Economic Alternatives, 2018, Issue 4, pp. 578-584 The Resurgence of Populism in Europe

Ivayla Stoeva* 1 as a world of “post-trust”, a world in which demagogy and populism are the key to being Abstract in power. Although populism is not new on Since 2016 world politics has been the political stage, its re-emergence has changing to one vested with nativism, shaped the political discourses in Europe protectionism and cultural nostalgia, a like never before since the end of World War world of “post-trust” in which demagogy and II. Apparently the EU today is challenged to populism are used as tools to arouse popular search for a way out of the situation “EU at a trust and legitimacy. The article outlines three crossroads”, and the answer to the question dilemmas the EU faces in regard to populism what the EU future will be seems vaguer and resurgence and lists several factors for the problematic with the resurgence of populism growth in electorate support for populist not only in the heart, but also in the periphery political parties, such as migration, inequality, of the EU. terrorism, crisis of political representation. Based on discourse analysis, the article The author also identifies different factors examines the rhetoric populist techniques triggering the rise of populist parties in Western and appeals of the far-right political parties and Eastern countries and has classified across Europe, thus showing that language is the populist appeals in three categories: not a neutral tool for transmitting messages, scapegoating, capitalizing resentments and but nowadays in the voice of the populist constructing authority, all colored with new parties it is rather a way of talking about and approaches of negation, using Islamophobia understanding the world (Phillips & Jorgensen, and Euroscepticism. 2002: 1). Key words: populism, populist rhetoric In order to solve the puzzle of the EU categories and appeals future, first we need to examine what populism JEL classification: D72, D73 is. Although the first scientific researches on populism appeared in the middle of the 20th ince 2016 political events such as century, we still do not have a well-defined SBrexit, Trump’s election for president, doctrine explaining what populism really the electoral results of the National Front in is. Examining the broad literature on this France, Alternative for Germany, the Freedom subject, we can conclude that populism can Party of Austria and the Five Star Movement be examined from different aspects. In 2011, in Italy, along with the growing electorate of Jansen (2011, p.82) defined populism as a a number of populist far right political parties movement, stating that it is “any sustained, across Europe are indicative of the emergence large-scale political project that mobilizes of new politics – nativist, protectionist, vested ordinarily marginalized social sectors into with cultural nostalgia; a world often defined publicly visible and contentious political action, * Asst. Prof. PhD, Political Science Department, University of while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist National and World Economy rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people”. 578 Economic Alternatives, Issue 4, 2018 Articles Both Mudde and Canovan explain populism three major dilemmas regarding the future as a political ideology. According to Canovan development of the unique European project (1999, p. 3), “Populism in modern democratic in relation to populism. societies is best seen as an appeal to ‘the The first line of inquiry is related to the people’ against both the established structure question: who is responsible for the puzzle of of power and the dominant ideas and values the European integration – the European red of the society”. Few years latter Mudde (2004, tape (political and bureaucratic elites) or the p. 543) concluded that populism is “A [thin- European citizens? The economic and financial centered] ideology that considers society to crisis has motivated a number of citizens to be ultimately separated into two homogenous ask for their place in the political agenda of and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ the EU, thus allowing them to discover the versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues existence of the democratic deficit. Following that politics should be the expression of the this, citizens have uncovered and realized volonté générale (general will) of the people”. that despite all European policies, the dividing Despite the fact that populism is not yet lines between the interests of the elites and a well-defined concept, it has its own inner the ones of the citizens are not closing, but logic, which takes distinctive forms in the expanding. This division provokes increasing logic of how populist claims are articulated. mistrust in the EU institutions; the political Therefore, quite often populism has and the bureaucratic elites are aware of the been defined as political style or political reasons why they want and need more Europe, discourse. For example, Jagers & Walgrave but the lack of solidarity among the European (2007, p. 322) describe populism as “A political citizens and the persisting feeling of not being communication style of political actors that represented increases Euroscepticism. refers to the people”, while de la Torre (2000, The second dilemma facing the EU is p. 4) defines populism as “A style of political related to the “common enemy”. Who that might mobilization based on strong rhetorical be – the refugees or the terrorists, the USA appeals to the people and crowd action on or Russia? The European solidarity lacks the behalf of a leader. [. . .] It is a