DOCSLIB.ORG

NIE 10-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NIE 10-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc NIE 10-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 12 April 1955 I I I I I I I , I I ! This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com !.I ~ ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC THE PROBLEM To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot war con­ ditions in the Bloc. 1 INTRODUCTORY NOTE In estimating the resistance potential skill in doing so, the motivation, and the of a people in relation to their govern­ opportunities, vary from element to ele­ ment' it is necessary to know the nature, ment in the population, and from time to extent, and depth of their discontent, the time. strength of their will to resist, and their In this estimate, the following termi­ capability for resistance compared with nology is used to describe these types the will and capability of the regime to of action: maintain control. 1. Dissidence is a state of mind involving In a Communist-ruled country the best discontent or disaffection with the re­ known of these factors is the regime's in­ gime. tention to preserve internal security re­ gardless of cost; its capability of forestal­ 2. Resistance is dissidence translated into ling effective resistance; and its constant action. pressure to induce the individual to ad­ 3. Organized resistance is that which is just himself to the Communist environ­ carried out by a group of .individuals who ment. have accepted a common purpose, agreed· Lacking any .legal a ven ues for express­ 1 This estimate covers resistance potential in en­ ing dissent, the population still can indi­ tire Sino-Soviet Bloc. More detailed coverage of individual Bloc countries is set forth in the cate its discontent through a variety of attached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria, Czech­ actions and inactions unfavorable to the oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Poland regime, ranging from individual actions and Communist China are considered in the to widespread opposition. These types of over-all estimate, but no annexes are included on these countries. For more detailed treat­ resistance are symptomatic of discontent, ment of these two countries see RIR-t, "Anti­ but do not necessarily reveal the extent, Communist Resistance Activities and Potential constancy, and specific causes of under,.. in Poland," dated 20 July 1954, and RIR-2, "Anti­ Communist Resistance Activities and Potential lying discontent. The will to resist, the in China," dated 2 November 1954. ~ 1 ~ 2 on leadership, and worked out a commu­ warfare, assistance in ~scape and evasion, nica tions system. open defiance of authority, or prepara­ 4. Unorganized resistance is that which is tory activity for any of the above. It may carried out by individuals or loosely asso­ or may not involve violence, and may be ciated groups which may have been conducted openly or clandestinely. formed spontaneously for certain limited 6. Passive resistance, organized or unor­ objectives, without over-all plan or strate­ ganized, is that which is conducted with­ gy. in the framework of the resister's normal 5. Active resistance, organized or unor­ life and duties, and involves deliberate ganized, is that which expresses itself in nonperformance or malperformance of positive acts against the regime. It may acts which would benefit the regime, or take such forms as intelligence collection, deliberate nonconformity with standards psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla of conduct established by the regime. ESTIMATE 1. There is evidence of widespread dissi­ .still be operating in some Satellites, nota­ dence in all Communist Bloc countries. bly in Albania, but they are no more than While in general dissidence is greatest a local nuisance which probably will be among the peasantry, even the youth and wiped out sooner or later by the security industrial workers, two groups which forces. might be expected to be most favorable 4. Even though dissidence within the to Communist indoctrination, have be­ Sino-Soviet Bloc creates a resistance po­ come increasingly disaffected in the Euro­ tential, we believe that under continued pean Satellites and to a lesser extent in cold war conditions active resistance is the USSR. unlikely to develop. There may be a few 2. However, the intensity of dissidence isolated acts of unorganized resistance, varies considerably. It is probably least but the effectiveness of Communist se­ pronounced in the USSR, where Commu­ curity controls and police state methods nism has become more firmly established. will probably remain such as to make In the Far East Bloc areas, where Com­ active organized resistance virtually im­ munism is exploiting the new surge of na­ possible, except in a few almost inaccessi­ tionalism, dissidence almost certainly is ble areas.. Therefore, even in countries much less strong than in the East Euro­ where dissidence is strongest, such as East pean Satellites, where national interests Germany, we see no prospect of resistance are being subordinated to those of the activities developing on a scale sufficient USSR. to threaten the stability of the regimes. 