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1853-1856 Ottoman-Russian War and Egypt State EKEV AKADEMİ DERGİSİ Yıl: 16 Sayı: 51 (Bahar 2012) 45 1853-1856 OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR AND EGYPT STATE Besim ÖZCAN (*) Abstract Besides its importance for the Ottoman Empire, the 1853-1856 War was very important for England, France and Russia. England and France attended the war with the Ottoman Empire in order to stop Russia’s progress and ensure the continuity of their benefits in the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was in a bad situation in terms of its military and financial situation. Firstly a general aid campaign was organized and when it was understood that this campaign wasn’t enough, states were required to pay more to supply all the needs. Different from the other states, as Egypt had army and navy forces, helped the Ottoman Empire significantly before and during the war. Egyptian soldiers who were seriously wounded and martyrs were paid equal amounts of salaries and given help. It was especially important for the Empire to treat equally and satisfy all the needs of Egyptian soldiers and families of the martyrs. Keywords: the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Russia, help, army, navy. 1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi ve Mısır Eyaleti Özet 1853-1856 Harbi Osmanlı Devleti’nin yanısıra harbe katılan İngiltere, Fransa ve Rusya için de önemli neticeler ortaya koyan bir savaş olmuştur. İngiltere ve Fransa, Rusya’nın ilerleyişini durdurmak ve Osmanlı ülkesindeki menfaatlerinin devamını sağla- mak için Osmanlının yanında harbe katılmışlardır. Askeri gücüne ilaveten ekonomik ba- kımdan da zor durumda bulunan devlet, harp masraflarını karşılayabilmek için öncelikle ülke genelinde yardım kampanyası başlatmış, bu yeterli olmayınca da eyaletlerden ihti- yaçlarını temin yoluna başvurmuştur. Diğer eyaletlerden farklı olarak aynı zamanda kara ve deniz gücüne sahip bulunan Mısır, harb öncesinden başlayarak harp süresince hem askeri, hem de önemli miktarda maddi yardımda bulunmuştur. Savaşta şehid düşen veya çalışamayacak derecede ağır yaralanan Mısır askerlerine, Osmanlı askerleri için uygu- lanmakta olan ailelerine yardım etme ve maaş bağlama usulü aynen uygulanmış, böylece şehit aileleri ile yaralıların mağduriyete düşmelerinin önüne geçilmeye çalışılmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Devleti, Mısır, Rusya, yardım, ordu, donanma. *) Prof. Dr., Ataturk University Faculty of Letters Department of History. (e-posta: [email protected]) 46 / Prof. Dr. Besim ÖZCAN EKEV AKADEMİ DERGİSİ Introduction Egypt was an important centre of population since ancient ages and with its unique Nile River, attracted many societies’ attention living in different geographies (Görgün, 2004: XXIX, 555). The state was a field of struggle between many countries and nations until Ottoman authority in 1516 when Sultan Selim the Stern became the only ruler (Avcı, 2004: XXIX, 559-562). He defeated the Mamluks and conquered Syria in Marc Dabik War; besides, with Ridaniyye triumph the Ottoman Empire became the only ruler in Egypt continent through which it became influential in North Africa1. While Ottoman had the authority in the XVIth Century, Mamluk origin people had the most administrative functions in Egypt except the positions of governorship and Kadiship and the Ottoman Empire’s authority in Egypt started to decrease in XVII and XVIII centuries (Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid, 2004: XXIX, 556-557). Egypt, negatively affected from colonization competition between European countries, was occupied by Napoleon in 1798 who wanted to build French authority in the Mediterranean and take advantage of the economic conditions. The Ottoman Empire ended this invasion in 1801 after making some agreements with Russia and England (Karal, 1999: V, 27 et al.). In 1805 Mehmet Ali Pasha of Kavala was appointed as governor to Egypt which was still struggling with domestic disturbance. Pasha, trying to strengthen the authority with various reforms, fought and killed most Mamluk Emirs (a high title of nobility or office), built the sole power and authority in the region (Kutluoğlu, 2002: XXV, 63). After this, Pasha (a high ranking Turkish officer or governor) who wanted to conquer more lands started a rebellion against the central government in 1831 and continued his struggle for many years2. Although it was a domestic affair at the beginning, the rebellion became an international issue when European countries got involved. At the end, although the Ottoman Empire tried to make an agreement in London on 15 July 1840 under the guidance of England, Pasha didn’t accept the articles of the agreement. Upon this, the navies of the Ottoman Empire, England and Austria defeated Pasha and made him accept the agreement. