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Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: From ‘Maidan’ to Separatist Uprising

Martin Malek

“Today, is an independent state and we respect it. And, of course, the choice of priorities, the choice of allies is a national sovereign right of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian leadership.”

Russian President in September 20131

“Whatever might happen, wherever Ukraine may be going, we shall meet some place, someday again. This is so because we [Russians and Ukrainians] are one people.”

Putin in September 20132

The current ‘Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation’, enacted by a decree of President Putin, calls Ukraine “[Russia’s] main partner in the CIS“; Kyiv has to be “involved in deeper integration processes”.3 Russian sources, claiming academic relevance, have criticised Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych due to alleged scepticism towards this ‘integration’ in the CIS and predicted that Kyiv will join the Customs Union (consisting, so far, of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) “and other forms of integration” only when “it has no alternatives to the Russian-initiated integration projects”.4 The Kremlin did its very best in order to create just such a situation. Thus, the Director of the Department for Economic Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Gorban, said at the beginning of 2013 that Ukraine prior to its accession to the Customs Union will not receive any price discounts on natural gas imports from Russia (then, Kyiv paid USD 424 per 1,000 cubic

1 Cited in: Ukraine Free To Choose Priorities, Partners – Putin. RIA Novosti, 20 September 2013, (28 November 2013). 2 Cited in: Lyudmila Alexandrova, If Ukraine opts for EU, Customs Union will slam its door shut. ITAR-TASS, 10 September 2013, (28 November 2013). 3 Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. V. Putinym 12 fevralya 2013 g., (5 April 2013); see also: Martin Malek, Die aktuelle Konzeption der Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation: Inhalte und Probleme. In: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, no. 4, 2013, pp. 563-587. 4 Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soyuz: otnoshenie k proektu v stranakh SNG. Problemy natsionalnoy strategiy, no. 1, 2013, pp. 7-41, here p. 20. 1 metres, the ‘pro-Russian’ Belarus only 185). This was too much for official Kyiv, which under the Yanukovych’s administration certainly did not pursue any ‘anti-Russian’ course: The Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs called Gorban’s statement “undiplomatic and insulting” and recommended Moscow “not to lapse into hysteria”.5 However, Russia went on to persuade Ukraine to become a full member of the Customs Union.6 Thus, Putin considered “restrictions” for Ukrainian citizens intending to work in Russia.7 In May 2013 the public learned that Ukraine will gain observer status in the Customs Union; at the same time, Kyiv officially adhered to the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU (initialled already on 30 March 20128) on the Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29 November 2013 in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. In the third week of August 2013 Moscow orchestrated a de facto blockade of all Ukrainian exports in the Russian markets. The Russian Customs Authority revealed its intention to “check” all Ukrainian goods on the common border. The Russian Government assured that it had nothing to do with this “decision of the custom bodies.”9 However, Sergei Glaziev, Putin’s counsellor for the „coordination of the activities of the federal bodies of the executive power in the framework of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space [in the CIS]”, made statements which cast doubts on this: According to him, it should make plain to Ukraine what it has to expect if it should sign the “suicidal” Association Agreement with the EU.10 In such a case, Glaziev (a member of both the Russian and Ukrainian National Academies of Sciences) continued, Ukraine would head towards an “economic disaster”: it would have to import goods from the EU on a duty free-basis, to comply with EU court decisions and face a lot of other negative consequences. Furthermore, Glaziev indicated that Ukraine’s membership in the CIS free trade zone could be suspended.11 The Russian Foreign

5 Ukraina otvetila na „oskorbitelny“ ultimatum Rossii, velev ne „vpadat v isteriku“. NEWSru.com, 3 January 2013, (25 November 2013). 6 Vgl. Pavel Tarasenko, Ukraina ne speshit v soyuz. Kommersant’, 15 January 2013, (25 November 2013). 7 Cited in: Pavel Felgenhauer, Moscow Attempts to Extend Its Strategic Influence from the to Mediterranean. Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 10, Issue 43. 7 March 2013. 8 EU initials Ukraine agreement 'to keep momentum'. EurActiv, 30 March 2012, updated 28 September 2012, (6 December 2013). 9 Cited in: Kabmin Rossii otreagiroval na proverku tovarov s Ukrainy. BBC Russian Service, 15 August 2013, (19 August 2013). 10 Cited in: „Torgovaya voyna“ Rossii s Ukrainoy: vsemu vinoy zhelanie Kieva dobitsya besposhlinnoy torgovli s ES. NEWSru.com, 19 August 2013, (19 August 2013). 11 Cited in: Gerhard Gnauck, Putin-Berater droht Ukraine mit „Katastrophe“. Die Welt, 20 July 2013, (28 August 2013). 2 Ministry warned Kyiv of “huge economic problems” due to EU association.12 Sergei Ivanov, Head of Putin’s Presidential Office, predicted that Ukraine would lose up to 12 billion USD a year only in the trade with Russia. And:

