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Home , Benigno Aquino III, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Imperial Manila, Maguindanao massacre, Rodrigo Duterte

10 Oligarchs ’s rise represents The Study a diversification of rather than a challenge to the Philippine national elite.

not afford to alienate a military that used the protracted campaigns against communist guerillas to justify its continued preeminence.3 Manifestations of the ’ continuing dependence on its former colonial master also Rodrigo Duterte persisted in aggravating nationalist sentiments. Eager to retain the favor of the , Aquino allowed Washington to hold on to its military bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay and the Philippine until these agreements came up for formal renewal. Disgusted by America’s support for the Marcos regime, enough pressure was maintained inside and outside the political establishment to close these bases down presidency in 1992. Yet, this only occurred after the Cold War had ended, thus creating the impression that the Americans had not been thrown Rupture or cyclicity? out so much as abandoned an overt military presence in the Philippines once it was no longer necessary. National leadership left much to be desired. Mesrob Vartavarian Scholars have devoted much attention to the rise of Rodrigo Presidents, weak and strong, rewarded cronies and kinsmen with lucrative contracts and Duterte and the impact his brand of has had on sinecures while leaving pressing problems the quality of Philippine . This piece focuses unresolved. Politics seemed to be the exclusive preserve of a charmed circle of elite instead on the evolving nature of the Philippine presidency who rotated high office amongst themselves. and gradual diversification of the national oligarchy. The dynastic nature of the Philippine presidency reached its apogee at the turn Rather than viewing Duterte as a break from the Philippine of the twenty-first century: two successive experiment with constitutional democracy or a reassertion presidents, Gloria Arroyo and Benigno Aquino III, were the children of former of national boss rule, it would be more accurate to view presidents. Impressive economic growth his rise as a manifestation of oligarchic proliferation, in has occurred since the early but little of this wealth has trickled down and the which actors and power groups previously excluded from Philippines remains far behind most of its the presidency manage to break into the national elite via neighbors in lowering the percentage of people living in poverty. political and electoral manipulation. Structures of illicit political bargaining that typified the pre-Marcos era emerged seemingly unscathed after 1986. National politicians aligned with provincial warlords and local strongmen who delivered guaranteed vote- banks during election campaigns in exchange for patronage and projects. Most resource disbursements from the center to the periphery disappeared into the pockets of local political clans, empowering a few elite families at the expense of an effective civil infrastructure and the satisfactory delivery of services. All these sociopolitical ills are magnified manifold on the island of , particularly in the autonomous Muslim areas. Neglect, mismanagement, clan , and corruption have left large parts of the island mired in poverty and disappointment. National politics are remote and seemingly uninterested in southern provincial problems. It was widely felt that only a presidential candidate from Mindanao could understand and resolve the island’s inequities. Duterte presented himself as a familiar strongman who could get the job done. He gave frequent speeches and interviews in Visayan, the lingua franca of the central Philippines as well as northern and eastern Mindanao. This was a welcome relief from the Taglish-speaking elites of imperial . His profanity-laced tirades and locker room banter made him come across as an avuncular figure not averse to using physical violence to keep unruly behavior in check. Mindanao’s electoral mobilization on behalf of one of its own was a major factor in Duterte’s victory, but it is unlikely he would have won the election without a similar sense Rodrigo Duterte and children at inauguration ceremony. Presidential Communications Operation Office, Public Domain. of disillusionment with elite politics throughout the archipelago. In areas like Central and the National Capital Region, voters turned Rejecting oligarchs: Duterte classes based in globally connected cities constitution that strictly curtailed possibilities to Duterte because he was an outsider. have neglected the socioeconomic concerns for authoritarian backsliding and greatly A new generation of young voters who had as demagogic populist of peripheral regions left behind as a result of empowered the national legislature. no memory of , The most widely disseminated interpretation rapidly evolving economic structures. These Almost immediately, however, it became or the backed an of the Duterte phenomenon contends that this globalist structures have placed more emphasis apparent that the Philippines had overthrown unknown quantity for the sake of shaking up local strongman from City is a national on highly mobile forms of capital and service a national cacique only to see the return a stagnant status quo. manifestation of a troubling international sector jobs that require levels of education of traditional political dynasties committed Duterte’s ostensibly simple solutions to phenomenon. Namely, the rise of right-wing and training inaccessible to poorer segments to a severely truncated form of democracy.2 complex problems have brought disruption populist figures who have issued crude, but of the population. 