rhetoric that consolidating factor of “the obvious, powerful constructs politics as a moral and ethical and premeditated enemy“ (Bauman, 1995, struggle between el pueblo and the oligarchy”. p. 320-321). The use of the so called “soft Why does populism matter today? It is power” (model of dialogue and negotiations) evident that at the moment Europe is living by the EU cannot turn it into an independent in populist times. The systematic crisis in geopolitical actor, with its own strategy and Europe made European citizens feel more and therefore it is not able to take on the burden more disillusioned with mainstream politics. of an active and vivid presence in the highly Their anger, distrust and fury against the polarized and contradictory world today. mainstream political parties, the bureaucrats The next dilemma corresponds to the in Brussels, and the economic elites have question: Can the common market be used as prepared the political scene for new populist common base for EU solidarity and justice? political actors, who speak in the name of the Unfortunately the common market itself alone “people”. cannot produce politically stable solidarity. In In regard to the uncertainties of the future addition, the populist political parties could of the EU political project following the Brexit also further “weaken the EU’s legitimacy. This and the increasing demands for restoring in turn would prevent Europe from bridging the the sovereignty of the member countries, deep divisions that have emerged between voiced by the populist parties, we can outline creditors and debtors, north and south, euro- 579 Articles The Resurgence of Populism in Europe ins and euro-outs, and citizens and elites – and losing their cultural identity and rituals, and on make the European Parliament increasingly the other losing their jobs to the new comers. irrelevant” (Leonard & Torreblanca, 2014, p.2). The third factor is terrorism – the last two The systematic crisis in Europe conduced or three years Europe has suffered a number to additional mobilization of the European of terrorist attacks, which provoked people to citizens by means of radicalization of political be afraid of the differences. messages, such as cultural conservatism, The forth, but equally relevant factor is xenophobia, racism, populism based on the the crisis of political representation and the opposition between the elite and the people. gradual decrease of the impact of mainstream In other words, the new European populism is political parties on society. Therefore, the new founded on two underlying conflicts: the first is European nationalism successfully recreates the antagonism “we-they” (we – the Christian a new reality for the citizens, in which the Europeans and they – the Muslim, refugees, society is divided into two antagonistic parts: and immigrants) and the second one is the in hierarchy dependence – the “people” vs. the existing structural cleavage – the conflict “elite” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), and horizontally between the national and the European – the “people” vs. the “foreigners” (Canovan, (Todorov, 2010, p. 233). 1999, p. 5). The dread of the unknown, the loss of The rise of the populist far-right political identity in the “global village” increases parties in Eastern European countries cannot the fears of the Europeans towards the be explained by the same factors that have led to the emergence and expansion of the “foreigners”, allowing a number of populist radical right in Western Europe. Up until and demagogical political parties to utilize 1990s problems such as globalization and the anti-capitalist, anti-European, anti- immigration did not exist for these societies, immigrant, anti-Islamic rhetoric. The growth but one of the major impulses for the in electorate support for populist far-right emergence of far-right political parties was (radical) political parties can be explained the transition to democracy that created a by a number of factors. The first factor that number of the so called “losers” – people triggers that growth is the loss of economic living in small villages, with low incomes, security and the growing inequality. According without jobs, etc. A vast number of people to Thomas Piketty (2014) today we are living that at first were enthusiastic about the in the so called Gilded Age, where only a democratic change, then turned to far-right few people have accumulated enormous political parties, because they became angry wealth. Inequality, however, not only relates and dissatisfied with the life they compared to the people, but taking into consideration to what had been promised they would the regional differences in the EU, we can achieve, in other words these countries faced conclude that there is also specific inequality the so called democratic fatigue. Mistrust of among the EU regions that trigger additional mainstream political parties has been growing frustration and despair among the European along with the mistrust of all democratic citizens. institutions such as parliament, government, The second one is the increased migration justice system – all of them labelled with the towards Europe (refugee waves and economic sign of corruption. Therefore it is not surprising migration). The increased number of that East European far-right political parties immigrants and refugees coming to the EU for were able to gain such an electoral support the last decade, on one hand provoked deeply offering the people a way out of the crisis. rooted fears among the European citizen of The Euro-zone crisis and the migrant crisis 580 Economic Alternatives, Issue 4, 2018 Articles in the EU additionally enhanced the impact of