The Challenge of the Five Star Movement

Rinaldo Vignati

If you were to determine who the main Italian political character of 2012 was, the choice could only fall on Beppe Grillo. Until the local elections in May, his political presence had aroused scant attention, and he had been reduced to an essentially folkloric phenomenon. Grillo was considered a “troublemaker” who was in a position to influence the electoral results. This was the case in the regional elections in Piedmont in 2010, where the grillino candidate drew away votes from the candidate of the center-left, Mercedes Bresso. However, Grillo was not given chances to become a powerful and long-lasting political heavyweight. Following the local elections in May, the sub- sequent rise in polls, and the Sicilian regional elections of October, Grillo’s Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement) has become a leading figure of the political confrontation. It is able to interpret the consensus of a large chunk of the electorate and can therefore influence the political strategies of other actors.

The Local Elections of 2012: Where Did the Votes for the Five Star Movement Come From?

The path that led today’s M5S to the position of a prominent political actor—from the founding of Grillo’s blog to the creation of Meetup Groups, from the two “V-Days” to the birth of the civic lists1—raises

Italian Politics: Technocrats in Office 28 (2013): 78–94 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2013.280105 The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 79 one question: is this a project that has had from the beginning the goal to create a list able to compete nationally, or has the M5S established itself randomly, opportunistically exploiting the spaces that a political system in deep crisis has from time to time provided? On the one hand, it is hard to imagine that, at the beginning of the path, Grillo and his companion Gianroberto Casaleggio2 had the ambition to form a political force able to compete with the major parties on the scene.3 On the other hand, if we think back to the collection of signatures on the “V-Days” (both unsuccessful), the “citizen primaries” (ignored by the government), and the candidacy of Grillo in the primaries of the Democratic Party (obstructed),4 they seem like plugs to a “plan.” This plan demonstrates how to use the doors that the political system reserves for popular participation and to highlight, through its “losses,” the fictional character of these same opportunities. This cre- ates a growing distrust of traditional political forces and a “mythology” to justify the increasing direct involvement of the Movement within the political institutions, replacing parties that have proved unable to listen to citizens.5 In addition to these “demonstrative” activities, the party’s entry into the electoral arena followed strategic timing, not a mere desire to make a point. To illustrate, in 2009, Grillo chose not to participate in the European elections, and the M5S’s participation in the local elections was announced only after political support had been consolidated. It is certainly an exaggeration to assume the existence of a step-by- step comprehensive strategy diligently executed from the beginning, yet the success of the M5S is definitely the result of a long preparation process. Nevertheless, the outcome of the 2012 administrative elections have surprised most observers. Some have also denied that the results were even relevant. This was the case with the president of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, who, when interviewed after the elections, denied with a smile that there had been any “boom” of consensus for Grillo’s lists. In the following weeks, the polls confirmed that the ballot box of 6 and 7 May had produced something extraordinary. The M5S contested seats in 101 municipalities and received almost 200,000 votes, that is, 8.7 percent of the valid votes cast in those municipalities. Where it is possible to make a comparison with the results of 2010, the 2012 data show a strong growth: in Alessandria the votes almost quadrupled; in Verona they almost tripled; in Parma, Monza, Cuneo, and Belluno they more than doubled. The results, however, are not geographically uniform: as in previous elections, the South proves to be a weak point. In fact, between the North and the “red zone,” the M5S presents lists in as many as 77 municipalities, while in the Center-South it is present in only 24 centers. Also, when 80 Rinaldo Vignati

in the North and the “red zone,” the percentages of votes are often in double digits (and never less than 3 percent), whereas in the Center- South, the overall percentage stops at 3 percent and in some cases does not exceed 1.1 percent.6 The growth of the party’s support pushed politicians and commentators to question the origin of the M5S’s votes. The calculations carried out by the Istituto Cattaneo—through the so-called Good- man model—on the regional flows between 2010 and the last com- munal elections in the main cities showed that the component from the People of Freedom (PdL) is almost non-existent.7 There are two sources from which the M5S drew its electoral strength. One is the Northern League (LN), which in Monza, Piacenza, and Parma con- stitutes approximately a quarter of the vote and in Verona and Genoa a little less. It is plausible to argue—even if there is no data to support it—that the transfer of votes from the League has intensified particularly after the outbreak of the scandal involving the LN’s trea- surer, Francesco Belsito, and the organizational problems that have hit Umberto Bossi’s party.8 The other source—the center-left—is even more substantial. From this camp, adding the votes that in 2010 had gone to the Democratic Party (PD), the Radical Left, the only presidential candidate of the Center, and Italy of Values (IdV), comes a component of the M5S electorate ranging from 24 percent in Piacenza to 71 percent in Genoa, exceeding 37 percent in Parma and Verona, and 42 percent in Monza. This data can be read in several ways. One could simply highlight the “protesting” component that is in opposition to the political establishment, which has also been expressed by the League and the IdV, and stress that there is a certain similarity between themes of the M5S and the topics used in previous political phases by these two parties. This would reduce the success of the M5S to the periodic high tide of a protesting and anti-political component that is always present in the Italian electorate and that, in different political phases, has assumed differentiated identities. More tempting, in my opinion, is to argue instead that there has been a transfer of votes from the center- left bloc.9 One might ask, in this regard, if the present success of the M5S does not tell us something interesting about the transformations that have affected the electorate of the center-left in recent decades— changes that may have escaped the notice of researchers due to the tendency to associate “populism” with “the right.”10 In this regard, it is perhaps worth examining the M5S’s relationship with previous movements born on the left side of the political spec- trum—the girotondi (roundabouts), the Purple People (Popolo Viola), the rallies at the Palasharp arena promoted by Freedom and Justice The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 81

