Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

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Evolution of European Union

Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine,

Moldova and Belarus

(2003-2014)

Dmytro Tyshchenko

Orientadorа: Professora Doutora Raquel Cristina de Caria Patrício

Coorientadora: Doctor of Sciences Tetiana Sydoruk

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais

Lisboa 2017

Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Dmytro Tyshchenko

Orientadora: Professora Doutora Raquel Cristina de Caria Patrício Coorientadora: Doctor of Sciences Tetiana Sydoruk

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais Júri:

-Presidente: Doutor António Costa de Albuquerque de Sousa Lara, Professor Catedrático e Presidente do Conselho Científico deste Instituto;

Vogais: -Doutor José Adelino Eufrásio de Campos Maltez, Professor Catedrático do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa; -Doutor Heitor Alberto Coelho Barras Romana, Professor Catedrático do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa; -Doutora Maria Raquel de Sousa Freire, Professora Associada c/Agregação da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra; -Doutora Raquel Cristina de Caria Patrício, Professora Auxiliar do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa, na qualidade de orientadora; -Doutora Andreia Mendes Soares e Castro, Professora Auxiliar do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa; -Doutora Liliana Domingues Reis Ferreira, Professora Convidada do Departamento de Sociologia da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade da Beira Interior.

Lisboa 2017

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

“L'objet final est d'éliminer les barrières entre les peuples d'Europe, il est de réunir ces peuples en une même communauté.”

Jean Monnet

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

DEDICATION

Thanks, Mum.

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Undertaking this PhD has been a truly life-changing experience for me. It would not have been possible to do without the support and guidance that I received from many people.

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude my advisor Professor Ph.D. Raquel Cristina de Caria Patrício, you have been a tremendous mentor for me. I would like to thank you for encouraging my research and for allowing me to grow as a research scientist.

I would also like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my co-advisor Dr. Phil. Tetiana Sydoruk. Your guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. Without your guidance and constant feedback, this PhD would not have been achievable. I could not have imagined having better advisor and co-advisor for my Ph.D. study.

I would also like to say a heartfelt thank you to my mother, Oksana, and my brother Oleksandr for always believing in me and encouraging me to follow my dreams.

Finally, I thank my God, my good Father, for letting me through all the difficulties. I have experienced Thy guidance day by day. Thou art the one who let me finish my degree. I will keep on trusting Thee for my future. Thank Thee, Lord.

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

CONTENTS DEDICATION………………………………………………………………………….…..….v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………….…...... vi INTRODUCTORY NOTE…………………………………………………………….…...... ix ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………..…..x RESUMO……………………………………………………………………………………...xi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………….xii LIST OF TABLES/MAPS/FIGURES………………………………………….…………….xiv CLARIFICATIONS……………………………………………………………………….....xvi INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………...... 1 Research Field.……………………………………………………………………………...... 3 Problem Formulation….……………………………………………………………………...... 4 Research Questions………………………………………………………………………….…4 Objectives of the Study………………………………………………………………………...5 Hypotheses of the Study………………………………………………………………………..7 Methodological Approach……………………………………………………………………...9 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………….10 Thesis Design…………………………………………………………………………...... 18

CHAPTER I. GENESIS AND NATURE OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY…………………………………………………………………..…20 I.1. Regional Approach of the European Union towards its Neighbours…………………….20 I.2. Origin and Conceptual Formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy……………..36 I.2.1. The European Neighbourhood Policy Funding……………………………………55 I.3. Reformation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2006-2007: Principles and Directions…………………………………………………………………………….…..62 I.4. Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy…………………………………...... 72 I.5. Final synthesis to Chapter I……………………………………………………..………..84

CHAPTER II. CONVERSION OF EASTERN DIMENSION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY…………………………………………………………..………....87 II.1. A new Impulse to the ENP: Eastern Partnership……………………………………...... 87 II.1.1. Bilateral Framework within the Eastern Partnership…………………………….112 II.1.2. Multilateral Framework………………………………………………………….116

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Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

II.2. Positions of EU Members and Partner States concerning Eastern Partnership: in Varietate Concordia?...... …....120 II.3. Harmonisation of the Eastern Partnership Initiative with other EU Policies in Eastern Europe…………………………………………………………………………………..143 II:4. “A Common Neighbourhood”: between two centres of power……………………...... 149 II.4.1. EU-Russia contemporary relations……………………………………………....149 II.4.2. Role of the European Union in resolving conflicts in the “Shared Neighbourhood”………………………………………………………………...154 II.4.3. Eurasian Economic Union as false alternative to the European Union or neo-imperial project of Russia………………………………………………………………...182 II.4.4. EU and Russian Soft Power……………………………………………………...191 II.4.5. EU and Russian Hard Power in Eastern Europe……………………………....…205 II.4.6. Hybrid Warfare of Russia…………………………………………………….….210 II.5. EU Normative Power in Eastern Europe and its Shortcomings…………………………217 II.6. Eastern Partnership, qvo vadis?...... 223 II.7. Final Synthesis to Chapter II...... 228

СHAPTER III. EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN 2003-2016………………………...... 231 III.1. Revolution of Dignity…………………………………………………………...... 240 III.2. Return to pro-European Path…………………………………………………………..244 III.3. Final Synthesis to Chapter III………………………………………………………….254

CHAPTER IV. RELATIONS WITH MOLDOVA AND BELARUS: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP “POSTER CHILD” AND “PARIAH”………………....256 IV.1. Moldova and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003-2016)………………….….256 IV.2. Belarus – European Union. Main problems of the Partnership…………………….….267 IV.3 Final Synthesis to Chapter IV……………………………………………………….....281

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………...283 Conclusion about Hypotheses…………………………………………………………….....283 Conclusion about Problem of Investigation……………………………………….………...286 Сontribution to Science………………………………………………………..…………….289 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………290

APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………...... 351

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Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The present thesis was written in British variant of the English language

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation joins a vibrant conversation in the political sciences about the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern dimension. The Policy stands on regional approach of the European Union. The evolution of the Eastern Partnership henceforth is profoundly dependent upon foreign policies of the Member States and the EU institutions.

The thesis also intends to study the bilateral relations between the EU and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Eastern Europe has а significant importance in the European sub-continent. In this sense, I studied tools of influence of the European Union and Russia in the “Shared Neighbourhood”, the soft and hard power instruments together with the Moscow-led integration projects and the hybrid war of Russia. Moreover, participating in the crisis settlement resolution in Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has been increasing its potential as a global political actor.

The development of the proposal model of research is based upon the analysis of the empirical data together with theoretical approaches, which are divided into two groups – nuclear approaches (neo-liberalism, neo-realism and Normative Power Europe) and a range of complementary theories.

Therefore, the study was divided into four chapters, trying to describe a connection and interdependence of these areas.

KEYWORDS: European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, hybrid war, soft power, hard power.

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

RESUMO

A investigação junta-se à discussão vibrante nas ciências políticas sobre o desenvolvimento da Política Europeia de Vizinhança e da sua dimensão oriental. A política está baseada na abordagem regional da União Europeia. Portanto, a evolução da Parceria Oriental está profundamente dependente de políticas externas dos Estados-Membros e das instituições da UE.

A tese também pretende estudar as relações bilaterais entre a UE e a Bielorrússia, a Moldávia e a Ucrânia. A Europa Oriental tem a importância significativa no subcontinente europeu. Nesse sentido, eu estudei ferramentas de influência da União Europeia e da Rússia no “Vizinhança Comum”, os instrumentos do poder brando e duro, também os projetos de integração de Moscovo e a guerra híbrida da Rússia. Além disso, participando na resolução das crises na Ucrânia e na Moldávia, a UE tem vindo a aumentar o seu potencial como ator político global.

O desenvolvimento da tese baseia-se na análise dos dados empíricos, juntamente com abordagens teóricas, que são divididos em dois grupos – abordagens nucleares (neoliberalismo, neorrealismo e Normative Power Europe) e uma série de teorias complementares.

Portanto, a investigação foi dividido em quatro capítulos, tentando descrever uma conexão e interdependência dessas áreas.

Palavras-chave: Política Europeia de Vizinhança, Parceria Oriental, Bielorrússia, Ucrânia, Moldávia, Rússia, guerra híbrida, poder brando, poder duro.

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA – Association Agreement

AfEI (alternative abbreviation AIE) – Alliance for European Integration

CPRM – Communist Party Republic of Moldova

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

EaP – Eastern Partnership

EC – European Commission

EEAS – European External Action Service

EEU – Eurasian Economic Union

ENI – European Neighbourhood Instrument

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

EUBAM – EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

EUSR – European Union Special Representative

FTA – Free Trade Area

HDI – Human Development Index

HR – High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

IR – International Relations

MASSR – Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic xii

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

MSSR – Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic

ND – Northern Dimension

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NIS – New Independent States

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PHARE – Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies

PMR – Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic

UfM – Union for the Mediterranean

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNDP – UN Development Programme

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

WTO – World Trade Organization

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Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: EU financial mechanisms towards neighbouring countries………………………….55 Table 2: European Neighbourhood Instrument funding on 2014-2020, billion euro…………59 Table 3: ENPI budget for Ukraine bilateral programmes, million euro……………………….60 Table 4: ENPI budget for Moldova bilateral programmes, million euros…………………….60 Table 5: Visa Policy of the EU Member States towards Ukraine (2012)……………………..77 Table 6: A comparison of Eastern Partnership Economies…………………………………...87 Table 7: Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum……………………………………………92 Table 8: 2010-2014 Indexes on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus………………………….…101 Table 9: Eastern Partnership Summits………………………………………………………109 Table 10: Eastern Partnership Association Agreements, including DCFTAs………..……..112 Table 11: EU Member States on Eastern Partnership………………………………………123 Table 12: Comparison of the Eastern Partnership with other EU regional projects…………145 Table 13: Periods of Moldova-Transnistria/Russia war………………………...…………...155 Table 14: EU restrictive measures against Russia and the Crimea (individuals, companies and officials) in 2014-2016……………………………………………………………168 Table 15: Chronology of key Eurasian Economic Union developments……………………184 Table 16: SWOT analysis of possible impact of the Eurasian Economic Union of economies of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus...………………………………………………186 Table 17: PEST analysis of possible joining Ukraine and Moldova into the Eurasian Economic Union…………………………………………………………………………...... 187 Table 18: Comparison of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union………...190 Table 19: Nye’s Three Types of Power……………………………………………………..191 Table 20: Soft and Hard Power……………………………………………………….……..192 Table 21: Presence of Russian and EU soft power institutions in Eastern European states….194 Table 22: The Soft power instruments of the European Union and Russia in the “Shared Neighbourhood”……………………………………………………………….....196 Table 23: Comparison of Soft Power Indices………………………………………………..202 Table 24: Russian and EU Hard Power……………………………………………………...210 Table 25: Ukraine-EU Summits……………………………………………………….…….237 Table 26: EU-Moldova Co-operation Timeline………………………………………….….261 Table 27: Main bilateral programmes of EU assistance to Moldova………………….…….264 Table 28: Financial support for Moldova within the ENPI, million euro……………………265 xiv

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: European Neighbourhood Policy Space………………………………………………45 Map 2: Eastern Partnership…………………………………………………………………...90 Map 3: Independent Moldova since 1991…………………………………………………...154 Map 4: The Crimean Peninsula……………………………………………………………...163 Map 5: Separatists-Ukraine border according the Minsk negotiations………………………177 Map 6: Eurasian Economic Union…………………………………………………………..189 Map 7: Debunking Russia’s Myth of NATO Military Expansion…………………………..209 Map 8: Russian military units in eastern Ukraine (August 2016)……………………………213

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Research questions…………………………………………………………………..6 Figure 2: Strategy for the analysis…………………………………………………………….17 Figure 3: European Investment Bank lending in the Eastern Partnership, million euro……..59 Figure 4: Multilateral Framework of the Eastern Partnership……………………………….117 Figure 5 Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy………………………………………167 Figure 6: Most violent non-state actors in the world……...…………………………………214 Figure 7: Components of Hybrid warfare…..……………………………………………….215 Figure 8: Objectives of EU Policies towards Eastern Europe……………………………….219 Figure 9: Main Trade Partners of Belarus (January-February 2016)……...…………………281

Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

CLARIFICATIONS

In this thesis, there are some uses of words that need to be clarified. These are briefly presented in this chapter.

First of all, it is necessary to define what is meant by Eastern neighbours. This term became popular after publication of the Communication of the European Commission “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” in March 2003 and included Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia1.

Eastern Partners (partners) term is used to indicate the six neighbouring countries participating in the Eastern Partnership, - Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Another term, Eastern dimension, refers to a direction of the EU foreign policy towards the neighbouring countries in the east – Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. It appeared as an analogy to the EU “Northern dimension”, a policy referred to the northern countries of Europe. Nowadays, Eastern dimension is used in EU documents on the Eastern Partnership as “Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission, 2008a).

Moldova. Besides Moldova referring to the Republic of Moldova, the use of the term also depends on the context. Most of the times it refers to the whole country, but when the conflict with Transnistria is covered, Moldova refers to the area west of the river Dniester. The same situation with term Ukraine during the negotiations with Russia and Russia-led terrorist organisations in the east of Ukraine.

1 Russia was a part of the Eastern neighbours group in the EC Communication. However, Russia refused to take part in the ENP. As a result, the Russia-EU relations were based on four “common spaces” of the co-operation, defined during EU-Russia summit in 2003.

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Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

INTRODUCTION

The European Union is the most important European organisation that becomes supranational, appears as one of the most influential global actors. After the collapse of the socialist system, the role and involvement of the European Union in the global and regional processes has been steadily increasing. In 2004 and 2007, there were the most ambitious enlargements. This expansion has once again demonstrated the attractiveness of the European Union as political and socio-economic model for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the EU accession of CEE countries was understood by the elites as a “return to Europe” from other system, the core of which was not so long ago Russia (Heinisch, 2013: 1). The last EU enlargement in 2007 brought the European Union geographically closer to Russia, claiming to have a special role in the new world order. There are states between them that belonged to Soviet Union while were located in Europe. The European model arises interest in post-Soviet states that have complex economic, political and social conditions, as well as their growing co-operation with the EU. The common history is a factor, which brings together and repels at the same time the European CIS countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) from Russia, and close economic ties with it in terms of raw nature of the Russian economy is not conducive to successful socio-economic transformation of Russia’s neighbours. After 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the eastern dimension of the EU policy acquire a qualitatively different meaning. At the beginning of the 21st century, the eastern policy is focused on the rest European countries that cannot or even do not want to join the European Union. The topicality of this study is based on several statements:

 Firstly, it is a steadily increasing international and regional importance of the European Union. In 2004 and 2007, there was a large-scale enlargement of the European Union, which demonstrated the attractiveness of the socio-economic and political model, embodied by the European Union, for the post-socialist states. However, the extension does not only give the EU the new impulses to the development, but also poses a number of challenges for it. The European Neighborhood Policy, formally initiated in 2004, has played an important role in transformation of the European Union. First of all, it is an “external dimension” of the efforts to consolidate the structure of the European Union, the use of external activity to ensure safety of regional context of internal transformations in the EU. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine occupy a special place in Neighbourhood Policy, because the

1 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

fact that they are the geographical part of Europe gives them the right to claim the right to join the EU.

 Secondly, there is of particular importance of the region, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, to Russia and vice versa. These four states still have close economic, social and cultural ties and whereby changes in one of them influence on the situation in others. In these conditions, through the study of the evolution of EU policy towards Russian neighbours it is important to understand the nature of the expanding European model, as well as the motives and perspectives of the desire of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine to strengthen cooperation with the EU until joining it.

The object of study is the interaction of the European Union with the neighbours on the eastern border – with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and the subject is the features of the implementation of the EU relations with its eastern neighbours within the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership between 2003 and 2014.

The emergence of direct border between the EU and Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, was the impetus for enhanced EU policy towards its eastern neighbours. At the same time, the European Union had to take a pause in its expansion for an indefinite period of time. The emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003-2004 only in the medium term was intended to strengthen the security of the EU and its internal consolidation. In the long term, neighbourhood policy, following the internal logic of the EU, must inevitably develop into a policy of expansion, some aspects of which are laid down in the ENP from its appearance. Moldova and Ukraine have stated for long its intention to join the European Union. This trend is also possible in the case of Belarus in the future.

2 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Research Field “The success of [the European countries’] effort to consolidate themselves into the European Union will determine their future influence. United, Europe will continue as a Great Power; divided into national states, it will slide into secondary status.”

Henry Kissinger, 19941

After the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the European Union finally obtained a “face” in negotiations on the international arena. Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was the official who could represent the entire EU.

The development of this sphere of integration had been long and followed disagreements in Europe about foreign policy matters. At the beginning of the Iraqi war in 2003, the EU countries were divided into two camps: some members supported the US military intervention, others were against. The Russian aggression in Georgia of August 2008 highlighted existence of the same problem. The European countries were ambiguous in their reaction and position on the Russian military actions and annexation. A new level of integration within foreign policy was reached during the recent occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and war with Ukraine up to now. All the EU Members were unanimous concerning the international law violation and supported EU sanctions against Russia. However, this unanimous voice of the EU is getting harder and harder to keep.

Former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has in the past pointed out this paradox quite clearly asking: “Who do I call if I want to talk to Europe?” (Dumitrescu, 2017: 43) This is an example of the weakness of the EU, when it comes to outwardly be united and speak with one voice.

Nonetheless, the EU has always been a difficult actor to analyse. The question of the EU role on the international arena has been even more difficult to understand. The EU is often described as a case of Sui Generis2 because the relations between the Member States and the institutions do not fit into the concepts and framework of traditional ideas of International Relations theory. For instance, the neo-realistic approach cannot explain why states would

1 Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

2 In political philosophy, the unparalleled development of the European Union as compared to other international organisations has led to its designation as a sui generis geopolitical entity. There has been widespread debate over the legal nature of the EU given its mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements, with the organisation thus possessing some characteristics common to confederal and federal entities. 3 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) give up sovereignty to EU inter- and supranational institutions or why the EU does not at present have military capacity.

The international world order of the twenty first century is unprecedented in many ways. For hundreds of years, Europe was synonymous with conflicts and clashing national interests in the three eras: the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna and the Cold War. Today’s world order in which the common acknowledgement of the concept raison d’état3 makes the former conflicting national interests obscure. Although, the conflict of interests between states is limited to local or regional interest spheres (verbi gratia Eastern Europe).

Problem Formulation The final problem formulation of the treatise is:

Has the European Neighbourhood Policy towards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova evolved within a more than ten years time scale (2003-2014)?

In furtherance of better understanding of this problem, some research questions have been formulated.

Research Questions

The research questions of this dissertation are:

- How has the European Neighbourhood Policy developed until now? How is the current situation? - What kind of bilateral co-operation exist between the EU and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine? What interests do they have in each other? - Has the ENP been creating conflicts of interest with Russian foreign policy in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova? What kind of power do the EU and Russia use in Eastern Europe? - How active is the European Union involved in the conflict resolution processes in Eastern Europe?

3 Raison d’état is the concept of national interest. A nation’s goals and ambitions and how it pursues these are central in the field of International Relations

4 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

- Do Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova accept completely the ENP, or there are some argued spheres? - Has the EU Normative Power been contributing to the development of the three Eastern European states within multi- and bilateral relations with the European Union?

Objectives of the Study The study is focused on the evolution of the EU eastern policy towards three CIS republics in 2003-2014. Further, it aims to achieve these general objectives: - To analyse the formation of the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003-2014; - To determine the bilateral relations between the European Union and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The specific objectives are: - To consider the debates and the key initiatives towards EU-eastern neighbours relations within the neighborhood policy on the supranational (European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the EU) and national (governments of the EU member states) levels since their emergence and till 2014; - To analyse the changes in domestic and foreign policies of the EU eastern neighbours in relation to the emergence of the European Neighborhood Policy; - To study the dynamics of their interaction with the EU in 2003-2014; - To determine the impact of the international and regional context on EU-eastern neighbours relations, on neighborhood policy formation and the evolution of its Eastern dimension; - To evaluate of the Russian factor in the interaction of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine with the European Union in the context of the ENP.

5 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) Figure 1: Research questions

Problem Formulation - Has the European Neighbourhood Policy towards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova evolved during more than ten years (2003-2014)?

How active is the What kind of bilateral Has the ENP been Does Russia propose any How has the European Has the EU Normative Power European Union co-operation exist creating conflicts of alternative path of Neighbourhood Policy been contributing to the involved in the conflict between the EU and interest with Russian integration for the ENP developed until now? development of the three resolution processes in Belarus, Moldova and foreign policy in Belarus, countries? Eastern European states within How is the current Eastern Europe? Ukraine? What interests Ukraine and Moldova? multi- and bilateral relations situation? do they have in each What kind of power do with the European Union? other? the EU and Russia use in Eastern Europe?

Empiric

EU Belarus Russia IR Theories

Ukraine Moldova

Ukraine

ANALYSIS

6 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The Chronological Framework of the study is limited by the period from 2003 until 2014. This period is fully applied to the analysis of EU neighbourhood policy towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. However, in the case of discussions on the future of EU relations with its neighbors after the enlargement 2004, the period was extended to 2002, as this is the start of the substantive discussion of the concept of the neighbourhood within the European Union. The future neighbours did not participate in this discussion until 2003. Taking into consideration Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 with following annexation of Crimea and commence of hybrid war, the period was also extended to 2017.

Hypotheses of the Study

H.1. “The European Neighbourhood Policy is addressed to states which do not have the perspectives to become members of the EU at this moment or at all”. Thus, this initiative is intended to denote a pause in the process of enlargement of the European Union. In this case, on the prospects for full membership to the Member States of the “Neighbourhood Policy”, The European Union takes a certain inconsistency. In this study, the hypothesis that originated as a strategy aimed at mitigating the effects of large-scale “expansion” of the EU, which aims to “buy time” for urgent internal reforms before the next wave of new members, the “neighbourhood policy” has been regarded as an alternative to full EU membership, securing thus, for the newly independent states the status of “neighbours”.

1.1. Ukraine and Moldova accepted the ENP and Eastern Partnership as a stage of European integration path to join the EU in a long-term perspective.

1.2. Belarus accepted the ENP and Eastern Partnership to obtain a financial support from the EU, the economic development and create a counterbalance to Russian political influence on Minsk. Moreover, Russia officially rejected the initiatives and insisted Belarus to do the same.

1.3. Within the EU, there are groups of Member States which are “in favour” and “against” towards the evolution of the ENP. The first group “in favour” is leaded by Poland and contains such states as Germany, Sweden, Czech Republic and Hungary.

7 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The opposing group “against” is led by France and is supported by Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta.

H.2. “One of the most important tasks of “neighbourhood policy” is the creation of “a prosperous and stable neighborhood” on the borders of the European Union, which would be characterised by “peaceful relations among nations based on cooperation” (European Commission; 2006a; 5). In this regard, it is likely expected to increase the EU role in conflict resolution on the territories of new emergent states. In the present paper, there is a hypothetical assumption that the growing influence of the EU on security issues in the Eastern Europe will lead to the fact that the settlement of regional conflicts will occur in several models, either with Russia or without it.

H.3. Eastern Europe is not a homogenous region, but rather different by internal diversification and polarisation of the foreign policy. Among the participating countries, there are several models of relations with the EU. In one of them, the EU is seen as a strong regional actor that ensures security and stability. In another model, it focuses primarily on the economic partnership, the attractiveness of the European market for national products.

H.4. The European Neighbourhood Policy is the foundation of a common EU foreign policy formation. Strengthen the political influence of the EU and harmonisation of member countries in the area of foreign policy will contribute to the results of internal change – the emergence of a permanent president of the European Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

H.5. The thesis raises the question of what might be the consequence of “neighborhood policy”, if it is not a temporary stage before joining the EU, the countries to which it is addressed. As a possible answer to this question is the hypothesis that the ENP can lead to the evolution of the political situation in neighbouring countries, the partial transformation of the governance models by convergence and the emergence of forms of political regimes. This raises the question of how deep can be convergence of political systems and societies of the EU and three Eastern European states.

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Methodological Approach This project will answer the problem formulation mainly by applying theoretical analysis, empirical analysis and analysis of other secondary sources. Thus the focus of this project is a qualitative analysis. The problem formulation will be answered through the applications of theory to an analysis of reports, law, speeches and articles and the theoretical framework will be elaborated deductively, moving from theory to analysis and hypothesis testing. This thesis will be using three different theory frames in order to analyse and answer the problem formulation and to maintain a critical perspective to the research field of this project. The frames used are: Neo-liberalism, Neo-realism and Normative Power Theory. Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism will be used for the purpose of reflecting on whether normative impact could be explained by either theory.

Both empirical and theoretical articles such as the case studies on Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine serve as basis of the analysis.

When looking at the empirical material, the EU relations with Eastern European States within the ENP can be identified through primary and secondary sources. The primary source are the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon, article excerpts, transcripts of speeches by commissioners, speeches of official representatives of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

Secondary sources are theoretical literature on the EU and the theoretical approaches. The theory of Ian Manners of Normative Power Europe will serve as the main theoretical framework of the project.

At various stages of the work and dealing with individual objectives of the study applied a broad range of specific methods of collecting data, its processing and analysis.

I used an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political actors of international relations, which combines theoretical elements of political theory, history, and sociology. In the study of the political aspects of EU relations with the neighbouring countries in the context of “neighborhood policy” a systematic approach was used. It allows us to consider the development of “neighborhood policy” in relation to other areas of European integration and the political-strategic processes on the European continent. This approach makes it possible to bring not just chronologically tuned and fair presentation of the facts, but to show the logic, driving forces of the ENP.

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A comparative analysis was used in the research, which will analyse the development of the “Neighbourhood Policy” in the broader context of other foreign policy initiatives of the European Union, such as Enlargement Policy or Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The scientific methods were to evaluate the relationships between the different actors of the regional geopolitical system, including descriptive and inductive methods. The comparative historical analysis was applied in the study of the features of the influence of the social environment, political factors, as well as the traditions and experience of foreign policy formation with respect to the new independent states.

A documents analysing method was selected due to the need to consider the legal and regulatory ENP framework to obtain reliable information on the origins of this initiative.

In addition, the study also used the method of statistical analysis, which helps to systematise data collection to determine the features of EU cooperation with Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

Theoretical Framework The following chapter aims to describe the theoretical foundation of the dissertation. Basing upon a theoretical pluralism and a pragmatist philosophy of science, the thesis includes a range of different theoretical perspectives that interact with each other. First, the European Normative Power theory is described. Then, two of the main traditions within international relations theory, Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism, and Normative Power Europe (as a nuclear theory).

Normative Power Theory

The international identity of the EU for a long time has been characterised by many scholars as a “soft” or “civilian power”. The concept was first developed by Duchene in 1973, and defined the EU as a unique international actor, being strong in economic terms but weaker in military forces, the strength lying in its ability to encourage stability through economic and political means and discursive practices. However, after the 1990s the debate inclined towards the idea that the EU was no longer a civilian power. Instead, as put by Karen Smith, the EU with its developing military dimension can be actually placed “somewhere along the spectrum

10 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) between to ideal-types of civilian and military power” (Smith, 2005: 16), and can be defined as a “specific kind of international actor”.

Much recent debate over the EU’s international identity turned around notions of normative, value-driven external policy. This happened when Manners’ influential article on the subject brought the notion of the EU as a normative power into the centre of the debate. Since then in most of the works on the EU’s international role, the latter is perceived as a normative actor.

The concept Normative Power Europe used by Manners refers to not only the fact that the EU can achieve goals without military power, but also that the goals of the EU are normatively anchored in a Kantian philosophy. The EU has both norms it wishes to promote and a normative way of achieving it. According to Manners, the EU is special because it not only wants to promote norms, but also promotes the norms via a normative process and “the European Union represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature utilising economic tools and international diplomacy, nor a military power of supranational nature using force and international intervention, but a normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard notions of “state” or ”international” (Manners, 2001: 7).

Manners’ main argument is that the international role of the EU as a promoter of norms does not fit in the classical English School division of states in either military or civilian powers. He claims that the developments of the 1990s in international relations lead to rethinking the notions of military and civilian powers, thus transforming the EU into a new type of power, normative power. The EU as a normative power does not rely on military power to set the standards of international politics, and it is not even civilian economic means that are the core of EU power, instead, “power becomes an effect of norm leadership and persuasion” (Manners, 2002: 236).

By the idea of normative power the author suggests that the EU is not only constructed on a normative basis, but that the concept predisposes the EU to act in a normative way in international relations. The notion of the EU normative power is constructed on the argument, that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does and what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002: 252). Thus, if conceptualising the EU as a normative power, values and norms are important elements of EU’s external activities.

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According to Manners, an international norm is defined as shorthand way to express of what passes as “normal” in international relations, and therefore, normative power is to be understood as the ability to shape or change what passes for normal (Manners, 2001: 10).

The EU is based on a broad normative basis, which has been developed over the last fifty years through a range of declarations, treaties, policies and the conditions. Manners identifies five core norms, which have become institutionalised since the beginning of the integration process: peace (found in key declarations, such as the European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951, TEC of 1957), liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights (Article 11 of TEU, Article 177 of TEC, and the membership criteria adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993). In addition to these five core norms, Manners also distinguishes four minor norms: social solidarity, equality, sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2001: 10).

In recent years, the geopolitical space of Eastern Europe is becoming increasingly complex priority in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The stabilisation of the region is very important for the EU to ensure its own security. Politically Eastern Europe is also a subject to the diplomatic efforts of two other world powers – the US and Russia. A lack of coherent arrangement of the space, stable institutional framework and security mechanisms makes it extremely sensitive to changes in external conditions and the internal dynamics. At this stage, all the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe highly depends on the strategy and a content of relationships that the EU offers to the states of the region, especially Ukraine. It is in Eastern Europe currently the main test for the ability of the EU to influence the external environment through the use of its own normative power and transpose the principles of its internal organisation in other countries.

In the initial discussions, the sources of the normative power of the EU along with the principles of its internal organisation were considered and the availability of the required resources to influence their external environment on the normative level. The fact of the formation of the integration of states on an equal basis with extremely high levels of socio- economic development and ability to prevent armed conflicts among its members makes the EU an extremely attractive platform for other countries.

In addition, an important source of EU normative power features of is its own position in the international arena as a “normative power” that can be traced as the rhetoric of senior officials of the European community and in official policy documents, as well as the specific nature

12 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) and response to the external environment. Through its integrative nature and the organisational structure the EU has significant advantages over traditional state powers: first, it aims to influence the implementation of norms and values, therefore it is not exclusive and does not prevent the establishment of cooperation with other centers of power, and, secondly, the result of its effect is the occurrence of receptors on an equal basis with the EU and their conversion into a subject of the influence (Haukkala, 2008: 1608). Its activity in the international level is focused mainly on the development of comprehensive cooperation mechanisms that do not pose a threat to other states. Therefore, the EU cannot be characterised by a relationship of direct confrontation, which significantly improves its communication qualities to the partners. These benefits may result in restrictions, as other power centres can use the mechanisms of influence and pressure, which cannot be used by the EU and the integration of new members can unbalance its internal structure.

O. Shapovalova (2009) mentions that one cannot deny the appeal of the European way of management and it should be noted that attractive potential of the EU itself does not generate international influence. This requires, first of all, instruments that would allow to convert this potential in the ability to determine the behavior of other actors, and secondly, the political will and coherent strategy of using these instruments, and thirdly, recognition of their legitimacy by other states (p. 129). The main arm of this regulatory force in the EU is to build asymmetric relation formats with individual countries, where projection of norms and values of the EU without direct coercion would be within the relations, but on the basis of mechanisms for the promotion, based on the legitimacy of the EU as a data standards holder. The mechanisms are based on the principle of conditionality, which is the main instrument for the normative power design of the EU and it means the dependency of level of the relations between the European Union and other state on degree of approximation to EU norms and values. In each case, the principle of conditionality is manifested in many ways, but its components are bound by a formal declaration of clear criteria of a partner’s progress towards implementing the “European standards”, consolidation of formal obligations of a partner to implement the necessary reforms and the establishment of special controls of this process by the European Union.

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Neo-Realism

The school of neo-realism is a modern transformation of the school of political realism, a modernisation of the realism in current international realities

The first and most decisive reformer of the political realism was American researcher Kenneth Waltz. His book “Theory of International Politics”, published in 1979, began a new stage in the development of realistic paradigm4.

Waltz, as well as his predecessors, states on anarchic nature of international relations as an original platform for political realism. It distinguishes them from intra-social built on the principles of hierarchy and subordination, formalised by the law, the most important of which is a state monopoly on legitimate violence within its territory. According to Tsigankov (2002: 89) anarchism of international relations, lack of supreme power, as well as legal and moral standards capable to effectively regulate interaction between the main actors, preventing destructive conflicts, remained essentially unchanged since ancient times. Therefore, there is no hope to reform this field, to build a world order that is based on legal norms, collective security and the crucial role of supranational organisations.

Waltz considers that no one, except for the state (personified by a political leadership), is interested in the country’s security reinforcement, as well as power as ability to influence other states.

Hence, neo-realism supports the position of classical realism on state as a key element of international relations. The fundamentally new view, however, comparing to classical realism is that the state is treated together with structures that it creates, including unions and intergovernmental organisations. Actually, this was a reason to call neorealism as structural realism.

A significant step in the development of the theory of neo-realism was the idea of a decisive importance of the global system of international relations, the international organisation. The neo-realists support the idea that any change in the anarchist international system is associated with the distribution of power that affects the existing balance of power. It means that the structure of the international system becomes a decisive factor for states’ behaviour, and is

4 Other political scientists also contributed to further development neo-realism: “Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism” (1985) by Stephen Krasner; “The Origins of Alliance” (1987) by Stephen M. Walt; “War and Change in World Politics” (1981) by Robert Gilpin. 14 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) defined as a set of external constraints and restrictions. The foreign policy depends on a logic of international system and distribution of power (force) among the states. For instance, bipolar and multipolar systems require fundamentally different behaviors of states on the international arena.

Waltz formulated three principles of the structure of international relations (structural triad):

1. The state is guided in international relations by the motive of survival. States may have many different objectives, but survival is the basis to achieve them; 2. The second principle determines the participants in international relations, which can be only states. Non-governmental members (international organisations, multinational corporations &c) only gain a decisive role when they can and overtake superpower in the field power capabilities; 3. The third principle is that the states are not homogeneous, but have different capabilities and potential. They try to increase their importance that leads to changes in the structure of international relations (Lebedeva, 2003: 32).

Neo-Liberalism

Neo-liberal approach does not simply come from the idealism of Immanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius, or classical idealism concepts in 20s-30s of the 20th century. Neo-liberalism, as opposed to neo-realism, is not an only approach, but rather a combination of theoretical concepts, which are based on similar principles. There can be distinguished two main interpretations of neo-liberalism: Pluralist approach and the World Polity Theory.

One of the most important studies of the neo-liberalists was Nye and Keohane’s “Transnational Relations and World Politics” (1971). Based on the bifurcation theory of international Relations, suggested by Rosenau, the authors argue that close interaction between societies of different countries, which is not subject to state control, plays an active role in the modern world. For instance, between the West these interactions involve trade, personal contacts, exchange of information.

Neo-liberal studies state’s power as well. Nye and Keohane in the book “Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition” (1977) formulated a “complex interdependence theory” giving to term “power” a completely new definition. The theory denies the decisive role of military force of a state in its foreign policy and stresses the need

15 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) for transformation of power in accordance with emergence of new forms of international relations.

Keohane and Nye define power as “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004: 2). For a better understanding of this ability in the interdependence of states, two additional concepts were introduced: “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”, which determine neo-liberal understanding of the concept of “power”. “Sensitivity” means how quickly changes in one country lead to significant changes in another, how significant these consequences are. As for the “vulnerability”, it depends on relative availability and pricing of alternatives of different actors (Baldwin, 1980: 484).

The concept of “power” was further developed within the concept of “soft power” and “smart power” of Joseph Nye. According to him, all the actors of international relations have hierarchy of values, which can be influences on by means of persuasion.

The concept of “smart power” appeared as a logical extension of the idea of “soft power”. According to Joseph Nye, the ”smart power” is primarily ability to combine “hard” and “soft” powers in a single effective strategy (Nye, 2008: 43). As to sources of implementation of “smart” power, such sources of “hard” and “soft” powers as coercion, payments and attracting are also sources of “smart” power. However, in some cases, the “hard” and “soft” powers sources are used independently from each other, in the case of “smart” power, a combination of them is used (Nye, 2009).

16 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) Figure 2: Strategy for the analysis Emperical

Normative Power Europe Neo-Realism

ENP/Eastern Bilateral Relations Partnership (EU-Ukraine, EU-Belarus, EU-Moldova)

Russia’s Soft/Hard integration Powers of EU EU’s conflict projects. and Russia resolution role Hybrid war Neo-Liberalism

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Thesis Design

In the following text, there is an explanation on how the chapters of the dissertation fit together with the problem formulation. The thesis is divided into four chapters, introduction and conclusion:

Introduction. Where will be given a relevance of the research topic, its scientific innovation, the chronological, theoretical framework and methodological basis, characterisation of the source base and literature, formulated goals and objectives. Chapter I – “Genesis and Nature of European Neighbourhood Policy”. Regional approach that explains form and function of the ENP of the European Union will be studied. The origin and development of the Policy will be researched. Analysis of limitations of the ENP is also important in terms of demonstrating us first results of the Policy implementation. Chapter II – “Conversion of Eastern Dimension of EU Foreign Policy”. There will be examined the occurrence of neighbourhood policy, including initiatives by individual states, their discussion in the Council of the EU and the circumstances of the formation of the concept and content of the Neighbourhood Policy by the European Commission. I will analyse analyse a period of practical implementation of neighbourhood policy to occurrence of the Eastern Partnership. A great attention will be given to study of instruments of soft and hard power of the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe. Analysis of Hybrid warfare of Russia against Ukraine has also place in the chapter.

The next two chapters are designed to reveal the specifics of the interaction of the European Union with individual Eastern neighbours – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the context of the neighbourhood policy.

Chapter III – “EU-Ukraine Relations in 2003-2016” will reveal the co-operation between Ukraine and the EU in the context of Neighbourhood Policy. I shall show that the conceptual design of the ENP coincided with a period of cooling of relations between Ukraine and the European Union. Period of the Ukrainian crisis and war with Russia has a big impact on Ukraine-EU relations. Chapter IV – “Relations with Moldova and Belarus: Eastern Partnership “Poster Child” and “Pariah””. The relations with the Republic of Moldova and the Republic of Belarus in the context of European Neighbourhood Policy will be examined in this chapter. I evaluate

18 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the EU isolation policy towards Belarus and then I determine the following, more successful attempt of Belarusian authority to restore relations with the European Union, related to Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative in May 2008.

In Conclusion, the analyses and consequences of the ENP implementation towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine will be made.

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CHAPTER I – GENESIS AND NATURE OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

I.1. Regional Approach of the European Union towards its Neighbours.

The place of the European Union in international relations in view of its political influence, significance in world economy and ideological potential vastly define its regional dimension. Thence, the neighbouring countries are one of EU’s several objects of interest, together with relations with the major world powers and the participation in the global agenda. Herewith, the neighbouring space is becoming the main source of challenges, significant to develop an international identity of United Europe. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle noticed that “if the EU wants to become a credible global player, it must start within its neighbourhood” (Official website of the European Union, 2011). In spite of having repeatedly emphasised upon “the end of geography” (Bauman, 2008:14) in the modern era of globalisation, the geographical propinquity continues playing a significant role, especially in case of security menaces, challenges to political stability or even main directions of international trade.

Attention should be focused on the importance of the neighbouring space for the European Union and their bilateral relations are in need of being examined from two points of view – in positive and negative contexts. The positive context is related to economic interdependence, common interests, possibilities to develop international identity and EU’s growing influence. In this context, the economic relations between the EU and its neighbours, more possibilities for commerce should be taken into consideration. The neighbourhood is a territory for projection of the European influence; it is a test for united Europe’s ability to play a noticeable role in the international arena. This dimension of relations denotes possibilities to open and strengthen the dialogue with the neighbouring countries. The second aspect, the negative one, contains challenges and menaces that derive from neighbouring regions and can directly or indirectly influence the European Union and its security in particular. In this case, the main factor that attracts attention is a potential of instability, the imperative of interests are vitally important interests of the EU and its Member States, the symbolic reaction is an estrangement, barriers construction. The metaphor “Fortress Europe” expresses this aspect the best (Borkowski, 2009: 48).

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The two aspects above described acutely put a fundamentally important problem about international role that the European Union plays in relations with its outer circle. However, before its examination, it is necessary to see where to find the sources of current EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and what the main features of the region are, eastwards from the EU.

The interests of the united Europe in developing tight relations with the neighbouring countries are nothing new, as it was one of the main foreign priorities in the past. After the end of Cold War, the European Union aimed at assisting regional co-operation in Europe, which fits in literature in a broader context of the second wave of regionalism in the world. E. Mansfield and H. Milner note that in the post-World War II era, “from the late 1950s through the 1970s”, the regionalism “was marked by the establishment of the EEC, EFTA, the CMEA, and a plethora of regional trade blocks formed by developing countries” (Mansfield & Milner, 1999: 600). The second wave of regionalism emerged in completely other context that the first one. It appeared as a result of the end of Cold War and coming changes in international relations and security (Mansfield & Milner, 1999: 600-601). P. Katzenstein indicates this new regionalism as an attempt to “regain some measures of political control over processes of economic globalization that have curtailed national policy instruments” (Katzenstein, 1996: 127). Governments have to develop relations with neighbouring countries to withstand successfully new global problems, taking into consideration “a neighbour’s action or inaction on a cross-border problem directly affect their own policies” (Attinà, 2003: 183). Hence, the collaboration with neighbouring countries has a great importance for a national security to provide a political stability and security and economic growth.

According to Emerson (2013), there is complex set of external concentric circles of the EU’s external and neighborhood policy:

 The first circle incorporates external members of the European Economic Area – Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (and Switzerland as a special case). These countries adapted a huge part of quis communautaire of EU market law in order to their businesses being treated as its full members of the four freedoms of movements (goods, services, capital and people). The states are also members of the Schengen Area that makes them more integrated into the EU regional policies.

 The second circle are micro-states – Vatican, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra. These states are even more dependent upon the EU economically than the states of the first circle and are part of the Euro area and Schengen area. 21 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

 Third circle includes accession candidates that are Turkey, Montenegro, Albania, FYR of Macedonia and Serbia. These countries have a very explicit integration process based on the “Copenhagen criteria” for accession (political, economic and institutional criteria). The bilateral negotiations with each candidate state include over 35 “chapters” that cover every sector of the EU common norms needed to be implemented.

 Other Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) may be viewed as the fourth circle having a status of potential candidate countries. The negotiation processes are similar to the latter ones.

 The fifth circle is the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (pp. 3-4). The European Commission defines a regional co-operation as a “general concept that refers to all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring countries to address issues of common interest” (European Commission, 1995). The regional concept has become, without a doubt, the most important factor of EU’s international identity in the post-bipolar era. In June 1992, the Lisbon European Council called on a Foreign Policy co-operation based upon “geographical proximity”. The three components, included in the so-called “EU Near Abroad”, at the time were: 1) The Central and Eastern European Countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); 2) The Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, Former Yugoslavian Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, Montenegro and Albania) at the exception of Slovenia, which is included in the first group; 3) The Mediterranean (Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine Authority, Lebanon and Syria) (Rossi, 2004: 8-9).

When looking at post-Soviet partners, one can say that “not all actors are interested in promoting the order-inducing properties of regionalism” (Fawcett, 2005: 21), and such a disinterest or unwillingness conditions success or failure of regionalism. Fawcett argues that in a world “where established states are regionally organised” (2005: 31), a lesson for states “that may yet have only poorly developed institutions, or those who have traditionally relied on the politics of power, is that they cannot afford to ignore the potential of regionalism” (Fawcett, 2005: 30). Veronika Pulišová (2011: 9) defends that like many examples of regionalism from the past have shown, it is just a matter of time when they realise it.

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In the last decade, the European Union has realised several strategies towards these regions with different level of co-operation, which caused different consequences. These results also depended upon different geopolitical contexts within these regions. The approaches that the EU applied towards these groups of states can be combined into two: 1) the assistance for stabilisation based upon strengthening the regional co-operation and partnership (regionalism), 2) the real integration aimed at joining the EU. The latter was typical for the relations with the Mediterranean and Baltic countries. Since the late 90s, the strategy of integration with further EU accession has spread to the Western Balkans.

The position of the European Union towards the post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe was determined by other factors in that period. As R. Rossi notices, Brussels had never considered this space as a “region” (Rossi, 2004: 9) and, therefore, there had been no single political approach towards this space for a long time. There were signed several Partnership and Co- operation Agreements between the European Communities and their Member States and the Member States of the Community of Independent States (CIS) in mid-90s in return. Several years earlier, the EU had initiated technical and financial assistance for these states within the TACIS programme. The EU accession of Finland in 1995, resulting Russia closely approximated to the EU borders, caused (not immediate) changes in the European Eastern Policy. In 1998, Brussels actuated a programme Northern Dimension, which had been proposed by Finland a year before, to strengthen relations with the countries of Baltic and Barents Seas and it contained Russian Northwest Territories (Cichocki, 2003: 14). The Northern Dimension provided a regional framework where the EU participated for the solutions of transnational and cross-border issues, but the participation of Eastern European CIS Member States was only circumscribed by Russian participation. The European Union adopted first Common Strategy in June 1999 towards Russia (Delegation of the European Union to Russia, 1999), the similar document was adopted towards Ukraine in December of the same year (The European Council, 1999). These documents outlined general interpretation of the partnership’s evolution between the EU and Russia and Ukraine, having defined main objectives and spheres of bilateral co-operation. A very general character of the stategies’ texts testifies EU’s restrained approach in relations with the states though.

B. Cichocki indicates that the EU’s policy on the emerged states in Eastern Europe had been “virtual” until the EU enlargement eastwards finished (Cichocki, 2003: 15). Brussels let them choose their own way of development declaring herewith the support the only way that 23 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) provides democracy and free trade. Thus it is hard to say whether the EU could foresee a possibility of making such choice in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. With all the rigors of the EU’s attitude to these states, it indicates that from the very beginning the Partnership and Co- operation Agreements were largely formulated in such way so as to prevent excessive (substantial) funding and its political participation in Eastern Europe.

This situation was acceptable until Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus were disengaged from the EU by the states candidates to join the union, until the problems of democracy in Belarus, territorial integrity of Moldova or political stability of Ukraine were the internal problems of these countries or at least the problems of Eastern European region. The EU accession of the twelve new States (including Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) and the enlargement of a common frontier with the Western CIS States to thousands of kilometers have radically changed the situation and it required a profound revision the EU’s policy towards this region. In such conditions, the attemptions of Brussels to formulate principles of the EU’s Eastern policy in a new way are seemed logical. The European Commission recognised that the completion of EU enlargement process could cause tensions in EU Member States and Non- Member States relations and could cause obstacles for the co-operation on the new EU borders that had not existed before (Patten 2006: 81). Hence, the EU had to review its policy towards new-born states – a “New European Periphery” (Rossi, 2004: 10). The altered geopolitical reality caused new challenges to the EU but also offered chances to play more significant role in the new-formed political space.

The European Security Strategy, approved in January 2003 (The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), and the European Neighbourhood Policy, initiated in 2003-2004 (European Commission, 2003: 103), have formed a framework for a new foreign policy of the European Union. Taking geographical changes into consideration, the neighbouring states were united into three new groups that was reflected in a joint letter by the European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Pattern and EU High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana, – this document initiated broad discussions of a future neighbourhood policy foundations (Official website of the European Union, 2002). They are the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, Russia and the Eastern European countries. While for the Western Balkans the accession was already foreseen and it was considered as a question of time, the accession for the Mediterranean is explicitly excluded. The Eastern European countries seem to lie in between the other two conditions. Analysing current 24 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) neighbouring space of the enlarged Europe more precisely, one should specify a problem of significant heterogeneity of the space, presence of an aspirant for the role of regional power (Russia) within it; and also presence of several subregions, different by many parameters and levels of relations with the EU.

First of all, it is Western Balkans, European subregion that had suffered the conflicts in post- bipolar era the most. At the same time, one can agree with P. Borkowski that the Western Balkans is a space of Europe’s defeat, reproach that calls to minds about the EU’s incapability to prevent bloody events on the territory of former Yugoslavia in 1990s of the XX century (Borkowski, 2009: 39). Some countries of the region (Albania, FYP Macedonia) are the less economically developed countries in Europe so far. The essential characteristic of the region can also be presence of Muslim, autochthonous population, but not immigrants as it is in other parts of the continent. On the one hand, the European Union applies a significant number of instruments of Common Foreign and Security Policy; on the other hand, it implements the Enlargement policy with prospects of joining these states in the Union.

Secondly, the Mediterranean, containing counties from Morocco to Turkey. This space is very heterogeneous. However, from the European point of view, the region is united by single policy, whose main instrument is Barcelona process – Union for the Mediterranean. In this region, Turkey seems different (candidate for accession to the EU), but the prospect of its membership is so problematic that allows affirming the existence of insoluble “Turkish problem”.

Eastern Europe, the third region, is a part of the former communist bloc and has not become a part of United Europe hitherto and the date when it will be is obscure. The region contains Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The EU counts also the states of Southern Caucasus to the Eastern Neighbourhood: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The latter states have only recently become an object of the EU’s interests that currently builds its own policy on the most distant “neighbours”. Russia is also a country that belongs to the Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, because of its size, potential and foreign claims it is not a state that aims at having close relations with the EU, but it aims at being a potential partner on international arena and in the European regional subsystem of international relations above all. In this manner, the relations with Moscow generate slightly different challenges that should be defined analysing the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours (Borkowski, 2009:

25 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

40). Accordingly, the EU’s Eastern Dimension is represented by three groups of states: Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus), Southern Caucasus and Russia.

As it can be seen, the neighbouring space of the EU is not homogeneous from political, cultural or religious points of view. It affirms that some states differ from Europe also by metaphoric backwardness in institutional, social and civilisational aspects. Every state of subregions raises challenges to the EU that can be transformed into threats. In this conditions, an affective far-sighted policy towards outer countries is the biggest challenge for Europe, is a test to become an important player in the world.

It cannot be fully described as significance of the vicinity for the EU, excluding essential factors of the influence on the formation of EU’s relations with its neighbours in the post- Cold War period. Firstly, there was a significant diminishing of the military factor in international relations after the grandiose changes caused by the end of the Cold War, and it may be regarded in context of a broader phenomenon – a redefinition of a concept of security. It has not a direct connection with the 1989-1991 changes, but the decline of confrontation made this issue visible. It refers to the expansion and deepening of the idea of security (Sydoruk, 2012: 18). The security issue, together with military one, begins to be associated with challenges stemmed from economic, technological, ecological, public and cultural nature. These problems were considered as the main source of the European preoccupation after the Cold War (Açikmeşe, 2005: 6). They were defined in the European Security Strategy, a so-called “Solana’s Strategy Document”. The European Council obliged EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to develop the EU common security strategy in June 2003 in Thessaloniki. The prepared European Security Strategy was approved by the European Council in December 12, 2003 (The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003). In this document, the threats to the EU in the sphere of security after the Cold War are “more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003: 3) and are divided into following categories: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure (as a result of bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability), organised crime in such forms as cross-border trafficking of drugs, women, illegal migrants, etc (The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003: 3-4).

It is clear that none of the neighbouring countries can be regarded as a real military threat to the EU or its Member States nowadays. Nevertheless, R. Aliboni argued “local and interstate 26 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) conflicts in neighbouring countries as well as various kinds of illegal trade, organised crime and terrorism” as a new source of threats for the EU (Aliboni, 2005: 6). These factors are not military threat to Europe but finalise big risks for the society and economy.

Globalisation is the second factor that has a significant influence on EU’s foreign policy formation at the present stage. This phenomenon causes a considerable number of spheres and directions which must be taken into account while searching instruments to provide security or realise its own interests in foreign policy. The most distant spaces become political neighbours in the globalisation and it is impossible to build barriers from geographically close territories (Borkowski, 2009: 42).

On the other hand, the globalisation is perceived by many social groups as a thereat for their independence and cultural, religious and ethnic identities. Hence, increasing role of factors of identification and cultural specialties become an opposite tendency in international relations. The EU’s neighbouring space is completely diverse from this angle. In applies especially to the subregions of Western Balkans and the Mediterranean. Eastern Europe also may cause challenges especially in geopolitical and civilisational frontiers frameworking Europe and Western Civilisation, Russia’s position in this case and the absolute orthodox tradition (Sydoruk, 2012: 21).

