Spring 14 Rising Populism and European Elections Collection of selected contributions www.iedonline.eu This publication received financial support from the European Parliament. Sole liability rests with the author and the European Parliament is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. 2 Contents EUROPEAN UNION ……………………………………………………………….5 POPULISM, POLARIZATION, POLITICIZATION, PARTICIPATION. PROJECTING THE EU BEYOND THE MARKET? FRANCESCO NICOLI AUSTRIA…………………………………………………………………………...32 POPULISM, ELITES AND EUROSCEPTICISM: THE CASE OF AUSTRIA, COSTANZA CAPUTI CYPRUS……………………………………………………………………………50 POPULISM AND THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN CYPRUS, ELLADA IOANNOU FRANCE……………………………………………………………………………80 POPULISM IN FRANCE: 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AT STAKE? MATHIEU CAMESCASSE ROMA MIGRATION IN FRANCE: FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE UNION OR A THREAT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY, RADOST ZAHARIEVA GERMANY………………………………………………………………………..128 WHICH POLITICAL PROCESSES HAMPER AND BENEFIT RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES' ADVANCES - LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN CASE 1982-2012, TIMO LOCHOCKI IRLAND…………………………………………………………………………...153 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 'FAR RIGHT' AND 'POPULIST POLITICS' IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND, PETER MCGUIGAN ITALY……………………………………………………………………………..178 OPPOSITION IN THE EU AND OPPOSITION TO THE EU: SOFT AND HARD EUROSCEPTICISM IN ITALY IN THE TIME OF AUSTERITY, PIETRO CASTELLI GATTINARA, CATERINA FROIO A FIVE STAR DIGITAL POPULISM, GENTIOLA MADHI ROMANIA.………………………………………………………………………..229 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ROMANIAN CASE, MIHAI SEBE SPAIN.……………………………………………………………………………..285 POPULISM IN SPAIN: DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF THE EUROPE, BUT ANYWAY GROWING, OIER LOBERA EZENARRO AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………….283 3 4 Populism, Polarization, Politicization, Participation. Projecting the EU Beyond the Market? Francesco Nicoli1 The goal of this study is to investigate whether the rise in Euroscepticism observed in the Euro Area in the last years may have democratic-enhancing effects alongside its often-discussed negative implications. The paper focuses on the emergence of Eurosceptic forces in the Euro Area countries, engaging both in horizontal comparative analysis and in the discussion of two case studies, Italy and the Netherlands. The first part of the work focuses on the presentation of the main theoretical approaches that expected a rise of populism as a reaction to the politicization of the European construction. The second part of the paper analyses the effects of populism on the sequential chain of polarization, politicization and participation of European policies both at national and European level. The results suggest that although the rise of populism may have short term negative implications for the political system, it also provides a push to pursue a more democratically- oriented pattern to the full politicization of the EU. The author is grateful to Doris Schyns for her excellent research assistantship. The author wishes to thank Leila Giannetto, Simone Tagliapietra, Davide Denti and Doris Schyns for their useful comments and insights. 1. Introduction Since the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, there has been a growing attention on the rise of Eurosceptic parties in the member states and the structural features of the European Union that might have triggered the change.2 However, Euroscepticism has acquired a primary political relevance only after 2010, when the nationalist parties traditionally opposing European integration have been flanked by new groups identifying the European governance and institutions as the leading political agents responsible for the resilience of the financial crisis in the Euro Area.3 1 Ph.D. Candidate in International Studies at the University of Trento 2 Startin, N. and A. Krouwel (2013) Euroscepticism Re-galvanized: The consequences of the French and Dutch Rejections of the European Consitution. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, Issue 1. 