(Libertà e Giustizia), and so on—as well as the characteristics of these movements. Was the success of the M5S favored by these movements, or should we speak of discontinuities? Several leaders of the above- mentioned movements have clearly put distance between themselves and the Five Star Movement. And there is a huge difference between the rhetoric of, for example, Gustavo Zagrebelsky, with his learned quotations and calm voice, and the shouting rallies of Grillo. Yet I submit that, in the perception of ordinary citizens, there is continuity. These movements, I would argue, are going beyond even the intentions of their promoters, helping to fuel and legitimize in the center-left electorate a general lack of confidence in the political class, in politics in general, and in the need to compromise that follows. Thanks to technological and organizational tools, and to his unquestionable skills and unscrupulous rhetoric, Grillo has been able to take advantage of all this and become a political entrepreneur.11 Arguably, some elements that make implicit reference to the usual practices of “anti-politics” (unwillingness to compromise, tendency to see political competition in terms of good and bad, generalized distrust of the political class) have in the last 20 years spread through the center-left electorate. This may have contributed to the loss of votes by historically center-left parties in favor of the political forces—the IdV previously and the M5S today— that have approached these issues with greater resolve and have been more vigorously opposed to the “privileges” of the political class. The current success of the M5S, I argue, can therefore be indicative of deeper cultural transformations that have not yet been appraised.

The Five Star Movement to the Parma Government

The result of the administrative elections of May is important not only due to the amount of the votes collected by the M5S, but also due to the capture of four municipalities, of which one is Parma. This Emilian city, which came out of a disastrous administrative experience (the Vignali administration having left a budget in deep distress), saw in the second round of elections the confrontation of Vincenzo Bernazzoli, the center- left candidate, against the grillino Federico Pizzarotti, with the first having a distinct advantage (starting at 39.2 percent against 19.4 percent). Belying all predictions (with Bernazzoli calling the vote “a final against a second-division team”), the second round was concluded with the victory of Pizzarotti (with 60.2 percent of the vote). The electoral flows produced by Istituto Cattaneo indicate that in the second round of the vote, the ballots that had gone in the first round to the candidates of the center-right (a total of 31 percent, split between Buzzi, Ghiretti, and 82 Rinaldo Vignati