1986 was more of a restoration than a rather than resolution. The scourge of at times unsettlingly effective challenges to According to proponents of oligarchic revolution. Proponents of major social reform criminality and illegal drugs, which Duterte liberal globalism. According to its detractors, rejection, the origins of this populist backlash were either met with congressional obstruction vowed to eradicate in a matter of months, has the humanist inclusivity of liberal rhetoric that in the Philippines can be dated to the People or military repression. No meaningful land resulted in an interminable war on the poor. claims to champion the rights of all races, Power Revolution of 1986.1 A combination reform took place, particularly on those Drug users and small time pushers are targeted genders, and sexual orientations is but a of virulent plunder politics and increasing estates owned by well-connected oligarchs. for extrajudicial execution while major kingpins mild palliative in the face of turbocharged neo- repression of traditional elites by the Counterinsurgency operations against have been largely unaffected. Duterte’s true liberal economic policies that have left more authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos led agrarian leftist organizations launched during intentions appear to be a nationwide social and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands. to a groundswell of mass opposition, which the the Marcos years continued under the new cleansing of indigents and undesirables. Neoliberal globalization has been accused of armed forces refused to suppress. Abandoned democratic dispensation. Beset by a wide The poor are a convenient scapegoat for the creating deep fissures between classes and by their military and police, the Marcos array of economic woes and attempted coups social ills that plague the body politic, but regions across what were once more cohesive fled. The new democratic government of by disgruntled elements of the Armed Forces of killing them does not reform the structural nation-states. Cosmopolitan upper and middle gave the Philippines a new the Philippines (AFP), President Aquino could inequalities that produce those ills. The Newsletter No. 80 Summer 2018 11 The Study

The near obsession with eradicating or try hard enough to lessen the staggering This period of centralized executive power His law-and-order platform, undergirded illegal drugs in slum areas further delayed disparities between rich and poor. Access to was brought to an end by the Japanese by a steady hum of extrajudicial executions, the enactment of the Bangasamoro Basic socioeconomic resources were still heavily invasion. The violence and dislocation that made him popular with local business interests Law (BBL) of 2014, which would give territorial dependent on the favor and patronage of came with Japanese occupation created and Chinese investors seeking to expand their autonomy to the Muslim south. The Moro elite families. The Philippine presidency was spaces for new power networks. Followings horizons into the island of Mindanao. Duterte Islamic Liberation Front’s inability to pass the still exposed to capture by a wild oligarch.4 cohered around local strongmen who could allowed the business sector to accumulate BBL in partnership with Duterte expeditiously Oligarchic power was temporarily tamed obtain weapons and plunder. Rivals were profits without being too avaricious or involved weakened the organization’s credibility through a plethora of civic reform programs eliminated under vague accusations of in their activities. This set the precedent and among its members and precipitated the and presidential initiatives, but its deep ‘collaboration’ as armed bands competed for tone for his economic policy at the national breakaway of disaffected family clans who structures endured, making it possible for smuggling routes and high-value contraband. level. Although his associations with the leftist joined or founded more extremist Islamic Duterte’s predatory populism to take hold. The political future belonged to these local movement and hostility to the United States groups. The ’s rise was a result toughs. With independence in 1946, they make him something of an atypical president, of these frustrations. Their seizure of quickly entered the national legislature, using he is quite the typical warlord. Duterte built City in conjunction with other extremist gangs Oligarchic proliferation: their war records and armed followings to alliances with and accepted resources blindsided Manila. The AFP missed numerous obtain electoral support. Ferdinand Marcos from any quarter that would increase his self-declared deadlines for Marawi’s complete an expanding national elite was only the most successful example of personal power. liberation. More damaging has been Duterte’s The abovementioned theories focus more guerilla commanders who had gone to Upon his election to the presidency, Duterte imposition of martial law on the entire island of on contemporary practices and beliefs than Manila. Once in the national political arena, brought a bevy of advisors and acolytes with Mindanao. Although not as all-encompassing on long-term historical trajectories. Once he furnished his kin, armed followers, and him to Manila. Team Duterte quickly replicated a political crackdown as the variant imposed established, the traditional families appear former fraternity brothers with further rewards. local methods of social control on a national by Marcos over forty years ago, it brought unshakable and near hegemonic in their Marcos also made extensive use of the rapidly scale, with the killings of social marginals back bitter memories of an era thought to be control of national political office. Some modernizing news media to construct an image across the archipelago becoming a top priority. long gone. The fighting in Marawi also offset oligarchs are more civil and reform-minded of heroic military service that went well beyond The rhetorical flourish utilized by traditional Duterte’s attempted tilt away from the United than others, but they are basically cut from the factual record. In addition, he managed to elites to mask the brutalities of a profoundly States, with the military seeking the technical the same cloth and in being so their reformism market