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The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers- Cior, and Perspective of Relation with Ex-Soviet Union (E-Su) States in the Context of Crimea Crisis

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The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers- Cior, and Perspective of Relation with Ex-Soviet Union (E-Su) States in the Context of Crimea Crisis “HENRI COANDA” “GENERAL M.R. STEFANIK” AIR FORCE ACADEMY ARMED FORCES ACADEMY ROMANIA SLOVAK REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE of SCIENTIFIC PAPER AFASES 2014 Brasov, 22-24 May 2014 THE INTERALLIED CONFEDERATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS- CIOR, AND PERSPECTIVE OF RELATION WITH EX-SOVIET UNION (E-SU) STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMEA CRISIS. ROLES OF THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND MILITIA OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TURBULENCE THEATRE LCDR. (AF-Res.) Ioan PITICAR Air Force Academy “Henri Coanda”, Brasov, Romania Abstract: The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers commonly referred to by its French acronym CIOR, represents the interests of over 1.3 million reservists across 36 participating nations within and beyond NATO, making it the world’s largest military reserve officer organization. Founded in 1948 by the reserve officer associations of Belgium, France and the Netherlands, CIOR is now a NATO-affiliated, non-political and non-profit umbrella organization of member nations’ national reserve officer associations. This presentation will deal possible future relations between NATO/CIOR on the one hand, and Ukraine, Moldova, or the South Caucasus States on the other hand, in conditions when Russia tending to recreate the „Soviet” old territory, in the context of events and of the recent evolution from Crimea. The reservist’s role from paramilitary or militia organizations based on Ethnic Minorities, was used very efficient in Crimea by Russian forces, in order to reach their objectives in operations in an efficient and quickly manner. This abstract intend to present the implication of paramilitary or militia organizations, based on Ethnic Minorities, in conflicts between states, like an asymmetrical option that could lead to civil war and to the terrorist acts, out of any control of the states. Keywords: CIOR, Crimea, paramilitary, militia, civil war, reservists. 1. Roles of CIOR 2. Before of february's Crimea events The CIOR has two main roles: to provide advice on Reserve issues and support to the According to a pact from 2010 between NATO Alliance, and to foster the professional Ukraine and Russia, Russia had a lease for development of reserve officers. their naval facilities in Crimea until 2042, and maintained the right to use some small areas of Crimea, up to 25.000 troops, 24 artillery systems, 132 armored vehicles, and 22 military Russian individuals claiming "Russia's clear planes on the Crimean peninsula. violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 3. The pact – „The Kharkiv Agreement” territorial integrity". These threats were subsequently carried out and Russia retaliated. Russia’s use of their warm water port in The Crimean Peninsula is seen by Russia as Sevastapol was due to end in 2017 with its strategic link to the Mediterranean Sea, Ukraine saying their would be no extension (as Black Sea, and the Balkans with Azov Sea per their constitution prohibiting foreign area, as well as a land of historic cultural and military use of their lands) and Russia would religious significance. The Russian have to leave. government maintains that its preparedness to But now, after Crimea episode, Russia have enter the Ukraine militarily in Crimea is to Ukraine as an enemy over "a barrel" of gas protect ethnic Russians in the region. theft. Russia does not recognize the newly In 2010 Russia and Ukraine "negotiated" an installed interim government in Ukraine, treaty called "The Russian Ukrainian Naval instead considering now-ousted- Base for Gas treaty" which is also known by PresidentViktor Yanukovych Ukraine's the name of "The Kharkiv Pact". legitimate leader. The bottom line of the deal is this, Russia Yanukovych formally asked Russia to gives Ukraine a "special price" on gas - a intervene in Ukraine militarily to maintain supposed 30% discount - (which in turn will peace and order. Russia claims that its armed help them purchase gas to return into the forces were not involved in the stand-off prior system for the gas they supposedly took, or if to the referendum and reunification of Crimea they chose they can use the discount to pay to Russia, and also asserts that use of force for Russia back faster for the gas they didn’t pay the purposes of humanitarian intervention in for and in return Ukraine leases the Naval base Ukraine has not yet occurred. in Sevasatapol until at least 2042 (Russia Vladimir Tyunin, used to be the director of wrote a clause into the treaty giving them the a humanitarian institute in the Ukrainian city option of extending to 2047). of Sevastopol. He now commands 100 trained Russia gets its money (or gas) back AND gets men at the