Geographic proximity predetermines the current trends described above very important for the EU. They are challenges for all security structure in Old Continent and for the forming EU Common Security and Defense Policy in particular. The solutions of the threats and challenges derived from “outsiders” (Haukkala, 2002: 5) and enlargement of security zone around Europe became one of the EU’s strategic objectives in the early 21st century. The High Representative Javier Solana said about strategic objectives for the European Union at the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003:

First, we can make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our

immediate neighbourhood. Second, more widely, we need to build an international

order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, we must tackle the threats, new and

old. (p.6)

27 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The first concept of EU’s Eastern Policy was ‘New Neighbours Initiative’ (NNI). NNI was dealing with more institutionalised relations with three countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (as EU’s future direct neighbours). The Initiative was proposed by the United Kingdom with Swedish support in spring 2002. The Initiative was firstly discussed at the EU Council Meeting General Affairs in Luxembourg on April 15, 2002. On the Meeting, there were discussions about new threats and challenges causes by the new EU enlargement (2004) and the changes of EU’s borders. At the same time, the participants of the Meeting were interested in settling relations with the future neighbours (Council of the European Union, 2002a).

During formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy framework, the main position of the most EU Member States has revealed towards new neighbours: it is better to promote amplifications of stability, security and welfare of outer states than to build a wall around Europe. Moreover, such wall would not guarantee protection in the era of globalisation. According to one of the British diplomats, lessons of the past teach if you do not ameliorate standards of living in neighbouring countries, then you soon will meet their residents in front of your door (Castle, 2002). Then European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy B. Ferrero-Waldner also had her say in the similar context: “European Neighbourhood Policy: helping ourselves through helping our neighbours” (Union Européen Action Extérieure, 2005).

The European Security Strategy 2003 signalises explicitly the security reasons of the ENP, which clearly emphasises the importance of relations between the EU and its neighbours: Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European

interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged

in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional

societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer

to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East

of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can

enjoy close and cooperative relations. (pp. 12-13)

28 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The comments of official representatives of EU Member States give a clear idea about the core of the enlarged EU’s policy towards the neighbours on East. During the EU Summit meeting on December 14, 2002, a then Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller noticed that the so-called Initiative was especially focused upon Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus; also if these countries do not progress then, obviously, the European Communities will have one more problem, because people who are involved in crime and drugs will penetrate the EU, as it happens when poorer countries try to survive neighbouring with rich countries (Dergachov, 2003: 71). Hence, the increased attention of the EU towards the Eastern European states was caused by the geographical proximity, not by their significance.

In recent years, many scholars pay attention on radical transformation of the term European “identity” at the beginning of the new century. The new identity is based upon conception that the Europeans managed to overcome their past, it cannot be repeated, and a formation of adequate policy is the only way to guarantee security. So, The European Security Strategy 2003 talks only about external threats, whereas a problem of possible conflict within the EU, which used to be central issue, is completely absent. Europe needed protection from itself in the past, but now unpredictable outer world is considered to be the main source of threats, and it is opposed to the ordered and cozy European Union. According to F. Fukuyama’s ideas, the Europeans have already reached “The End of History”, but one cannot say the same about the EU neighbours that are still far from becoming democratic states. In this manner, current EU security policy is based upon simplified version of Democratic Peace Theory: political systems, different from Western democracies, may cause threat themselves and the EU should be interested in supporting their democratic and commercial development. The European Neighbourhood Policy is in fact based upon this concept; one of the main motifs of its initiation was a security issue in the conditions of security redefinition and new regional realities in Europe in post-bipolar era.

The completion of the EU enlargement eastwards is the second reason that have directly influenced a neighbourhood policy formation and metamorphosed the EU from Western European into Europe-wide organisation. After the 2004 enlargement (and later 2007), the European Union faced with internal and external changes and had to reformulate its foreign policy priorities. The New geopolitical situation enhanced rope of the EU in Europe, but there was a need to create new co-operation forms with the neighbouring countries within this changed geopolitical reality. Most successful EU instruments, aimed at strengthening co- 29 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) operation with European partners, had been focused upon prospects of EU’s membership up to that time. However, the enlargement process has its limits. That is why the European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten noted in 11 March 2003 (Rossi, 2004): Over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has

undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the

coming decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability, security and

prosperity we have created within the enlarged EU. We should begin by agreeing on a

clearer vision for relations with our neighbours. (p. 8)

Referring to the Communication on Wider Europe where it is stated: “the incentive for reform created by the prospect of membership has proved to be strong – enlargement has unarguably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument”(European Commission, 2003). In 2003, a then President of the European Commission R. Prodi mentioned: “we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale” (Prodi, 2002). What is needed, then, is to draw on successful experiences with the new Member States, and exporting these experiences to other countries, however, without prospecting the membership (Rossi, 2004).

Thence, after completion of the Eastern enlargement, the EU faced a vitally important dilemma formulated by Michael Emerson: whether to continue the enlargement process until the continent’s geographic boundaries that could threaten the internal organisation of the integrated Europe or could deprive one of the pivotal principles of openness for all European democracies, thereby risking to cause a negative affect around the EU’s outward frontier (Emerson, 2004). In seams that the ENP has been seeking its own way between the two dilemma’s poles.

H. Haukkala notices that every time after each EU enlargement, new neighbours begin to be considered as potential candidates for the EU accession (Haukkala, 2003: 1). Nonetheless, after the 2004 enlargement, the EU refused to acknowledge the Estern European countries as the next candidates for accession. The great enlargement eastwards in 2004 and the recognition Western Balkans next space for the enlargement made the support of EU’s citizens and governments reach the climax, and it caused the nascence of “Enlargement Fatigue” (Szołucha, 2010). Furthermore, the countries of Eastern Europe still were not 30 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) prepared for practical realisation of pre-accession strategy in spite of proclaiming pro- European rhetoric. Consequently, Brussels had to seek a new balance between enlargement and its absorptive capacity. The EU could not ignore the expectations, claims and appeals from the neighbours in a meantime. That is why the EU wanted to prevent its eastern partners’ intentions to intensify political dialogue for membership prospective, maintaining at the same time pragmatic relations with them and supporting in internal reforms implementation. The ENP emerged as a result of “rethinking enlargement” (Grant, 2006) and has become its “alternative” (Dannreuther, 2006:183).

Most scholars share the same view about the reasons of the ENP launch. M. Emerson notes that after the 2004 enlargement the EU became a victim of its success facing a dilemma, “The dilemma is about how the EU should define the nature and extent of its future frontiers, which means defining its very essence and identity” (Emerson, 2004: 1). There are only two solutions for the dilemma: first escape route “is to accelerate the Union’s powers and institutional development to the point that it enhances its capacity to accept further enlargement over a politically relevant time horizon”, the second route is to do something really significant under the name of the new European Neighbourhood Policy, blurring the frontiers between “in” and “out” that “the Union might achieve beneficial leverage on developments in the periphery without rushing ahead with further accession negotiations” (Emerson, 2004: 1). German sociologists Ch. Banse, D. Müller and H. Stobbe from the University of Göttingen assert the European Neighbourhood Policy was initiated because many states neighbours had not have any chances to adhere the EU in the nearest future. Via the ENP, the European Commission tries to influence the political and economic development of the neighbouring states without promise of membership prospects (Banse, 2007). From D. Milczarek’s point of view, the main principle of all ENP is the absence of the EU full membership prospects (Milczarek, 2005: 151). Ukrainian Scholar V. Kopiyka tells the initiatives towards the EU neighbours are an attempt to institutionise a theoretical approach of “last confines” and stop further (and farther) enlargement, which is supported by European conservatives (Kopiyka, 2008: 267-268).

One may state that the EU motivation towards the neighbourhood policy formation is based upon two factors: the first is attempts to strengthen security in the new reality, the second one is the consequences of the Eastern enlargement and the complications from further expansion of United Europe’s border. The Communication from the Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy paper” clearly indicates that the ENP is a respond of EU 31 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) enlargement and “it will also support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy” (European Commission, 2004: 2). Hence, the main objective of the ENP is to respond different risks and threats for EU security deriving from the neighbours, and to halt the rising queue candidates for membership in the environs. The first factor regards to the Mediterranean and the second one is exclusively topical for the EU-Eastern Europe relations.

The length of EU common border with the CIS countries has significantly increased as a result of Eastern enlargement. Formerly, the EU only had had the common border with Russia (Russian-Finnish border) in the East, but after the accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, the EU frontiers with Eastern European States have extended from Barents to Black Sea. The accession of Finland in 1995 brought a 1.300 km length EU-Russia common border (Açikmeşe, 2005: 15). The 2004 enlargement added a new segment of 2.400 km border with Ukraine and Belarus, and 450 km more after Romania joined the EU (Açikmeşe, 2005: 15). Current EU Eastern border is four Eastern European countries – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, which set boundaries with seven EU Member States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). This is more than 5.000 km long boundary line (Açikmeşe, 2005: 15).

The common EU-Eastern Europe border enjoins more fundamental challenges for a long list of problems that exist in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The end of the Cold War had destabilised consequences for these regions too: old conflicts were defrost, the significance of ethnicity and religion was elevated, the new states’ weaknesses became visible, and attention was drawn to the region’s history. The conflict in Moldova between Chișinău’s central government and separatist region Transnistria, Caucasian conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno- Karabakh and South Ossetia are the main challenges in the sphere of traditional threats for the European security. Moreover, in the dimension of “Soft Power”, threats originating from Eastern Europe are not smaller than ones from other regions. The EU tried to respond these risks by offering the region’s countries Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA) in 1990s that served as instruments for political dialogue, support for trade and investments growth, encourage in democratic changes. Nonetheless, the EU did not managed to succeed in transforming the states into Western liberal-democratic models using these agreements owing to two reasons. The first reason is the PCA did not offer any essential benefits (incentives) for the partners such as access to markets or free trade as a result of successful transformations. The second one is that these agreements hardly included progress in the relations in 32 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) perspective, not even mentioning about the EU accession prospects. Virtually, “the PCA method is close to deadlock5” until 2002 (Borkowski, 2009: 71). Poverty, deindustrialisation, growth of oligarchic power structures, lack of transparency in public sphere etc are the characteristic phenomena for all EU Eastern neighbours. Brussels bypassed the conflicts adjustment in the region. Consequently, the EU had an acute need in a new approach to transform these nations on the basis of European principles, rules and values, not offering them encouragement as membership at least in long-term perspective. On that score, L. Karabeshkin notifies that after the 2004 enlargement EU faced a dilemma: dissociate itself from the “chaos zone” on the East of Europe or support the transformation of the states (Karabeshkin, 2004: 34). The European Union chose the second way, initiating the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In addition to the common for all the EU’s neighbouring space challenges and threats, Eastern Europe brings a number of specific challenges related to its historic, political, cultural and civilisational peculiarities. In this context, the European enlargement eastwards was not only a symbol of the end of era of violent division of Europe, but it also emphasised the difference between former Central European socialist nations on the one hand, and post-Soviet states from the other (except for the Baltics) (Borkowski, 2009: 60). Those, who in the wake of EU and NATO political decisions in 1990s found their place in European structures, have returned metaphorically to the place where was, without a doubt, their place that had been forcibly deprived after the WW2. There are countries outside the EU and NATO, who raise doubt about their own identity, desire and capability to implement European rules and values. Thereby, in case of Central European states, the EU has a clear vision of them as natural EU Member States; Eastern Europe is regarded as a challenge and the states require answers about political and civilisational frontiers of Europe.

The EU border on East is a line (finish) for welfare space from economic point of view. Comparison of GDP per capita of the Eastern European countries with the EU shows an essential gap in the progress: GDP per capita of Belarus in 2014 reached 16. 869 Int$, Ukraine – 7. 657 Int$, Moldova – 3. 766 Int$ and the EU – ca. 33 000 Int$. Such a big difference eases up by GDP per capita of the new EU Member States, some of which are comparable with GDP per capita of Eastern neighbours.

5 Original text in Polish: “Metoda UPW zbliżyła się do głuchego kąta”

33 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The European Union depends directly upon energy imports from Eastern Europe to some extent, especially from Russia, which is not solely an energy exporter but has its own ambitions to control major oil and gas transportation routes to the Western Europe. Russian- Ukrainian relations have a great significance in this context. The EU imports 40% of its consumed energy from Russia; at the same time, EU new Member States import 70-90% of energy (Popescu, 2009: 24). Nevertheless, the dependency in energetic sphere is mutual: Russia exports more than 80% of oil and gas on the European market, which is the main source of Russian budget revenues (European Commission, 2013a). Accordingly, the trade turnover between Russia and the EU reached 67% in 2010 (Shyshkina, 2011: 15).

In general, the post-Soviet space in Eastern Europe may be considered as an “increased risk” zone for the EU because principally after the 2004 enlargement, the EU had new problematic countries on East that did not manage to realise a pro-European option after independence. It is obvious that those states are different – authoritarian Belarus, small Moldova with its separatist problems and Ukraine that is seeking its identity; but they are united by lack of “natural” choice. Despite the history, civilisational affiliation and political ambitious, the Baltic countries had a pro-European option a “natural”. One may aver the same about Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. Nowadays, the EU Eastern neighbourhood includes nations that are making political choice and are participating in a new EU’s Eastern borders defining at the same time and this shows a political unity of the Western Civilisation.

Secondly, the communist system had been functioning in East Europe for almost 70 years and it had caused bigger damage in economic and social spheres, people’s consciousness than in countries where the regime lasted 45 years. It reflects in economic backwardness, weakness of civil society where democratic values are something strange, unknown.

Thirdly, Russia considers these nations as a natural sphere of its vitally important interests, “near abroad”, the existence of which is a basic element to confirm a “Great Power” (imperial) identity. In this regard, every political initiative from the West is considered and valued as attempts to displace (eject) Russia from the sphere of its (Russian) primordial interests; hostilities that aim at weakening Russia. The European Union must act in these conditions carefully not to provoke Russia as an important partner; on the other hand, only yield in Eastern policy may bring desired results in such political conditions. Hence, the tension between a “circle of friends”, developing relations with Russia and using the latter as

34 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) a mediator in contacts with the whole region invariably accompany Eastern Dimension of EU’s foreign policy.

The space of EU’s neighbourhood is thereby a natural space of influence and execution of important international roles. Interdependence is connecting the EU and neighbouring nations, forces to form an agenda of relations in outer borders of United Europe. Even powerful international actor feels more assured when it has a “circle of friends” around itself. On the other hand, the EU that overshadows neighbouring countries, becomes an attractive partner for them because of membership prospects or to have access to EU market, or to deepen political dialogue.

The end of EU Eastern enlargement actualised an issue of new neighbourhood framework, developing strategy towards it, and also more important and at the same time awkward question about the frontiers of European integration project. The formulation of ENP principles was an attempt to respond them and for expectations for the EU role in a new emerging geopolitical space.

Eastern Europe accumulates three interdependent challenged for the EU today: necessity of region’s stabilisation via European normative model export; rivalry for influence with more aggressive Russia, EU-Russia mutuality in energetic sphere. When these challenges move to the level of political objectives, there will be a great tension between them. Then, seeking for equilibrium between expansion of European civilisation space and further (as well as farther) enlargement eastwards, geopolitical rivalry and geo-economic interdependence in region is the biggest challenge for the European Union.

35 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

I.2. Origin and Conceptual Formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 were the main impetus for the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the “new neighbours” (Casier, 2012: 32-33). In May 2004, the number EU Member States has risen to 25. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 20076. The boundaries of the European Union have changed: mainly, the eastern border; in the South of Europe, there were only two small states – the Republic of Cyprus and Malta that joined the EU. Belarus and Ukraine became new EU neighbours in Eastern Europe in 2004 and Moldova in 2007.

The enlargement has set a lot of goals to the EU. A need to ensure the safety of new EU borders was in the first place. However, a new issue arose – how to make the ENP attractive for the neighbouring nations that do not have prospect of EU membership in the near future. These states were expected as sources of challenges to the EU’s security (Morgiardim, 2004: 155). A new approach was needed that:

 Could contribute to the development of the EU neighbouring countries, turning them from the sources of threats into the “ring of friends”; politically stable, economically developed states with the same practices and values that the EU has;

 Would allow disentangling the effect of the decision to put an end to the EU enlargement to the uncertain prospect so that the EU could not lose its appeal in the future for those countries that wish to join it (namely Ukraine and Moldova).

On April 15, 2002, at the Meeting of the General Affairs Council, chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain Josep Piqué i Camps, there was discussed future EU relations with the Eastern neighbours. The Council supported an idea to entrust the development of proposals to the High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations Ch. Patten. The EU Council invited developers to take into account different levels of political and economic relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours in the future (Council of the European Union, 2002a). The Barcelona process (the Mediterranean) and the

6 According to Raquel Patrício (2009: 580), after significant geopolitical changes in East, the European Union realised that it would have to extend and cover post-Soviet and post-communist countries. Otherwise, it would deplete the very content and idea of European integration, which could even be simply self-destructive. United Europe limited to the western perimeter would be in uncomfortable position of having to deal with a permanently divided continent. The European Union would be on the one side, and on the other side are the old satellites of Moscow tohether with the constant risk of antagonisms and uncertain peace that would easily move the lines of conflict from Eastern Europe to the heart of the European Union. “O alargamento a Leste surgiu, neste context, como uma necessidade vital, repleta de significado nesta era global e globalizante”, mentions Dr Patrício (2009: 580). 36 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Eastern neighbourhood, were thus clearly separated at the same time. In fact, only Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus were not included in any of the existing EU regional dimension at the beginning of a discussion about the relations with the neighbours after 2004 and 2007 enlargements.

The discussion took place in the initiative of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and Sweden. In early 2002, Jack Straw, UK Foreign Secretor has sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain Josep Piqué i Camps, while Spanish presidency of the Council of the European Union. J. Straw noted (Jeandesboz, 2007):

Within three years, Ukraine and Belarus will border the EU – with all the attendant

problems of cross-border crime, trafficking and illegal immigration. Moldova will not

be an EU neighbour until later [….] but it already faces grinding poverty, huge social

problems and mass emigration7 (p. 13)

The UK Foreign Minister proposed to the EU Council to draw attention to the relations with Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine in this letter, and to provide them the EU “special neighbour status” in the future. This status was to incorporate a prospect of free trade with the EU, as well as strengthening cooperation in border management, security and internal affairs (Castle, 2002). There was decided to name this programme “New Neighbours Initiative” (NNI) (Czapska, 2009: 33).

In the period between the Meeting of the EU Council on April 15, 2002 and the Meeting of the European Council on 12-13 December 2002, four regional directions of EU foreign policy were discussed, each of which could be strengthened as a result of the forthcoming enlargement: the Mediterranean area, the Northern Dimension, the Western Balkans and the new proposal to strengthen the EU relations with its Eastern neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova).

An integrated approach for deepening relations with the Eastern neighbours was supported mainly by British Foreign Secretary J. Straw and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden A.

7 Original text: “Sous trois ans, l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie seront à la frontière de l’UE – avec tous les problèmes attenants de criminalité transfrontalière, de trafic et d’immigration illégale. La Moldavie ne sera un voisin de l’Union que plus tard […], mais elle est déjà confrontée à une pauvreté écrasante, d’importants problèmes sociaux et une émigration massive” 37 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Lindh. The NNI also gained support of other Scandinavian states, Germany and Austria (Czapska, 2009: 34). The main difference between the two proposals is the question of including Russia to the Eastern neighbours.

British proposals considered only Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine as the Eastern neighbours. The Swedish proposal was to broaden the scope of the Northern Dimension and to include all the Eastern neighbours. Back in December 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden A. Lindh in collaboration with the EU Commissioner Ch. Patten performed with the Northern Dimension initiative to give more dynamics after the future EU enlargement (Lind, 2000). In March 2002, the Swedish Foreign Ministry held consultations with the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and Spain as the State-Presidency of the Council of Spain about a vision of future relations with its Eastern neighbours. In particular, there was an idea of creating an EU common concept towards all the neighbours, but with maintaining the two autonomous regional dimensions – the Mediterranean and the East neighbourhood (including Russia) (Europolitics, 2002).

Taking into account the location of most future EU Member-States, it seemed logical to strengthen EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. These states were to be the main EU neighbours on its Eastern border. Nevertheless, the authors of the initiative did not have a plan to give Russia a secondary role in EU Eastern policy. As it can be seen from the title of the initiative, London and Stockholm only tried to draw Brussels’ attention to the countries that had not been the EU’s neighbours at that time; unlike Russia that had common frontier with the EU from 1995 (when Finland had joined the EU) and the EU policy towards Russia had already formed.

This direction, excluding Russia, had been supported by Poland, a not EU Member-States at that time. The Polish position was formulated in high-profile informal proposals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Proposals related only to the Polish Eastern neighbours – Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, excluding Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2002). The fundamental point of the Polish proposal was the idea of providing Eastern neighbours with clear perspective of the EU membership. After all, Eastern European states are the states that, according to one of the main criteria for EU membership, might be potential candidates to join the European Union in the future.

38 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The EU Council returned to the basis of its further foreign policy several times, emphasising the significance of strengthening relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The deceleration thus of political reforms in Ukraine and Moldova, and the existence of any reforms in Belarus, made the EU discomposed and did not facilitate in forming ambitious far- sighted policy towards this “awkward trio”.

However, the context in which the discussion began on the EU relations with future neighbours after enlargement, did not contribute to the allocation of a separate Eastern Dimension. International events that took place in 2001-2003, largely concerned the Mediterranean, but not the Eastern border. Minutes of the Meetings of the European Commission in April 2002 (Sessions on April 3, 9, 14, 17, 24 and 30) clearly indicate the lack of significant interest of the European Commission to the problem of relations between the enlarged EU with its Eastern neighbours. The European Commission was not interested in Eastern Europe before and after the meeting of the European Council of 15 April 2002 whereas the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans were discussed several times.

The European Commissioner for External Relations Ch. Patten writes the same. According to his memoirs, the key topics for the European Union in 2002-2003 were:

 Security, anti-terrorism fight and the EU proximity to the potentially turbulent regions (the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Balkans) (Patten, 2006: 179-198);  2004 enlargement that causes significant challenges to the EU, especially to the economic and institutional effectiveness of the Communities (Patten, 2006: 201- 2013).

The first issue led to the inclusion of the Mediterranean in the Neighbourhood Policy at its widest part in addition to its Eastern neighbours, and also led to the decision to integrate all the Balkan states to the EU. The second one led to the need to define the limits of the enlargement before the next possible candidates from Eastern Europe. The European Commission were well aware of the fact that “the offering membership in the EU is the most effective instrument of Europe’s soft power” (Patten, 2006: 158). However, the choice was made in favour of the determination of the limits of integration in breadth.

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The EU Commissioner Ch. Patten and High Representative Javier Solana issued a joint letter, titled “Wider Europe”, to the shared thoughts on the future of EU policy towards its neighbours on August 7 2002. In this letter, they indicated three groups of neighbours as potential participants in future initiatives: the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours. According to them, the problems of Eastern European States would become European problems after the EU enlargement. These are certain provisions of the document:

 Ukraine is a key state among Eastern neighbours as it seeks recognition of its “European aspirations” by the European Union;  Moldova will remain a source of instability in the region without a successful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict;  There are no any relations with Belarus;  Russia is an integral part of the region, it is impossible to deepen regional cooperation without it (European Commission, 2002).

The letter aimed at preventing the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe and deepening co-operation with Eastern Europe. Solana proposed a new conception of relations with Eastern European countries in medium-term prospect (ten years), when the EU had to adapt itself to the new realities after the enlargements, and Eastern European post-Soviet states had to define paradigms of their further development (European Commission, 2002). The letter’s authors proposed that a new initiative may acquire shape by December 2002. Moreover, the focus was still offered on the Eastern neighbours (European Commission, 2002).

The next step on the way to the formation of “neighbouring” strategy was the conclusions of the EU Council on November 18, 2002, where the EU expressed a desire to establish a policy that could “enhance its relations with its Eastern European neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus”(Council of the European Union, 2002b: 12). It mentioned that:

There is a need for the EU to formulate an ambitious, long-term and integrated approach

towards each of these countries, with the objective of promoting democratic and

economic reforms, sustainable development and trade, thus helping to ensure greater

stability and prosperity at and beyond the new borders of the Union. (p. 12)

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The Solana-Patten proposals were discussed at a Meeting of the European Council under the chairmanship of Denmark on September 30, 2002. A special attention was given to the three future EU Eastern neighbours – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The Council decided that “beyond the question of Eastern neighbours, the broader question of “wider Europe” deserved consideration” though (Council of the European Union, 2002c: 8).

Some interested EU Member States and future Members in Central and Eastern Europe proposed several projects of future Eastern policy. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic and Poland proposed their visions of the policy. It was natural that Poland was active in forming a new EU strategy towards Eastern Europe. In may be explained by historical and geographical circumstances, trade and economic interests in Eastern European markets and by the need to find its place in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. In a conclusion, the document of Polish Foreign Office was mostly discussed.

The unofficial document of Polish MFA was prepared in December 2002 and represented as a Polish vision of future EU-Eastern Europe relations. The key proposals of the document are:

 The EU approach should be individualised and depended upon the progress in relations with each particular neighbour;  Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine represent a single region because of their historical heritage and the relations. For this reason, an autonomous EU Eastern policy is needed;  Existing agreements with Moldova and Ukraine should be replaced by Association Agreements (AA) in the medium term, the same opportunity might be open for Belarus if the political situation changes there;  Recognition of the “European choice” of Ukraine by the EU could strengthen the pro- Europe sentiment in the country;  Eastern neighbours should get a clear perspective of EU membership;  A free trade area to be established with the Eastern neighbours after their accession to the WTO;  Co-operation with Ukraine and Russia in the field of energy supply should be one of the key priorities of the EU Eastern policy;

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 Action Plans may be signed with each Eastern neighbour, which would identify specific priorities and objectives; it was important to monitor regularly implementation of the Action Plans;  It was needed to develop mechanisms for cross-border co-operation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours;  The EU should actively foster contacts between citizens of the EU and the Eastern European neighbours;  A wide range of European financial institutions and investors should be involved in financing projects within EU Eastern policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2002).

Unfortunately, the Polish proposals towards Eastern Dimension were not included in the UC basic documents that formed basis of the ENP. The Eastern Dimension did not become a separate direction of the EU foreign policy at that time.

Meanwhile, Paris and Rome with Commission’s support under chairmanship of R. Prodi, lobbied actively a decision to expand the policy on the all neighbours (new and old) including non-European ones. They argued the Mediterranean EU neighbours should not suffer in consequence of the new initiative. They insisted therefore upon indispensable expansion of the neighbourhood policy geography by the Mediterranean nations (Grant, 2006). After the Cold War, the EU had been focused upon its Eastern neighbours (Central and Eastern European states at that time) and the Southern Member States advocated for deepening relations with the Mediterranean to prevent further drift to the East (Longhurst, 2008: 12).

At the Summit of the European Council, which was held on 12-13 December 2002 in Copenhagen, there was in fact a ready decision to include not only Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to the number of neighbours, but also the Southern Mediterranean. “The European Union ... wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach”, mentioned in the final document of the summit (Council of the European Union, 2003: 7). The title of the project was changed into “Wider Europe Initiative” (Czapska, 2009: 35).

The European Council stressed the need to avoid establishment of a new dividing lines in Europe after the enlargement to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the EU. The European Commission and the EU High Representative Javier Solana 42 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) agreed the further development of the concept of the EU relations with the new neighbours (Czapska, 2009: 35).

It is necessary to take into consideration the following important points in order to understand the reasons for the inclusion both Eastern and Southern neighbours in a future European Neighbourhood Policy:

 A complex international context where there was a formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This was actualisation of the problem of international terrorism, instability in the Middle East, the war in Iraq (Spring 2003 ) and the search for the European Union model of its security;  The complex internal processes in the EU, due to the future enlargement. First of all, it was a need to consolidate and strengthen the EU policies and its institutional structure. That is why, the integration of breadth was accompanied by the integration of depth. In 2002-2003, there was an active work in developing the new Treaty, having received then the name of the European Constitution.

As a result, at the Meeting of the European Commission Romano Prodi and Commissioner Patten presented the European Commission Communication on relations with the EU’s neighbours after the enlargement on March 11, 2003. The Commission paid attention upon an issue of membership prospects, and it was decided to make adjustments that ENP did not provide EU membership for its neighbours in the medium term (European Commission, 2003a: 18). As it may be seen later, the question of membership prospects of the Eastern neighbours arose on the EU agenda several times and each time the decision was not in favour of these countries in 2003-2014.

After the discussion, the European Commission presented its views on the concept and the general content of the EU’s relations with future neighbours to the EU Council and the European Parliament in the Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” on March 11, 2003:

 The Communication referred to the political and economic interdependence of the EU and its neighbours. Accordingly, it was in the interest of the European Union to promote political stability and economic development in neighbouring countries;

43 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

 The Communication states that the new EU initiative will focus upon those groups of neighbours (The Western NIS countries – Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; Russia; the Southern Mediterranean), and EU should establish a close interaction with excluding the prospect of membership (Map 1);  A prospect of access to the EU internal market and the four freedoms of movement should be given to the new EU neighbours; the EU should maintain a high pace of negotiations on accession to the WTO with its neighbours, particularly Ukraine;  It is necessary to strengthen regional cooperation, especially on the Eastern border of the EU: “ The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment” (European Commission, 2003b);  The European Union should consider the possibility to facilitate a border crossing for certain categories of citizens of neighbouring countries (for people who live in border regions or participate in EU programmes); the simplification of border crossing must be accompanied by the conclusion of readmission agreements with neighbouring countries;  The EU should play more active role in resolving conflicts on its borders (Transnistria, Western Sahara, Palestine, etc.);  Commission proposed to conclude Action Plans with the neighbouring countries, which, as the policy document, would reconcile already existing and new goals and objectives in relations between the EU and its neighbours; the Action Plans should establish clear criteria by which it will be possible to implement annual monitoring of progress;  The new policy should be accompanied by new financial assistance (Commission of the European Union, 2003).

44 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 1: European Neighbourhood Policy Space

Source: EU Neighbourhood Info Centre. (2014). ENP Map, http://enpi- info.eu/medportal/publications//682/ENP-Map Viewed 24.08.2016

The Wider Europe concept can explain the need of a new EU policy on the neighbours. Such need was explained by an idea of adaptation in 1990s – to transform the outworld model on the Western example, to the interdependence principle (economic above all but not only) of the territories on the both sides of the boundaries of the enlarged EU. This explanation could assist in searching allies within the EU to realise the neighbourhood policy ideas and to help to “crack” the resistance of other Member-States that were against the EU proactivity towards the neighbours. Such countries bore in mind that the enlargement, internal reforms and the already made efforts in developing relations with Southern and Eastern neighbours, had exhausted financial and organisational possibilities in the coming years (Sydoruk, 2012: 35). Unlike the adaptation paradigm, the interdependence paradigm presumes a possibility of a serious deterioration of a situation beyond the EU, which may become a threat to the economic and social stability inside the EU. Hence, the interdependence paradigm is mainly focused upon benefits that the EU might gain by the realisation of new foreign policy initiatives, but not focused on the initiatives’ countries-addressees.

The Wider Europe conception had become a substructure of the EU Eastern policy in spite of some critical remarks. Some comments of the High Representative Javier Solana were caused 45 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) by the combination of such heterogeneous regions as Maghreb and Eastern Europe within one programme (Gänzle, 2006: 15). Furthermore, excluding Ukraine from a list of potential candidates to join the EU in the medium-term prospective caused critics from some future EU Member States (e.g. Poland) (Cichocki, 2003: 18). The candidate states of the CEE considered the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova for obvious reasons as one the pillars their own security (Sydoruk, 2012: 36).

The formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy lasted more than one year. July 9, 2003, Wider Europe Task Force (a Work Group) was established in the structure of the European Union and was led by the Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen (Comelli, 2005: 5). The group aimed at further specification of the neighbourhood policy and consultations with separate Member States.

The group was formed by the Directorate General for the External Relations (DG Relex) personnel and by the Directorate General for Enlargement (DG Enlargement). According to a number of researchers, it affected the shape of the future neighbourhood policy. This restructuring partly explains why the original policy ideas and instruments of the ENP were adapted from the experience of enlargement (Tulmets, 2006: 5). The group held preliminary talks with the partners from Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean in the second half 2003-beginning of 2004, and the neighbouring states generally confirmed their interest in neighbourhood policy participation. Meantime, the European Commission analised internal situation of Partner States in political and economic spheres and state of co-operation with the EU. The results of the work were presented in May 2004 in form of reports about the situation in seven states (Ukraine, Moldova, Tunisia, Palestine, Morocco, Jordan and Israel) (European Commission, 2004a: 2). The debates about the need to allocate specific Eastern dimension of ENP had been in the EU’s institutions until the end of 2003.

The Committee of the Regions has begun preparation of a Report on the EC Communications in June 2003 on the future of relations with the EU’s neighbours after enlargement (COM (2003) 104 final and COM (2003) 393 final). There were debates and an official Opinion of the Committee of the Regions was adopted in October 2003. Committee of the Regions, as well as the European Commission and the EU Council, insisted on the exclusion of membership prospects in future relations with the neighbours. The Committee called for the respect of the principle “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” (paragraph 2.2) in relations with the neighbouring countries (eur-lex.europa.eu, 2003). However, the key issue 46 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) this document was that the Committee drew attention to the existence of a large difference between the two regions, “Russia and the NIS” and “the Mediterranean”, and it was proposed to build relations with each of the autonomous regions (eur-lex.europe.eu, 2003).

The European Parliament joined the discussions of specific proposals of the European Commission in autumn 2003. On November 5, 2003, the European Parliament had debates on the report of the deputy from Italy Pasqualina Napoletano on a resolution project of the European Parliament on the Commission Communication “Wider Europe” (European parliament, 2003a).

Consequently, the European Parliament adopted a resolution. The document reflected position of the supporters of inclusion the Mediterranean and the Eastern European States in a future neighbourhood policy in fact. In addition, the Initiative was proposed to include Western Balkans and South Caucasus. The resolution indicated that the new EU initiative should be extended to all the neighbours after the 2004 enlargement, taking into account, thus, their regional differences. Hence, there was pointed, for instance, the existence of similar structural problems faced by all the EU Eastern neighbours. Following the Communication of the Committee of the Regions, the document clearly separated the prospect of EU membership from the future ENP (European parliament, 2003b).

In December 2003, EU High Representative Javier Solana presented European Security Strategy, declaring that “building security in our neighbourhood” (Council of the European Union, 2003a: 7) was amongst the core strategic objectives of the EU. With regards to Eastern Europe, the Strategy affirms that:

it is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe.

We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our

neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a

stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will

in due course also be a neighbouring region. (pp. 7-8)

The Mediterranean has been given special attention – it was about the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, to strengthen EU co-operation with the Arab world (Council of the European Union, 2003a). Another strong intergovernmental component was added by the

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“Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” in 2003-2004 that proposed the category of a “Special Relationship” to be reserved for immediate neighbours aspiring for closer relations. Hence, Art. I-57 of the “European Constitution” titled “The Union and its neighbours” stipulates:

1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to

establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the

Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with

the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and

obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their

implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation. (p. 58)

Despite the Treaty was not ratified, most of the objectives expressed above became a vital part of ENP. The fifth enlargement of the European Union was on 1 May 2004. Ten countries became the EU members: five Eastern European States (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia); Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and two Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta). Almost two weeks later, May 12, the EU Commissioners Chris Patten and Günter Verheugen presented a project of a Communications of the European Neighbourhood Policy at the Meeting of the European Commission. Speakers noted that the Commission had consulted not only with the EU Member States, but also with the future neighbours (Moldova and Ukraine in particular). The neighbouring countries have expressed their interest in the future European Neighbourhood Policy during the consultations. In the discussion, emphasis was placed on the fact that relations with each particular neighbour would depend upon its enforcement of the principles from the Action Plans. The members of the European Commission confirmed again that the ENP did not provide for the prospects of EU membership: “the neighbourhood policy constituted an alternative, and not a prelude, to enlargement of the Union”. As a result, the Communication was approved (European Commission, 2004b: 16-19).

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Date of publication of the Communication from the European Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper” (12 May 2004) is considered as the official start of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This strategic document was signed by 25 Heads of EU members on 14 June 2004.

One should pay attention on a contradiction in the title of the ENP. The previous initiative was called “Wider Europe”, and proclaimed the European states as a target. The new initiative transformed into the European Neighbourhood Policy, which shows the orientation on the European states, but not the EU neighbours. Moreover, the group of the neighbours became larger – the Commission recommended to include the Southern Caucasus to it along with Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. The ENP expanded to 16 nations as a result.

The European states were mentioned Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia. However, Moscow refused to take part in the ENP, preferring to cooperate with the EU on equal footing, developing four common spaces: economic; freedom, security and justice; external security; research and education (Moga, 2012: 386). Professor of Moscow State Institute of International Relations M. Strezhniova notes, “Moscow does not want “Wider Europe” replaced the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU, as this puts Russia on a par with other EU partners, who it snoots until today, remembering its own imperial past and hoping for a large territory and wealth of mineral resources”. She also mentioned, “Official Moscow wants leading roles in the European Concert, rather than vegetating on the sidelines of current European neo-empire”8 (Strezhniova, 2007: 142-143). Thence, the Russia-EU relations with development within the Strategic Partnership in four “common spaces”: economic (aiming at creating free and integrated market between Russia and the EU), security and justice, external security, scientific research, education and culture. The “common spaces” were determined at the Summit EU-Russia in Saint Petersburg in May 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003c: 1).

In the Mediterranean, the ENP includes all participants of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona process), which are non-members, except for Turkey (is in preparatory process to join the EU), – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria.

8 Original text in Russian: “В Москве не хотят, чтобы “Большая Европа” подменила стратегическое партнерство между Россией и ЕС, так как это ставит Россию на одну доску с другими партнерами ЕС, к которым сама она, вспоминая собственное имперское прошлое и уповая на большую территорию и богатство недр, до сих пор склонна относиться свысока. Официальной Москве хочется первых ролей в европейском концерте, а вовсе не прозябания на обочине современной европейской неоимперии”. 49 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Furthermore, Libya is also an object of the ENP that did not take part in the Barcelona process and do not have a basic bilateral agreement with the European Union (Pardo & Zemer, 2005: 39).

The neighbourhood policy was also enlarged to the Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) despite the fact that the EU does not have a direst frontier with them. Nevertheless, these countries play a significant role in forming Pan-European space of security, namely in energy sphere. The European Security Strategy indicates that it “should ... take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (2003: 13).

According to many scholars, the wide territorial expansion was one of the main weak points of the ENP. Moreover, the object of the ENP is not all the EU neighbours. Theoretically, the policy had to include at least the geographically closest non-member states. These countries were the official candidates for EU accession (Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and Iceland); potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo); the states that do not want to join the EU with privileged status and are considered as “more than neighbours” (Norway and Switzerland); microstates that are not considered as potential EU members (San Marino, Monaco, Vatican, Liechtenstein and Andorra).

Hence, the European Neighbourhood Policy may be seen as a combination of Mediterranean and Eastern policies. According to the EU, all the ENP Partners have several similarities: a) all the states are not potential candidates and, in spite of differences, have difficulties in the area of economic and democratic development; b) both groups have more in common than with the EU; c) Eastern and Southern spaces have similar challenges that the EU may respond with similar methods; d) Brussels is interested in integrating all those states in the European space with no revision of a basis of the European project. All these states will not join the EU in the nearest future and, therefore, the EU proposes common rules of co-operation to them. Moreover, the President of the European Commission J. Barroso underscored (Press Releases Database, 2007):

focusing attention on the wider European and Mediterranean area, the ENP has

leveraged more support from the EU’s Member States than when we looked at each of

our neighbours in isolation. No longer is the level of attention paid to one country or

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region dependent on the special interest of whatever EU Member State happens to be

holding the Council Presidency at the time.

Despite the officially declared common approach, there are significant differences in EU’s relations with two groups of neighbouring states. It is important to note that the EU had never negotiated with the Meridional states about either enlargement or pre-accession strategy development. After having rejected Morocco’s application for EU accession in 1987, it was clear that none of North-African states can join the EU. The Objectives of EU relations with Southern neighbours are different: the Union aims at consolidating political stability in the region, stimulating democratic evolution and increasing economic growth. The Euro- Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) (formerly known as the Barcelona Process) had been launched in 1995 to achieve those goals. EUROMED is a multilateral mechanism that includes the EU members and 12 Partner States. The Barcelona Process re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with more goals such as energy security, illegal migration, anti-terrorism cooperation (European External Action Service, 2013).

The content and dynamic of EU’s relations with Eastern Europe is related to the enlargement context in any way. The ENP was initially bethought as a respond to European aspirations of the Eastern neighbours. It is worth noting that there was no any regional equivalent to Barcelona Process on the East. There are no consolidated efforts from the EU to stimulate interregional co-operation – the relations with EU partners are maintained mainly on bilateral level. In South, Brussels contacts with sub-regional structures as Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia and Morocco); on East, the EU avoids contacting with similar initiative, such as GUAM (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Kerry Longhurst, a Senior Researcher at the College of Europe, rightly observes that “the EU’s shyness for region-building in the East can equally be attributed to the role of Russia” (Loghurst, 2008: 13). The European Union recognises in general European identity of Eastern neighbours, namely Ukraine and Moldova, but does not consider them as possible EU members. Consequently, the main function of the ENP in this region is to maintain balance European aspirations of Eastern neighbours and EU unwillingness to respond it.

A significant part of the Communication was focused upon the Action Plans, the mechanism of their adoption, content and implementation. According to the European Commission, the European Union and each of the neighbouring countries can work together to identify the key

51 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) priorities and areas of co-operation in Action Plans. Such Differentiation Principle means that, although the Action Plans provide a basic set of provisions common to all the neighbours, in the details of the Plans depend upon particular state of relations and the priorities of the sides. The Action Plans will be developped by the European Commission after negotiations with neighbouring countries and will be approved by a joint institute of cooperation provided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (in the case of the Eastern neighbours). The European Commission conducts regular monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plans; the results of their implementation will be important whilst developing a new agreement between the EU and neighbouring countries. In 2004-2006, a financial support consisted of reallocation of resources between existing financial instruments (TACIS, PHARE, MEDA, etc.), and, in 2007, a new financial instrument was launched – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (European Commission, 2004a).

The EU’s relations with its neighbours will depend upon their following common values: rule of law, human rights (including minority rights), respect for the principles of good- neighbourly relations with neighbouring states, market economy and sustainable development (European Commission, 2004a).

As for the Eastern dimension of the ENP, there was a principle of “regional cooperation on EU eastern border”, which will be carried out by support of existing organisations (Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of Europe, the Central European Initiative, etc.) and through cross-border cooperation programmes. A decision on the inclusion of the South Caucasus in the ENP was adopted by the EU Council on 14 June 2004 and recalled “its continuing interest in promoting stability, democracy and prosperity in this region” (Council of the European Union, 2004b: 13).

In mid-July 2004, the European Council has obliged the European Commission to prepare proposals for the first Action Plans with assistance of the High Representative (Council of the European Union, 2004c: 14). The European Commission informed the EU Council about completion of negotiations on the Action Plans with 7 neighbouring countries (including Moldova and Ukraine) in December and it was ready to transfer the Action Plans to the Council for approval (European Commission, 2004c: 3). Despite the fact that the Action Plans signed by the European Union and the neighbouring countries, the content of Plans was one- sided.

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In 2005, the Committee of the Regions presented its views on the Commission Communication “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategic Document” (May 2004). Committee reiterated that the “European Neighbourhood Policy whilst offering an improved relationship between the EU and its neighbouring countries is distinct from the process of enlargement itself and should be viewed in such a context” (Art. 1.1.4) (Eur-lex, 2005).

Since the second half of 2004, the interest to the Eastern Dimension of the ENP in the European Parliament gradually begins to increase. After the 2004 enlargement, there were elections to the European Parliament on June 10-13. The Parliament has been significantly altered by deputies of the new Member States. For example, Poland gained 54 seats (equal to Spain), the Czech Republic had 24 seats (like Portugal) (House of Common Library, 2004: 61, 66). Polish deputies, as well as Members of some other new EU members (Lithuania, Czech Republic) have contributed to a significant activation of the European Parliament with regard to the EU’s Eastern neighbours.

A member of a Polish party “Civic Platform” (polish “Platforma Obywatelska”), the future Minister of Defence of the Republic of Poland Bogdan Klich, had been a Member of the European Parliament in 2004-2007 and had been leading a delegation of the European Parliament for Relations with Belarus. Similar European Parliament Delegations for Relations with Moldova and Ukraine were much more successful because of political circumstances. They represented the European Parliament in the EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committees.

September 13, 2004, Armin Laschet, a MEP from Germany and a member of CDU, was named a Rapporteur on the new Communication of the Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper”. However, while preparing the Report, the “Orange Revolution” had been escalating in Ukraine. All the attention of the European Parliament at the end of 2004 – beginning of 2005 was focused upon the situation in Ukraine, and not on the ENP. Moreover, the “Orange Revolution” made many politicians to reconsider the establishment of the EU boundaries on the border with the new Eastern neighbours.

Mr Laschet finished draft of the Report in April 2005, where the peaceful revolution in Ukraine was welcome. Nonetheless, the European Parliament emphasises that “not all the problems in Europe and its neighbourhood can be solved by enlarging the European Union” (European Parliament, 2005a: 5).

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In September 2005, Charles Tannock, MEP for London for the Conservative Party, become a chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The development of the report was during the period of UK Presidency of the EU Council (second half of 2005). On December 7, 2005, Mr Tannock presented his report on the European Neighbourhood Policy offering a resolution of the European Parliament. From his point of view, success of the ENP to a large extent depends upon Russia -EU relations. Mr Tannock offered to make bigger effort to promote the transformation of Belarus also through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In relations with Ukraine, the EU should draw upon the implementation of the Action Plan. As for Moldova, one of the most important reasons for its difficult economic situation is the Transnistrian conflict (European Parliament, 2005b). The adoption of the resolution was in early 2006.

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I.2.1. The European Neighbourhood Policy Funding.

Prior to the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy and during first years of its existence, the European Union supported reforms in countries through direct funding and different policy mechanisms had that specific reform goals with not coherent functionality, which, of course, complicated creating a comprehensive neighbourhood policy. Amongst five EU financial mechanisms, two were focused upon the EU Neighbourhood: TACIS and MEDA (Table 1).

Table 1: EU Financial Mechanisms towards Neighbouring Countries

Name of mechanism Year of Function launch

INTERREG (European Territorial Co- 1990 To increase cross-border co- operation ) operation with the EU in order to enhance internal cohesion and dissipate borders

TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 1991 To help members of the Commonwealth of Independent States ) Commonwealth of Independent States in transition process to democratic and market- oriented economies

MEDA (Mésures 1996 To provide financial and d’Accompagnement Financières et technical assistance to the Techniques) countries in the southern Mediterranean

PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for 1989 To support Central-Eastern Restructuring of the Economies) European countries in the EU accession process providing

55 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

funding and support of the adaptation of Aquis

CARDS 2000 To provide assistance to the countries of South-Eastern Europe in economic and democratic reforms

Sources: Author’s compilation based upon European Commission. (2015a). European Territorial Co-operation. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/ Viewed 22.04.2015 Morgiardim, M. R. (2004). O Alargamento da União Europeia: Novos Vizinhos. Lisboa: Prefácio, p. 160

The TACIS programme, established in 1991, gave technical and financial assistance to 13 countries of Eastern Europe and Middle Asia – 12 former republics of the Soviet Union and Mongolia9. From Wesselink’s and Boschma’s point of view (2012: 7), TACIS had its weaknesses – the programme haвtechnical assistance in transition of economy but had a much weaker focus on regional economic reforms and investment. The MEDA programme, established in 1996, was focused on economic reforms and investment in countries of southern Mediterranean aiming to develop a free market area. In 2000-2006 budget period, MEDA had budget of 5.3 billion euro and TACIS had nearly 3.1 billion euro.

In July, the European Commission it is Communication “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” proposed to launch a new specific policy instrument named “A New Neighbourhood Instrument” for the financial perspective 2007-2013 (European Commission; 2003c: 10). Due to a number of budgetary and legal questions, it was set out two-phase approach of the ENP funding: in the period 2004-2006, the existing financial instruments were to be co-ordinated. After 2006, it was planned to establish a new neighbourhood instrument. In the Communication from May 2004, the Commission proposed that the European Neighbourhood Instrument would complement assistance under already existing financial instruments, and would not substitute them (European Commission, 2004b: 25). In a new Communication concerning “Financial Perspectives 2007-2013” from July

9 Since 2003, Mongolia is covered by the ALA (Asia and Latin America) Programme

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2004, the Commission proposed a “drastic” simplification of the instruments, viz. the new instrument would comprehend all financial instruments on the neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2004d: 24-25).

Hence, in the period 2004-2006 various policies had time on convergence and harmonisation. From 2007 up to 2013, most of the funding was centralised in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument that is legally based on EC Regulation No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24th October 2006 (European Commission, 2006). It also funded EU-Russia strategic partnership.

Since the launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative, it was claimed that the new Eastern dimension of the ENP would be neutral for the EU’s budget. Nonetheless, the implementation of a number of goals of multilateral and bilateral dimensions might be questioned if they were funding exclusively within the ENP budget. The funding became the weak point of the Eastern Partnership. Hence, this fact was recognised by the European Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Eastern Partnership” from 3rd December 2008:

One of the clearest signals the EU can give of a concrete commitment to its partners is

to bring funding levels in line with the Partnership’s level of political ambition.

Substantially increased financial resources are required to achieve the objectives set

out in this proposal. (p. 13)

The summit of the European Union on 19-20 March 2009 in Brussels approved the establishment of the Eastern Partnership and supported the proposal of the European Commission regarding the use of available funds reserved to the ENPI Regional Programme East) in amount of €250 million for the period of 2010-2013. According to the Declaration by the European Council on the Eastern Partnership, it was proposed to allocate a technical assistance for the EU Eastern neighbours €600 million, €350 million of which are for the period 2013-2020.

The funds were used to promote comprehensive institutional programmes of the Eastern Partnership and provide advisory support and appropriate training for public authorities and

57 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) equipment and specialised infrastructure needed for their activities. The funding provided work of platforms and support in implementation of the flagship initiatives.

However, during the internal discussion of funding allocations, a number of EU Member States led by France opposed the additional financing of regional strategies for EaP partners aiming at stimulating internal stability by weakening and eliminating socio-economic differences. These countries insisted on a simultaneous increase in financial assistance to the Southern neighbours (North Africa and Middle East) in proportion – 1/3 to the Eastern neighbours and 2/3 to the Southern neighbours. This may have an explication that the EU Southern countries are making a greater contribution to the common EU budget and are more interested in their maritime neighbours in the Mediterranean.

Hence, the allocation of the EaP funds was: €85 mln for 2010, €110 mln for 2011, €175 mln for 2012 and €230 mln for 2013. As it can be seen, the funds are distributed uniformly but with a gradual increase each year.

Worth noting the fact that the European Commission sought for active involvement of auxiliary sources of financing projects of the Eastern Partnership by international financial institutions, international organisations and countries.

Soon after the first EaP summit in May 2009, the EIB announced its readiness to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the partner countries. The bank implemented measures to encourage the private sector to improve the business environment in the partner countries. The loans reached some €1.54 bn by the end of 2014. In sum, the European Investment Bank lending reached a total of €4.4 bn for the EaP countries financing some 67 investment projects and providing credit lines (European Investment Bank, 2015:1) (Figure 3).

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Figure 3: European Investment Bank lending in the Eastern Partnership, million euro

Source: European Investment Bank. (2015). EIB financing in the Eastern Partnership. Factsheet http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/factsheet_eastern_partnership_2014_en.pdf Viewed 02.09.2016

Starting from 2014, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) that will run until 2020 (Tables 2, 3 ,4 ). The replacement shows real needs and considerations that have emerged over the year and the new financial programme will give support to the implementation of the political and economic initiatives of the European Neighbourhood Policy making them shorter and better focused, so that they are more effective.

Table 2: European Neighbourhood Instrument funding on 2014-2020, billion euro

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total

2,100 2,213 2,226 2,265 2,340 2,439 2,514 15,4

Source: European Commission. (2011a). A Budget for Europe. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 29.06.2011, COM(2011) 500 final. – Part 1, p. 25

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Table 3: ENPI Budget for Ukraine Bilateral Programmes, million euro

Area 2007-2010 2011-2013

Democratic development 148.2 94-141 and good governance

Regulatory reform and 148.2 117.5-164.5 administrative capacity building

Infrastructure 197.6 X development

Sustainable development X 211.5-258.5

Source: Wesselink, E. & Boschma, R. (2012). Overview of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Its History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures, WP1/04 search working paper, January 2012, p. 45

Table 4: ENPI Budget for Moldova Bilateral Programmes, million euros

Area 2007-2010 2011-2013

Democratic development 52.4-73.4 95.5-109.3 and good governance

Regulatory reform and 31.5-41.9 x administrative capacity building

Poverty reduction and 83.9-125.8 x economic growth

Social and human X 68.3-81.9 development

Trade and sustainable X 95.5-109.3 development

Source: Wesselink, E. & Boschma, R. (2012). Overview of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Its History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures, WP1/04 search working paper, January 2012, p.37

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Two main principles of the new funding instrument are 1) giving incentives and rewarding best performing and 2) offering funds in a faster and more flexible manner (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014a). The budget of the instrument is €15.4 billion providing funding through a number of programmes. The co-operation instrument continues to be managed by DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid.