himself as a firm believer in top-down unequal society was quickly dropped in favor assistance of American special operations can only go so far. While it is true that national technocratic modernity, which would catapult of a far cruder demonization of the superfluous forces without initially informing Duterte elites have rarely been eliminated, they the Philippines into the foremost ranks poor. Oligarchs who had been under a cloud of their intention to do so. have had to share the trough of state with of developing nations. during Aquino III’s administration were quickly Oligarchic rejection thus led to a rash an increasing variety of voracious mouths. All this was enough to win him the rehabilitated and Duterte was frequently seen decision on the part of voters to back a local An examination of Philippine political presidency in 1965, but if he wanted to hold hobnobbing with the likes of Gloria Arroyo, warlord for the nation’s highest office. Although development since the American colonial onto it indefinitely he would need the military. Estrada, and the Marcos family. The Marcoses he ran relatively effectively, the advent demonstrates that Duterte is as much The politicization of a heretofore professional delivered him the votes of Ilocos Norte, their use of local methods to solve national problems a manifestation of oligarchic proliferation as a officer corps began almost immediately. provincial bailiwick, in exchange for expediting has had very mixed results. While Duterte has rupture or cyclical phase. From the beginning Budget increases, infrastructure projects, their political rehabilitation, symbolized by thus far been able to reward his supporters and of the twentieth century, the Philippine national and slush funds gave military and police Ferdinand’s reburial in Heroes’ Cemetery. coopt most of the national legislature through elite has become progressively diverse. Various commanders a taste for power. When Marcos Duterte has also experienced substantial the disbursement of presidential patronage, he oligarchs of different origins have had to share declared martial law in 1972 their status and pushback from other established oligarchic has not dismantled vested interests committed an increasingly crowded national political opportunities for illicit enrichment increased interests. Fidel Ramos chided Duterte for to the socioeconomic status quo. While Duterte’s arena. The initial channeling of local and exponentially. Marcos continuously allowed his tilt away from the United States and other violence at home and grandstanding abroad regional elites into Manila politics by American them to accrue wealth and in exchange senior officers grumbled at his patronage have been cathartic for many, the Philippines colonial officials led to a homogenization of the they continued to support his dictatorship. of the police at the expense of the AFP. remains as oligarchic a state as ever. national political class. This homogenization Yet, the dictator had made a mistake. His Such opposition has compelled Duterte began to break down during the Second World military and police cronies soon became to backtrack on his anti-American rhetoric War. Marginal and more militarized elements autonomous oligarchs in their own right. The and the protracted conflict in Marawi City Philippine oligarchic of this elite began to penetrate national profits they accumulated from payoffs, black made for quite amicable exchanges between cycles: wild and reformist office in ways previously thought impossible. market ventures, and smuggling routes were Duterte, US Secretary of State , These aggressive up-and-comers assembled plowed back into constructing client networks and President Trump during ASEAN’s 2017 fluctuations client networks that allowed them to distance of their own. When the regime’s prospects summits. Certain senators have also expressed Theories of oligarchic rotation have viewed themselves from established political families. became untenable they readily turned against growing unease at the negative international Philippine national politics as a cyclical Marcos’s consolidation of power and declaration it to preserve their privileges. Abandoned by imagery generated by the drug war, a down- phenomenon that operates according to the of martial law then saw the politicization of his security forces during the People Power ward slide that could result in divestment disposition of the national executive. Corazon a heretofore apolitical military. Finally, since Revolution, Marcos had no option but to and credit rating downgrades. Duterte has Aquino’s presidency from 1986 to 1992 saw the year 2000, local warlords from fringe areas pack up and fly away. responded to elite criticism with a combination the reestablishment of elite families who were have been gaining in power and influence, Having enabled the fall of Marcos, the of threats and half-hearted investigations denied the spoils of office under the Marcos a trend which culminated in one local warlord security forces felt entitled to a preeminent of police excesses. dictatorship. Although President Aquino herself seizing control of the national state. political role in the new era. A series of It remains to be seen if the various oligarchs rarely engaged in pathological excesses, a Political horizons began to expand for coups were launched against a tottering in Manila will fully accept Duterte as one of number of her close family and key associates the indigenous elite during the archipelago’s Aquino administration, several of which their own. Established families and interests ruthlessly reasserted their dominance over transition from Spanish to American rule. came dangerously close to succeeding. can be cajoled and occasionally bullied, but local bailiwicks and lucrative assets. Fierce Philippine elites were no strangers to fierce Consequently, Aquino agreed to maintain never fully eradicated. Most of them must competition between provincial clans for electoral contests that determined the Marcos-era security structures and make