Ubaldi) were transferred to Pizzarotti. This transfer does not disprove the hypothesis of low permeability between the center-right and the M5S outlined above (and later confirmed by the Sicilian flows), since in this particular instance the motivation of the center-right voters was a consideration of political convenience. As stated in one of the most accurate journalistic analyses of the vote in Parma, to direct the behav- ior of the center-right voters to the ballot “was an argument of the kind ‘Let Samson die with the Philistines.’ It is better to have an outcome that brings an outsider onto the mayor’s chair but leaves fluid the power relations in the economic sphere. It is better to give a chance to the grillini and maybe hope for a quick administrative failure rather than the kind of political ‘retirement’” that would have followed the victory of Bernazzoli and “the political alliance of the PD with the business community.”12 Therefore, in the second round of the elections, those who were “outraged”—who had protested for months in front of the town hall against the preceding administration—converged toward Piz- zarotti. Paradoxically, they merged with those who had supported the administration and now, in order to have a better chance of coming back into the game soon in the future, had preferred to go for a political choice (the M5S) deemed less able to consolidate its own power. Therefore, for the first time, a member of the M5S found himself at the head of a provincial capital. However, some difficulties arose immediately. All commentators noted the delay in the formation of the government of Parma (giunta comunale), which took nearly 46 days. This was seen as an indication of a lack of political capital at the elite level. Also problematic was the choice of director-general for the city council, a position for which the new mayor had initially proposed Valentino Tavolazzi, an early member of the Movement who had been thrown out by Grillo for having demanded greater internal democracy. After a tough intervention by Grillo, who had deemed the choice “impossible,” Pizzarotti was forced to give up his candidate.13 If it could have chosen the municipality in which to test its capac- ity to govern, the M5S would have hardly chosen Parma, a city bur- dened by two giant inconveniences: a heavy debt, which places tight constraints on any administrative choices, and the looming presence of the city’s incinerator, which poses an impossible dilemma to a political force that made the opposition to incinerators one of the key elements of its programmatic proposal. To meet the expectations of an electorate with a grudge against the waste and privileges of the “caste,” some of the first measures taken by Pizzarotti included a 10 percent cut in the compensation of the mayor and the administration, a reduction in the number of the so-called blue cars (city hall corporate cars), and the cancellation of the free tickets to Teatro Regio, The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 83 where seats were customarily reserved for public authorities like the mayor and the city councilors. Again in order to reduce expenses, Pizzarotti dismissed the (pri- vate) orchestra of the Teatro Regio, replacing it with the Toscanini Orchestra (funded by the region). This caused discontent at the Cham- ber of Commerce, “which closed the taps on the funding of the opera season and led to the resignation of the vice-president of the executive board of the Regio.”14 Another debated measure, much joked about by the less sympathetic press, was the “anti-movida” order, prohibiting the use of alcohol after 9:00 pm. In line with the emphasis placed by the M5S on the transparency of institutions, the new mayor has also launched a “live streaming” of the city council sessions. This is in keeping with actions taken by militant grillini, who in recent years have launched in several municipalities the so-called fiato sul collo (breathing on their neck) operation—recording the sessions of the municipal councils and circulating them on the Internet. These measures, although of great symbolic impact, were of secondary importance compared to the two issues mentioned earlier: the debt and the incinerator, which are intertwined with each other. While Pizzarotti finds himself compensating for the “hole” inherited from the previous administration, he must somehow also honor the election promise to stop the entry into operation of the incinerator, a promise that could cost him a heavy penalty. In short, the incinerator is where the credibility of the M5S will be tested. During the election campaign, it had promised to block the incinerator, while Iren SpA, the multi-utility that operates the plant, had an interest in completing the construction by December so as to avoid losing 40 million euros of government incentives related to the production of electricity from plants using renewable resources. The city of Parma owns only 6 percent of Iren, and thus the company responds only partially to the wishes of the Pizzarotti administration. Other administrations (including the municipality of Reggio Emilia, the city where the headquarters of the holding company is based) are pushing for the early entry into operation of the plant, so as to recover their investments. The battle took place with appeals in court, and at the end of August Parma’s prosecutor had asked for the preliminary seizure of the construction building on the allegation of construction and office abuses. Grillo declared victory, but afterward the judge for preliminary investiga- tions rejected the request of the prosecutor. This decision brought the sword of Damocles back over Pizzarotti’s head in the form of a fine of 180 million euros to be paid in case of the closure of the incinerator— a heavy penalty for any administration, unsustainable for Parma.15 84 Rinaldo Vignati

When Grillo returned to Parma for a speech at the end of Sep- tember, the press reported that it was a “flop”: few people attended, compared to the huge gatherings that Grillo was used to. This does not mean that the population of Parma chose to turn their backs on the just elected administration. It would be rash to suppose that the disappointment of the citizens of Parma, due to a failure of Pizzarotti’s administration on the issue of the incinerator, could have an impact at the national level. As was written in an assessment of the first 100 days of the new mayor, “probably the difference between facts and promises … will not be decisive for the electoral outcome of a list sustained by its ‘no’ to the current political supply rather than its ‘yes’ to an alternative model.”16

Growth in the Polls and the Vote in Sicily: An Unstoppable Movement?

The problems that emerged in Parma did not prevent a dramatic growth of the M5S in the surveys. Immediately after the first round of the administrative elections, according to surveys of two leading public opinion research institutes, Ipsos and SWG, a bandwagon effect was triggered (see fig. 1). This effect got stronger and stronger with the second round. Soon the electoral strength of the M5S was close to 20 percent and sometimes even exceeded this threshold. The next electoral test that followed the local elections in May confirmed the growth in consensus recorded by the surveys. At the Sicil- ian regional elections held on 28 October, the M5S, with 14.9 percent, became a political force on the island. Led by presidential candidate Giovanni Cancelleri, the Movement brought a large contingent of 15 elected members to the regional assembly. This contingent—in a context characterized by the absence of a solid majority in support of the winner (Rosario Crocetta, candidate of the center-left)—could prove politically decisive. An analysis of electoral flows confirms the findings from previous rounds. A comparison of the results of 2012 with those of the main cities in the Sicilian regional elections in 2008 (see table 1) reveals that the M5S got its votes mainly from the center-left. The flows from the center-right and from abstentions are far weaker, with the exception of Siracusa, which has fewer polling stations and is therefore, of the four cities, the one in which estimates using the Goodman model are less reliable. The flow analysis contradicts an opinion frequently heard in the aftermath of the 2012 elections (and endorsed by the candidates of the The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 85

