NIE 10-55

Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

12 April 1955

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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEM To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot war con­ ditions in the Bloc. 1

INTRODUCTORY NOTE In estimating the resistance potential skill in doing so, the motivation, and the of a people in relation to their govern­ opportunities, vary from element to ele­ ment' it is necessary to know the nature, ment in the population, and from time to extent, and depth of their discontent, the time. strength of their will to resist, and their In this estimate, the following termi­ capability for resistance compared with nology is used to describe these types the will and capability of the regime to of action: maintain control. 1. Dissidence is a state of mind involving In a Communist-ruled country the best discontent or disaffection with the re­ known of these factors is the regime's in­ gime. tention to preserve internal security re­ gardless of cost; its capability of forestal­ 2. Resistance is dissidence translated into ling effective resistance; and its constant action. pressure to induce the individual to ad­ 3. Organized resistance is that which is just himself to the Communist environ­ carried out by a group of .individuals who ment. have accepted a common purpose, agreed·

Lacking any .legal a ven ues for express­ 1 This estimate covers resistance potential in en­ ing dissent, the population still can indi­ tire Sino-Soviet Bloc. More detailed coverage of individual Bloc countries is set forth in the cate its discontent through a variety of attached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria, Czech­ actions and inactions unfavorable to the oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Poland regime, ranging from individual actions and Communist China are considered in the to widespread opposition. These types of over-all estimate, but no annexes are included on these countries. For more detailed treat­ resistance are symptomatic of discontent, ment of these two countries see RIR-t, "Anti­ but do not necessarily reveal the extent, Communist Resistance Activities and Potential constancy, and specific causes of under,.. in Poland," dated 20 July 1954, and RIR-2, "Anti­ Communist Resistance Activities and Potential lying discontent. The will to resist, the in China," dated 2 November 1954.

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on leadership, and worked out a commu­ warfare, assistance in ~scape and evasion, nica tions system. open defiance of authority, or prepara­ 4. Unorganized resistance is that which is tory activity for any of the above. It may carried out by individuals or loosely asso­ or may not involve violence, and may be ciated groups which may have been conducted openly or clandestinely. formed spontaneously for certain limited 6. Passive resistance, organized or unor­ objectives, without over-all plan or strate­ ganized, is that which is conducted with­ gy. in the framework of the resister's normal 5. Active resistance, organized or unor­ life and duties, and involves deliberate ganized, is that which expresses itself in nonperformance or malperformance of positive acts against the regime. It may acts which would benefit the regime, or take such forms as intelligence collection, deliberate nonconformity with standards psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla of conduct established by the regime.

ESTIMATE

1. There is evidence of widespread dissi­ .still be operating in some Satellites, nota­ dence in all Communist Bloc countries. bly in Albania, but they are no more than While in general dissidence is greatest a local nuisance which probably will be among the peasantry, even the youth and wiped out sooner or later by the security industrial workers, two groups which forces. might be expected to be most favorable 4. Even though dissidence within the to Communist indoctrination, have be­ Sino-Soviet Bloc creates a resistance po­ come increasingly disaffected in the Euro­ tential, we believe that under continued pean Satellites and to a lesser extent in cold war conditions active resistance is the USSR. unlikely to develop. There may be a few 2. However, the intensity of dissidence isolated acts of unorganized resistance, varies considerably. It is probably least but the effectiveness of Communist se­ pronounced in the USSR, where Commu­ curity controls and police state methods nism has become more firmly established. will probably remain such as to make In the Far East Bloc areas, where Com­ active organized resistance virtually im­ munism is exploiting the new surge of na­ possible, except in a few almost inaccessi­ tionalism, dissidence almost certainly is ble areas.. Therefore, even in countries much less strong than in the East Euro­ where dissidence is strongest, such as East pean Satellites, where national interests Germany, we see no prospect of resistance are being subordinated to those of the activities developing on a scale sufficient USSR. to threaten the stability of the regimes. 3. Despite the existence of dissidence At a maximum such activities will tend throughout the Bloc, active organized re­ to delay the achievement of Communist sistance is practically nonexistent. A political and economic objectives. At a few isolated small guerrilla bands may minimum they will constitute a nuisance SECPil'i'- 3 to the regimes and will raise the morale nist military and security forces would al­ of anti-Communist elements. Increased most certainly remain sufficiently strong active resistance would be likely only if to prevent or check outbreaks. However, the Communist security apparatus were we estimate that major resistance move­ greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power ments in the Bloc, comparable to those of and prestige were greatly decreased. World War II, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control 5. On the other hand, a sUbstantial de­ until the local security organizations had gree of passive resistance is likely to con­ been seriously weakened and the USSR tinue. Such resistance is unlikely seri­ and Communist China were unable to ously to threaten the political stability of enforce order in their respective orbits. the Communist regimes. However, par­ Until such circumstances arose, activities ticularly in agriculture, it will probably of resistance elements would probably be remain a troublesome and even serious confined to intelligence collection and factor throughout the Bloc countries, im­ transmission, surreptitious antiregime peding the fulfillment of their political propaganda, aid to Western personnel in and economic programs. Nevertheless, escape and evasion operations, and de­ we believe that the persistent pressures fection inducements. exercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of even pas­ 7. In many countries of the non-Commu­ sive resistance and will almost certainly nist world there are organizations, com­ prevent the emergence of coordinated re­ posed of and led by persons who have sistance activities. emigrated from countries of the Soviet 6. In most of the USSR and to a lesser Bloc. In general these organizations extent in Communist China, the out­ have lost effective contact with their break of open warfare would stimulate homelands and do not significantly con­ patriotic feelings in support of the re­ tribute to resistance potential. Virtual­ gimes. Widespread destruction or pro­ ly all have suffered from internal bicker­ tracted hostilities, however, might lead ing and lack of funds and have been pen­ etrated by agents of Communist security to the emergence of resistance. In the forces. The people within the Bloc know newly acquired areas of the USSR, such very little about emigre organizations. as the Baltic States and the Western With rare exceptions they would almost Ukraine, hopes of liberation would be re­ kindled at the outset, intensifying the re­ certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation. sistance potential. In the European Sat­ ellites, the outbreak of war would not .8. In the event of war, the nationality only stimulate hopes for liberation but of invading forces probably would in gen­ would also increase popular unrest and eral have little bearing on the coopera­ passive resistance. We believe, however, tion offered by resistance elements in the that no active organized resistance would Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces occur, unless the Bloc suffered severe were clearly integrated in a broad anti­ military setbacks, and Western forces Communist military· organization. In approached Satellite territory. Commu- certain situations, however, long-stand-

SEQRE or- ...il;Q8ft"-!I 4 ing national antipathies might outweigh not substantially affect the will to resist anti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti­ the· regimes in the Bloc countries. 2 Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent • The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department use of: (a) German forces in Czechoslo­ of State, would substitute for this paragraph the following: vakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugo­ The question of responsibility for the initiation slav, Greek, and Turkish units in Bul­ of general war will not affect the will to resist in the European Satellites, whose populations are garia; (c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav so overwhelmingly against the existing regime as units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt. in North Korea and Communist China. It will probably have more significance in the USSR, where support for the regime by the war­ 9. The question of responsibility for the weary population would be decreased or in­ creased by popular judgments as to the aggres­ initiation of general war would probably sive or defensive character of the war.

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ANNEXES TO NIE 10-55

The following Annexes have been coordinated among the lAC Agencies:

Page Annex A: ALBANIA 6

Annex B: BULGARIA 9

Annex C: CZECHOSLOVAKIA 12

Annex D: EAST GERMANY. 15

Annex E: HUNGARY 18

Annex F: RUMANIA 21

Annex G: USSR . 24

Annex H: NORTH VIETNAM 28

Annex I: NORTH KOREA . 30

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ANNEX A: ALBANIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE has made Albania's few intellectuals pay perfunctory lip service to Communism but 1. The widespread popular dissidence in Al­ they remain strongly opposed to Soviet cul­ bania springs from political, social, cultural, ture. The regime, apparently unable to and religious as well as economic causes. The change this situation, has frequently charged ruthless efforts of the Communist regime to its teachers with still being "bourgeois," and destroy individual freedoms, patriarchal fami­ having a "low ideological level." The Com­ ly patterns, village autonomy, and religion are munist crusade against religion has further particularly resented. For many centuries, increased popular discontent not only be­ opposition to central authority has been an cause of interference in matters of belief but Albanian tradition. Local patriotism and also because religion is regarded as a part rugged individualism have combined to create of the national cultural heritage. Religious opposition to all authority, alien or native, groups (Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and Roman beyond the confines of the immediate tribes Catholic) which played a major part in the or villages. This trait is particularly pro­ country's cultural development have been nounced in the northern areas predominant­ brought under state control. ly inhabited by the Ghegs, mountain tribes who until World War I had little contact with 4. The present inadequate standard of living the modern world. The more accessible south­ is a further cause of dissidence. Although ern tribes, the Tosks, have been in closer touch living standards have always been low, the with new ideas and modern techniques, and difference between pre- and post- Communist the Tosk intellectuals were the first to become living conditions is great enough to evoke interested in Marxism. grumbling which is considerably enhanced by government economic measures such as 2. Moreover, the present Communist regime qu<;>tas and forced loans. is identified with the traditionally hated Slavs. Ever since the Slavs drove the Al­ MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS banians back into the mountainous edges of 5. Dissidence toward the regime appears the Adriatic, the Albanians have been anti­ strong among all classes. With the exception Slav. The massacre of Albanians by Serbs of the top governmental bureaucracy, the during the 1912 Balkan War aggravated this ranking officers in the army, the national and feeling. Thus Communism, particularly for local Party leaders, and the security forces, the Ghegs, has the handicap of its Slavic asso­ there is no group - even within the Party­ ciation, all the more so since the Albania Com­ which derives real benefits from the regime. munist Party was founded in 1941 by Yugo­ The suppression of elements considered in­ slav Communists who directed the movement corrigible and their internment in forced la­ until 1948 when Tito defected and Albanian bor camps has exacerbated the widespread iU­ Communist leader Hoxha cast his lost with feeling toward the government. After 10 the Cominform. years of Communist rule approximately 10 3. Another basic cause of dissidence is Com­ percent of the population is still in jails and munist interference with Albania's cultural labor camps. Annual amnesties have not de­ heritag'e. After Albania became independent creased the prison population which indicated in 1912, a number of French, English, and that new "enemies of the people" have re­ Italian schools were created, young Albanians placed those freed. were sent to Western univerSities, and West­ 6. The Peasantry. Albania is a country of ern cultural influence grew considerably. The peasants, who comprise the largest and most regime's attempt to enforce Soviet orientation formidable anti-Communist element, The

