is a member of the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association, the Retired Officer Association, the American Historical Association, and the Pensacola Civil War Round Table. He currently resides in Prescott, Arizona, with his wife Penny. x Preface Comparable to twentieth century cavalry, early forward air controllers (FAC) probed, observed, and reported enemy activity. Flying rickety, underpowered, and unarmed aircraft, they operated on the leading edge of ground combat. The efficient use of airborne FACs never developed in a meaningful way in World War II, with the possible exception of their use in Marine amphibious operations in the Pacific. But the rugged terrain of Korea and the jungle mazes of Vietnam restricted the capabilities of ground controllers to identify targets, thus expanding the need for “eyes in the air.” FAC roles changed from those of probing, observing, and reporting, to those of locating targets, marking them for air strikes, and taking an active role in their destruction. This expanded mission resulted in the inevitable evolution of FAC equipment and responsibilities. Interservice differences regarding the definition of close air support (CAS) caused controversies which clouded ground- support operations in both Korea and Vietnam. The Navy and the Marines saw CAS as the primary mission for airpower. The Air Force and the Army saw CAS as the last priority, to be employed after air superiority has been gained and maintained, supplies have been interdicted, and the enemy’s infrastructure has been damaged. Even the definition of what constitutes CAS was not resolved by the services. In both Korea and Vietnam, these interservice differences were resolved in favor of the Air Force; a Tactical Air Control System was designed to support the Air Force’s concept of CAS, and the FAC became a critical component of that system. In Korea, the FAC’s role began as an observer. It quickly became apparent that the lack of heavy artillery early in the conflict made aircraft bombardment necessary to support friendly ground troops. Getting the observer above the battlefield seemed the best way to identify threats to friendly forces. As the North Koreans swept down the peninsula, xi targets of opportunity were plentiful behind their rapidly advancing forces—and United Nations airpower was often the only force slowing their advance. Mosquitoes were concerned with controlling the “airborne artillery” necessary to protect UN forces in retreat. Entrenched UN forces at Pusan presented a new problem for the controllers: destroy enemy equipment and supplies before they arrived at the stagnant front. Gen Douglas MacArthur’s successful invasion at Inchon and Eighth Army’s “breakout” at the Pusan perimeter represented additional challenges to FACs. The rapid offensive advance made identification of friendly and enemy forces more difficult, and FAC responsibilities were extended to a greater range. Lack of a defined “bomb-line” made close control of airpower more important. Intervention by the Red Chinese in November 1950 turned the conflict into a see-saw slugfest that eventually stagnated along the 38th parallel. The “trench warfare” in Korea between 1951 and 1953 presented other challenges to airpower as the battle lines became fixed and enemy men and equipment were entrenched. Interdiction became airpower’s primary mission as CAS became less effective. Forward air controllers were disbanded during the interwar years (1954–61) as each service competed for defense dollars during the cold war. Strategic weapons and nuclear war on a grand scale occupied Department of Defense thinking for nearly a decade. If the notion of close air support and FACs existed at all, it was a very low priority. The services competed for nuclear submarines, strategic ballistic missile systems, intercontinental bombers, and aircraft carriers. The concept of a conventional confrontation in Europe was approached as being only the beginning of what would become a global nuclear conflict. In this environment, funding for low-technology, light, observer-type aircraft was a low priority indeed. Preparing for “unconventional” war finally received attention under the Kennedy administration. Soviet “wars of national liberation,” announced by Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev in 1960, were recognized as the most probable type of conflict.