FIGURE 1 Voting Intentions for the Five Star Movement in 2012 (percentages)

JAN 2 JAN 4 FEB 1 FEB 3 MAR 1 MAR 3 APR 1 APR 3 MAY 1 MAY 3 MAY 5 JUN 2 JUN 4 SEP 1 SEP 3 OCT 1 OCT 3 OCT 5 NOV 2 NOV 4 DEC 2

Ipsos SWG

Source: Polls carried out by Ipsos and SWG. See http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali .it (accessed 30 December 2012). Data supplemented with information from http://www .scenaripolitici.com (entries dated 19 and 21 December 2012).

TABLE 1 Estimation of the Electoral Flows towards the M5S in the Major Sicilian Cities: How 100 Voters Who Voted for the M5S in the Regional Elections of 2012 Had Voted in the Regional Elections of 2008

Palermo Catania Messina Siracusa

Amici di Beppe Grillo 9 11 8 6 Far left 14 9 6 0 IdV 2 7 5 2 PD 32 26 37 34 Finocchiaro list 9 10 8 2 UdC 7 5 11 0 PdL 9 0 3 41 MpA 1 2 5 0 Lombardo list 1 7 0 1 Democratici Autonomisti 0 5 6 3 La Destra, Forza Nuova 3 4 0 2 Votes for president 13 14 11 9 Abstentions 0 0 0 0 Total 100 100 100 100 Source: Elaborated by the Istituto Cattaneo, based on data provided by the electoral services of the four municipalities. 86 Rinaldo Vignati

Movement). According to this opinion, the M5S brought back to the polling stations voters who did not vote at the 2008 election. From the point of view of a sociological analysis, this result seems to substanti- ate the above-mentioned remark on the vote for the M5S originating from the center-left. However, in political terms it suggests that the victory of the candidate of the center-left was due mainly to a process of “demobilization” within the center-right. A reorganization of the center-right might have reduced the progress made by the M5S, which was the only political party that increased its total number of votes between 2008 and 2012. In the end, what do the 2012 results show with regard to the Sicil- ian M5S? Do they indicate the fading away of the structural factors that had until then slowed down the grillini in the South? We need to say that the Sicilian vote was strongly affected by “contingent” factors. First, we have to consider the high number of people who did not turn up at the polls. This number, however, tends to decrease in between regional and national elections depending on what center-right parties offer to the Sicilian voters. Furthermore, there was the strong push deriving from the direct commitment of Grillo to the territory. He was the real protagonist of the campaign, more so than the candidates on the list. His campaign has been noted for two main reasons. The first was his ability to stage spectacular events: he swam across the channel between Messina and Reggio di Calabria and managed to climb the volcano Mount Etna, thus gaining the attention of the mass media. The second was his ability to adapt the message to the audience, in line with one of the most typical characteristics of populism: he was able to change the message depending on the needs and expectations of his audience. In this regard, some statements stand out. Surpris- ingly, considering that the leader of the Five Star Movement relent- lessly condemns the extravagance of the political class, Grillo stated that the high number of forest guards in the region was necessary. Yet this is one of the most cited examples of the excessive growth of the Sicilian public sector and the logic of patronage that regulates it. Even more so than the result in Parma, the Sicilian regional elections have provided a challenge for the Movement. Will the new regional councilors be able to resist the temptation of the Palace in a regional assembly where party switch rates are high and in a context in which the regional government does not have a solid majority and therefore will have to find support among other political parties? The latter implies the need to seek help of various kinds among other political forces. Will the Movement be able to maintain its cohesion? Can it avoid isolating itself in a sterile opposition without creating discontent and protests among the ranks of its supporters? The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 87

The Sicilian vote placed Grillo’s M5S more than ever in the spotlight for reasons regarding its political stance as well as its organizational structure and internal mode of operation. On the first issue, discussion ensued regarding the credit Grillo gave to Antonio Di Pietro, referring to him as the ideal next president of the Republic. This came at a time of profound difficulty for the IdV. An investigation of the news television program Report had just criticized the patronage management of Di Pietro, and some leading figures—including the party whip Mas- simo Donadi—were preparing to leave him. Some of Grillo’s statements made some newspapers speak of a sort of hostile takeover of the IdV party on his part. Previously, there had been attempts by Di Pietro—to whom Grillo had never failed to show his personal esteem—to aggregate a coalition combining all the forces opposed to the Monti government. The leader of the M5S had always refused to take part, and even after the Sicilian vote, following several days of journalistic speculation, Grillo confirmed the unavailability of his Movement to form alliances with other political forces. To date, the statements concerning Di Pietro remain the largest credit given by the Movement to a member of one of the “hated” political parties. Grillo’s position on Di Pietro’s suitability for the presidency could also be a way to explore—by reading the many comments to the post—the deep feelings of the M5S’s “base” and the opinion of supporters with regard to the choice between isolationism and taking part in political alliances.