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principal reasons for peasant disaffection are ance leadership potential. Most of the Al­ crushing taxes, heavy obligatory delivery banian intelligentsia fought the rise of Com­ quotas for which the government pays low munism during the war. Balli Kombetar prices, seizure of livestock, imposition of "vol­ (National Front), the strongest anti-Commu­ untary" (forced) labor and forced state loans, nist nationalist organization during World collectivization pressures and pOlice terroriza­ War II, was founded by intellectual demo­ tion. Mainly because of peasant opposition, cratic elements. Many of the intelligentSia only 16 percent of the arable land has so far were exiled, executed, or jailed after the Com­ been collectivized. Poor and landless peas­ munists came to power. Of the intellectuals ants in the south and central areas initially remaining in Albania, only a few can be profited by the so-called agrarian reforms of trusted by the government. The clergy, par­ 1945-1956 but were quickly disillusioned. In­ ticularly the Roman CathOlics, also hate the dividualistic and proud of their past inde­ regime. While Moslem and Orthodox priests pendence, the peasants are indifferent to and appear to have been cowed, the regime can care less for Communist ideology. The in­ probably not rely on them. tense peasant antagonism against Communist policies largely accounts for lack of reliability INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE of the armed forces and industrial labor, both 10. There is evidence that Albanians have not of which groups are recruited chiefly from the lost the hope of eventual liberation, and iso­ peasantry. lated acts of overt resistance are still reported to occur. However, mounting police terror 7. youth. Albanian youth, both rural and and brutality ,have decreased active resistance urban, had joined the liberation movements during the past five years. On the whole, the against the Italian and German occupation, success of security forces in detecting and de­ and the Communists, camouflaging them­ stroying guerrillas has greatly weakened the selves in the National Liberation Front, suc­ small, scattered, and uncoordinated guerrilla ceeded for a period in attracting large num­ bands operating in mountain redoubts. Es­ bers of youth. However, by 1950 Communist cape to Yugoslavia and Greece and passive re­ propaganda had become ineffective because sistance have become the primary expressions of economic inequalities, "voluntary" labor, of opposition to the regime. Despite police imposition of a foreign ideology, and economic surveillance, there is passive resistance in in­ want. dustry and agriculture such as obstructing 8. Military. The rank and file of the Albanian the work of Soviet advisers, damaging ma­ Army cannot be considered loyal to the re­ chinery, producing goods of poor quality, hid­ gime. One indication is the fact that units ing produce, and failing to meet farm quotas. of the army have never been used to stamp out guerrilla activities. Fanatical Commu­ EMIGRE GROUPS nist security pOlice were used instead. Only 11. The situation in Albania differs from that the security police, some noncommissioned in other Satellites in that much of the resist­ Officers, and ranking army officers who rose ance activity that exists is directed by emigre to their present position during the wartime groups in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy. There partisan warfare or under the Communist are four principal Albanian emigre groups regime are considered reliable. These groups, in the West, the BK (Balli Kombetar), the and the network of informers placed in every Legality Movement (close to King Zog), a village, are the security backbone of the Al­ - group of nonparty individuals, and the Na­ banian regime, and have prevented anti-Com­ tional Independent Bloc, whose leaders col­ munist bands from overthrowing the Tirana laborated with Fascist Italy. The first three government by force. groups became affiliated in the National Com­ mittee for Free Albania (NCFA) in 1949. It 9. Intelligentsia and Clergy. Intellectuals gave the appearance of relative strength by and clergymen represent a considerable resist- combining most of the emigre groups and

~ SECPil'f'- 8 obtaining financial and moral support from plies. Thus, a gradual liquidation of these the West. This Western support is the strong­ activities is likely. However, a substantial de­ est unifying factor in the emigration. How­ gree of passive resistance will probably con­ ever, when in 1953 the National Independent tinue to manifest itself. Bloc and some other individuals were ac­ cepted in the NCFA, certain left-wing mem­ RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME bers of BK split off and formed the National CONDITIONS Democratic Committee for a Free Albania (NDCFA). 15. Because most Albanians are probably con­ vinced that only an East-West war could bring 12. There .have been some contacts between them liberation, the outbreak of general war resistance elements in Albania and the prin­ would almost certainly strengthen their re­ cipal NCFA affiliates. Most resistance groups, sistance potential. At the very least, it would particularly those reportedly operating in cen­ probably stiffen the hostility of the peasantry tral and southern Albania, appear to have toward the regime. Both peasants and work­ identified themselves with the NCFA. Al­ ers would probably try to sabotage the Com­ though there is still much pOlitical and per­ munist war effort when they could do so with­ sonal factionalism rending Albania emigre out undue risk to themselves. Furthermore, organizations, they appear to be in a relative­ the feasibility of at least covert help from Yu­ ly better shape and seem to have more con­ goslavia, Greece, and Italy, the geographic tact with their homeland than the emigres isolation of Albania from the Bloc, and the of the other Satellites. necessity for the regime to use all available 13. There is also a Yugoslav-sponsored League manpower to secure its frontiers from attack of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia, or infiltration would probably make it easier which has the advantage of being closer to in Albania than anywhere else in the Bloc Albania than other emigre elements. Its con­ for guerrillas to prepare organized resistance. tacts with certain resistance elements in Al­ It is likely that well led and equipped anti­ bania, through Yugoslav intelligence service regime Albanians could infiltrate the country cross-border operations, have probably been from Yugoslavia or Greece. closer and more numerous than those of the Western-oriented elements with the NCFA 16. Although large-scale uprisings probably emigres. At one time, arms, supplies, and would not occur immediately upon the out­ money reportedly were supplied to the un­ break of war, Albanian resistance elements, derground by this group. However, due to if supported from the outside, might be able Yugoslavia's normalization of relations with to organize some active resistance. However, the Bloc powers, the group's activities have the commencement of large-scale guerrilla reportedly been sharply curtailed. warfare would depend upon such develop­ ments as Western military successes, the weakening of the regime, the attitudes of Yu­ RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR goslavia and Greece, and the ability of the CONDITIONS West and the emigre groups to provide leader­ 14. The few isolated resistance bands in Al­ ship and aid. Unless the USSR were able to bania may continue for some time to occupy reinforce Albania with Soviet units soon after the attention of Communist security forces , the war broke out, a large-scale uprising could. and inflict sporadic damage in the fields of develOp, particularly in the northern and cen­ communication and transportation. How­ tral regions, before Western forces actually ever, the regime's security measures make vir­ reached Albanian territory. Such a develop­ tually impossible the organization of guerrilla ment would presuppose, however, that large warfare on a national, cohesive, and centrally numbers of Albanian conscripts escaped to directed scale. Any guerrilla forces would the mountains, even though many of their probably also be short of weapons and sup- officers remained loyal to the regime,

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ANNEX B: BULGARIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE and inadequate wages. So far, the "new course" and the return to Bulgarian control 1. Traditionally, through race, language, and of some Soviet-Bulgarian jOint companies culture the Bulgarians have been closely have had little effect on depressed living con­ linked with the Russians. Prior to the Soviet ditions. Industrial workers resent the ex­ occupation in September 1944, the majority tremely harsh labor laws which bind them of the population favored friendship with the to their jobs by penalty of imprisonment or USSR. But the conduct of the invading So­ confinement in a forced labor camp and per­ viet forces, the ruthless exploitation of Bul­ mit mandatory transfers. Significantly, these garian resources by the USSR, and the relent­ laws have been created to prevent "unjustifi­ less sovietization carried out by Communist able absenteeism, growing labor turnover, and puppets have quickly spread disillusionment deteriorating labor discipline." Drastic meas­ and resentment. Bulgarians have long been ures are also being taken to prevent growing used to political tyranny but the imposition industrial sabotage. of a system that made a mockery of their national sovereignty has alienated most Bul­ 4. The clergy has been subverted or intim­ garians. The regime's economic policies are idated with the help of the government-con­ regarded by most of the population as de­ trolled "Union of Orthodox Priests" and other signed to further Soviet interests rather than pro-Communist religious organizations. The those of Bulgaria. Extensive Soviet controls formerly independent Bulgarian Orthodox have made Bulgaria a virtual Soviet colony, Church, embracing nearly all Bulgarians, has but available evidence indicates that most been compelled to come under the Russian Bulgarians are chafing under their Commu­ Patriarchate. The leadership of the small nist regime and loathe Soviet domination. Catholic and Protestant communities has been virtually destroyed, and a large part of the MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS Moslem minority deported to Turkey. The re­ maining non-Communi~t clergy is strongly 2. The Peasantry. The peasantry, some 80 opposed to the regime and constitutes a con­ percent of the population, constitutes the siderable resistance potential. Regime meas­ strongest opposition element. In the past, ures to discourage religious practices have there were comparatively few landless peas­ also contributed to dissidence. ants; most peasants owned a small tract of land which they tilled with the help of a co­ 5. youth. There is some evidence that a con­ operative system. They are bitterly opposed siderable number of Bulgarian youth may be to collectivization. While the. regime has gradually losing whatever initial enthusiasm maintained the facade of Alexander Stam­ it had for Communism. The restrictions and bolisky's Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, discipline imposed upon it by the Party are Communist collectivization poliCies have nUll­ probably increasingly resented. The regime's ified this gesture. The regime's extremely irksome methods of indoctrination probably unpopular methods of implementing Commu­ have caused many young people to resist Com­ nist agricultural doctrine have aroused in­ munist teachings and to look for liberation tense dissatisfaction on the part of most peas­ to the West. Evidence suggests that a signi­ ants. ficant number of university students are op­ posed to the regime. However, youth has 3. Industrial workers, at one time the little outlet for expressing its resentment. staunchest suppoi'ters of Communism, have shown increasing dissatisfaction with work­ 6. Militm·y. The majority of the officer corps ing conditions, totalitarian labor discipline, is probably loyal to the regime. Most officers,