3. Despite the existence of dissidence At a maximum such activities will tend throughout the Bloc, active organized re­ to delay the achievement of Communist sistance is practically nonexistent. A political and economic objectives. At a few isolated small guerrilla bands may minimum they will constitute a nuisance SECPil'i'- 3 to the regimes and will raise the morale nist military and security forces would al­ of anti-Communist elements. Increased most certainly remain sufficiently strong active resistance would be likely only if to prevent or check outbreaks. However, the Communist security apparatus were we estimate that major resistance move­ greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power ments in the Bloc, comparable to those of and prestige were greatly decreased. World War II, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control 5. On the other hand, a sUbstantial de­ until the local security organizations had gree of passive resistance is likely to con­ been seriously weakened and the USSR tinue. Such resistance is unlikely seri­ and Communist China were unable to ously to threaten the political stability of enforce order in their respective orbits. the Communist regimes. However, par­ Until such circumstances arose, activities ticularly in agriculture, it will probably of resistance elements would probably be remain a troublesome and even serious confined to intelligence collection and factor throughout the Bloc countries, im­ transmission, surreptitious antiregime peding the fulfillment of their political propaganda, aid to Western personnel in and economic programs. Nevertheless, escape and evasion operations, and de­ we believe that the persistent pressures fection inducements. exercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of even pas­ 7. In many countries of the non-Commu­ sive resistance and will almost certainly nist world there are organizations, com­ prevent the emergence of coordinated re­ posed of and led by persons who have sistance activities. emigrated from countries of the Soviet 6. In most of the USSR and to a lesser Bloc. In general these organizations extent in Communist China, the out­ have lost effective contact with their break of open warfare would stimulate homelands and do not significantly con­ patriotic feelings in support of the re­ tribute to resistance potential. Virtual­ gimes. Widespread destruction or pro­ ly all have suffered from internal bicker­ tracted hostilities, however, might lead ing and lack of funds and have been pen­ etrated by agents of Communist security to the emergence of resistance. In the forces. The people within the Bloc know newly acquired areas of the USSR, such very little about emigre organizations. as the Baltic States and the Western With rare exceptions they would almost Ukraine, hopes of liberation would be re­ kindled at the outset, intensifying the re­ certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation. sistance potential. In the European Sat­ ellites, the outbreak of war would not .8. In the event of war, the nationality only stimulate hopes for liberation but of invading forces probably would in gen­ would also increase popular unrest and eral have little bearing on the coopera­ passive resistance. We believe, however, tion offered by resistance elements in the that no active organized resistance would Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces occur, unless the Bloc suffered severe were clearly integrated in a broad anti­ military setbacks, and Western forces Communist military· organization. In approached Satellite territory. Commu- certain situations, however, long-stand- SEQRE or- ...il;Q8ft"-!I 4 ing national antipathies might outweigh not substantially affect the will to resist anti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti­ the· regimes in the Bloc countries. 2 Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent • The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department use of: (a) German forces in Czechoslo­ of State, would substitute for this paragraph the following: vakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugo­ The question of responsibility for the initiation slav, Greek, and Turkish units in Bul­ of general war will not affect the will to resist in the European Satellites, whose populations are garia; (c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav so overwhelmingly against the existing regime as units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt. in North Korea and Communist China. It will probably have more significance in the USSR, where support for the regime by the war­ 9.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Blood-Red Hands of Ho Chi Minh
    The Blood-Red Hands of Ho Chi Minh Readers Digest, November 1968 John G.Hubbell http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/vietnam/hochiminh.html The village chief and his wife were distraught. One of their children, a seven-year-old boy, had been missing for four days. They were terrified, they explained to Marine Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, because they believed he had been captured by the Vietcong. Suddenly, the boy came out of the jungle and ran across the rice paddies toward the village. He was crying. His mother ran to him and swept him up in her arms. Both of his hands had been cut off, and there was a sign around his neck, a message to his father: if he or any one else in the village dared go to the polls during the upcoming elections, something worse would happen to the rest of his children. The VC delivered a similar warning to the residents of a hamlet not far from Danang. All were herded before the home of their chief. While they and the chief’s pregnant wife and four children were forced to look on, the chief’s tongue was cut out. Then his genital organs were sliced off and sewn inside his bloody mouth. As he died, the VC went to work on his wife, slashing open her womb. Then, the nine-year-old son: a bamboo lance was rammed through one ear and out the other. Two more of the chief’s children were murdered the same way. The VC did not harm the five-year-old daughter — not physically: they simply left her crying, holding her dead mother’s hand.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism Versus Democracy
    Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:58 07 June 2016 Terrorism versus Democracy This book examines the terrorist networks that operate globally and analyses the long-term future of terrorism and terrorist-backed insurgencies. Terrorism remains a serious problem for the international community. The global picture does not indicate that the ‘war on terror’, which President George W. Bush declared in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, has been won. On the other hand it would be incorrect to assume that Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other jihadi groups have won their so-called ‘holy war’ against the Coalition against Terrorism formed after 9/11. This new edition gives more attention to the political and strategic impact of modern transnational terrorism, the need for maximum international cooperation by law-abiding states to counter not only direct threats to the safety and security of their own citizens but also to preserve international peace and security through strengthening counter-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction (CTR). This book is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students of terrorism studies, political science and international relations, as well as for policy makers and journalists. Paul Wilkinson is Emeritus Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. He is author of several books on terrorism issues and was co-founder of the leading international journal, Terrorism and Political Violence. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:58 07 June 2016 Series: Political Violence Series Editors: Paul Wilkinson and David Rapoport This book series contains sober, thoughtful and authoritative academic accounts of terrorism and political violence.
    [Show full text]
  • Read the Full PDF
    en Books published to date in the continuing series o .:: -m -I J> SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, George Lenczowski, 1971. 176 C pages, $4.00 ;; Explores and analyzes recent Soviet policies in the Middle East in terms of their historical background, ideological foundations and pragmatic application in the 2 political, economic and military sectors. n PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND SOCIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Howard S. Ellis, m 1970. 123 pages, $3.00 en Summarizes recent economic developments in the Middle East. Discusses the 2- significance of Soviet economic relations with countries in the area and suggests new approaches for American economic assistance. -I :::I: TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Lee E. Preston in association with m Karim A. Nashashibi, 1970. 93 pages, $3.00 3: Analyzes trade flows within the Middle East and between that area and other areas of the world. Describes special trade relationships between individual -C Middle Eastern countries and certain others, such as Lebanon-France, U.S .S.R.­ C Egypt, and U.S.-Israel. r­ m THE DILEMMA OF ISRAEL, Harry B. Ellis, 1970. 107 pages, $3.00 m Traces the history of modern Israel. Analyzes Israel 's internal political, eco­ J> nomic, and social structure and its relationships with the Arabs, the United en Nations, and the United States. -I JERUSALEM: KEYSTONE OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, Richard H. Pfaff, 1969. 54 pages, $2.00 Suggests and analyzes seven policy choices for the United States. Discusses the religious significance of Jerusalem to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and points out the cultural gulf between the Arabs of the Old City and the Western­ r oriented Israelis of West Jerusalem.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism” Was Applied to the Vietnam War Tatiana Nigh Agnes Scott College
    The Onyx Review: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal © 2018 Center for Writing and Speaking 2018, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 105–112 Agnes Scott College Red Terrorists, or Red, White and Blue Terrorists? A Closer Look at How the Word “Terrorism” Was Applied to the Vietnam War Tatiana Nigh Agnes Scott College “Terrorism” has become a familiar term in today’s new stories, but is it being used properly? Has it ever? This paper examines elements of U.S. discourse during the Vietnam War to better understand how U.S. officials and media used the term ‘terrorist’ at the time. One excerpt of the Pentagon Papers is thoroughly examined, along with a conversation between President Lyndon B. Johnson and his national security advisor, and various media sources at the time. The review of these sources concludes that, while the term ‘terrorism’ was not legally misused in all contexts in the Pentagon Papers, there are instances in which it is misapplied by U.S. officials regarding the Vietnamese resistance. LBJ’s conversation with advisor Bundy clearly states the U.S. political agenda to label the Vietnamese as ‘terrorists’ in order to increase waning domestic support for the invasion of Vietnam. With the President's political motives in mind, this paper concludes that the U.S. intentionally painted the Vietnamese resistance as ‘terrorism’ whether or not Vietnamese actions technically fulfilled the term. Although the Pentagon Papers admit no such thing, certain actions taken by U.S. military in targeting and killing civilians for political purposes does legally constitute terrorism. Overall, U.S. officials incorrectly applied the word ‘terrorism’ to the Vietnamese resistance and omitted the word ‘terrorism’ regarding U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism in Italy: an Update Report, 1983-1985 Report
