Ottoman Sea Power………
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ’S FLEET (1861-1876) MEHMET ALİOĞLU SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ PHD THESIS ISTANBUL, JUNE 2020 Mehmet Alioğlu Doktora Tezi 2020 Student’s Full Name Ph.D. (or M.S. or M.A.) Thesis 2011 CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ’S FLEET (1861-1876) MEHMET ALİOĞLU SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ PHD THESIS Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Discipline Area of International Relations under the Program of International Relations. ISTANBUL, JUNE, 2020 I, MEHMET ALİOĞLU; Hereby declare that this PhD Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources. MEHMET ALİOĞLU __________________________ JUNE 2020 ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL This work entitled CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZIZ’S FLEET (1861-1876) prepared by MEHMET ALİOĞLU has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on ... ... 2020 and accepted by our jury as PHD THESIS. Prof. Dr., Serhat Güvenç (Advisor) Kadir Has University Prof. Dr., Mitat Çelikpala Kadir Has University Doç. Dr., Gün Kut Boğaziçi University Prof. Dr., Gencer Özcan Bilgi University Doç. Dr., Ahmet Salih Bıçakçı Kadir Has University I certify that the above signatures belong to the faculty members named above. SIGNATURE Prof. Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe Institute Director School of Graduate Studies DATE OF APPROVAL: …/…/…. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………….. i ÖZET………………………………………………………………………………. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………. v DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………...... vi 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………….. 1 1.1. The Purpose……………………………………………………………………2 1.2. The Scope………………………………………………………………………3 1.3. The Methodology………………………………………………………………3 1.4. Literature Review…………………………….……..…………………………4 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK…………………………………….. ……..8 2.1. Realism…………………………………………………………………………8 2.2. Problems with Realism………………………………………………………..14 2.3. Constructivism………………………………………………………………...16 2.4. Identity and Security………………………………………………………….19 2.5. What is Security?...............................................................................................20 2.6. The Choice of Theory…………………………………………………………20 3. AN EVALUATION OF OTTOMAN SEA POWER………...........................22 3.1. What Is Sea Power?.......................................................................................... 22 3.2. Was the Ottoman Empire a Sea power State?............................................... 28 3.2.1. Presence of a battlefleet……………………………………………………… 29 3.2.2. Presence of a merchant fleet…………………………………………………. 33 3.2.3. Population……………………………………………………………………. 34 3.2.4. Strategic needs of the state…………………………………………………... 35 3.2.5. Sea-mindedness of the state………………………………………………….. 35 3.3. A Historical Evaluation of Ottoman Naval Power………………….............37 3.3.1. 1494-1654 pre ship-of-the-line era…………………………………………... 37 3.3.2. 1655-1860 ship-of-the-line era………………………………………………. 41 3.3.3. 1861-1945 battleship era……………………………………………………... 44 4. OTTOMAN STRATEGIC NEEDS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY…………………………………………………………………….. 49 4.1. The Morea Revolt / The Greek War of Independence 1821-1832………... 49 4.2. The Rebellion of Mehmet Ali, 1833-1841…………………………………… 56 4.3. The Crimean War, 1853-1856……………………………………………….. 64 4.3.1. An evaluation of the Ottoman fighting capabilities in the Crimean War……. 69 4.3.2. The Paris Peace Congress……………………………………………………. 72 5. THE ERA OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ……………………………………... 75 5.1. The Naval Situation Before the Reign of Sultan Abdülaziz………………...75 5.2. Sultan Abdülaziz’s Fleet…………………………………………………….. 79 5.3. Financial Burden of a Modern Fleet…………………………………………84 5.4. Threats to The Ottoman Empire……………………………………………. 86 5.4.1. An Assessment of Ottoman Power …………………………………………...87 5.4.2. Russian Threat………………………………………………………………...88 5.4.3. Greek Threat………………………………………………………………......93 5.4.4. Egyptian Threat……………………………………………………………….95 5.4.5. The Question of British friendship…………………………………………... 96 5.5. Sultan Abdülaziz’s Fleet in Action……………………………………. …….97 5.5.1. The Cretan Rebellion………………………………………………………… 98 5.5.2. The War of 1877-1878……………………………………………………….. 98 6. GERMANY AND THE HIGH SEAS FLEET………………………………. 109 6.1. Germany’s Rising Power in The Nineteenth and The Twentieth………… Centuries………………………………………………………………………109 6.2. Ideology and Weltpolitik…………………………………………………….. 110 6.3. The Imperial Navy Until 1897………………………………………………. 111 6.4. The Tirpitz Plan and The Risk Theory……………………………………... 113 6.5. Unsustainability of the Risk Theory…………………………………………116 6.6. The Failure of the Risk Theory……………………………………………… 125 6.7. A Struggle for Recognition with Battleships……………………………….. 