The ENI also encourages closer links between the EU and the ENP Partner States having a goal to develop civil societies and enable citizens of the Partner States to take part in EU internal projects. Four types of programme are now supported under the ENI:

1. Bilateral programmes for the EaP partners; 2. Regional programmes for the East and the South; 3. Erasmus for All programme, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the Umbrella programmes10; 4. Cross-Border Co-operation programmes.

The ENP countries were organised into two groups: ENI East, six EaP states, and ENI South, ten Mediterranean countries. The co-operation with Syria is currently suspended by cause of the political situation (civil war).

Apart from the ENI, a range of other EU programme are also financing the Partnership countries: e.g. the Development Co-operation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Stability and interventions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (European External Action Service, 2016a).

10 The Umbrella programme allocates up to 10% of the ENI budget to the ENP countries basing on their progress in democratisation, implementing agreed reforms. The ENP Progress Reports serve as indicators for the assessment of the countries 61 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

I.3. Reformation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2006-2007: Principles and Directions.

A period 2006-2007 may be characterised as a time of focusing the European Commission and EU neighbouring countries (Ukraine and Moldova in particular) upon bilateral relations advancement and the Action Plans execution. There were tested the mechanisms of the ENP in practise during this period, accompanied by discussions about the need to review and strengthen the Policy.

The year 2006 began with the European Parliament Resolution on the ENP. The European Parliament called on the Council and the Commission to put development of relations with the neighbouring states in direct dependence uypon their following the principles and common values that were mentioned in the ENP documents and Action Plans (European Parliament, 2006a: 315).

The European Parliament for the first time allowed a fairly harsh criticism of the European Commission for bureaucratisation of the ENP, for failing to engage European Parliament in the process of developing mechanisms and synergies with the neighbours (Point 21): “[The European Parliament] regrets that in its strategy paper (COM(2004)0373) the Commission responded only to the Council’s opinion and ignored Parliament’s comprehensive resolution of 20 November 2003” (p. 317). According to the European Parliament, the Commission should take into account the fact that the Parliament has significant budgetary authority, in particular in the case of the newly established the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (Point 23) (p. 317).

The European Parliament recognises Ukraine’s and Moldova’s “European aspirations and calls for a long-term European perspective to be established” (p. 321). The Parliament also stated that the success of the ENP in relations with Belarus “...is in the interests of both the EU and Russia...” The Parliament called on the Council to raise the EU in negotiations with Russia the question of democratisation Belarus (p. 321).

During the debates on the blueprint of the resolution, the Polish MPs showed high activity. Their basic idea, regardless of political affiliation, was that the European Neighbourhood Policy should not be an obstacle to membership perspective or its substitute (European Parliament, 2006b).

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The resolution was developed under the influence of internal and external changes in Ukraine and was the first document of the European Parliament which reflected conflict of opinions between decoupling membership prospects from the Policy (mostly deputies of EU-15) and active supporters of integration the Eastern European States into the EU (mainly representatives of the new EU members).

It should be noted that the deputies from the new EU Member States influenced the interest of the European Parliament to the interaction between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. However, the activity of the elite of the new Member States in the discussions about EU’s policy towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine reinforced by little interests amongst the citizens of the new EU Members. This interest was significantly below the average for the EU in some cases. For example, in 2006 64% respondents in Poland and in Lithuania said that they were not interested in the events in the EU’s partner states. For comparison, the EU average was 48% (European Commission, 2006b: 15). In 2007, the number of respondents who were not interested in the situation in EU’s neighbouring countries increased to 68 % in Poland to 71 % and in Lithuania, as well as up to 54 % on average of EU (European Commission, 2007a: 13).

In December 2006, on the eve of EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, as well as entry into force of the ENPI, the European Commission presented a Communication “on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”. The Communication pointed out the weaknesses of the ENP:

- Lack of clear prospects for trade and economic integration; - Slow progress towards visa facilitation; - Little progress in EU support for the process of conflict resolution (European Commission, 2006c). In addition, it was mentioned an idea that the interest of neighbouring countries in the ENP is very limited:

It has thus become clear that the ENP could and should be strengthened, particularly

when one considers the prohibitive potential cost of failing to support our neighbours in

their reform efforts. The EU must present an attractive offer to ENP partner countries...

(p. 2)

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Accordingly, those offers are:

 Strengthening economic and trade co-operation. Future free trade areas (FTAs) should include all kinds of goods and services. Moreover, it was stated that the conclusion of “deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs)” is a medium-term objective, and, for some of the neighbouring countries, is the long-term objective (pp. 4-5);  Facilitating mobility and managing migration. According to the European Commission, many tasks of the ENP may be proving difficultly between the partners, if there is no possibility of quick and unhindered obtaining visas (pp. 5-6);  Promoting people-to-people exchanges. It refers to idea of the ENP with a “human face”, reached by educational, youth, research exchanges, training and visibility activities etc (pp. 7-9);  Building a thematic dimension of the ENP. It was proposed to create a number of so- called “cross-cutting themes” of collaboration such as energy, transport, the environment, rural development etc (p. 8);  Enhancing political co-operation. The main action points are possibility of alignment with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Declarations, EU participation in civil and military peace-keeping mission, intensified parliamentary co-operation etc (pp. 9-10). It was mentioned about the Union’s presence across the region: “Full Commission Delegations should be open in all the ENP countries as soon as possible” (p. 10);  Strengthening financial co-operation.

The Communication did not envisage a single Eastern dimension of the Neighbourhood Policy. The European Union had not yet overcome constitutional crisis in 2006-2007. In 2007, the EU prepared and was adopting the Treaty of Lisbon (December 13, 2007) – a new attempt to reform the EU’s institutions in virtue of internal and external challenges.

Nonetheless, there were tendencies of distinguishing the EU’s Eastern policy in a single dimension from 2007. For example, documents of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (the main instrument for financing the ENP’s projects) have a term “ENPI Eastern Region”, which referred to Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia (European Commission, 2007b).

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The accession of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU on January 1, 2007 made Ukraine and Moldova direct EU’s neighbours and made the EU a part of the Black Sea region. The EU’s interests towards the Black Sea region are associated with its location between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, at the intersection of energy and transport flows, illegal migration and organised crime. After Bulgaria and Romania accession, “the EU is no longer an external actor in this region …, [it is] irrevocably part of the region, with our future security and prosperity intimately bound up in its fortunes” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008) The documents referring to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) had repeatedly stressed the importance of co-operation between the EU and the Black Sea region. The first step towards the new EU initiative institutionalising was taken in 2007, when the European Commission prepared a Communication to the Council and Parliament “Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative” (European Commission, 2007c) The Commission stresses that the initiative was complementary to the existing formats of co-operation with the Black Sea region – the bilateral relations with Turkey, Russia, the ENP in relation to other countries in the region.

Bulgaria, Romania and Greece, having direct access to the Black Sea, were highly interested in the region. These countries are also interested in the allocation of EU funds for various projects key issues solution and for development co-operation of the Black Sea. Romania seeks co-operation in the region to give more political aspect in its nature, with an emphasis on security and the “frozen conflicts resolution”. Moreover, Bucharest supports the establishment of close relations between the EU and the key organisation in the region, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). At the initiative of Romania, a new format of co- operation was launched in 2006, the Black Sea Forum, which was also considered as one of the institutional pillars of the Black Sea Synergy. Development of the new policy (initiative) took place during German Presidency in the EU Council, which advocated for the development of the ENP and mentioned about enhanced co-operation in the Black Sea in the documentation about the new Eastern policy.

Black Sea Synergy was conceived as intended as a “flexible framework to ensure greater coherence and policy guidance” (European Commission, 2007c: 3) in the joint venture of partners in more than thirteen areas: democracy and human rights, security, frozen conflicts , energy, transport, trade, environmental protection, maritime policy etc. According to the document, the main principle of Black Sea Synergy should be “flexible geometry” (European

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Commission; 2007c: 3), where individual countries also might participate in single spheres. Funds for the implementation of activities were to be based upon the principle of co- financing. If necessary, the EU may transfer funds of the ENP national, regional and cross- border programmes, other instruments for external assistance. The EU Member States are financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERAF), which main objective is to “help reinforce economic and social cohesion by redressing regional imbalances”. This is achieved by “supporting the development and structural adjustment of regional economies, including the conversion of declining industrial regions” (Art. 17) (Council of the European Union, 2006a).

The new initiative did not aim at creating either institutions or specialised structures; the states were proposed to continue co-operating within the existing formats and sectoral programmes, initiated by the European Union. It was also intended to establish close ties with other regional organisations, especially the BSEC, where seven EU Member States had observer status (France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) and three of them were members (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania) (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 2014). EU sought to take advantage of co-operation with the BSEC institutions to increase its presence in the region. Black Sea Synergy was planned to become an “umbrella structure” for the main organisations and programmes operating in the Black Sea region.

The first summit of EU’s and the Black Sea States’ foreign ministers took place in Kyiv in 2008, during the presidency of Ukraine in the BSEC. The participants recognised the role of the EU in increasing the capacity of regional co-operation in Black Sea and the Black Sea Synergy as an important tool to achieve this goal. In the final statement, the participating countries expressed their support for obtaining the European Commission observer status in the BSEC in 2007 and the establishment of co-operation in various fields (European External Action Service, 2008a). Only Russia did not accede to the final statement. Russian Foreign Office explained such decision: “at the meeting in Kyiv, where was not agreed a balanced document providing for the establishment of equal relations between the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the European Union” (The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008).

The report on the first year of the Black Sea Synergy noted the European Commission to obtain an observer status in the BSEC as a great achievement. It was also proclaimed the 66 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) necessity of implementation of the outcome document of the Kyiv meeting on the development of relations with these and other regional organisations (European External Action Service, 2008b). There had to be selected country or organisation for each individual issue that would co-ordinate activities at national and regional levels. The report explains the mechanism of meetings: either within a sectoral co-operation (TRACECA or the Baku Initiative) or by Kyiv meeting model (within the BSEC).

The document “Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperation Initiative” indicated a possibility of the new format for the “frozen conflicts” resolution by improving governance, economic development and social stability. In the annual report, the Commission reiterated the need for the EU’s involvement in resolving such conflicts in the region, including the framework of the Black Sea Synergy. The events of August 2008 increased the EU interest to engage in settlement of “frozen conflicts” in the region of its neighbourhood.

Ukraine is an important state among the EU partners within the Black Sea Synergy. Kyiv considers this initiative as an additional way of co-operation with the EU, the opportunity to increase its influence in the region and its importance for the EU as a conductor of his interests. The Brussels and Kyiv have common interests in the Black Sea, such as the construction of bypass routes for energy from Asia to the EU, settlement of the “frozen conflicts” (especially Transnistria). This initiative still has a declarative character though.

Nonetheless, the Black Sea Synergy has a big disadvantage – it duplicates the functions of existing organisations, such as the BSEC, the Black Sea Forum. In 2009, the EU launched a new initiative towards its Eastern neighbours Eastern Partnership that identified similar goals for the Black Sea States. This had caused the declination of the Black Sea Synergy importance. The Commission attempted to fix this policy for a specific niche within the ENP. In a document dated 2010 the Commission emphasised that, in contrast to the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy was open to all states in the region, it had a binding character on the various organisations and platforms of co-operation in the Black Sea region (European Union. Press Releases Database, 2010). Three priority areas of co-operation were distinguished: environment, transport and energy. The EU Black Sea had special “duties” in the development of this initiative: Romania oversaw co-operation on environmental issues, Greece was responsible for co-operation in the transport sector and Bulgaria ruled the energy sphere. Unfortunately, security issues and resolving “frozen conflicts” were not mentioned in the document. 67 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

There is no consensus regarding the EU policy in the region amongst the EU Member States. The minor success of this policy is explained not only by low interest of the Member States, but also the complexity of the relationships between the various actors in the Black Sea.

Another important event in the evolution of the ENP was German Presidency in Council of the European Union in the first half of 2007. Germany was working in the question of reforming the Treaty of the European Union (Berlin Declaration on March 25, 200711) during the first months (Council of the European Union, 2007a). Berlin also paid attention to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In June 2007, Germany submitted a report to the Council on strengthening the ENP. The speakers noted that the ENP remained a key priority of the EU’s foreign policy. There were mentioned achievements in relations with its eastern neighbours:

 The negotiations regarding agreements on visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Ukraine and Moldova had been completed;

 The achievements of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAUM).

The negotiations on an Enhanced Agreement with Ukraine were considered as a flagship model for agreements with the other neighbours. The report stated also the need to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of co-operation between the EU and its neighbours in the framework of the ENP (European Commission, 2007d).

The Council of the EU approved the Germany’s report where it was again noted that the ENP is a single, well-balanced structure and is not associated with issues of EU membership: “ENP remains distinct from the question of EU membership and does not prejudge any possible future developments of partner countries’ relationship with the EU” (Council of the European Union, 2007b: 2).

A meeting of the European Council was held on 21-22 June 2007, the main issue of which was problem of the reform of the EU Treaty. It was decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (Council of the European Union, 2007c: 2). The European Council considered and adopted the Council’s conclusions upon strengthening the ENP and recommended that

11 The Berlin Declaration (officially the Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaty of Rome) was designed to provide renewed impetus to the process of EU reform after the ratification of the European Constitution had failed, the Declaration aimed for a “renewed common basis” in time for the 2009 European Parliament elections.

68 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the Council and the European Commission continued to work on this issue (paragraphs 45- 46) (p. 12).

The ENP Conference took place in Brussels on September 3, 2007 and brought together representatives of the EU institutions, ministers of the Member States and neighbouring countries. The Conference provided also, for the first time, participation of non-governmental organisations of the EU and neighbouring countries.

President of the Commission Jose Manuel Barroso gave an answer to critics of inclusion in all the EU’s neighbours into the ENP in his opening speech, despite the significant difference in their cultures, levels of political and economic development. He stated that covering of all the neighbouring countries by the Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 contributed to consolidation of political interest on the part of the EU Member States. Peculiarities of some neighbouring countries intended to address to the differentiation principle, established in the ENP from the beginning (Barroso, 2007).

The views of the Member States relating to the prospects of membership for the EU Eastern neighbours are divided. Germany clearly stated the need to separate the ENP from the prospects of EU membership. The new Member States (Central European countries) indicated the need to acknowledge the “European Aspirations” of the eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine. The perception of EU neighbours by the Member States is highly influenced by the degree of geographical proximity: in 2007, the status of EU neighbour for Moldova was recognised an average by only 37% of EU citizens (the highest percentage was recorded amongst the Romanians – 68%. The highest recognition of Ukraine as the EU neighbour showed Poland (89% versus 57 % on average in the EU) and in case of Belarus – Lithuania (84% versus. 49 % on average in the EU) (European Commission, 2007a: 11).

The European Parliament has been one of the main “pillars” of impact on the EU’s agenda of supporters forming autonomous Eastern Dimension of the ENP in 2007. In November, the European Parliament criticised the Neighbourhood Policy towards eastern neighbours. There were talking about the absence of the EU’s long-term strategy towards Eastern Europe in particular (European Parliament, 2007). In the Resolution of 17 November 2007, European Parliament pointed to an unnatural character of the ENP, containing Eastern European and non-European (Mediterranean) neighbours, and emphasised the special status of the eastern neighbours, having introduced concept of “Eastern European Neighbourhood”. The

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Parliament proposed to strengthen regional multilateral co-operation in individual sectors (energy, transport, etc.) as one of solutions to the problem, taking into account the specific features of each region. Moreover, the European Commission has again been accused of ignoring the interest of the European Parliament in the European Neighbourhood Policy: for example, pointed to the reluctance of European Commission to allow the European Parliament to develop and monitor implementation of the Action Plans (European Parliament, 2007).

As a result, the European Commission presented considerations on measures to strengthen the ENP as a supplement to the enlargement policy. The Communication “A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy” (December, 5, 2007) underlines the fact that the further neighbouring countries move in reforms, the more the European Union is ready to offer. In this regard, the Commission offered the neighbouring countries to focus upon already taken obligations in a framework of the ENP (the Action Plans) (European Commission, 2007e).

The paper noted that the EU Member States could also contribute to progress in future negotiations between the European Commission and the neighbouring countries. Indeed, liberalisation of agricultural trade is in their competence (Art. 3.1). The opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies is also an important and attractive feature of the partnership within the strengthened ENP, “in 2007, the Commission began negotiations to establish protocols with Israel, Morocco and Ukraine”, the three partners countries identified as being the most likely to benefit from these measures (pp. 9-10). The Commission’s Communication reiterated the fact that the Commission will act primarily as executive in issues of the ENP, and not as the initiator of major changes without the Council’s authorisation.

In October 2006, the Council and the Parliament adopted a Regulation on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which determines the basic principles, forms and directions of financing the European Union of certain projects of the EU’s co- operation with its neighbours (European Commission, 2006c). The Regulation was to apply from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013 (Art. 32). The document introduced a principle of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with neighbouring countries: it was envisaged a possibility of the withdrawal of funding or other programmes and projects if the neighbour country “fails to observe” the common principles with the EU (Art. 1 and Art. 28).

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The programme TACIS, which was functioning before the ENPI, was considered by many scholars as ineffective. I. Pashkovskaya (2006: 63-64) notes that the programme was not viewed entirely positive for Russia because of problems on the technical level; a significant part of EU’s personnel was not qualified. Moreover, such form of co-operation had not become priority neither for the EU nor for Russia. Anders Åslund (2009), a prominent Swedish economist, names the first reason of the ineffectiveness – the vast majority of funds of TACIS was spent on the consulting services of European experts. Furthermore, slow actualisation of the situation in neighbouring countries periodically led to funding already irrelevant projects:

For example, after Ukraine finally managed to break out of the ruble zone and bring

inflation into control, TACIS sent a French Trotskyite into Kyiv with a project to restore

a currency union with Russia and Belarus. The demand for such proposal was limited

and quietly died. (p. 62)

The problems with EU financial assistance remained until 2010. As an example, experts point to the support of ENPI funds specific programmes implemented by government and the country’s budget. Such a situation was about implementation of programmes within the Energy Strategy of Ukraine for 2006-2030. The strategy was approved by the Government of Ukraine in March 2006 and was aimed at implementing the EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the energy sector from December 1, 2005. Despite a number of critics and warnings from Ukrainian experts, the European Union allocated €23 million in December 2008 for projects of the strategy, and only later suspended further tranches (Gumeniuk, 2010: 2).

The findings of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, in a framework of the EU’s budget 2007-2013, included spending upon EU’s foreign policy. In the 2007, the budget of ENPI attained 20.8% (€1,419,955,400) of total expenditure on foreign activity of the European Union (European Commission, 2007f: 10). In 2010, it attained 25.8% (but significantly more in quantitative terms €2, 467,782,527) (European Commission, 2013b: 20). Monitoring of ENPI funds is by the European Commission, namely the Directorate-General (DG) for Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) (European Commission, 2013c).

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I.4. Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

More than ten years of the ENP’s lifetime allows use see some negative aspects of the policy’s implementation. The results were not as scale as it was expected, in spite of the EU’s repeated attempts ENP implementation to improve the conceptual basis and to strengthen the ENP instruments; EU even renewed the strategic documents of the Neighbourhood Policy several times. These preoccupations were acknowledged in a Communication of the European Commission titled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” (European Commission, 2011). The influence of the European Neighbourhood Policy remains finite in Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean as a result of policy’s weaknesses and internal conflicts in the Partner States. Public protests and evolutions flooded North Africa and Middle East in 2010- 2011 (Masetti, 2013: 2) As it can be seen, the EU had been co-operating with the dictatorial North African regimes instead of promote common European democratic values. In the Eastern Dimension of the ENP, there was no signed any Association Agreement. Ukraine has been constantly criticised by slow implementation of economic and political reforms and noticeable “retreat” from democratic values (use of selective justice in struggle with political opponents, violation of human rights and freedoms in particular). Belarus had been in isolation because of anti-democratic presidential elections on 19 December 2010, which were not recognised by either the EU or the USA. Moldova suffered from political crisis. In this manner, a thesis of former President of the European Commission D. Prodi about the aim of the ENP to create a circle of security and stability did not seem alive.

A great number of scholars note the ENP has some “weakspots”. K. Smith states the realisation of the ENP ambitious objectives face serious problems – difficulties in neighbouring space building with respect for common values, and also “the ghost of enlargement”(Smith, 2005: 767). This statement was supported by David Cardier, mentioning that the ENP “should move away from the ghost enlargement and be constituted as more coherent and more assertive foreign policy instrument” (2013: 52). J. Kelley examines the use of enlargement policy tools in the ENP and considers the EU puts very high demands to the internal reforms in the states. The ENP political instruments herewith are too weak to stimulate and support those reforms (Kelley, 2006: 49). M. Cremona and Ch. Hillion emphasise disadvantages of the European Neighbourhood Policy concept: the limited enlargement methodology in the concept with different goals and the existence of well- defined regional framework in its Eastern dimension. (Cremona & Hillion, 2006: 24-33).

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From my point of view, the main limitations that deteriorate the effectiveness of the ENP are: 1) Unreasonably wide geographic “coverage” of the policy; 2) Brussels did not propose any radical incentives to support implementation of domestic reforms by the Partners; 3) a groundless assumption that the EU may establish close relations with the neighbouring countries based upon acknowledgment and abidance of shared values; 4) the EU transferred a Conditionality Principle (when providing economic and political benefits depends upon respect for democratic principles) from the enlargement policy as main co-operation principle not taking into consideration the completely different conditions.

Disputed Geography of the ENP (Disengaged Member States). A wide geography of the Neighbourhood Policy caused significant problems for the EU. The Mediterranean direction of the EU’s foreign policy had been largely designed (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) at the time of ENP formation, and there had not been any multilateral EU-Eastern Europe relations (Kochenov, 2009: 7). Moreover, Eastern European and Mediterranean States had completely different aspirations concerning further relations with the EU: the ultimate goal for the European Partners was joining the EU and objectives for the Mediterranean states were to consolidate political stability in the region, economic development, trade increase with the EU, illegal migration etc.

There is nothing in common between the ENP Partner States. The only common feature here is geographical proximity by land or sea boundaries with the EU and not inclusion in any other projects and programmes provided for more important or developed partners (candidate states, European Economic Area states etc.). In spite of theoretically developed policy, it reduced to attempts to unite all the unsuitable Eastern and Southern neighbours in reality. B. Lippert (2007) mentions that the direct consequence of the “circle of friends” creation was that “the cleavage between South and East runs through all discussions on the ENP at the working and the political levels of the EU” (p. 182). The geographic coverage of the ENP disappointed as some EU Members (especially Poland where the Eastern Direction was a sensory issue of the foreign policy) as some ENP target States: Ukraine and Moldova were disappointed and baffled by the EU decision to include them together with the Mediterranean countries, which meant stagnation rather than innovation for them. Moreover, those countries “are well aware of the fact that the EU cannot grant them the status of a potential candidate at the moment due to its “big bang enlargement fatigue” as well as their domestic instabilities” (Açıkmeşe, 2005: 21). All this undermined an attractiveness of the new policy

73 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) from the very beginning and it caused a descent in its support, decreased its political significance (Cremona & Hillion, 2006: 16).

Roland Dannreuther (2006), a head of the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Westminster, underscores that the ENP “one size fits all” policy is counterproductive and frustrates the ambitions of those genuinely seeking to engage substantively with the EU” (p. 191). From his point of view, the emphasis in the ENP has to be “on the need for a more differentiated approach which takes into account the existing state of relations within each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests” (2006: 191). G. Meloni makes a rhetorical question (2007):

If the ENP is promoting the principle of differentiation, isn’t it finally preferring some

particular neighbours over others depending on the degree of their resemblance to the

EU itself? (p. 27)

She adds that the efforts to “Europeanise” bordering countries and to convince them to adopt aquis communautaire seem to prove that “the EU is ready to ‘love’ its neighbours only as far as they look like itself” and the EU does not intend to act “like the Good Samaritan who is ready to love any neighbour” (Meloni, 2007: 27). A. Pop also draws attention to this limitation, saying that the ENP “reflects the European Union prevailing position on the regional level, without providing the neighbour countries with a political cooperation structure attractive and powerful enough to make them accelerate the ‘Europeanization’ process” (2005: 20).

Finally, the differentiation policy became inevitable as a result of the objective difference between the groups of the Partner States within the European Neighbourhood policy. Therefore, by initiating the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership in 2008, Brussels only tried to fix the main drawback of the policy. Nonetheless, the complete geographical differentiation did not occur even after the 2011 reforms.

Weak Incentives.

... all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s

Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement

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of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms). If a country has reached this

level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member. (European

Commission, 2003b: 10)

The ENP offers weak stimuli that cannot make the partners interested in and encourage them to implement the reforms. Ch. Grant (2006) makes a good observation by saying that “the incentives offered to neighbours are not big enough to persuade them to carry out many of the far-reaching reforms they need to undertake” (p. 51). This is about the absence of “symbolic capital” in the ENP as membership perspective for the Eastern European States, taking into consideration that only the Neighbourhood Policy could perhaps lead to radical reforms in the distorted post-Soviet public and economic systems. P. Kratochvil (2006: 11) considers “extreme uncertainty” of the ENP’s ultimate goals as the main problem of the initiative. The EU interprets the ENP as alternative to enlargement, the Eastern European countries see it as a step in integration process. From Kratochvil’s point of view, there is no any chance to have dynamic and tied relations until the ENP has different interpretations (p. 11). Sooner or later, only one interpretation will win, which will make another side discontent.

The economic incentives for the partners remain blurred hitherto. First of all, as for the creation of neighbourhood economic co-operation in a distant future, there is lack of information even now, besides, it remains only hypothetically. Secondly, it is obvious that during the ENP operation economic incentives have become less likeable (expansion from four freedoms area to free trade area).

Brussels proposes such political incentives for the neighbouring states, after having succeeded the Action Plans: a possibility to sign bilateral agreements of a new generation. The Association Agreements (AAs) impose juridical obligations on both sides (unlike the ENP’s Action Plans). In other words, the European Union and the Partner States move forward to develop a legal policy, with less soft law and more definiteness about rules and conditions of the priorities’ implementation. On the subject of the AA content, new treaties with the Eastern European States will not be worse compared with present Association Agreements with the Mediterranean partners: this could destroy the already EU’s co-ordinated approach for the Eastern and Southern Dimensions, and it could diminish potential of the relations between the EU and Eastern Europe to comparing to the Southern partners. Free trade areas will be the

75 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) most prominent economic aspect of the agreements. Nonetheless, to my mind, for the future of Ukraine and Moldova and their relations with the EU, content as itself will be less important than a short paragraph in a preamble, where the pro-European aspirations and membership perspectives would be acknowledged.

In general, the political incentives within the ENP (a possibility to establish special relations with the EU based upon new treaties) do not seem remarkably attractive for the neighbouring states to become impetus or stimulus for deep and complex internal reforms realisation. Financial assistance may be regarded as a potential stimulus for closer co-operation with the EU and internal reforms, which come to the recipients by European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. This assistance is, thus, very modest to compare with funding provided to candidates to join the EU. Furthermore, the financial side of the assistance cannot be essential incentive by two reasons: firstly, this funding is not enough to “buy” regime changes in the neighbouring countries; secondly, the allocation comes to the problematic regimes, strengthening them instead of providing democratic reforms, rule of law and human rights.

The other important “weak link” within the ENP co-operation is the ENP’s incapacity to facilitate people-to-people contacts and ease visa rules. The Commission considers promoting people mobility and visa liberalisation as one of the stimuli for the partners in this situation. Travelling from the ENP countries to the Schengen Area has been “accompanied” by numerous bureaucratic difficulties even up to date. Unlike United Kingdom that provides multiple-entry long-term visit visas, the Schengen Area states provide mainly short-stay visas. Such system is highly unfavourable for travels with administrative problems concerning visa requests. Zaiotti (2007) characterises this situation as a “Gated Community Syndrome” (p. 143) and criticises the failed attempts within the Policy to fix anything in this sphere (pp. 143, 148). Ukraine and the European Union signed a Visa Facilitation Agreement on June 18, 2007 that establishes special facilitation related to fees for processing visa, timeframes and specified procedures for some categories of travelers (Eur-lex, 2008). Analysis of practical process of visa facilitation regime by the EU indicates the fact that some Member States, mainly new members, do not develop liberal visa regime for the Ukrainians, unlike what was provided by the agreement (Table 5).

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Table 5: Visa Policy of the EU Member States towards Ukraine (2012)

Country Average No of exta Average visa Estimated Score processing documents, cost, euro failure rate time for average/max documents (days) Italy 21 9/14 43 6,7 Problematic Czech 6-10 7/12 28 6,1 Problematic Republic UK 15 9/14 124 3,3 Problematic Germany 6-10 5/10 30 3,3 Contrasty France 5 9/15 51 0 Contrasty Belgium 5 6/11 47 0 Contrasty Finland 6-10 6/9 44 5 Contrasty Portugal 11-15 9/12 25 3,3 Contrasty Slovenia 6-10 6/9 28 0 Contrasty Netherlands 5 7/15 45 6,7 Contrasty Greece 6-10 8/16 30 2,2 Contrasty Latvia 5 7/11 28 0 Neutral Lithuania 6-10 6/16 46 1,7 Neutral Spain 5 8/15 50 0 Neutral Sweden 6-10 6/14 60 5 Neutral Austria 6-10 7/14 25 0,31 Neutral Denmark 6-10 7/12 61 0 Neutral Hungary 6-10 6/11 34 1,1 Friendly Poland 6-10 4/10 27 1,9 Friendly Slovakia 6-10 3/13 19 0 Friendly Estonia 6-10 6/13 20 0 Friendly

Source: Forbes. (2013a). Visa regime: the most problematic and most loyal EU Members to the Ukrainians http://forbes.ua/business/1351223-vizovyj-rezhim-samye-problemnye-i-loyalnye-k-ukraincam-strany-es Viewed 11.03.2015

Studies show that the connexion between visa regime and the scale of illegal migration is tiny (Emerson, 2007); hence, the visa regime issue is more associated with fear of neighbours in the EU, rather that with rational sense. Meanwhile, this fear, present in the EU and in relations between “new” and “old” Member States, harms the relations between the EU and its partners. I may agree with Zaiotti (2007) that “despite its stated objectives, the European Neighbourhood Policy is actually reproducing – if not reinforcing – some of the existing barriers between the EU and its neighbours and, more problematically, is creating new ones” (p. 144). 77 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Technical assistance is offered to the neighbouring states, apart from political, economic and financial incentives: it is a possibility to study better practices of the European Union and its Members, information and knowledge exchange, participation in EU’s programmes and agencies, which testifies a positive evolution of the EU’s incentives for the partners. The European Commission, observing a law level of ENP’s attractiveness, endeavors to improve its systems of instruments and stimuli after every policy’s renovation and actualisation. The results of this evolution are ambiguous though. In spite of new incentives, emerged in 2006- 2008 (participation in European agencies and programmes), some operations withdrew (join to “four freedoms”), which was replaced by prospects of free trade area emerging. A. Pop added two more sub-limitations of the ENP in incentives sphere: Firstly, there are no clear dialogue mechanisms and instruments of co-operation in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) fields. Secondly, a co-ordination of instruments and actions is difficult: “the EU has not developed mechanisms to correlate the specific instruments in order to co-ordinate over 300 actions” (p. 21).

As a conclusion of the incentives’ nature, it may be referred that, firstly, some of the ENP words seem unreal (e.g. statement of free mobility while Europeans stand steadfastly against it). Secondly, even if Brussels proposes “all, but institutions” for the partners, it does not give what the neighbouring states really desire: some countries as Tunisia and Morocco want access to the EU’s agricultural markets, which would give them valuable economic opportunities. The EU has been, though, unwilling to make any further concessions concerning those issues. Thirdly, the EU’s offers are blurred in gaining share of the internal market, which is concerned as the most innovative aspect of the ENP. Fourthly, the policy’s funding is not essential in the last budget period. And there will not be any specific actions without funds. Fifthly, the European Neighbourhood Policy did not meet expectations of some partner states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) that are aiming at joining the Union. Furthermore, not all the neighbours are interested in so deep relations with the EU, proposed by the ENP (Belarus, Libya, and Syria). The participation of those countries in the Neighbourhood Policy undoubtedly undermines confidence in the EU and new mechanism’s consistency and effectiveness. All these factors question the EU’s capability to create a “ring of friends” around its outer borders.

The main reason of low attractiveness of EU’s offerings for the partners within the ENP is differences in visions of goals and purpose of the Policy among 27 (28 since 2013) Member

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States. There is no consensus within the EU concerning priorities of collaboration with Eastern and Southern neighbours, concerning commercial and financial stimuli that cannot be offered to them. In addition, supranational institutions (mainly European Commission) do not have authority to pursue the ENP with no consensus with the Member States (Kochenov, 2009: 26).

The discordance among the Member States towards ENP’s priorities and ways to achieve it caused to put the Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership back to the EN}’s principles, which could have been demolished by new offerings. Instead of offering the partners new ways of co-operation, those two projects have become evaluating only in the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy. This situation will continue until perhaps the Member States elaborate a unanimous approach towards this issue, or the EU’s supranational institutions have enough power to make independent policy. Nonetheless, none of these factors will probably change in the near future.

Eastern Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean do not remove the ENP’s deficiencies above mentioned. The both initiatives could not manage to go out from the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, and, therefore, the policy that binds to one the Mediterranean and Eastern European partners remains unchangeable. Therefore, the functional differentiation the two ENP’s Dimensions is unmodified. Rhetoric about shared values is the same; the Conditionality principle is not reformed (it is considered as hardly useful to achieve the ENP’s goals). There were barely any new incentives for the partners added despite the Commission’s Communication “Eastern Partnership” and “Prague Declaration” contain long lists of them.

Shared values. The EC Communication “European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper” notes in the chapter “Action Plans” (2004):

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy,

equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the

Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-

discrimination. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its

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peoples. In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these

values (p. 12).

Thence, the ENP wants to build a “privileged relationship with neighbours, which will build on mutual commitment to common values” (European Commission, 2004: 7). These values are to be found “within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development” (European Commission, 2004: 7). Nevertheless, the second essential disadvantage of the ENP is “hidden” is the rhetoric of the shares values. It refers to baselessness of the EU values projection, stated in the fundamental treaties, on its partners. R. Zaiatti (2007) avers that “as for the case of interests, however, the extent to which these values are effectively shared with the neighbours is doubtful“; moreover, “... values are indeed shared, but apparently only by EU countries” (p. 150). Only obliquely it is recognised that the neighbours might uphold them as well: “The Union’s neighbours have pledged adherence to fundamental human rights and freedoms, through their adherence to a number of multilateral treaties as well as through their bilateral agreements with the EU” (European Commission, 2004: 7).

This cannot stand as an argument against the versatility of the EU’s values, but it seems unreasonable that the European Commission thinks the EU’s sixteen Partner States within the ENP adhere (or will adhere in the coming future) those values. It is obvious that the significance of rule of law, democracy level and human rights in Azerbaijan or in Morocco cannot be compared to any Western European state. If it acknowledges some day that the shared values do not work or even do not exist, it may lead to fatal consequences for the ENP.

Inconsistent Conditionality. The conditionality of the ENP resembles the enlargement conditionality. The difference lies in the absent of the membership prospects though, which were an impetus in the integration process for the states of Central and Eastern Europe. A success in the conditionality in the ENP is questionable without such an important stimulus.

If the EU’s Partner States do not want to build democracy and adhere to the shared values with the Union in practice, the stimuli and incentives from the EU’s side must be so ponderous to compensate for the inevitable losses caused to the states’ political elites in case of reforms. It is hardly possible to imagine how the stimuli must be significant to cause important changes in less democratic states within the ENP (Belarus, Azerbaijan or even 80 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Algeria or Tunisia). Hence, it is clear that the Conditionality principle is unlikely to promote changes in unprepared (or unwilling) neighbouring states. The statements of N. Tocci are well-directed in this regard (2007):

if democratisation and human rights call for a redistribution of powers, the legal and

institutional installation and protection of rights and the enhancement of political

participation, it is unclear how EU relations with states whose entire modus operandi

often negate these developments, can meaningfully promote these values. (pp. 23, 27)

The following argument of Tocci, D. Kochenov (2009) is absolutely right in stating if simple adherence to the EU’s values is lying at the core of conditionality requires nothing but regime change, the governments that the EU is trying to turn into friends “will never be in the position to comply with any of the EU’s demands” (p. 15). Consequently, in such a context, the incentives offered by the Union to reward ENP partners for compliance can be viewed as unfriendly acts, instead of positive engagement. The ideals of openness, liberalisation of economy and rule of law are largely alien for many EU’s partners in the ENP and it makes the Conditionality principle unsuitable for implementing as an instrument for the reforms.

Moreover, the Conditionality principle implementation does not have obvious results even in case of interested partners (Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova) yet. In the enlargement policy, the membership is the main “reward” for successful candidates; to fail the accession process means to lose the EU membership and the EU would expect the candidate states to openly co- operate with EU in this manner. The ENP conditionality differs by the stimuli that are less important than the enlargement’s ones. Cremona and Hillion (2006) note that the transplanting pre-accession routines into a policy otherwise conceived as an alternative to accession and intended to enhance the security of the Union, “may however undermine both its current effectiveness and its longer-term viability”(p. 26).

The Conditionality principle was probably formed not precisely in the ENP because of policy’s different ultimate goals. The Commission’s documents about the ENP do not contain any defined list of democratic norms or specific political retirements to the neighbouring states. Obligations of human rights and democratic norms also do not have a specific character in the Action Plans (AAs). Furthermore, the AAs do not have obligatory validity and the implementation control is largely formal and fragmented. Hence, in spite of formal 81 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) partner countries’ obligations to adhere to democratic principles, during the ENP existence there has been no clear understanding of measures the implementation of which would lead to “reward” (Strelkov, 2008: 277-278).

The European Union also faces a “stability or democracy” dilemma in relations with Arab Mediterranean states and Caucasus states: is co-operation’s priority is security, struggle against illegal migration or providing the energy to the EU, the democratic development in the neighbouring countries ceases to be important direction of EU’s policy. Brussels does not impose sanctions against the Mediterranean partners; sanctions against Belarus and Azerbaijan were not effective. The purposeful implementation of the Conditionality principle in relations with EU-orientated Ukraine and Moldova desists by the EU reluctance to acquire additional responsibilities about countries’ future, which could have been inevitable in case of EU’s insistence on the AA execution or other treaties (Strelkov, 2008: 278, 280).

The ENP documents contain another principle “Joint Ownership” and is consistently emphasised as one of the ENP’s advantages. From J. Kelly’s point of view, the EU mitigates the traditional conditionality using the Joint Ownership principle (Kelly, 2006: 44). Here, the Joint Ownership means that the ENP is based upon its own interests, common understanding and EU-neighbours equal partnership. The EC Communication “The European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper” (2004) accentuates that:

The ENP is an offer made by the EU to its partners to which they have responded with

considerable interest and engagement. Joint ownership of the process, based on the

awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to

impose priorities or conditions on its partners. (p. 8)

Kelley (2006) however noted “the inherent tension” between Joint Ownership and Conditionality highlighting that “joint ownership emphasized the (potential) equality in the relationship”, whereas the ENP remained “inherently unilateral [as] was epitomized by the highly specific conditionality [of the Action Plans]” (Cremona and Hillion, 2006:21).

As it can be seen, there is a distinct contradiction between the Conditionality and the Joint Ownership principles. It makes doubt whether the Joint Ownership is just added to the ENP rhetorically or it is real. K. Smith (2005: 765) notes that the Action Plans reflect mainly the

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EU’s own interests as priorities of co-operation with the ENP’s States. As T. Sydoruk (2012: 80) observes, the ENP is neither “space” (as four “common spaces” in relations with Russia12), nor “area” (as European Economic Area13); this is “policy” and, therefore, is greatly asymmetric. Only EU decides what meet the common interests and also forms a catalogue on shared values. As a result, it is hard to say whether the ENP is based upon the Joint Ownership of the EU and its neighbours or not. The Initiative did not seem to be equal partnership from the beginning. It was formed by the European Union as a unilateral act aimed at changing the Union’s neighbouring space. When in 2006 began talking about the need to reform the ENP, Kyiv tried to share its vision to the Commission and prepared necessary proposals. Nonetheless, the EC answered that the ENP is the EU’s unilateral policy towards the neighbouring countries and the EU was not able and willing at discussing the ways of the ENP reformation with the countries (Shpek, 2007). As R. Zaiotti (2007: 151) emphasises that the EU tells its neighbours:

We appreciate your support, but we do not trust you; we want your cooperation and

friendship, but we build protective fences; we share interests, but we define what these

interests are; and we believe in promoting collective security, but our own security

comes first.

Too Much “Hub and Spokes”. The main focus of the European Neighbourhood Policy has remained the bilateral relations between Brussels and each partner states and there was no great attention to the regional co-operation. Even the multilateral forums of the Eastern Partnership, as well as the Union for the Mediterranean, have not achieved essential significance in the region.

Stephan Lehne (2014) thinks that it is inevitable because of huge differences between the partner countries. The EU ignores the fact that many of the persistent problems in the ENP

12 The four “spaces” are a Common Economic Space, A Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Common Space of Cooperation in the field of External Security, and a Common Space on Research Education and Culture. Road Maps for the Common Spaces were adopted at the EU-Russia Summit on 10 May 2005. The Road Map on the Common Space on External Security is largely focused on joint support for international initiatives and Conventions rather than envisaging any concrete joint initiatives (Cremona& Hillion, 2006: 25)

13 The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises all the EU Member States and the European Free Trade Association states, established on 1 January 1994 (European External Action Service, 2014a)

83 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) space are regional in character and that the solutions to these problems should be also developed on that level.

The Eastern European Countries and the South Caucasus, in particular, do not have tied economic relations within the Policy. Economic development is held back by the lack of infrastructure and insufficient intraregional trade and economic integration. Key issues of these sub-regions also needed to be discussed in a multilateral regional setting. The EU should also systematically engage the ENP with existing regional fora as GUAM, Black Sea Synergy and OECD. Given its vast experience in regional co-operation, the EU has a lot to offer in this area. Although, to be effective, it has to strengthen the regional and multilateral instruments of the ENP.

I.5. Final synthesis to Chapter I.

The European Neighbourhood Policy was created in order to ensure security and stability, increase standards of living in the neighbouring countries by “exporting” common European values and norms without the idea of further enlargement. The policy aims to assist reforms in strategic for the European Union areas in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. It was caused by the states of development of the EU neighbours: all the sub-regions (North Africa, Middle Orient, Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe and South Balkans) of the neighbourhood space pose fundamental threats for the EU at that time: terrorism, regional conflicts, non- democratic political systems, unstable governments, high corruption level, absence or weak civil society, organised crime, illegal migration, trans-border drug, weapon and women trafficking, &c. Moreover, each country of the sub-regions have a range of cultural, civilizational, historical features that may cause threats to the United Europe. In Eastern Europe, verbi gratia, the biggest threat is attempts for region’s stabilisation thanks to EU normative power, lack of political will to continue the enlargement process to the East, and Russia as its rival in the region.

The foreign policy of the European Union is largely based upon regional approach, which takes into consideration the neighbouring space while developing the international image and identity of the EU, including threats and challenges coming from that space. One of the

84 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) biggest challenges for the EU is adequate long-term policy towards its neighbours that could question the united Europe as pivotal actor in international relations. The EU policy towards its closest neighbours reflects global tendencies since end of the Cold War, e.g. globalisation, increased importance of cultural difference, terrorism. However, the enlargement to the East (in 1995, 2004 and 2007) caused the biggest influence to the meaning of neighbourhood in Europe. The EU new border after the enlargement induced a new geopolitical reality and new threats, at the same time, gave an opportunity to the EU to become an important player in regional and international arena.

The design of the European Neighbourhood Policy has passed a long distance from ideas of special relations with the Eastern neighbours to a сonsiderably wider in geographic terms union. The development of the ENP can be divided into four phases. The first phase (2002- 2005) englobed discussions about concept and design of a new policy and new bilateral agreements (Action Plans). The second phase (2006-2007) is characterised by a slight revision and enforcement of the Policy together with accomplishment of the bilateral accords by the Partner States. During the third period (2008-2014), the differentiation of the ENP became an idea number one within discussions about reform of the Policy: Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership emerged and Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP. The fourth phase (2014-nowadays) is a new level of co-operation between the EU and mainly Eastern neighbours when the Association Agreements and visa-free regime with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia came into vigour.

The European Neighbourhood Policy from the very beginning was planned as an alternative to the enlargement process, it was considered as an integration to EU economy, adopting its aquis without membership. The Policy proposed multi-speed levels14 of integration with the EU neighbours. Hence, the policy aims to eliminate gaps between the EU Members and their neighbours that did not join the Union. The main limitations of this policy are: firstly, the geographic dimension of the policy is extremely wide, a significant difference between the partners was not taken into consideration. Secondly, the EU unreasonably relied on an idea that other countries would negotiate adopting the European values and norms. Thirdly, there were no evident stimuli for the partners to conduct internal reforms. Lack of unanimous

14 The idea of multi-speed integration or co-operation is similar to the idea of variable geometry Europe or multi- speed Europe within the European Union which means that EU members may integrate at different levels and pace taking into consideration their political 85 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) position within the EU concerning future development of the policy is the biggest factor of its small productivity and timid results.

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CHAPTER II – CONVERSION OF EASTERN DIMENSION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

La UE debería hacer más para ayudar con los problemas prácticos de la región que derivan en debilidad endémica de los Estados y presión periódica de Rusia. El vecindario oriental está en la puerta de al lado y sus problemas ya afectan a la UE15

Andrew Wilson, expert at European Council on Foreign Relations

II.1. A New Impulse to the ENP: Eastern Partnership.

The attempts of strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2006-2007 did not solve the problems. In 2007, the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for strengthening the Mediterranean direction of the EU’s foreign policy and proposed to establish Union for Mediterranean (UfM) (Glodirova, 2007). Paris was to preside over the EU Council in the second half of 2008 and the key policy point of the Presidency was creation of the Mediterranean Union. Germany and Turkey criticised the initiative: Berlin feared excessive influence of France in the region and Ankara was afraid of replacement of the EU membership by the UfM.

Poland was the main initiator and mover of the EU’s eastern dimension and it has to enlist the support of the EU Member States that had been much longer in the European Union than the countries of 2004/2007 enlargements. Warsaw conducted negotiations with Berlin concerning a joint initiative of the ENP’s Eastern dimension inasmuch as Germany resisted the French initiative (UfM). Some deputies of the European Parliament from Germany expressed ideas about the future initiative. In particular, the deputy leader of the Christian Democratic Union from the European Parliament, Ingo Friedrich, member of the EP presidium, proposed in the mid-April 2008 the building of a Union of Eastern Europe, which would include Ukraine, Moldova, and the South Caucasus (Table 6). This Union was to provide the neighbouring states aiming at joining the EU “a third way between the quality of EU member and non- member, between countries inside and outside of the EU” (Cristal, 2009). However, the German Foreign Ministry refused from direct involvement in the Eastern Partnership initiative due to the lack of Polish proposals Russia.

15 Ramímez. M. (2009). La Unión Europea intenta conquistar a los vecinos del Este con más dinero. http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/05/07/union_europea/1241683256.html Viewed 15.06.2017 87 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 6: Comparison of Eastern Partnership Economies

Country Population, million GDP per capita, GDP nominal, euro (2014) billion euro (IMF estimates for 2016)

European Union 506.8 27 300 16,477,211

Eastern Partners 75.2 3 700 195,378

Armenia 3 2 600 10,774

Azerbaijan 9.5 6 000 35,141

Belarus 9.4 5 800 45,887

Georgia 4.5 2 700 13,942

The Republic of 3.6 1 700 6,084 Moldova

Ukraine 45.2 3 100 83,550

Sources: European Commission. (2015b). Eastern Partnership Summit. Facts and figures about the Eastern Partners of the European Union. Eurostat news release. 89/2015 Viewed 20 May 2015 International Monetary Fund (2016). Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/weorept.aspx Viewed 01.09.2016

The Project of Communication “Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean” was presented by the European Commissioner for Extern Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner at a meeting of the European Commission on May 20, 2008 (Soler i Lecha, 2008: 8).

Eastern Partnership initiative was presented jointly by Poland and Sweden at the meeting of foreign ministers on 26-27 May 2008. It should be noted that the Czech Republic, thus in April 2008 presented its own initiatives to deepen the Eastern dimension of the ENP, provided strong support for this initiative. The basic idea of the Polish-Swedish proposals was the need to deepen relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours (especially with Ukraine) in the format of the Eastern Partnership, which, despite being based upon the ENP, was

88 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) autonomous co-operative mechanism. Eastern Partnership was to cover 6 post-Soviet neighbour countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The key idea of the proposals was the intensification of regional co-operation between the Eastern partners in the thematic platforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2008).

A week later, a Polish-Swedish initiative was presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council, chaired by Slovenia. The initiative was agreed and the next step was the European Council. May 28, 2008, during the visit of N. Sarkozy in Warsaw, France and Poland reached a tacit agreement on mutual support of the Eastern Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean initiatives (Treshchenkov, 2013: 77). The interest of France in the ENP Eastern Direction increased because of events in the Caucasus in August 2008.

There were three important events that drew attention to the idea of strengthening the eastern dimension of the ENP. The first one is a gradual deterioration in Russia-Belarus relations culminating with energy conflict in winter 2006-2007. The next point is that Ukraine joins the WTO in 2008 and starts negotiations on a free trade area with EU. The third and the most important factor for a new vision on Eastern Europe is Russia’s military occupation of some parts of Georgia.

The first Eastern Partnership Summit was held on 7th May 2009 in Prague during the Czech Presidency in the EU Council signifying the official start of the initiative. All the EU and Partner States were presented on the summit. Ukraine was represented by President V. Yushchenko, First Vice-Premier V. Syamashka was from Belarus, Moldova – Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration A. Stratan. Poland, as the motor of the Eastern Partnership, was represented by Prime Minister D. Tusk. Most of EU Member States were presented by the presidents or the prime ministers. Some countries were represented by Foreign Ministers (The United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal) or by other governors: Austria (Permanent Representative of Austria to the European Union) and Italy (represented by Minister of Welfare Maurizio Sacconi) (Council of the European Union, 2009: 2-3). The EU institutions (EU Council Secretariat, Commission, Committee of the Regions, the European Parliament) were represented by senior officials (Council of the European Union, 2009: 4). The fact that the summit was not attended by the major EU leader (Sarcozy, Brown, Berlusconi and Zapatero) can be interpreted as a lack of interest in the initiative. It worth mentioning that the first Mediterranean summit was attended by almost all the EU leaders. 89 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The summit participants issued a Joint Declaration in which the main goal of the Eastern Partnership proclaimed the creation of the necessary conditions for the development of political association and economic integration between the European Union and interested Partner States (Map 2). The Declaration is relatively short (11 pages) and elucidates the co- operation between the EU and EaP Partners in several spheres:

a) A more ambitious partnership between the European Union and the partner countries;

b) Deeper bilateral engagement;

c) Focus on multilateral co-operation;

d) Funding.

Map 2: Eastern Partnership

Source: European External Service Action. (2016). EU Association Agreements. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/3763/eu-association-agreements_en Viewed 14.08.216

90 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

P. Żurawski vel Grajewski (2010) notes that the biggest concern of Germany was that “the invited neighbourhood countries were not called “European Partners (this could have been interpreted as approving their ambitions concerning future membership in the EU)” (p. 41) but as the Eastern European partners (Council of the European Union, 2009). Berlin also refused to support a Polish plan aiming at dividing all the countries of European Neighbourhood Policy into two groups – “European neighbours” and the “neighbours of Europe”. Moreover, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former EU Commissioner for the External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated upon equal treatment of Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP (Żurawski vel Grajewski; 2010:46-47).

The Swedish presidency in the Council of the European Union prioritises the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and paid particular attention to the implementation of the Eastern Partnership. The Presidency intended “to work to ensure that the implementation of the Eastern Partnership gathers momentum and is consolidated via, among other things, new multilateral cooperation, negotiations on association agreements and free trade, and steps to facilitate the mobility of people” (European Commission; 2009: 16).