“We do not compel Ukraine to change the vector of its evolution, we just say that after ‘a’ follows ‘b’. This will be the end of the remnants of Ukraine's aerospace and shipbuilding industries. As to the nuclear power industry, there is almost nothing left.”13

EU suggested Russia not to exert any pressure on Ukraine “and other neighbouring countries” [meaning former Soviet republics, M.M.], which want to get closer to the EU. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, made it clear that “we do not accept attempts to limit the sovereign choice of these states. We cannot turn our back to them.” And the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, called any threats from Russia linked to EU agreements “unacceptable.”14 However, EU representatives did not announce any clear steps (thus, not only words) in the case that “attempts to limit the sovereign choice” and “Russian threats” would not stop, so Moscow could ignore the statements from Brussels without any noticeable difficulties. Russian officials went on to paint horror scenarios if Ukraine should dare to sign the Association Agreement with the EU: The “member states of the Customs Union” – meaning, above all, Russia – in such a case “must” erect tariff barriers against Ukraine, which will lead to the shutdown of enterprises especially in the aerospace, nuclear power and armaments industries there. The alleged consequences would be mass unemployment and “social discontent and rebellion especially in the Eastern and Southern regions” of Ukraine. Glaziev foresaw “a sharp decline of the living standard”, “chaos” and possibly a “breakup of the state.”15 – Some Western European scholars agreed with such scenarios, for example Kyiv-

12 Moskau warnt ukrainisches Volk vor schweren Zeiten bei Assoziierung mit EU. RIA Novosti, 29 August 2013, (30 August 2013). 13 Cited in: Administratsiya Kremlya: Rossiya ne zastavlyaet Ukrainu izmenit vektor razvitiya. UNIAN, 1 October 2013, (1 October 2013). 14 Cited in: EU: Moskau darf UdSSR-Nachfolgestaaten nicht unter Druck setzen. RIA Novosti, 11 September 2013, (12 September 2013). 15 According to Glaziev, contemporary Ukraine could face “Mazepa’s fate”, who already had promoted a “European integration”; cited in: Ukrainu ozhidaet raspad. 2000, 24 September 2013, (19 November 2013). – Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) had joined the Swedes during the Second Northern War (1700-1721) in order to achieve independence of his territories from Russia. But Russian Czar Peter the Great defeated Mazepa and Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava in 1709. Mazepa’s image of a disgraceful traitor persisted throughout entire Russian and Soviet history. – On 28 November 2013, Glaziev was (together with other celebrities and public figures with Putin among them) in the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow honored as the 2013 “Person of the Year” by the Russian Biographical Institute because he “helped return Ukraine to a common economic space with 3 based German Andreas Umland: According to him, Kyiv in its current difficult economic situation will be especially vulnerable to Kremlin pressure, and should the Ukrainian economy enter a free fall, a rise of tensions between the Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking parts of the country would be likely. And:

“All this would not bode well for the still unconsolidated Ukrainian state and raise the specter of separation or even civil war. Once secessionist scenarios are in the air, Moscow, in turn, will be unable to resist claiming its responsibility for the over eight million ethnic Russians living predominantly in eastern and southern Ukraine. A particularly fragile hot spot is the Crimean peninsula, largely populated by ethnic Russians, where the Russian Black Sea fleet is stationed. It will be difficult for Russia to stand aside should the Ukrainian state disintegrate and pro-Russian regions declare their readiness to become part or protectorate of the Russian Federation. In the absence of clear borders along which Ukraine could be divided, large-scale armed confrontations over the demarcation of this dividing line cannot be excluded.”16