After the First Successes, the Question of Organization

To investigate the inner modus operandi of the Movement is more complex. Since the M5S began to participate in elections, reports mentioned several episodes of “purges,” internal conflicts, interference by the “staff” of Casaleggio, and harsh in-or-out decisions by Grillo involving local organizations. The most notorious case is that of Valentino Tavolazzi, as previously mentioned. In 2009, Tavolazzi created a list (Project for Ferrara), which was then “certified” by Grillo. However, Grillo withdrew support when Tavolazzi organized a meeting to discuss internal democracy. Furthermore, there is the case of the Emilian regional councilor, Andrea Defranceschi, who was “ex-communicated” by Grillo for pro- posing a motion of solidarity with the newspaper L’Unità. Several dis- sidents—including Sonia Alfano, a candidate of Amici di Beppe Grillo (Grillo’s Friends) for the presidency of the regional government of Sicily in 2008, who then moved to the IdV—also spoke of interferences by Casaleggio. These cases stayed mostly confined to the local news. 88 Rinaldo Vignati

After Parma and Sicily, this issue got even more visibility due to the forthcoming 2013 national elections, with polls consistently forecast- ing M5S triumphs. Two episodes in particular reached the headlines. The first is the case of Giuseppe Favia. Endowed with a decent local following, the Emilian regional councilor, in a “stolen” blooper from the television show Piazza Pulita (La7), launched heavy accusations against the interference of Casaleggio. Called the “gray eminence” of the Movement, Casaleggio was accused of being able to maneuver Grillo and of being ruthless, suppressing any deviations from the party line. Later, it was the turn of the Bologna councilor Federica Salsi to receive a severe reprimand via blogs from Grillo (31 October 2012) for taking part in the show Ballarò (on the public television channel RAI 3) and having therefore violated the rule to boycott all talk shows. Shortly after taking a stand against Salsi, Grillo issued a sort of “Ten Commandments” in which he set the rules for the Movement (in a blog dated 6 November 2012): “We strongly advise against participation in television talk shows, and in the future all appearances on talk shows shall be prohibited.” Among the columnists, the critical judgments prevail. They empha- size the lack of democracy within the M5S and its patriarchal features, with Pierluigi Battista of the Corriere della Sera commenting about this on several occasions. Marco Travaglio argued a different opinion in his editorial during the talk show Spazio Pubblico (La7, 8 November 2012). His thesis is that the demands for democracy from members of the M5S and their claim for autonomous space in regard to their relationship to the media are unfounded: those who subscribe to the M5S know what to expect (the rules imposed by the leader) and therefore have no reason to complain. Travaglio’s comment deserves to be cited. In fact, it should be noted for the use of an old rhetorical argument of rude “realistic” origin: internal party democracy is an irrelevant issue since political parties are free and voluntary associations. This clashes with a context in which other political forces—through primaries or other means—feel the need to be more open to the voices coming from their base while recognizing the diversity within it. It also clashes, in particular, with the legitimacy of a political organization aiming to be “hyper-democratic.” For several months, Favia and Salsi remained in a sort of limbo— disparaged by the leader but not explicitly expelled. Then in Decem- ber, at the end of a video intervention characterized by unprecedented harshness (“Do not bust my balls on democracy … If there is some- one who believes that I am not democratic or that Casaleggio takes money, get out of here”),17 Grillo prohibited the two Emilian leaders from using the name and symbol of the M5S in their activities.18 These The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 89 episodes marked a moment of difficulty for Grillo’s “party.” At the same time, coinciding with the second round of coalition primaries during which the PD and the center-left chose their candidates for the leadership of the government, the M5S announced its own online primaries (parlamentarie) to select candidates for the forthcoming elections.19 Between organizational difficulties, procedural opacity, low participation,20 doubts on the quality of the candidates,21 and domestic disputes,22 the initiative resulted in a substantial failure. Nonetheless, Grillo expressed satisfaction and declared: “For the first time in the world, people were selected to stand for election [on our list] without any indication by the party or Movement … With the gradual spread of digital voters, democratic participation will only increase.” These organizational difficulties were met with the “recovery” of the traditional parties. Following the center-left primaries, Berlusconi was still able to attract the attention of the media and to “occupy” many television slots, while a center “sponsored” by Monti began to emerge. This explains why the M5S, after months of relentless growth, recorded a drop in the polls in December 2012.