On 16th-17th November 2009, Brussels hosted the first General Assembly of the Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum. The idea of the Forum was indorsed at the Prague Summit of 2009 aiming to “facilitate the sharing of information and experience on the partner countries' paths towards transition, reform and modernisation” (Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, 2009). The European Commission underlined that “ongoing reforms [in Eastern Partner countries] require stronger participation of civil society to enhance oversight of public services and strengthen public confidence in them”. It proposed “to support the further development of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)” and in particular, ”to establish an Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum to promote contacts among CSOs and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities” (European Commssion 2008:14). Over 200 CSOs participated in the General Assembly in November 2009: think tanks, employers’ organisations, professional associations, NGOs, trade unions, non-profit foundations. The EaP CSF holds an Annual Assembly every autumn (Table 7). The Steering Committee meets four times a year. A Secretariat was set up in Brussels in August 2012 in order to support the work of the Steering Committee (Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, 2009).

91 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 7: Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum

December 2008 Communication from the European Commission (to the European Parliament and the Council) on the Eastern Partnership

March 2009 Consultation process on the creation of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum

May 2009 The Prague Eastern Partnership Summit where is was agreed a Concept paper on the EaP CSF

November 2009 First EaP CSF General Assembly, Brussels, Belgium

November 2010 Second EaP CSF General Assembly, Berlin, Germany

November 2011 Third EaP CSF General Assembly, Poznań, Poland

August 2012 Registration of the EaP CSF Secretariat as a Belgian non-profit organisation

November 2012 Fouth EaP CSF General Assembly, Stockholm, Sweden

December 2012 Start of EaP CSF Secretariat

October 2013 Fifth EaP CSF General Assembly, Chișinău, Moldova

November 2014 Sixth EaP CSF General Assembly, Batumi, Georgia

Resource: Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. (2009). Background of EaP CSF http://eap-csf.eu/en/about- eap-csf/background1/ Viewed 29.09.2016

In May 2010, the European Commission published the results of implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy during 5 years (2004-2009). The EC divided the co- operation with ENP Partner States into two formats – bilateral and multilateral levels. The bilateral framework included governance improvement, visa facilitation process, advanced economic integration, &c. The multilateral level included such initiatives as Union for the Mediterranean, Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy. The EC highlighted that

92 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) despite the difficulties, “the EU has been able to establish a partnership for reform with its neighbours” (European Commission, 2010a: 14). The Commission also published.

On 25th March 2010, the High Representative sent to the Council of the European Union a proposal on the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which had been mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon:

The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be

established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the

High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the

consent of the Commission (Art. 13a (2).

The High Representative states in the proposal that “… [the EEAS] will help strengthen the European Union on the global stage, give it more profile, and enable it to protect its interests and values more efficiently” (Council of the European Union, 2010c: 2). The European Parliament passed a resolution approving the proposal on 8th July 2010 (European Parliament, 2010a) and the Council adopted a decision that confirmed the proposal on 26th July 2010 (European External Action Service, 2010a). The EEAS officially launched on 1st January 2011.

The political consequences of the EEAS formation to the Eastern Partnership are primarily related to the role of the Service in the initiative. The EEAS plays a significant role in achieving the goals of the EaP on bilateral and multilateral levels. In the bilateral dimension, the EEAS participates in negotiations on the Association Agreements (in consultation with a special Committee, which includes representatives of all EU Member States), coordinates the European Commission talks about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (Kostanyan, 2013: 50).

In July 2010 the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle sent out a questionnaire to all the EU Member States and 16 neighbouring states concerning the vision of the evolution of the ENP in the period up to 2020. In response, Polish Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his Swedish counterpart C. Bildt wrote a letter on 6th October 2010 to Baroness Catherine Ashton and Mr Štefan Füle. In the letter, they noted that all Eastern partners could join the EU, unlike the countries of North Africa and Middle East:

93 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

“Some are European and thus enjoy special status in accordance with the treaties, others will remain neighbours of Europe” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2010a: 1). Most of other big players in the EU were openly hostile to further expansion though. The French and German response to Mr. Füle said nothing on enlargement (Rettman, 2010).

The Ministers also recommended to split the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument into two: “In order to facilitate the further evolution of EU policies in the neighbourhood, we should take into consideration dividing the ENPI into two separate financial instruments, one for the East and one for the South, in mid-term perspective” (p. 4). From the Ministers’ standpoint, the Eastern Partnership should not be perceived as a complement to the ENP, to be a multilateral dimension. The bilateral relations between the EU and Eastern partners should develop within the EaP.

The Eastern Partnership was discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 25th October 2010, where the Council adopted the following conclusions: the EaP is recognises as the ENP’s regional dimension (Point 1); the EaP is the EU’s tool for political association and economic integration with its Eastern neighbours by supporting political and socio-economic reforms (Point 2); the EU will continue to establish the DCFTA (Point 5) and encourages further efforts to sign AAs (with Ukraine and Moldova ) and launch the negotiations concerning the AAs (with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) (Point 6) (Council pf the European Union; 2010a: 1-2). The Council also was satisfied by the implementation of the multilateral track of the EaP (Point 14).

On 13th December 2010, Brussels held the second meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the EaP countries where it was discussed the realisation of the EaP during the last two years on bilateral and multilateral tracks. The report also had data concerning ENPI Assistance to the Eastern partners for the period 2010-2013, according to which, Ukraine was to receive 596,06 million euro, Moldova – 339,14 million euro and Belarus – only 90,26 million euro (European External Action Service, 2010b: 16).

The same month, the European Union and the Council of Europe developed a new programme within the Eastern Partnership – “Facility” aiming to provide support to reform processes in the Eastern partners. The EaP Facility was developed as part of the EaP Platform on “Democracy, Good Governance and Stability” where the Council of Europe is a permanent partner. Moreover, the Council of Europe contributes to development of the Platform

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“Contacts between People”. The Eastern Partnership Facility was signed by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, and the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, on 15th December 2010 with budget of 4 million euro. The programme assists the EaP Partners to approximate to the European standards in judicial reform, public administration and electoral standards, fighting cyber crime and corruption, and promoting good governance (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 2011). A CoE EaP Facility Steering Committee (composed of the EU representatives, CoE EaP Facility National Co-ordinators for each EaP country and CoE Major Administrative Entities) aims to assess and guide the implementation of the programme’s projects (Council of Europe, 2011).

All the 2011 year, the EU was experiencing serious economic and political crisis and foreign challenges (the developments in North Africa and the Middle East “Arab Spring” in 2011 and non-democratic presidential elections in Belarus in late 2010) extremely deteriorated and required quick and appropriate responses from Brussels. All these reasons made the EU Member States to discuss a reformation of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU was not ready for a powerful wave of migration due to destabilisation of the situation in Tunisia and Libya. In early May 2011, a new wave of migration from Syria to increasingly deteriorated the situation. The failure of the ENP was evident not only in the Southern dimension, but also in the Eastern dimension the ENP did not become an instrument of reforms in Eastern European countries. Thus, there was a need to build a new concept of relations between the EU and its neighbours.

On 16th March 2011, Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament supported draft reports Marek M. Siwiec (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Poland) and Mário David (Group of the European People’s Party, Portugal) on the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP. According to Mr. Siwiec, the European Neighbourhood Policy helped a lot to achieve significant results by the neighbouring countries, but was needed a more sophisticated approach towards the Partner States: “These countries are quite different, from Belarus, where there is no direct and effective means of communication for any policy, until Moldova, which demonstrated significant progress” (European Space, 2011). The Committee proposed to focus more on contacts between people, civil society, good governance and mass media in the relations with the EU’s neighbours. Mr. Siwiec underscores a need to give a precise perspective of membership in the EU for the 95 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Eastern countries that might be an impetus for reforms. Mr. David expressed regret that Europe had not yet managed to divide completely the policy on the Eastern and Southern neighbours. “My dream was to completely divide East, which could become a member of the EU, and South, which will always remain neighbour”, said Mário David (European Space, 2011).

Nonetheless, at the plenary session of the European Parliament of 7th April 2011, a discussion arose about the content of the definition of “European perspective”. The proposal to treat this term as an EU membership was rejected with a slight advantage, and the final text of resolution included only a general reference to the Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (Article 10) (European Parliament, 2011a).

The process of revision of the ENP, which had begun in summer 2010, ended by joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative C. Ashton on 25th May 2011 “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”.

According to the Communication, an opportunity to approximate to the EU was clearly and uncompromisingly depended on progress in reforms – a “more-for-more” principle16. This principle allows the EU to increase its support significantly for those partners who genuinely implement democratisation process. The Communication states that the renewed ENP would have six core pillars:

1. Supporting progress towards “deep democracy”: the Commission mentions that “there is no set of model or a ready-made recipe for political reform”, but there are elements that remain vital in construction of deep democracy. They are: free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reforms and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces (European Commission, 2011c: 3).

2. Intensifying political and security co-operation. The pillar outlines the commitment of the EU in solving conflicts in the region.

16 The “more-for-more” principle was introduced in a Joint Communication of the High Representative and the European Commission “A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” on 8th March 2011 as the EU’s strategic response to the Arab Spring. 96 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

3. Supporting sustainable economic and social development. The Commission supports a policy that would “support partner countries' adoption of policies conducive to stronger, sustainable and more inclusive growth, to the development of micro, small and medium-sized companies and to job creation” (European Commission, 2011b: 6). It was also planned to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the neighbouring countries in order to develop closer trade ties, because trade is the key to creating jobs, improving social protections and boosting growth. This pillar of the ENP includes also enlarged operation area of the European Investment Fund.

4. Establishing Mobility Partnerships aims to enhance the mobility of the people between the Partner States and the EU, to facilitate access to legal migration channel.

5. Strengthening the Eastern Partnership and building partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean. The sides “move to conclude and implement Association Agreements including DCFTAs”; continue the processes of democratisation and visa regime liberalisation, enhance sectorial co- operation (particularly rural development) and work more with civil society.

6. Providing additional funding with clearer priorities. The reform included additional 1 240 million euro to the budget of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument of 5700 million euro for 2011-2013 (European Commission, 2011d: 19). President of the Commission Manuel Barroso mentioned in a Statement that the increase of the ENP funding was a “[…] commitment to reforms in the partner states”. “And it shows we are serious in our desire to help those who aspire to political freedom and a better future”, added he (European Commission, 2011d).

In addition, Commissioner Štefan Füle mentioned that the new approach would involve a much higher level of differentiation: […] each partner country develops its links with the EU as far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow (European Commission, 2011e).

The European Commission and the High Representative also proposed the same day “A Medium Term Programme for a renewed European neighbourhood Policy (2011-2014)” aiming to concretize the Communication (European External Action Service, 2011a). A table- formed document contained measures, deadlines and the EU institutions responsible for the exercising. 97 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

On 25th May 2011, there was also presented a report on the implementation of the EaP in 2010 that analysed the development of major areas and projects of co-operation on multilateral and bilateral tracks (European External Action Service, 2011b).

The plan of review of the European Neighbourhood Policy of the Commission and the High Representative from May 2011, was welcomed the Foreign Affairs Council at the meeting in Luxembourg on 20th June 2011. The Council supported the “more-for-more” principle (the EU gives greater assistance to the partners that show real progress) and prioritised such areas of the co-operation as democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Council of the European Union, 2011a: 10). The Council also looked forward to the second EaP Summit in September 2011 in Warsaw as a step on enhancing the relations with the EU Eastern partners, and it acknowledged the European aspirations of some partners (in fact only three countries out of six declared the European integration as their objective – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) (p. 13). In the case of Belarus, the Council toughened its sanctions against Minsk because of “ […] the continuing deterioration in the political and human rights situations […]” by extending the visa ban and freezing assets for more individuals, and imposing arms embargo (p. 2).

The second EaP Summit was held on 29th-30th September 2011 in Warsaw, Poland, nicknamed “engine” of the eastern policy of the European Union. It worth noting that Poland as the host country had high hope on the summit as it sought to implement its initiative under the presidency of the EU Council, and it hope that Ukraine would have signed the Association Agreement with the EU and would have gained new perspectives European integration.

The Warsaw Summit was planned as a demonstration of the effectiveness of the EU’s external influence in Eastern Europe. The unpredictable political processes in the Middle East “paralysed” the Union for Mediterranean, so, ruling political circles of Europe tried to demonstrate an active role of the ENP in the post-Soviet space. Most EU countries were represented by heads of state or government17 plus the EU’s main institutions were represented by chair people.

17 Some EU leaders did not attend the Summit, e.g. Italy was represented by State Secretary A. Mantica, Cyprus – Foreign Minister E. Kozaku-Markulis, the UK – Deputy Prime Minister N. Clegg, and France – Prime Minister F.Fillon. Some analysts say that the absence of the heads of state or government of key EU countries significates a lack of interest in co-operation with the Eastern Partners, and they give example that instead of participating in the Summit, N. Sarkozy took part in event concerning Alzheimer’s disease and then awarded the parents of many children with medals (Baranovskaya, 2011) 98 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The main issue of the Summit’s Agenda was situation in Belarus (deteriorating democratic standards). President Lukashenka was not invited to the Summit as he was banned move to the EU because of persecution of the Belarusian opposition. Belarusian Foreign Minister Syarhey Martynau received an invitation to the Summit from the Belarus’ side. However, official Minsk refused to send Mr. Martynau (because A. Merkel was to have a meeting with Belarusian oppression at the Summit), so the delegation of Belarus was led Ambassador to the Republic of Poland Viktor Gaysenok. Tough situation of Belarus made the delegation of Belarus to leave the Summit on 30th September 2011 accusing the EU of “discrimination” of Belarus (the delegation of Belarus was prohibited to participate in all the events of the Summit’s agenda) (Rfi, 2011).

The summit adopted a Joint Declaration that gave a strong signal for the Partner States to continue political and economic co-operation, evaluating the European integration path of each EaP partner. The parties agreed to continue the realisation of the Eastern Partnership, which adopted at the summit in Prague in 2009. The Declaration underscored the thesis that “the participants of the Warsaw Summit acknowledge the European aspirations and the European choice of some partners and their commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy”, which had already been mentioned in the Communication from May 2011 and supported by the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2011 (Council of the European Union; 2011b: 1). The Declaration also mentions greater differentiation and mutual accountability as principles to intensify the co-operation, and “partners most engaged in reforms will benefit more from their relationship with the European Union, including closer political association, deeper gradual economic integration in the EU Internal Market and increased EU support” (p. 2).

It was noted that in the Partner States succeed in political and economic reforms and the relations between the EU and its Eastern partners significantly deepened. In order to consolidate this trend, the EU and its partners were negotiating Association Agreements that would lead to free trade areas. Concerning Eastern European states, the EU noted the launch of dialogues on visa-free regimes with Ukraine and Moldova, and sought to have similar agreement with Belarus. The EU gave a clear signal to Minsk that would not provide any financial aid to Belarus if Minsk did not begin democratic reforms and dialogue with opposition.

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In case of Ukraine, imprisonment and criminal cases against former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were the main obstacle towards concluding negotiations and signing the AA. Moreover, the EU officials several times publicly raised the issue of the prosecution of Mrs. Tymoshenko. At a press conference after the Summit, President of the European Council H. van Rompuy said that the issue was constantly raised during the Summit: “We have expressed our concern about the Tymoshenko case, we have said again that we reject the possibility of selective use of the judicial system against the opposition” (Analitik, 2011). President of the European Commission J. Manuel Barroso said that the EU was satisfied with the choice that Ukraine had made on its European path. At the same time, “we have also very clearly expressed our concern over Tymoshenko” (Analitik, 2011).

The “more-for-more” or “less-for-less” principle, proposed in May 2011, was enhanced by analytic centres of six Eastern Partners, and it was included into “European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries” (hereafter – Index). The Index was developed by independent civil society experts in reforms concerning European integration and is prepared by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in co-operation with the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and other thank-tanks and university institutions depending on the year. The Index was designed to make recommendations to the EaP countries along the reform process and to “raise the alarm when countries depart from the expected trajectory, when progress is being held back or even reversed” (Eastern Partnership Index, 2014a). The Index is produced annually and serves as an important monitoring tool for civil society as well as policymakers in the EU and the Partner States. It studies the progress in European integration in three interdependent dimensions:

 Linkage – political, economic and social ties between each of the EaP states and the EU;

 Approximation – converging legislation, practices and institutions towards EU standards;

 Management – quality of management of the European integration process.

Each dimension is divided into sub-categories. The first Index was published in November 2011, according to which, Moldova was leader of the ranking among six states. Georgia and Ukraine were second and third respectively. Belarus was on the last place. According to the newest Index of 2014, Moldova keeps the leading position (first place in Linkage and 100 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Approximation). Ukraine experienced a mixed record on reforms because of a very difficult year (economic crisis and Russian invasion). Belarus remains the poorest performer of reforms with a minimal improvement (European Partnership Index, 2014b: 3) (Table 8).

Table 8: 2010-2014 Indices on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus

Moldova Ukraine Belarus

LINKAGE 2011 0.70 0.60 0.19 2012 0.69 0.64 0.31 2013 0.70 0.65 0.31 2014 0.70 0.66 0.31 APPROXIMATION 2011 0.67 0.57 0.37 2012 0.65 0.57 0.31 2013 0.67 0.58 0.33 2014 0.69 0.60 0.34 MANAGEMENT 2011 0.88 0.68 0.20 2012 0.53 0.45 0.22 2013 0.59 0.52 0.24 2014 0.71 0.50 0.25

Source: Eastern Partnership Index. (2014). 2014 European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%202014.pdf Viewed 28.09.2016

Notwithstanding the aims and hopes for Polish Presidency of the second half of 2011, almost all experts and politicians admit a complete Polish defeat in the sphere of Eastern Partnership, namely, Eastern Partnership Summit. Polish Politician Rrzysztof Szczerski mentioned that “Eastern dimension of the Polish Presidency in the EU has been important but turned out to be a big political defeat” (Tyshchenko, 2014a: 74). Despite the critics on the results of the Warsaw Summit, the Polish Authorities claimed success in Eastern policy in the official rapport of the results of the Polish presidency in the Council (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznyc, 2012: 179-180). The Danish presidency (first half of 2012) did not plan any special innovations within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The only noticeable emphasis was placed on the need to promote trade liberalisation between the EU and its

101 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) neighbours (Tyshchenko, 2014b: 48). The Eastern Partnership was also beyond the priorities of the Cyprian presidency in the second half of 2012.

In 2012, the European Union continued increasing effectiveness of the ENP and its attractiveness amongst the Partner States. On 15th May 2012, Commissioner Štefan Füle and High Representative Catherine Ashton published the annual “neighbourhood package”. It was presented a Joint Communication entitled “Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy” that made an assessment of the first year of implementation of the new ENP in 2011. The actualisation of the ENP was caused mainly by the situation in Southern Mediterranean. The new ENP included the “more-for-more” principle and recognised the importance of mutual accountability between the EU and its partners (European Commission, 2012a: 2). Tools to strengthen mutual accountability are enhanced political steering of the Partner States, Country Progress Reports, and increased contacts at all levels between the EU and the Eastern Partners (European Commission, 2012a: 6). The package included also a report on “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” concerning Southern Mediterranean; 12 joint Staff working documents on progress made by individual ENP Partners in 2011 with a set of recommendations for the future. In case of Ukraine, it was acknowledged Kyiv’s positive steps “to secure deeper long-term future relations with the EU, and to confirm the European vector of its foreign policy, by working intensively to finalise the negotiations of the Association Agreement, which closed in December“ (European Commission, 2012b: 1). At the same time, degradation of the rule of law and the slow pace of a number of political reforms became obstacles on European integration. Moldova made good progress in almost all areas of the Action Plan and the negotiations on the AA were at good pace (European Commission, 2012c: 1). The progress report for Belarus was not prepared because there is no ENP Action Plan in force and Minsk participates only in the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership. There was analysed political and socio-economic situation on Belarus and the state of the EU-Belarus relations (European Commission, 2012d: 1). There was also published “Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011 – Regional Report: Eastern Partnership”. This regional report states that there are still exist strong challenges in the EaP Partner States (rule of law, human rights and democracy) in spite of progress on bilateral and multilateral dimensions (European Commission, 2012e). The document underlined the significant role of all the stakeholders in the revolution of the relations, and mobility of citizens was highlighted as an area of considerable progress.

102 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Other document presented on 15th May 2013, “Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit”, established a new multilateral initiative entitled an Eastern Partnership Roadmap. The Roadmap had to be a tool to organise the process of implementation of the EaP doctrine between the Warsaw (autumn 2011) and Vilnius (autumn 2013) Eastern Partnership Summits. The document concretised the innovations which, according to Brussels, emerged in the ENP in 2012: for example, implementing “more-for- more” principle shows the EU’s willingness to give even greater support for progress of the Eastern Partners in fulfilling their obligations.

The Roadmap consists of two blocks; each of them was presented in a separate document, on multilateral and bilateral track, “guided by the principles of joint ownership, differentiation and conditionality” (European Commission, 2012f: 2). The Roadmap contained specific objectives that had been defined by the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit, underscoring that the main goal of the Eastern Partnership is “to create the conditions to accelerate political association and deepen economic integration” between the EU and EaP Partners (European Commission, 2012f: 3). In the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership, the table-formed list covered such areas as public administration reforms, border management, strengthening the judicial system, anti-corruption programmes (European Commission, 2012g). The block of bilateral dimension was constructed similarly. For example, in the area “Political Association and Economic Integration”, every Eastern partner had its tasks and the EU tools to achieve objectives (European Commission; 2012h: 1-16). The Eastern Partnership Roadmap had systematised and regulated all the problems of the last years acting and proposed by the European Union tools to solve them. The Roadmap did not offer anything new in terms of content. Nonetheless, in conceptual vision, the Roadmap responded the general tendency of the EU’s institutions in adopting documents with specific obligations with deadlines and responsible staff. The EaP Roadmap was agreed by all EU Member States and EaP Partners at the ministerial meeting on 23rd July 2012. In order to enhance co-operation on bilateral and multilateral tracks and support regional development, the European Commission initiated an Informal Eastern Partnership Dialogue in 2012, aiming to discuss implementation of the reforms, EaP Roadmap monitoring and conducting informal meetings of sectorial ministers and commissioners. The informal dialogue is a supplementary form of meeting on the political level to the EaP summits and ministerial meetings. The meetings are held every 6 months in different capitals of the EaP countries. The first meeting of ministers within the informal dialogue was held in 103 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Chișinău, Moldova, on 5th June 2012 and was devoted to the problem of regional security. Moldova was chosen to host the first meeting not by chance: according to EU Commissioner Štefan Füle, “Moldova is a very good example of how the determination in the implementation of the agreed reforms […]” (European Commission, 2012i: 1) The second meeting was hosted by Georgia, on 12th-13th February 2013, and it had, for the first time, sectorial ministerial meeting on transport (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 2013a). The third meeting was held in Yerevan, Armenia, on 11th-12th September 2013. Amongst the multilateral and bilateral tracks of co-operation, the core issue of the agenda was education, training, youth and sport: the EU initiated joint Master programmes and offered Erasmus+ programme (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 2013b). The last meeting took place in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, on 8th-9th September 2014 with a special attention on energy security and energy co-operation (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 2013c). The year 2013 was remarkable in the development of the Eastern Partnership as the European Union looked forward to initial the AAs with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine at the Vilnius EaP Summit in autumn 2013. In March 2013, the EC published a new report concerning realisation of the European neighbourhood Policy. It was mentioned that both the EU and the Partner States faced great challenges in 2012, and some countries tackle economic, social and political problems, some of which require immediate responses. Consequently, there is little time on medium- and long-term reforms. Nevertheless, “the ENP remains the basis on which the EU works with its neighbours to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (European Commission, 2013d: 2). Along with this report, the EC and HR prepared regional reports on Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean, and separate reports one very ENP partner. In case of Eastern Europe, the reports showed clearly a great difference in the European integration between the countries on the same region. Moldova implements most of the recommended reforms, whereas Ukraine did not act most of the key recommendations. Belarus was hardly mentioned in the reports because it does not participate in the bilateral track of the EaP (European Commission, 2013a). The next EaP Summit was held on 28th-29th November 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The EaP Partner States were represented by heads of states or government, except for Belarus that was

104 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) represented by Belarusian Foreign Minister B. Makei. The EU was represented by heads of institutions18 and the Member States.

At the summit, the European Union successfully initialled Association Agreements (including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas) with Moldova and Georgia, and the sides looked forward to sign the treaties in 2014. In addition, the EU signed a visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan and a framework agreement with Georgia on participation in EU Crisis management operations. Ukraine slowed its progress towards the European integration though. The Ukrainian authorities showed their position to slow down the European integration or even to “pause” it: the Ukrainian leadership unilaterally expressed a clear position that they would not sign the Association Agreement. A week before the Summit, on 21st November 2013, Ukrainian government adopted a resolution that suspended preparations for the Association Agreement with the EU that was to be initialized at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. Kyiv resumed active dialogue with Russia and other countries of the Customs Union and the CIS states instead in order to recover trade and economic relations (Ilnytska, 2014: 118).

The events at Vilnius Summit, unexpected reluctance of Ukrainian President to sign the AA, and intensification of dialogue with the Russia caused disagreement among Ukrainian citizens and led to an unprecedented civic engagement, mass protests and movements named “Euromaidan”/“Revolution of Dignity”. Tens of thousands of citizens defended European integration, defending their European aspirations. Apart from supporting European integration course, the protesters demanded the resignation of the Government and early parliamentary and presidential elections, punish those responsible for the use of force by authorities on peaceful protesters.

Despite the suspension of preparations for signing the AA by official Kyiv, European leaders continued naming the day 28th of November as the “deadline” to initial the accord, that Ukraine still had time to reconsider. Ukraine was. In fact, invited to sign the treaty at the summit despite previous declarations. Nonetheless, President Yanukovych proposed the EU to participate in trilateral negotiations Ukraine-Russia-European Union. The EC brought to

18The Summit was attended by President of the European Parliament and representatives of the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership and EuroNest 105 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Vilnius a copy of the AA to have been signed by Kyiv, but Yanukovych was not to sign it, as it was told. Commissioner Štefan Füle expressed himself at the Vilnius Summit that he regretted that Ukraine stopped its European integration (Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2013, 2013):

[…] I regret this decision. […] The European Union will be ready to resume the

preparations for the signature of the Association Agreement as soon as Ukraine is

ready to resume its path towards political association and economic integration with

the European Union for the benefit of its citizens – citizens that have again shown in

these last days that they fully understand and embrace the historic nature of European

association.

The EU had two ways in negotiations with Ukraine after the Summit: first way was to return to the AA in first months on 2014 at the EU-Ukraine summit; or sign of the treaty would be postponed until the next EaP summit in 2015. The European leaders were in favour of continuing negotiations and they hoped that the Revolution of dignity would make the Ukrainian authorities to finally sign the accord.

Two weeks after the Summit, on 12th December 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the results of the Vilnius Summit and the prospective of the Eastern Partnership. The resolution mentions that the Summit had demonstrated the need for EU’s more active role and support the European aspirations of its Eastern Partners. The European Parliament welcomed the initialling of AAs with Moldova and Georgia and considered Ukraine’s decision to withdraw from signing the AA to be “a major missed opportunity in EU-Ukraine relations and for Ukraine’s aspirations” (European Parliament, 2013).

Parliament also condemned Russia’s pressure on Ukraine, Armenia and other Eastern partners to keep them from signing agreements with the EU and it called on the Commission to consider countermeasures if Russia violated the rules of the World Trade Organization, resorting to politically motivated trade sanctions against the EU and its partners.

In case of Euromaidan, the MPs expressed their solidarity with the Ukrainians that were peacefully protesting at that time against the decision of President Yanukovych not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The European Parliament also condemned the “use of 106 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) brutal force against peaceful demonstration” by the police. The MPs called for immediate and unconditional release of arrested protesters and urged Ukraine to send a mediation mission of the highest level.

The question of Ukraine was one of the main issues at the two-hour EU-Russia summit on 28th January 2014 in Brussels. It was agreed to pursue bilateral consultations at expert level on the Eastern Partnership Association Agreements, which had been previously proposed by Ukraine and Russia and denied by the European Parliament in its resolution of December 2013. There was no clash or blame on Ukraine at the summit in spite of statements made at lower level (Gotev, 2014). Moreover, President of Commission Manuel Barroso mentioned a mutual benefit if Eastern European countries sign the AAs with the EU (European Commission, 2014):

I think we need to change the perception that one region’s gain is another region's

pain. We in the European Union are against the mentality of block against block. We

believe the European Union and Russia have all to gain from a cooperative attitude. (p.

Taking into consideration that Ukraine and Armenia19 backed down from signing landmark AAs with the EU, two Foreign Ministers on Sweden and Poland presented their papers on the Eastern neighbourhood to their counterparts. The Swedish Non-paper document, called “20 points on the Eastern Partnership post-Vilnius”, was supported by thirteen EU countries, mainly Central Eastern European and Nordic states, and was discussed by the Council on 10th February 2014, but was not published officially. The document proposes all the EaP countries, apart from signing the AAs, to discuss some sort of “European package” that would be a “station beyond AA/DCFTA”, focusing on more twinning projects, student exchanges, mobility and increased participation in EU community programmes and agencies (Point 7) (Sargsyan, 2014). The document also recommended speeding up internal procedure in order to allow for signature of AAs with Georgia and Moldova as soon as possible (no later than August 2014), and prepare co-ordinative response in case Russia begin pressing the states not to implement the accords (Rettman, 2014). It was also recommended to continue

19 Armenia denied to sign already prepared AA in September 2013, two months before the Vilnius summit, but joined instead the Moscow-led EurAsEc Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhtan 107 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) open dialogue on integration processes in Europe, but, at the meantime, it was underlined that “punitive actions and threats against EaP partner countries are unacceptable” (Point 17). In case of Ukraine, the document mentioned nothing about sanctions, but kept the opinion open of the situation get worse, saying that the EU should: “Continue engagement with Ukraine on a broad political spectrum and adjust the EU policy in light of developments” (Sargsyan, 2014). Belarus was not even mentioned.

The second paper, proposed by Poland, is focused upon EU funding that should be increased mainly for Georgia and Moldova and this extra aid should go on agriculture and rural development, and civil society as one of Poland’s main interests. According to Judy Dempsey (2014), analyst of Carnegie Europe think tank, these two papers are important as they “convey a sense of urgency” calling the European Union to act now, instead of spending much time on carrying out public diplomacy, or shifting around funding for the partner states.

At the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 10th February 2014, the Council remained steady for quick response to any deterioration in Ukraine. At that time, it welcomed steps to deescalate the situation and reiterated its readiness to signing the AA with Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2014a: 7-8).

On 24th-25th April 2014, Prague hosted a mini-EaP summit dedicated to the 5th anniversary of the launch of the Eastern Partnership. The EU was represented by delegates of Austria, Sweden, Baltic and Visegrád states. The EaP Partner States were presented almost all, except for Belarus. At the summit, the officials urged Russia to withdraw its troops from the Ukrainian border, and expressed support for free and fair presidential elections in Ukraine in May 2014.

According to Czech President Miloš Zeman, a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukrainian border would be a peace gesture aimed at de-escalation of the crisis. The delegates also advised Ukraine to speed up process of implementation of the decentralisation of power. In addition, presidents and representatives of four former Soviet republics and six EU countries offered to perform a role of mediator in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia but a prerequisite for this must agree of both sides of the conflict (Deutsche Welle, 2014).

The fourth EaP summit was held on 21st-22nd May 2015 in Riga, Latvia. The Riga summit was highly anticipated event not only for the partner countries but also for the EU as a whole. Never attention of the EU and its individual member countries were so serious drown to 108 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) events in Eastern Europe, primarily to Ukraine. The summit became largely a reflection of all parties to the new realities of internal and foreign policy within the Eastern Partnership. The expectations of the Riga Summit were sometimes higher than the actual willingness and ability the EU. Hence, a feeling of unimplemented opportunities and unreached purposes appeared in the information space. Most participants understood that the summit would not give significant results a few weeks before, and a fight for formulation of new ambitious goals of the Eastern Partnership was between the delegations of EU and the partner countries (Table 9).

Table 9: Eastern Partnership Summits

Date Place Issues on Features representation

7th May 2009 Prague, Czechia Launch of initiative;

Perspective for AA, deeper integration in the EU economy, visa-free regime, financial assistance

29th-30th September 2011 Warsaw, Poland Belarus did Progress of AA not participate negotiations with Moldova;

Deep concerns about imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and democracy deterioration in Belarus

28th-29th November 2013 Vilnius, Lithuania Moldova and Georgia initialled the AA with the EU;

Ukraine and Armenia

109 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

refused to sign the AA (Ukraine had initialled its AA earlier)

21st-22nd May 2015 Riga, Latvia Visa free regime with Ukraine and Georgia was discussed. Accord on financial assistance to Ukraine.

24th November 2017 Brussels

(Europa building)

Source: Author’s own compilation based on

Fernandes, D. S. (2014). Rússia e União Europeia: dos gigantes e um continente. In P. Daehnhardt, & M. R. Freire (Eds.). A Política Externa Russa no Espaço Euro-Atlântico: Dinâmicas e Cooperação e Competição num Espaço Alargado (pp. 199-222). Coimbra; Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, p. 210.

Silva, A. (2017). A Aventura da Moeda Única Europeia: Enredos e Dilemas, Progressos e Desafios, Ensaio de História e de Política. Coimbra; Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, p, 165.

Delcour, L. (2017). The EU and Russia in Their 'Contested Neighbourhood': Multiple External Influences, Policy Transfer and Domestic Change. London and New York: Routledge, p. 83.

Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. (2017). 24/11/2017 – 24/11/2017 Eastern Partnership summit: https://www.eu2017.ee/political-meetings/eastern-partnership-summit Viewed 25.07.2017.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia insisted on inserting a paragraph about recognising of European perspective for these countries in the final declaration. These three states not just signed and began performing the Association Agreement, but they declare directly intention to apply for membership in the future. This political signal could have had a fundamental importance for these states as a recognition of such perspective in a more concrete form, not in a regular reference to Article 49 of the EC Treaty.

The EU acknowledged instead aspirations and ambitions of the Eastern Partnership countries, their sovereign right to choose level of integration in their relations with the EU (European External Action Service, 2015a). Such recognition has two conclusions: Firstly, this is evidence of unwillingness of the EU to speak clearly about the prospect of enlargement to

110 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Eastern Europe. Therefore, a principle of fixing a long-term strategy vision of the EU of relations with its neighbours has neither de facto nor de jure changed today. Secondly, this requirement becomes a clear message to Russia that uses its policies and pressure to infringe on the sovereign right of each member of the Eastern Partnership to choose their relations with the EU and the ultimate goal of such relations.

Despite the obvious and understandable need for transformation of the Eastern Partnership in a more ambitious political programme, the EU is still not ready to make such a move. Moreover, the Joint Declaration of the summit stressed that the main priority of the European Union and its partners in the coming years will be implementation of the Association Agreements as the main mechanism for the development of democracy and modernisation.

Other negative aspect of the summit could be special stance of Armenia and Belarus – they refused to endorse the text of the Joint Declaration with words about the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the adopted text of the Declaration became an example of diplomatic tricks (Deutsche Welle, 2015). In the third paragraph, the countries were deeply concerned about not the annexation of Crimea, but the “actions against Ukraine” that “cannot be taken granted in the 21st century”." In the fourth paragraph, the participants confirmed their position by March 2014 approved the first UN General Assembly resolution, which condemned Russia’s actions and did not recognise referendum of the peninsula as legal. Neither Belarus nor Armenia supported that resolution. The EU confirmed its earlier voiced position “on the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol” (European External Action Service, 2015: 2).

The next, fifth summit is scheduled for 2017 and will be held in special circumstances. This will be the year of the French presidential elections, parliamentary elections in Germany and referendum about possible exit of Scotland from the UK and Catalonia from Spain. It seems that only optimists can look forward to a new rapprochement of the EU with its eastern neighbours.

111 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

II.1.1. Bilateral Framework of the Eastern Partnership.

The bilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership has three long-term objectives:

Political Association and Economic Integration. The first area focuses upon signing Association Agreements (AA) between the EU and the Partner States, which replace the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA), signed with the Eastern European countries (except for Belarus) in the mid-nineties. The AA include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) that aim not only to liberalisation of trade by removing customs barriers, but also on the harmonisation of trade laws of the Partner Countries with the EU standards and acquis communautaire. The membership in the World Trade Organisation is a precondition to the DCFTA negotiations (Belarus and Azerbaijan are not members of the WTO) (Table 10).

Table 10: Eastern Partnership Association Agreements, including DCFTAs

Country Negotiations Initialling Signature Application Ratification EP consent

Belarus

Republic February 29th 27th June 01st 18th July 13th of 2012 – November 2014 September 2014 November 2013 2014 2014 Moldova June 2013

Georgia February 29th 27th June 01st 18th July 18th 2012 – November 2014 September 2014 December 2013 2014 2014 July 2013

Azerbaijan Requires WTO membership

Ukraine 18th 19th July 21st March Partially 11th July 16th February 2012 2014 01st January 2017 September 2008 – 2016, fully 2014 27th June 01st January 19th October

112 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

2011 201420 2017

Armenia February 2012 –

24th July 2013

Source: Author’s own compilation

The second goal of the EaP bilateral track is Increased Mobility of Citizens. Within Eastern Partnership, the EU offered the six Partner States visa-free travel as a long-term goal. On 1st January 2008, entered into force Readmission Treaty and Visa Facilitation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, had had been signed in 2006 and 2007 respectively, which was the first step towards this goal. At the Paris EU-Ukraine Summit on 9th September 2008, the parties agreed “to launch a visa dialogue, developing the relevant conditions, with the long- term perspective of establishing a visa free regime between the EU and Ukraine”. The EU- Ukraine visa dialogue was opened on 29th October 2008. Before the Treaties, Ukraine had cancelled the visa obligation for the EU citizens since 1st May 2005 (International Organization for Migration, 2015). At the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit on 7th May 2009, the EU reaffirmed its long-term goal of a full visa liberalisation for individual Partner States on a case-by-case basis only if there are all necessary conditions for well-managed and secure mobility. The next EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv of 4th December 2009 made a revision of a process and decided to move to “a structured visa dialogue focused on sequenced priorities of action and recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities”. The parties agreed to enter into a fully operational phase of the visa dialogue on the base of an Action Plan at the EU-Ukraine JLS Ministeral Meeting of 9th June 2010. Ukraine was promised a visa roadmap, which was modelled after the Western Balkan roadmaps but the name was changed into “Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP)” and was presented to Ukraine on 22nd November 2010 (European Commission, 2010a). In case of Moldova, the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched on 15th June 2010 and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan was presented in January 2011. The VLAP include four blocks of benchmarks: a) Document security, including biometrics; b) Illegal immigration, including readmission; c)

20 The political part of the agreement was signed on 21st March by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk, the economic part was signed on 27th June by President Petro Poroshenko 113 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Public order and security; d) External relations and fundamental rights (International Organization for Migration, 2015). The implementation of Action Plans is monitored by the European Commission through regular publicly accessible Progress Reports, which are transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council.

The third objective is Enhanced Sectorial Co-operation between the EU and Partner Countries. In order to increase the co-operation, the EU established informal Eastern Partnership dialogue and encourages the Partner States to participate in EU programmes and agencies. In February 2012, the European Commission unified approaches to participation of 13 Partners within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in the “open” and “partially open” EU programmes and developed a mechanism for co-financing costs (50% of total contribution). In the framework of the 2014-2020 EU budget, European Commission modified the list of programmes and the conditions for participation of the EaP countries in accordance with the priorities of the EU.

The main vectors of the co-operation are energy, transport infrastructure, environmental protection, justice, security. Energy and energy safety were not mentioned in the preliminary idea the Eastern Partnership in 2008. However, the unthinkable Russian-Georgian war in summer 2008 and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute (Russian stopped supplying gas to Ukraine and the EU) made Brussels to reconsider the initiative. Nowadays, the energy sector is one of the most important in negotiations with Eastern European states. Ukraine is a key gas and oil transit country from East to the EU that is declared in the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in the field of Energy between Ukraine and the European Union on 1st December 2005 (Verkhovra Rada of Ukraine, 2005) and Joint EU-Ukraine International Investment Conference on 23rd 2009 (European External Action Service; 2009: 3). The other Eastern European states play role in transit energy resources: Moldova transport gas to South East Europe; Belarus is a transit country of oil (Druzhba pipeline) and gas (Yamal-Europe pipeline). Ukraine and Moldova are members of the Energy Community since 2010, which aims at establishing an energy market in Europe by extending the EU energy acquis to the Non-Member States.

Reforms in transport sphere have a great deal of problems to fix. Its main objective is to approximate the transport infrastructure of the Partner States to the EU standards, e.g. transport safety, social protection of passengers. The EU also launched in 2012 Twinning project “Development and coordination of combined transport and logistic processes in 114 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Ukraine” (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2012) and European Partnership Transport Panel on 23rd September 2011, whose goal is “to strengthen transport connections both between the partner countries and the EU and between partner countries themselves. It addresses reforms underpinning regulatory convergence across transport modes” (European Commission; 2015c). The EU concluded air service agreements in aviation sector with Moldova and Ukraine. Notwithstanding, reforms in maritime sphere are questionable as the flag of Moldova remains on the black list of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control21 (European External Action Service, 2012: 8).

In the sphere of justice, freedom and security the bilateral relations evaluate moderately: Ukraine and the EU signed in June 2007 a Revised EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice (European External Action Service, 2007); Moldova and the EU signed in May 2008 a Mobility Partnership (European Commission, 2008b). These accords assist to improve the regional co-operation within Eastern Partnership in order to regulate border issues that may emerge in the work of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM22) from 2005.

In the sphere of Regional Development, Agriculture and Rural Development, the European Union and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding for establishing of a Dialogue on Regional Policy and development of cooperation between the Ministry of regional development and construction of Ukraine and the European Commission on 22nd July 2009 (Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, 2015), (European Commission, 2009a: 1). The Dialogue aimed to resolve such issues as disproportion in development of regions, urbanisation, and territory recovery from industrial decline and nature disasters as flood or climate change impact. In 2012, commission launched a European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) to strengthen the co- operation in the area of agriculture with Partner States (European External Action Service, 2012: 10).

21 Ukraine moved from the “Black List” to the “Grey List” in 2012

22 EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was launched on 30th November 2005 by the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine aiming at controlling the traffic on borders between Ukraine and Moldova, and helping to resolute the Transnistrian conflict. The budget of the Mission is €21 million (2011- 2013) and the current mandate is expiring on 30th November 2015. 115 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

II.1.2. Multilateral Framework

Multilateral framework is an innovative element of the co-operation between the EU and EaP Partner States and focuses upon enhancing and strengthening the bilateral dimension of Eastern Partnership. It creates a forum where the EaP countries can exchange information, knowledge and experience in a process of reforms and modernisation. The framework is also perceived as an instrument in the European integration for some EaP countries. The multilateral track plays a greater role in Eastern Partnership comparing to the European neighbourhood Policy. According to the EC Communication about Eastern Partnership in 2008, the Commission proposed to organise four levels of the multilateral EaP framework: Meetings of EaP Heads of State or Government; annual spring meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; thematic platforms, and panels to support thematic platforms (European External Action Service, 2008c: 9).

On the Political level, the EaP parties established Summits of Heads of States and Governments that are held every two years. The first EaP Summit was held in Prague (Czech Republic) on 7th May 2009. The second Summit was in Warsaw (Poland) on 29th-30th September 2011. The third Summit was in Vilnius (Lithuania) on 28th-29th November 2013. The fourth summit will be held in Riga (Latvia) in May 2015. As we can see, all the Summit were held in Central Eastern EU Member States as have a common border with EaP Partner States and are interested in developing the region and joining the EU.

The multilateral frameworks also foresees Meetings of foreign ministers of the EU and the Eastern Partners that are usually held once a year in Brussels. The first ministerial meeting of the Eastern Partnership was held on 8th December 2009, the second – 13th December 2010, the third – 23th July 2012, and the fourth – on 22nd July 2013. The last Meeting was held in Brussels on 22nd July 2014 (Government Portal, 2014a). The meetings are devoted to assessing the progress and the prospects of further development of Eastern Partnership and endorse the main objectives and the work programmes of the multilateral thematic platforms.

On the Technical Level, there were created Thematic Platforms aiming to change useful data on a path towards reforms and to establish connection between experts of the Partner Countries and EU Member States. There are four Thematic Platforms:

a) Platform 1 - Democracy, good governance and stability. The platform studies issues of democracy, human rights, justice, freedom, security and stability; 116 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

b) Platform 2 – Economic integration and convergence with EU policies – commercial and regulatory approximation to the EU, social economic development, environment, climate changes; c) Platform 3 – Energy security – support in infrastructure development, harmonisation of energy policy, diversification of energy supply; d) Platform 4 – Contacts between people – education, science and culture issues; media and information society.

Each platform has a list of updated objectives according to its programme. European Commission elaborates agenda of the meetings of platforms in close co-operation with Presidency of the Council and Partner States. The Commission also presides the meetings (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Multilateral Framework of the Eastern Partnership

FIRST LEVEL

Summits of Heads of States and Governments,

every two years

SECOND LEVEL

Meetings of foreign ministers of the EU and the Eastern Partners, once a year in Brussels

THIRD LEVEL

4 Thematic Platforms: Democracy, good governance and stability Economic integration and convergence with EU policies Energy security Contacts between people

117 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

FOURTH LEVEL

Committees on assistance to Thematic Platforms

Source: European External Action Service. (2008a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Eastern Partnership Brussels, 3.12.2008 COM(2008) 823 final

The meetings of every Multilateral Platforms are held at least twice a year at the senior official level engaged in the reform work in the relevant policy area (Peters & Gromadzki, 2009: 11). The results of the functioning of the Platforms are reported to the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EaP. In some situations, the work of the platforms may be promoted through sector specific Ministerial meetings. Each platform can establish panels in order to support its work in specific area (European External Action Service, 2015b). Two platforms took advantage of this opportunity. Platform 1 (Democracy, Good Governance and Stability) has three groups of experts (panels): Panel on Integrated Border Management (IBM); Panel on Fight Against Corruption and Panel on Administrative Reform. The Platform 2 on Economic Integration and Governance with EU Polices established Panel on Small and Business Enterprise (SME), Panel on Trade and Trade Related Regulatory Approximation, linked to DCFTAs (Trade panel) and Panel on Environment and Climate Change (European External Action Service, 2015c).

Moreover, the European Union created a number of Flagship Initiatives that “give additional momentum, concrete substance and more visibility to the Partnership” (European External Action Service, 2015d). The Platform 1 supervises the implementation of two flagship initiatives – “Integrated Border Management Programme” and “Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters”. The Platform 2 supervises “Small and Medium-size Enterprise (SME) Flagship Initiative”. The Platform 3 (Energy security) deals with two initiatives – “Regional Electricity Markets, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sources Flagship Initiative” and “Environmental Governance Flagship Initiative”.

On the level of Participation, the parties launched the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly as a parliamentary component of the EaP. This platform of parliamentary level aims to exchange

118 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) and share of experience in legislative branch of power. The Assembly began its work in 201123. The idea to establish the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly was first presented in the European Parliament Resolution on 15th November 2007, where it proposed to create such an assembly following the example of other multilateral parliamentary assemblies with the participation the European Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Committee for European Integration, 2011: 1).

The Assembly contains 50 representatives from 5 EaP Partner States and 50 deputies from the European Parliament. The Assembly established four permanent Committees – Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy, on Economic Integration, Legal Approximation and Convergence with EU Policies, on Energy Security, and on Social Affairs, Education, Culture and Civil Society with a maximum of 30 members (Euronest, 2013: 1).

On the level of Local Government, regional aspect of the Partnership, the EU Committee of the Regions established a Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) in 2011. The Conference seeks to engage regional and local governments to participate in EaP programmes and develop local self-government in the Partner States. CORLEAP consists of 36 regional and local politicians: 18 from the 6 EaP partner countries and 18 from the Committee of the Regions (The EU’s Assembly of Regional and Local Representatives, 2014). There were four CORLEAP meetings since 2011, where the delegates identified the priorities for co-operation: on its last meeting in 2014 in Tbilisi, the Conference confirmed its firm place on the political map of Eastern Partnership. Today CORLEAP focuses upon supporting the process of decentralisation, regionalisation and territorial co-operation in the Partner countries.

On the level of Civil Society, Civil Society Forum (CSF) was founded in 2009. In Joint Declaration of Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, the participants endorsed the idea of establishing Forum and invited the European Commission “to develop and propose modalities for establishment of a Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership” (European Council, 2009: 10). The idea to establish the CSF was indicated in the EC Communication on the

23 The EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly had to be launched in 2009, but only began to work in 2011 because of debates between the European Parliament and civil society about membership of Belarus. The 2010 Presidential election in Belarus was called “flawed” by OSCE and the European Parliament decided not to include the representatives from Belarus to the EuroNest Assembly but continue consultations with Belarusian civil society 119 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Eastern Partnership in December 2008 (European Commission, 2008: 13-14) and the CSF concept was drafted the same month (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2008). The first Civil Society Forum was held in November 2009 and gathered more than 200 representatives from the EU Member States and Eastern Partner countries. Since then, the EaP CSF holds the General Assembly every year. The CSF aims to strengthen civil society in EaP Partner States with assistance of thoughts and experience exchange and recommendations on a level of Thematic Platforms and Meetings of ministers. On the national level, the main goal of the CSF is to strengthen the diversity of public discourse and policy making by promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. There are five Working Groups with the Forum that follow directions of the Thematic Platforms. The management of the CSF is provided by Steering Committee. On a national level, the Forum is presented by National Platforms in all six EaP countries.

II.2. Positions of EU Members and Partner States concerning Eastern Partnership: іn Varietate Concordia?

“If we are to be good neighbours, we must offer our partners

the chance to move closer to the EU in political and economic terms24.”

Angela Dorothea Merkel, incumbent Federal Chancellor of

the Federal Republic of Germany

After Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the processes of convergence and institutionalisation of foreign policy of the European Union has enhanced. It made the EU foreign policy more unified that has always been the weakest element of the EU’s integration project. The foreign policy of the EU is not united nowadays though. Today’s process of foreign policy construction is co-ordination of foreign policy strategies and positions of all EU Member States. Therefore, the evolution of the Eastern Partnership initiative depends entirely upon interests and objectives of the EU countries.

24 The Federal Government. (2017). The Eastern Partnership is more important than ever: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/05_en/2015-05-21-regierungserklaerung_en.html Viewed 18.08.2017. 120 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Poland, as an initiator of the Eastern Partnership project, entirely supported the implementation and further evolution of Eastern Partnership. Warsaw has been always emphasising the necessity to intensify efforts to strengthen relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours since the launch of the European neighbourhood Policy in 2003, and is advocating and “Open Door Policy” of the European Union to the Eastern European countries. Moreover, although the EU dialogue and co-operation with Russia is highly important, Poland considers that this should not lead to the perception and evaluation of the EU initiatives towards Eastern Europe through the Russia’s position (Rada Ministrów, 2012: 42).

After joining the EU Poland is actively involved in various activities, aimed to develop the EU’s Eastern policy. Warsaw collaborates closely with other Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to strengthen the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Visegrád Group, 2008). These problems often became the subject of much consultation with the Baltic countries. Poland aims to revise and improvement the ENP that it will takes into account the expectations of the Eastern European countries as well as to convince the “old” EU members to develop closer relationships with the latter. In 2006-2007, the Polish government institutions in Brussels prepared the following documents: “The European Neighbourhood Policy – Eastern Dimension” and “The EU – Ukraine Relations: Polish proposals”, which emphasised that the format of the European Neighborhood Policy is unsatisfactory because it combines different states of historical, geographical and civilisation ways of regions (Eastern Europe and North Africa). While EU eastern neighbours are European neighbours, European countries, the neighbours on the South are not European ones. Moreover, Poland required balancing in funding the Eastern and Southern areas of the ENP. In April 2008 the Polish Sejm Speaker B. Komorowski criticized the fact that 70% of funds for Neighbourhood come to the South (Tyshchenko, 2014). After the launch of the initiative, Poland focused on campaigning for support the Eastern Partnership initiative in the EU structures and Member States (Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2009). Polish politicians and government officials held intensive consultations with the European Commission aimed at incorporating proposals contained in the project of the Eastern Partnership, the European Commission’s forthcoming Communication on this issue. Poland also sought to create a “front” of countries that would support Eastern Partnership. In November 2008 in Warsaw, a meeting of the Visegrád Group took place where Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden also participated. The participants were in favour of 121 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the EU to offer its Eastern neighbours new forms of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership in order to help them get closer to EU norms and standards, to create a free trade zone and start the process to facilitate the movement of citizens, which in the long term will “abolish” the visa regime (Visegrád Group, 2008). Poland conducted also intensive consultation with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other Member States at different levels. Poland, like the other EU Member States who support enlargement eastwards, sees the Eastern Partnership as a pragmatic response to the enlargement fatigue. From Polish point of view, if the initiative directly discussed the possibility of the EU enlargement, it would not have any chance of being approved by all its Member States. In addition, the current format of the Eastern Partnership countries can help the recipients actually become closer to the EU and to prepare them for eventual full membership in the future. The Association Agreements, the introduction of free trade area and visa liberalisation will play an important role in this process. It seems that Poland, as the largest border country in the Eastern part of the EU, should naturally become the representative of EU’s eastern policy. Particular stress has been put on the relations with Ukraine, which is a new neighbour for the EU, but a traditional partner for Poland, collaborating in responsible for shaping EU’s relations with its other eastern partners, e.g. Russia and Belarus, which is sometimes hard (Adamczyk, 2010: 203). The partners of Poland within the European Union, which share Warsaw’s vision on EU’s Eastern policy, may be classified into three groups. The first group is “Like-Minded States”, countries that support Polish project of Eastern Partnership and are in favour of its enhanced development. The second category contains pivotal EU countries that are able to influence on positions of other Member States or alter them and can considerably modify the equilibrium in Council of the European Union. These states are Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The third group is composed by reticent or neural to the Eastern Partnership project countries (Table 11).