On the one hand, Russian officials threatened Kyiv with “economic warfare in the case of non-compliance with political demands”17; on the other hand, they expressed “concerns about the people in Ukraine” and pictured a wonderful and carefree future, if Ukraine only joined the Customs Union: the price for Russian gas would be reduced to a third of the present level, the Ukrainian economy would expand, the trade with Russia soar etc. At the same time, Russia worried about Ukraine’s sovereignty – towards EU: Glaziev made remarks about this, and the government daily newspaper called it “embarrassing”, that Ukrainian officials as well as opposition figures (allegedly) “lined up” in front of Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski (who said that Russia tries to “re-collect former Soviet territories” – according to “principles of 19 century geopolitics”18). Ukraine, according to the paper, “has allowed to be treated like a vassal state. Brussels’ envoys, Sikorski and his Swedish counterpart Carl Bildt, […] behaved as if they entered a territory occupied by Western ‚friends of Ukraine’.”19 Sometimes, and especially abroad, the Kremlin’s representatives claim that the ‘Eurasian integration’ (with the Customs Union) does not encompass any political

Russia.” Cited in: Nazvany laureaty natsionalnoy premii „Chelovek goda – 2013“. Pravoslavie.ru, 28 November 2013, (15 January 2014). 16 Andreas Umland, Raising the Stakes. Fending off Russian strangulation of Ukraine’s economy. German Council on Foreign Relations, 22 November 2013, (4 December 2013). 17 Andrei Piontkovskiy, Russkiy patsient. Svoboda.ru, 12 December 2013, (12 December 2013). 18 Cited in: Alice Bota/Jörg Lau, „Wir wollen keine Wiederkehr des Kalten Kriegs“ (Interview). Die Zeit, 27 September 2013, (4 November 2013). 19 Yevgeniy Shestakov, Pervoe evropeyskoe preduprezhdenie. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 October 2013, (4 November 2013). 4 components at all and is limited to the economic sphere.20 But this was inconsistent with a plenty of other declarations of Russian officials indicating that a possible Ukrainian EU association is not only (and maybe not even predominantly) an economic issue. This became obvious, for example, at the occasion of statements by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who tried to dissuade his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kozhara from the “way to EU”: “[…] it is false to accept everything from EU. We must retain our unique civilizational features.“21 And Glaziev, too, stressed a “civilizational choice” (meaning between ‘Eurasia’, that is to say Russia, on the one hand and the EU on the other), which has to be made by Kyiv.22 – These conditions made it evident that the Russian ‘integration’ efforts are, above all, a geopolitical project, which is designed to keep the ‘Near Abroad’ under the Kremlin’s control – and as far as possible away from the EU, not to mention NATO.

Yanukovych’s Refusal to Sign the Association Agreement With the EU

The conclusion of an Association Agreement with the EU was one of the demands of Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions pre-election programme for the parliamentary elections in 2012.23 But on 21 November 2013, only several days before the scheduled signing of the Agreement, the Ukrainian leadership informed the public that it had decided to suspend preparations for further EU association (which Kozhara only some weeks before had praised as “important factor for the security in Eastern Europe”24). A Ukrainian government decree, written in a very roundabout style, said that it was necessary “to study and work out a complex of measures in details, which Ukraine has to take in order to restore the lost

20 Oleg Lebedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian 's Committee on CIS affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, in a speech in Vienna, Presseclub Concordia, 13 November 2013, in the presence of the author. 21 Cited in: Russland will Ukraine von EU-Assoziierung abhalten. RIA Novosti, 29 October 2013, (6 November 2013). 22 Sergei Glaziev, Posledniy god nezavisimosti? Sergei Glaziev, ofitsialny sait, 3 September 2013, (19 November 2013). – The Ukrainian opposition – in its specific manner – even agreed with the Russian opinion that Kyiv faces a “civilizational choice” (or a “choice of values”): The opposition, however, answered this question in a different way than Moscow wanted – in favour of the EU; see, for example, the interview with former interior minister Yuri Lutsenko: Paul Flückinger, „Ohne Assoziation mit der EU keine freien Wahlen“. Die Presse, 29 November 2013, p. 6; and: Sergei Chasov, SNG: A tabachok vroz. The New Times (Moscow), 21 October 2013, pp. 22-33, here p. 27. 23 Ot stabilnosti – k blagopoluchiyu! Predvybornaya programma Partii Regionov. Ofitsialny sayt Krymskoy respublikanskoy organizatsii Partii Regionov, (13 January 2014). 24 Cited in: Kozhara: Signing of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to be important factor for security in Eastern Europe. Kyiv Post, 17 September 2013, (22 November 2013). 5 production output and areas of trade and economic relations with Russia and other CIS member states.” Furthermore, the document proposed a ‘tripartite commission’ with the EU and Russia in order to work out “complex issues aimed at restoring the lost production output and areas of trade and economic relations, expansion and promotion of international trade.”25 Bildt, a very experienced specialist on EU matters, immediately replied that Kyiv “suddenly bows deeply to the Kremlin. Politics of brutal pressure evidently works.”26 Four days later Barroso and the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, condemned, in a common declaration, “external pressure” on Ukraine. „We therefore strongly disapprove of the Russian position and actions in this respect.“27 Yanukovych confirmed in a telephone conversation with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite that Moscow resorted to “economic pressure and blackmail” in order to compel Kyiv not to sign the Association Agreement.28 Ukrainian Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov (an outspoken pro-Russian politician, who speaks Ukrainian poorly; his ‘main merit’ was his total devotion to Yanukovych), too, admitted Russian pressure; according to him, there where no Russian promises of a lower gas price or loans.29 And the fact that Yanukovych did not want to release his political arch- enemy (and former Prime Minister) from jail, which was one of the main EU demands, under no circumstances almost for sure played a crucial role as well. Furthermore, his chances winning the next presidential race in 2015, which with a signed Association Agreement would be under EU’s close(er) scrutiny, would doubtless wane. So, Yanukovych preferred to associate himself even closer than before with Putin, which was alleviated by their similar leadership style.30 The Ukrainian opposition fumed after Yanukovych’s decision to scrap the Association Agreement, threatened to bring a vote of no confidence in the government and the president with impeachment. In several big cities, and especially in Kyiv, hundreds of thousands rallied