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. 99th Congress S. PRT. 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 99-94 TERRORISM IN ITALY: AN UPDATE REPORT, 1983-1985 REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM FOR THE USE OF THE C;OMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE OCTOBER 1985 U.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1985 ,.. COMMIT'l'EE ON THE JUDICIARY STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL LAXALT, Nevada EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ORRIN G. HA'fCH, Utah ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama HOWELL HEFLIN, Alabama ARLEN SPEC'fER, Pennsylvania PAUL SIMON, Illinois MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky DENNIS W. SHEDD, Chief Counsel and Staff Director DIANA L. WA'fERMAN, General Counsel DEBORAH G. BERNSTEIN, Chief Clerk MARI\ H. GITENSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama, Chairman ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona MITCH McCOKNELL, Kentucky JOEL S. LISI\ER, Chief Counsel and Staff Director FRAN WERMUTH, Chief Clerk (Ill U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Poinls of view or opinions stat~d In this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Nalional Institute of Justice.
    [Show full text]
  • HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS of SOVIET Terroi\
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. I --' . ' J ,j HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOVIET TERROi\ .. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBOOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED ST.A.g;ES;~'SEN ATE NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOVIET TERRORISM JUNE 11 AND 1~, 1981 Serial No.. J-97-40 rinted for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary . ~.. ~. ~ A\!?IJ.ISIJl1 ~O b'. ~~~g "1?'r.<f~~ ~l~&V U.R. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1981 U.S. Department ':.~ Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permissic;m to reproduce this '*ll'yr/gJorbJ material has been CONTENTS .::lrante~i,. • . l-'ubllC Domain UTIltea~tates Senate OPENING STATEMENTS Page to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Denton, Chairman Jeremiah ......................................................................................... 1, 29 Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permis­ sion of the 00j5) I i~ owner. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES JUNE 11, 1981 COMMI'ITEE ON THE JUDICIARY Billington, James H., director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ......................................................................................................................... 4 STROM THU'lMOND;1South Carolina, Chairman Biography .................................................................................................................. 27 CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL LAXALT Nevada EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JUNE 12, 1981 ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia. Possony, Stefan T., senior fellow (emeritus), Hoover Institution, Stanford Uni- ROBERT DOLE Kansas HOWARD M.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism As “Counter- Hegemonic Political Violence”
    1 TERRORISM REDEFINED: TERRORISM AS “COUNTER- HEGEMONIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE” In the ongoing “war on terror,” few terms are as contentious as the concept of terrorism. While there are several definitions of “terrorism,” most contemporary classifications contain three primary components: (a) the threat or use of violence; (b) the furtherance of broader political objectives; and (c) the psychological effects on innocent victims. Yet, I will argue that most definitions of terrorism are meaningless because they neglect to consider the hegemonic basis of its conceptualization. As developed by Antonio Gramsci, the concept of “hegemony” encompasses not just the economic or coercive power of the dominant forces within a particular society but, more importantly, the cultural, moral, and ideological leadership exerted by such groups. Recently, the concept of hegemony has been applied to the international context, specifically to the global dominance of the United States and its Western allies, not just to indicate their military and economic preeminence, but also their cultural and ideological supremacy. An examination of the modern history of terrorism, from the French Revolution, through to the Anarchist and Third World nationalist groups of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to the Islamic fundamentalist movements of today, demonstrates that the term “terrorism” has been applied solely to those movements that have challenged the position of the dominant powers or states (i.e., the “enemies” of “the status quo”). Realist theorists argue that war is endemic to the conduct of international politics and that conflict is a natural part of the interactions between states. Consequently, all states use violence to incite fear for some political objective.