religion of intolerance, oppressing women, the far-right political parties on national and homosexuals, and Jews (Mayer, 2013). European level. The fear of the EU policy Second, political parties that raise the flag towards the nation state and the fear of losing of the national sovereignty, such as the Party their national identity with the Union caused a of Independence in UK and the Alternative rise in right-wing radicalization on the basis of for Germany – concentrate on the themes slogans about national purification, opposition of identity, immigration and cultural decline, to the EU, and a return to “true values” (Ekiert without being burdened with extremist and & Kubik, 2014, p. 54). racist views (Camus, 2002). The above listed premises, according Third, the members of the European to Jean-Yves Camus (2002) have led to the conservatives and reformists group in the “mutation” of the populist parties in Europe, European parliament that includes the British which can be systematized in three groups: conservatives and the political party “Right First, far-right political parties, varying and Justice” in Poland whose nationalism can from the National front in France to Jobbik in Hungary and “Golden Dawn” in Greece –all be defined with David Cameron’s statement: focus on the anti-immigrant rhetoric, cultural "In the name of a state multiculturalism we racism, stigmatizing the “others”. The core have encouraged the different cultures to exist messages of the far-right political parties separately, isolated from one another and have not changed over time, but in the past withdrawn from the main culture (…) I think ten years the leaders of these political parties, that it is time to break off with the policies of in particular the National Front have managed the past, which failed"(Todorov, 2013, p. 183). to soften the image of the far-right, leaving Despite the existing differences among the behind the ideas of neo-Nazism, claiming they populist parties across Europe, if we examine are far from being “racist”, but rather being their party programs, we can see that they also defenders of secularity and of democracy, share some core values. These similarities they fight against the Islam presented as a can be observed in the table below. Table 1. Populist Party values Globalization Nation state Democracy Economic policy Party/ Country Corporate Banking movement Trade Immigration Sovereignty Representation Redistribution taxes sector Alternative for Germany Mixed Populist Populist Populist Mixed N/A N/A Germany France National Front Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Freedom Party Liberal/ Austria Mixed Populist Populist Populist Populist N/A of Austria Consensus Italy Five Star Movement Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Liberal/ Liberal/ Poland Law and Justice Party Mixed Populist Populist Populist Populist Consensus Consensus Hungary Jobbik Mixed Populist Populist Populist Populist N/A Populist Source: Allianz Global Investors, Barclays, August 2017. The failure to impose multiculturalism freedom, no to multiculturalism, no to the in Europe and the following refugee crisis European integration. In other words, the new revived xenophobia, although today it is seen European nationalism cultivates Islamophobia, in a slightly newer aspect as Islamophobia, postulates to differentiate the “roots” of the nationalism based on negativism: no to the nations from the immigrants and in particular refugees, no to the migrants, no to religious the non-European ones, whose right to stay 581 Articles The Resurgence of Populism in Europe in the country, as well as their economic and The first rhetoric category is mainly social rights should be limited. related to the proposed economic patriotism. The popular success of these political It represents a new national alternative to parties cannot be possible without the use the market globalization, by offering new job of populism, understood as a discourse positions closed for the foreigners, a state and political style. The populist discourse is responsible for everything – in other words understood as the polemic techniques and it is hegemony of the right masked with left means (including the mass media) used rhetoric. The emergence of this economic to lead to delusion, aiming to convince the patriotism has been facilitated by the lack people in their rightfulness; so it is an appeal of left alternatives that can fight the income to the emotions of the people rather than the stagnation, the decreased and fewer financed reason, thus provoking racists, religious and social services. The economic patriotism is class prejudices. clearly visible in the statements of the far- The populist appeals can be classified in right political parties in the EU. For example, three main rhetoric categories: according to Marine Le Pen, the leader of the 1. The first one can be defined as National Front, the free movement is “madness” scapegoating, or proposing answers to and therefore “we should restore our state where all the problems come from: By borders”. Therefore the new nationalism has engaging in stereotyping of out-groups, the been constructed along the dividing lines: demagogue attempts to justify prejudice nation state against the European governance; against them (Bronner, 2014, p. 59). the idea of “one land, one nation” against the 2. The second category is arousing and multicultural society. capitalizing resentment and paranoia, Therefore, Euroscepticism is a distinctive followed by increased distrust in public characteristic of the new European authorities: By stoking a sense of outrage, nationalism. All far-right (radical) political humiliation at a loss