NIE 10-55 Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 12 April 1955 I I I I I I I , I I ! This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com !.I ~ ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC THE PROBLEM To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot war con­ ditions in the Bloc. 1 INTRODUCTORY NOTE In estimating the resistance potential skill in doing so, the motivation, and the of a people in relation to their govern­ opportunities, vary from element to ele­ ment' it is necessary to know the nature, ment in the population, and from time to extent, and depth of their discontent, the time. strength of their will to resist, and their In this estimate, the following termi­ capability for resistance compared with nology is used to describe these types the will and capability of the regime to of action: maintain control. 1. Dissidence is a state of mind involving In a Communist-ruled country the best discontent or disaffection with the re­ known of these factors is the regime's in­ gime. tention to preserve internal security re­ gardless of cost; its capability of forestal­ 2. Resistance is dissidence translated into ling effective resistance; and its constant action. pressure to induce the individual to ad­ 3. Organized resistance is that which is just himself to the Communist environ­ carried out by a group of .individuals who ment. have accepted a common purpose, agreed· Lacking any .legal a ven ues for express­ 1 This estimate covers resistance potential in en­ ing dissent, the population still can indi­ tire Sino-Soviet Bloc. More detailed coverage of individual Bloc countries is set forth in the cate its discontent through a variety of attached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria, Czech­ actions and inactions unfavorable to the oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Poland regime, ranging from individual actions and Communist China are considered in the to widespread opposition. These types of over-all estimate, but no annexes are included on these countries. For more detailed treat­ resistance are symptomatic of discontent, ment of these two countries see RIR-t, "Anti­ but do not necessarily reveal the extent, Communist Resistance Activities and Potential constancy, and specific causes of under,.. in Poland," dated 20 July 1954, and RIR-2, "Anti­ Communist Resistance Activities and Potential lying discontent. The will to resist, the in China," dated 2 November 1954. ~ 1 ~ 2 on leadership, and worked out a commu­ warfare, assistance in ~scape and evasion, nica tions system. open defiance of authority, or prepara­ 4. Unorganized resistance is that which is tory activity for any of the above. It may carried out by individuals or loosely asso­ or may not involve violence, and may be ciated groups which may have been conducted openly or clandestinely. formed spontaneously for certain limited 6. Passive resistance, organized or unor­ objectives, without over-all plan or strate­ ganized, is that which is conducted with­ gy. in the framework of the resister's normal 5. Active resistance, organized or unor­ life and duties, and involves deliberate ganized, is that which expresses itself in nonperformance or malperformance of positive acts against the regime. It may acts which would benefit the regime, or take such forms as intelligence collection, deliberate nonconformity with standards psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla of conduct established by the regime. ESTIMATE 1. There is evidence of widespread dissi­ .still be operating in some Satellites, nota­ dence in all Communist Bloc countries. bly in Albania, but they are no more than While in general dissidence is greatest a local nuisance which probably will be among the peasantry, even the youth and wiped out sooner or later by the security industrial workers, two groups which forces. might be expected to be most favorable 4. Even though dissidence within the to Communist indoctrination, have be­ Sino-Soviet Bloc creates a resistance po­ come increasingly disaffected in the Euro­ tential, we believe that under continued pean Satellites and to a lesser extent in cold war conditions active resistance is the USSR. unlikely to develop. There may be a few 2. However, the intensity of dissidence isolated acts of unorganized resistance, varies considerably. It is probably least but the effectiveness of Communist se­ pronounced in the USSR, where Commu­ curity controls and police state methods nism has become more firmly established. will probably remain such as to make In the Far East Bloc areas, where Com­ active organized resistance virtually im­ munism is exploiting the new surge of na­ possible, except in a few almost inaccessi­ tionalism, dissidence almost certainly is ble areas.. Therefore, even in countries much less strong than in the East Euro­ where dissidence is strongest, such as East pean Satellites, where national interests Germany, we see no prospect of resistance are being subordinated to those of the activities developing on a scale sufficient USSR. to threaten the stability of the regimes. 3. Despite the existence of dissidence At a maximum such activities will tend throughout the Bloc, active organized re­ to delay the achievement of Communist sistance is practically nonexistent. A political and economic objectives. At a few isolated small guerrilla bands may minimum they will constitute a nuisance SECPil'i'- 3 to the regimes and will raise the morale nist military and security forces would al­ of anti-Communist elements. Increased most certainly remain sufficiently strong active resistance would be likely only if to prevent or check outbreaks. However, the Communist security apparatus were we estimate that major resistance move­ greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power ments in the Bloc, comparable to those of and prestige were greatly decreased. World War II, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control 5. On the other hand, a sUbstantial de­ until the local security organizations had gree of passive resistance is likely to con­ been seriously weakened and the USSR tinue. Such resistance is unlikely seri­ and Communist China were unable to ously to threaten the political stability of enforce order in their respective orbits. the Communist regimes. However, par­ Until such circumstances arose, activities ticularly in agriculture, it will probably of resistance elements would probably be remain a troublesome and even serious confined to intelligence collection and factor throughout the Bloc countries, im­ transmission, surreptitious antiregime peding the fulfillment of their political propaganda, aid to Western personnel in and economic programs. Nevertheless, escape and evasion operations, and de­ we believe that the persistent pressures fection inducements. exercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of even pas­ 7. In many countries of the non-Commu­ sive resistance and will almost certainly nist world there are organizations, com­ prevent the emergence of coordinated re­ posed of and led by persons who have sistance activities. emigrated from countries of the Soviet 6. In most of the USSR and to a lesser Bloc. In general these organizations extent in Communist China, the out­ have lost effective contact with their break of open warfare would stimulate homelands and do not significantly con­ patriotic feelings in support of the re­ tribute to resistance potential. Virtual­ gimes. Widespread destruction or pro­ ly all have suffered from internal bicker­ tracted hostilities, however, might lead ing and lack of funds and have been pen­ etrated by agents of Communist security to the emergence of resistance. In the forces. The people within the Bloc know newly acquired areas of the USSR, such very little about emigre organizations. as the Baltic States and the Western With rare exceptions they would almost Ukraine, hopes of liberation would be re­ kindled at the outset, intensifying the re­ certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation. sistance potential. In the European Sat­ ellites, the outbreak of war would not .8. In the event of war, the nationality only stimulate hopes for liberation but of invading forces probably would in gen­ would also increase popular unrest and eral have little bearing on the coopera­ passive resistance. We believe, however, tion offered by resistance elements in the that no active organized resistance would Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces occur, unless the Bloc suffered severe were clearly integrated in a broad anti­ military setbacks, and Western forces Communist military· organization. In approached Satellite territory. Commu- certain situations, however, long-stand- SEQRE or- ...il;Q8ft"-!I 4 ing national antipathies might outweigh not substantially affect the will to resist anti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti­ the· regimes in the Bloc countries. 2 Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent • The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department use of: (a) German forces in Czechoslo­ of State, would substitute for this paragraph the following: vakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugo­ The question of responsibility for the initiation slav, Greek, and Turkish units in Bul­ of general war will not affect the will to resist in the European Satellites, whose populations are garia; (c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav so overwhelmingly against the existing regime as units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt. in North Korea and Communist China. It will probably have more significance in the USSR, where support for the regime by the war­ 9.