25 Government adopted resolution on suspension of preparation process to conclude Association Agreement with EU. Department of Information and Communication of the Secretariat of the CMU [Cabinet of Ministers], 21 November 2013, (6 December 2013). 26 Cited in: Richard Balmforth/Pavel Polityuk, Ukraine drops plan to go West, turns East to Moscow. Reuters, 21 November 2013, (22 November 2013). 27 Cited in: Joint statement by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on Ukraine. European Commission – MEMO/13/1052, 25/11/2013, Brussels, 25 November 2013, (26 November 2013). 28 Cited in: Yanukovych tells Grybauskaite Kyiv cannot sign agreement with EU because of Russian pressure. Interfax-Ukraine, 22 November 2013, (22 November 2013). 29 Yanukovich nazval usloviya Evrosoyuza unizitelnymi. BBC Russian Service, 26 November 2013, (27 November 2013). 30 Lilia Shevtsova, Ukrainian Unrest. The Putin-Yanukovych Anti-Western Pact. The American Interest, 26 December 2013, (16 January 2014). 6 against Yanukovych and his policy. The president responded with police cordons, baton charges and tear gas. In the night of 30th November 2013, the Berkut special police unit armed with batons, stun grenades, and tear gas attacked and dispersed protesters from the Maidan in downtown Kyiv, arguing that they were interfering with preparations to decorate the square for the Christmas and New Year's holidays. In the night from the 10th to the 11th of December, Yanukovych’s police again attempted to oust occupying protesters from the Maidan by force. At this particular time, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, was in Kyiv yet after talks with senior Ukrainian officials; the German „Spiegel Online“ commented: “It is difficult to imagine a greater humiliation [by Yanukovych] for Brussels.”31 It became totally obvious that the Kremlin has more influence on Yanukovych’s European Integration policy than the Ukrainian opposition inside and outside of the Supreme Rada (Parliament), although Barroso declared that “the times of limited sovereignty are over in Europe”, and van Rompuy judged that Moscow’s attempts to influence the “sovereign choice” of Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics are in breach of OSCE’s principles.32 Bildt accused official Russia of launching a propaganda campaign “based on misinformation and sometimes outright lies against the [EU-Ukraine] Agreement [...]. It is both a propaganda war and economic pressure that they exert against Ukraine.”33 Indeed, Russian state-controlled TV channels “have spared no efforts to portray the protesters as a horde of hooligans funded by the West to topple Yanukovych and sow chaos in Ukraine.”34 This had a strong impact on public opinion in Russia: According to a poll, conducted by the well-known Moscow-based Levada Center between 20 and 24 December 2013, 41 percent explained the protests on the Maidan (‘’) with “the influence of the West”, 27 percent with “nationalist sentiments” among Ukrainians; and only 13 percent