    [Show full text]
  • Extreme Left Terrorism in Contemporary Europe: from “Communist Combatant Parties” to Militant Campaigns?
    Stőedoevropské politické studie Roÿník IX, þíslo 4, s. 294-314 Central European Political Studies Review Volume IX, Part 4, pp. 294-314 Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity ISSN 1212-7817 Extreme Left Terrorism in Contemporary Europe: from “Communist Combatant Parties” to Militant Campaigns? Miroslav Mareš1 This article was written as a part of the Research project Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies (code MSM0021622407). Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the strategy and tactics of the of extreme left terrorism in Europe. Traditional red terrorist organizations (combatant communist parties like the RAF, the RB etc.) have been replaced by small militant groups, by violent militancy campaigns, by anti-globalist violence or by “single-issue” terrorism. The militant extreme left may itself be both a direct and indirect ally to other forms of terrorism, including Islamist terrorism. Key words: Anti-globalist violence, Communist parties, European security, Extreme left, Militancy campaigns, Terrorism Introduction From the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, one of terrorism’s dominant strains was its extreme left version. The fall of the communist regimes and intensive counter-terrorism policies after September 11, 2001 caused its decline; indeed, the last couple of years has seen the remaining original terrorist movements in Europe destroyed. Vestiges of red terrorism nevertheless survive in many places of the world, including the Old Continent, and the extreme left scene still exhibits militant tendencies which lead (or can lead) to terrorism. This article analyzes the potential of contemporary left terrorism in Europe. Conceptualization of traditional European extreme left terrorism Extreme left terrorism in Europe is usually understood as a specific and fairly homogeneous version of terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Viewpoint, the Mere Existence of the Soviet Union
    Florida State University Libraries Honors Theses The Division of Undergraduate Studies 2013 Seeing Red in Double Vision Austin Yost Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] Yost 1 THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES SEEING RED IN DOUBLE VISION By AUSTIN YOST A Thesis submitted to the Department of History In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in the Major Degree Awarded: Spring 2013 Yost 2 Seeing Red in Double Vision In recent times, with the fall of the Soviet Union over two decades behind us, it would be very easy to ignore the traditional Marxist-Leninist historical narrative of evolving ideological conflict between the two superpowers. To this day, however, most American students still are educated about the Cold War through the prism of exactly such an ideological conflict, as is made apparent in the title of the classic university course on such matters, “Comparative Political Systems.” But upon further research it becomes harder and harder to justify such an approach to describing the USA’s growing paranoia and fear regarding the specter of communism. While there was an intellectual and psychological angle to both Red Scares, its themes and motifs differed tremendously from what one would expect from a struggle between the haves and the have nots. While the First Red Scare played most of the original Marxist tropes straight – politicians, the wealthy and the religious were in a state of panic, while intellectuals and the working class kept an open mind – the Second Red Scare defied or subverted almost every stereotype regarding what a competition between capitalism and socialism should look like.1 The term “Red Scare” has come to be one of the most recognizable phrases identified with twentieth century American history and political science.