heart of the standoff between to keep its port in Sevastapol under the Russia and the West. auspices of "saving" Ukraine. “I have a group of people that can do any kind The treaty had a rough ride through the of task” Tyunin, 57, said at the end of Ukrainian parliament with fights and February, in the port on the Crimean demonstrations breaking out, it was finally peninsula. ratified under dubious circumstances (several “These are special forces. They can assault assenting votes were registered by people buildings, they can block buildings. We are known not to even be in the building when the ready to protect ourselves.” votes took place). In Russia the treaty As diplomats around the world seek to was passed through their parliament in one defuse the crisis, Crimea is preparing for a vote with 96% assenting. March 16 referendum on splitting from Apparently we could say: „this is fair”. Ukraine and joining Russia. Pro-Moscow Russia get's paid for gas, Ukraine gets cheap supporters like Tyunin’s unit, which he says gas and Russia doesn't have to build a new participated in the siege of the Ukraine Navy’s base for their ships. All Win, right? headquarters, are on the front line of a conflict But here's the Russian triky! that so far has been fought more with words On February 24, 2014, additional soldiers than weapons. arrived, on the Crimean Peninsula, but the The militias gave President Vladimir Putin total number remained well below 25,000. the upper hand in the autonomous republic of Western Governments accused the Russian about 2 million people, home to his Black Sea military of seizing control of the Crimea Fleet. Their numbers rose to about 15,000 on region, and threatened sanctions against March 7, when a local hunting club joined “HENRI COANDA” “GENERAL M.R. STEFANIK” AIR FORCE ACADEMY ARMED FORCES ACADEMY ROMANIA SLOVAK REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE of SCIENTIFIC PAPER AFASES 2014 Brasov, 22-24 May 2014 with 4,500 members, guns and ammunition, Yarema said in Kiev today. Meanwhile, the according to Alexander Bochkarev, a retired militias in Crimea keep Ukrainian forces colonel from the Ukrainian Interior Ministry confined to their bases, patrol streets and and now the commander of the militia in the control the road network with checkpoints. Crimean capital, Simferopol. The units are armed with bludgeons, iron crowbars and hunting rifles, with more 4. Rival Groups substantial weapons also at their disposal, Bochkarev said by telephone. For now, militia officials say the main task “We have several arsenals in reserve that are of the paramilitaries is to keep order in Crimea guarded by our Crimean guys,” said after the protests in Kiev left more than 100 Bochkarev, who has 2,800 people under his people dead last month. There has been no command. Many of them may join the regular bloodshed since the standoff began on the Crimea army that is being formed now, he peninsula, where ethnic Russians make up 59 said. percent of the population, while Ukrainians Crimean authorities started recruiting last account for 24 percent and ethnic Tatars for 12 week and 186 soldiers have already taken an percent, according to the 2001 census. oath, the Interfax news service reported, citing “The danger is that the people of Crimea premier Aksenov. There will be a 1,500-strong who are pro-Kiev may now form their own army with guns guarding polling stations at the militia,” said Ben Barry, senior fellow for land March 16 referendum, he said. warfare at the London-based Iternational Bochkarev, whose regiment has fast-response Institute for Strategic Studies. troops, a logistics unit and a security service to “This may also be the case with Tatars.” do background checks on would-be members, Militia organizers including Bochkarev say the said he recommends the best people to the groups mirror those formed in Lviv in western recruiters. New soldiers get a contract and a Ukraine and Kiev, where they kept the peace Kalashnikov assault rifle. in the immediate aftermath of the revolt that toppled Kremlin-backed President Viktor 6. No Aggression Yanukovych. The militias were organized at the call of Ukrainian Army Colonel Yuli Mamchur, Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksenov, acting commander of a besieged airbase near installed after the regional parliament had been Sevastopol, said he is in touch with militia and seized by armed Russia supporters. The groups didn’t see any aggression from them. supplement the official Russian troops in the “We are calling each other when we see region, estimated by the Ukraine government something strange near the base,” Mamchur at more than 19,000. said by phone. “Drunken crowds, for example, or some non-sanctioned rallies. There was 5. Troop Buildup absolutely no threat to anyone here till Russians came here to protect us.” Russian troops continue to be deployed and Putin said it’s not his troops who are to “increase their presence” along Ukraine’s surrounding Ukrainian army installations. eastern border, First Deputy Premier Vitaliy Yet Bochkarev, the Simferopol 7. Tatar Response commander, said Russian involvement is key.
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