122 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 11: EU Member States on Eastern Partnership

Group of countries Like-Minded States EU pivotal states Neutral

Positions in favour of EaP able to influence on No clear development positions of other interests in Member States and Eastern the Council Partnership

Countries Poland, Sweden, Germany, France, Other EU Czechia, Slovakia, UK members Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria

Source: Author’s own compilation

The Like-Minded States are Sweden, Visegrád Group countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Baltic states.

Sweden is considered one of the biggest supporters of EU’s Eastern dimension. The Polish- Swedish proposal for Eastern partnership became an impetus in the evolution of the European neighbourhood Policy. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt together with his Polish homologous Radosław Sikorski are known as the founding fathers of the Eastern Partnership as they initiated the Eastern policy project in form of “soft power” response to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Stockholm sees the initiative as a possibility to stimulate economic and democratic changes in Eastern Europe. According to B. Wojna (2009: 52), Sweden recognises the Eastern European states as potential EU Member States, and the European Neighbourhood Policy as a next stage towards possible future accession to the EU. Sweden joined the Poland’s concept in 2008 because of two main reasons: firstly, Stockholm, as well as Warsaw, had the same vision of relations between the EU and Eastern Europe and have tied historic relations with EaP partners. Secondly, the Swedish support in presentation of the proposal caused better chance for the initiative to be perceived and succeed. During the

123 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union on the second half of 2009, Stockholm made the relations with Eastern neighbourhood as one of the priorities of foreign relations, including deepening co-operation and practical realisation of the Eastern Partnership (Langdal & von Sydow, 2009: 13). In the report of the Presidency, it was admitted a progress in some areas of the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, mainly in the sphere of negotiations concerning Association Agreements and deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with EaP Partner States (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009b: 36). At the meeting between the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Kingdom of Sweden Stefan Löfven on 11th March 2005, President Poroshenko named Sweden “the most powerful Ukraine’s advocate in the European Union” as Stockholm supports Kyiv’s eurointegration aspirations (Polianska, 2015). Moreover, Sweden understands the key importance of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries for security and stability in the region and continent (Perebyinis, 2009: 5).

The countries of Visegrád Group (V4) are the most motivated supporters of the idea of deep co-operation and integration of EaP Partner States with the European Union within the Eastern Partnership. Taking into consideration moderate influence in foreign policy, the countries try to co-ordinate their positions within V4 and on EaP. These countries are interested in establishing and enhancing economic relations, people-to-people contacts and strengthening security on the eastern border of the EU. The position of the Central Eastern European countries on EU-Eastern Europe relations is also caused by interests in increasing its influence on European policy-making. The policy and principles of the countries within the Visegrád Group towards the EaP are co-ordinated and mentioned in official documents. V4 declared their support for the EaP, offering their help, expertise and experience in socio- economic and political reforms, at the meeting of V4 Foreign Ministers on 2nd March 2010 in Budapest (Visegrád Group, 2010). At the next summit, 3rd March 2011 in Bratislava, V4 and Germany made a statement where the parties expressed readiness to share experience on reforms with Eastern partners and reiterated that “a strong long-term relationship between partners and the EU could only be built only on the basis of full respect for human rights, democratic standards, and the rule of law in the Eastern Partnership countries” (Visegrád Group, 2011). The other not less important frameworks of co-operation of V4 on Eastern Partnership are: implementation of the principles of differentiation and “more for more” (more EU assistance for countries that are ready to go further and faster in fulfilment of their commitments); negotiations on the AA and DCFTA; visa regime facilitation. The V4 added 124 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) value to the evolution of projects and initiatives on bilateral and multilateral levels within the Eastern Partnership. The countries call for adequate financing of the EaP as they completely understand the problems of Eastern collaborates because of common unfortunate socialist past and a long way of adaptation to aquis. The Partner states are short in funds to fulfill all the objectives and need financial assistance from the side of the EU. Each V4 country has its own policy on Eastern Partnership.

The Czech Republic joined the formation and implementation of the Eastern Partnership since Poland and Sweden proposed the initiative in 2008. Nonetheless, Prague had elaborated its own initiative on Eastern dimension. When Czechs started preparing for the 2009 EU Presidency in 2006, they made consultations with partners within the V4 and other like- minded countries on the enhanced initiative eastwards of the ENP and prepared a non-paper in 2007. The main goal of the proposal was to develop a multinational initiative through a flexible framework of co-operation in addition to the existing mainly bilateral framework through the Action Plans. Unfortunately, the initiative was not concrete and elaborated enough to be supported by other EU Member States, comparing to the Polish-Swedish proposal on 2008. The main difference between the two initiatives was that the Czech proposal was less institutionalised and more flexible; the other one was more formal and similar to the emerging EU initiative – the Union for the Mediterranean. The Eastern Partnership was one of the top priorities of the Czech Presidency in 2009. Moreover, the Government was obliged to include it to the tops because of two main reasons: firstly, the geographical position, history and the previous work of the V4 countries in this area. Secondly, the Russian intervention in Georgian in August 2008 turned as a strong motive for the EU to bring its Eastern neighbours to its orbit (Král, 2011: 11). During the preparation of the inaugural EaP Summit in the spring 2009, Prague had more challenges: Russian- Ukrainian gas war in January 2009, which seriously affected some of the EU Member States. By cutting the gas supply, Moscow attempted to undermine the festive launch of the EaP and the credibility of Ukraine as a neighbour and future partner state within the Eastern Partnership. The other issue on the way of launching the initiative was that some countries were not in favour of the initiative. They considered the EaP as anti-Russian project that would re-distribute ENP funds more for Eastern Europe and turn into a part of the enlargement process. The Czech Republic is clearly in favour of the Eastern Partnership as a platform for upgrading the relations between the EU and Eastern European states. The officials of the Czech Foreign Office see the EaP as “a waiting room for the countries to gain 125 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) a candidate status and become a part of the enlargement process” (Král, 2011: 16). Nowadays, energy security is the main priority for Prague in the area of the EaP as it is highly dependent upon oil and gas from the region. The long-term goal of the Czech diplomacy within the initiative is democratisation of the region through European assistance in bi- and multilateral frameworks. From the Czech point of view, the Eastern Partnership can counterbalance the Russian influence on the region.

Slovakia also supports the Eastern Partnership as prioritises the relations with Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Nonetheless, the territory of Slovakia is located on the path of energy supply to the European Union, which make Russia the most important country in Eastern Europe. The EaP corresponds to the priority interests of Bratislava and maintains the internal cohesiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Slovakian Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš statedvEastern Partnership was “a very good preparation to future unification of all parts of Europe in one European project” (Marušiak, 2009: 147). During the visit to Moldova in 2008, the Slovak vice-president Dušan Čaplovič mentioned that Slovakia “regrets that in this phase it was not able to push through the perspective of membership into the initiative” (Visegrad. Info, 2010). Slovakia supports reforms in partner states and is interested in enlarging of a free trade are in Europe and facilitating visa regime with EaP countries. As well as Czech authorities, Slovakia does not treat the initiative as anti-Russian, but focuses upon the stability and security issues in Eastern Europe. Despite Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico publicly blaming Ukraine for gas crisis in 2009, it continues to be one of the Slovak priorities within the EaP. Bratislava is pleased that Belarus also takes part in the initiative, as thanks to the enhanced co-operation between the Belarus and the EU, the latter is able to influence the democratisation and economic development there.

Relations with Eastern partners in the framework of Eastern Dimension play key role in Hungary’s foreign policy. Having outer EU border (with Ukraine), Hungary is interested in having prosperous and peaceful relations with EaP countries. Official Bucharest tries to stay in background in tough issues concerning EU-Russian relations, e.g. Russian invasions and annexations of the neighbour countries’ territories. In spite of supporting the development and realisation of the Eastern Partnership, the practical contribution of Hungary is minimal. There are several areas of the programme where Hungary has special interests. One of the interests is an issue of Hungarian minorities abroad. The question caused problems in bilateral relations between Hungary and its neighbours where exist Hungarian minorities (Romania,

126 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Slovakia and Ukraine). The second issue of special interest is energy security – a dependency of Hungary on Russian gas supplies. Budapest stresses the importance of having alternative sources of gas and alternative transit lines. At the EaP Prague summit in 2009, the Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai mentioned that “the Partnership is especially important for Hungary and the EU because it improves energy security” (Rácz, 2010: 23). The Hungary’s priorities within the EaP is clearly Eastern European countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) that come from geographic position. The countries of South Caucasus are geographically farther and there are practically no historical and cultural ties, and political and economic relations are limited. During the 2009/2010 presidency in the Visegrád Group, Hungary gave strong priority to the implementation of EaP supporting political and socio-economic reforms of the EaP Partner States that aim to facilitate the approximation to the EU. Budapest also paid especial attention to the negotiations on AA with Ukraine and Moldova and the V4 contribution to the visa facilitation process (Visegrad Group, 2009). In the programme of the 2013-2014 presidency, Hungary stressed wishing to enhance V4 co-operation with the EaP partners and broaden V4+EaP co-operation formats. The Hungarian authorities had a goal of completing the AAs and DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, and signing the accords with Ukraine at the EaP Summit in November 2013 (which unfortunately was not done) (Visegrad Group, 2013: 9-10). According to the programme of Hungarian presidency in the Council of the European Union (in the first half of 2011), Budapest continued playing complementary and supportive role in the development of the Eastern Partnership. The Hungarian authorities planned to host the second EaP summit in May 2011 in the city of Gödöllő (Hungarian Presidency on the Council of the European Union, 2011a). Nonetheless, after consultations with the Permanent President of the European Council, on 17th February 2011 Budapest proposed Poland, the upcoming Presidency, to hold the summit in the second half of 2011 (Hungarian Presidency, 2011b).

Baltic States. Lithuania shows great interest in the shaping of the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours by unequivocally supporting the European Neighbourhood Policy, namely the Eastern Partnership initiative. Lithuania is against treating the ENP as an alternative to membership and is pushing for an “open door” policy. Lithuania, together with Poland, convinced the European Council at the December 2007 meeting to add to the Conclusions a point about the need for development of multilateral dimension of co-operation between the EU and its Eastern European partners (Sydoruk, 2010: 72).

127 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Official Vilnius supported the Polish-Swedish initiative concerning Eastern Partnership because the initiative aims to increase the significance of the Eastern dimension of the ENP. Lithuania also signed (together with the Visegrád countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and Sweden) the Warsaw Joint Statement (Visegrad Group, 2008) on 24th November 2008 calling for the EU to offer the Eastern European partners new forms (dimensions) of co- operation with the Eastern Partnership initiative in order to bring them closer to the European standards and norms, establishing visa-free regimes, free trade areas in a long-term goal (Point 8). Moreover, the signatories of the Statement supported the idea of creating effective framework of institutional co-operation mechanisms including possibly a Special Co- ordinator of Eastern Partnership, foreign and sector-oriented ministerial meetings (Point 9).

Lithuania supported the proposal of including association agreements, facilitating the movement of people and strengthening of co-operation in energy security. Lithuania sees the need for balancing the Southern dimension and the Eastern dimension of the ENP aiming to build a predictable and stable vicinity.

Lithuania put the greatest efforts to the development of the Eastern Partnership during its Presidency of the Council of the second part of 2013. The third summit of the EaP on 28th- 29th November 2013 in Vilnius achieved the highest political attention to this policy organising the Eastern Partnership Business Forum, Civil Society Conference and Eastern Youth Forum. Other positive moments of the summit were initialling the EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova Association Agreements, including DCFTA, signing the EU-Azerbaijan Visa Facilitation Agreements. Unfortunately, despite the EU was ready to sign the AA, it was not signed with Ukraine (Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2013, 2014: 9).

The President of Ukraine Poroshenko named Sweden the strongest advocate of Ukraine in the EU. According to Hennadiy Druzenko, expert in international relations, there is no doubt the Lithuania is the closest friend and partner of Ukraine in the European Union (Polianska, 2015).

Latvia is interested in building a prosperous and secure Europe, therefore, Latvia supports the development of the ENP and the EaP stressing the economic and political stability of the Eastern neighbours. Ever since the launching of the Eastern Partnership, it has been a priority in Latvia’s foreign policy. Latvia continues providing strong support for the implementation

128 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) of the Association Agreements of the Eastern partners and visa liberalisation processes, thereby bringing the Partner States closer to the European Union (Wojna, 2009: 36).

Eastern Europe is one of the most important areas for Estonian foreign policy being among the first supporter of the Eastern Partnership initiative. Estonia keeps well-developed relations with ENP Partner States, considering this initiative as a stage for EU membership. According to Foreign Minister Paet:

the objective of Estonia’s foreign policy is to avoid the emergence of divisions in

Europe. Therefore, we are dedicated to assisting the EU’s eastern neighbours –

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – in their political and

economic integration with the European Union. This includes providing support for

the concluding of association agreements with Eastern Partners as well as the creation

of a comprehensive free trade area and the establishing of visa freedom (Tulmets,

2014: 173).

Despite being relatively small country, Estonia has big experience learned from the process of reforming both the economy and political system. In addition, the country smoothly co- operates with the EaP Partners, mainly through the Estonia Center of Eastern Partnership25, and having bilateral agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

It is also worth noticing than Estonia participates in modernisation processes that take place in states embroiled in conflicts. After the Russian invasion into Georgia in 2008, Estonia put in its National Security Concept that the Russian imperialism is a danger to the state’s safety (Popławski, 2012).

Pivotal countries

The positions of three pivotal EU countries, France, the EU and Germany, are vastly important for the development of the initiative of Eastern Partnership. Their political and

25 Estonia Center of Eastern Partnership (ECEAP), founded in January 2011 in Tallinn, is a training centre and a think tank dedicated to developing relations with the EaP countries as well as contributing towards achieving EU’s Eastern Partnership policy goals. The Center is financed by the Estonian Foreign Ministry’s Development Cooperation’s Fund and supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and the European Commission (Šišková, 2014: 160) 129 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) economic power has been influencing the policy-making process within the block. If London and Berlin are traditionally pro-East, Paris is more pro-South because of its geographic position and absence of strategic interests in Eastern Europe. According to Estonian political analyst Ahto Lobjakas (2008),

De source diplomatique, on assure que les grands Etats membres de l’UE, souvent

opposés aux "nouveaux" Etats plus petits sur les questions liées à l’espace ex-

soviétique, soutiennent le Partenariat oriental. La France, qui présidera l’Union à partir

de juillet, est motivée par le besoin de convaincre les Etats membres de l’Est de la

valeur de sa stratégie méditerranée. L’Allemagne s’intéresse traditionnellement de

près à la politique orientale de l’UE, tandis que la Grande-Bretagne a toujours été l’un

des plus fervents partisans de la poursuite de l’élargissement.

Amongst these three states, Germany is more involved in evolution of the Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood Policy. Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Western Balkans remain traditional sphere of influence of Berlin that became a determinate role in formation of the EaP. Germany sees Eastern Partnership as instrument to enhance economic co-operation, e.g. Germany has become the Ukraine’s second largest trade partner (after Russia), donor of bilateral aid (after the US) and direct investor (after Cyprus). According to the German authorities, the Eastern partnership should not be considered as an instrument of the EU pre- accession, as it was treated by some EaP partners and EU Member States one of the key positions against EaP as enlargement instrument is “lack of controllability” and alteration of balance in the EU after joining relatively big large countries with big population (as Ukraine or Turkey). It can be seen on German proposals in the initiative period of the EaP: Germany insisted on using a term “Eastern European Partners” instead of “European Partners” in the Joint Declaration of the inaugural Prague Eastern Partnership Summit so that these states do not use Art. 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, Germany supported the names of new treaties concerning deepening bilateral relations with the Partner States – Association Agreements, in order to avoid connotations with “Europe Agreements”, adopted for the Central Eastern European countries in 1990s that are already members of the EU. Besides, Berlin stands against usage of terms “strategic” or “integration process” in official documents

130 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) in case of implementing necessary part of the acquis (Snihyr, Hutsal, Mitriaieva and Lendiel, 2011: 19).

The Federal Republic of Germany supports visa regime liberalisation with Eastern Partners and helps implement AAs on the bilateral level of the EaP. From Germany’s standpoint, these accords will provide to extend the EU legal framework not only in economic area, but also in transportation, internal security energy sector, interest areas for Germany. According to Gotkowska (2010: 4), Germany is not actively involved in multilateral dimension as the multilateral projects are not as significant as bilateral co-operation. Furthermore, the multilateral collaboration does not include relations with Russia, which is important partner in the East. The development the EaP is not the prime objective of the German foreign policy, but its significance is growing. Germany is involved in overcoming the economic crisis in the EU and now Russian hybrid wars with EaP countries become obstacles for developing the Eastern Partnership. There are three main objectives of Germany in EaP space: stable energy supply, enhanced economic relations and implementation of security and stability in the region. Germany is guided by the Russia first principle and states that the EaP must not jeopardise relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, Germany proposes to enhance co-operation with the EaP countries with further joining the EU, it could cause tough relations with Russia, which did not lose its imperial identity and sees Eastern Europe as its area of interests. If Berlin accepts the Moscow’s position for sake of strategic partnership, it may lead to serious discordance within the EU.

The problems of inner development of the European Union is the other factor that influences the Berlin’s policy towards Eastern Policy. The fifth EU enlargement in 2004 and then the 2007 enlargement increased diversity of the Member States from social-economic, political and cultural points of view. The problems in the EU because of lack of coherence are seen in the common foreign policy, where most of the states try to use the European Union to reach their own goals, instead of prioritise common objectives.

France, as most of the European partners, has its own vision on the European Neighbourhood Policy. The foreign policy of Paris is focused on Mediterranean region rather than Eastern Europe, which was expressed by the President Sarkozy’s initiative to establish the Union of the Mediterranean in 2008. Taking into consideration historical and cultural ties with North African states, France has been strengthening its position on the continent. That is why, Paris was not very interested in Polish-Swedish initiative. France, nevertheless, “was made aware 131 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) of the fact that Poland was willing to support the strengthened Mediterranean partnership only under the condition that a similar initiative could be designed for the Eastern neighbourhood” (Lefter, 2012). France was opposed to the idea to approximate the EaP partners to the EU membership and was against increasing funds for the initiative. In March 2009, Poland insisted on the EaP funding of about 600 million euro for 5 years (2009-2013), as it was proposed by the Commission. “We have already seen how fragile is this region during the Georgian crisis, gas crisis and economic crisis”, mentioned Polish Foreign Minister R. Sikorski (Unian, 2009). France stood against fixed amount of the funding for the EaP and it would diminish the financing of the programmes for the Mediterranean partners. In general, Paris was in favour of increasing the financial aid for the Eastern partners, but it supports the thesis that the funding should be used solely for the existing projects. Moreover, France stood for maintaining the balance of the ENP budget, where two thirds were directed to the South and one third to the East.

France was actively involved in the resolution of Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, when France held Presidency of the Council. President Sarkozy was accused of being ineffective during the resolving the conflict and biased towards Russia. During the Presidency, France tried to enhance relations with Eastern partners, namely with Ukraine: in September 2008, it was agreed the form of the new bilateral accord – Association Agreement, and the negotiations towards visa regime liberalisation began the following month. The 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas war showed Paris the fragile sides of its energy security and did not favour either side in the conflict. In relations with Russia, France stresses, as well as other EU members, that the EaP is not aimed against Moscow. France sees Russia the main target of the EU’s eastern policy. Supporting South dimension of the EU’s foreign policy, France shows some negative arguments concerning further enhancement of the Eastern dimension: the Eastern European countries are not ready to implement even minimal aquis; the countries are not capable to co-operate within the European energy market and there is a need to co- ordinate integration processes in European and Eurasian spaces (Denysenko, 2013: 400-401).

The United Kingdom, in contrary to other European powers (Paris and Berlin), traditionally opposes strengthening supranational institutions of the European Union, and is in favour of expansion of its geographical scope and supports the EU’s Eastern policy (Sydoruk, 2012: 139). Therefore, the Polish diplomat could easily convince the British leaders of the adequacy of the “Eastern Partnership” project in 2008: the Polish-Swedish initiative for EU Eastern

132 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) neighbourhood meet long political line adopted by London, which aims to strengthen the Union’s Eastern policy. The UK was one of the initiators of the EU Neighbourhood Policy that should focus on Eastern Europe – the British leaders together with Swedish colleagues suggested a programme “New Neighbourhood Initiative” in 2002, whose priority was to develop a common policy on Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (Czapska, 2009: 34).

According to B.Wojna (2009), although the Eastern Partnership countries “are not, in truth, significant economic or political partners of the UK, but its interest in this region is considerable” (p. 53). The result is that the Foreign Office is focused on gradual expansion of stability, security and free trade that are the basis for further EU enlargement. The United Kingdom supports the EU enlargement policy and can see that “the British government points out that the ENP cannot be an alternative to or a waiting room to EU membership. It openly favours admitting Ukraine to the EU” (p. 54). As a result, Britain supported the project of the Eastern Partnership as a step towards membership, this initiative was to be complementary to the ENP instrument to improve security on the periphery of Europe (especially in the context of Russian-Georgian war in August 2008), and as a pragmatic tool for strengthening existing relations with Ukraine – a privileged partner of London and the EU (p. 54). The UK was convinced that the Polish proposal on the EU’s Eastern policy was important because the Foreign and Commonwealth Office clearly supports EU enlargement and eastern direction of the EU foreign policy (Tyshchenko, 2013: 62).

Eastern Europe is one of the key priorities of the Romanian foreign policy. Bucharest had been critically disposed to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative primarily. The government supposed there would not have been any consultations about the new project for the important region for Romania. Having feared that Eastern Partnership would make negative impact upon on the Black Sea Synergy, Bucharest insisted upon division of functions of those two initiatives. The EaP had to be focused upon the bilateral co-operation and the neighbouring countries’ adaptation to the EU standards; the Synergy had major in multilateral projects and building a zone of security and confidence in the region (Institutul European din România, 2008). Howsoever, Romania declared the Eastern Partnership might support further transformation in the Eastern Europe and bring Moldova closer to the united Europe (Wojna. 2009: 47). The Eastern Partnership development was proclaimed as one of the key priorities of Romania’s foreign policy in 2009-2012 (Parlamentul României. Camera Deputaţilor, 2008: 78) and 2013-2016 (Guvernul României, 2012: 57). The Romanian authorities accentuate that

133 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the EaP can strengthen economic and political relations between the EU and Eastern Europe, especially in energy and transportation spheres.

Relations with the Eastern European countries play a significant role in the Bulgaria’s foreign policy. Furthermore, the strengthening co-operation with Black Sea region (mainly with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) is a vital priority for Sofia. Bulgarian diplomats note the Black Sea Synergy, the EU initiative towards the Black Sea region, is the best “tool” to realise the Bulgaria’s interests, “assessing all initiatives directed to EU neighbours through the prism of this co-operation”.(Wojna; 2009; p. 18). In this regard, Bulgaria distanced from the Eastern Partnership initiative at first time, this was caused by fear of EaP negative influence on implementation of the Black Sea Synergy. Moreover, the European Commission noted in its Report in June 2008 that the implementation of the Synergy might face problems (European Commission, 2008c). The authorities took a critical stance with regard to the funding question – the EaP implementation could reduce the funds for the Synergy development, which might worsen its already limited effectiveness. Bulgaria also dreads that Poland, being a motor of the Eastern Partnership initiative, tries to marginalise the Black Sea Synergy within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). B. Wojna notes that “although the Polish government’s criticism of this initiative was later toned down, during June 2008 meeting of the Council of Europe, Bulgaria was one of the EU members that voiced the greatest number of reservations with regard to the EaP» (2009; p. 18). The Polish diplomats thus succeeded in convincing the Bulgarian representatives that both initiatives (The Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership) could be complementary and should not complete with one another. Taking Bulgaria’s position into account, the conclusions of the Council of the European Union on 19th–20th June 2008 stated that co-operation in the EaP “should…be complementary to the already existing and planned multilateral cooperation under and related to the ENP, in particular the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension”(Council of the European Union, 2008a).

Belgium supports the institutional development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its objectives. Nonetheless, Brussels emphasises the difference between the enlargement process and the ENP (does not aim to join the EU). Although Belgium declares its support for the ENP’s Southern and Eastern dimensions, in fact, it supports the Southern dimension more paying greater attention upon the migration issue (Sydoruk; 2012; p.149). The launch of border crossing facilitations is treated by Brussels as a tool to incline Eastern neighbouring

134 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) states to co-operate in the creation of “a save environment” in the countries: e.g. combating organised crime and improvement of public safety; one that goes beyond the questions that are not connected with only safe travel documents (e.g. passport is not a sufficient guarantee for the safe surroundings). Belgium also voiced reservations concerning the financing of the EaP and it viewed unfavourably the earmarking of additional funds for the EaP (Wojna & Gniazdowski, 2009:17).

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is acting on the assumption that a successfully developing and stable Eastern dimension of the ENP is in the interests of all the EU Members, because it ensures the security of the EU’s external boundaries, investment benefits and the safety of energy supplies (from Russia). However, the Dutch authorities are concerned that the relations between the European Union and the neighbouring states should not lead to membership. The Hague welcomed the EaP, with this acceptance rooted mainly in the fact that the Eastern Partnership does not address the issue of the EU membership of the countries which it is addressed to. Furthermore, the policy is close to the Dutch concept of a new form of partnership between the EU and the Eastern European countries: assumes a more advanced form of co-operation going beyond the framework of the ENP, and still excluding the EU prospective (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009: 19-20). This concept emerged in debates in 2005, following the negative outcome of the referendum on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. The Dutch authorities treat the Eastern Partnership as an instrument for further democratisation of the EU’s Partners and supported the idea of concluding Association Agreements with three Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in 2014). The Netherlands are also favourably inclined towards creation of free trade areas with the EaP countries, which has been seen as an opportunity to give more dynamism to trade with Eastern Europe, especially with Ukraine. However, The Hague shows a degree of caution towards the visa facilitation and do not want to alter already existing forms of co-operation in the sphere of movement of people. The Netherlands stand negatively towards any increase of fund for the ENP and the EaP. The stance may be explained by the Netherland’s status as a net payee to the common budget and fears that it will require new financial obligations (Wojna & Gniazdowski, 2009: 42).

The Luxembourg’s perception of Eastern Partnership’s space is deeply connected with role of Russia as an important political and economic partner. Luxembourg supports the ENP and the EaP, but it is not the object of its special interests. The Luxembourg authorities declare a

135 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) necessity to close co-operation with Eastern European countries, but support a balanced approach to the Eastern and Southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Sydoruk, 2012:150).

Position of three classic neutral European countries, Ireland, Austria and Finland26, on the Eastern Partnership is very similar: they support the new initiative and see it as a tool of Europeanisation of the neighbouring countries.

Finland supported the launch of the Eastern Partnership but the principal aim of the state keeps development of the Northern Dimension. Within the initiative, Finland supports the partner states on the path of reforms, democratisation and strengthening of civil society. Helsinki supports the idea that the free trade area are the central parts of the association agreements and supports the facilitation of the free movement of the people between the EU and the EaP Partners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012: 10-11). The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument funded common trans-border programmes between Finland and Russia. As to Belarus, Suomi supports its participation in the initiative and suggest a greater use of soft power in relations with Minsk.

Since the start of the Eastern Partnership, Austria responded positively to it, because it could contribute to effective development of the countries’ economies during the economic crisis. After the Polish-Swedish proposal the former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik stressed the importance of individual partnerships that could increase under the Eastern Partnership and will regulate bilateral relations with eastern neighbour by ability to implement needed reforms.

According to M. Turiv (2009: 6), a good attitude to the partnership can also be explained the fact that the country wants defend its economic interests in Eastern Europe as Austria has a large number of financial institutions in Eastern European countries and has significant investments in the their economies.

The Eastern Partnership became an incentive for development of Danube Co-operation programme, wherein Austria is especially interested. Austria emphasises also the need for complementarity of the initiative and other EU regional projects that include Black Sea countries and other eastern neighbours.

26 Ireland, Austria and Finland were considered to be neutral because they declared themselves non-belligerent countries since the interbellum until join to the European Communities 136 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Austria belongs to the group of EU Member States who believe that the initiative should not be directed against Russia and did not contradict the inclusion of third countries, primarily Russia and Turkey, to multilateral projects within the Eastern Partnership. It is because Austria openly declared that the initiative and the whole ENP do not create prospects for further EU integration. Russia plays an important role in Austria’s foreign policy based on historical, political and economic aspects. Therefore, Austria does not want to spoil good relations with Russia, which did not positively react to the initiative.

Another factor that explains a neutral stance of Austria on the Partnership was that the key objective of Austrian foreign policy is membership of the Western Balkans countries in the EU countries to create a zone of peace and stability in the region.

Denmark is too far to be bothered about the development of the eastern direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Copenhagen did not even formulate any detailed position concerning the launch of the initiative.

The national Danish EU Presidency programme for the first half of 2012 referred to the EaP within the framework of the overall Neighbourhood Policy (Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2012):

Relations with the EU’s neighbours will be actively supported during the Danish

Presidency. …. Furthermore, the Presidency will also focus on the implementation of

the revised Neighbourhood Strategy. Work will be carried out to promote greater

flexibility, increased merit orientation and better coherence in the EU’s efforts in

southern and eastern neighbourhood regions.

Danish presidency did not plan any special innovations within the Policy either. The only noticeable emphasis was placed on the need to promote trade liberalisation between the EU and its neighbours.

As for Ireland, Dublin conducts same approach to all dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy. According to Ireland, the fundamental objective of the EU in relations with its neighbours should be support of democratic changes (Dáil Éireann, 2008: 51). Relations with Eastern Europe does not play a significant role in the foreign policy of Ireland; at the same time, Dublin praised the Eastern Partnership proposal, seeing it as a beneficial 137 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) addition to the ENP. This would effectively support the democratic changes in the neighbouring countries and the EU would help them adjust norms and standards of the united Europe. The Eastern Partnership project did not become the subject of extensive debate among Irish political elite while the Irish government mentioned that the Eastern Partnership could not be seen as the path to EU membership (Sydoruk, 2012: 148).

Greece does not have vital interests in Eastern Europe as it is traditionally connected to the EU’s Southern neighbours. At the same time, Greece co-operates with the states of the Black Sea basin, the majority of which are Eastern European countries. Athens is also interested in the development of the Black Sea Synergy. Taking into consideration religious (Orthodox Church), civilisational, energy connection and the “Cyprus Question”, Russia is the principal partner in the post-Soviet space. The relations between the Greece and other Eastern European countries are less important, which is reflexed on the Greece’s involvement in Eastern partnership. Greeks consider EaP would be one of the elements of “Association Plus” or “limited” or “partial” membership in the EU (Emmanouilidis, 2008: 6).

The eastern Partnership is perceived as one of the instruments for preventing conflicts in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. The Greek presidency of the Council of the European Union in first half of 2014 was focused upon Southern dimension of the ENP. The Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister E. Venizelos stated that the EU Southern neighbourhood had a great significance for Greece as Eastern Partnership for Latvia (presided the Council in the second half of 2013) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hellenic Republic, 2014). During the Greek presidency, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed Association Agreements/Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the EU that are aiming to enhance political co-operation and economic integration.

Cyprus perceives the Eastern European neighbours through the prism of the resolution to the “Cyprus question”. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and can significantly influence upon the Cyprus question resolution. Moreover, Russia is a large economic partner of Cyprus as a supplier of energy resources. Cyprus has an Armenian minority and immigrants from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which also effects the relations with Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

Nicosia welcomed the Eastern Partnership initiative and reinforcement of the ENP in 2009 as a project that prevents the isolation of non-EU countries (Wojna & Gniazdowski; 2009; p. 19).

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Cyprus also insisted upon including the EaP within the framework of the ENP so “as to maintain the cohesion of this policy and to prevent the Eastern region’s domination of EU actions intended for its neighbours” (Wojna & Gniazdowski, 2009: 19). The Cypriot authorities draw attention to necessary to take into account the balances approach in financing Southern and Eastern dimension.

According to the Cypriot diplomats, the Eastern Partnership cannot be connected with the policy of EU enlargement, in practice can help the Partner States in reaching that goal in the future though.

The EU Neighbourhood Policy is one of the priorities of the Malta’s foreign policy because of its geographic and geopolitical situation. Malta “maintains a special focus on furthering dialogue, peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean and the Middle East” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta, 2014). Malta identifies the ENP with Mediterranean policy. The Maltese government states on balance between Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP. It was mentioned by the Maltese Foreign Minister T. Borg in the beginning of the Czech presidency in the Council of the European Union (2009). The minister also stated that he looked forward “to the strengthening of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis its eastern partners in the context of the Eastern Partnership”, but paid more attention on collaboration with the countries of North Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta, 2009).

Valletta also emphasises on strong relations with Russia. It points to the Russia’s significance in the sphere of security and sees it as a condition for the success of the Eastern Partnership.

Eastern Europe is almost absent in Portugal’s foreign policy. Portugal primarily participates in realisation of Southern (Mediterranean) dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Nonetheless, interest to Eastern Europe has been growing during the last decade, which is explained by increasing number of immigrants from Ukraine, Moldova and Russia.

Eastern Partnership had not been a subject of broad public debate in Portugal. Even the parliamentary discussions about the Russo-Georgian war (August 2008) did not refer to the initiative. The government stated that Portugal accepted the Eastern Partnership and hoped it would be strengthening the bilateral co-operation between the European Union and its eastern neighbours (Sydoruk, 2012: 144). At the beginning of the EaP implementation, Lisbon was rather against additional funds for the Eastern dimension.

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Spain is traditionally called Mediterranean state. Its main area of interest is the Mediterranean region, where the most important for the security of the state’s challenges and threats come from, as migration, energy security and terrorism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to aver that this state regards hostilely towards the development of the EU Eastern policy. Its interest in Eastern dimension of the ENP is weak, although the perception of the EU eastern neighbourhood has been gradually changing in the recent years. Russia is considered as the most important political and economic partner in Eastern Europe. However, Madrid begins noticing other countries of the region, Ukraine and Moldova in particular, because numerous groups of immigrants derive from these states.

There were barely discussions about Eastern Partnership (EaP) in Spain. Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero only noted that in the EU there is a visible tendency to reinforce the Eastern dimension of the ENP but, at the same time, he stated that for Spain, the Mediterranean policy is the most important (Tyshchenko, 2014c). According to Spain’s standpoint, this initiative should be frames within the ENP and it cannot be perceived as a preparatory stage for membership.

Although Spain declared its support for the EaP, it greeted the allocation of additional funds for this initiative with reserve. According to the Government’s proposal, it was necessary to safeguard a financial balance between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP, which they understand as “two thirds of the funds allocated to cooperation with Southern neighbours, and one third for cooperation with the former Soviet republics” (France Diplomatie, 2005). Spain supported this principle during formation of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. N. Shapovalova (2010: 2) mentioned that Mr Zapatero even did not attend the Prague summit in May 2009 that launched the Eastern Partnership because Madrid had been reluctant to agree a new EU funding for the EaP.

Italy also considers the Mediterranean regions as the main space of the ENP focus. Rome is totally discordant to deepen relations with the Eastern European states within the ENP and does not see the Policy as the strategy to join the EU. The ENP and the EaP are not pre- accession period in a middle-term prospective. Italy has privileged economic and political relations with Russia, which is clearly observed in Italy’s policy towards Eastern Europe: Rome tries to keep and ameliorate the tied partnership relations between the EU and Russia and pays less attention to the initiatives that could be considered against EU-Russia relations.

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Italian politicians and public did not perceive the Polish-Swedish project interested. Rome support the EaP as one more tool for enhanced relations with EU eastern neighbours but as a programme within the European Neighbourhood Policy and not as an independent project. Italy supported funding increase for the EaP but with equivalent increase for the South dimension. As for visa liberalisation regime, the Italians proposed separated negotiations with each country and were afraid that the North African partners would also require visa bans (Sydoruk, 2012: 145).

EaP Partner States

Interests and positions of each of six EaP countries are different, but only their fulfillment is a key to effectiveness of the multinational level of the initiative.

At the beginning, critical perception of the Eastern Partnership by Ukraine was caused by the lack of political and security component in the initiative. Now, Ukraine’s goals in the context of co-operation with the EU almost completely coincide with the objectives of the EU within the Eastern dimension of its foreign policy. The principal difference between Ukraine and the EU is a failure and unwillingness of the EU to meet the ambitious aspirations of Ukraine to obtain EU membership even in a long future. I consider that this problem is just a matter of political debate, but a positive decision of a possible membership perspective could become a strong political influence on the development of political processes not only in Ukraine but also in other EaP Partner States.

Belarus has a special place in the development of the initiative. Belarusian officials were interested in Eastern Partnership as a tool for advancement of economy with European investment, increasing independence from Russia and accretion pf their own power within the state. Nevertheless, Belarus’ involvement in the programme is limited due to complicated political relations with the EU.

The position of the Republic of Moldova towards Eastern Partnership (EaP) almost fully reflects the content of the EU official documents aimed at providing perspectives of EU membership. This position was formulated in a special non-paper document titled “Proposals of the Republic of Moldova on the future development of the Eastern Partnership”, which was sent by Moldovan authorities to ministries, embassies and parliaments of the EU Member States (Hobrowski, 2011). According to the document, Chișinău proposed several areas EaP development: 1) Regional development and cohesion policy; 2) Agriculture – creation a new 141 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) instrument of financial support for agriculture and rural areas; 3) Macroeconomic policies that would improve the investment climate and support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs); 4) Energy security; 5) More communication links with the EU countries.

Moldova also calls on the EU to provide prospective of EU membership to the countries that can meet the criteria for joining the EU in a future (The Copenhagen criteria) and notes the lack of internal co-operation between the Eastern. A lack of new ideas and attempts to make the EaP idea appealing may lead to a complete fading of enthusiasm from the part of the Member States and participating countries of the Eastern Partnership.

Today, the EU estimates Moldova as a country that is making significant progress in the field of reforms implementation and approximation to the EU. Brussels stresses attention on the progress in democratic achievements and the rapid progress in the negotiations with the EU on Association Agreement and Free Trade Area in particular. Here are the reasons of the EU increased attention to the current European Union to Moldova: a) first of all it is a small size of the country and its economic weakness, which results in almost complete association of Moldova’s position with the position of the EU; b) a significant diplomatic, political and financial support provided to Moldova by Romania; c) EU’s desire to use the factor of “Moldova’s success” to stimulate other EaP partners in making domestic reforms.

The launch of Eastern Partnership led to serous progress in relations of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with the EU. Agenda of the project fully satisfied these countries because it was completely innovative and even exceeded the expectations on relations with the EU. Azerbaijan and Armenia did not insist on obtaining EU membership.

The countries of South Caucasus are interested in increasing economic and humanitarian presence of the European Union and increasing co-operation with it. One of the main interests of these three countries is EU involvement in peacekeeping processes, a security guarantee. Georgia and Azerbaijan consider Eastern Partnership as a counterbalance to Russian influence and a possibility of expanding multilateral co-operation without Russian.

As to economic relations, Armenia, which has serious ambitions for European integration, hoped for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership would give it additional economic benefits and would help diversify international contacts. In relations with West Azerbaijan`s priority number1 is economic affairs. Baku has no ambitions to join the EU and the EU for its part requires energy from Azerbaijan. 142 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Hence, this revision of positions and interests on EU Member States shows us some common features towards the launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2009: all the countries support further development of the relations with the Eastern European countries together with signing the AA. At the same time, there are some disaccords: primarily, it is an idea of extra funds for the EaP and free visa regime. The latter issue is caused by fear of uncontrolled influx of immigrants from Moldova and Ukraine. EU-Russia relations issue was also one of the topics of discussion and the EU assured that the new initiative would not menace Russia or cause EU-Russia rivalry neither. Some EU countries were against taking into consideration Russia’s interests while policy-making within the EaP. The start and support of the Eastern Partnership by all the EU states is a gigantic step for common EU foreign policy and was an impetus for further development of the block.

II.3. Harmonisation of the Eastern Partnership Initiative with other EU Policies in Eastern Europe.

The new initiative of the European Union towards Eastern Europe is a new approach in relations with Eastern European countries. In the same time, some EU members expressed their concern that the EaP might overlap functions of other EU programmes and initiatives in the region – the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension.

The EU’s interests towards the Black Sea region are associated with its location between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, at the intersection of energy and transport flows, illegal migration and organised crime. Therefore, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, “the EU is no longer an external actor in this region,… [it is] irrevocably part of the region, with our future security and prosperity intimately bound up in its fortunes” (Ferrero- Waldner, 2008: 2). The first step towards a new EU initiative was taken in 2007 when the Commission prepared a Communication “Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative”. The new initiative was assumed to complement already existing formats of co- operation with the Black Sea region – the bilateral relations with Turkey and Russia, the ENP concerning countries of the region (European Commission, 2007).

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Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, having direct access to the Black Sea and being EU Member States, were interested in establishment such initiative and allocation of EU funds for various projects of co-operation in the Black Sea. The Black Sea Synergy was conceived as a “flexible framework to ensure greater coherence and policy guidance” in the joint venture of partners in more than thirteen areas: democracy and human rights, security, frozen conflicts, energy, transport , trade, environmental protection, maritime policy &c (European Commission, 2007: 3).

According to the document, the main principle of Black Sea Synergy should be “flexible geometry”, where individual countries also might participate in single spheres. Funds for the implementation of activities were to be allocated based on the principle of co-financing. If necessary, the EU may transfer funds of the ENP national, regional and cross-border programmes, other instruments for external assistance.

The new initiative did not had not goal to create either institutions or specialised structures; the states were proposed to continue co-operating within the existing formats and sectorial programmes, initiated by the European Union. It was also intended to establish close ties with other regional organisations, especially the BSEC, where seven EU Member States had observer status (France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) and three of them were members (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania). EU sought to take advantage of co-operation with the BSEC institutions to increase its presence in the region. Black Sea Synergy was planned to become an “umbrella structure” for the main organisations and programmes operating in the Black Sea region.

The first summit of EU and the Black Sea states’ foreign ministers took place in Kyiv in February 2008, during the presidency of Ukraine in the BSEC. Participants recognised the role of the EU in increasing the capacity of regional co-operation in the Black Sea and the Black Sea Synergy as an important tool to achieve this goal. In the final statement, the participating countries expressed their support for obtaining the European Commission observer status in the BSEC in 2007 and the establishment of co-operation in various fields (European External Action Service; 2008). Only Russia did not accede to the final statement. Russian Foreign Office explained such decision: “at the meeting in Kyiv, where was not agreed a balanced document providing for the establishment of equal relations between the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the European Union” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008).

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What is vastly important is that the Communication from 2007 indicated a possibility of the new format for the “frozen conflicts” resolution by improving governance, economic development and social stability. The events of August 2008 increased the EU interest in engaging in settlement of “frozen conflicts” in the region of its neighbourhood.

Table 12: Comparison of the Eastern Partnership with other EU Regional Projects

Initiative Eastern Black Sea Synergy Northern Dimension Partnership

Target 28 EU Member EU + Romania, EU + Norway, Iceland, countries States + Ukraine, Bulgaria and Greece Russia. The US and Moldova, Belarus, (as EU Members) + Canada have observer Georgia, Armenia Ukraine, Moldova, status. Belarus is not a and Azerbaijan Russia, Georgia, member but it has Armenia, participated in the Azerbaijan, Turkey environmental partnership and partnership on transport and logistics since 2009

Initiator(s) Poland and Sweden Germany Finland

Relations Different Is close co-operation Co-operation with other with other international with regional regional organisations: regional organisations can organisations and Arctic Council, Council actors take part in EaP initiatives, e.g. of the Baltic Sea States, activity, e.g. Council Organisation of Barents Euro-Arctic of Europe, OSCE Black Sea Economic Council, Nordic Council Co-operation, Black of Ministers Sea Forum, Baku Initiative, Black Sea Commission for the protection of the

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Black Sea

Main Four Thematic - stimulate - environment; spheres of Platforms: democratic and - public health and co- economic social well-being; - Democracy, operation reforms; - transport and good governance - support stability logistics; and stability; and promote - culture - Economic development; integration and - facilitate convergence practical projects with the EU in areas of policies; common - Energy security; concern; Contacts between - open up people opportunities and challenges through coordinated action in a regional framework; encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region

Operational - Summits of - No new Meetings of foreign Structure heads of institutions were ministers every two state/government established. years; meetings of senior every two years; Ministerial officials if needed annual meetings Meetings, with (obligatory in years of of foreign un-identified meetings of foreign ministers; frequency, ministers); meetings of

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meetings at the provide political Steering Group thrice a level of senior orientation of the year officials within initiative the thematic platforms twice a year; meetings of sectorial ministers if needed Financial European European Financial programmes Instruments Neighbourhood Neighbourhood and instruments of the Instrument; EIB and Instrument; budget EU (including ENI); EBRD; European of Partner States; budget of partner States; Investment Facility loans from EIB and private sector; EIB and EBRD; EBRD;

Source: Author’s own compilation &

Ferreira, M. F. (2009). A Construção Social da Vizinhança Europeia: Identidade e Segurança. In C. G. Costa, M. J. Pereira, A. M. Soares (Ed.). A UE como Actor Global: Dimensões Económicas e Normativas da Política Externa Europeia. Colecções Manuais Pedagógicos, ISCSP, Lisboa, pp. 79-88.

As it can be seen, both initiatives, the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy, are directed to the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus aiming to increase attention to the region and assist its development. These initiatives have great differences, though, allowing them not only to co-exist but also to complement to each other:

a) The goals of two initiatives are different – the EaP aims to develop European integration processes of the Partner States by strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations. The Black Sea Synergy aims to deepen regional co-operation between the countries of the Black Sea; b) The participant countries are different – Turkey and Russia do not participate in the EaP but are members of the Black Sea Synergy, Belarus – vice versa; c) The Eastern Partnership is a new step in development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, when the Black Sea Synergy is an additional tool to the ENP;

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d) Areas of co-operation are slightly different: the EaP includes political association and economic integration with free trade and visa-regime facilitation. The Synergy envisages resolution of frozen conflicts, fishery, development of the Black Sea region, area, that are barely described in the EaP; e) The EaP is more flexible containing various forms of co-operation with the bilateral and multilateral tracks; f) Institutional structure of the Eastern Partnership is more complex compared to the Synergy (meetings at the level of foreign ministers with not regularity) (Martyniuk, 2009: 17).

The launch of the EaP in 2009 caused declination of the Black Sea Synergy. The Commission attempted to fix the initiative for a special niche with the ENP. In 2010, the Commission emphasised that, in contrast to the Eastern Partnership, the Synergy was open to all states in the region with tied relations with various organisations (European Commission, 2010b: 1). The EU also established sector partnerships in three areas: environment, transport and energy, which have great importance in the region.

One more initiative of the European Union is the East is the Northern Dimension27. Despite not including any of the EaP Partner States, Belarus has participated in the environmental partnership and the partnership on transport and logistics since 2009 (Dyner, 2013: 1). The Northern Dimension has not a goal to develop the European integration but it is aimed to

27 Northern Dimension initiative is an instrument of co-operation between the two partners – the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia and geographically covers the Baltic Sea, North-West Russia and the Arctic regions (including the Barents Sea). The policy includes a series of sectors of co-operation as environment, nuclear security, energy, transport, trade and investment, science, education and culture. The idea of the initiative was proposed by Finland during its pre-accession process to the EU.

Prime Minister of Finland, Esko Aho, first mentioned the need for the EU to develop the Northern Dimension in March 1994 (Hladysh, 2012: 69). However, the Northern Dimension initiative was officially presented by Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, at the conference of Barents Sea region countries in September 1997. In December 1997, the Finnish government proposed the Northern Dimension initiative to the European that ordered the Commission to prepare a communication presented to the European Council in December 1998. The Northern Dimension was initiated in 1999 and renewed in 2006. There are four partnerships within the initiative:

1. Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP); 2. Northern Dimension Partnership Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS); 3. Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics (NDPTL); 4. Northern Dimension Partnership on Culture. It was also established Northern Dimension Institute, Northern Dimension Business Council and Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum in order to complement the co-operation between the members. Over the years, the EU has contributed nearly 100 million euro for the Northern Dimension (European External Action Service, 2015e). 148 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) increase stability and facilitate security in the region of Northern Eastern Europe through co- operation with the EU Member States.

Other regional initiatives, such as the Central European Initiative28, do not overlap the objectives of the Eastern Partnership either in geographic scope or in functional dimension. Hence, the Eastern Partnership does not collide with any of the EU initiatives/ programmes concerning Eastern Europe.

II.4. “A Common Neighbourhood29”: Between Two Centres of Power.

“[…] Pena que a Rússia não tivesse, desde o início, aceitado participar na política europeia de vizinhança, porque (a Rússia) é o grande parceiro dentro do continente europeu, mas a ideia que por vezes perpassa de que alguma da instabilidade que se vive nesta região é resultado da política europeia de vizinhança é errada.”30

Pedro Manuel Mamede Passos Coelho,

Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic (2011-2015)

II.4.1. EU-Russia Contemporary Relations.

Throughout its history, Russia has always been balancing between being important player in Europe and being at the continent’s periphery. This has not changed even twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this context, Kremlin has chosen its own path, relying on its major military and nucler power. Tom Casier, a researcher at Brussels School of

28 Central European Initiative (CEI) is forum of co-operation between 18 Central , Eastern and South Eastern European countries that was established in 1989 in Budapest aiming to overcome the division between post- Communist and Western European countries by consolidation their economic and social development

29 The term “common/share neighbourhood” was primarily used to denote the post-Soviet states covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy and thw Eastern Partnership – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and three countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) (Averre, 2009: 1689).

30 Governo de Portugal. (2015). Rússia não deve ver a política europeia de boa vizinhança a leste como uma ameaça: http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/o-governo/arquivo-historico/governos-constitucionais/gc19/primeiro- ministro/pm/mantenha-se-atualizado/20150521-pm-ue-parceria-oriental.aspx Viewed 15.07.2017. 149 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

International Studies, mentions that Russia, benefiting from an underground rich in resources and minerals, has become an energy giant and major deliver of gas and oil to the EU countries. “Relations betwenn the EU and Russia are crucial, not only for energy but also for trade and even more importantly for reasons of stability in Eastern Europe”, refers Dr Casier (2013: 123).

The EU enlargement in 2004 caused new problems in bilateral relations, when the relations with Russia were reduced to the level of relations with the states of so-called immediate neighbourhood, together with North Africa and Eastern European countries. According to Zbigniew Brzeziński (2004: 96), in a long-term prospect, the European Union enlargement has appeared to become a common interest for both actors, as it enlarges the centre of the world where peace rules, promotes the absorption of Russia by a wider West and engages Europe in concerted actions with the USA.

Therefore, one may say that the EU and Russia treated each other as important but not as strategic partners. For the EU, the subject of concern is energy dependence on Russia, and in this lies “of strategy” of relations with Russia. The EU is an important trading partner for Russia.

During that period, the most important contradictions between the two sides were:

 Presence of Russian military bases in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria) and Russia’s interference into internal affairs of these states;  Unresolved issues of transportation between the main territory of Russia and the Kaliningrad region;  • EU initiatives to limit Russia’s foreign influence on post-Soviet countries;  Violations of human rights and civil liberties in Chechnya;

Lack of progress in relations between Russia and the EU led in particular to postpone of EU- Russia summit, scheduled for 11th November 2004. The summit still held on 25th November 2004 but without positive dynamics. However, the prospects of these relations concluded a number of agreements to deepen cooperation (even the "road map"), had to solve the major contradictions in the development of bilateral relations.