~ 10 since the purges of older elements, have ob­ t;MIGRE GROUPS tained their rank through Communist influ­ 9. The few Bulgarian emigre groups are bad­ ence and are not anxious to lose their privi­ ly split and plagued by personal rivalries leges, even if they do not agree with the re­ among the leaders. Until 1952, the Bulgarian gime's policies. The enlisted personnel are National Committee was regarded as the most recruited mainly from the peasantry, the influential but without the support of the strongest anti regime element, but the loyal­ National Committee for Free Europe, its in­ ty of the Bulgarian Army is probably some­ fluence has waned. The most widely known what higher than in the other Satellites. The emigre, former political leader G. M. Dimitrov, close ethnic relationship of Bulgaria with has been unable or unwilling to improve the Russia probably influences the attitude of the situation. Despite extravagant claims of cer­ Army. tam emigre leaders, there is no evidence that INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE emigre elements have in any way guided or 7. Although dissidence is strong in almost assisted organized or unorganized resistance every segment of Bulgarian society, few Bul­ within Bulgaria. Although present evidence garians have dared to defy the regime open­ indicates that Bulgarians still remember Di­ ly. The regime has been able to suppress mitrov, it is difficult to determine how wide­ active resistance and little opportunity for spread his following may be. it exists. At present there is no evidence of organized resistance; acts of open resistance RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR are few and reports describing them are CONDITIONS often uncomfirmed. There have been two ma­ jor purges of anti-Soviet elements: one broke 10. In view of the regime's effective security. up anti-Communist opposition between 1944 controls, close Soviet supervision, and the and 1947; the other, an internal party affair, absorption of Bulgaria into the Soviet security took place after Tito's 1948 break with the sphere, there is little likelihood that organized Cominform and resulted in removal of those resistance can develop under cold war con­ Bulgarian Communists who favored greater ditions. Isolated instances of unorganized ac­ independence of the USSR. tive resistance will probably continue to occur, but without tangible outside help or a weak­ 8. On the other hand, some degree of passive ening of the Communist apparatus, they will resistance against the regime has continued probably diminish. The average Bulgarian is in spite of the purges. Instances such as subtle economic sabotage by peasants and too engrossed in the daily struggle of living workers have occurred frequently, although and too cowed by the police state to have time they are, qualitatively and quantitatively, less and energy left for resistance activities. At than in most of the other Satellites. Peas­ best, active resistance will be restricted to ants hide livestock and grain, secretly slaugh­ an tiregime propaganda, some intelligence ac­ ter livestock, disregard sowing and plow­ tivity, and performing isolated acts of subtle ing regulations, avoid planting maximum sabotage, not necessarily recognizable as such. amounts of grain, and fail to make use of the Cautious passive resistance will probably con­ machine tractor stations. Office and factory tinue to be the only real outlet for disaffec­ workers neglect maintenance of machinery, tion. Since agriculture is the main-stay of refuse to attend conferences and meetings, the Bulgarian economy, peasant dissidence interpret government regulations with a will continue to create major problems for strictness designed to show their absurdity,· malinger, and practice absenteeism. Bulgar­ the regime. However, if the "new course" ians who have the opportunity listen to West­ is continued and produces tangible results, or ern broadcasts which the government is try­ if the Bulgarians come to feel there is little ing to jam. A few Bulgars continue to escape hope for their liberation, passive resistance across the frontiers or defect abroad. and dissidence may decrease.

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RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME guiding, coordinating and supplying Bulgar­ ian resistance groups, outbreak of some guer­ CONDITIONS rilla fighting would be likely. Escape and eva­ 11. Upon outbreak of an East-West war, the sion operations for Western personnel could resistance potential in Bulgaria would almost begin to function. The Rhodope and Balkan certainly increase. However, active resistance mountains provide ideal terrain for guerrilla probably would be severely inhibited by the bases. However, participation in such activi­ presence of Soviet forces, which could be ex­ ties probably would not assume the character pected to move into Bulgaria and establish of a mass movement.. Although Bulgarian bases for operations in the Near East and the history has been characterized by individual Mediterranean area. Emergence of large­ acts of violence, 500 years of Turkish rule did scale resistance could not be expected until not produce great rebellions. A Bulgarian the Communists had suffered major military popular uprising against the Communist re­ defeats, transport and communications facili­ gime almost certainly would not materialize ties were disrupted, and above all, until West­ unless the Soviet rule had broken down, West­ ern invasion were imminent. ern victory appeared assured, and clear-cut 12. In the event of such an invasion, especial­ Western policy statements appealing to Bul­ ly if prior contacts had been established for garians had been announced.

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ANNEX C: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE inated against in education and restricted in the choice of career. Most dissatisfied are 1. Even though the old Czechoslovak Republic those who were denied advanced schooling had a more vigorous democratic tradition than on political grounds and sent into unpopular any other Eastern European country and was 'industries such as mining. The greatest pro­ strongly oriented toward the West, Commu-· portion of Czechs escaping into Germany and nist strength was greater in Czechoslovakia Austria consists of persons under 24 years of than in the other present Satellites. In the age. last free elections in 1946, Communist candi­ dates got 38 percent of the votes (43 percent 4. The peasantry, well aware of the regime's in Bohemia-Moravia and 30 percent in Slo­ designs for eventual collectivization, are not vakia). Since the 1948 coup, however, the deceived by the temporary reduction of pres­ Communist regime's drastic reshaping of sures under the "new course." Hostile toward Czech political and economic life has alienated the government and Party, they complain many one-time sympathizers and even many about high delivery quotas and low prices, Party members. Communist police state lack of consumer goods, harassment by local methods, the discrimination against non­ Party officials, and unfair government distri­ Party members, and the subordination of bution of farm maChinery and fertilizer. Czech interests to those of the USSR stand 5. Minorities. Communist attempts to elim­ in sharp contrast to life under the first Re­ inate the thorny minority problem in Czecho­ public. Czechoslovakia's new submission to slovakia have so far failed. The Slovaks in foreign domination after its long struggle for particular appear dissatisfied with Prague's independence is deeply resented on cultural growing domination of local administration. as well as political grounds. In addition, dis­ They tend to place the blame for this, and the affection is created by Soviet economic exploi­ 1948 coup, on the greater popular support tation and internal mismanagement which given the Communist Party in Bohemia-Mo­ have sharply lowered living standards. Food ravia during the 1946-1948 period. They also is scarce, agricultural production is lagging, recall past Czech incursions into Slovak and housing is inadequate. Consumer goods affairs. The Communist Party continues to are often either unavailable or poorly made have less influence in Slovakia than in Bo­ 'and expensive. The "new course" has to date hemia-Moravia and the Slovak potential for done little to ameliorate this situation. active resistance is probably higher. Where­ as the German wartime occupation provoked MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS mainly passive resistance in Bohemia-Mora­ 2. Industrial workers, many of whom voted via and only a few isolated acts of defiance Communist in 1946 and helped the regime occurred, the Slovak active resistance tradi­ in the 1948 coup, are now one of the most tion was demonstrated in the uprising at disaffected groups in Czechoslovakia. They Banska Bystrica in 1944. complain about too long work hours, unpaid overtime, "voluntary" Sunday shifts, and too 6. The clergy, chiefly Roman Catholic, has many deductions from the paycheck. They been decimated by the regime. Many higher dislike the severe labor discipline and the members of the hierarchy have been arrested favoritism toward Party members. and replaced by priests willing to collaborate with the Communists. The lower clergy is 3. youth is restless, disillusioned, and regi­ under close surveillance and obliged to sub­ mented by government youth organizations. mit sermons for censorShip. The Church has Children of non-Party members are discrim- .been denied the right to educate. Known be-

~ SECBF'J!- 13 lievers are harassed and are deprived of handled locally, and there is no hope that any chances for improvement of their position. uprising would receive Western help. The The regime has more recently taken steps only open demonstration of Czech disaffec­ designed to give the impression that it is not tion occurred in the abortive Pilsen riots of undermining the Church, though in fact such June 1953, followinK the currency reform. steps are bringing it more under state control. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks have been sullen These measures have greatly lessened the and apathetic, passively expressing their dis­ clergy's resistance potential. satisfaction with the regime through a high percentage of absenteeism (sometimes up to 7. The middle class, especially the professional 20 percent of the entire labor force), shoddy and managerial groups, either has been dis­ workmanship, high labor turnover, opposi­ possessed outright and placed under surveil­ tion to farm collectivization and crop delivery lance, or works under supervision of Party quotas, higher attendance at Church services, members whose professional background is refusal to accept Eastern cultural orientation, almost invariably inferior. In spite of recent etc. attempts of the regime to enlist their coopera­ tion, the vast majority of these groups are thoroughly disaffected; they have lost their EMIGRE GROUPS social and financial status, are limited in their 10. There are numerous and voluble emigre choice of jobs and use of talents, and live in groups with headquarters in the US, Canada, constant fear of being blamed for any failure and Europe, but the,re is virtually no evidence of the regime. that any of them play an active role in Czech­ oslovakia resistance. The most important is 8. Military. Since many officers have a stake the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, consist­ in the continuation of the regime, and there ing of Czechs and Slovaks and perhaps repre­ were thorough purges of pro-Western officers senting the nearest approximation to the in 1948, the over-all reliability of the officer Masaryk-Benes tradition. The Czech Nation­ corps has probably increased. However, there al Council and the Slovak National Council is evidence that its loyalty to the regime leaves Abroad are separatist organizations of minor much to be desired. Unreliability is even more importance. The extreme-rightist Slovak Lib­ pronounced among the rank-and-file who re­ eration Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcan­ portedly resent the harsh diSCipline, close So­ sky, who maintains contact with extreme­ viet supervision, lack of leave, and constant rightist Germans, probably has little influ­ indoctrination. As a conscript force, the ence in Slovakia. Representatives of the old army reflects the low morale of the general political parties, and of a Czech labor group population. The air force is probably one of and a Sudeten-German group, also live the least reliable in the Satellites. There have abroad, but they have little personal follow­ been several defections from the military ing among the emigres fn the West and prob­ services to the West in the past few years. ably less in Czechoslovakia itself, although the INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE number of party followers is probably still large. 9. Although dissidence seems to be somewhat more pronounced in Slovakia than in Bohe­ 11. It is possible that some contacts between mia-Moravia, there is little evidence of active these organizations and their home country resistance in either area. Communist pOlice were maintained between 1948 and 1951, but controls are so pervasive that people are there have almost certainly been no contacts afraid to voice their criticism of the regime, of significance since. According to defector let alone engage in open resistance. More­ reports, internal Czechoslovak interest in over, there is a conviction that Soviet troops, emigre groups is feeble and does not indicate while not at present stationed in Czechoslo­ a deSire to entrust future leadership to any vakia, would come to the help of the regime of the emigre leaders. Therefore, it is un­ to put down any revolt that could not be likely that emigres are in a position to direct

