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Italy's Major Political Parties

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Italian Election: What You Need To Know • Election Details: Italians head to the polls on March 4 to choose their next government and leader. • State Of Play: A coalition of centre-left parties currently governs in Italy, led by Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and the Democratic Party (PD). Additional party members include More Europe, Together, and Popular Civic List. In the most recent polling, however, the Democratic Party has been outpaced by the Five Star Movement, and the broader centre-left coalition is trailing the centre-right, which is comprised of Forza Italia, Lega Nord, Brothers of Italy, and Us with Italy parties. • Electoral Process: Italy currently has a "Rosatellum" electoral system, which includes three components for selecting parliamentary representation. ̶ Proportional Representation: Sixty-one percent of seats (386 in the lower house, 193 in the upper house) are chosen by this method, with seats allocated depending on percentage of national vote share ̶ First-Past-The-Post: Around 37 percent of seats (232 in the lower house, 116 in the upper house) are elected through single-member constituencies ̶ Italians Abroad: Two percent (12 seats in the lower house, six in the upper house) of the incoming parliament seats are chosen by Italians living abroad Parties must meet a three percent threshold to be eligible for a share of the seats allocated by proportional representation. If a party receives between one and three percent, but is allied with a larger party within a coalition, that vote share is transferred to the larger coalition partner. Sources: The Financial Times Italy Has Relatively Short Political Terms And Frequent Leadership Changes In Government Number Of Leaders And Term Length By Country 10 10 Germany 9 9 Italy 8 Spain 8 7 UK 7 Greece 6 Portugal 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 0 No. of Leaders Since 2000 Avg. Term Length (Years) Italy's Major Political Parties Party Ideology/Platform Leaders Coalition Forza Italia Pro-EU, Catholic Social Teaching, • Silvio Berlusconi Centre-Right Social Market Economy Democratic Party Social-Democracy, Pro-EU, Pro- • Paolo Gentiloni Centre-Left Migration, Environmentalist • Matteo Renzi Five Star Movement Online Direct-Democracy, • Luigi Di Maio None Eurosceptic, Out of The Left-Right • Beppe Grillo Spectrum Lega Nord Fiscal Federalism, EU Critical, Anti- • Matteo Salvini Centre-Right Immigration Source: The Local It Polling Has Remained Relatively Stable, With The Centre-Left And M5S Trading Leads Polling By Party And Coalition (Rolling Avg.) Centre-Left M5S (Coalition Poll) +E CP LN NcI Centre-Right PD I FI FdI M5S (Party Poll) 40 35 30 25 20 Percent (%) Percent 15 10 5 0 16-Feb 8-Feb 2-Feb 25-Jan 19-Jan 11-Jan Italy’s Economic Recovery Has Been Sluggish Compared To Its European Counterparts GDP High Public Debt 110 135 108 130 125 106 120 104 Below Pre-Crisis Level 115 102 110 100 105 100 98 GDP Of Percent Index, Index, 2010=100 95 96 90 94 85 92 80 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Eurozone 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Italy Real Labor Productivity Youth Unemployment 104 42 40 103 38 102 36 34 101 32 100 30 28 99 26 Index, Index, 2010=100 98 24 22 97 Population Active Total of Percent 20 96 18 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 - - - - - - - - - 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 Source: Eurostat What’s Next? Election Results Aftermath • Voting takes place between • The results of the election will • Unless one of the parties 7am local time (1am ET), be announced by 2pm local gathers at least 40 percent of and 11pm local time (5pm time (8am ET) at the latest. the vote, coalitions will have to ET). be molded in order to form a • 630 seats in the Chamber will government. • Five Star Movement are be attributed: projected to fall short of the • Paolo Gentiloni has claimed PD — 232 by plurality. 40 percent threshold, and will not consider a coalition trail the centre-right — 386 plus 12 abroad, by with Berlusconi’s party. coalition by four points. proportional representation. • Luigi Di Maio said he may be • 315 seats in the Senate will be open to forming a ‘grand attributed: coalition’. — 102 by plurality — 207 by proportional representation.
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