2 The Challenge of The five STar MoveMenT Rinaldo Vignati If you were to determine who the main Italian political character of 2012 was, the choice could only fall on Beppe Grillo. Until the local elections in May, his political presence had aroused scant attention, and he had been reduced to an essentially folkloric phenomenon. Grillo was considered a “troublemaker” who was in a position to influence the electoral results. This was the case in the regional elec- tions in Piedmont in 2010, where the grillino candidate drew away votes from the candidate of the center-left, Mercedes Bresso. However, Grillo was not given chances to become a powerful and long-lasting political heavyweight. Following the local elections in May, the sub- sequent rise in polls, and the Sicilian regional elections of October, Grillo’s Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement) has become a leading figure of the political confrontation. It is able to interpret the consensus of a large chunk of the electorate and can therefore influ- ence the political strategies of other actors. The Local Elections of 2012: Where Did the Votes for the Five Star Movement Come From? The path that led today’s M5S to the position of a prominent political actor—from the founding of Grillo’s blog to the creation of Meetup Groups, from the two “V-Days” to the birth of the civic lists1—raises Italian Politics: Technocrats in Office 28 (2013): 78–94 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2013.280105 The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 79 one question: is this a project that has had from the beginning the goal to create a list able to compete nationally, or has the M5S established itself randomly, opportunistically exploiting the spaces that a politi- cal system in deep crisis has from time to time provided? On the one hand, it is hard to imagine that, at the beginning of the path, Grillo and his companion Gianroberto Casaleggio2 had the ambition to form a political force able to compete with the major parties on the scene.3 On the other hand, if we think back to the collection of signatures on the “V-Days” (both unsuccessful), the “citizen primaries” (ignored by the government), and the candidacy of Grillo in the primaries of the Democratic Party (obstructed),4 they seem like plugs to a “plan.” This plan demonstrates how to use the doors that the political sys- tem reserves for popular participation and to highlight, through its “losses,” the fictional character of these same opportunities. This cre- ates a growing distrust of traditional political forces and a “mythology” to justify the increasing direct involvement of the Movement within the political institutions, replacing parties that have proved unable to listen to citizens.5 In addition to these “demonstrative” activities, the party’s entry into the electoral arena followed strategic timing, not a mere desire to make a point. To illustrate, in 2009, Grillo chose not to participate in the European elections, and the M5S’s participation in the local elections was announced only after political support had been consolidated. It is certainly an exaggeration to assume the existence of a step-by- step comprehensive strategy diligently executed from the beginning, yet the success of the M5S is definitely the result of a long preparation process. Nevertheless, the outcome of the 2012 administrative elec- tions have surprised most observers. Some have also denied that the results were even relevant. This was the case with the president of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, who, when interviewed after the elec- tions, denied with a smile that there had been any “boom” of consen- sus for Grillo’s lists. In the following weeks, the polls confirmed that the ballot box of 6 and 7 May had produced something extraordinary. The M5S contested seats in 101 municipalities and received almost 200,000 votes, that is, 8.7 percent of the valid votes cast in those municipalities. Where it is possible to make a comparison with the results of 2010, the 2012 data show a strong growth: in Alessandria the votes almost quadrupled; in Verona they almost tripled; in Parma, Monza, Cuneo, and Belluno they more than doubled. The results, however, are not geographically uniform: as in previous elections, the South proves to be a weak point. In fact, between the North and the “red zone,” the M5S presents lists in as many as 77 municipalities, while in the Center-South it is present in only 24 centers. Also, when 80 Rinaldo Vignati in the North and the “red zone,” the percentages of votes are often in double digits (and never less than 3 percent), whereas in the Center- South, the overall percentage stops at 3 percent and in some cases does not exceed 1.1 percent.6 The growth of the party’s support pushed politicians and com- mentators to question the origin of the M5S’s votes. The calculations carried out by the Istituto Cattaneo—through the so-called Good- man model—on the regional flows between 2010 and the last com- munal elections in the main cities showed that the component from the People of Freedom (PdL) is almost non-existent.7 There are two sources from which the M5S drew its electoral strength. One is the Northern League (LN), which in Monza, Piacenza, and Parma con- stitutes approximately a quarter of the vote and in Verona and Genoa a little less. It is plausible to argue—even if there is no data to sup- port it—that the transfer of votes from the League has intensified particularly after the outbreak of the scandal involving the LN’s trea- surer, Francesco Belsito, and the organizational problems that have hit Umberto Bossi’s party.8 The other source—the center-left—is even more substantial. From this camp, adding the votes that in 2010 had gone to the Democratic Party (PD), the Radical Left, the only presi- dential candidate of the Center, and Italy of Values (IdV), comes a component of the M5S electorate ranging from 24 percent in Piacenza to 71 percent in Genoa, exceeding 37 percent in Parma and Verona, and 42 percent in Monza. This data can be read in several ways. One could simply highlight the “protesting” component that is in opposition to the political estab- lishment, which has also been expressed by the League and the IdV, and stress that there is a certain similarity between themes of the M5S and the topics used in previous political phases by these two parties. This would reduce the success of the M5S to the periodic high tide of a protesting and anti-political component that is always present in the Italian electorate and that, in different political phases, has assumed differentiated identities. More tempting, in my opinion, is to argue instead that there has been a transfer of votes from the center- left bloc.9 One might ask, in this regard, if the present success of the M5S does not tell us something interesting about the transformations that have affected the electorate of the center-left in recent decades— changes that may have escaped the notice of researchers due to the tendency to associate “populism” with “the right.”10 In this regard, it is perhaps worth examining the M5S’s relationship with previous movements born on the left side of the political spec- trum—the girotondi (roundabouts), the Purple People (Popolo Viola), the rallies at the Palasharp arena promoted by Freedom and Justice The Challenge of the Five Star Movement 81 (Libertà e Giustizia), and so on—as well as the characteristics of these movements. Was the success of the M5S favored by these movements, or should we speak of discontinuities? Several leaders of the above- mentioned movements have clearly put distance between themselves and the Five Star Movement. And there is a huge difference between the rhetoric of, for example, Gustavo Zagrebelsky, with his learned quotations and calm voice, and the shouting rallies of Grillo. Yet I submit that, in the perception of ordinary citizens, there is continuity. These movements, I would argue, are going beyond even the inten- tions of their promoters, helping to fuel and legitimize in the center-left electorate a general lack of confidence in the political class, in politics in general, and in the need to compromise that follows. Thanks to technological and organizational tools, and to his unquestionable skills and unscrupulous rhetoric, Grillo has been able to take advantage of all this and become a political entrepreneur.11 Arguably, some elements that make implicit reference to the usual practices of “anti-politics” (unwillingness to compromise, tendency to see political competition in terms of good and bad, generalized distrust of the political class) have in the last 20 years spread through the center-left electorate. This may have contributed to the loss of votes by historically center-left parties in favor of the political forces—the IdV previously and the M5S today— that have approached these issues with greater resolve and have been more vigorously opposed to the “privileges” of the political class. The current success of the M5S, I argue, can therefore be indicative of deeper cultural transformations that have not yet been appraised. The Five Star Movement to the Parma Government The result of the administrative elections of May is important not only due to the amount of the votes collected by the M5S, but also due to the capture of four municipalities, of which one is Parma. This Emilian city, which came out of a disastrous administrative experience (the Vignali administration having left a budget in deep distress), saw in the second round of elections the confrontation of Vincenzo Bernazzoli, the center- left candidate, against the grillino Federico Pizzarotti, with the first hav- ing a distinct advantage (starting at 39.2 percent against 19.4 percent).