~ ~ 14 resistance activities nor is there evidence that cess of such efforts would greatly depend upon anyone of the factions would be acceptable the ability of the West to establish contacts for government leadership in a liberated and furnish arms. Czechoslovakia. 14. If Western forces approached the Czech borders and the effectiveness of the security RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR organization weakened, restlessness and in­ CONDITIONS subordination would probably increase sharp­ 12. There is considerable resistance potential ly. More intelligence for the West would be in Czechoslovakia, particularly among indus­ forthcoming, more escape and evasion opera­ trial workers, and there might be an occasion­ tions on behalf of Western personnel would al recurrence of isolated riots like that of be undertaken, and intensified anti-Commu­ June 1953. However, active cold war resist­ nist propaganda could be expected. An im­ ance is highly unlikely to emerge on any sig­ pending Western invasion of Czechoslovakia nificant scale so long as there are stringent would probably demoralize indigenous securi­ police and party controls. On the other hand, ty forces to such an extent that Soviet troops passive resistance will probably continue in would largely have to take over. At such a the form of absenteeism, isolated acts of sub­ time, parts of the Czechoslovak Army and tle industrial and agricultural sabotage, dis­ pOlice would probably defect in growing num­ seminating the contents of Western broad­ bers. Some of them probably would try to casts, and escapes and defections to the West. establish an anti-Communist record by par­ ticipating in organized resistance. At this RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME point, the anti-Communist intelligentSia, CONDITIONS freed pOlitical prisoners and displaced persons 13. The intensification of regime security might contribute substantially to organizing measures upon the outbreak of general war resistance. in Europe, and the active partiCipation of So­ viet forces, would make immediate organiza­ 15. However, full-scale guerrilla war in Slo­ tion of large-scale resistance all but impossi­ vakia and open organized resistance in Bohe­ ble. Even unorganized passive resistance mia-Moravia still could not be expected be­ would probably become more dangerous. How­ fore a virtual breakdown of Communist con­ ever, if the West appeared to be winning, an trols. Moreover, there might be, at least for increase in passive resistance and unorgani­ some time, conflict between anti-Communist zed attempts at sabotage could be expected. and pro-Communist guerrillas, diminishing Resistance in the Czech lands would probably the effect of resistance and confusing escape be mostly passive, but in Slovakia more active and evasion operations. Some antiregime resistance might develop. For example, small resistance elements might also insist on tak­ anti-Communist guerrilla bands might be able ing ferocious revenge for their sufferings at to operate successfully in the more remote the expense of assisting the West in combat­ and inaccessible areas of Slovakia. The suc- ing Communist troops.

~ 15

ANNEX D: EAST GERMANY

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE been insufficient to reduce popular disaffec­ tion. Although the GDR's antireligious cam­ 1. The widespread popular disaffectio~ in East paign has not been as violent as those of other Germany is intensified by the fact that un­ Satellites, it also contributes to popular dis­ like the other Satellites, the "German Demo­ satisfaction. Finally, the regime's attempts cratic Republic" (GDR) 1 is not cut off from to orient East German culture eastward are contact with the West. The special condi­ much resented. The East Germans consider tions of the occupation have made impossible themselves culturally as belonging to the the complete separation of the GDR from West, and believe their culture to be superior West Germany, and both the GDR and the to that of the East. Communist attempts to Federal Republic have encouraged contacts change this outlook have contributed to re­ between the two areas. Such contacts exist sentment against the regime. on an extensive scale. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany by com­ 4. Disaffection in East Germany is very great, mon bonds of national identity and by the not only among the disaffected groups listed hope that eventual unification will mean lib­ below but also among many rank-and-file eration. members of the Party and its mass organiza­ 2. Most East Germans do riot feel that they tions, the government bureaucracy, white col­ are living. in a separate country and do not lar workers, and the "technical intelligent­ look upon the GDR as permanent. Rather, sia." During 1953, 340,000 East Germans fled they see it as a temporary administrative de­ to West Germany; during 1954, the number vice, imposed upon them by Communist pup­ of refugees decreased to 200,000. It has been pets backed by Soviet guns. The abortive up­ estimated that not more than 10 percent of risings of 17 June 1953 proved to the East the population actually support the regime, Germans as well as to the Soviets that with­ and it is almost certain that such support is out the backing of the Soviet Army, the GDR confined to people who have a personal stake regime could not remain in power. Moreover, in the regime's continuation. Very few are the Soviet occupation in East Germany can­ motivated by ideological conviction. not be disguised. Consequently, Communism is now identified with Soviet rule and dis­ MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS credited accordingly. The leaders of the Com­ 5. Industrial Workers. In contrast to the munist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and the other Satellites, where the peasantry is the government are generally hated and detested. chief dissident element, disaffection and re­ Police state measures to keep the people in sistance in the GDR are greatest in the in­ line exacerbate these sentiments. dustrial centers. About one-third of the esti­ 3. Economic hardships are another major mated 6.5 million wage and salary earners cause of antiregime sentiment. Except for in the GDR are industrial workers. Seventy the Party hierarchy, government, and the in­ percent of these are employed in the nation a­ telligentsia, nearly every East German has ized industries. There is evidence that many been adversely affected by the practices of the workers, probably a majority, are dissatisfied regime. While the introduction of the "new with the regime. Most East German workers course" in mid-1953 and some Soviet repara­ have been traditionally social-democratic and tions concessions had somewhat improved strongly trade union minded. German social­ living conditions, these improvements have democracy has always been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and, therefore, was

1 For the purposes of this estimate, the GDR is the target of intensive Bolshevik hostility. assumed to include East Berlin. Since the tradition of free trade unionism is

SECREt! - ~ 16 so strong, the fact that under the GDR the ants in mid-1953 did not alter their attitude. unions have become instruments of govern­ The adverse effect of the regime's antireligious ment control has greatly contributed to the campaign on a large p~rt of the population disaffection of the workers. Furthermore, and the support received by the churches in the workers are disgruntled with low wages, East Germany from the West Germans have substandard living conditions, insufficient forced the regime to apply a milder type of food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever­ persecution than practiced by other Satellite present offensive propaganda, forced attend­ governments. The resistance potential of ance at pOlitical rallies, imposition of Soviet the clergy is conSiderable, though it is not labor methods, and a constant drive for more at the point of open active resistance at this production without adequate rewards. time. 6. The Peasantry. There are still some 600,- 9. Military. Many officers of the 100,000 men 000 independent peasants in East Germany KVP (Garrisoned People's Police) and the who cultivate about two-thirds of the arable small naval and air contingents probably re­ land. Even though many of them benefited sent Soviet controls. They enjoy preferential from the postwar land reform, the overwhelm­ treatment but as a group, their basic loyalty ing majority are opposed to the regime, large­ to the regime is questionable. It is uncertain ly as a result of the collectivization program whether the GDR regime could rely on them begun in mid-1952. Special privileges were in time of war, especially if the Communists extended to members of the so-called "co­ suffered reverses, but there is probably less operatives," to the detriment of independent resentment in this group than in any other farmers. Since mid-1952, about one-seventh in the GDR, and their resistance potential is of the arable land has been abandoned by its likely to be limited. The morale of enlisted owners. The "new course" improved condi­ men is low. The general popular disaffection tions somewhat and the regime, in view of is shared by most soldiers, many of whom poor agricultural production, slowed down its have been pressured into service against their collectivization program. However, peasant will. In spite of some improvement of their disaffection is still strong. Moreover, there living conditions during 1954, most of them are indications that the collectivization pro­ are probably not loyal to the regime and gram is being resumed. would side with the West if given opportunity. 7. Businessmen. Private industry still ac­ 10. youth Groups. The regime has made counts for 15 percent of total industrial pro­ strenuous efforts to control and indoctrinate duction; private wholesale and retail trade youth. There are indications of support for account for about 6 and 31 percent respective­ the regime by some young people, but many ly of trade turnover. Although this group have become indifferent or disillusioned. The received some relief as a result of the "new influence of parents, older workers, and non­ course," they probably realize that this is only Communist teachers, and the nearness of the a temporary reprieve and that their group West still militate against success of the Com­ will eventually be liquidated. The outlook munist youth program. In most cases, the of this group is of necessity antiregime, but attitude of East German youth is one of op­ many of its elements continue to be conserva­ portunism. Although the majority of East tive and cautious, inclined only to passive re­ German youth almost certainly is not yet sistance, if any, and that only provided they loyal to the Communist regime, it has made see no risk. little or no efforts to resist the regime. A 8. The Clergy. The Protestant and Catholic relatively small group of more mature young clergy has been outspoken in assailing Com­ people may eventually constitute a resistance munist atheism and combat particularly the potential but just as many will probably be­ regime's effort to indoctrinate youth. Con­ come Communist enthusiasts unless their cessions made by the regime to the Protest- chances for better living improve greatly. SBCREI- 17