of influence, or an parties in one way or another doubt the obsession with the perceived decline of essence of the integration as well as the society, the demagogue is able to compel future development of the EU; they aspire for their followers to renounce due process its dissolution or, at least, for preserving it as and rule of law in their rush to marginalize, a formal structure but restoring the national expel or punish the scapegoated out-group sovereignty to the member states, exploiting (Benson, 2011, p. 25). According to Bart the themes of the cultural decay and the Bonikowski (2016, pp. 10-11) the populist change in the demographic picture of lots of political parties exploit the antipathies the European states. towards the scapegoated out-groups – The second rhetoric category of ethnic, racial, or religious minorities and a the demagogue appeal is visible in the result of this exclusionary discourse is the expressions used by the nationalists to arouse implicit narrowing of “the people” to a subset and capitalize resentment and paranoia. of the public that qualifies as the legitimate For this category what is of importance are source of political power. the used abusing metaphors and images 3. The third category is constructing of the forbidden golden past, colored with authority – on the one hand, the demagogue manifestations of racism, xenophobia, anti- proclaims himself to be a truth keeper, on the immigrant acts. The electorate is instigated other he proclaims others to be ostensibly towards fear from the other nationalities, corrupt elites, stating they all profit from the because they threaten to take their jobs, they institutions (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 11). endanger the indigenous culture and safety. 582 Economic Alternatives, Issue 4, 2018 Articles Marine Le Pen argues French citizenship he is a “hysterical, radical Europeanist” who is should be «either inherited or merited». As weak on jihadi terror (Henlye, 2017). for illegal immigrants, they «have no reason to Discrediting the opponent is widely used stay in France, these people broke the law the technique in political battles to win the minute they set foot on French soil»(Nowak & electorate, but when it comes to far-right Branford, 2017). political parties in Europe today they resort In addition, the terrorist attacks in Europe to using specific language and accusations. lead to fortified space identification. For As it is evident from the past year elections example, the radical political party Pegida in France and Germany, the far-right political in Germany have stated that “the attacks in leaders accuse the mainstream political Paris do not come out of the blue; they are leaders for being too Europeans, i.e. they a result of the migrant policy across Europe” forget the national interest favoring the EU; (Hewitt, 2015). Their position has been firmly they freely open the state borders without states on January 1, 2016 in Cologne, when thinking of the following consequences for the the main slogan of the anti-Islam meeting was state, predominantly state security; that they „Rapefugees not welcome“. In a similar way have governed for years and were not able Orbán opened his anti-immigrant campaign to handle the social problems in the society, saying that “Today the pledge is Europe, but on the contrary the immigrant policy they the European way of life, the survival or the were adhering to for a long time has led to extinction of the European values and nations exclusion of certain groups in the society. or their transformation to be unrecognizable. Contrary to the normatively prescribed We want Europe to be kept for the Europeans” justice and solidarity, the systematic crisis in (Mudde, 2015). the EU challenges the founding values of the This rhetoric category today is closely Union: solidarity, justice and equality. Facing related to the issue of the enemy within multiple crises and perils – migrant and refugee Europe. It is quite easy to blame all immigrants crisis, crisis of democratic legitimacy, political for the problems of the nation as well as for the leadership crisis, economic stagnation, high terrorist attacks across Europe, but the main social tensions, dangers of terrorist attacks, issue remains unsolved, i.e. who is the actual the future of the EU depends on its ability enemy within Europe. We cannot ignore the to oppose the internal and external dangers, fact that most immigrants are Muslim and this to provide for economic growth and social changes the demographic picture of Europe, justice and solidarity in the highly heterogenic but on the other hand it is also very interesting structure of the union and an increasing to observe that nations such as France and economic and social destabilization around Slovakia use the anti-immigrant and anti- the world. Islam rhetoric while France has a big Muslim The approaches used by the populist minority and Slovakia does not have one. far-right political parties in Europe are not The third rhetoric category is related to the new, they have been used before. What is appeal of creating the demagogue as the true different this time are the specific rhetoric and only authority; the opponents are often appeals – although some of the categories discredited in order to be able to control the have been used for decades, the existing narrative and negate the opposition. The most serious institutional imperfections of the recent evidence of this rhetoric category can EU, the increasing mistrust of the European be seen at the French presidential elections citizens in the European institutions, the EU this year. 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