128 7. THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE OCEAN- GOING FLEET……………...............................................................................135 7.1. Russian Geopolitics And The Navy…………………………………………..135 7.2. Development of Doctrine And Naval Plans In The USSR………………….160 7.3. Stalin’s Big Ship Program…………………………………………………… 167 8. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………... 183 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………… 189 CURRICULUM VITAE………………………...………………………………... 203 LIST OF TABLES Figure 3.1. Ottoman warships......................................................................................32 Figure 3.2. British, French, Russian, and Spanish warships.....................................33 Figure 5.1. Ironclads of the European Powers on 30 May 1876................................80 Figure 6.1. British, French, German, and Russian battleships………………… ...112 Figure 7.1. British, American, and Soviet battleships……………………………..170 Figure 7.2. British, American, and Soviet navies total tonnages in 1937……...…171 ABSTRACT ALİOĞLU, MEHMET. CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDULAZIZ’S FLEET (1861-1876), PHD THESIS, Istanbul, 2020. In this study, the Ottoman Fleet during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz is taken as a case that stands out as a Nineteenth Century precursor to subsequent efforts by continental powers, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR, to build sub-optimal fleets in the Twentieth Century. Therefore, these two cases are added in order to answer the following question: why do continental powers establish or try to acquire naval power beyond levels needed for the physical security of the state? In the first chapter, the purpose, the scope, and the methodology are presented. In the second chapter, the theoretical framework of the study is established and why a Constructivist theoretical framework is preferred over a Realist one is explained. The third chapter is devoted to the study of Ottoman sea power from historical and theoretical perspectives. As a result, the Ottoman Empire is identified as a continental power. In the fourth chapter, the strategic needs of the Ottoman Empire are studied to identify physical threats to the state from a historical perspective. The fifth chapter covers the fleet of Sultan Abdülaziz and its evaluation against potential threats. The inquiry made shows that Sultan Abdülaziz’s Fleet was not commensurate with the threats it was supposed to counter. Therefore, it was an irrational arming decision. As a result, it is studied from a struggle for recognition perspective which fits in with the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. In the sixth and seventh chapters, the German and the Soviet naval expansions are evaluated against the threats these states faced. As a result, the German and Soviet fleets during the reigns of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Joseph Stalin are identified as inappropriate tools against the physical threats they were supposed to counter. They instead fit better in a struggle for recognition perspective. Then Ottoman, German, and Soviet naval expansions are comparatively evaluated to answer the question of why i continental powers establish or try to acquire naval power beyond levels needed for the physical security of the state. In this context this study concludes that all three states tried to acquire status through naval power. Hence, Constructivism offers a better explanation of continental states’ over-investments in naval power. Keywords: Constructivism, Status seeking, Ottoman Empire, Continental Power, Seapower State ii ÖZET ALİOĞLU, MEHMET. KARA DEVLETLERI VE STATÜ ARAYIŞI: ABDÜLAZİZ DONANMASINA AİT KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA (1861-1876), DOKTORA TEZİ, İstanbul, 2020. Bu çalışmada neden karasal devletler fiziksel güvenlik gereklerinin ötesinde bahriye kurmaya çalışırlar sorusu Sultan Abdülaziz Donanması örneği üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu çaba 20. yüzyılda Wilhelm Almanyası ile Stalin dönemi Sovyetler Birliği’nin giriştiği büyük donanma kurma çabalarının bir öncüsüdür. Dolayısıyla bu iki örnek karşılaştırma amacıyla teze dahil edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda 1. Bölümde tezin amaç, kapsam, ve yöntemi ayrıntılı olarak tanımlanmıştır. 2. Bölümde tezin kuramsal çerçevesi İnşaacı bir kuram tercih edilerek oluşturulmuş ve bunun gerekçeleri belirtilmiştir. 3. Bölümde Osmanlı deniz gücü tarihsel ve kuramsal bileşenler üzerinden incelenmiş ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin karasal bir devlet olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. 4. Bölümde Sultan Abdülaziz döneminde devletin karşı karşıya olduğu tehditler