At the Moscow Summit in May 2005, the parties adopted detailed “road maps” for the implementation of four “common spaces” of their co-operation: Common Economic Space;

150 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; External Security and Research and Education. Lacking strategic guidance, instruments, and even clear definitions, Michael Emerson (2005: 1) called the Common Spaces “the proliferation of the fuzzy” of the EU- Russia relations

In practical terms, these steps should have been aimed at the convergence of the economies of Russia and the EU, deepening joint co-operation in the fight against organised crime, terrorism, illegal migration and visa facilitation process in the future.

Describing the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation from 2014 until now, it should be noted a complicated multidimensional situation. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and hybrid war in eastern Ukraine contributed to mutual misunderstanding of the parties. The “Ukrainian question” is still an important factor in the development of relations between the EU and Russia today.

The EU officials noted in public statements that the EU-Russia relations can be normalised only when the Russia performs the Minsk agreements and return Crimea to Ukraine.

The “Ukrainian question” clearly defined the basic requirements to Russia to restore a constructive dialogue with the EU – Brussels will strengthen the sanctions against Russia in the case of default of the Minsk agreements, continued destabilisation in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. In addition, the European Parliament condemned Russia’s direct and indirect support for terrorists in Donbas (eastern Ukraine), including weapon supply, armament and recruitment, which “leads to the continuation of the war” The European Parliament also called on Russia and all parties “to use their influence to stop the fighting and prevent further war crimes and new victims” (TSN, 2015).

As to geopolitical viewpoint, Russia claims its right to have senior positions in the sub-region of Eastern Europe occupying a significant part of the Eurasian continent and still having a powerful industrial and military potential,. This position becomes noticeable in its policies on post-Soviet space particularly. Even after the Baltic States joined the EU, Moscow continues to disagree with the existence of sovereignty of former Soviet republics and has been trying all available means to limit them plunging into the Russia’s orbit.

Energy dependence on Russia is one more significant threat to the EU. Europe realised Russia’s influence on the energy sphere in 2005 – the Europeans, the first time in many years,

151 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) felt consequences of the energy crisis when Russia cut gas supply. So, the EU leaders engaged in search of alternative sources of oil and gas.

Andriy Kyrchiv, a Ukrainian researcher, indicates another important problem in relations between the EU and Russia – Russia’s “Western territory” Kaliningrad (Königsberg). In the post-war political structure of Europe, the Soviet enclave was understandable for ideological and military purposes (a naval base of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy is at Baltiysk) (2006). Now, the district has become a vestige of the old system of balances in the international arena “inside” the united Europe. However, it does not prevent Russia from using the question of the enclave for speculations on visa liberalisation process; restrictions for NATO programmes in the Baltic region and restrictions on the rights of Russian citizens in the context of European standards.

A special position of Russia is clear in regional conflicts, when the Russian military contingent of the UN peacekeeping force plays a significant role. In order to justify its incursion into the internal relations if the neighbouring countries, Russia uses effectively Soviet neo-colonial political stamps as the idea of Slavic brotherhood, Pan-Slavism, a single Motherland (the Russian empire or the USSR as an example), common interests against the West, “aggressive NATO and US expansionist policy” (Burrow, 2007). I would agree with T. Sydoruk (2014: 37) that despite the EU’s unwillingness to speak “geopolitical” language with Moscow, clash with Russia is inevitable if the EU really wants to promote democracy, economic modernisation and gradual integration of Eastern Europe.

As to the Eastern Partnership, two principles are in conflict. Russia perceive the region of Eastern Europe as its “sphere of influence”, the EU though acknowledges it as European Common Spaces (Adomeit, 2011: 9). Moreover, Russia sees Eastern Partnership in a negative way and proposes Brussels a “zero-sum game”, where winner in the battle for influence can be only one (Schäffer, 2010). The European Union argues that the Eastern Partnership is equally beneficial for the parties, and therefore Russia should support it, or at least not hinder the realisation of the project. There is a big misunderstanding between the EU and Russia towards objectives of the project because the logic of the Cold War prevents Kremlin think consciously.

In 2014, a Berlin-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2014a) presented a work entitled “The EU and the East in 2030. Four Scenarios for Relations between the EU, the Russian

152 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Federation, and the Common Neighbourhood”. These scenarios are not analytical forecasts, but offer different visions of possible and probable situations of particular research interest.

Scenario I: “Shared Home”. All Europeans share a single home. After two decades, the relations are characterised by political crises and economic stagnation. The EU and Russia focus on common interests only from 2020. The new FTA will facilitate the integration of the Eastern Partnership countries that will no longer have to decide whose side to take, the EU or Russia.

Scenario II: “Common Home”. Europe is home to peoples bound by common values. Deep economic crisis in Russia will lead to democratic and economic reforms that will help improve relations between the EU and Russia. Therefore, Russia and the EU will stand together not only to resolve conflicts in Europe, but also in the fight against common threats.

Scenario III: “Broken Home”. The European home is in ruins. The confrontation between Russia and the EU continues to 2030. The successful authoritarian modernisation in Russia and the EU energy dependence give both parties an opportunity to act separately. The Eastern Europe is an object of intense competition between Russia and the EU forming it an area of instability.

Scenario IV: “Divided Home”. The EU and Russia live in the neighbourhood, but separately. The EU and Russia are in a “dead end” – a significant deterioration of relations. The relations cannot be improved because of low degree of confidence.

Thence, no matter how good and effective the sanctions against Russia are, they remain the sole tool of pressure on Kremlin. It one of rare situations when all the EU countries united for making a decision despite having severe economic losses.

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2.4.2. Role of the European Union in Resolving Conflicts in the “Shared Neighbourhood”.

Transnistria

The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the political world map caused recovery of many “frozen conflicts”. They are: Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Crimea since 2014. There is also one active, not frozen conflict, eastern Ukraine that has been occupied by Russia.

As to Transnistria, it is part of Moldova and is situated on the left bank of the river Dniester. The processes of devolution of the USSR influenced on beginning conflicts within Moldova because about 2/3 of the population of Moldova was Romanian origin and they wanted to move closer to its western neighbours, Romania and the European Union (European Communities at that time) and preserve the Moldova’s integrity. The population of the left bank of Dniester were in favour of maintaining close relations with Russia and Ukraine as well as proclaim its own statehood.

The conflict seriously deployed after proclamation of independence of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) on 25th August 1991, two days earlier than it did Moldova (27th August 1991) (Map 3).

Map 3: Independent Moldova since 1991

154 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Source: Andersen, A. (1995). The Conflict in Transnistria: National Consensus is a Long Way off (1990 - present). http://www.conflicts.rem33.com/images/moldova/nistru_konflikt.htm Viewed 30.09.2016

Such strategy of rivalry was clear during all four phases of the conflict: the first “pre-conflict” period lasted in last years of the USSR until 1992 and is characterised by forming main elements of the conflict such as parties, objectives, object, motives &c. The language issue became determining motive (but not the reason obviously) for the conflict because Moldova planned to come back to Latin alphabet instead of Cyrillic while separatists were exposed to the Russian languages. On March 28th 1992, Moldova responded the Transnistrian coup d’etat by declaring a state of emergency in the country and tried to defeat the military forces of Transnistria.

This attempt was futile because the Moldavian army several times weaker than the Russian“14th Army” (formerly Soviet 14th Army) based in Transnistria31 (Table 13).

Table 13: Periods of Moldova-Transnistria/Russia War

Phase Time Description

First Phase 1989 – March 1992 Forming main elements of the conflict – parties,

objectives, object, motives

Second Phase March-July 1992 Moldova tries to regain its sovereignty on the rebel territory by military forces. Russia’s 14th army defeats the Moldovan army

Third Phase July 1992-novadays De-escalation and peace-making negotiations

Source: Popescu, N. (2011). EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts Stealth intervention. London: Routledge

31 The biggest battle of the entire conflict was the Fight for Bender in 1992, a disputed city. The total death toll exceeded 600 people and the number of refugees exceeded 80,000 people 155 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

A cease-fire was accomplished by an accord between the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin on 21st July 1992. According to the treaty, a territorial integrity of Moldova was recognised with Transnistria’s right to proclaim its independence. This treaty only stopped the active military war, did not resolve the conflict that became the “frozen” one.

Despite a small area of the region (only 4163 km2), Moscow is very interested in keeping it under its control. Russia is interested not solve the conflict, and keep Transnistria in an uncertain situation on Moldova or Ukraine. It is useful in order to destabilise the political situation in Ukraine by reminding Ukrainians that all modern territory of Transnistria (except for the city of Bender) used to be a part of Ukraine until 1940. There is also a great number of Russian militaries and arms depots and widespread smuggling of people and weapons to the Central Europe. Other important factor is commercial co-operation: most factories and plants export their good in Russia.

Moscow is trying now to use any advantage on Transnistria, including the political, having at the same time a status of a mediator in the conflict. Russia’s main objective today is make Transnistria a member of the Customs Union in order to prevent its EU integration. The Russian Orthodox Church is another obstacle: the Church widely deploys propaganda “against” the European Union and in “favour” of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia the orthodox church to prevent any co-operation between the unrecognised country and the EU. The 14th Russian army is another obstacle in peacekeeping development: two infantry battalions, whose function is to protect the vast arsenal munitions left over from the Soviet 14th army, comprise this army. Russia is not interested in resolving the conflict and is doing everything possible to maintain its position in Eastern Europe

After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union, Moldova became direct neighbour of the EU and drew attention to the Transnistrian conflict, which creates an instability zone near the EU’s boundaries and stimulates flaws of illegal migrations and smuggling. Moreover, European integration of Moldova even increases the importance of resolving the conflict.

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in a form of a brief document titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, the comprehensive 156 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) document than analysed and defined for the first time key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the European Union. The Strategy was result of the split between the EU Member States over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which accentuated the need for a common vision to internal cohesion amongst all the EU Members.

According to the document, building security in the Neighbourhood is one of the strategic objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, aiming to promote “a ring of well governed countries” to the South and to the East of the EU in order to develop close and cooperative relations. “We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there”, said in the document (European Council, 2003: 8).

Amongst a number of “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space, the EU was more interested in tackling the Transnistrian conflict due to its geographical proximity to the EU.

In 1990s, the EU was involved in resolution of the conflict only through the OSCE as official representative in negotiations. The EU became an ad hoc diplomatic actor in the negotiations since 2003, after the stabilisation of the Balkans32, Danish Presidency of the OSCE in the attempt to draft a new constitution for the reunited Moldova (Javier Solana declared lack of EU support for the “Kozak Memorandum”33 in November 2003, which led to Moldova’s rejection the Russian plan). Brussels also tries to internationalise the Russian military mission to Transnistria, but the proposal was abandoned due to the fierce Russian rejection. In 2005, the EU gained the status of observer, together with the US, to the 5+2 negotiating format. The official negotiations on the conflict resolution ceased he following year, in September 2006, when Tiraspol, with complete support of Russia, held a referendum of independence of Transnistria with its futher integration into the Russian Federation34. Three months later, on

32 The situation in the Balkan Peninsula was stabilised after the resign of Slobodan Milošević, President of Yugoslavia amid demonstrations in 2000 and Ohrid Agreement ending armed conflict between the government of FYROM and ethnic Albanians (National Liberation Army) on 13th August 2001.

33 In November 2003, Dmitry Kozak, close ally and envoy of President Vladimir Putin, developed a unilateral settlement plan, known as the “Kozak Memorandum” that would have opened the way to a Russian military presence (circa 2000 troops) in Transnistria until 2020, assuming that the region would have equal status in federation with the rest of the country. The plan presented several issues that could cause blockage in policy- making precisely to impede the Moldova’s integration to the EU and NATO.

34 According to the results of the referendum, 98 % of votes were in favour of independence and potential future integration into Russia. None of the international organisations and counties recognised the referendum as the latter had failed to meet the conditions of a free will expression by citizens. 157 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

10th December 2006, Transnistria held presidential election according to which the incumbent President Igor Smirnov won.

The European Union is acting to settle the conflict in two ways: challenging the status quo and proposing an alternative making Moldova more attractive. Challenging the status quo implies actions on economic level to impede the illegal trade and on political level to make Transnistria more democratic, e.g. the EU imposed controls on import of Transnistrian steel in September 2004 (the import could be possible if the exporting companies had a certificate to export issued by the authorities of Moldova). The EU had also required Ukraine to introduce new customs regulations according to which all imported goods from Transnistria must have documents processed by Moldovan customs offices since May 2006. A year before, in 2005, the EU, Ukraine and Moldova also signed a Memorandum on measures against illicit activities on the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border (Ranieri, 2007: 82).

Concerning the second way, Brussels tries to offers an alternative to the people and separatists of Transnistria that consists of closer co-operation with Moldova aiming to make the country more competitive. The relations between the EU and Moldova have been developing basing upon a number of agreements (e.g. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Action Plan, Association Agreement) that establish and promote institutional framework of bilateral (the EU-Moldova) and multilateral (within ENP-EaP) relations. The European Union represents the most trading partner for Moldova – 46.4% of its trade takes place with the EU, followed by Russia (21.9% and Ukraine (11.8%) (European Commission, 2014a).

In March 2005, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was appointed as the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova aiming at increasing the influence of the EU of the conflict settlement process and assisting in the preparation of the EU;s contribution to the implementation of the eventual conflict settlement. Since 2005, he participated as observer in the OSCE-managed “5+2 talks” until 2006 when there broke down35 (Végh, 2012: 6). The EUSR also had political advisers in Chișinău to keep him informed about the events in Moldova (Popescu, 2011: 136).

35 The main disadvantage of the EUSR was that he was nor based in Brussels, but in The Hague that hindered personal communication with the most European institutions headquartered in Brussels. The second EUSR, Kálmán Mizsei, was appointed in March 2007 and had his office Brussels. 158 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

At meeting in Moscow in September 2011, the parties decided to resume formal negotiations within the “5+2 talks” format. They also agreed to renew official work of Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the framework of the negotiation process on the Transnistrian conflict settlement. The Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat was in favour of re-organisation of the “5+2” format into “format of 7” by providing the EU and the US status of full participants, not observers (NewsRu.md, 2011)

Aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian war and following EU and US economic sanctions against Russia led to the economic and social situation has significantly deteriorated in Transnistria: The great part of the industrial enterprises are about to stop production and export-import operation have fallen by almost 40% in the first half of 2015. In addition, due to lack of budget, salaries and pensions are paid only by 70%. On 8th June 2015, Ukraine denounced agreements with Russia on transit of military forces in Moldova, signed in 1995, because it was “a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine“ (Trach, 2015). In order to prevent even worse economic situation, Moldova together with European partners expressed their willingness to provide assistance to Transnistria to find functional solutions for overcoming the economic crisis (Novoye Vremya, 2015a).

After the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Natalia Gherman, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Relations and European Integration of Moldova, made a statement at the UN General Assembly in September 2014. In the statement, she declared that Russia had to withdraw its military forces and ammunition, being addition obstacle to the settlement process, from Transnistria “without further delay” as it is contradictory to international commitments and the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (Gherman, 2014: 3). Nonetheless, Russia refused to withdraw its forces as, of course, is go against its neo-imperial policy in the region. Moreover, there is no common border between Russia and Moldova so it would be harder for Russia to influence the internal situation in Moldova. In March 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during a meeting with Moldova’s Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici expressed his support for Moldova on the problems of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, “demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova” (Mirror Weekly, 2015)

In 2014 and 2015, there were attempts to resume negotiations by Switzerland and Serbia within the OSCE format that ended by failure. In June 2014, a meeting in Vienna dealt with problems of socio-economic nature, including those related to issues a number of schools 159 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) located on the territory of Transnistria, but working under the auspices of the Ministry of Education of Moldova. None of the issues achieved significant results (Deutsche Welle, 2016).

In September 2014, the Transnistrian officials refused to return to the negotiating table accusing Moldova in opening criminal cases against high-level Transnistrian officials, as well as in the economic blockade of the region as a result of the Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova that was signed in June 2014.

The next round of negotiations concerning the Transnistrian conflict settlement in the “5+2” format was launched on 2nd June 2016 and was initiated by Germany that took a chairmanship.in the OSCE in January 2016 (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016). The delegates aimed to analyse a package of proposals made by Russia in March 2016 related to agreement guarantees, the freedom of movement of people and goods, political leadership of the working groups, including those concerned with transport and education. In the end, the negotiations appeared to not have much result.

Nicolae Timofti, the incumbent President of Moldova, says that the actual format of the conflict settlement “5+2” (Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia and OSCE, as well the EU and the US as observers) is obsolete and demonstrates its inconsistency. According to the President the settlement of the conflict and reintegration of Moldova suggests withdrawal of Russian soldiers and arms from the country according to the accords signed by Russia at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul (1999) and Porto (2002) that would be displaced by a civil mission with an international mandate. Nonetheless, Moscow denies this proposal providing financial, political and military support for Tiraspol, and trying to block the process of European integration of Moldova at the same time (Gurskaya, 2015).

The EU uses other elements of soft power to stabilise the situation on which the official Tiraspol cannot counteract. For example, since April 2014, nationals of Moldova may travel to the European Union without any visa restrictions and the population of Transnistria uses this regime by “leg voting”. About 60% of the rebelled territory have Moldovan citizenship and the number of those who wish to restore their Moldovan citizenship has increased three times since the introduction of the visa-free regime. According to Cornel Ciurea, a political expert of Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” in Chișinău, the EU decided to go through a gradual involvement of Transnistria that may join the agreement

160 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) when it is ready. Transnistria will use the old regime of preferences by 2016 while Moldova has a more stringent regime and has to implement a number of reforms (Zanuda, 2014). Such a “special regime” to Transtistria means de facto economic recognition of the territory, although political recognition is out of question, mentions Cornel Ciurea.

In the case of sanctions, in February 2003, the Council of the European Union together with the US introduced sanctions against 17 persons responsible for the lack of co-operation to promote a political settlement of the conflict in the form of travel restrictions (USEmbassy, 2003). In August 2004, the measures were broadened to an additional ten officials from Transnistria who were responsible for the campaign on intimidation and closure against Latin- script Moldovan schools36 in Transnistria, which was a human rights violation (Official Journal of the European Union, 2004: 47-49). In February 2008, the Council decided to temporarily discontinue the application of the sanctions in order to stimulate progress in reaching a political settlement to the conflict, and with regard to the Latin-script schools (Giumelli, 2016: 124). From my point of view, these sanctions had limited effects because other pivotal players in the conflict settlement (namely Ukraine and Russia) did not impose the same sanctions. Moreover, the key supporters of the separatist regime (important businesspeople, financial companies and Russian officials) were not involved in the EU sanctions.

In September 2010, The EU imposed new sanctions against President Igor Smirnov and other ministers of the regime including his two sons Vladimir and Oleg (Council of the European Union, 2010). Now the sanctions are still in vigour despite the tenure of Mr Smirnov as Head of State. A settlement of the conflict cannot obviously be based on satisfying all requirements of the parties because of collision of the territorial integrity of Moldova and independence of Transnistria. The conflict will remain in the “frozen” state for a long time.

Institute of Foreign Policy, a Kyiv-based think tank, elaborated four probable scenarios for settling the conflict in Transnistria. The first option is statvs qvo maintain. This scenario is the most likely, because during the past 25 years, people have accustomed to the situation. The second scenario is idea of Europeanising Transnistria by its democratisation, integration into

36 The Moldovan language was historically based upon Latin alphabet. The Cyrillic alphabet was introduced in the early 1920s aiming to make a clear distinction from the “bourgeois” Latin-based Romanian orthography that was introduced in Romania in 1860s. In 1989, the contemporary Romanian version of the Latin alphabet turned into an official script in the Moldovan SSR, whereas Transnistria still uses Cyrillic script. 161 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the European economic and cultural spheres. The third scenario is Transnistria becomes an international protectorate. I think, this option is very unlikely due to a nature of idea of protectorate. It is usually used in order to exercise functions of state institutions absent on the territory. In case of Transnistria, there is a functioning government structure. The last scenario is complete independence of the unrecognised country which is doubtful from a legal standpoint (Institute of World Policy, 2011).

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Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

The Revolution of Dignity that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych sparked a political crisis in Crimea that initially manifested in form of demonstrations against the Euromaidan movement and a new interim government, but lately supported separatist movements and military invasion of Russia. The demonstrations commenced on 27th February 2004 where the parliament of Crimea was occupied and the Ukrainian troops in the peninsula were blockaded (Map 4). On 1st March, The Council of the Federation of Russia, the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly – the parliament of Russia, unanimously approved the proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin on military intervention in Ukraine “until the social and political situation in that country is normalised”(President of Russia, 2014a); (Pinto, 2014b). The reaction of the European Union was immediate: EU HR Catherine Ashton stated that the European Union “deplores” the Russia’s decision to use armed forces in Ukraine, naming it “an unwarranted escalation of tensions” (European External Action Service, 2014: 1). Moreover, Baroness Ashton called on “all sides to decrease the tensions immediately through dialogue, in full respect of Ukrainian and international law”. “The unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine must be respected at all times and by all sides. Any violation of these principles is unacceptable. More than ever, restraint and sense of responsibility are needed”, added she (European External Action Service, 2014: 1). At that time, Ukrainian authorities had pinned hopes on diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, emphasising the important role of the West (the EU and the US) in a political settlement37.

37 According to the research of Bloomberg, after the Russia’s anschluss of Crimea in February-March 2014, the interim Ukrainian government was debating whether or not to fight back against the Russian army. “But the message from the Barack Obama administration was clear: avoid military confrontation with Moscow”, mention Josh Rogin and Eli Lake (2015). Nonetheless, the message to Kyiv was advice and not an order and was based upon several factors: Firstly, there was a lack of data about what Russia was really doing on the territory. Secondly, the Ukrainian military was not ready to confront the Russian military forces (namely special operations) that “were swarming” on the Crimean peninsula. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government was only an interim administration in Kyiv until the elections a few months later. According to Ukrainian officials, other European governments sent Kyiv a similar message. Nonetheless, the main concern was Vladimir Putin: the White House feared that if the Ukrainian military fought in Crimea, it would give Putin justification to commence even greater intervention in Ukraine where Kremlin could use the same scenario employed in 2008 having invaded large part of Georgia. 163 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 4: The Crimean Peninsula

Source: BBC. (2015). Ukraine crisis in maps: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526 Viewed 15.08.2016

On 16th March 2014, Russian and pro-Russian separatist activists held a referendum on joining Crimea to the Russian Federation38. The UN, the EU, the OSCE and the CIS did not sent observers to the referendum and did not recognise the results (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2014), (Espreso, 2014), (The Moscow News, 2014). However, on 21st March, the Council of the Federation unanimously adopted two laws with sequent President’s signatures of joining Crimea to Russia39 (President of Russia, 2014b).

38 Zbigniew Brzeziński mentioned in his “The Grand Chessboard American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives” Ukraine as a geographic pivot and its existence as an independent state influences Russia. If Russia occupies Ukraine, it will augment its critic weight by having access to resources and all north of the Black Sea. This could have caused a geopolitical shift in Eastern Europe (Brzeziński, 1997: 46 apud Dias, 2006: 154). However, this scenario did not come true entirely: Russia occupied only some parts of Ukraine (Crimea and Eastern regions).

39 The laws are Federal Constitutional Law “On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing with the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”, and Federal Law “On Ratifying the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation New Constituent Entities”. 164 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Intervening and annexing Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia violated international agreements that are supposed to govern bilateral and multilateral relations of the states:

 First, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe40 – a treaty, adopted in 1975 and where Ukraine and Russia are signatories, that sought to promote détente during the Cold War. According to the Final Act, the signatories must “refrain…from the threat or use of force” against one another (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975: 4). Moreover, the participating countries “regard as inviolable one another’s frontiers” and “will refrain now and in the future from assaulting those frontiers”. The countries also “respect territorial integrity of each of the participating States” and “refrain from making each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct and indirect measures of force in contravention of international law” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975: 5).  Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurance, signed in Hungary on 5th December 1994. After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine became the third largest nuclear power in the world. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, the US, the UK agreed with Russia and Ukraine that the latter eliminate their atomic weapons stockpiles and Ukraine to transfer all of its nuclear arms to Russia (Pifer, 2014). In exchange, the signatories reaffirmed “their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine” (Point 2) and greed “to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine….if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used” (Point 4) (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Vienna, 2014).  Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, signed in 1997: under Article 2, the partners agreed to “respect each other’s territorial integrity, and confirm the inviolability of the borders existing between them” (Steward, 1997: 69). The Ukraine-Russia Friendship Treaty also

40 Helsinki Final Act was the first act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki, Finland, in summer 1975, and signed by thirty-five states (Canada, USA and most European states). Geopolitical changes in late 1980s and early 1990s required a change of role and significance of the CSCE in peace-keeping/making in Europe. In 1995, the organisation was renamed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 165 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

ensures “the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious originality of national minorities on their territory” and the creation of “conditions for the encouragement of that originality” (Art. 12) so as there is a large Russian minority in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian minority in Russia.  Black Sea Fleet agreements, three agreements signed in 1997 between Ukraine and Russia governing the status of the Black Sea Fleet41. According to the accords, the fleet was divided between Ukraine and Russia and the latter received the greater part. Ukraine also agreed to lease Crimean naval facilities to the Russian part of the fleet for $97 million annually (Kimball, 2014). The leasing agreement was renewed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) and expires in 2042. Shortly after the Russian occupation of Crimea (February-March 2014), Russia unilaterally terminated the accord on 31st March 2014 (Aleksashenko, 2014).

The response of the international community was General Assembly resolution of 27th March 2014 titled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” which condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine and which was supported by the United States and all countries of the EU and NATO (United Nations, 2014a).

On 17th April 2014, the meeting of Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, US, EU and Russia in Geneva tried to encounter measures to stabilise the Ukrainian-Russian relations. According to its results of the quadrilateral meeting, there was made a joint statement, according to which the parties had agreed on initial concrete steps to de-escalate tensions, refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions (Permanent Delegation of the European Union to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva, 2014)

There is no doubt that the annexation of the Crimea by Russian was a direct consequence of the political crisis in Ukraine that arose because of the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that in 2010-2013 the Ukrainian authorities act to ensure social and political stability and measures to strengthen national security factors on the Crimean peninsula.This situation caused that the European politicians lacked political courage, determination and responsibility.

41 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia faced problem of how to divide the Black Sea Feet stationed in Sevastopol. Each of the states declared the Fleet as their own. Some former Soviet sailor declared their allegiance to Russia, others were loyal to Ukraine. 166 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Oleksiy Haran, professor at University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, expresses that “the response of the West to the events in Crimea was weak; if it had been strong enough, the Russian invasion would not have continued in the Eastern Ukraine. Western sanctions have been delayed, but finally have they started to work” (Hetmanchuk, 2014). Former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2014) Radosław Sikorski shares this point of view mentioning that the absence of the reaction from the European Union caused Russia to use economic pressure and annex Crimea. “Outside the EU, live Europeans who are willing to resolutely to fight for the European principles and norms than in some EU countries, they must not be betrayed and disappointed”, underlines Sikorski (Ipress, 2014).

In March 2014, the European Council adopted first diplomatic response to military aggression of Russia against Ukraine. The European Union strongly condemned the annexation of the Crimea did not recognise it. As there were no steps by Russia to de-escalate the situation, the EU introduced the first level of restrictive measures (17th March 2014) in the form of a visa ban and asset freeze against persons who infringed upon the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

After the occupation of two other eastern regions in Ukraine by military aggression in, the Council imposed economic sanctions against Moscow on 31st July 2014, which were reinforced in September 2014. One of the crucial aspects in de-escalation of decision in March 2015 to tie the duration of the economic sanctions against Russia to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The restrictive measures of the EU on Russia last until 31st January 2017.

Among the major diplomatic events it is worth noting cancellation of the G8 summit in Sochi in spring 2014 and holding it without Russia in the form of G7 on 4th-5th June 2014 in Brussels. All the EU Member States supported the suspension of negotiations on Russia’s accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency. Moreover, the EU-Russia summits were also cancelled and the European countries decided not to hold bilateral summit meetings with Moscow. There were also suspended bilateral talks with Russia to abolish the visa regime and sign of a new strategic agreement between the EU and Russia.

After the extension of personal restrictive measures, the total number is 146 individuals and 37 institutions. The limitations include visa bans and freezing of assets on the territory of the EU. Among them are high government officials, the State Duma and the Council of the

167 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Federation of Russia, administration officials the Russian president, military leaders, so-called “leaders” of the Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk terrorists and oligarchs close to Putin.

In terms of economic restrictive measures, they continue against Russia’s economic activity in temporarily occupied Crimea and Sevastopol. It is about prohibitions and restrictions for EU companies and individuals for activities in Crimea in economic, financial and investment sectors, energy, tourism.

European individuals and companies cannot buy real estate or firms in the Crimea, finance them or provide them with related services. The EU tour operators cannot work in the Crimea and Sevastopol and European cruise ships cannot enter the ports of the Crimean peninsula, except for emergency cases either (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy

*The lack of oil drilling technologies causes losses of 50-70 million tons of oil by 2030, equivalent to 25 billion euro at 70 dollars per bbl

168 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Source: Harlik, P. (2015). Russia - Economic Turmoil and Policy Options: Reorientation Away From the EU? The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 77th East Jour Fixe of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Friday, May 29, 2015.

Brussels also restricted export of certain goods and technologies for Crimean companies and vice versa, no import of goods from the Crimea, except if they have a certificate of origin issued by the competent authority of Ukraine. The restrictions are also related to transport industry, telecommunications and energy sectors, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources.

The EU imposed sanctions five Russian state banks, three leading energy companies, the top three companies of defense industry, as well as offices of these institutions in the EU. The EU citizens and companies cannot buy or sell new foreign bonds, shares and other financial instruments, whose redemption period exceeds 30 days. Mediation assistance in financial operations of Russia’s institutions is also prohibited. The EU citizens and companies cannot lend the listed Russian banks and companies with repayment duration exceeding 30 days (Table 14).

Table 14: EU restrictive measures against Russia and the Crimea (individuals, companies and officials) in 2014-2016

Stage Spheres

First Round

17th March European Union Council Decision imposed sanctions against 21 2014 Russian and Crimean politicians and officials, in particular: banned them entry to the EU or transit, as well as freezing all funds and economic resources owned or controlled by those persons (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014b).

20th March Cancellation of EU-Russia summit, scheduled for June 2014 (European 2014 Council, 2014a: 13).

21st March Included 12 more public and military figures of Russia and the Crimea

169 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

2014 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014c).

The EU countries prohibited their embassies in Russia grant visas for the inhabitants of the Crimea (Paul; 2015: 2). 25th March 2014

Second Round

12th May 13 more people and 2 Crimean companies seized in Ukraine in the 2014 sanction list. The Council called on all UN Members to adopt economic, commercial and financial measures against Russia because of the annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol (Council of the European Union, 2014b).

29th May 17 more persons and 2 companies in the sanction list (Council of the 2014 European Union; 2014c).

12th July 11 more persons in the sanction list (Council of the European Union, 2014 2014d).

18th July European Investment Bank stopped funding new projects in Russia on 2014 the recommendations of the European Council (European Council, 2014b)

Third Round

30th July Sanctions against 8 persons and several companies. A ban on 2014 investment in infrastructure, transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, as well as oil, gas and minerals. A ban equipment supply for these sectors, as well as providing for their financial and insurance services.

A prohibition on the purchase of more than 250 types of products, including minerals and hydrocarbons. European financial institutions are not allowed to lend or acquire shares in the projects that are affected by sectoral sanctions (Council of the European Union, 2014e).

170 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

29th-31st The Council adopted a package of targeted “economic sanctions”. July 2014 These measures concern exchanges with Russia in specific economic sectors. The sanctions against “Sberbank of Russia”, VTB Bank, “Gazprombank”, “Vnesheconombank”, “Rosselkhozbank”. An embargo on the import and export of weapons to Russia; a ban on the export of dual-use goods and technologies for military use in Russia or the Russian military end-users. Obliged exporters to obtain prior authorisation from the competent authorities of the Member States on the export of certain types of energy equipment and technology in Russia and also imposed a ban on the supply of Russian high-tech equipment for oil production in the Arctic, the deep offshore and shale oil (Council of the European Union, 2014f).

12th A new package of restrictive measures targeting exchanges with Russia September in specific economic sectors entered into force, reinforcing the 2014 measures adopted on 31 July:

 The Council prohibited organisation of debt financing of three Russian fuel and energy companies: “Rosneft”, “Transneft” and “Gazprom Neft”;  Prohibited sale of bonds of these companies with a maturity of over 30 days and involved in arranging such securities;  Tightened restrictions on lending and investment services to five Russian banks: “Sberbank of Russia”, “VTB Bank”, “Gazprombank”, “Vnesheconombank”, “Rosselkhozbank”.  Forbade debt financing for the three largest defense companies: “Uralvagonzavod”, “Oboronprom” and “United Aircraft Corporation”.  Included nine Russian defense companies and 24 people into the sanctions list (Council of the European Union, 2014g), (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014d). 28th The Council freezes assets and bans visa travels to 13 persons and five November entities involved in action against Ukraine’s territorial integrity in

171 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

2014 eastern Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2014h).

20th The Council prohibited investment in the Crimea and Sevastopol December (Council of the European Union, 2014i): 2014  the European companies cannot purchase real estate and businesses in the Crimea or the Crimean financing companies; cannot provide tourist services on the peninsula (entry of tourist liners is only in case of emergency);  A ban on the supply of about 200 names of the goods: transport- related technology, telecommunications, gas exploration and production, oil and mineral resources and precious metals.  The provision of technical assistance, construction and engineering services is also prohibited 29th The Council agreed to extend the existing individual restrictive January measures, targeting 132 persons and 28 entities for threatening or 2015 undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, until September 2015 in response to the escalation of fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

16th As requested by the Foreign Affairs Council of 9 February, an asset February freeze and an EU travel ban were imposed to 19 persons and 9 entities 2015 involved in action against Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Official Journal of the European Union, 2015: 7)

22nd June The Council extended EU economic sanctions against Russia until 31 2015 January 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2015b).

14th The Council prolonged the restrictive measures against 149 people and September 37 entities until 31st July 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2015 2015c).

21st The Council prolonged the sanctions against Russia until 31st July December 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2015d).

172 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

2015

10th March The Council prolonged the restrictive measures against 146 people and 2016 37 entities until 15th September 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2016a).

14th March The EU recommended the European banks to refrain from purchasing 2016 Russian sovereign bonds (Financial Times, 2016).

17th June The Council prolonged sanctions against Crimea until 23rd June 2017 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2016b).

01st July The Council prolonged the economic sanctions targeting specific 2016 sectors of the Russian economy until 31 January 2017 (Council of the European Union, 2016c).

15th The Council prolonged until 15 March 2017 the application of September sanctions targeting actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 2016 sovereignty and independence. These sanctions consist of an asset freeze and a travel ban against 146 persons and 37 entities (Council of the European Union, 2016d).

09th The EU added six members of the Russian Federation State Duma November elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea 2016 and the city of Sevastopol to the list of persons subject to restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (Council of the European Union, 2016e).

19th The Council extended the application of economic sanctions targeting December specific sectors of the Russian economy, until 31 July 2017. This was 2016 decided following the European Council meeting on 15 December 2016, where the leaders assessed the progress in implementing the Minsk agreements and paved the way for a further extension of sanctions (Council of the European Union, 2016f).

03rd The Council extended until 6 March 2018 the asset freezes against 15

173 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

March people identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian 2017 state funds or for the abuse of office causing a loss to Ukrainian public funds (Council of the European Union, 2017a).

13th The Council prolonged for a further six months, until 15 September March 2017, the application of sanctions targeting actions against Ukraine's 2017 territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The measures consist of asset freezes and a travel ban applying to 150 people and 37 entities (Council of the European Union, 2017b).

19th June The Council extended the restrictive measures in response to the illegal 2017 annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia until 23 June 2018. The measures apply to EU persons and EU based companies. They are limited to the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol (Barigazzi, 2017).

28th June The Council prolonged economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of 2017 the Russian economy until 31 January 2018. This decision follows an update from President Macron and Chancellor Merkel to the European Council of 22-23 June 2017 on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (Council of the European Union, 2016f).

04th The EU has added 3 Russian nationals and 3 companies involved in the August transfer of gas turbines to Crimea to the list of persons subject to 2017 restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (Deutsche Welle, 2017).

As for military domain, there is an embargo on import and export of weapons, technologies and commodities used in the military sphere, as well as dual-use technologies. The EU abolished licenses for export of equipment, products and services used to search and production of oil on the sea area at a depth of over 150 meters, and in the Arctic. Exports of other equipment and technologies in the energy sector has to take approval of EU Member States.

174 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The war continued in August with massive losses from the both sides, the occupied territories were on the brink of humanitarian catastrophe. In order to de-escalate the conflict, the representatives of Ukraine, Russia and 2 separatist leaders42 of self-proclaimed republics signed “Minsk Protocol” on 5th September 2014 in Minsk, Belarus after extensive talks under the auspices of the OSCE43 (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014) (Appendix 1). The truce was based upon the peace plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko, presented in late June 2014 with some amendments of the President of Russia. The protocol consists of twelve points, the most important of which are to ensure bilateral ceasefire, release of hostages, to ensure early local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian law, to withdraw illegal armed groups and military equipment (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2014). Unfortunately, the accord did not came into force: the separatists held illegal elections on occupied territories, and almost every day the war took lives of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians as the ceasefire did not work. Moreover, the Russian and pro-Russian troops enlarged its territory by occupying new cities and villages in spite of the established by the Trilateral Contact Group line of division.

The Minsk Protocol did not functioned entirely and the active war in January made the European leaders to enhance their participation in the peace-making negotiations. The

42 The representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and the terrorist leaders of two self-proclaimed creations form the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, the main objective of which is to encounter the diplomatic solution for the war in the East of Ukraine. The group was created in May 2004.

43 First negotiations in format of Ukraine, the US, EU, Russia were held on 17th April 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland. During the talks, Russia denied its involvement in the aggression against Ukraine and tried to persuade other participants in acknowledging terrorist organisations in the occupied territories.

On 5th March 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during talks with US Secretary of State John Kerry proposed Russian plan on peaceful settlement of the situation in Ukraine. It was in fact a plan for gradual international isolation of Ukraine, its russification, territorial division, liquidation of its statehood. According to the plan, Ukraine should not sign the Association Agreement with the EU; refuses to join NATO; postpones presidential elections; begins to develop a new constitution based on idea of federalisation and making Russian the second official (state) language). Obviously, neither Ukraine nor the US and Western European countries supported this plan.

A newly elected President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko presented a new peace-making initiative according to which a cease-fire would be installed; illegal armed forces should leave Ukraine’s territory by guaranteed hallway security. Kyiv proposed also amnesty those who did not commit serious crime and initiated decentralisation and reconstruction programmes in Donbas. The plan came into vigour unilaterally by Ukraine on 20th June 2014 for seven days and then extended for three days. Russia ignored this plan though, increased support for armed groups, and augmented its militia presence along the Ukrainian-Russian border.

Russia insisted on a change the format of negotiations. On 2nd July 2014, the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Germany, France and signed a Berlin Declaration providing for creation of a Trilateral Contact Group comprising representatives of the OSCE, Ukraine and Russia. 175 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

German Chancellor A. Markel and the French President F. Holland made their proposals towards resolving the conflict during the trips to Kyiv and Moscow on 5th and 6th February respectively. After negotiations on the level of the foreign ministries, the Chancellor of Germany and the Presidents of France, Ukraine and Russia44 had a meeting on 11th-12th February 2015 in Minsk, calling the meeting Minsk II. After sixteen hours of negotiations, the parties agreed to a new package of peace-making measures entitling “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”45 (Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe, 2015). It worth mentioning that the new accord does not cancels the previous one, the Minsk Protocol from September 2014, but enhances and makes the agreement more precise. The agreement, signed by the Contact Group, has thirteen points like immediate and comprehensive ceasefire and its strict, withdrawal of heavy weapons by both parties at a distance in order to create a security zone. The OSCE had to monitor and verify the ceasefire regime (Map 5).

44 The leaders of the four states are named as “Normandy format” (Appendix 2), which comes from the first meeting of the heads of the four states on 6th June 2014 in Château de Bénouville in Normandy, France, during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Operation Overlord. The second meeting was held on 16th -17th October 2014 in Milan, Italy, during the Asia-Europe Meeting (a forum aiming to enhance relations between the EU Member States and most of the Asian countries). The meeting in Minsk, February 2015, was the third joint meeting of the Normandy Four. The format operates mainly through telephone calls between the heads of states and respective ministers of foreign affairs. 45 The second document is a declaration by Poroshenko, Putin, Hollande, and Merkel about their support of the package of measures reaffirming “full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” (United Nations; 2015a). Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 was though not mentioned in the declaration. 176 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 5: Separatists-Ukraine Border According to the Minsk Negotiations

Source: BBC. (2015). Ukraine crisis in maps: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526 Viewed 30.09.2016.

From my point of view, the Minsk II agreement has several significant disadvantages: first of all, Ukraine officially recognises two unrecognised semi-republics as the sides of the conflict, despite the fact that they are completely governed by Kremlin. These negotiations allowed Putin to return, partially, on the international arena. He does not already participates in international summits, but leaders of other states visit him and ask him for truce. The last Minsk agreement did not mentioned the occupation of Crimea, but one cannot forget that Crimea is a significant part in the context of the Russia’s military intervention.

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian active war in February-March 2014, some Western experts considered that the conflict could be resolved by so-called finlandisation of Ukraine in order to include Russian interests in European integration of Ukraine. This means

177 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) that Russia recognises Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for the refusal from NATO to accept Ukraine as its member.

The term finlandisation originates in Western Germany policy in late 1960s-1970s and was used by NATO Member States in reference to the decision of a country not to challenge a more powerful neighbour in order to maintain its national sovereignty. This conception was used in reference to Finland’s foreign policy in relation to the USSR during the Cold War.

American political scientist Henry Kissinger (2014, who served as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, made four proposals towards the conflict, which were published by The Washington Post as an op-ed piece on 5th March 2014:

1. “Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe”; 2. “Ukraine should not join NATO”, the position that was first mentioned seven years ago; 3. “Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country”. Mr. Kissinger imagined an international position for Ukraine similar to Finland; 4. Ukraine should maintain sovereignty over Crimea. In March 2015, American political scientist and geostrategist, Zbigniew Brzeziński declared at the Brussels Forum46 that (TVN24, 2015):

The resolution of the conflict can be reached ... so, as in the case of Finland after the

Second World War. That is not by unilateral decision, when Ukraine integrates with

the West, becoming part of the EU and NATO, and Russia becomes compromised and

must retreat.47

46 The German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum is an annual high-level meeting of European North American the most influential intellectual leaders that shape a new transatlantic agenda in order to adapt to changing global realities and new threats

47 Original in Polish: “Rozwiązanie tego konfliktu może być osiągnięte, jeśli Zachód będzie stanowczy i zjednoczony, w sposób nieco podobny do sytuacji, w której znalazła się Finlandia po II wojnie światowej, czyli 178 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Later in March 2015, Mr. Brzeziński pronounced that if Ukraine joins the European Union and the NATO, “it would be too big slap in the face for Russia” (Ćosić, 2015). The idea of finlandisation of Ukraine is also supported by the Czech President Miloš Zeman, that Ukraine should not join NATO and has to stay neutral (Radiosvoboda.ua, 2014). In June 2015, Mr. Brzeziński gave an interview to German journal Der Spiegel where he did not change his stance concerning Ukraine’s neutrality: “Die Ukraine sollte das Recht haben, ihre politische Identität frei zu wählen und sich enger an Europa zu binden. Gleichzeitig muss Russland versichert werden, dass die Ukraine nicht in die Nato aufgenommen wird. Das ist die Lösungsformel”.

Nonetheless, the Finnish model of foreign policy has already been in Ukraine, which was called “multi-vector foreign policy” – during more than two decades, Kyiv did not provide active policy on integration towards the EU and NATO and hardly participated in the Moscow’s led regional organisations.

All the Ukraine’s Presidents drifted to the West, however, which irritated Russia. The process of finlandisation did not made Ukraine a part of European, Occidental world, but neutral and more loyal to Russia.

Gustav Gressel (2015), an expert of the European Council on Foreign Relations, discloses there scenarios of Russia’s further acts in Ukraine. The first scenario is total aggression and occupation of all Ukraine, but it “seems highly unlikely”. Russia does not have enough resources to support an occupation regime across Ukraine. Kremlin would not be able to buy local complicity and fight a counterinsurgency campaign all over the occupied territory.

The second option is the conquest Ukraine up to the Dnieper River and create a so-called “Novorossiya”. According to Gressel, this scenario does not include probable centres of resistance and would increase possibilities for negotiations with Ukraine on federalisation issues. Kremlin would have to finance completely the necessities of the occupied terrains as private enterprises would avoid doing business there for fear of Western sanctions. Moreover, Russia could not be confident that Ukraine cease to continue European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Hence, Russia would lose the rest of Ukraine.

nie jednostronne rozwiązanie, że Ukraina wchodzi do Zachodu, staje się częścią UE, NATO, a Rosja zostaje skompromitowana i musi się cofnąć” 179 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The third, most likely scheme of action, foresees limited offensives against Ukrainian forces to demonstrate Kyiv that the violence will end on Kremlin’s terms and worsen the economic situation in Ukraine. Russia is not aiming at ending the standoff quickly. It knows that “the longer the economic crisis persists, the greater will be pressure on the government in Kyiv to find a compromise” and the West becomes its main financial donor.

If Ukraine collapse after several years after continuing war without rapid military victory of Russia, it would deter the West from trying to support any further “Colour Revolution” in Russia’s near abroad (Gressel, 2015).

In the end, I would like to suggest some recommendations to the European Union in resolution of the conflicts:

Stage 1: The EU has to find the solution of withdrawing Russian troops from Eastern Ukraine, the Tauric Peninsula and Transnistria and led Ukraine and Moldova take their administrative borders under full control.

Stage 2: The EU should improve the use of ENP instruments in three crucial areas:

1. Diplomatic support to direct negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria;

2. Enhancing Moldova’s Ukraine’s democracies in view of improving their functioning and their conflict resolution potential;

3. Stabilising Ukraine’s and Moldova’s economies in order to enhance its attractiveness for the population of eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Transnistria respectively;

Stage 3: The EU need to increase its involvement in the conflict settlements:

1. Brussels must declare the resolution of the conflicts priority of the Eastern Partnership;

2. Find more united and coherent approach towards Russia, fist of all, endure sanctions, weaken energy dependence on Russia;

3. Prepare the ground within the EU and for peacekeeping missions in eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Transnistria.

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It is still difficult to study the final effects of the Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2014-2016. The occupation of the Crimea by Russia and the war in eastern Ukraine are now testing the bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine. Analysing the current situation, I can state that the EU has not used its political capacity fully to resolve the crisis in Ukraine and transforms it in one of the “frozen” conflicts in the Black Sea region. Ukraine has to return annexed Crimea through legitimate, legal and regulatory procedure at the International Criminal Court headquartered in The Hague.

I would also advise to initiate Geneva format of talks with an expanded agenda and staff members, including China. These talks would aim to reform security and co-operation in Europe; relations between NATO, Ukraine and Russia. A new Budapest format is also a good opportunity for the crisis settlement. The Guarantor of the security of Ukraine (signatories of the Budapest Memorandum) Ukraine, possibly the European Union, the UN and OSCE would participate in a new format aiming at guaranteeing peace and security in Ukraine in the context of preparation and implementation of a new peace plan.

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II. 4.3. Eurasian Economic Union as false Alternative to the European Union or neo- imperial Project of Russia.

These two projects are historically and inherently different projects

Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council (2009-2014)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, fifteen “new-born” countries face tremendous social- economic challenges because of complete incompatibility of their economy in the world market economy. Apart from the devolution (decentralisation) processes in the post-Soviet space, all the new countries tries to integrate in international and regional blocks. Some countries grouped together in order to facilitate their adaptation into new reality, e.g. Baltic states.

From David Cadier’s standpoint (2014: 6), a researcher of London School of Economic and Political Sciences, Russia has attempted to develop Moscow-led organisations as a response to the Eastern Partnership initiative, which is considered a threat to Russia’s economic interests in the common neighbourhood.

Nonetheless, “common history”, similar mentality of most of peoples and economic interdependence caused new integration structures in post-Soviet space under the Russian leadership, based upon its cultural strategy. According to Heitor Barras Romana (2016: 23), its neo-Eurasian ideology supports the doctrinal adjustments of the Great Russian strategy seeking to play with geography and energy security, regaining space in its “inner-world”, while attempting to approach Europe through a proposal for the construction of a “Greater Europe” – from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

The first idea of creating a new regional trade organisation was suggested by President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in 1994. In 1995, three post-Soviet countries, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and later Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signed first accords on the establishment of a Customs Union aiming to create open borders between the countries (Eurasian Economic Community, 1995). Next year, 1996, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed a Treaty on Increased in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields to create a common economic space with common market of goods, services, capital and workforce, and to develop unified transport, energy and informational systems (Eurasian Economic Community, 1996). In order to implement these treaties, these four countries and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space in 1999 182 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) that aimed to complete the formation of the Customs Union and create a Common Economic Space (Eurasian Economic Community, 1999). This accord, in fact, became a base for evolution of idea of Eurasian integration up to 2015 and the Eurasian Economic Union.

In 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan48 signed a Treaty on establishment of Eurasian Economic Community that came into force on 30th May 2001 (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2014: 7). The new economic union aimed to create a free trade area, form common energy market, transport system, &c. One of the principal tasks of the union was harmonisation of economic for future single currency. In 2003 Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan signed the second Treaty on the Single Economic Space (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2014: 7). The Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan finally began to work in July 2010 within the Eurasian Economic Community as basic economic organisation. In December 2010, the leaders of these states made a political decision to launch a process of creating a Eurasian Economic Union. In November 2011, Presidents of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan signed a Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration establishing the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015, denying re-creation of the Soviet Union (BBC, 2011). The Declaration also defined the establishment of Single Economic Space on 1st January 2012 that sought to gradually develop a cohesive economic space of the three states and established the Eurasian Economic Commission, modelling on the European Commission, serving as regulatory institution for the three organisations – Eurasian Customs Union, Single Economic Space and Eurasian Economic Union (Zagorski, 2012).

The last step on establishing the Eurasian Economic Union was signing the Treaty by presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus on 29th May 2014. According to the treaty, the EurAsEU was officially established in 1st January 2015 (Garcés de los Fayos, 2014: 4). In 2015, the Union was enlarged – Agreement to enlarge the EEU to Armenia was signed on 9th October 2014 and came into force on 2nd January 201549. Kyrgyzstan signed the agreement on 23rd December 2014 and will become the member of the Union in May 2015 (Table 15).

48 Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community in 2006, but left it in 2008.

49 Armenia announced its decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union in September 2013 when Armenia President Sargsyan had meeting with Russian President Putin. After the meeting, the Armenian President refused to sign the AA with the EU. 183 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 15: Chronology of Key Eurasian Economic Union Developments

Date Feature

6th October 2007 Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a treaty launching the Eurasian Economic Union

1st January 2010 The Customs Union of three states came into existence and its Commission started to work

1st July 2010 (6th A Treaty of Customs Service came into force and the Customs Code July 2010 for becomes effective Belarus)

1st July 2011 Internal physical border controls were eliminated

1st January 2012 Eurasian Economic Space was established by functioning of a single market for goods, services, capital and labour. Eurasian Economic Commission

1st July 2012 Eurasian Economic Commission replaced the ECU Commission

1st January 2015 Eurasian Economic Union came into effect

Source: Author’s own compilation

Having become President of Russia for the third time in 2012, Putin strengthened the economic dimension of Russia’s influence. The geopolitical reality during the last decade, when the EU has not become a geopolitical player yet but is still regional organisation with serious economic and political problems; the US commence to reconsider their place in current world seeking economic advantages of being super power, gives Putin an opportunity to make his geopolitical dream come true – to restore the power and influence of post-Soviet space. Putin was an initiator of a new mission of the Eurasian Economic Union – to create a new centre of power as a result of economic integration modelled on the European Union.

Most of the CIS countries have tied economic relations with members of EEU, mainly with Russia, and some analysts think that the aim to increase these relations may become an impetus for Eurasian integration. The EEU can enlarge and increase its significance in world 184 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) economy because most of post-Soviet states have no geopolitical or geo-economic alternative (Tikhonov, 2013), (Goltsov, 2014: 30). I think that the EEU may enlarge only to the rest of countries of Turkestan and other countries have no plans on joining this organisation because of small dimension of economy of the EEU comparing to similar economic blocks. Even Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not interested in joining this Eurasian economic integration. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have already signed the AAs with the EU and will not join the EEU that wanted Kremlin, because accession of these countries to the Eurasian Economic Union would have increased the economic potential of the block and its position in world economy.