eventually be accommodated, or else a hostile legislative seats and mayoralties resulted in distribution and denial of resources. However, Fidel Ramos her foremost advisor on military oligarchic coalition might coalesce, as it did extensive electoral violence. The AFP and police under Spanish rule elections were limited to matters. Coup threats were thus contained, in 1986, and place Duterte in an untenable remained on hand to suppress those voices the local level. As an increasingly valuable but at the price of sustaining institutions position. Populist pronouncements aside, and non-governmental organizations calling possession of ’s and personnel from Duterte’s principle intention appears to be the for genuine social reform. The administration dwindling empire, an authoritarian past. consolidation of his position as a new type of of Fidel Ramos, 1992-1998, significantly provincial and capital “ … national elites [ … ] The subsequent Ramos national oligarch; whether or not he succeeds, tamped down on egregious political violence. administrative positions presidency saw former other local warlords will invariably follow suit. Although a former Marcos crony and kinsman, were reserved for have had to share the military and police Duterte’s rise to power represents a further Ramos went some way toward portraying Spaniards alone. commanders reach widening of the Philippine oligarchic gyre. the Philippines as a business friendly country The lockout of trough of state with an the commanding eager for foreign investment. Attempted coups indigenous elites from increasing variety of heights of political Mesrob Vartavarian became a thing of the past and economic lucrative government power. Ramos filled his Independent Scholar deregulation was the order of the day. posts was a major voracious mouths.” administration with [email protected] These reforms were far from complete by factor precipitating over a hundred retired the time Ramos left office. Partial stabilization the Philippine struggle officers.7 Although the was followed by an extended period of for independence. armed forces were retrenched and modernized Notes wild oligarchic accumulation during the Faced with a formidable insurrection to a significant extent, Ramos maintained its 1 Teehankee, J.C. & M.R. Thompson. presidencies of , 1998-2001, of their own, American policymakers cast privileged position and rewarded his former 2016. ‘Electing a Strongman’, Journal and , 2001-2010. about for ways to dissipate mass resistance. military associates with the plums of office. of Democracy 27(4):125-34. The Arroyo years saw the very worst of what Initially, they opted to govern the archipelago The Estrada and Arroyo years witnessed 2 Anderson, B. 1988. ‘Cacique Democracy presidential predation had to offer. Provincial through highly educated Manila-based elites. the elevation of local warlords to heretofore and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams’, warlords such as ‘Chavit’ Singson in Ilocos Sur Very soon, however, American administrators unknown levels of prominence. Marcos had New Left Review 169:3-31. and the Ampatuan clan in the autonomous found these capital-elites ill-suited to govern a used warlords to drum up support and marshal 3 McCoy, A.W. 1999. Closer than Brothers: Muslim areas were given free reign so long as highly localized and deeply fragmented polity. votes in the past, but they were never a Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy. New Haven and London: major component of his inner circle. Arroyo’s they delivered the votes Arroyo’s clique needed The colonial state thus began to cultivate Yale University Press, ch.7-8. to prolong its rule and amass further plunder. local and provincial elites who were then cast reliance on the vote-banks of the Ampatuan 4 Quimpo, N.G. ‘Can the Philippines’ 5 The damage inflicted under Arroyo was so upwards into national politics. Weaving local clan by contrast meant sustained levels Wild Oligarchy be Tamed?’, in Case, extensive that significant reforms were required indigenous elites into central administrative and of presidential patronage and support for W. (ed.) 2015. Routledge Handbook to salvage the Philippines’ international political networks substantially weakened the provincial predation. Full presidential backing of Southeast Asian Democratization. image and economic prospects. Benigno insurgency. Popular and millenarian movements created a sense of complete impunity that London: Routledge, p.347. Aquino III’s presidential term from 2010 to would continue to erupt in rural and urban areas eventually went too far. Had the Ampatuans 5 Cullinane, M. 2003. Ilustrado Politics: 2016 saw a sustained drive against corruption but were not enough to halt the coalescence of not committed the massacre Filipino Elite Responses to American and attempts to prosecute provincial clans a self-replicating national oligarchy. This stage in 2009, they might have used their near total Rule, 1898-1908. City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. involved in politically motivated massacres. of Philippine political development reached a control of the autonomous Muslim region to act 6 Abinales, P.N. & D.J. Amoroso. 2017. While political killings as a whole were never high point under the authoritarian presidency as kingmakers in future presidential elections. State and Society in the Philippines. 6 completely eliminated, they ceased to manifest of Manuel Quezon. He carefully cultivated Rodrigo Duterte’s urban warlordism proved Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, themselves in the brazen and bloody manner alliance networks stretching from rural far more successful.8 He launched his career pp.153-157. that typified the Arroyo era. However, Aquino localities to Washington, DC. Soon, almost from a narrower base, Davao City, where he 7 ibid., McCoy, pp.31-32. III’s administration did not last long enough all state patronage flowed from his hands. had to contend with fewer jostling interests. 8 ibid., Abinales & Amoroso, pp.337-342.