31 Benjamin Bidder, Polizei-Offensive in Kiew: Janukowitsch brüskiert den Westen. Spiegel Online, 11 December 2013, (11 December 2013). 32 Cited in: EU to complain to Russia on Ukraine. EU Observer, 29 November 2013, (3 November 2013). 33 Cited in: Adrian Croft/Justyna Pawlak, EU says door remains open to Ukraine as unity cracks. Reuters, 16 December 2013, (16 December 2013). 34 The Russian ‘star’ news anchor Dmitri Kiselyov played an especially important role in the coverage of the events in Ukraine since November 2013. On 8 December 2013, Ukrainian journalist Vitali Sedyuk interrupted Russian journalist Artyom Kol during a live coverage from the Maidan. Sedyuk presented an ‘Oscar’ to Kiselyov and the Rossiya 24 channel for broadcasting “nonsense and lies” about the mass protests before being pushed by Kol out of the frame, see: Claire Bigg, Ukraine's 'Euromaidan' Through The Lens Of Russian Television. RFE/RL, 9 December 2013, (10 December 2013); Oskar dlya Kiseleva i telekanala Rossija – zhurnalist vvorvalsya v efir na Evromaidane. YouTube, 8 December 2013, (10 December 2013). Only one day later, Putin appointed Kiselyov as executive director of a new state media organization called ‘Rossiya Segodnya’, or ‘Russia Today’. 7 thought that the protests are motivated by the conviction of Ukrainian citizens that their country is “as civilized as the EU member states”.35 The Russian State Duma (Lower House of Parliament) in its declaration “On the situation in Ukraine” blasted the Ukrainian opposition for its activities and demanded its “return into the constitutional framework.”36 All Russian calls to “show restraint” were solely addressed to the Ukrainian opposition and not to Yanukovych and his security agencies as well.37 The Russian elite was firmly convinced that this opposition was initiated and funded “from abroad” (meaning what Moscow considers as ‘the West’); however, it could not adduce any hard evidence. The Kremlin on many occasions slammed what he called “interference” of EU and NATO in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. Thus, Putin supposed to have heard an “EU threat against Ukraine”, “which ranged to the organization of mass protests. This is pressure and threats.“38 Furthermore, Putin spotted in Ukraine “not a revolution, but pogroms” of the opposition. On its side, the Russian President continued, “well-prepared and trained militants [boeviki] are active.”39 Lavrov expressed Moscow’s readiness to broker between Yanukovych and the opposition, but only if the former would ask for such an initiative; this, however, did never materialize. Russian prime minister Dmitri Medvedev advised Yanukovych to restore “stability and order” in Ukraine,40 which was clearly a call for tough action of the security forces against the protesters especially in Kyiv. Medvedev continued literally that the Ukrainian leadership must not act like a “whimp” towards the opposition.41 Glaziev identified a “choice” for Yanukovych: he could either put down the opposition’s “mutiny” or lose power, whereupon “increasing chaos and an internal conflict” in Ukraine would follow.42 And

35 Rossiyane ne privetstvuyut maydan. Levada-Centr, 26 December 2013, (30 December 2013). 36 Cited in: Rossiya vyshla na Majdan.Gosduma RF prinyala zayavlenie po situatsii v Ukraine. Kommersant’- Ukraina, 11 December 2013, (16 December 2013). 37 This was even noticed by the cautious BBC (in particular, its Russian Service): Konfrontatsiya v Kieve: Kreml stavit na Yanukovycha. BBC Russian Service, 19 February 2014, (27 May 2014). 38 Cited in: Putin: EU blackmailing Ukraine over halt in trade deal. Russia Today, 22 November 2013, (25 November 2013). 39 Cited in: Putin: Na Ukraine ne revolyutsiya, a pogromy. Grani.ru, 2 December 2013, (3 December 2013). 40 UPDATE 3-Russia urges order in Ukraine as gas talks begin. Reuters, 4 December 2013, (9 December 2013). 41 Medvedev prizval vlasti Ukrainy ne stanovitsya tryapkoy. BBC Russian Service, 20 February 2014, (27 May 2014). 42 Sergej Pravosudov, Beseda s Sergeem Glaz’evym, 31 January 2014, (28 May .2014); see also: Ukraina: sovetnik Putina obvinyaet SShA vo vmeshatelstve. BBC Russian Service, 7 February 2014, 8 the pro-Kremlin daily Izvestia featured a commentary of Oleg Bondarenko, head of a “Russian-Ukrainian Information Center” in Kyiv,43 which demanded from Yanukovych to “scrunch the vermin” (meaning the opposition). If Yanukovych should fail to “take decisive action to normalize the situation” (meaning to subdue the opposition), he could lose Moscow’s political and financial support.44 Timothy Snyder depicted the background of the Russian pressure on Yanukovych to ‘settle accounts’ with the opposition as follows: “Putin wants Ukraine in his Eurasian Union, which means that Ukraine must be authoritarian, which means that the Maidan must be crushed.”45 This view of the Russian leader did not change until the Maidan’s victory on 22 February 2014. Well-known Russian nationalist writer Alexander Prokhanov at the end of November 2013 made clear:

„Putin is a very tough man. This no man willing to compromise, this is a man of very different and complex combinations, which he usually wins. And for him, the Eurasian topic and […] Ukraine’s membership in the Customs Union […] are questions of his worldview and prestige.“46

When protesters on the Maidan rallied for a European perspective for Ukraine, Yanukovych and Azarov shuttled between Kyiv and Moscow. After talks between Yanukovych and Putin in the Kremlin on 17 December 2013, it was announced that Russia would buy Ukrainian government bonds for USD 15 billion and that the cost of Russian gas supplied to Ukraine would be slashed from more than USD 400 per 1,000 cubic metres to 268.5. The speaker of the State Duma, Putin’s associate Sergei Naryshkin, commented that “Russia really assisted Ukraine without putting forward unreasonable conditions as the West did.”47 But Ukrainian opposition leaders were sceptical and demanded to know what Yanukovych has offered Moscow in return for the deal. Such details were revealed only little by little in the following days. Thus, the gas price discounts for Ukraine were – as Putin put it – ‘temporary’ and would

(16 February 2014). 43 According to its website (where the latest entry was made in April 2012), it was founded in 2006 by Dmitri Rogozin, then member of the State Duma and today deputy (and in charge of the military-industrial complex). It was evidently one of its most important tasks to promote Ukraine’s accession to the Russia-dominated “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (a military alliance made up of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), Rossiysko-ukrainskii informatsionnyj Tsentr, (27 May 2014). 44 Oleg Bondarenko, , razdavite gadinu! Izvestia, 20 January 2014, (26 May 2014). 45 Timothy Snyder, Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine. The New York Times Review of Books, 19 February 2014, (27 February 2014). 46 Osoboe mnenie. Alexander Prohkanov as Olga Bychkova’s guest. Echo Moskvy, 27 November 2013, (5 December 2013). 47 Cited in: Knockout für Klitschko: EU begrüßt Janukowitschs Deal mit Putin. RIA Novosti, 20 December 2013, (20 December 2013). 9 be reviewed each quarter, which gives Russian de facto Kremlin-controlled energy company Gazprom even more influence on Ukraine’s energy policy.48 And according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Moscow can call in the loans at any time.49 “For this reason, Moscow gets a new, permanently active tool for pressure on Kyiv.”50 Yanukovych and senior officials of his administration – referring to democracy, law, and the – repeatedly demanded the Maidan’s surrender and accused it of a “hunger for power” and the planning of a coup d'état; furthermore, they shifted the blame for the violence on the streets of Kyiv to the opposition. On 16 January 2014, the majority of the Supreme Rada, consisting of the Party of the Regions, the Communist Party and some ‘independent’ MPs, by showing of hands (!) passed draconic, obviously Russian-inspired laws restricting freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. They were signed into law by Yanukovych the following day, which further inflamed the protest movement; clashes with the security forces claimed several people dead and wounded. Even Yanukovych’s counselor Maryna Stavniichuk admitted that during the voting several articles of the Constitution and the parliamentary rules of procedure were violated.51 Yanukovych offered the post of prime minister to , leader of the parliamentary faction of Tymoshenko’s ‘Batkivshchyna’ (Fatherland) party, and to boxer- turned-politician Vitali Klitschko the position of deputy prime minister for humanitarian affairs. However, the opposition turned down Yanukovych’s advances, insisted on his ouster and increased its pressure on the regime. On 28 January 2014 the Azarov government resigned, and the Supreme Rada voted on the abolition of the controversial laws of 16 January. Albeit these important gains for the opposition, February saw the worst clashes in Kyiv so far; a total of 130 people were killed, most of them demonstrators. On 22 February 2014, the Supreme Rada impeached Yanukovych, who escaped to Russia; however, he went on to insist that he was the “legitimate president” of Ukraine. Russian mass media tried its