Developing its neo-imperial goals in the neighbourhood, Russia tries to impede the development of alternative projects of integration in post-Soviet space50. That is why, Russia has made political and economic pressure on countries that did not choose the EEU, e.g. trade wars. The political and economic situation in Russia is better that in most of neighbouring countries, which Moscow uses to influence the states. A good example of Russia’s pressure on the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development that halted its functioning since 2010.

To consider the EEU an alternative integration project to the European Union, one must analyse the comparison of these blocks from economic and political point of view. The GDP of the EEU, even after Armenia and Kyrgyzstan enter, is about $2.6 trillion with population of 170 million comparing to about $18 trillion and 500 million people (Matlack, 2014). Hence, GDP per capita of the EU is much higher than the EEU’s. Apart from GDP, economic freedom of the states is also an important factor of nations’ well-being and potential for economic growth. According to the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, elaborated by the Heritage Foundation (2015), countries with higher level of economic freedom have stronger economies, combat poverty with greater success, and have higher level of human development. Comparison of the countries of the EU and the EEU show that all of the EU countries are “mostly free” and “moderately free” economies (except for Greece that is “mostly unfree” economy), whereas Russia is considered “mostly unfree” economy and Belarus – “repressed”, being on 143th and 153th space respectively (Tables 16, 17).

50 Such tradition of carring bi- and multilateral relations goes along with mobilisation of a great part of society around “cidadela do Kremlin” and defense of “pátria russa-ródina”, justifying system of power constructed by leadership core of security elites and military heir of a soviet model of two centreas of power (Lara, 2011: 144). 185 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 16: SWOT analysis of possible impact of the Eurasian Economic Union of economies of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus Internal Strong Weakness factors spread of Russia’s political obsolete technology; influence; high level of unemployment;

higher possibility for conflict low competitiveness and product quality; resolution; high energy consumption for industry purposes easier settlement of issue of transit of energy supplies through countries’ territories to Europe (Ukraine in particular);

common customs union

 co External Opportunities Threats factors free trade within the union; energy and economic dependence from Russia; development of economic relations; Moldova and Ukraine would be in

political sphere of Russian influence; use of Ukraine as a resource base

Source: Author’s complation and Osadcha, N. (2012). Vplyv Mytnoho Soyuzu Rosiyi, Bilorusi ta Kazakhstanu na zovnishnioekonomichnu diyalnist Ukrayiny, Ekonomichni innovatsiyi, No. 47.

186 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Table 17: PEST analysis of possible joining Ukraine and Moldova into the Eurasian Economic Union Political factors Economic factors spread of Russia’s political influence; creation of favourable investment environment; higher possibility for conflict resolution; trade expansion between the countries of easier settlement of issue of transit of the Union; energy supplies through countries’ territories to Europe (Ukraine in increase in demand and volumes of particular); production; common customs union creation of a common market of goods, services and capital; preferential gas prices; reduction of transportation cost

Social factors Technological factors common social and cultural values possible improvement of industry (religion, history, language); development; common labour market; technological convergence between increase of social benefits and quality of economy; life use of new technologies in production; higher competitiveness

Source: Author’s own compilation

The Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International (2014), shows in its last edition a big gap in corruption levels in the EU and the EEU. For instance, in the list of 175 countries, Belarus (119), Kazakhstan (126) and Russia (136) are amongst the most corrupted states in the world. In the EU, the highest perceived level of public sector corruption is in Romania, which is on the 69th place in the list. In terms of democracy, the citizens of the European Union have more political and civic rights. Freedom House published annual reports on situation of democracy in the world. Annual score given to each state/region is based upon a number of indicators of political rights and civil liberties, where free countries have open political process, strong opposition, representation of minorities, 187 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) freedom of speech, and independent judicial system. All the EU Member States are “free”, according to the last Report (2015). Amongst four categories (free, partly free, not free, and worst of the worst) Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan are “not free” with tendency of deteriorating the situation. Countries with not free democracies, or better non-democratic countries, have very limited political rights and freedoms with political prisoners and existence of freedom of speech.

The EEU has no specialised institutions that could regulate integration of economies of the members. As in the EU, the most important institution of the EEU is summit of head of state. Nonetheless, other institutions as Eurasian Economic Commission or courts cannot influence the organisation policy or decision-making mechanism; they can only make recommendations.

The Eurasian Economic Union began functioning on 1st January 2015 and already has complicated obstacles in its development. First, neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan are planning to lose its sovereignty before Russia. These countries are not interested in transforming the EEU into a Eurasian Union as a political union with supranational institutions and common currency. Their goal is to enhance economic relations with their neighbours (Map 6).

188 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 6: Eurasian Economic Union

Source: Political Geography Now. (2015). What is the “Eurasian Union”? http://www.polgeonow.com/2015/04/what-is-eurasian-union-map.html Viewed 16.08.2016.

Knowing how Russia execute agreements, Belarus insisted on making an amendment to the treaty of the EEU that elucidates a process to exit the organisation. “Its essence [the amendment to the treaty of the EEU] is that if the agreements we have reached will follow, we will do everything concerning the EEU. If they do not comply, we reserve the right to exit from this union”, said President Lukashenka at the summit on 1st January 2015 (DT.UA, 2015). Belarus and Kazakhstan did not supported Russia’s sanctions against West as a response to sanctions of the EU and US because of Russia’s agression against Ukraine. Moreover, they did not support Russia’s occupation of the Crimea but recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine. “Dann müsse man praktisch das ganze russische Hoheitsgebiet 189 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Russlands an die Mongolei zurückgeben”, said President Likashenka (Sommer, 2015) (Table 18).

Table 18: Comparison of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union

European Eurasian Economic Union Union

Population, million people 503 170

GDP, trillion US dollars 16,4 2,3

Import, trillion US dollars 2,4 0,4

Average salary, thousand 29 8 US dollars

Source: Eurasian Economic Commission. (2014). Eurasian Economic Integration: facts and figures: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/Documents/broshura26_ENGL_ 2014.pdf Viewed 17.04.15

I share the idea of K. Sheryazdanova (2011) that the transformation processes in Eurasia in last decades on the 20th century and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union force Russia to develop a new level of relations with large and small countries in Europe and Asia based upon integration, economic and military-political co-operation.

Hence, the idea of Eurasianism was not just a philosophical idea, it becomes a strategic element of Russia’s foreign policy. Consequently, Moscow classifies now large-scale foreign projects in the world according to the criterion of “Eurasianism” or “Atlanticism”. Modern adepts of Eurasianism focus on rapid decline of Western liberalism.

The Eurasian neo-imperial project includes three scales of implementation: planetary, regional and internal. Russia sees its role missionary in creation of Eurasian civilisation, which has to be one of the poles multipolar world. The favourable geostrategic position of Russia together with territorial, energy, military and foreign policy resources should ensure Russia a status of great power in the world.

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II.4.4. EU and Russian Soft Power.

I believe that the “soft power” of EU will be stronger than “the big stick” of Russia.

Hanne Severinsen,

co-rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for Ukraine

The term “soft power” was first mentioned in 1990 by Professor of Harvard University Joseph Nye (1990) that refers to complex of diplomatic, economic, political, military, legal and cultural non-coercive instruments of influence on situation in foreign countries in the interests of national safety.

According to Nye, the soft power includes international co-operation political, military, economic, cultural spheres, &c; participation in post-conflict recovery in other countries; use of information technology to control large masses of people (including social networks in recent years); launch of educational and internship programmes for foreign citizens (Tables 19 and 20).

Table 19: Nye’s Three Types of Power

Type of Power Behaviours Primary Government Currencies Policies

Military coercion threats coercive diplomacy

deterrence force war

protection alliance

Economic inducement payments aid

coercion sanctions bribes

sanctions

Soft attraction values public diplomacy

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agenda setting culture bilateral and multilateral policies diplomacy institutions

Source: Riaz, S. (2014). Hard and Soft Power – Two Sides of the Same Coin? A Quantitate Examination, IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (2): 187-214.

The main difference between the soft power and the hard power lies tools and instruments for their implications – the soft power uses tools of consensus, foreign policy measures and co- operation. The hard power is based on the use of forces and imposition of coercive capabilities, whereas the soft means of power aim at attracting other countries to their culture, way of life, political ideals and programmes.

Table 20: Soft and Hard Power

Type of Behaviour Sources Examples Power

Soft Attract and co-opt Inherent qualities, Charisma

Communications Persuasion, example

Hard Threaten and induce Threats, intimidation. Hire, fire, demote

Payment, rewards Promotions, compensation

Source: Nye, J. (2006). Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership, John F. Kennedy School of Government, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf Viewed 17.09.2016 192 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Russia has a great potential of the soft power in the “Common Neighbourhood” with the EU thank to a number of reasons:

 Russia inherited from the USSR a potential of cultural and informational influence;

 Most of the population of CIS members have good attitude to Russia and the Russians;

 Other CIS countries have low developed potential to influence other states.

Russia has been successfully using the soft power relying on its international experience and implementing its own tools. Moscow’s policies on its soft power attained a new level in mid- 2012, when Russia’s President stressed the need to build a favourable image of Russia abroad. To this end, Russian authorities had to ensure, using all kinds of the soft power tools, a favourable perception of the Russia’s internal and external policies by international community and claim Russia’s “great” contribution to the world science and culture. National and loyal foreign media were to explain Russia’s position in foreign policy issues, to strengthen the sense of pride for emigrants belonging to the Russian diaspora in Europe and United States; among in the leading countries, spread a sense that Russia is the successor of the USSR in the cultural realm as well. Russian diplomats were given a task to use the soft power in promotion their interests by persuasion and attract of sympathy for Russia, based on achievements not only in material but also in intellectual and cultural spheres.

As to Russia’s image abroad, Moscow founded a special organisation “Rossotrudnichestvo” (official name is the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation) whose bodies are Russian centres of science and culture all over the world. The main objectives of this organisation are: co-operation in education, science, culture and information areas; co- operation in media relations, innovation projects. The Agency drives youth programmes; supports Russian-speaking population abroad by humanitarian co-operation and conducts historical works (Zvyagina, 2013: 112). The main governing body of Rossotrudnichestvo is Russian Centre of Science and Culture. These centres work throughout the post-Soviet countries (Table 21).

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Table 21: Presence of Russian and EU Soft Power Institutions in Eastern European States.

Name of Organisation Belarus Ukraine Moldova

Russian Centre of Science 2 (Minsk and Brest) 1 (Kyiv) 1 (Chișinău) and Culture

EU Information Centres 1 (Minsk) 23 6

Source: Delegation of the European Union to Belarus. (2016a). EU Information Centres in Belarus, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/more_info/eu_information_centres/eu_info_cent_belarus/index_en.htm Viewed 17.09.2016.

As to the EU, in 1960s, the European Communities founded Information Centres in order to promote education and research on European integration. These agencies provide necessary information about the history of and principles of the European Union, common achievements of the Member States, current issues and future strategy of the European Community. Today, there are more than 600 centres are open mainly at universities, national libraries and research centres.

European Union Information Centres obtain information from the official institutions of the European Union (European Commission, European Council, Eurostat &c) and produce a wide variety of publications, periodicals, magazines relating to the activities of the EU. The main objective of the European Union Information Centres: spread of information about the EU and its policies; promote the development and expansion of relations between each country and the EU; inform students about EU programmes and assist in the preparation of scientific and research work on European integration.

Studying the use of hard and soft powers of the European Union, we should bear in mind that while the United States fought with the communist bloc for ideological dominance in the world, Western Europe was engaged in post-war reconstruction of the economy (with US support of course) and then showed the world results of almost five decades of reforms. The Europe became an example of a successful integration project, unprecedented for history of international relations.

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The feature of EU foreign policy is the fact that the results of the successful integration could add to the “arsenal” of all the EU Member States and the EU as a whole. The European Union is actively using its successful experience of political and economic integration, its main resource of soft power, particularly in the framework of enlargement. This most successful component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has become a powerful reason for democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Its strong economic potential indicates the presence instruments of economic pressure or encouragement, the hard power.

Since 1991, the EU launched a wide range of assistance programmes in order to help post- Soviet countries that funded projects in the areas of institutional, legal and administrative reforms; support economic development; mitigate the social consequences during transition period; rural development, nuclear safety and others.

The EU is funding a number of programmes of educational and scientific exchanges both within the EU and with the participation of other countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy offers also the neighbouring countries privileged relations based on mutual recognition of common values, mainly in the field of rule of law; equitable management; human rights, the principles of market economy &c. The implementation of these shared values is the main criterion for the development of bilateral relations with the EU.

Hence, the EU soft power is an example of its own success and is closely linked with a part of hard power as “carrot” of the economic benefits of co-operation. That is why, the formula of Theodore Roosevelt “speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far” does not indicate a weakness of EU’s foreign policy.

The EU’s soft power may be also differentiated by:

 Passive soft power: it includes an attractiveness of the EU international and supranational institutions and foreign policies; a model of regional integration.  Active soft power: public and foreign diplomacy (e.g. European External Action Service); the biggest donor of humanitarian aid in the field of mass media, exchange programmes, providing direct and indirect support for post-Soviet countries.

Culture. Jean Monnet, one of the architects of the modern united Europe, remarked several months before passing away, “Si c’étais à refaire, je commencerais par la culture” (If I had to start anew, I would begin with culture) (Schirmann, 2008: 91). Moreover, one particular EC

195 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) communication to the Parliament and to the Council states that Europe’s cultural identity is nothing less than a “shared pluralistic humanism based on democracy, justice and freedom” (Shore, 2006: 13). Although we are living in the age of the primacy of economics and finance, the Europeans emphasise crucial importance of culture for human development and civilization and the EU documents (European Commission, 2007g) state that

the EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of a “soft power”

founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of

expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue, values which, provided

they are upheld and promoted, can be of inspiration for the world of tomorrow. (p.3)

This quotation has a significant importance when referring to the European Neighbourhood Policy and EU soft power in Eastern Europe. Although the Eastern Partnership means foremost economic co-operation in order to integrate the neighbours into the EU economy, intercultural relations are also important. Moreover, tolerance and intercultural dialogue are basis for the EU soft power.

Cultural relations with Eastern European countries can be useful to strengthen civil society and democratisation. It can support conflict prevention and contribute to peacekeeping dialogues. European national cultural institutes and centres, as the British Council, the German Goethe-Institut &c, have their branch offices in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

In 2012, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (The Official Web Site of the Nobel Prize, 2012) (Table 22).

Table 22: The Soft power instruments of the European Union and Russia in the “Shared Neighbourhood”

European Union Russia

Possibility of membership in long-term Russian Centre of Science and Cultures; prospects; Free visa regime and free labour market; Information Centres;

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Enhanced economic relations; Influence on information space; Bilateral and multilateral programmes on The Russian Orthodox Church; civil society building; Declaring of common history, culture, Support of democracy and European language, mentality; values Loads of pro-Russian organisations stating on closer co-operation with post- Soviet integration projects

Source: Author and Sydoruk, T. V. (2012). Polityka susidstva Yevropeyskoho Soyuzu u Skhidniy Yevropi: model intehratsiyi bez chlenstva. Lviv: PAIS.

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved on 12th February 2013, names “soft power” an indispensable component of modern international relations defining it as “a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy” (Art. 20) (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013). The Russian language traditionally takes one of the key positions in Russia’s soft power. The development of this branch is governed by Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian World) that was founded by the President’s decree on 21st June 2007, aiming at “promoting the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language teaching programs abroad” (Russkiy Mir Foundation, 2007). The ideology of the Russkiy Mir Foundation (hereinafter “the Foundation”) is completely subordinate to the Russia’s state interests that means that “Russian world is the world of Russia”. A Mission Statement mentions that the Russian world is not only the territory of the Russian Federation and its population of 143 million people, but it is much more than that. Professor António de Sousa Lara mentions in his work “Subversão e Guerra Fria” (2011):

a russificação começa com o “Manifesto de Abril” de 1702, de Pedro I, “o Grande”, até

Catarina II (1782-1796). O Czar Nicolau I estabelece, em 1832, o conceito de

“nacionalidade oficial russa”, baseada no jus soli, na vassalagem imperial e na fé

ortodoxa fiel ao Patriarcado de Moscovo e todas as Rússias. (p. 285)

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They are millions of ethnic Russians and their families and descendants around the world making Russian diaspora. Moreover, the Russian world includes foreigners who speak, study or teach Russian, or simply who “have developed an appreciation for Russia” (Russkiy Mir Foundation, 2015). According to the Foundation, forming the Russian world as a global project, Russia gain a new identity, new possibilities for effective co-operation with the rest of the world, which, consequently, becomes an impetus for the Russia’s development. The Foundation focuses on its activity in post-Soviet space, in our case, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, which are considered traditional and natural area of the Russian language, Russian cultural space.

In the sphere of education, in April 2013, the Ministry of education and Science initiated a programme of distance education in Russian that would be available for the Russian compatriots living abroad, particularly in CIS countries. According to the programme, residents will be able to pass exams and receive a certificate of secondary education in the near future. There are also plans to open Russian-language schools and “Russian-Slavic universities” in the CIS countries that would be financed by the programme for $ 1,100 per student. In Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the Foundation manages associations of teachers of Russian, Russian culture centres, associations of “compatriots”, charities, youth movements, FM-radio and other media.

Russian minorities in other countries are central to Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet space. “Compatriots” are the main target of Russian soft power organisations such as Rossotrudnichestvo51, responsible for relations with “compatriots” in the CIS. Konstantin Kosachev, who served as the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, and then was appointed as head of the agency Rossotrudnichestvo expressed his opinion concerning soft power: “Soft power opportunities best meet Russian foreign policy tasks at present. These tasks stem from the need of domestic development […]. They are […] means to modernise the country” (Sharikov; 2013). Nonetheless, the reasons for development soft power do not come from pragmatic and instrumentalist considerations, rather than based upon

51 Rossotrudnichestvo is the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation – is an autonomous agency under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established on 6th September 2008 aiming to co-ordinating various kinds of Russian foreign humanitarian activity, including support for Russian compatriots living abroad, preserving Russian cultural heritage, promoting the Russian culture and language and educational and scientific co- operation (Sharikov, 2013). In is in fact a tool to maintain influence of Russia in the post-Soviet space and to foster friendly ties in order to advance economic and political interests in foreign states. 198 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) ideology. It is clearly understood by Mr. Kossachev’s new declaration: “il faut comprendre que nos compatriotes de l'étranger vivent à présent dans un nouveau contexte géopolitique”.

According to the last censuses, there are almost 800,000 ethnic Russian in Belarus (2009) corresponding to 8% of the state’s population. In Ukraine, more than 8 million citizens are Russian (2001), which is 17% of the population. Nearly 400,000 Russian live in Moldova (2004) making almost 10% of the population.

The politically constructed Russian diaspora is institutionalised by a number of institutions/organisations, such as the Russkiy Dom network (Russia House, a Russian version of the British Council) or the Russkiy Mir Foundation. According to Eleonora Tufaro (2014: 5), Russians uses the defense of interests of Russians abroad to meddle on others’ domestic affairs in much harder ways. For example, Moscow issues passports to the citizens in neighbouring states (mainly Eastern European countries) in order to create and even strengthen pro-Russian forces amongst the population and to influence local politics, which was clearly seen in Ukraine and Moldova. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this “pasportisation” strategy created legal grounds to intervene militarily and occupy Crimea in March 2014 to protect Russian citizens. The similar situation happened in Georgia, when prior to the Russian-Georgia war in 2008, there were issued a great number of Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Transnistria a third region of population was believed to hold Russian passports – about 180,000 Transnistrians hold Russian passport (Ivan, 2014: 3). In April 2014, President Putin signed a law relaxing the requirements for obtaining Russian citizenship for those who are fluent in Russian and live or have lived in the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire within the present boundaries of Russia, which will facilitate and increase political influence and exploitation of Russian minorities by the Russian authorities (Business Standard, 2014). A World Congress of Russian Compatriots is held every three years, but at the last Congress in St. Petersburg in 2012 a number of participants declined (nearly 500) comparing to the previous Congress in Moscow in 2009 (nearly 1000).

The Russian Orthodox Church and its head, Patriarch Kirill, also play an important role in Russia’s soft power in the “Common Neighbourhood”. The Belarusian Orthodox Church and Moldova Orthodox Church are autonomous parts of the Russian Orthodox Church and promote a policy of Patriarch Kirill and Kremlin. The situation in Ukraine slightly different. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, having an administrative but not 199 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) ecclesiastical autonomy, used to be the most popular church in Ukraine. Nonetheless, the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, unrecognised by Moscow, had become the most popular since 2011 on. According to Patriarch Filaret, Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, 60% of Ukrainians support this church and see it as a core of unification of all Ukrainian Orthodox Churches52 (Deutsche Welle, 2015).

Patriarch Kirill I is one of the most influential political figures in Russia. He officially supports the Russian ideology and has become its principal promoter. In 2009, he proclaimed that his principal doctrine was the cultural and spiritual unity of three Eastern Slavic peoples – Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. He mentioned (Bogomolov & Lytvynenko, 2009):

The core of the Russian World today is Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and … regardless

of state divisions, of certain discords in politics, we spiritually, and I would like to

emphasize again, spiritually continue to be one nation, and the majority of us are

children of the Russian Orthodox Church. (p. 12)

Apart from cultural sphere, Ukrainian researcher Tetiana Sydoruk (2011: 160) mentioned another resource of Russia’s soft power – a free visa regime for Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian citizens and possibility of their ease employment in Russia. The vast majority of economic migrants from Ukraine work in Russia, except for workers from western Ukraine who migrate mostly to the EU

Mass Media is a tool par excellance for the soft power. Russian media, especially TV channels, have a significant impact on perception of Russian political processes and mass culture in the neighbouring countries. State monopoly on television allowed Russian media to create a “virtual” world of popular culture, which is effectively blocking public communication and promotes “correct” internal and external policy of Russia. In the Internet space, Russian authorities support individual blogs and websites trying to implement a tough information policy. In particular, Internet Agency “Regnum” and “Новый Мир” (New Region in Russian) are the most successful projects in spreading Russia’s policies. Moreover, position of official Russia spread widely because many media and journalists loyal to Russia use

52 Apart from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, there is also Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with support of 1 % of the population. 200 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Russian information resources and give a distorted information for population (Levchenko, 2014: 44).

The first attempt to measure soft power through a composite index was created and published by the Institute for Government and the media company Monocle in 2010. The Index measured the soft power resources of 26 countries and organised the results according to a framework of five sub-indices – culture, diplomacy, education. business/innovation, and government. As of 2014/15, the list is calculated using around 50 factors that indicate the use of soft power, including the number of cultural missions, Olympic medals, the quality of a country’s architecture and business brands (Monocle, 2015).

According to a Ranking of Soft Power, elaborated by Portland, British PR agency, Russia is on the place 27 among 30 most powerful states. The Portland Index consists of two parts – the objective and subjective measures, respectively constituting 70% and 30%. The subjective indicators are determined by the data of opinion polls. The objective ones are enhancement, culture, government, education, digital and enterprise (Portland Communications, 2015).

Another Soft Power Index was made by Real Instituto Elcano (2015) – the Elcano Global Presence Report scores the European Union first for soft presence when its member states are excluded and the EU is considered as a whole (Table 23).

201 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) Table 23. Comparison of Soft Power Indices

Rank Monocle’s Portland’s Elcano

Soft Power Survey 2014/15 The Soft Power 30 2015 Global Presence Report

2015

1 United Kingdom EU United States United States

2 Germany EU United Kingdom EU United Kingdom EU

3 United States Germany EU Germany EU

4 France EU Canada China

5 Canada France EU France EU

6 Australia Australia RUSSIA

7 Switzerland Europe Japan Japan

8 Japan Switzerland Europe Netherlands EU

9 Sweden EU Sweden EU Canada

10 Netherlands EU Netherlands EU Italy EU

202 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) 11 Denmark EU Italy EU Spain EU

12 Italy EU Spain EU Saudi Arabia

13 Austria EU Denmark EU Australia

14 Spain EU Finland EU Belgium EU

15 Finland EU Norway Europe Republic of Korea

16 New Zealand New Zealand United Arab Emirates

17 Belgium EU Austria EU India

18 Norway Europe Belgium EU Singapore

19 Ireland EU Singapore Brazil

20 South Korea Ireland EU Switzerland Europe

21 Singapore Portugal EU Sweden EU

22 Portugal EU South Korea Norway Europe

23 Brazil Poland EU Mexico

24 Poland EU Brazil Malaysia

203 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) 25 Greece EU Greece EU Turkey

26 Israel Hungary EU Austria EU

27 Czech Republic EU RUSSIA Thailand

28 Turkey China Poland EU

29 Mexico Czech Republic EU Denmark EU

30 China Argentina Ireland EU

Sources:

A) Real Instituto Elcano. (2015). Elcano Global Presence Report, pp. 14-15 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/f36b5f004830c24a8e3b8fe0dd72d861/Global_Presence_2015.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=f36b5f00483 0c24a8e3b8fe0dd72d861 Viewed 15.09.2016. B) Monocle. (2015). Soft Power Survey 2014/15, https://monocle.com/film/Affairs/soft-power-survey-2014-15/ Viewed 15.09.2016. C) Portland Communications. (2015). The Soft Power 30, http://softpower30.portland-communications.com Viewed 15.09.2016.

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II.4.5. EU and Russian Hard Power in Eastern Europe.

Both the European Union and Russia have their own “loyalty programmes” in relation to the states of the “Common Neighbourhood” and the South Caucasus, as a result, a competition arises inevitably. Both players are interested in achieving maximum economic benefits required to secure leadership in the regional and global scale. Worth noting that the foreign policy resources of the European Union and Russia to conduct their policy within Eastern Partnership space are equal: the EU is not yet ready to allocate more funds for the Eastern Partnership and Russia remains attractive due to the prevailing historical, cultural and social ties, visa-free regime and liberal migration policy.

Everyone knows what the hard power is and most of us are familiar with Russian hard power rather than soft power. The hard power is not something new, but has a long history as the hard position in foreign policy allowed state to exist. The Russia’s hard power is mostly based on nineteenth-century paradigms like complete economic dependence of the satellites and strong military force.

The Czarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia may be explained by continuum of the international relations, which was clearly identified in “O Imperial Comunismo” by Professor Maltez (1993). Such continuum is based on encerclement of history, refering to answer of Russian Emperor Alexander the First to the quartion about main allies of Russia in the world. The answer was clear: Russia has only two great alies – its army and navy, the main tools of hard policies implementation.

Natural energy resources is one of the key tools of Moscow’s hard power towards its Western neighbours. Russia sees energy as very valuable tool in raising its international status and influence, mainly regarding the European states and countries in post-Soviet area. Moreover, Russia uses energy cut-offs concerning its neighbours in order to politically influence and maintain the economic coercion. For example, during the last ten years, there were three big energy crises between Russia and Ukraine, not counting the crises in the 1990s. The first crisis occurred in 2005-2006 when Russia (state gas company “Gazprom”) established a market price for per 1,000 cubic meter – approximately $250. Ukraine denied this proposal as earlier Russia had agreed to sell gas for $50 per 1,000 cubic meter until 2010. When the parties did not agree the price, Russia drastically cut off gas on 1st January 2006. Moscow blamed Kyiv of illegally taking gas that was transported to the European states. the crisis was

205 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) resolved only four days later – on 4th January. The other crisis (or rather Russian-Ukrainian economic and political gas war) occurred in 2008-2009. On 1st Janury 2009, Russia reduced gas supplies to Ukraine. Russia proposed new price for gas - $450 per 1,000 cubic meter. The recent conflict about gas price began in 2014 after the Revolution of Dignity and Russian invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territories. Belarus has similar conflicts with Russia in 2006 and 2010. The last 2010 crisis aimed to force Belarus to join Eurasian Customs Union. From Wilson’s and Popescu’s standpoint (2009: 323), every time Russia pushes higher prices and proposes political ways of resolution – to cede energy infrastructure or to fulfill non- economic Russian objectives. Hence, Gazprom controls now majority part in gas distribution company in Moldova (50% of “Moldovagaz”) and 100% in Belarus (“Gazprom Transgaz Belarus”).

The trade embargoes, or trade wars, have accompanied Russian energy pressure. In 21st century, Russia began six trade “battles” with only three neighbours: wine blockade against Moldova in 2005-2009; beef and dairy war with Ukraine in 2006; sugar and diary wars with Belarus in 2006 and 2009 respectively, cheese embargo and chocolate war against Ukraine in 2012 in 2013 respectively. The most recent war is the trade blockade of Ukraine since summer 2013.

Russia has maintained and even significantly increased its military presence in various forms in the EaP countries, mainly in Ukraine. In case of Belarus, Minsk is an ally of Moscow from military point of view as it relies on Russian military bases to ensure security. Today, the military presence of Russia in Belarus is 1,500 people as personnel of radar station and naval communication centre until 2020. In Moldova, there is Russian operational group in Transnistria up to 1,500 people. Here Russia maintains its military presence under the banner of “peacekeepers” in the frozen conflict zone. In case of Ukraine, after the annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian territories, there are no precise data concerning the military presence.

Other “tool” of Russia’s hard power is a “passportisation” of the citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova by providing Russian passports. A number of Russian passport holders in these regions has been growing which makes Russia invoke its national interests in defending its citizens by defending the independence or annexation of these regions (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Transnistria and Găgăúzia). According to the Russian Foreign Office (2014), Russia planned to impose passport regime for the citizens of the CIS 206 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) states since 1st January 2015 aiming to “increasing control over migration processes”. It would not affect only countries that are members of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space.

Unfinished demarcation of the borders is another problem that facilitates Russia’s influence on its neighbours. The common Ukrainian-Russian border is an example of the most complicated situation. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia refused to complete demarcation of the border, which led the influx of illegal migrants and traffic. The fully demarcated frontier is one of the requirements for obtaining visa free regime with the EU.

The major problem in the delimitation and demarcation of the Russia-Ukraine border may be explained by the interpretation of the meaning and significance of carrying out the act. For the Ukrainian side it is only formalising territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. Russia associates it as an act of erecting a fence between the neighbours, “artificial” and nonporous construction that will impede free movement between the states. Such perception of borders may relate back to the Cold War time, when a border was viewed as an obstacle for preserving the existing political and social order (Ekengern & Simons, 2011: 179).

On my opinion, Russia will keep status quo because it is not interested in Ukraine gaining visa free regime and its further European integration. For the complete demarcation of the border, there are no any technical obstacles, only political, as the border is a vital attribute of the Ukraine’s sovereignty. Reintegration of the post-Soviet space is the prime objective of the Russia’s foreign policy and explicit borders with the neighbours are not in its agenda.

The Russia’s invasion into Crimea and Eastern Europe have shown that Kremlin is not going to finish the process of demarcation of the common border that is highly important to Ukraine. That is why, Ukraine launched a unilateral process of demarcation in November 2014 (Government Portal, 2014b). Earlier, in September 2014, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk announced that Ukraine would strengthen its border with Russia by building a wall along the border. “The European Shaft53” project has been planned as a two

53 The European Shaft (or Wall) is planned to be finished in 2018. In August 2015, it was announced that Ukraine has completed 546 (out of 2 295) km of the fortification line. The total budget of the project is about 4 billion hryvnias (Unian, 2015).

207 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) defense line fortification “to prevent the infiltration by the adversary into the territory of Ukraine” (Dolgov, 2014) and also to get the visa-free regime with the EU.

Russian authorities have been promoting the myth of NATO military expansion and uses it to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea and following invasion of Eastern Ukraine. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin claims in April 2014 that “When the infrastructure of a military bloc is moving toward our borders, it causes us some concerns and questions. We need to take some steps in response” (American Security Council Foundation ASCF, 2014). The Atlantic Council, a think tank in the field of international relations, published infographics in August 2015 that refute the statements of the Russian authorities. It shows that there had been very little NATO military presence in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Russia maintains tens of thousands of troops in several of its neighbours (Benitez & Ventura, 2015) (Map 7).

208 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 7: Debunking Russia’s Myth of NATO Military Expansion

Source: Benitez, J. & Ventura, L. D. (2015). Infographic: Data disproves Russian lies about NATO military expansion, Atlantic Council. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/infographic-data-disproves- russian-lies-about-nato-military-expansion Viewed 31.08.2015.

209 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

In stark contrast to the Russia’s tools of hard power, the European Union uses coercive measures against the neighbourhood states, the so-called “smart” sanctions. The EU has much more difficulty using economic measures to cause changes in Eastern Europe because the rewards to the neighbouring states from the ENP is much more modest than those that came with the EU accession. In 2007, the EU withdrew some trade preferences from Belarus because Minsk was falling short of international labour standards. However, this sort of sanctions was not directed against the authoritarian practices of the regime, and, consequently did not succeed. Moreover, Belarus overcame economic problems caused by the sanctions by relocating its target markets. Other type of EU coercive measure is visa restrictions and asset freezes for Lukashenka and 40 ministers and officials imposed after the fraudulent 2006 elections in Belarus and travel bans on Transnistrian leaders in 2003 (Table 24).

Table 24: Russian and EU Hard Power

Russia European Union

 Non-withdrawal of troops  “Smart sanctions”, visa bans, asset  Trade blockades freezes  “Pasportisation”  Financial assistance  Passport regime  Monitoring and border missions  Infrastructure takeovers  Critical evaluation of the ENP Action  Differential energy prices Plans  Oil and gas embargoes  Blocking of demarcation of common borders

Source: Author and Sydoruk, T. V. (2012). Polityka susidstva Yevropeyskoho Soyuzu u Skhidniy Yevropi: model intehratsiyi bez chlenstva. Lviv: PAIS.

210 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

II.4.6. Hybrid Warfare of Russia.

“A Rússia, o maior país do mundo em termos da dimensão geográfica, pegou num bocado do país vizinho. Invadiu o país e continua a guerra. É uma guerra não declarada. A guerra, que alguns chamam “guerra híbrida”, que é o novo conceito, mas é uma guerra. É uma guerra do mais forte contra o mais fraco. Contra todos os princípios do direito internacional.”

José Manuel Durão Barroso, on television debate “Que Mundo É Este?” on RTP1 channel on 22nd February 201654

The Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has become a long-term factor of influence on Ukrainian political, military, social and economic spheres. This aggression distorted global and regional security systems, as well as the current system of international law. Unfortunately, almost all international security guarantors of Ukraine (namely the guarantors within the Budapest Memorandum) were incompetent in a situation where aggressor is one of the guarantors – the Russian Federation. This proves a thought of Dr Helena Cristina Rego expressed almost twenty years ago in her work “A Nova Rússia” (1999):

Apesar de a Rússia não poder ser encarada, em termos globais, como uma grande

potência, excepto que se refere à sua força militar, tem vindo a prosseguir uma política

regional que, no campo das intensões em nada difere da anterior política da URSS. (p.

390)

According to I. Pronoza (2006: 126), the basic reason for the Russia-Ukraine war in eastern Ukraine is ideology of Russism (Russian nationalism) that combines Russian fascism, the personality cult of Putin, anti-Western (anti-NATO and anti-American) rhetoric, the “Russian World” doctrine, and international terrorism.

Russia commenced the war based on Gerasimov doctrine, created by Valery Gerasimov, a Russian General and the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. This doctrine was presented in January 2013 and became a part of Russia’s military doctrine

54 Rádio e Televisão de Portugal. (2016). Debate - Que Mundo É Este? 22 Fevereiro 2016, https://www.rtp.pt/play/p2350/debate-que-mundo-e-este Viewed 17.06.2017. 211 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) from 30th December 2014. The doctrine introduced for the first time a component of “hybrid war” to the military doctrine as a tendency to eliminate frontier between war and peace and undeclared war (McDermont, 2016: 99).

The main differences between the hybrid warfare and classic war are:

 No one declares hybrid warfare – it gives an opportunity to aggressor to manipulate the international opinion. The target state, the victim, is unable to react adequately because of absence of judicial reason (there was no war declared);  Main goal of hybrid warfare is not only to conquer territories but also to create a chaos, a permanent conflict, destruct infrastructure, cause conditions unsuitable for living;  Use of “theatrical” military actions played by actors in order to male footage for mass media;  The basis of this warfare is an identity, slotting of statehood, the nation and identity of the target country,

Russia used against Ukraine a concept of “hybrid warfare” that is quite unique by its structure and functioning: it is hybrid by the form is and the asymmetric by the meaning. A new type of war was clearly demonstrated for the first time during Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in February-March 2014, support of local radical elements and then a full-scale Russian invasion to the eastern regions of Ukraine.

Although many scientists and researchers point to “hybrid” nature of this war, its concept is ambiguous and incomplete. The concept of “hybrid warfare” appeared in mid-2000s but contained other terms and concepts than it has now. In order to characterise the modern conflict could be described as “unconventional warfare”, “irregular warfare” or “compound warfare”, or “State-Sponsored Hybrid warfare”. All these concepts show a mix of military conflict with non-military means that do not regularly have a direct relation to the classic military war (Horbulin, 2015).

Each element of this “hybrid warfare” is not new and was used in almost all the wars of the past, but its uniqueness is in combination and co-operation of these elements, dynamism of their use and growth of importance of information factor. Moreover, the information factor in some cases becomes independent component and is more important than military one (Map 8). 212 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Map 8: Russian Military Units in Eastern Ukraine (August 2016).

Source: Ukrayinska Pravda. (2016). Deputy PM: Number of Heavy Weapons in Donbas Has Multiplied, http://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2016/08/26/7118736/ Viewed 31.08.2016.

Terrorism component. Since the beginning of the Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, terrorist threats have sharply increased throughout the country. During the past two years, a number of terrorist acts carried out in various regions of Ukraine (especially in Odesa in May 2014 and the explosion in Kharkov on 22nd February 2015), shows that terror is one of the key means of the hybrid war that Russian authorities conducting against Ukraine.

According to research of the IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, the two Moscow- led terrorist organisations that are acting in the occupies regions of eastern Ukraine are in top 10 most violent non-state actors in the world (Zaxid.Net, 2016) (Figure 6).

213 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Figure 6: Most Violent Non-State Actors in the World.

Source: Statista. (2016). Islamic State by Far the Most Active Violent Group in 2015, https://www.statista.com/chart/5918/violent-non-state-actors/ Viewed 22.09.2016.

One more element of a successful terrorist attack is a fast reaction of extremist organisations to take responsibility. As a result, the population of the affected region is convinced that it was not an accident or action of an individual but the planned act that can be repeated regularly. Waiting for repetition reinforces the sense of panic, stimulates public to pressure on the authorities to prevent further attacks. As the government cannot quickly destroy the organisation, it has to make concessions. One of the typical examples is the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 when the Spanish government removed their troops from Iraq under public pressure (Figure 7).

214 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Figure 7: Components of Hybrid Warfare.

Types of War Components of Hybrid Warfare

Classic war Other components

Information war Economic sphere

Energy war Political component

Political war Energy

Economic war Information

Others Classic/military component

Source: Author’s own compilation

Economic dimension. The crisis observed in the Ukrainian economy in 2014-2015 years are two main reasons:

1) The expected systemic crisis resulting from the prolonged absence of economic policy based on programmes of social development and technological modernisation of the economy; 2) The consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war that began in February 2014 where Kremlin is using hybrid methods of war aimed at destroying the economic and socio- political stability of Ukraine.

Russian militants use tactic of shelling populated areas controlled by the Ukrainian military forces and damage homes, infrastructure. Apart from losses caused by a gap of economic ties between Ukraine and Russia, the latter has obtained certain benefits from the economic war: it removed Ukraine as a competitor in strategically important sectors of its own economy through massive destruction of Ukraine’s economy, especially industry.

215 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Energy factor. The energy infrastructure is a special sphere of interest of Russia within hybrid warfare because its capture or destruction brings significant economic losses for target country threatens a sustainable functioning of society.

It is obvious that Russia consciously attacks energy infrastructure for its own political and economic interests as well as for reduction of military and economic potential of other state as soon as possible. In case of Ukraine, having annexed the Crimean peninsula, Russia got control upon Ukrainian energy objects that are outside the administrative borders of the Crimea. As a result, Russia not just occupied energy infrastructure in the Crimea but also seized oil fields of the shelf and natural gas in the volume of 2 billion cubic meters annually through pipelines and compressor stations (Slobodian, 2016).

In eastern Ukraine, Russians destroyed many coal plants, blocked and destroyed transport infrastructure. This led to problems with coal supplies for consumers, especially for thermal power plants, which destabilised functioning of the Ukraine’s energy system. Hence, Russia’s energy warfare caused worsening of socio-economic situation not only in the East in the whole Ukraine.

Information dimension. Although the military component of the war remains a major factor in the conflict’s deployment, the information component is becoming larger more effective. NATO’s chief military commander, General Philip Breedlove, mentioned that Russia is waging “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” (Gallagher, 2014). The information dimension of the hybrid warfare has several directions: first of all, it is population in the conflict zone; propaganda among the population of the target nation which is not covered by the conflict; propaganda amongst the citizens of aggressor and among the international community.

The active phase of military confrontation that began in the end of February – early March 2014 was accompanied by tactical information support – the first thing that the Russians did in the occupied territories was switching off Ukrainian TV channels that only Russian channels could be available. Therefore, the strategy of the information component of the conflict was to form a unified and fully controlled information space.

Russia has also been financing the foreign information front. Moscow controls a great number of cultural institutions, funds and mass media. Russian channels abroad focus primarily on the European countries by maintaining instability and spreading disinformation. A situation in 216 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Czechia is a good example of it. According to the Czech Security Services, Russia has begun an information warfare and maintains internal tensions in 2015: “Actions of the Russian special services were focused on penetrating the Czech mass media and spread misinformation and planting a slogan “all lie” amongst the population by distributing both true and false information” (Bezpečnostní Informační Služba, 2016). In Poland, for instance, Russia aims to sow doubt, confusion, a fear of political and economic crises in the country through propaganda by the Polish edition of Russian channel Sputnik as well as cyber-attacks. Moreover, Moscow finances pro-Russia political parties not only in Poland, but in other EU countries as well (Czekaj, 2015). Consequently, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence was founded in 2014 in Latvia whose main task is to provide an adequate response to the attempts of other countries to influence the information space within the NATO members (LePage, 2015). The importance of strategic communications was also underlined after the NATO summit in Wales.

II.5. EU Normative Power in Eastern Europe and its Shortcomings.

It worth admitting that until the 2004, 2007 EU enlargements, Eastern Europe was not a priority of EU foreign policy compared to the Mediterranean and Western Balkans (Facon, 2006: 635). The existence of any war and “peaceful” collapse of the USSR, except for some local conflicts, reduced the overall level of engagement with the Western powers in the political processes that took place in this part of the European continent, and hence contributed to reducing the need for systematic involvement in the process data, the total area which has long remained uncertain. It was practiced instead a selective co-operation on specific functional issues mainly in security and energy spheres. In general, the EU supported development of independent states with effective management, but rather for reasons of their own safety than on the basis of political strategy.

It can be proved by content of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and the CIS states in the mid 90s. Establishing a general framework for political dialogue and co-operation in various sectors, these agreements virtually introduced the principle of conditionality in relation those countries. The prospects for convergence with the EU were not

217 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) clearly mentioned and the obligations of partners for the approximation and implementation of European norms were limited.

The principle of conditionality has been put in basis for EU relations with the countries of Eastern Europe only with the introduction of European Neighbourhood Policy and the signing of its bilateral Action Plans, which in general are the basic components of this principle. ENP together with Eastern Partnership, are based upon adoption by the neighbours the objectives of normative convergence with the EU (Averre, 2005: 177), but, unlike the enlargement process, in this case the impetus is not the prospect of full membership, but more selective and limited forms of involvement in certain areas of European integration. Deep free trade area is the closest form of convergence with the EU for Eastern Europe, which is an intermediate stage between normal free trade area and integration into the single market, bypassing the stage of custom union.

The objectives of the European Union policy in Eastern Europe can be formulated as a triad “Security – Stabilisation – Europeanisation” (Shapovalova, 2009: 190) (Figure 8). The European Union has a direct interest in stabilising that space and lowering potential for conflict. Also, the existence of a common border, interdependence and announcement by a number of Eastern European countries the intention to join the EU (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) lead to the increasing interest of the Union in the gradual Europeanisation of the space, which means implementing the majority rules and regulations of the European Union. Nonetheless, this interest is not so urgent as to require direct connection of these countries to the EU, in contrast to the new member states from Central Europe or the Balkans. In addition, Member States clearly stated that the expansion of community integration could not be seen as a main aim for stabilising the external space. This explains the specifics of EU policy in the Eastern Neighborhood – the limited political engagement, influencing in crises, but without influence and contrasting its positions with other key players. The prevalence of asymmetric bilateral relations between the EU and countries, involved in Eastern Partnership, means the further centralisation of space around the European Union and, more important, increase the direct role of the EU in internal reforms in these countries. Notwithstanding, the EU seeks to minimise its own political and material costs for the stabilisation of Eastern Europe.

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Figure 8: Objectives of EU Policies towards Eastern Europe.

Source: Authour’s compilation based on Shapovalova, O. I. (2009). Normatyvna syla Yevropeiskoho Soyuzu v Skhidniy Yevripi. Scientific bulletin of Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, 2009, No.15.

It is noteworthy that the strategy, based on a similar regulatory convergence, has usually a long-term character because internal reforms are gradual and lengthy process. Thus in the case of Eastern Europe the dependence and sensitivity of the EU in several areas, mainly energetic and migrational, are so high that require immediate action. The European Union has to use more flexible forms of normative power and the Eastern Partnership initiative can be a vivid example of it (Tulmets, 2007: 70).

There are different views on the nature of the factors that influence the effectiveness of the EU’s normative power in Eastern Europe. One of them is national context and political will of third countries to co-operate and conduct internal reforms (Tulmets, 2007: 63). The researches S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig (2009: 802-805) offer more comprehensive approach in a concept of “External Governance”, which is directly associated with the concept of normative power and reveals the process of projection the norms and values beyond the EU. They argue that the efficiency of this process is determined by the following factors, such as the degree of institutionalisation of relations between the EU and the state that is an object of the process; the dominance of the EU in comparison with other centres of influence in this space, and internal organisation of the object etc. This means that the implementation of the normative force depends, firstly, upon the political commitment of the EU to use it to influence the international environment, secondly, the intensity of competition with other powers in certain 219 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) geopolitical space, and thirdly, the political will and objective ability of the states-object of the EU normative power.

There are can be defined three groups of factors that affect the efficiency of the EU strategy in Eastern Europe, based on the principles of regulatory convergence:

1) Factors associated with the structure of most instruments entrusted with the European Union;

2) Factors associated with the perception of the EU policy in Eastern Europe;

3) Factors associated with geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, the positions of other major powers and general trends in this space.

The most frequently mentioned factors associated with the structure of most instruments entrusted with the EU in its policy in Eastern Europe are lack of effective incentives to implement European standards, namely membership prospective, fixing the asymmetry between the EU and Eastern Europe as a result of the unilateral establishment by the EU convergence criteria and forms for these states and, consequently, the political “peripherisation” of Eastern Europe.

The EU refused to apply to the countries of Eastern Europe the strategy used in the case of the new Member States, which was to provide internal stabilisation by the prospect of EU accession, offering instead more selective forms of involvement in the integration process. For the EU itself it, on the one hand, means greater dependence upon the internal situation in the neighbouring counties and their readiness to implement the necessary reforms, but on the other hand, it can move the focus from the political question of joining the EU into the issues such as convergence in certain functional and objective spheres and states’ willing to participate in the integration process. The normative power of the EU in Eastern Europe caused by its ability to define monopoly form and “European” content belonging to the European civilisation, giving the EU an unprecedented leverage on domestic politics of countries interested in approaching it (Haukkala, 2008: 1605-1606).

Nevertheless, the biggest factor that significantly limits the effectiveness of the normative power of the EU in Eastern Europe is the segmentation of its political and functional components. Narrow understanding of “Europeanisation” as a projection of EU regulations in functional sectors virtually eliminates the involvement of the political dimension of the EU normative power, which is, however, the key to the stabilisation of the space. The 220 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) convergence with EU is desirable for Eastern European countries not only in terms of economic benefits, but also primarily on the status and identity consequences of the process. Therefore, the lack of significant political incentives in the structure of active tools of “Europeanisation” significantly reduces the ability of the EU to promote the stabilisation of Eastern Europe by using its normative power.

This also explains the effect of factors related to the perception of the EU in Eastern Europe. The adoption of the EU norms and regulations require considerable adaptation spending, the feasibility of which is not obvious without clear political advantage, so even if a national consensus on EU, the integration process of implementing European standards progresses slowly and require more intensive involvement of the European Union. Sometimes it complicates by using instruments to declare goals for the EU integration to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of political regimes that are in power in some countries.

Notwithstanding, the most important group of factors are about the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, especially in the context of policy in this area and its implications for the implementation of the EU normative power. The interdependence with Russia, in the opinion of some researchers, is a key variable that determines the effectiveness of “external management” of the EU in the region. On the one hand, the process of Europeanisation, as already mentioned, is limited by domestic reforms in certain countries and therefore has no direct consequences for their international standing. On the other hand, the Eastern European countries, especially those seeking integration into the EU, tend to look at the process from geopolitical perspective in the context of accession to the Western community as a whole, although neither ENP nor “Eastern Partnership” have a similar meaning. Hence there is negative evaluation of the “Eastern Partnership” by Russian authority.

The origins of this situation rooted in the refusal of Russia to build its relations with the EU on the basis of conditionality, which means refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the authority of the EU as a carrier of European values. That is why the possibility of the European Union to use its normative power in relation to Russia is limited, which leaves its mark on EU policy in Eastern Europe.

EU really makes its influence not to oust Russia, but its methods and consequences contradict Russian politics. Projects in the European Neighbourhood Policy, “Black Sea Synergy” and “Eastern Partnership”, do not contain confrontational elements against Russia, but the fact

221 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) that they are lobbied for the most part by the new members who have conflicts with Russia, makes cautious attitude to the Russian side. Russia does not have legitimate opportunities for playing similar role. Its leverage on internal processes in the “near abroad” is based on informal relations between political elites; participation in the “frozen conflicts” settlement; placing their military bases and means of economic pressure and power. Despite the fact that the competition for influence in Eastern Europe, Russia shows more willing to invest political and practical resources into the region than the EU. The mentioned instruments make it difficult to effectively enhance the credibility to Russia, they do not provide attachment to the structural level of political domination and in many cases to avoid general drift of neighbouring countries towards other leading centres of power closer to them. The EU is objectively the least threat among them to Russia’s position because, firstly, does not seek to extend its “expansion” in the countries of Eastern Europe; secondly, aims to establish stable cooperative relations with Russia; and thirdly, the EU and Russian are tied with close interdependent relations. Therefore, Russia could allow a certain degree of involvement of the EU in this area, provided it does not lead to a weakening of its position. Therefore, the challenge for Russia is existential, it is derived from the general political climate between Russia and the EU and it could be weakened if Brussels elaborates an optimal strategy in EU- Russia relations on the political level.

An interesting example of the EU’s efforts to use its normative power to produce political effects is its behavior during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August 2008 and the Russian- Ukrainian crisis of January 2009. For the EU, the political consequences of these crises are ambivalent: on the one hand, the efforts of European diplomacy decisively influenced their termination (at least in the case of Georgia), and on the other hand, it is not meant to qualitative changes in the political configuration of the Eastern European space, making clear the limitations of existing EU leverage on Russia (as well as in Georgia and Ukraine). It is shown that the influence of the EU depends on the willingness of other actors of international relations to perceive and follow its influence.

These crises have shown that the most important threat to European security is a full-scale political conflict on the periphery of the continent between Russia and former Soviet states. Moreover, unlike the Balkans, there can be no reconciliation achieved through limited military intervention. Diplomatic leverage are priorities for quality changes in Eastern Europe, and the European Union has greater structuring potential than the classic military alliances or

222 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) nation states (NATO and the United States). Howsoever, the EU cannot rely solely on its own normative power.

The EU norms and regulations implementation in Eastern Europe does not guarantee political normalisation in the countries. EU should direct its regulatory power to encourage Eastern European countries to political normalisation of relations between them, which will contribute to their normative convergence. The normative power of the EU is, without a doubt, more effective in those countries who have being seeking rapprochement with it and are ready to implement the norms and values of the EU, but it is not sufficient to keep these countries out from increased tensions with Russia

II.6. Eastern Partnership, qvo vadis?

The eastern dimension of the EU foreign policy interest is significantly heterogeneous: the EaP partners are the EU geographically closest neighbours since 2007 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. On the other hand, the initiative also includes the Caucasus that declared their interests in integrating into a united Europe in spite of being separated from the EU by the Black Sea.