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE rule, strengthened GDR pOlice controls, and Soviet help if necessary, will probably forestall 11. Despite the great extent of disaffection any attempt at open resistance. So long as the in the GDR, with the single exception of the USSR maintains sizeable forces in East Ger­ 17 June 1953 uprisings it expressed itself only many, resistance will almost certainly remain in defection, transmission of intelligence, pas­ limited to intelligence collection, antiregime sive resistance (without risk involved), anti­ propaganda dissemination, and defection. regime propaganda activities, and apathy. The East Germans realize that the steadily Although unrest was growing before June improving infiltration methods of the regime's 1953, the intervention of the Soviet Army in security organs render attempts at organiza­ the June uprisings, the lack of expected help tion in GDR territory extremely dangerous. from the West, and lack of progress toward re­ They probably also realize (after June 1953) unification weakened East German hopes for that under present conditions tangible West­ an early liberation and led to a more passive ern help for large-scale resistance will not be attitude. The failure of the 17 June upris­ forthcoming during the cold war period. ings resulted in the arrest or flight to the West of many actual or potential resistance leaders. and made it clear to those who remained that RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME a successful uprising against the regime is CONDITIONS impossible so long as the Soviet Army controls 14. The outbreak of a general war probably East Germany. Some improvement in living would not lead to organized resistance at once, conditions and such political concessions as although (depending upon the location of more freedom of travel between East and West battle fronts and the fortunes of war) there Germany, as well as East German reluctance would probably be an increase in isolated acts to take risks against overwhelming odds, have of sabotage and violence. But so long as So­ contrived to keep resistance predominantly viet power remained unimpaired, savage re­ passive. taliation for any act of resistance, coupled 12. However, the feasibility of access to the with a limited number of areas offering con­ GDR from West Berlin and West Germany cealment, would make organized resistance has facilitated the organization of some resist­ virtually impossible. Active resistance on an ance groups operating from these areas. extensive scale would almost certainly not be These g-roups encourage cautious covert re­ initiated until Communist controls appeared sistance activities; their main objects are to be weakening or breaking down as a result antiregime propaganda, keeping files of per­ of Soviet defeats and the proximity of West­ sons in Communist prisons and aSSisting ern forces. families of the prisoners, keeping track of 15. If East Germany became a combat area, crimes committed by the Communists, keep­ many of those East German forces which ing alive the spirit of resistance, and gather­ could do so would probably seek to join the ing as much information as possible. They West in fighting the Bloc. Furthermore, if discourage, however, overt active resistance military operations were in progress within which stands little chance of escaping harsh the GDR, organized resistance groups almost retaliation. certainly would supply information, disrupt Soviet communications, sabotage war ma­ RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR terial, and assist Western soldiers in escape CONDITIONS and evasion on a scale measured by Western 13. While rearmament of West Germany successes. On the other hand, Western de­ would almost certainly raise East German feats would immediately lead to a reduction hopes for eventual liberation from Communist in East German resistance activities.

~ " ~ 18

ANNEX E: HUNGARY

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE poor working conditions, the perversion of labor unions into instruments of the regime, 1. Dissidence, which is very widespread in the constant pressure for more production Hungary, has its roots in economic discontent, without adequate incentives, harsh labor dis­ deeply entrenched nationalism, traditional cipline, and the regime's poor showing in western orientations, historical and psycho­ labor protection and welfare have made the logical antagonism toward Slavs, and strong proletariat. a potential resistance element Roman Catholic religious heritage (two-thirds rather than the "spearhead of revolution." of the Hungarians are Catholic). Dissidence i is aggravated by recollection of the 1919 Bela 4. youth. One of the most conspicuous fail­ Kun Communist regime which included Ra­ ures of the regime has been its inability to kosi, Gero, and other current leaders, by dis­ secure the firm support of youth. By its own like of Communism on the part of all age admission, the principal youth movement groups, and by antagonism toward neighbor­ (DISZ) is plagued by a general apathy to- . ing Satellites which have acquired former ward Party work, which retards the recruiting Hungarian territories. The inadequate stand­ of future intellectual cadres for Communism. ard of living is probably the most important Open criticism of this organization has been cause of dissidence. Work norms are high, rising steadily since 1952, and the "new wages are low, housing' is poor, and food is course" has so far failed to meet this situation. scarce. The people resent regimentation, The majority of students in high and techni­ compulsory political activities, and the lack cal schools and universities remain negative or of leisure time. They also resent the oppres­ indifferent toward Communism. sive police state system which is maintained by the state security apparatus, by the civil 5. Military. Considerable resistance potential pOlice, and by the presence of two Soviet di­ is believed to exist within the Hungarian visions. Apathy and cynicism are wide­ armed forces. Their loyalty is generally ques­ spread. tionable, except for higher officers who have the greatest stake in the regime. The Air MAJOR DISSIDENT ElEMENTS Force is believed to be predominantly loyal. 2. The peasantry, with the exception of a rel­ However, since the majority of young army atively small number of collective farm mem­ officers are recruited from rural areas, they bers who were formerly landless, represents almost certainly share those antiregime atti­ the largest single focus of opposition to the tudes which make the peasantry the greatest Communist regime. The concessions intro­ focus of dissidence. The rank-and-file of the duced by the so-called "new course" in 1953 army, who have none of the officers' privileges, have done little to alleviate peasant com­ have even less reason for allegiance. Soviet plaints. In spite of the financial and social control of the Hungarian Army contributes to hardships connected with such action, about animosity and disaffection as does forcible one-half of the approximately 515,000 peas­ alliance with neighboring Satellites who are ants in collectives took advantage of the re­ ancient enemies. This resistance potential gime's offer to withdraw if they so desired. of the armed forces, however, cannot be real­ Moreover, the continuation of the "new ized unless a marked deterioration of the re­ course" is uncertain. gime's control system takes place. 3. The majority of industrial workers, some 6. The clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, of whom were among the few original sup­ no longer show open defiance of the regime. porters of Communism, now constitute a ma­ They do, however, exercise considerable influ­ jor dissident element. A low living standard, ence among the people and, despite their lack

SECRET.- 19. of aggressive leadership, maintain some covert which they have gathered has proved of and sporadic opposition. The clergy are dubious value. Moreover, the political dis­ cautious and adroit in the use of the "be­ unity and the controversial background of tween-the-lines" technique in sermons and Ill;any of their leaders has almost certainly statements. The government-sponsored Na­ discredited these emigre groups in the eyes tional Peace Committee of Catholic Priests has of resisters inside Hungary. Besides the above repeatedly admitted failure in propagandizing mentioned emigre groups, there also exists Communism. But while the clergy's resist­ a numerically small but well-organized group ance potential, especially in the provinces, of extreme rightists under General Arpad remains strong at present, it is bound to de­ Henney, consisting of fanatical Nazi-type ac­ crease as more and more clergy are replaced tivists, most of whom were members or sup­ by Communist supporters. porters of the so-called Arrow Cross Party during World War II. This group will not INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE cooperate with Western powers unless its 7. Hungary's recent history, including World conditions are met; its political ideology, War II, abounds with resistance incidents, somewhat camouflaged, runs so counter to but no broad resistance movement emerged Western concepts as to make its successful and no local groups achieved lasting success. integration into a general resistance move­ During the German occupation, sporadic acts ment unlikely. There is some evidence that of sabotage were committed against the Axis Yugoslavia has had limited success with clan­ powers. The much more effective Soviet con­ destine operations to propagate Titoism in trol system has restricted Hungarian resist­ Hungary. ance to passive, unorganized manifestations. Other factors, such as physically and psycho­ RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR logically exhausting work norms, material CONDITIONS want, and compulsory pOlitical activities have 10. Effective internal security control and lack further discouraged active resistance. of know-how will continue to limit the devel­ 8. However, passive resistance in Hungary opment of organized resistance, active or pas­ appears to have been more widespread and sive. Cold war activities, at best, will probably effective than elsewhere in the Satellites. Al­ remain restricted to information collection, though existing controls preclude open up­ clandestine antiregime propaganda, isolated risings, intensified passive resistance by in­ acts of sabotage, and unorganized passive re­ dustrial and agricultural workers is impeding sistance. Poor terrain impedes the formation the regime's efforts to build a strong and of nuclei for future guerrilla operations; the viable economy. development of contacts for escape and eva­ sion would be difficult, even on a local level. EMIGRE GROUPS Further factors militating against an active 9. There are three main Hungarian emigre resistance build-up are: the vigilance of the organizations: the Hungarian National Coun­ police, the presence of Soviet troops, lack of cil in New York, General Andras Zako's experienced reSistance leaders, lack of con­ League of Hungarian Veterans with head­ tact with Western agencies that could guide quarters in Innsbruck, and the Hungarian and help them, and the absence of a well­ Liberation Movement, led by General Ferenc developed security consciousness. However, Kisbarnaki-Farkas, with headquarters in Hungarian capabilities for unorganized pas­ Munich. The leadership of the latter two sive resistance, especially in industry and groups was merged in 1954. Although it is agriculture, will remain substantial. possible that these emigre groups have been RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME in touch with elements of unknown reliability inside Hungary, it is unlikely that they have, CONDITIONS as sometimes claimed, organized any signifi­ 11. Under conditions of open warfare, Com­ cant resistance movements. Information munist security measures would almost cer-

~ SECRET_ 20 tainly be so greatly increased that no signifi­ and security apparatus, resistance activities cant resistance could be expected until West­ would almost certainly sharply increase. ern forces had won major victories in Europe. Their scope and effectiveness would depend In the event of such victories, passive resist­ upon the extent of Western aid, the ability to ance probably would increase sharply, and establish communications, and the degree of clandestine organization of large-scale resist­ weakness in the state security controls. Assist­ ance would be attempted, possibly with the ance to Western forces probably would take help of disaffected military or police elements. the form of organized support of escape and There would probably also be increased pop­ evasion operations, information collection, ular willingness to assist in escape and eva­ psycholog'ical warfare, sabotage and, pOSSibly, sion, and defections would become more num­ limited guerrilla warfare. The most likely erous. However, premature guerrilla war­ sources of defection under such circumstances fare and sabotage would be likely to provoke would be: (a) army enlisted personnel; (b) reprisals of a nature which would retard, if the mass of political prisoners; (c) the un­ not cripple, the development of effective re­ reconciled intelligentsia; (d) peasants and in­ sistance. If Western military success brought dustrial workers in areas near the Western about a deterioration of the Hungarian state forces; and (e) youth. ~ 21