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire published an Egyptian Governorship Edict of Concession on 13 February 1841 (Uçarol: 1985: 134- 135; Karal, 1999: V, 201-202). The government of Egypt was made hereditary in the family of M. Ali Pasha, and Egypt became a state under direct rule of the Ottoman Empire but with a special statute. M. Ali Pasha ruled the state until 1848 as the governor, his son İbrahim Pasha became the governor upon his illness (Kutluoğlu, 2002: XXV, 64). Asking for Military Assistance from Egypt State upon the Start of War Ottoman-Russian war –known as Crimean War- is one of the most significant war in the XIXth century. Although on the surface this war seems to result from disagreements between sects on the issue of possession of sacred maqams in Jerusalem, the real cause 1) For the Conquests in Egypt see: Uzunçarşılı, 1998: II, 283 et al.; Tansel, 1969: 165 et al. 2) For the details of M. Ali Pasha Revolt see: Altundağ, 1988: Part I). 1853-1856 OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR AND EGYPT STATE 47 of the war was the politic and economic superiority struggle of England-Russia in the Middle East (Tukin, 1949: 236 et al). They couldn’t come to an agreement as Russia’s ambassador Prince A. Sergeyeviç Mençikov acted against the rules and made requests that are contrary to the state’s freedom. Upon Mençikov’s return to the country, the states’ diplomatic connections were broken which created the possibility of a new war. Besides attending official meetings, the government, started preparations for war and planned to strengthen its army and navy military powers (Özcan, 1999: II, pp. 97-101). The state decided to ask for military help from Egypt State in order to increase its military power. Besides being a state of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had an army and navy in order to defend itself against any possible attacks from land or sea. Upon governor İbrahim Pasha’s death on 10 November 1848, Abbas Hilmi Pasha (BOA, Mısır-Mektûmî: Register Nr: 15, p. 17). was appointed to the position. An official message was written from the Vizierate Office in 1853. In this message, after Ottoman and Russian meetings were explained, battleships and army forces were required from the State with these words: “requested soldiers with their equipments shall be sent here with the ships of navy without a moment’s delay” (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 543). Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha wrote an official answer to the Vizierate Office on 10 June 1853, and stated that in case of a war with Russia, he would do anything possible for his religion, state and nation, and would send army and navy forces as much as possible. He promised that 12 ships will be prepared in 30-40 days, soldiers and equipments will get on these ships and will be sent in the first place. On the other hand, he mentioned that coasts under his administration should be protected from any possible attacks, so necessary precautions started to be taken and soldiers will be prepared (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 543, Appendix 2). Admiral Mahmud Pasha wrote an official message to the Vizierate Office on 21 July 1853; he stated that Abbas Hilmi Pasha prepared 6 regiments of foot soldiers four of which will be sent from Alexandria with two kapak (a kind of galleon) four frigates, two corvettes and one gölet (a kind of small ship) on the 10th or 12th of the month; the rest two regiments will be sent 15 or 20 days later with one kapak and two steamships (B0A, İrâde- Mısır: Nr. 546). Egyptian fleet under the control of Vice Admiral Hasan Pasha had nine battleships (B0A, İrâde- Mısır, Nr. 547). The ships departed from Egypt; the first group reached İstanbul on the 14th of August and reached Büyükdere where Turkish fleet was situated on 26 August (Ceride-i Havadis, 1269: Nr. 637). Egypt Fleet had 9 battleships: Crimea and Miftah-ı Cihad galleons, Reşid, Dimyad and Bahire frigates, Cihadpeyker corvette, Saika gölet, Cây-ı Ferâh brig, Nile and Pervâz-ı Bahrî steamships (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 23). 1 rear admiral, 5 district governors, 3 lieutenant commander, 22 Kol Aghasis (senior commanders), 60 lieutenants, 150 mülazims (assistant lieutenants), 122 voluntary soldiers, 4.885 soldiers and other crew members; namely 5.335 people in total existed on the Fleet from Egypt (Tezel, 1973: 632). 48 / Prof. Dr. Besim ÖZCAN EKEV AKADEMİ DERGİSİ In the work named Kırım Zafernâmesi –Hayrâbât, it is stated that the Governor of Egypt sent 17 battalions of soldiers under the command of Selim Pasha besides many ammunitions and ten thousand bags of silver coins (Hayri, 1988: 32). The Ottoman war power increased and strengthened with the navy and armies sent by Egyptian Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha. Egyptian and Ottoman Power Cooperation and Developments Totally 30.000 Egyptian soldiers sent from Egypt step by step under the command of Selim Pasha and they were placed into the tents in Beykoz. Commander-in-chief Mehmed Ali Pasha, Admiral Mahmud Pasha and Imperial marshal Mehmed Pasha inspected these forces and a part of them was sent to Şumnu overland. Afterwards, all forces moved to Rumelia (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 9). Arrival of Egyptian soldiers to İstanbul and sending them to the Rumelian side was told in a poem (Ahmed Rıza Trabzonî , 2000: 91-92).
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