3 It must be pointed out that it is methodologically unrefined to equate populistic Euroscepticism with opposition against European policies, although the different groups often overlap. The methodology adopted in this work classifies as eurosceptic and populistic parties only the political forces that actively claim a reduction of the level of institutional integration, either as a consequence of a multilateral decision, or as a unilateral action performed by member states. Consequently a number of national parties opposing given European policies, without however campaigning for a substantial decrease of the European Union competences, have not been 5 On the one hand, the rise in populism and Euroscepticism observed in several European countries is surely a worrying by-product of the current crisis. However, this paper argues that the European project and the democratic stance of the continent may also be positively influenced by the entrance of these forces in the electoral arena at national and European level. In both arenas, the democratic- enhancing effect may occur as a consequence of multiple phenomena. This study will show that the sequential chain of populism, polarisation, politicisation and participation may be consistent with a new phase of the European integration, where the integration of polities, and not only of policies,4 is the characterising factor. The analysis focuses on Euro Area countries with particular attention given to countries with more than 4 millions of inhabitants; in addition, Italy and the Netherlands are adopted as case studies for a comparative exercise. While the possible threats of a surge of nationalism and Euroscepticism are clear and must not be downplayed, this eventuality had long been expected as a consequence of the progressive expansion of the integration process beyond the pure market—enhancing regulatory policies. The paper is organised as follows. The second section will look in detail into the traditional theories of European integration in the attempt to disclose some clues on the correlation between the rise of populism and “the end of the market Honeymoon” 5, presenting the theoretical approaches that contribute to explain why the rise of Euroscepticism is inevitable. The third section will deal with the impact of the Euro crisis on the structure and competences of the Union; the fourth section will discuss the issue of political polarisation over European policy occurring at national and European level, investigating the emergence of Grand Coalitions. The fifth sections will deal with the progressive politicisation of European policies studying the impact of Euroscepticism domestically, abroad and at European level. Finally, the seventh section will deal with participation, discussing whether the rise in Euroscepticism may actually generate an increase in democratic participation at national and European level. classified as Eurosceptic populist parties. This includes the Greek leftist party Syriza, the German FDP, and the Irish Sinn Féin. This criterion is today required as the European crisis has boosted a number of political forces that do not oppose European integration or the European institutions for their nature, but rather they claim a substantial change in the policies indicated and pushed forward by the EU. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance represents the main exception to this criterion. The Treaty, as such, cannot be considered purely as a policy. However, it does not formally belong to the body of European law, and it has a very strong stance in terms of policies required at national level. Automatically identifying forces opposing the Fiscal Compact as populist and eurosceptic would both expand enormously the account of Eurosceptic forces, and shade the particular traits of contemporary Euroscepticism- its resurgent nationalistic nature. 4 Schmitter, P. (2002) Neo-Neo-Functionalism. Working Paper for the publication in Wiener A. and T. Diez (eds) (2003) Theories of European Integration. Oxford University Press, p.33 5 Hartmann, M. and F. De Witte (2013) Ending the Honeymoon: constructing Europe Beyond the Market. German Law Journal, Vol.14, No.05, p.445 6 2. Eurosceptic Populism: an expected surge. Populist and nationalist Eurosceptic parties are growing in many Euro Area countries.6 While this development may have surprised policy-makers and mainstream parties, it was hardly unexpected for scholars of European integration. In particular, three long-standing theoretical approaches contribute to explain why the rise of Euroscepticism is inevitable- and why we should be only limitedly worrying about it. The first explanation is provided by early7 and contemporary8 versions of neofunctionalism. The second can be found in the theory on party formation by Lipset and Rokkan.9 The third in the growing body of literature concerning the so-called “democratic deficit” of the European Union, and in particular, in Weiler,10 and Majone.11 Early neofunctionalist theorists expects a surge of nationalism against the process of centralization as a phenomenon characterising the fourth and conclusive phase of integration of a federal state, when the ruling groups are engaged to proceed with political integration.12 The absence of solidarity and common nationhood among the countries of the Union implies that central institutions cannot be based on truly democratic values. Instead, central institutions are likely to acquire an authoritarian nature in the attempt to perform central government functions without having the necessary