48 Roman Olearchyk, Ukraine’s Yanukovich: Thanks for the bailout, Russia… want the gas pipeline now? Financial Times, 19 December 2013, (30 December 2013). – In January 2014, Ukrainian Energy and Coal Industry Minister Eduard Stavitsky said that Ukraine has ceased buying gas from EU countries and will instead purchase the fuel solely from Russia. 49 See: Shuvalov, Rossiya vsegda smozhet potrebovat ot Ukrainy vernut dolg. NEWSru.com, 23 December 2013, (23 December 2013). 50 Oleg Gavrish/Juriy Barsukov, Gaz do otkaza. Skidka “Gazproma” lishaet Ukrainu stimulov dlya reformy TEK. Kommersant-Ukraina, 19 December 2013, (20 December 2013); similar: Rudolf Hermann, Die Ukraine am russischen Gängelband. Janukowitsch rechtfertigt den Moskauer Deal. NZZ Online, 20 December 2013, (23 December 2013). 51 Sovetnik Yanukovycha: „ruchnye“ zakony narushayut Konstitutsiyu. NEWSru.ua, 27 January 2014, (27 May 2014). 10 best to portray the situation in Ukraine as ‘chaotic’, but as a matter of fact, there were ‘not even’ reports about lootings in Kyiv or other Ukrainian towns.52

Russia’s Role After Yanukovych’s Fall

Russian journalist and political observer Georgi Bovt wrote on the prevailing attitude in Moscow in the fall of 2013: “Even 22 years after the Soviet collapse, Russia's ruling elite still cannot resign itself to the fact that Ukraine is a separate and independent state whose interests differ from Russia’s.”53 By exploiting Ukraine’s political, economical and military weaknesses, Putin is acting rationally in pursuit of a centuries-old goal of Kremlin foreign policy, keeping Ukraine in Russia’s orbit – now in the context of an ‘Eurasian integration’.54 If Kyiv would have joined the Customs Union, “that would constitute the most important trophy for Russia’s collective escapism. Ukraine’s accession to Putin’s project would transform the Russian president into a new assembler of lands.”55 But a Ukrainian rapprochement with EU would compel the Kremlin to abandon its ‘neoimperial dreams’.56 With the end of Yanukovych’s regime Moscow obviously (and rightly so) came to the conclusion that it will be impossible to bring a ‘Maidan Ukraine’ into the Customs Union or to initiate Kyiv’s participation in any other ‘Eurasian integration’ projects. Moreover, Moscow almost certainly suspected that the new Ukrainian leadership could terminate the so- called ‘ pact’, concluded by Yanukovych and then Russian president Medvedev in April 2010, which extended the Russian lease on naval facilities in to 2042 (with an additional five year renewal option) in exchange for a multiyear discounted contract to provide Ukraine with Russian natural gas. In this situation Putin decided to implement an obviously well-prepared plan to occupy Crimea and to destabilize South Eastern Ukraine (or, as Putin called this region, ‘’), using Russian secret services, special task forces of the armed units and Russian and Ukrainian ‘volunteers’, hoping to tear there some more

52 Olga Bobrova, Iz strany sbezhali… Vsekh ne perechislit. Novaya gazeta, 25 February 2014, p. 2. 53 Georgy Bovt, How Russia Lost Ukraine. The Moscow Times, 23 October 2013, (27 May 2014). 54 On 29 May 2014 the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the founding documents of an ‚Eurasian Union‘, which is planned to come into being by 1 January 2015. Ukraine’s participation was not on the agenda. 55 Andreas Umland, Ukraine: Key to Restoring a Greater Russia. Ukraine is caught between European integration and Russian re-unification aims. The Globalist, 16 January 2014, (16 January 2014). 56 Andreas Umland, Tor zum Osten oder Krisenherd? Wie das EU-Ukraine-Abkommen den postsowjetischen Raum verändern würde. Internationale Politik, no. 6, 2013, pp. 108-112, here p. 109. 11 ‘junks’ out of the territory of the “neighbor, partner, friend, brother” (Lavrov) 57 Ukraine. To support this campaign, Moscow exerted economical pressure (Gazprom raised the price it charges Ukraine for natural gas dramatically), a propaganda drumfire on prime minister Yatsenyuk’s transitional government in Kyiv, which all Kremlin-controlled media called only “so-called new administration”, “rebel government”, “Nazis” and “fascist junta” without any legitimacy (which sounded especially odd against the backdrop of the fact that the Kremlin has been accused many times of rigging elections) and persistent demands of a ‘federalization’ of Ukraine (which so far is defined as a unitary state by its constitution), meaning a redistribution of Kyiv’s responsibilities in favour of the country’s regions, which should obtain much more rights in the spheres of language policy and budget and even foreign and foreign trade policy.58 However, this would doubtlessly further weaken Ukraine’s internal cohesion,59 which was the ‘hidden agenda’ of the ‘federalization’ effort. Moscow obviously aspired to impose Kyiv even the principles of its state building – and, at the same time, resolutely denied to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs. On the whole, the Kremlin’s actions especially after Yanukovych’s overthrow left no doubt in its aim to cause as much as harm to Ukraine as possible. Snyder even attributed to Putin the attention to make it a ‘failed state’.60