ANNEX F: RUMANIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE 3. Industrial workers are worse off than the peasants, who at least are able to dodge 1. After the USSR occupied Rumania at the forced deliveries and to acquire on the black end of World War II, it quickly proceeded to market what is needed for their personal con­ re-annex Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, sumption. The urban and industrial popula­ liquidate the" non-Communist government, tion suffers from a depressed living standard, drive the King out of the country, and dele­ poor housing, food shortages, and other pri­ gate power to a puppet regime under absolute vations. Workers cannot obtain necessary Soviet control. As a result the vast majority consumer goods; they are forbidden to leave of Rumanians, deprived of their Western con­ their jobs and are subject to constant political tacts and of self-determination, have come to indoctrination and police surveillance. Those feel that their country is virtually a Soviet who supported the regime at the beginning COlony. They have almost certainly identified' of the Communist rule are becoming dis­ Communism with their traditional fear of illUSioned, and a considerable passive resist­ Russia. Moreover, Soviet economic exploita­ ance potential is accumulating. tion since 1944 has been so great that even a country as rich in ~atural resources as Ru­ 4. youth. Large sections of Rumanian youth mania had been chronically in want. War are opposed to the regime. Tradition, which booty, reparations, and the operation of So­ is strong in Rumania, together with the in­ viet-Rumanian mixed companies placed a dividualistic tendencies of youth, militate staggering load on its economy. The sharply against acceptance of regimented life and depressed living standards which resulted are Communist group control techniques. The blamed on Soviet exploitation. Adding to regime has been far less successful in gaining Rumanian fear and resentment on these the loyalty of youth than it had expected. scores, the brutal methods of a Communist police state have imposed an alien way of life. 5. Military. With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists (or MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS who have survived the purges) and who have a stake in the regime's continuation, the re­ 2. Peasantry. The violent opposition of the liability of the armed forces is questionable. peasantry, comprising about 70 percent of the Opportunism has been a predilection in Ru­ population, has constrained the regime to pro­ mania, ingrained during centuries of foreign ceed very slowly in collectivizing agriculture. rule, and most of the officers are probably Not only kulaks and small farmers but also opportunists. Enlisted men, coming mainly landless peasants have resisted the process. from rural areas imbued with the antiregime It is questionable whether even the poor, land­ feeling, are almost certainly only bowing to less peasants who constitute 42 percent of the force. If the regime were to lose its grip on present membership of collective farms, can the control apparatus and if Soviet supervision easily be induced to adopt the collective prin­ were withdrawn, very few of the enlisted men ciple itself. By the reg'ime's own admission would prove reliable. agricultural production is lower than before 6. Intellectuals, clergymen, national minori­ the war. The kulaks and small farmers are ties. In addition to the above, there are var­ producing almost all the grain the country ious lesser groups which might have consider­ grows, and the regime has been unwilling to able resistance potential. The intellectual take drastic steps in the face of their apparent and professional elements in particular have solidarity, Thus the peasantry constitutes a generally resisted Communist indoctrination. formidable reSistance potential. There is evidence that not enough Commu-

SEGRE"T' SEC:RE~ 22 nist-trained teachers are available. Many to accept factions of three exile parties as members of the professions and almost all of leg'al representatives of the Rumanian people. the former higher and middle classes, now de­ Factional strife, however has greatly under­ prived of their property and displaced socially, mined their importance. The King is prob­ are intensely hostile to the regime. The top ably the only person who maintains a sem­ hierarchy of the Orthodox Church has been blance of continuity of a non-Communist Ru­ largely reoriented toward the Moscow Patri-. manian government-in-exile. There is also a archate and some of the leading anti-Soviet group of left SOCialists, and some Iron Guard­ churchmen have been eliminated, but the ists, who are opposed to a restoration of the rank-and-file of the lower clergy and the monarchy. Evidence exists that the King is parish priests remain at heart anti-Commu­ still popular in Rumania, particularly among nist.. They constitute a considerable resist­ the peasantry, but the problem of non-Com­ ance potential, as do the clergymen of the munist succession to the Communist regime Catholic and Uniate Church whose institu­ will probably remain a source of factional tions have been virtually destroyed. National strife. minorities, particularly the Hungarians, are 9. Few, if any, contacts seem to exist between constantly dissatisfied, and, indeed, would be the emigres and the homeland. Communi­ opposed to any Rumanian government which cations are very precarious and censorship is would not cater to their national aspirations. rigid. All borders are closely guarded and patrolled. Rumanian language broadcasts INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE from the West are jammed; they appear to 7. Although dissidence is strong in almost all be heard best in rural areas. Printed anti­ segments of Rumanian society, including the regime propaganda which has frequently lower echelons of the government and Party, reached Rumanians is reported to have en­ active organized resistance has steadily de­ cOUl'aged sporadic manifestations of resist­ clined in the past several years and appears ance. to be virtually extinct at present. Isolated in­ stances of active unorganized resistance are RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR still being. reported, and are sometimes ad­ CONDITIONS mitted by the Communists. Moreover, the 10. Under cold war conditions, such active re­ regime has not succeeded in eliminating pas­ sistance as may still exist can be expected to sive resistance, which continues to express it­ decline as the regime's security controls im­ self mainly in economic sabotage. However, prove and as long as there is no clear indica­ such resistance is not exclusively anti-Com­ tion of positive aid from the West. Neverthe­ munist in motivation, but reflects considera­ less, there may be sporadic, disjointed guer­ able degree of self-interest or frustration. Acts rilla-type raids of no more than local signifi­ of economic sabotage such as absenteeism, cance, particularly from the less accessible deliberate damage to machinery, occasional parts of Rumania. Passive resistance will derailing of trains, arson, work slowdowns, probably also continue in a variety of forms, and general negligence mayor may not be chiefly economic sabotage. At best, such ac­ politically motivated. Whatever the motiva­ tivities will retard the implementation of the tion, there does appear to be considerable re­ regime's pOlitical and economic program; at sistance impeding agriculture, government­ the least, they will have a nuisance value, sponsored trade, industry, and the over-all keeping numbers of reliable Communists implementation of the Communist program .. from performing more useful work. This fact is openly admitted by the regime. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME EMIGRE GROUPS CONDITIONS 8. King Mihai, who could become a rallying 11. In the event of open war, Rumanian se­ point of the Rumanian emigration, appears curity forces would almost certainly be re-

~ ~ 23

inforced by Soviet troops. The resulting in­ and the attitude of the Balkan Pact countries, tensification of security measures would prob­ notably Yugoslavia. There might be some ably minimize even passive resistance. Never­ attempts at defection to Yugoslavia, if that theless some guerrilla activity might develop. country sided with the West. As Western The extent of active organized resistance troops approached Rumanian territory, guer­ would depend on the military situation in rilla warfare against local Communists and Europe, notably the nearness of Western Soviet units might flare up even before West­ forces, the help made available by the West, ern forces actually entered the country.

. ~ ~ 24

ANNEX G: USSR

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE position to Communist ideology per se as.upon neglect or denial by the Communist leader­ 1. Russia has a long history of resistance, but ship of basic popular rights and needs. Poor the revolution of 1917 was the only successful living conditions probably constitute the most act of resistance in modern times resulting Significant cause. The apparent unwillingness in the overthrow of a government in power. or inability of the Soviet Government to raise It occurred only after the war had virtually the standard of living is exacerbated by the destroyed central authority. The new Bol­ knowledge, acquired by millions of Soviet shevik leaders were careful to establish securi­ soldiers during World War II, that things are ty controls strong enough to prevent another better abroad. All-pervading fear of the pOlice popular revolt. Nevertheless, passive resist- also contributes greatly to dissidence as do . ance continued. It showed great strength the social stratification, nepotisrri, and favor­ l during the 1930's when Stalin was forcing itism, which divide the ruling elements from t: throug'h collectivization of agriculture. At the masses. Finally, antireligious campaigns the beginning of World War II mass deser­ and the Russification of the national minori­ tions occurred and various national minorities ties have created extensive resentment. were willing to collaborate with the Germans until harsh Nazi pOlicies rebuffed them. The colossal devastation of World War II resulted DISTRIBUTION OF DISSIDENCE in widespread discontent which necessitated 3. Peasantry. Of all social groups, the peas­ t-. powerful application of coercive measures. ants have suffered most under Soviet rule. I.' ~, .. The most troublesome postwar areas proved Their living standard is the lowest, except for ~ 1. to be those which the USSR had newly an­ that of the forced laborer. Soviet ruthless­ c. nexed: the Baltic States, the western parts ness in collectivization and pressure for in­ of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and Moldavia. creased production have provoked strong hos­ Partisan movements flourished in all these tility. The attempts by peasants to recover areas, especially in the Baltic States and the their status as individual land owners during western Ukraine, until mass deportations and the German occupation demonstrated their police terror succeeded in subduing them. opposition to the collective system. Continued The continued strain imposed upon the So­ insufficiency of agricultural production since viet people by Stalin's foreign and economic the war is probably due in part to lack of pOlicies compelled the Politburo to retain most peasant cooperation. The government has of the wartime controls and even to strength­ made a number of minor concessions to the en some of them. However, by 1949, order peasants but not enough to stimulate their had been restored throughout the country, cooperation or to overcome their opposition and operations ag'ainst the partisans in the to collectivism. troubled areas had eliminated nearly all or­ ganized resistance. 4. youth. A considerable segment of Soviet youth probably support the Soviet regime. 2. Many Soviet citizens, largely convinced by Generally, they receive special consideration Soviet propaganda of the improvements since from the government. Their education and in­ Czarist days, probably feel that their lot has doctrination are carefully supervised. Never­ improved. Moreover, a core of adherents of theless, there are elements among the youth Communist ideology are willing to accept pri­ whose loyalty is open to question. Among vations in its name. However, there appears them are: (a) children of parents persecuted to be some degree of discontent and disaffec­ by the regime; (b) descendants of Czarist offi­ tio~ a~ ~earlY' every level of Soviet society. cialdom; (c) offspring of kulaks, of purge ThIS dISSIdence is not based so much upon op- victims and of inmates of forced labor camps;