Conclusion: What Is the Five Star Movement?

When we talk about the M5S, we can identify two opposing interpreta- tions: on the one hand, there are those who highlight the civic-participatory character of the phenomenon; on the other, there are those who point out its leader-centric, demagogic, and populist character. In the first interpretation, the emphasis is on the activists, while the leader is left in the background. In the second interpretation, the emphasis is on Grillo (and possibly Casaleggio), while activists and supporters are viewed as a manipulated mass in search of a “strong man.”23 It is more useful, I believe, to examine how the two sides of the phenomenon are articulated within a largely new political project. This way we can avoid a Manichaean representation of the M5S. Populist and participatory components can be found both in the work of the leader as well as in the expectations of the voters. Among the citizens who vote for or sympathize with the M5S, one can find not only disinterested public spirit, but also a significant component of resentment and distrust of the political class that arises not so much through expertise and information, but rather through hostile prejudice. To become aware of this, it is enough to attend an M5S event or read the comments on the blog. On the other hand, statements and initiatives by Grillo, while fully exploiting populist fears triggered by a political and economic crisis of epochal dimension, also remain anchored in a strong desire to ensure 90 Rinaldo Vignati

the participation and empowerment of the citizens.24 Grillo’s rants against the political class (albeit vulgar and crude) are also rooted in an “objective” protest against waste and the failure to enact reform.25 Moving between populist forces and citizenship, between the hyper-democracy of the web and “leaderism,” the M5S is now facing three main challenges. The first is the challenge of the government. For the first time, with the victory at Parma, the Movement has found itself administering a city and will have to put its binding promises to the test. Will the M5S be able to live up to expectations while being confronted with a reality inevitably more complex than campaign programs and promises? The second challenge is the Movement’s role in opposition. The election in Sicily of a consistent opposition council group imposes a quantum leap to the institutional presence of the Movement. No longer merely an isolated presence as a “witness,” but a group with consistent dimensions, the M5S will be called upon to elaborate a political strategy within an institution that, for various reasons, will be in the spotlight and will test the ability of the Move- ment to maintain its cohesion. The third challenge is that of organization. To address properly the new game of having a large contingent of MPs, the M5S will have to evolve toward some sort of compromise with the classic structure of one of the party models. It will in fact have to build a more solid structure with less evasive or utopian answers to the question of democracy. The issue of internal democracy (i.e., the development of facilities to organize internal debate and handle disputes when different positions are taken) is not the Trojan horse for those who want to bring into the Movement the seeds of old politics.26 However, it is a sine qua non so that the Movement can really give robustness to the consensus it has obtained. So far, Grillo and his staff have not responded to questions that are critical for any organization: How do we resolve the conflict between different opinions and interests within the organization? How will dis- sent be organized? If the Movement wants to consolidate the consensus that has been achieved, its political core must necessarily deal with these questions. So far, the M5S has been able to organize itself according to a peculiar dual structure that involves two elements: the local civic lists, equipped with (relative) autonomy but subject to the sum- mit’s control, and a central staff that has absolute power of veto and censorship but is deprived of any traditional democratic legitimacy. The strategy behind this leadership set-up is to isolate the individual members, thus avoiding the formation of “currents” or internal groups with critical mass.27 As long as the Movement remained a sort of federation of civic lists, the presence of a so-called master father could be limited to sporadic The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 91 interventions. When national policy issues need to be addressed, such a decision-making process will prove to be clearly authoritarian and at the same time inadequate in terms of party unity. The switch from a general and generic stance (which so far has been limited to programmatic pronouncements on most issues) to daily confrontation in the institutions and on specific policies will show that the present structure of the M5S is unlikely to hold up. If the first two challenges (the government and the opposition) have been addressed with enthusiasm and goodwill by Pizzarotti and Cancelleri, the third challenge (the definition of an organizational structure) has met with very general answers from a leader driven by a utopian and naive trust in the miraculous virtues of the web and the revolution of the network. Behind Grillo’s confidence, however, it is not impossible that a much more cynical view is concealed. In a situation in which new cases of political corruption and mismanage- ment erupt almost daily among the traditional parties, the M5S will not have to commit to a more precise organizational structure. Its consensus will continue to grow, and its leaders will not have to be accountable to its base, for in an organization that wins, the leaders can hardly be questioned. With its rapid growth, however, the Movement poses challenges not only to itself but also to the entire political system. The latter has to renew itself, to find ways of participation, to provide answers to the gap between citizens and the political class and to the requirements of cost reduction and privileges in politics. Discussions as to whether those who have been found guilty of criminal offenses should be able to stand for election or whether MPs who have served for two legis- latures should be able to stand for a third have been met with neglect or decisions in the opposite direction. Perhaps the slow and modest response from the political class is as cynical as the outlook of the grillini. Presumably, the argument of the traditional parties is that once inside the institutions the grillini will prove to be equal to, or even worse than, those who have been there for a while.28