4. A ‘Geopolitical challenge’ For the EU

The EU in the context of the events in and around Ukraine faced challenges in a realm in which it, until then, was hardly active: “Brussels and its junior partners [in the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership] were discussing steel tariffs, wheat exports and the purchase of Eastern European wine. When such ties suddenly became an issue of geopolitics, the West was shocked.”61 Ashton was quoted saying that she does not “believe that the crisis in

57 Cited in: Lawrow gegen Einmischung in Kiew. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 January 2014, p. 5. 58 Sergei Sidorenko, Sergei Glaziev: federalizatsiya – uzhe ne ideya, a ochevidnaya neobkhodimost (Interview). Kommersant‘-Ukraina, 6 February 2014, (7 February 2014). 59 Yuriy Onyshkiv/James Sherr, It is time we stopped praising Ukraine for ‘exercising restraint’ (Interview). Kyiv Post, 26 March 2014, (26 May 2014); Roman Goncharenko, Would a federal Ukraine be viable? Deutsche Welle, 22 February 2014, (11 July 2014). 60 Michael Jungwirth, „Dann wird es für Putin ungemütlich“ (Interview). Kleine Zeitung, 8 March 2014, (28 May 2014). 61 Christian Neef/Matthias Schepp, Maintaining Russian Power: How Putin Outfoxed the West. Spiegel Online, 16 December 2013,

russia-s-grip-on-the-east-a-939286.html> (11 July 2014); see also: André Härtel, Aus dem Scheitern lernen – für eine neue Ukraine-Politik Europas. Ukraine-Analysen, No. 127, 11 February 2014, pp. 7-8. 62 Cited in: Situation in Ukraine not to worsen EU's relations with Russia – Ashton. Ukrinform, 16 December 2013, (18 December 2013). 63 Galina Dudina/Grigorij Tumanov, Bryusselskii kapustnik. Vygodno li Rossii usilenie radikalnykh partii v Evroparlamente. Kommersant, 26 May 2014, (26 May 2014). 13 seemingly, taken by Putin as an ‘invitation’ to do something similar with Ukraine.64 French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner already on 27 August 2008 directly pointed to the possibility of a Russian military intervention on Crimea, but this warning was largely ignored in the EU. On 21 March 2014, EU leaders signed a ‘political association agreement’ with Ukraine, and on 27 May 2014, Poroshenko signed the economic part of the association agreement. It includes a deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement (DCFTA) that will open much of the European market to Ukrainian exports. However, these documents lack any concrete membership perspective, and Russian voices went on to accentuate that Ukraine will “never” or “in 1.000 years” join EU as a full-fledged member. – This could pan out as expected. Thus, Ukraine will remain in a peculiar Zwischeneuropa – anyway, under the significant influence of Putin’s Russia.

Conclusion

Ivan Krastev recently contrasted the outbreak of WW I 1914 and the Crimean/Ukrainian 2014 crisis and emphasized that ‘Munich 1938’ teaches “that capitulating to the demands of a territorially aggressive dictatorship does not bring peace. Although it does avoid a war in the short term, it makes a larger war, on less favourable terms, inevitable later. This warns not against over-reaction but against inaction.”65 Indeed, the current events in Ukraine raise several serious questions which EU and NATO would have liked to avoid: What can be done if Putin should not be willing to ‘restrict’ his ambitions to Crimea, but takes further steps to ‘amputate’ Ukraine territorially (as demanded by ‘Neo-Eurasian’ ideologist Alexander Dugin and others in Russia)? And what would happen if Putin under the pretext of a ‘danger’ for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers not only in Ukraine stirs up uprisings and separatism or even intervenes militarily – for example in the Baltic republics, which are EU and NATO members, or in Kazakhstan? Would the North Atlantic Alliance really fight against Russia for the sake of the freedom and independence of its tiny members Estonia and/or Latvia?

64 Mykola Rjabtschuk, Dreizehn schlimmere Orte auf der Welt. Juri Andruchowytsch (ed.): Euromaidan. Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht. Berlin 2014, pp. 149-158, here p. 152. 65 Ivan Krastev, 1914 versus 1938: how anniversaries make history. OpenDemocracy, 7 July 2014, (14 July 2014). 14 Completed 17 July 2014

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