SEC~Elr 25

(d) the young men who have served in the summer of 1953, strikes occurred at the armed forces abroad and were able to com­ Vorkuta and Norilsk camps in the Far North pare their living standard with the much of Siberia. While the uprisings, from all ac­ higher one outside the USSR; and (e) some counts, were nonpolitical, they speak for the students of higher educational institutions. desperation of these repressed elements. There have been persistent reports of anti­ Communist organizations among university 7. Intellectuals. In spite of the preferred po­ students; such a group was uncovered at the sition of intellectuals in Soviet society, ideo­ university of Moscow and allegedly at Kaunas. logical controls and restriction of their free­ Constant admonitions in the Komsomol pa­ dom to create have probably led to accumu­ lated resentment. As a result, quite a few pers have denounced youth's flouting of So­ intellectuals have withdrawn into themselves, viet taboos. refused to study Marxism, and turned to in­ 5. National Minorities. About 45 percent of significant fields where Party control is less the Soviet population consists of national pronounced. Except for a few Communist minorities, some with a distinguished history fanatics, those artists and scientists who find of their own. Russification of these minori­ themselves frustrated by Party ukases telling ties under the Tsars had little success. Ini­ them what is correct, appear to be conform­ tially the Bolsheviks propagandized the con­ ing outwardly while inwardly resisting. How­ stitutional and cultural autonomy of their ever, before a breakdown in Soviet controls component republics and autonomous regions. they will almost certainly maintain sufficient After the war, possibly as a result of the poor conformity to avoid losing their material ad­ showing of loyalty to the Soviet state during vantages. the German occupation by certain minorities, 8. Industrial Workers. There is frequent evi­ they sharply restricted cultural autonomy. dence of discontent among the mass of fac­ Some minorities were liquidated as such by tory workers. The very low living standard, dispersal of populations, and whatever auton­ constant pressure for production under un­ omy other minorities still enjoyed was virtu­ favorable conditions, lack of freedom of move­ ally ended by intensified Russification and ment, and harsh labor discipline have al­ Sovietization. Consequently, disaffection was most certainly caused widespread discontent. rampant. During the first postwar years, While there has been a slight increase in food 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and 100,000 and consumer goods in recent years, it is not in Lithuania reportedly battled Soviet troops. nearly enough to satisfy the workers. More­ By 1949, the back of the revolt was broken. over, the promises of increased consumer But even now the Ukrainian Party Secretariat goods since Stalin's death, have recently been finds it necessary to call publiciy for vigilance de-emphasized. against infiltration by Ukrainian partisans. 9. Armed Forces. In general the armed forces 6. Repressed Elements. The millions of So­ constitute a bulwark of the regime rather viet citizens who have been sentenced to than a threat to it. Over-all morale is-con­ forced labor camps and exile in remote Sibe­ sidered to be sufficiently high to insure the rian areas constitute a fairly important re­ reliability of the armed forces, although there sistance potential. During World War II, are many reports of low morale in individual many such individuals emerged as leaders of instances. The officers, especially in the high­ collaboration in German-occupied territories. er ranks, are a favored economic group. How­ Their hatred of the Soviet regime almost cer­ ever, the Kronstadt mutiny (1921), the purges tainly transcends their patriotic feelings. in .the late 1930's, the low morale of the Red Knowing this, the government keeps former Army at the beginning of World War II, mass inmates of labor camps under strict controls. desertions and the establishment of a resist­ There have been persistent rumors of up­ ance army under Vlasov in German-occupied risings by forced laborers, supposed to have territory, and the persistant postwar defec­ occurred between 1948 and 1951. In the tions in Germany and Austria have caused the ~ ~ 26

Soviet Government to take extraordinary pre­ 12. According to defector reports, there is cautions, including police and Party surveil­ little or no awareness among the Soviet people lance, and virtual isolation of troops from of the present activities of emigre groups . . native populations in occupied territories. A Defectors who admit familiarity with these few defections to the West are still occurring. groups acquired their knowledge in Germany Harsh discipline, a wide cleavage between offi­ and Austria. However, there are likely to be cers and men, inescapable indoctrination and . some memories from the war when many surveillance by an all-prevading informer sys­ emigre groups, particularly the NTS, were ac­ tem create discontent in the service and tend tive not only in German-occupied Soviet terri­ to decrease the value of its material advan­ tory but also among the millions of Russians tages of clothing, shelter, and food. Morale deported to Germany for forced labor. More­ in the Soviet Navy and Air Forces appears to over, the Soviet press itself keeps such mem­ be higher than that in the Army. ories alive by occasional attacks on the emigre movement. During the early postwar years, INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE there were some contacts between emigre groups and partisan groups in western areas 10. Although some dissidence exists at nearly of the USSR. Some tenuous connections may every level of Soviet society, the regime has still exist but are almost certainly negligible. succeeded in establishing such pervasive au­ The Soviet security apparatus has pacified thority that the people are forced to devote the new Western territories and deported their energies to coping with the system rather many of the inhabitants,. partially replacing than to conceiving an alternative solution or them with Great Russians. Some siight con­ taking steps to achieve such a solution. Ex­ tacts may still exist between the West and tensive resistance, such as occurred in the members of the former Uniate Church in the newly acquired territories after the end of Ukraine which was forcibly amalgamated with World War II, had virtually ceased to exist by the Russian Orthodox Church in the late 1950. The strikes and riots reported in Far 1940's. Northern labor camps may not have reflected political motivation and in any case were 13. The minority emigre organizations are not now in a position to gain the sympathy of the quickly suppressed. Whether indications of Great Russians to any appreciable extent. passive resistance in agriculture, industry, The peoples of the recently incorpora ted and the lower bureaucracy are not merely a demonstration of time-honored Russian in­ areas, especially in the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, may for a while be inclined difference or apathy cannot be estimated with any confidence. In sum, the gulf between to look to emigre organizations for support. But in those national minority areas which dissidence and resistance in the USSR is far wider than elsewhere in the Bloc (except pos­ have long been under Soviet rule (the Ukraine, sibly in Communist China). Georgia, Byelo-Russia, etc.), the people would almost certainly feel, like the Great Russians, that the emigres have been away from their EMIGRE GROUPS homeland so long that they have lost their 11. Numerous emigre organizations claim to grasp of Soviet realities. The people would represent Russians and national minorities. also resent what they believe to be the emi­ Of these, the Solidarists (NTS) - Great Rus­ gres' "luxurious living" in the West and are sians - are the largest and most important. still disillusioned over the connection of some emigre organizations with the Nazi regime. Some former Vlasov adherents and numbers They probably are unaware of any acceptable of recent defectors have joined this move­ pOlitical alternative to Soviet Communism. ment. Whenever emigre groups are known On the other hand, the Soviet Government it­ by Soviet defectors or by listeners to Russian­ self has given ~igns of apprehension lest emi­ language broadcasts, it is the NTS which ap­ gre groups be used for infiltration purposes pears to have the pre-eminent place. and has indicated fear of their organization

~ ~ 27 and propaganda. This was demonstrated in 16. In the event of major Soviet reverses, the Khokhlov and other cases, where they did some mass defections from the army might not shrink from elaborately preparing the occur, particularly among members of min­ murder of an emigre leader. Another aspect ority groups. If the war were prolonged and of the effort to neutralize emigre groups is hostilities carried to Soviet soil, chances for the Soviet attempt to encourage emigres to resistance activities would probably improve, return, promising them good treatment. and an invading army might meet with cautious, but at least partially sympathetic, RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR response as soon at it became evident that Nazi methods of occupation would not be re­ CONDITIONS peated. In such a situation, anti-Communist 14. Under continued cold war conditions, ac­ partisans, particularly in the minority areas, tive resistance against the Soviet system" is could probably be induced to fight their So­ highly unlikely unless the regime's security viet masters. Nevertheless, even if hard apparatus becomes seriously weakened. Some pressed on the military fronts, the Soviet lead­ degree of passive resistance will probably con­ ers would make a determined effort to main­ tinue, ranging from camouflaged disobedience tain sufficient control in the hinterland to of Party rules to agricultural and industrial prevent resistance elements from becoming sabotage. It may also be expressed in cynical active behind their lines. Moreover, in event attitudes toward the regime, attempts to of an impending collapse of the Soviet Gov­ listen to Western broadcasts, lack of interest ernment, anti-Soviet elements of the popula­ in working for the objectives of the govern­ tion, together with labor camp inmates and ment, and defection. forced exiles, could attain significant resist­ ance capabilities. Aside from such groups, resistance among the broad masses of the RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME Great" Russian population would be difficult CONDITIONS to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respect 15. In the event of general war security for Soviet authority, or apathy probably would would be tightened, virtually all people would render them passive and disinclined to active be employed in the defense effprt, and patri­ opposition. Unless the security apparatus otic appeals would be launched. We are un­ were seriously weakened, little activity could able to estimate the extent of or the impact be expected from the mass of the Great on resistance potential of such factors as: (a) Russian population beyond local harassing western military action; (b) the popular psy­ operations, help to Western personnel in es­ chological reactions to such actions; or (c) cape or evasion, dissemination of antiregime the regime's ability to portray the war as a propaganda, limited intelligence activities, patriotic and defensive one. and defections.