— Translated by Katherina Pruegel

Rinaldo Vignati is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Social and Political Science of the University of Bologna. 92 Rinaldo Vignati

Notes

1. For an account of the steps that have transformed the comedian Beppe Grillo into a politician, see R. Vignati, “Beppe Grillo: Dalla Tv ai palas- port, dal blog al movimento,” in Il partito di Grillo, ed. P. Corbetta and E. Gualmini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 29–63. 2. Entrepreneur and theorist of the web, Casaleggio has been by Beppe Grillo’s side from the establishment of the blog (http://www.beppegrillo. it). His role and his intrusiveness have been disparaged by a number of activists, sometimes with tones of “conspiracy theory” (see G. L. Filice’s eBook, Webbe Grillo). To these charges, Casaleggio has always answered in an evasive way (see his letter to the Corriere della Sera, 30 May 2012). 3. When the first announcement of the M5S’s participation in national elections took place, the party’s ambitions appeared much more modest, in the order of a list of “witnesses.” At the “5-Star Woodstock” event in Cesena (25–26 September 2010), Grillo proclaimed: “We will send 10 to 20 young people to Parliament.” 4. The “V-Days” (short for “Vaffanculo Days,” or Fuck-off Days) refer to two events held on 8 September 2007 and 25 April 2008, during which signatures were gathered, respectively, to promote laws of popular initiative on moral issues in politics and to request referendums on the issue of information. The “citizen primaries” involved a number of policy meas ures regarding energy, health, transportation, economics, and information (discussed on Grillo’s blog in 2006 and again in 2009), which are at the center of the M5S’s program. Finally, in the summer of 2009, the comedian tried, unsuccessfully, to participate in the primaries for the election of the secretary of the Democratic Party. 5. A case in point is the collection of signatures for the referendum promoted during the second “V-Day.” A few days after the event, Grillo announced that they had raised 1,300,000 signatures; however, the Supreme Court did not consider correct the procedures that had been followed for the collection of hundreds of thousands of signatures. The presidential decree with which the consultation was convened was on 6 February, thus making 6 May the first valid date to collect signatures. On this, see the opinion of Professor Paolo Armaroli (Il Secolo XIX, 1 May 2008). Grillo accepted the verdict in an unusually low-key manner. There were no shouts of harmed democracy, but merely a note on the blog: “I was informed that the signatures are not enough. One thing I get. We should have collected at least two to three times the valid signatures needed to be sure of the result, as was the case for the popular ‘Clean Parliament’ bill.” It is likely that such understatement is due to the fact that raising the tone would highlight the lightness (or perhaps the ruthlessness) of having collected most of the signatures at a time when they would not appear to be valid in order to “occupy” 25 April, the date chosen for the event. What matters most, however, was the internal use of “defeat.” Marco Travaglio (L’Unità, 13 November 2008) avoided the idea of investigating the matter further and merely said that the section of the Supreme Court that made the decision was chaired by Corrado Carnevale (a judge who The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 93