    [Show full text]
  • The Communist Party of Malaya's
    Securing the Population from Insurgency and Subversion in the Second Emergency (1968-1981) Submitted by Weichong Ong, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Research in History, August 2010. This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Abstract Divided into five core chapters, this thesis examines the success and failures of both the insurgent that was the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the counterinsurgent (Malaysia and to a lesser extent Singapore) during the Second Emergency (1968 to 1981). The conflict is set within a paradigm built upon the four key touchstones of utility of military force, civil-military relations, population security, and propaganda. Anglo- American Counterinsurgency practice in Malaya and Vietnam as well as the doctrine of People‘s War and Maoist mass persuasion will be comparatively examined within the framework of the abovementioned four touchstones to set the backdrop for the debate on the Second Emergency. The CPM‘s strategy of anti-colonial armed struggle from 1948 to 1960 will be compared with that of its post-colonial armed revolution between 1968 and 1981. Key themes exploited by the CPM in its propaganda to revolutionise the thoughts and actions of its target audience and its impact will be analysed.
    [Show full text]
  • May Day 2021
    International Coordination of Revolutionary Parties & Organizations www.icor.info 15 April 2021 ICOR Resolution May Day 2021 - International Day of Struggle of the Working Class and the Oppressed Peoples of the World! Let us develop the fighting spirit of the workers everywhere! Let us strengthen worldwide the international anti-imperialist united front against fascism and reactionary wars! For a socialist alternative to capitalism in crisis! May Day is the day of the year that unequivocally belongs to the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world. The working class has the power, the interest and the strength to end capitalist exploitation of humanity and nature - if it is organized and convinced of the struggle for national liberation and socialism! The working class began its struggle 150 years ago with the Paris Commune, continued it with the socialist revolutions of the 20th century, and continues its struggle until victory. On May 1, we celebrate our strength, reaffirm our resolve to fight in the face of reactionary pressures, by joining hands in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. On May Day 2021, there is something special to celebrate: after almost two years of preparation, the International Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Fascist United Front and its Coordinating Consultative Committee of ten international organizations were founded by nearly 500 organizations on five continents. On this year's May Day, the international working class and oppressed masses are facing the devastating consequences of the world economic and financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Some countries are in the process of overcoming the pandemic. Many countries are still in the grip of a third wave and new increasingly dangerous mutants are emerging.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism in Perspective. Its Relation to the State and the Class Struggle From
    Terrorism in perspective Its relation to the state and the class struggle from a Marxist viewpoint by Ray Nunes, Chairman WPNZ August 1996 If asked, most people would say that the major user of terrorist methods today was Islamic fundamentalism. But as a means of political or religious struggle at present terrorism is by no means confined to one religious grouping. The assassination of Rabin by a Jewish fundamentalist and the election of a Hindu fundamentalist prime minister in India are merely an indication of this. To get a clearer picture of the rise of fundamentalism and religious forms of terror one must use the Marxist method of analysis by the use of materialist dialectics, and by examining the question in its historical development in an all-sided way, seeking to establish the contradictory forces and tendencies at work in their movement, interconnection and interrelation. Background Which brings us to the question of what forms of terror exist, how they are used and where they lead. This article can by no means be regarded as a full answer, simply as a brief statement of our position as a Marxist party, and one which is not at all exclusive to us of the Workers’ Party of New Zealand. Looked at historically the use of terror to enslave and control masses of people goes back to ancient slave society, to a period when powerful tribes expanded their control of territories by force and set up empires based on slave labour, as was the case in ancient Greece and Rome. Out of this system developed chattel slavery, with individual ownership of slaves, who had no rights whatever and were frequently worked to death.
    [Show full text]