SECP;8'f'- SECRET- 28

ANNEX H: NORTH VIETNAM

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 1. In the past, the main political factors which 3. The Catholics, numbering some one and have created ill-will toward the Democratic one-half million (of whom, however, at least Republic of Vietnam (DRV) have been: im­ 500,000 will have left for the south before position of rigid ideological controls, restric­ May 1955), are probably the largest potential tion of personal freedoms, terroristic police resistance element in North Vietnam. If the controls, persecution of minority and religious DRV honors its promise of religious tolerance, groups, and the rising influence of the un­ they may resign themselves to passive coop­ popular Chinese. More recently disaffection eration with the regime. If, however, the re­ has arisen from the transition to peace of a gime should decide to take strong measures society long geared to war; the absorption against Catholic leaders and organizations, of new territories (and large cities) which the Catholics might be provoked into stronger are increasingly feeling the weight of Com­ opposition. munist oppression; and from resentment 4. Ethnic minorities, numbering about one against the DRV for having sanctioned, at and one-half million, oppose domination by least temporarily, the division of the country. the Vietnamese Communists but their resist­ Popular hostility has also been created by ance is ineffective. The DRV is now estab­ such economic factors as: (a) heavy tax bur­ lishing "autonomous administrative areas" dens, which deprive peasants of their surplus for larger ethnic minorities under Communist and prevent merchants from accumulating control, such as the one million Thai tribes­ capital; (b) land reform measures displacing men; the same policy may also be applied to large numbers of families and creating severe the Nungs, Muongs, Meos, Mans, and Thos. dislocations; (c) conscription of labor; (d) de­ The resistance potential of these tribes is low, preciation of the currency; and (e) occasional since they have no cohesion, leadership, or acute rice shortages in certain areas. Living unity of purpose. standards in DRV territory have always been poor but they are now even worse, and there 5. The peasants will almost certainly remain is little chance for a speedy improvement. dissatisfied unless the regime can alleviate their grievances. However, no more than 2. Recent DRV measures, including the passive resistance can be expected so long as Franco-DRV agreement on French installa­ the regime exercises pervasive pOlitical and tions in North Vietnam, and the Communist police controls. Chinese-DRY aid agreement may, if imple­ mtmted, somewhat alleviate the economic 6. The dispossessed elements, among whom stringency now reportedly prevailing in DRV can be counted non-Communist Chinese, rem­ territory. Moreover, discontent has been nants of non-Communist political groups, counterbalanced to some extent by the follow­ merchants, and landlords, are, of course, ing factors: (a) the prestige accruing to the highly disaffected and, given an opportunity, regime as the result of its long successful war would participate in resistance activities. In against the French; (b) its posture as a strong view of the regime's very tight security con­ cohesive and determined government; and trols, however, these elements will almost cer­ (c) the popular appeal of the regime's vigor­ tainly be gradually liquidated. ous nationalism. The regime's identification of Communism with nationalism is almost INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE certainly not recognized by the mass of the 7. Incomplete information, paucity of intelli­ people as a Communist tactic, and may con­ gence sources, and the fluidity of the present tinue for some time to counteract popular situation virtually preclude an accurate esti­ grievances. mate of the character and intensity of re-

~ ~ 29 sistance within DRV territory. Prior to the RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME Geneva agreement there were indications of CONDITIONS an anti-Viet Minh potential caused chiefly by Communist terrorism and persecution, and 9. Any estimate of the resistance potential in by fear of rising Chinese influence. Continued the DRV under conditions of open warfare is dissatisfaction with the regime is indicated by highly speculative. Resistance would depend the flight of large numbers of civilian refugees on the ability to survive countermeasures, the from the DRV zone.! At the same time, the extent to which security controls would be migration of these anti-Communist elements disrupted by military operations, and the from North Vietnam has almost certainly amount of training and material aid that weakened the resistance potential there as could be provided. Assuming that guerrillas has the French withdrawal, and the increase were moderately successful in surviving and of Viet Minh power and prestige since Geneva. training with new equipment, at least some. Moreover, the regime's identification of Com­ groups, such as the Thos and possibly the munism with nationalism, may continue at Nungs, and Mans, would be in a position to least for some time to distract attention from disrupt movements of overland supply col­ grievances. The anticolonial attitude on the umns along the routes from China into part of the ethnic Vietnamese will continue to North Vietnam. However, the reluctance of be used by the regime to popularize its actions. most guerrilla groups to move any consider­ However, some degree of continued passive re­ able distance from their tribal areas would sistance may be expected from Vietnamese limit their effectiveness. No cohesive and Catholics and from nonethnic minorities. large-scale guerrilla activities can be expected, and existing groups would be unable to gain RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR such control over large territorial areas in northern Tonkin as the Viet Minh did be­ CONDITIONS tween 1943 and 1954. It is possible that some 8. Such organized resistance groups as may resistance elements could be utilized to spread still exist are poorly equipped and poorly rumors, distribute pamphlets, and collect in­ trained. The current capabilities of such formation. However, willingness of resistance groups are probably limited to development groups to act against the DRV regime would of escape and evasion facilities, some training be contingent upon the military situation. activities, and information collection. Unor­ ganized resistance probably is limited to inter­ 10. The nationality of attacking forces would mittent passive opposition. Expansion and probably influence the willingness of resist­ intensification of resistance activities would ance groups to act. Tribal groups which have be largely dependent upon logistic support been helped by the French for many years, and training of personnel in the use of equip­ would be most receptive to French invaders. ment. Lack of coordination, caused chiefly Vietnamese would prefer other Vietnamese by the mutual animosity of the .various ethnic first and the French last. Other nationalities minorities, further reduces the already limited probably acceptable would be Thais, Filipinos, manpower available for guerrilla activities. and Americans. Participation of Nationalist The regime can be expected to use all methods Chinese might seriously jeopardize resistance at its disposal to reduce disaffection and liqui­ and create antagonism toward the occupa­ date vestiges of resistance. Even a weaken­ tion. A military government administered by ing of security measures would probably not Vietnamese in ethnic Vietnamese areas would bring forth an appreciable resistance poten­ probably have a salutary effect upon resist­ tial. ance activities. A French occupation would be distrusted by the majority of the Viet­

I About 700,000 people elected to leave the North namese people, and would adversely affect between August 1954 and March 1955. anti-Communist partisan warfare.

SECR~r:t- SECBil'¥- 30

ANNEX I: NORTH KOREA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE ticularly intense among the remnants of the Christian and former middle class elements. 1. After decades of Japanese domination, These constituted the main strength of the which had aimed to wipe out Korea as a na­ Korean Democratic Party which was estab­ tional entity and to make it a Japanese pro­ lished after liberation from Japan and sub­ vince, the Koreans were receptive to any type sequently liquidated in North Korea by the of government, provided it was Korean. Thus, Communists. Considerable dissatisfaction al­ it is not so much the form of government in­ so exists among the peasants, who feel that stituted in North Korea after World War II the regime is giving preferential treatment as the exploitative and oppressive methods to industrial workers. There is disappoint­ and foreign flavor of the Communist regime ment and disillusionment even among the which have created discontent. The extra­ workers. Army morale probably is at least ordinary hardships which the North Koreans fair. Dissidence is probably most widespread had to endure during the Korean War prob­ in the enlisted ranks, which have been kept in ably increased dissatisfaction and frustration. service many years. Although there are in­ Moreover, the burdens imposed by postwar re­ dications of a discharge program, it probably construction (such as high taxes, forced labor, does not provide for many early releases. pressures to turn farmers into industrial la­ Dissidence also extends to a small number of borers, contributions to political organiza­ officers. tions, military conscription, and over-all shortages) have almost certainly intensified INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE dissidence. The continued presence of large 4. Even though the regime's methods and pol­ Chinese Communist forces in North Korea is icies have caused considerable ill-will, there is probably also an important source of dissi­ no evidence that such disaffection is trans­ dence. lated into resistance, probably because of the 2. Although the North Koreans have very Korean tendency toward apathetic resigna­ little access to information on developments tion and by identification of the regime with in the ROK, the very existence of the Republic nationalist aspirations. Antiregime guerrilla of Korea (ROK) as a visible alternative to the activities, such as occurred earlier in the Ko­ North Korean Communist regime and the de­ rean War had declined greatly by 1951. Since sire for unification probably stimulate North then, heavy punishment for UN collaborators, Korean dissidence. In spite of the North nationalist propaganda, severe political con­ Korean campaign of vilification against the trol, and stimulation of "anticolonialism" ROK and the questionable popularity of the have been used to combat resistance activi­ Rhee government, there is almost certainly a ties. There is no indication that the ROK belief that conditions in South Korea are more aid to active North Korean resisters has been satisfactory than in North Korea. Dissidence effective. would probably grow if the advantages of living in the UN-backed ROK instead of So­ EMIGRE ORGANZIATIONS viet-Chinese supported North Korea became 6. After the establishment of a Communist more apparent. regime in North Korea, anti-Communist ele­ ments fled south. One sizeable group formed MAJOR DISSIDENT ElEMENTS a northwestern Young Men's Association, 3. Dissidence exists in varying degrees in which was absorbed by the ROK "Taehan every element of North Korean society, except Youth Corps" until it was assimilated into the small Communist ruling group. It is par- the South Korean Armed Forces. Many of

, SFQREI ~CRE 1- 31 this group were either Christians or followers support of nearby Soviet and Communist Chi­ of the Chondokyo Church (an indigenous nese forces if it could not carry out the task church strong in the northwestern areas of alone. Korea). These two groups had a background of active resistance against the Japanese. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME Many thousands of their number were used CONDITIONS as guerrilla forces by the UN Command dur­ ing the Korean War. Several smaller groups, 8. Under conditions of open war, North Ko­ cultural and political emigres, chief among rean resistance potential would probably in­ crease somewhat but would probably be which are the remnants of the Korean Demo­ cratic Party, led resistance against the Com­ limited to isolated instances of sabotage, some munists prior to the outbreak of the war. passive resistance and defections, assistance There are no current indications of guidance to anti-Communist personnel in evasion and or assistance to resistance elements in North escape operations, and some intelligence col­ Korea except that given by the ROK itself, lection. Increased security measures and sup­ port by the USSR and,. Communist China nor is there adequate information on the con­ would make organized resistance virtually im­ tacts, if any, made by the ROK. possible. In the event of a Bloc defeat or a major retreat of the Communist forces in Ko­ RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR rea, the populace still behind Communist lines CONDITIONS might be encouraged to resist their oppres­ 7. Assuming continuation of the armistice, sors. While such resistance would be an ad­ resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of ditional burden on the Communists, it is un­ much significance. At best, it may provide likely to be a decisive factor. a limited source of intelligence. The security 9. The responsibility for initiation of hostili­ forces and the army are capable of dealing ties would not significantly affect resistance with any opposition, whether from disgruntled potential. The nationality of any allied forces peasants, Christian elements, or survivors of invading North Korea also would not matter the domestic purges. Even though the topo­ provided that no Japanese forces were em­ graphy of the country, the vulnerability of ployed. Unless political conditions in the the North Korean transportation system, and ROK deteriorate sharply, the ROK would have the homogeneity of the Korean people (which no difficulty in establishing governmental in­ facilitates ROK infiltration) would favor guer­ stitutions in North Korea which would have rilla activities, the regime is considered capa­ the initial support or acquiescence of the bulk ble of coping with them. It would have the of the population.

.sF8ftE'l'