became famous because of the large number of Mafia cases overturned in the Court of Appeals where he was president), alluding, of course, to murky maneuvers. The reference to “betrayed signatures” returned several times, appearing, for example, in the posts announcing the birth of the M5S (4 August 2009 and 9 September 2009). 6. L. Pinto and R. Vignati, “Il successo e i dilemmi del Movimento 5 stelle,” Il Mulino, no. 4, 2012, pp. 731–738. 7. P. Colloca and F. Marangoni, “Lo shock elettorale,” in Corbetta and Gualmini, Il partito di Grillo, 65–88. 8. See the chapter by Anna Cento Bull in this volume. 9. The center-left is the field to which the IdV belongs. That Di Pietro’s policy proposal is not exactly “leftist” (so far that it was not uncommon to hear that “Di Pietro is a right-winger who is left”) is not a reason to exclude the IdV from the center-left field. On the contrary, it is part of the problem that I invite you to consider, that is, how was a political proposal that was “not quite left-wing” steal votes from the traditional forces of the center-left and be able to ally itself firmly with the forces of the traditional left? 10. In this context, there is however the exception of M. Tarchi, L’Italia popu- lista (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003). In this volume, Tarchi qualifies as “populist” many leftist movements of the past years. 11. I am referring to Grillo’s ability to reposition himself in the public sphere, for example, by explicitly addressing voters who were disappointed by the League and by appropriating topics that have always been taboo on the left—such as immigration and the tax burden—but that are perceived as problems in parts of his electorate. 12. D. Di Vico, Corriere della Sera, 22 May 2012. 13. This episode is examined by M. Pucciarelli, “L’altrapolitica tra predicare e razzolare: Inchiesta sul Movimento 5 stelle,” Micromega, no. 4 (2012): 14–29. 14. Europa, 21 August 2012. 15. For these judicial proceedings, see Italia Oggi, 1 and 20 September 2012. 16. Europa, 21 August 2012. Other newspapers published accounts of the first 100 days of the Pizzarotti administration. See, for example, La Stampa, 23 August 2012, and Il Giornale, 28 August 2012. On the “flop” at the end of September, see Corriere della Sera, 23 September 2012. 17. See Corriere della Sera, 12 December 2012. The intervention was also dictated by the controversy triggered by Ivano Mazzacurati, a Movement militant who had been excluded—unfairly, according to him—from the list of candidates running for Parliament. Interviewed by Servizio Publico, Mazzacurati declared that Casaleggio intended to appropriate for himself money that was destined for the parliamentary groups of the M5S. See Corriere della Sera, 4 and 11 December 2012. 18. La Repubblica, 13 December 2012. The expulsion from the M5S of Pied- mont regional councilor Fabrizio Biolè and Forlì municipal councilor Raf- faella Pirini also made the news. 19. The opportunity to run as a candidate was offered to those, regardless of their actual activism, who had already applied to the M5S in previous local elections without having been elected. This choice—which in many 94 Rinaldo Vignati

cases has brought to the forefront not the “best” and the more active but rather secondary figures in the Movement—seems dictated, in its substantial “casualty,” by a desire to make one’s “career” within the M5S dependent on the “call” of the leader. During the voting process, those who were registered with the Movement as of 30 September 2012 could indicate, exclusively online, three preferences. A statement by Grillo explained the meaning behind this method of voting, which performs a kind of “atomistic” conception of democracy: “The vote is individual, and one must ensure that it is not driven by phantom assemblies or commit- tees, both of which are categorically excluded from the Non-Statute. We must avoid the replication of party congregations on a local basis” (Cor- riere della Sera, 4 December 2012). 20. Of the 31,612 persons entitled to vote, 20,252 participated. In some con- stituencies, aspiring candidates were able to get placed on the list thanks to a handful of votes. See E. Liuzzi, “Primarie 5 stelle senza trionfo,” Il Fatto Quotidiano, 8 December 2012. 21. These doubts were also expressed in a newspaper seen as close to the Movement, Il Fatto Quotidiano (6 December 2012). 22. For example, with regard to the Piedmontese regional councilors Vittorio Bertola and David Bono, the first accused the latter of having supported the candidacy of his employees and having opposed that of others. See La Repubblica, 7 December 2012. 23. For the first interpretation, see E. Greblo, Filosofia di Beppe Grillo (Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis, 2010); L. Sciolla, “Là dove osano i ‘grillini,’” http:// www.rivistailmulino.it, 4 June 2012. We find the second interpretation in most journalistic accounts, which often attribute to the M5S an “anti-politics” or even “subversive” character. See, for instance, E. Scalfari, “L’alter nativa Grillo catastrofe annunciata,” La Repubblica, 4 November 2012. 24. In the brief introduction to his book Tutte le battaglie di Beppe Grillo (Milan: Casaleggio Associati, 2007), Grillo defines his “participatory” phi- losophy: “Fighting a battle is nice. Whether you lose or win, the taste of having tried remains. Watching the filth of life running past us and doing nothing, saying nothing, is demeaning. It takes blood from the body … The battles are better when won, of course, but to do that you have to engage yourself a second more than the opponent. Living for that extra second is the goal of a fighting citizen.” To push this commitment to the forefront, Grillo has often used the phrase “it is no longer enough to be the voyeurs of politics.” 25. See the chapter by Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella in this volume. 26. This is why Grillo threw out Tavolazzi. Nonetheless, after having sent him off, Grillo did not fail to show appreciation for Tavolazzi’s personal honesty. 27. P. Flores d’Arcais, “Grillo, non fare il caudillo,” Il Fatto Quotidiano, 12 Sep- tember 2012. 28. Career politician Gianfranco Micciché recently stated: “I am waiting for the moment when the grillini open their monthly pay slip with 15,000 euros net,” as reported in G. A. Stella, Corriere della Sera, 30 October 2012.