In 2007-2008, the region gradually moved away from democratic values and market economy after the the military conflict in Georgia, arrests of opposition leaders in Belarus and failure of the leaders of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine to reform the country. That time, the European Union began to lose the Eastern dimension of its foreign policy. That is why, the initiative of Poland and Sweden to create the Eastern Partnership project in 2008 received necessary support among the European leaders. The EU begins to involve actively Association Agreements and free trade areas with the EaP countries.

Notwithstanding, in 2011-2013, series of transformations in the partner states begin to worry Brussels: free trade and association agreements with the EU did not become impetus to any significant changes within the Eastern Partnership. In addition, two Caucasian countries Azerbaijan and Armenia began active dialogue on participation in the Moscow-led Eurasian Union. In Ukraine, after the 2012 parliamentary elections, the state power completely passed to the Party of Regions and President Yanukovych that continued introducing authoritarian 223 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) principles of governing contrary to the democratic principles of the West. Only Georgia and Moldova lead more or less pro-European reforms.

Before the Vilnius summit in November 2013, a sharp change in the position of the Ukrainian authorities on the Association Agreement and free trade area with the EU led to protests in many Ukrainian cities, which became a full revolution. It is worth noting that in spite of the Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories and no important economic and democratic reforms in Eastern Partnership during the last years, many positive changes in the ideological point of view have emerged.

The gap between the pro-EU countries and members of the Eurasian Economic Union become larger after Russia imposed unilateral sanctions and banned imports of some goods from the EU and Ukraine. None of the Russia’s allies took such measures, and some even took advantage of this situation for their own profit.

From my point of view, an ideological breakthrough is a major achievement in the Eastern Partnership today and the project would have completely failed without the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine.

An issue of reforming of the Eastern Partnership is in the focus of the European think tanks, since it is clear that the reforms in the EaP Partner States will be delayed for decades without change and a new impetus.

Nowadays, differences between the countries within the Eastern Partnership have been deepening. De facto, two groups of countries have formed in the project. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia represent the first group, a “core” of the policy. These countries not just fulfil the Association Agreements, they declare their intention to become members of the EU. The second group, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia, are not quite interested (at least current elites) to deepen relations with the EU, and is integrated into the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus and Armenia). The countries are qualitatively different by authoritarian tendencies, harassment of human rights, democracy and the limited political repression.

Hence, a new individual principle, a differentiation approach appeared in the Joint Declaration of the Riga Summit. The EU agreed to change a scheme of the EaP realisation and determined its priorities. It means that the level of co-operation will be determined in each case by the EU and “partners’ ambitions and needs as well as the pace of reforms”

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(European External Action Service, 2015: 3). The principle of differentiation indicated in the Declaration may start changes in models of both the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. It concerns mostly Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia where the implementation of the AAs make the Eastern Partnership a more practical model for internal modernisation and reforms in member countries. It is one more step towards a new stage in Eastern Partnership evolution but is less than these three countries need from the policy.

Another side of the differentiation principle is a new vision of relations with Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Brussels gives opportunities for these countries to deepen relations with the EU within the ENP. It proposes a co-operation in areas that constitute mutual interest of the parties. It is an important step to maintain dialogue where possible on the one hand. On the other hand, the European Union will have to ignore the problems of democracy and human rights in these states in order to start a collaboration in other mutually beneficial areas.

In early March 2015, the European Commission announced joint consultations on review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Partner States provided proposals on improvement of the policy, make it more up-to date. For instance, Ukraine propose to separate the Eastern Partnership from the ENP and make the policy more ambitious with enhanced tool and comparable to the European aspirations of the Eastern European partners.

Six months later, on 18th November 2015, a Joint Communication of the European Commission and EU High Representative was edited: “Review of European Neighbourhood Policy”, which was supported by the EU Council in December 2015 (European Commission, 2015d).

The introduction of the Communication states that the EU stability is based on democracy, human rights, rule of law and economic openness, so stabilising is a major political priority of the revised ENP. Therefore, stabilisation will be the most important issue within the neighbourhood space in the next three to five years.

“Stabilising the Neighbourhood” has three-dimensional structure:

 Political dimension – democracy, good governance, reform of the justice system, based on the rule of law and fundamental rights, and broad support for civil society;  Economic dimension – support the economy and prospects for local people aimed at ensuring that the Partner States have to become a place where people want to build

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their future and have to prevent uncontrolled movement of people. A full and effective implementation of the Association Agreements/DCFTA (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) is a key priority that will help adjust the partners to international standards and EU’s aquis. This will lead to a gradual economic integration to the EU internal market and creation of a common economic space;  Security Dimension of co-operation security issues, including prevention of conflicts through prevention, co-operation in the fight against terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling.

However, the ENP will be crucial for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of EU external action. The new, revised ENP will have some key principles:

First of all, it is a tailor-made approach, that means a partnership with each of the partner countries, reflecting different ambitions, abilities and interests. The EU aims to further development of the relations with the partner countries in order to maximise the benefits of co-operation, including increased opportunities for political dialogue at ministerial level. The year 2016 is the beginning of a new phase of co-operation, which could lead, if necessary, to establish new priorities of the jointly agreed partnerships.

“More for more” approach has been successful in supporting reforms in governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights where there is a commitment of the parties to implement such reforms. However, the approach is not enough to stimulate reform in areas where there was no political will. Therefore, Brussels intends to explore more effective ways to achieve the objectives, including interaction with the public, economic and social players.

The parties will also focus on a defined range of priorities as economic development, security and the fight against terrorism, migration, &c. Another approach is enhanced ownership of the partners: the innovation is emphasis on a need for full involvement of Member States and the Council of the EU to the ENP prioritisation and implementation. The Member States may be invited to participate as leading partners for certain initiatives or supplement certain efforts.

Flexibility of the existing financial instruments, namely the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The overall balance in the funds distribution (total of 15 billion euro for the period 2014-2020) remains unchanged: 2/3 of funds are directed to the Southern neighbourhood and 1/3 to the Eastern Partnership. However, each regional initiative will 226 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) introduce so-called “Flexibility Pillow” of 10% on urgent needs of the partners (post-conflict recovery, support for refugees &c.). A communication on the ENP will also be improved to raise awareness about this policy and its results.

The renewed ENP introduces a new approach to reporting that unlike the previous approach (a single set of reporting on the progress of all partner countries at a time), focuses on achieving the goals jointly agreed with partners. The regional dimension of the revised ENP will go out beyond the neighbourhood in resolving common challenges.

Hence, for Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership initiative is a good instrument for a gradual deepening of economic and political integration with the EU. Liberalisation of economic relations through creating a free trade area and enhanced political relations may lead to more tied relations between the EU and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership does not only influence upon the economic development of Ukraine, but it also helps institutionalise their political relations with the EU.

Participation in the initiative also helps Ukraine to form and strengthen its own position in Eastern Europe. Ukraine can also relations with non-EU countries by participating in the Eastern Partnership initiative.

In addition, the Eastern Partnership assists Ukraine to deepen relations with its neighbour countries as Moldova and Belarus. Kyiv has been participating in stabilising regional conflicts, namely Transnistrian conflict. It helps enhance relations with European pivotal states as the UK, France and Germany, which play an important role in Ukraine’s integration path.

For other Eastern Partnership Partners, the initiative can reinforce already existing and cause to emerge new regional organisations and fora in Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. The Eastern Partnership could be a supplement organisation for the Black Sea Synergy in the Black Sea region. The initiative can propose new framework of co-operation with Belarus by minimising its political isolation taking into consideration that Belarus does not participate in any of the multilateral initiatives of the EaP.

As for disadvantages of the Eastern Partnership, any of the official documents of the initiative contain a statement about granting perspectives of the EU membership to the EU neighbours. It could be a cause for a lack of interest from some of the Partner States. However, the

227 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) absence of this statement is a necessary point in order to increase a possibility the Eastern Partnership to be co-ordinated by all EU countries as well as countries from Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. Such statement could be unacceptable for many EU Member States that are not in favour of offering prospects of membership for all six states. These obligations can also be difficult even for some Partner States that are not aiming to join the EU.

From my point of view, the lack of statement about future membership in the EU does not mean that the EaP is an alternative initiative for the enlargement process. The Eastern Partnership continues consolidating and strengthening the European integration of the target countries instead.

Another disadvantage is that the Eastern Partnership has been a general initiative and does not propose any new areas of co-operation, new financial support or institutional structure. There is a big gap in co-operation in such areas as energy and legal system that play a significant role in further integration of the states. The initiatives does not provide a large-scale co- operation in defense and security too.

These two arguments have been used by Russia to criticise the initiative, stating that the Eastern Partnership is alternative to the EU enlargement and persuading the Eastern European countries to cease participating in it.

II.7. Final synthesis to Chapter II.

The project Eastern Partnership has emerged as a result of the gradual evolution of EU policy towards its neighbours – the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. It was the first comprehensive initiative towards six countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood. However, the current initiative is largely different from project presented by Poland and Sweden.

The Eastern Partnership is an instrument for a gradual and partial integration with the EU based on progress in internal reform of the Partner States. The EaP proposes an innovative sphere of relations – bilateral dimension that provides opportunities for the development of relations for all the Eastern neighbours as Association Agreements, free trade, visa free regime, programmes of institutional development and so on. The multilateral dimension is

228 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) also much diversified: Eastern Partnership Summits every two years, the Council of Ministers, thematic platforms, flagship initiatives, Civil Society Forum &c.

Each of the EU Member States has its own position and interests in the EaP development. According to this criterion, one can classify all the countries into three groups. The first group is states that are openly in favour of the EaP development. They are Poland, Sweden, and all the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romani and Bulgaria). Another group is pivotal countries, the states that decision- makers in the EU (The UK, France and Germany). Among them, the United Kingdom and Germany are pro-Eastern Europe, and France, obviously, is pro-Union for the Mediterranean. Other EU members had neutral or rather negative position to emerge of the Eastern Partnership. The Mediterranean countries were in favour of the ENP southern dimension. The EaP had no place in foreign policies of Benelux, Ireland due to their geographic location.

As we can see, there are substantial differences within the EU in relation to Eastern Europe. Even though the members recognise the need for greater involvement of the EU in the Eastern Europe by signing association agreements and creating free trade area, there are still debates on additional funds for the Eastern Partnership, visa-free regime or relations with Russia. The idea of Eastern Partnership was supported mostly by new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe and Sweden.

Comparative analysis of the instruments and objectives of “soft” and “hard” power of the EU and Russia in Easter Europe shows that Russia implements an active policy in order to keep Eastern Europe in their own sphere of influence. The EU’s influence in the regions aims to adapt these countries to political and economic standards of the EU not considering it as a pre-accession period. In case of Russia, such soft power tools as Russian Orthodox Church, Russian-speaking minorities, culture, Kremlin-controlled mass media together with economic, energy wars, military bases (hard power) do not only keep Russia’s influence on the countries, these factors are now starting to threat the Europe’s security.

In order to give an alternative to the EU, Russia has been developing its own integration projects that partially copy the structure of the EU. The Eurasian Economic Union aims to show other countries that there an alternative the European values and norm and this Union will be institutionalising Russia’s dominance in post-Soviet space. However, in terms of

229 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) social and economic levels of development, the EEU has far less potential comparing to the EU or even programmes of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

As to hybrid warfare of Russia against Ukraine, it is a new type of war put into practice on the Ukrainian soil since 2014. The warfare combine has components of most types of war – energy, information, economic, classic wars are now present in the hybrid one.

The relations between the EU and Russia are now the worst since the devolution of the USSR. All the EU members imposed economic, visa and trade sanctions against Russia and its officials due to war in Ukraine commenced by Russian terrorists. Moscow imposed the same sanctions in return. These sanctions caused significant economic and financial crisis in Russia and some problems in the European Union.

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СHAPTER III – EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN 2003-2016

“We, Ukrainians, are the living flame within the family of the European nations

and an active member of the European civilization work”

Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent President of Ukraine

A new period in Ukraine-EU relations began in 2004 after the European Union enlargement resulting in emerging a common border. The common geographical frontier made the both sides to enhance political and economic co-operation.

The European Union was very impressed by the situation in Ukraine during and after the 2004 presidential election and it made a first step forward (even though there was not fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria and the process of Ukraine’s accession to WTO was not sped up). Nonetheless, the “orange revolution” made great alternations for the political situation in Ukraine: unbiased judiciary branch of power, pro-Occidental parliament, free mass media, strong civil society, elevated international authority.

The European Parliament almost unanimously (467 votes to 19 in favour) made a Resolution on 13th January 2005 on the results of the presidential election in Ukraine. The Parliament called for EU Member States and institutions to give Ukraine a clear European integration prospective, to reinforce the contain of the Action Plan, to give a status of market economy, to facilitate a visa regime, and aid Ukraine in its path towards WTO “in order to further upgrade the relationship and to meet the expectations and hopes raised by the European Union's close involvement in the peaceful Orange Revolution” (Point 12) (European Parliament, 2005c). Moreover, the Resolution reminds the Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, which states that “EU membership is an option for all European countries that satisfy the relevant conditions and obligations”. The European Parliament also mentions that it “looks forward to a sustained transition process in Ukraine that would bring the country towards this objective” (Point 16) (European Parliament, 2005c).

Most of the EU Member States were not ready to give Ukraine a European integration prospect though. At the beginning of a new millennium the countries began deepening the integration within the EU. This process faces some obstacles, e.g. the vetoed EU Constitution in referendum in France and the Netherlands.

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The European Union proposed an Action Plan to Ukraine in January 2005 for a period of three years. The 40-page Action Plan determined 14 priorities of the EU-Ukraine relations comprising practically all the spheres:

a) European Union supports Kyiv’s aspirations to join the World Trade Organisation that would conduct to free trade regime between the EU and Ukraine;

b) EU recognises Ukraine as a trade economy;

c) Both side deepen economic and commercial relations;

d) Co-operation in energy, transport and environmental spheres;

e) Deepening co-operating in regional security;

f) EU aid to adapt European standards into Ukrainian legislation (European Commission, 2005).

The document was agreed on 21st February 2005 at the meeting of the Ukraine-EU Partnership and Cooperation Council – an Action Plan. A new document attested strengthening bilateral relations. The same day the General Affairs and External Relations Council adopts conclusions on Ukraine including 10 point plan, which had been submitted by the Commissioner B. Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative J. Solana to the European Council on 31st January 2005 “to maximize the benefits of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan” (Delegetation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2015). This initiative showed that Ukraine was witnessing a real progress in internal reforms and adapting European standards.

Nonetheless, the Action Plan did not include an idea of European integration prospects for Ukraine. The Ukraine’s President V. Yushchenko (2005-2010) mentioned in his speech in the European Parliament on 23rd January 2005:

We see the co-operation between Ukraine and the European Union in the framework of

the Action Plan out of the context of the ENP. By no means, we consider this co-

operation as an alternative to the dialogue on the new long-term convergence policy.

We offer right now to prepare such a dialogue, defining it as the aim to provide Ukraine

with prospects of membership in accordance with statutory documents of the European

Union (President of Ukraine. Official website, 2005).

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In 2004, European Commission a new initiative on the multilateral level – European Neighbourhood Policy. The initiative contained some disadvantages for Ukraine: first of all, the ENP is EU unilateral initiative and Kyiv wanted to develop bilateral co-operation. Secondly, most of ENP’s objectives were far long from Ukraine’s political interests. Thus stance can be explained by such reasons as the neighbourhood policy was proposed as alternative to enlargement, Brussels did not plan to implement a free-visa regime and no differentiation between the Partners from Europe and out.

The first common evaluations of the Action Plan implementation were made already in December 2005 at the EU-Ukraine summit (1st December) that was held in Kyiv. The monitoring was made by non-governmental organisations and think tanks.

The implementation of the Action Plan was also reviewed at the 2006 EU-Ukraine summit (26th October); meetings of Ukraine–EU Partnership and Cooperation Council (was substituted by the Association Council in 2014) on 13th June 2005 and 14th September 2006; the meeting of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC) on 19th October 2005 as well as Ukraine-EU committees.

During 2005, Ukraine and the European Communities signed seven highly important agreements within the Action Plan implementation:

- Exchange of letters, concerning the extension and amendment of the Agreement between the European Community of Ukraine on trade in textile products of 1993 (9th March);

- Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (28th April);

- Agreement to establish a framework for the participation of Ukraine in the EU crisis management operations (13th June);

- Agreement on the security producers for the exchange of classified information (13th June);

- Agreement on trade in certain steel products (29th July);

- Co-operation Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (1st December);

- Agreement on certain aspects of air services (1st December)

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Negotiations on signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine began in February 2007, visa dialogue in October 2008 (before the official launch of the initiative "Eastern Partnership" in May 2009 in Prague).

During 2007-2012, Brussels and Kyiv held 21 rounds of negotiations for the preparation of the Association Agreement in three working groups: 1. Group on political dialogue foreign and security policy; 2. Group on justice, freedom and security; 3. Group on economic and sectoral co-operation. There were also eighteen rounds of negotiations concerning the FTA that formed the fourth group (Free trade aspects of the Agreement).

The name of the future agreement (“Agreement on Association”) was previously agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the European Union on 22nd July 2008 in Brussels at a meeting of the European Union, which was proposed by France (Unian, 2008).

During the Ukraine-EU Summit, 9th September 2008, both sides adopted a compromise solution to the name of the new enhanced agreement as Association Agreement and agreed to sign it in 2009. However, the question of possible accession to the EU was not raised, the EU only “acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 3). According to the Joint Statement of the Summit, the Association Agreement aimed to:

- Renew common institutional frameworks of co-operation between the European Union and Ukraine; - Deepen relations in all areas; - Strengthen political association and economic integration based upon mutual rights and obligations. At this Summit, the leaders of the EU and Ukraine announced creating a deep and comprehensive free trade area with large-scale regulatory approximation of Ukraine to EU standards will contribute to the gradual integration of Ukraine into the EU market.

On 23rd November 2009, the EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council adopted the Association Agenda that aimed to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement. The thirty-seven-page document entered into effect on 24 November 2009 and substituted the existing Action Plan. This Interim Agreement contained a set of conditions needed to implement in order to sign an Association Agreement. The Document mentioned that negotiations and ratification of the Association Agreement would take some years before it enters into force. That is why it was expected that “an Interim Agreement covering the 234 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Community aspects of the Agreement [would] enter into force significantly earlier” (European Commissiom, 2009b: 2). The Agenda highlighted two key objectives of the Association – political association and economic integration of Ukraine into the European Union. The political part covers the following areas: co-operation to strengthen respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and good governance (Point 2.1). The document also includes co-operation on foreign and security policy, conflict prevention and crisis management (Point 2.3), enhance the co-operation within the 5+2 framework in settlement to the Transnistrian conflict in particular. Ukraine also had to implement all measures necessary for the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court55 (Point 2.4).

Ukraine participated in EU naval operation Atalanta56, which was also mentioned in the Agenda. The decision of the Ukraine’s participation in the operation was made by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on 20th November 2009 (President of Ukraine, 2010). The Political and Security Committee accepted Ukraine for the EU military operation on 5th March 2010 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010) and in November 2010 an officer from the Ukrainian Navy began to work in the Operational Headquarters in Northwood, UK (European Union External Action, 2010b).

The Economic part of the Association Agenda aims to establish a fully functioning market economy in Ukraine and approximating its policies to the EU’s policies in particular: macroeconomic stability; strengthening the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine; improving budget planning and pension system reform (“the sustainability of Ukraine’s pension system”); transparent privatisation and reducing the involving of the State in setting prices (European Commission, 2009a: 15-16).

The Agenda also mentioned trade and trade related matters important for the establishment of the Free Trade Area. It included the importance of adopting the EU’s technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and development of mutual transparent trade

55 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the treaty, adopted on 17th July 1998 and entered into force on 1st July 2002, which established the International Criminal Court. According to the Article 5 of the Statute, there are four crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression (United Nations; 2015b). 56 Operation Atalanta (European Union Naval Force Somalia) is a military operation, launched in 2008, aimed to protect vessels and shipments from pirate attacks in the Somali coastal territories as well as co-ordinate counter- piracy operations with Somalia’s government (European Union External Action; 2015f). 235 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) environment (Point 5). The energy co-operation included integration of energy markets, energy efficiency and nuclear safety (European Commission, 2009a: 22).

In February 2010, after the Presidential elections in Ukraine, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Ukraine. In the Resolution, the Parliament calls on Ukrainian authorities to work for “political and economic stabilisation, notably through constitutional reform, consolidation of the rule of law, the establishment of a social market economy and renewed efforts to combat corruption, and improve the business and investment climate”(Art. 7). The Parliament suggested the Council and Commission to revise the existing visa-facilitation agreement in order to work on a road map to visa-free travel for Ukraine, “including the intermediate objective of abolishing the existing visa fees” (Art. 10). From my point of view, the most important message of this Resolution was recognising Ukraine a European state and, according to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Ukraine may apply for membership of the EU (Article B) (European Parliament, 2010a).

After the presidential elections, a new President Viktor Yanukovych along with a new government continued pursuing the EU integration. Moreover, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov said that the “Ukraine’s Eurointegration line has not changed” and the government was about to complete the talks with the EU for the free visa regime for Ukrainian citizens (Interfax-Ukraine, 2010). An “Action Plan” for Ukraine towards the establishment of a visa- free regime for short-stay travel was agreed at the 14th Ukraine-EU summit on 22nd November 2010 (Table 25). The plan called Ukraine to improve its border controls as well as its migration and asylum policies (Alexe, 2010).

The final twenty-first round of negotiations on the Association Agreement hosted in Brussels on 11th November 2011, during which agreed with all the provisions of the Agreement. 19th December 2011, the conclusion of negotiations on the Association Agreement were officially announced during the fifteenth EU-Ukraine Summit leaders Ukraine and the EU (Council of the European Union, 2011c: 2). The Association Agreement was initialled on 30th March 2012 in Brussels (Vogel, 2012). Nonetheless, the EU governments were not willing to sign the accord due to strained relations with Kiev because of the treatment and sentencing of former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko. The EU governments boycotted the UEFA Euro 2012 soccer championship in Ukraine due to illegal imprisonment (BBC, 2012). They suggested that the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement would be ratified when the Ukrainian authorities immediately stop the selective

236 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) prosecution of the political opponents (Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko in 2011 and 2012 respectively) (Kyivpost, 2012).

Table 25: Ukraine-EU Summits

Order Date City, country

1 5th September 1997 Kyiv, Ukraine

2 16th October 1998 Vienna, Austria

3 23rd July 1999 Kyiv, Ukraine

4 15th September 2000 Paris, France

5 11th September 2001 Yalta, Ukraine

6 04th July 2002 The Hague, Netherlands

7 07th October 2003 Yalta, Ukraine

8 08th July 2004 The Hague, Netherlands

9 01st December 2005 Kyiv, Ukraine

10 27th October 2006 Helsinki, Finland

11 14th September 2007 Kyiv, Ukraine

12 09th September 2008 Évian-les-Bains, France

13 04th December 2009 Kyiv, Ukraine

14 22nd November 2010 Brussels, Belgium

15 19th December 2011 Kyiv, Ukraine

16 25th February 2013 Brussels, Belgium

17 27th April 2015 Kyiv, Ukraine

237 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

18 27th April 2015 Kyiv, Ukraine

Sources:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. (2016). Ukraine – EU Summits: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about- ukraine/european-integration/Ukraine-EU-Summits Viewed 01.09.2016.

European Council. (2017). EU-Ukraine Summit, 12-13/07/2017: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/07/12-13/ Viewed 07.08.2017.

On 10th December 2012, the EU Foreign Affairs Council made a statement where it (Council of the European Union, 2012a) reaffirms its commitment to the signing of the already initialled Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as soon as the Ukrainian authorities demonstrate determined action and tangible progress in the three areas mentioned above, possibly by the time of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 (p. 2).

These three areas are electoral, judicial and constitutional reforms “in line with international standards are integral parts of it and commonly agreed priorities” (Point 5). The Parliament of Ukraine approved a resolution on 22nd February 2013 stating that it would ensure that the recommendations of the 10 December 2012 EU Foreign Affairs Council are implemented (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2013a). At the 16th EU-Ukraine summit of 25th February 2013, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso stated that the sign and ratification of the AA completely depends upon state of democracy in Ukraine. President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy mentioned the statement of the December 2012 EU Foreign Affairs Council statement and reiterated (BBC, 2013):

We want to move to the signing and ratification of the Association Agreement as quickly as possible, but it will depend on political conditions. In this sense, a number of recent internal processes in Ukraine led to severe climate of relations between it and the EU.

The EU leaders hoped to sign the AA at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013. In order to co-ordinate the preparation of Ukraine on the way to sign the AA, Government adopted in February 2013 a “Plan on Priority Measures for European Integration of Ukraine for 2013”. The plan included measures for implementing conditioned for signing the accord as co-operation in the areas of justice, freedom and security; economic 238 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) co-operation; reforms in judicial and election systems (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2013b). On 5th March 2013, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle and Catherine Ashton paid attention to illegal annulment of parliamentary mandates of two deputies of the Parliament of Ukraine, MP Serhiy Vlasenko in particular, and called on the Ukrainian authorities “ to address this situation so as to avoid creating any perception of misuse of the judiciary for political purposes” (European Commission, 2013f).

On 7th April 2013, President freed Lutsenko from prison and exempted him from further punishment (as well as other Minister in the second Tymoshenko Government Heorhiy Filipchuk).

Beside internal obstacles for signing the AA in 2013, there are external problems – Russia’s trade war. The conflict with Russia began in July when Russian Sanitary Service (officially the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being) banned all imports of Ukrainian confectionary group “Roshen” because of unsatisfying packaging labelling. Later, on 14th August 2013, Moscow banned all import of Ukrainian commodities. Moreover, adviser to the Russian President Sergey Glazyev said on 10th August that if Ukraine signs the AA with EU customs policy for Ukrainian companies would be made stricter (Nielson, 2013). European Parliament responded Russia’s pressure on Ukraine and other states by adopting a resolution on 12th September 2013, where it recalls on Russia “to refrain from exerting more pressure on the Eastern partners and to respect fully their sovereign right to pursue their own political choices” (Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, 2013). A while after, Russia cancelled this trade war and begun an information war against Ukraine, e.g. Russian central channels said on every daily news that Ukraine’s economy would collapse if Kyiv signs the AA. The Ukrainian authorities continued Eurointegration however: at the opening session of the Ukrainian Parliament on 3rd September 2013, President urged to adopt all necessary laws in order to meet EU criteria to be able to sign the AA in November 2013 (Euronews, 2013). The draft of the Association Agreement was unanimously approved by the Government on 18th September 2013 (Radio Free Europe, 2013).

239 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

III.1. Revolution of Dignity.

“The revolution was, at its core, an affirmation of the European values of fairness and the rule of law. It was a fight for transparent democracy, accountability for public officials and an end to the rampant corruption that has plagued our country.”

Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine57

Although Chairman of the Parliament assured that all the laws needed for the AA would be passed, the Parliament did not pass any of the six motions on allowing Yanukovich’s arch- rival Tymoshenko to receive medical treatment in Germany (it was an EU demand for signing the AA) on 21st November 2013, a week before the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius (Traynor, 2013). The same day the Government adopted a decree that suspended the preparations for signing of the AA. The Government proposed to create a three-way commission between Ukraine Russia and the EU aimed to resolve trade issues between the sides (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2013b). The reason the of the termination of the Eurointegration was that the Ukrainian authorities had (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2013) to ensure the national security of Ukraine, to study and work a set of measures to recover lost production volumes and directions of trade and economic relations with Russia and other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, to form an adequate level of internal market which would ensure parity relations between Ukraine and the Member States of the European Union.

This suspension to sign the AA initiated protests on the central square of Kyiv. On the same day, 21st of November, circa 2,000 people gathered at the main square of Kyiv – Independence Square (in Ukrainian “Майдан Незалежності” – Maidan Nezalezhnostі), and agreed to stay there for the night. The following day, the activists installed tents despite the court ban, the police tried to stop them that led to first collision. On 24th November, people organised a mass rally at the Independence Square and then a meeting of about 100,000. Some of the demonstrators tried to block the main entrance to the building of the Cabinet, and Special Forces first used tear gas and stun grenades.

57 Poroshenko, P. (2015). Ukraine’s future is in Europe – we have chosen our path, The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/24/ukraine-future-europe-war-on-corruption Viewed 20.09.2016. 240 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The Revolution of Dignity has become one of the most powerful complex challenges not only for Ukraine, but also for the world community. The President’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement, the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, tragic events in eastern Ukraine and the current Russia-Ukraine war (the hybrid war) caused a wave of rethinking and understanding of existence of society. The struggle of the Ukrainian citizens for their rights was called the Revolution of Dignity or the Maidan.

Early in the morning on the 30th day of November, the authorities offered people at the Square to disperse under the pretext of the installation of the Christmas tree. After the refusal, the special police force “Berkut” (“Golden eagle”) broke up the protestors, most of whom were students, beating them with batons and kicking. The Christmas tree was installed, which was called “the bloody Christmas tree”. Later, the Interior Minister apologised to the victims, but it seemed to have been late. Ukrainians reacted immediately: the following day, around 500,000 people gathered at the St. Michael’s Square, then the Independence Square and occupied the building of Kyiv City State Administration, building of trade unions, and tried to topple a statue of Lenin. A week later, 8th December, the Square held “March of a Million” – one of the biggest meetings in Ukraine’s history. After the rally, the protesters toppled the statue of Lenin in Kyiv58. Until the New Year, there were two big meetings in Kyiv – on 11th and 22nd December. On 11th December, “Berkut” tried to conquer the Square but the attempts were unsuccessful59. On 17th December 2013, the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia had meeting and agreed on highly important issues for the Ukrainian authority. As Kyiv “paused” its eurointegration process, it received its “award”. Russia decreased the price of gas to Ukraine from $400 to $268,5 per 1,000 cubic meter. The Russian government was also ready to invest $15 billion of the National Welfare Fund into Ukrainian Eurobonds. The official reason of the deal was commented by President of Russia: “Keeping in mind the problems in

58 The fall the statue of Lenin in Kyiv caused a wave of “falls” of the statues of Lenin and other Soviet leaders and statesmen who were connected to creating famines in Ukraine or developed anti-Ukrainian policy. This process was called “Leninopad” (“Ленінопад”) with meaning of “Fall of Lenins”, similar to period when leaves fall – defoliation. Beginning from December 2013, there were toppled almost 600 statues in Ukraine.

59 At night of 11th December 2013, the bells of St. Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery have beaten alarm for the first time since 1240, during the Mongol invasion. The sound of bells summoned loads of dwellers if Kyiv so that “Berkut” and interior troops failed to clean up the Maidan. The monastery was also a refuge for the protesters during the first “Berkut’s” attack on 30th November 2013. 241 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the Ukrainian economy related ... pretty much to the global financial and economic crisis”60 (Forbes, 2013b).

A day before the meeting, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted laws that were nicknamed “dictatorial”. The amendments provided for the ability to block Internet sites, administrative responsibility for the installation of tents in the streets, the regulations for setting the stage and audio at rallies. The laws also introduced a ban of masks and weapons on mass actions. There was introduced a concept of “a foreign agent” – any political organisation, financed from abroad. Many amendments reminded laws passed by the State Duma of Russia in 2013. The opponents even started calling the Parliament “Ukrainian maddened printer” similar to the Russian Parliament61 (Tvrain, 2014).

On 19th January 2014, the opposition was going to block the building of the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) in order to compel the deputies to cancel the adopted amendments to the laws. People, 100,000 to 500,000, came to the meeting to the Square of Independence, where the leaders of the parliamentary opposition parties called for the creation of the People's Parliament (Assembly), no confidence to President and the creation of a new Constitution. Nonetheless, many protesters, outraged by “16th January laws” and omissions of the opposition leaders, went to the government district, which was under defence of police border. Several thousand people started throwing Molotov cocktails, shake buses of security forces. In response, “Berkut” began using traumatic weapons and flash grenades against the protesters. The police also used water cannons when the temperature was 7-8 degrees below zero. The following day, the battles with policy did not cease, the protesters began constructing barricades near the Government district. President promised to create a commission for the negotiations that would contain opposition and Administration of President. On 22nd January, two activists twenty-year old Serhiy Nihoyan and Michael Zhyznevskyy were killed by sniper’s gunshot. “Berkut” applied force to the protesters by arresting and beating. By the end of the day, doctors concluded the death of five protesters, three hundred people were wounded.

On 23rd-25th January 2014, the activists strengthen the barricades and construct new ones. The protesters began organising self-defence groups each of what had a hundred activists. The

60 The official quotation: “Имея в виду проблемы в украинской экономике, связанные... в значительной степени с мировым финансовым экономическим кризисом”. 61 The Parliament of Russia was nicknamed “Maddened printer” in early 2013 when it began “stamping” strange, mostly punitive laws in such a hurry, as if the world ends tomorrow. 242 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) leaders of the opposition parties and the President had a meeting, where they agreed an “armistice”, according to which the protesters had to leave the city streets and the authorities release all the detained and arrested people. The protesters did not accept all the points of the “truce” though and stated that the President and the government had to resign. On 24th January 2014, the activists occupied the building of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, which is located in the central street. The day later, the President Yanukovych proposed the opposition leaders seats in a new government – Arseniy Yatsenyuk (then head of the largest opposition fraction “Batkivshchyna” (“Motherland”) in the Parliament and acting Prime Minister) was proposed a seat of Prime Minister, and Vitali Klitschko (leader of the party “UDAR” and acting Mayor of Kyiv) was proposed to become a Deputy Prime Minister on humanitarian assistance issues. The opposition leaders said that they would not accept the proposal unless the President complied with all the demands of protesters, most important of which are early presidential elections in 2014 and abolition of the “dictatorial laws” of 16th January 2014. The same day, the protesters occupied “Ukrainian House”, the largest exhibition and convention centre of Ukraine near the Independence Square. On 28th January, the Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigns and the Parliament abolishes some of the “16th January laws”. The next three weeks the situation in Kyiv was more or less peaceful, the protester left all the buildings of regional and Kyiv’s administrations occupied in January- February, as it was agreed with the authorities.

On 18th February, the protesters went to the building of Parliament where the opposition required adopting constitutional amendments aiming to significantly reduce the power of the President. After clash between special police forces and the protester, the activists defeated and Special Forces began storming the Independence Square. The standoff continued all night and the following day “Berkut” tried to storm the building of trade unions causing 16 deaths of activists and 11 police officers.

The 20th day of February is “Black day” of the Revolution of Dignity. The Interior Minister said that the police had received weapons and had permission for its use and Security Service announced the start of “anti-terrorist operation”, which meant start of storming Maidan. On this day, Special Forces and snipers killed 67 protesters.

21st February was the day of “capitulation” of president Yanukovych. In presence of foreign representatives of the EU and Russia, the leaders of opposition and the President signed an agreement to return to the Constitution of 2004, which limits the powers of the President. At

243 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the Independence Square, the protesters say goodbye to the activists who died during the protests62. . The people at the Square call for the President to resign and the police and special forces leave the main streets of the city. The following day, 22nd February, government buildings turn under the control of Maidan’s self-defence63. Parliament returns to the Constitution of 2004 and adopted a resolution “On the withdrawal of President of Ukraine to fulfill constitutional powers and appointment of early presidential elections in Ukraine” on 25th May 2014 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2014a). The presidential duties were assigned to the new parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Turchynov.

As far as I am concerned, the main geopolitical result of the Revolution is Ukraine’s exit from the zone of Russian influence in economic and political spheres, and relative decrease of dependence on Russia in the cultural sphere. In the economic sphere, Ukraine became less dependent from Russia’s energy resources and increased their import from Europe. Kyiv also managed to reduce domestic energy consumption because of the war in eastern Ukraine and Russian intervention in the Crimea. Because of international sanctions, Russia’s trade wars against Ukraine are less harmful thanks to rupture of trade relations.

62 The killed activists during the protests of 2013-2014 were called “the Heavenly Hundred” as similar groups of self-defence of the activists at Maidan but already gone to heaven. There are currently over 110 identified victims, including kidnapped and tortured activists. Tens of protesters remain disappeared up to this day. The name of self-defence organisation “Hundred” was borrowed as a unit of the Cossack regiment from 16th century. 63 On 21st February, Yanukovych escaped from Kyiv to Eastern Ukraine in order to fly to Moscow, but the customs impeded him from passing the border. Yanukovych asked Putin then to escape to Russia. Hence, Russia Special Forces helped Yanukovych move to Crimea and he reached Russia via transport of Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopil. 244 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

III.2. Return to pro-European Path.

“Ukraine has no choice but to integrate with the European Union.

EU is a powerful engine of reform.

The alternative cannot be a union built only on gas, oil and theft.

It can be a disaster for Ukraine.”

Francis Fukuyama, American political scientist (Re:public; 2013)

A new government was formed on 27th February with Arseniy Yatsenyuk as a Prime Minister. The same day in Crimea, Russian Special Forces in unmarked uniform, with support local pro-Russian fighters, seized the building of the Council of Ministers of Crimea and the Crimean Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Crimea). Later, Russian landing joined the extremists and governed mainly by Russian military base in Sevastopil. During the month, Russians made a complete takeover (key civil and military infrastructure) blocking Ukrainian troops and ships. On 1st March 2014, Council of Federation64, the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, supported unanimously the appeal of President Putin for permission to use the Russia’s Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine. In response, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine decided to bring Ukraine’s armed forces on full alert and developed a plan of action in case of direct military aggression of the Russia. The Council of Federation cancelled the resolution only on 25th June 2014 (Deutsche Welle, 2014).

The illegal authorities in Crimea planned to make a referendum on 16th March 2014 whether Crimea should accede to Russia or remain as a part of Ukraine but with enlarged autonomy. Official Kyiv tried to impede to hold the illegal referendum on judiciary level. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine recognised the planned referendum unconstitutional on 14th March, and the following day, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a resolution “On dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” (Rapoza, 2014), (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2014b). According to the results of the illegal referendum, the majority voted in favour joining Russia. Neither Ukrainian authorities nor international community recognised the referendum (except for Russia, Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Venezuela). Two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin and separatist

64 Speaker of the Council of Federation, Valentyna Matviyenko, was born in Ukraine and is considered a traitor of Ukraine because of support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. She was one of the first persons put under sanctions of the US, Canada and the EU. 245 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) leaders signed an “agreement on accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation” aiming to form new subjects of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol (President of Russia, 2014c). The annexation of legitimated by the State Duma and the Council of Federation on 20th and 21st March respectively. Furthermore, the Parliament of Russia made amendments into the Constitution on 11th April concerning the annexed territories.

On 21st March 2014, the new Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and the 28 heads of state signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement at the EU summit in Brussels (European Council, 2014a: 12). On 27th March, the General Assembly of the United States adopted a resolution, entitled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, where the referendum on annexation of Crimea was acknowledged illegal. The resolution stated on “sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders” (United Nations, 2014b). The resolution was supported by 100 votes, while 11 nations voted against and 58 states abstained from the vote. Other international organisations neither recognised the occupation of Crimea. NATO stopped civil and military co-operation with Russia on 1st April. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), at the summit on 10th April 2014, deprived Russia of voting rights until the end of 2014. In January 2015, PACE continued suspending Russia’s voting rights in the organisation until April 2015. Moreover, Russia lost its right to be represented in the Assembly’s leading borders “as a clear expression of condemnation of continuing grave violations of international law in respect of Ukraine” by Moscow (Ukraine Today, 2015).

After the annexation of Crimea, Kremlin began invasion into eastern regions of Ukraine. In April, Russian armed forces and pro-Russian rebels, using weapons, occupied a number of government buildings and security forces buildings in eastern districts of Ukraine. The occupants called for referenda on independence of two regions. In order to impede a complete occupation of the districts by Russia, Ukraine announced start of an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) and began retaking the control under the occupied cities. On 11th May, the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk (two eastern districts) declared independence after illegal,

246 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) unrecognised referenda65. After the impeachment of Yanukovych, early presidential elections were held on 25th May 2014, where in the first round Petro Poroshenko won gaining 54.70% of the votes. P. Poroshenko sworn in as the President of Ukraine two weeks later, on 7th June 2014. In the speech, the president called on separatists to lay down their arms and end the fighting (Dearden, 2014). Later, he ordered to create humanitarian corridors allowing civilian to leave the war zone and to take back the corpses.

The new President signed the economic part of the Association Agreement with the EU (the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) in the margins of the EU summit of 27th June 2014, when there were signed the AAs with Georgia and the republic of Moldova (European External Action Service, 2014c). At the signing ceremony, the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy named the AAs a milestone in the history of the Partner States and the EU, and he mentioned: “In Kiev and elsewhere, people gave their lives for this closer link to the European Union. We will not forget them” (European Council, 2014c). The President of Ukraine mentioned in his speech that “In recent months, Ukraine has paid great, the highest price so that European dream came true” (Hromadske.tv, 2014). The Association Agreement was simultaneously ratified by the Parliament of Ukraine and the European Parliament on 16th September 2014 (Deutsch Welle, 2014). In June and July 2014, the Ukrainian army regained control under the occupied territories with significant success, as it was promised by the new President. Nonetheless, there were critical situations in the war zone: in June, the separatists shot down a Ukrainian military transport plane killing almost 50 people. On 17th July, a civil plane with direction from the Netherlands to Malaysia was shot down above the territory under the control of Russian and pro-Russian separatists, with the loss of 298 people.

The Eastern Partnership absorbed main achievements of Ukraine in relations with the EU that were proposed as the most innovative features of the new policy. However, the new EU initiative did not provide European perspective to the Partners: changing political and economic situation in the EU, the global economic and financial crisis and enlargement fatigue forced the EU to focus upon internal problems that led to an EU’s appropriate position of the arm’s length principle concerning the Eastern Partners (close to not allow them to move away from Europe, but far away from EU membership).

65 According to President Poroshenko, Russia aimed to occupy at least eight Ukrainian regions after annexation of Crimea (Novoye Vremya, 2015b). 247 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The Association Agreement creates a new, in-depth relations format between the EU and Ukraine. It is a unique bilateral document that reaches far beyond similar agreements between EU with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In fact, the Association Agreement is the most far-reaching agreement that the EU has ever had with a third country. The agreement not only provides a qualitatively new legal basis for further relations between Ukraine and the EU, but also serves as a strategic guideline for systematic socio-economic reforms in Ukraine, providing of large-scale adaptation of Ukraine to EU standards and rules.

According to the Agreement, the relations between Ukraine and the EU transferred to a new level – from partnership and cooperation to political association and economic integration. In the core of political association is convergence of Ukrainian and European positions on all matters of international peace and security to ensure direct participation of Ukraine in the policies of EU agencies and programmes, common action to ensure national security interests of Ukraine.

Ukraine has made some progress in political co-operation: in particular Ukraine joins (on a selective basis) to the statements and positions of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy; an active co-operation between the European Parliament and the Parliament of Ukraine. Ukraine participates in many EU programmes (e.g. Twinning66, TAIEX67 and CIB68), established co-operation with the EC Mission border assistance in Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). Ukraine is actively involved in the work of EU agencies: co-operation the Security Service of Ukraine and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders of the EU Member States (FRONTEX); practical relations between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the European Police Office (EUROPOL); the Ministry of Health of Ukraine and the European Monitoring Centre of Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Ukraine also ratified the “Convention for the Protection of individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data” (Council of

66 Twinning is an instrument for the cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States and of beneficiary countries (candidate countries and potential candidates to EU membership, as well as countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy) (European Commission, 2015f). 67 TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange) is an instrument of foreign assistance provided by the European Commission to exchange information in order to build an institutional capacity required for the adaptation of national legislation with the acquis communautaire (Centre for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union, 2013a). 68 CIB (Comprehensive Institution Building Programme) is integral part of the EU initiative "Eastern Partnership", which was launched on 7 May 2009 in the EU summit in Prague (Centre for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union, 2013b). 248 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Europe, 1981) and its Additional Protocol (the Verkhovna Rada adopted on 6th July 2010), which facilitate an agreement with Eurojust and operational agreement with Europol.

The direct participation of Ukraine in policies, agencies and programmes of the European Union improves the institutional and administrative capacity of Ukraine, but also helps co- ordinate the efforts of the parties to overcome common threats (illegal migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, cross-border crime).

Nonetheless, such co-operation should not be limited only to Ukraine implementation of international legal instruments but to aim to the interaction between Ukraine and the EU in other international organisations, Ukraine’s participation in information or co-ordination meetings organised by the EU and in the future – attracting Ukraine to develop joint position, joint implementation (operational) action, and to develop and implement joint strategies (particularly in the security area).

The economic integration aims at creating a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU for the gradual integration of Ukraine into the EU market, which is main pillar of EU normative economic policy. The Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU envisages trade liberalisation of trade of goods as well as services, liberalisation of capital movements and labour mobility to a certain degree. A distinctive feature of EU- Ukraine FTA is a comprehensive adaptation programme of sectorial laws and regulations of Ukraine to the EU standards (agriculture, transport, energy, services, &c.). This allows to eliminate the largely non-tariff (technical) barriers in trade between Ukraine and the EU and provide enhanced access to the EU internal market for Ukrainian exporters and vice versa.

The agreement provides regulation of other important areas of the bilateral co-operation. The main objective in the area of justice, freedom and security is rule of law and strengthening of institutions, in particular in the field of law enforcement and the establishment of justice (especially strengthening the judiciary, improving its efficiency, guaranteeing its independence and impartiality). Implementation of an adequate level of protection of personal data in line with European and international standards is an essential element of the co- operation.

In order to manage migration flows, the Agreement introduced a comprehensive dialogue on key issues of migration, including illegal and legal migration, human trafficking and so on.

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Particularly important part of the Agreement is regulation of the necessary conditions for workers legally working abroad.

The Visa Dialogue. The visa liberalisation dialogue between Brussels and Kyiv began on 28th March 2008 as one of the points mentioned during the Ukraine-EU summit on 9th September 2008.

Two years later, at the next summit on 22nd November 2010, Ukraine received EU Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (Mushak, 2015: 20). It was a new step in bilateral relations and transition from abstract discussions to substantive and purposeful work with a clear prospect of visa-free travel regime for the citizens of Ukraine (Van der Loo, 2016: 201).

The Action Plan was developed by the European Commission similar to the “road maps” provided by the Balkan states69 and granted later to Moldova and Georgia.

The Action Plan divided the visa dialogue into four blocks: 1) document security, including biometrics; 2) irregular immigration, including readmission; 3) public order and security; 4) external relations and fundamental rights.

The Action Plan provides for introduction of passports with biometric data, withdrawal of passports that do not meet the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) standards, strengthening of measures against illegal migration, improvement of border management, deepening of international legal co-operation in the fight against organized crime, drug and human trafficking, approximation of asylum legislation to the international standards in this area.

The Action Plan is being implemented in 2 phases:

1. The first period englobes Ukraine’s adoption of necessary legislation and national programmes concerning visa liberalisation dialogue; 2. During the second phase, official Kyiv has to implement the adopted legislative basis. The first phase ended in 2014, when the European Commission, on 27th May, the Fourth Report on adoption of the necessary legislation by Ukraine and recommended to move to the second phase. A month later, on 23rd June 2014, the EU Foreign Affairs Council also adopted

69 The “road maps” for implementation of visa-free travel regime with the EU was introduced in 1990s for citizens of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stiglmayer, 2011: 1).

250 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the decision on Ukraine’s commence of implementation of the second phase of the Action Plan.

The Fifth Progress Report was published on 8th May 2015, were the European Commission notes progress in the implementation of the second phase of the Action Plan on visa liberalisation but underlines the need to work more. “The significant effort made by the Ukrainian authorities led to a coherent legislative framework and commitment to institutional reforms. Sustained efforts by all stakeholders involved will be needed to implement the recommendations included in the present report”, mentioned the European Commission (2015e) in its report. The EC admits that the key priority of Ukraine is implementation of legal and institutional framework concerning asylum issues, the combat against corruption, human trafficking and discrimination.

On 18th December 2015, the European Commission published the final Sixth Progress Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation. In the report, the European Commission considers that Ukraine meets all the benchmarks set in respect of the four blocks of the VLAP. Moreover, the Commission presented, in April 2016, a legislative proposal for the European Parliament and Council of the EU to amend Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 on the exclusion of Ukraine from the list of countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and transfer of Ukraine to the list of countries whose citizens (holders of biometric passports) are exempt from visa requirement for short-term travels (up to 90 days) to the Schengen area countries (European Commission, 2016).

On 5th September 2016, the European Parliament will hear a report on proposed visa liberalisation for Ukraine, prepared by Mariya Gabriel.

Visas for Ukrainians had to be cancelled in summer 2016 but the visa-free regime will begin only in autumn 2016. Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, explained in early July that the visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine was postponed by two major issues in Europe:

 The first issue is “Brexit”. It is campaign in the UK for withdrawal from the EU. In June, the majority of residents voted for the UK out of the EU. The decision was a surprise for Europe. Therefore, the Ukraine’s issue moved to the second place.

251 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

 The second problem is migration crisis in Europe. Europe is experiencing the biggest influx of refugees in its history caused by the war in Syria and other countries where militants are operating. However, there are loads of factors in favour of the visa liberalisation process to be concluded successfully: first of all, the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee voted on 7th July 2016 the recommendations that the Schengen travel visas must be abolished as soon as possible for Ukrainian citizens (Ukraine Today, 2016). Secondly, Ukraine met all the requirements on the visa-free regime. Thirdly, Ukraine has German support in this process as key member in the European Communities (Reuters, 2016).

Financial Assistance. The European Union is the largest donor to Ukraine. Since 1991, EU financial aid amounted to more than €3.5. EU financial support aims at supporting reforms and European integration in Ukraine. Short and medium-term objectives of the funding are identified in the “European Agenda for Reform” adopted in May 2014 and the Road Map of EU support for a wide range of activities that reflect the priorities of the Government of Ukraine and the expectations of the Ukrainian people. These activities range from support for constitutional reforms to co-operation in the energy sector; from EU financial support to the unilateral opening of the European Union its market for Ukrainian goods, reforming the justice system and the civil service to visa liberalisation.

Implementation of the European Agenda for Reform for Ukraine included a “State building contract for Ukraine” signed on 13th May 2014 for about €355 million plus €10 mln for civil society support. The contract was to assist the Government of Ukraine to meet the needs of short-term economic stabilisation and to reform public administration, contribute to the fight against corruption, reform of public administration, electoral law and constitutional reform (European Commission, 2014b).

In April 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Macro- Financial Assistance Programme for Ukraine, which opened a credit programme of macro- financial assistance of €1.61 billion. The “State building contract for Ukraine” and macro- financial assistance loan programme constitute a package of financial support for Ukraine in the amount of €11 billion, announced by the President of the European Commission J.M. Barroso on 5th March 2014 (European Commission, 2014c).

Nevertheless, the common framework programme for Ukraine was suspended due to crisis in Ukraine. The funds planned for 2014 were directed to financing “State building contract for 252 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Ukraine On 26th March 2015, the European Parliament approved a new credit for Ukraine for €1.8 billion to help Kyiv reduce deficit in a short-term balance of payments. The allocation of the funds are associated with commitments of Ukraine to implement structural reforms to solve the problems that caused the current crisis.

Apart from the financial assistance for reforms, the EU provided a humanitarian assistance. Brussels increased its humanitarian support to Ukraine, where thousands of people have suffered from the effects of conflict, displacement, terrible poverty. The European Commission provided extra €15 million for humanitarian aid: a joint operation was organised by the European Commission and EU Member States – three cargo planes delivered humanitarian assistance to Ukraine (tents, blankets, sleeping bags and warm clothes). It aimed to help Ukrainians who needed it most, including people living in areas occupied by the Russian separatists. In sum, 85 tons of humanitarian aid was given to Ukraine.

Researchers of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2014b) studied four possible scenarios of future relations between the European Union and Ukraine until 2030. First scenario is called “Highway” when Ukraine, motivated by goals of progress, become EU member. This goal is achieved by constructive approach and relatively wide fruitful co-operation, based on mutual attention to problems. Ukraine becomes a regional player despite Russia’s attempts to influence on the internal affairs of Ukraine.

The second scenario of relations is “Road with a speed limit” when Ukraine becomes a candidate for EU membership launches negotiations on joining the EU. Ukraine shows good economic results with successful implementing of EU social standards. The bilateral co- operation is strengthened by a tremendous number of joint projects that turn Ukraine into a “bridge” between the EU and Russia.

“Bumpy road” is the third scenario. Ukraine is still be in process of implementation of the AA. The country have moved a little on the European integration path and found no clear policy after a few elections and did not show any political will to deepen integration with the EU. It leads to ambiguity in the relations of EU-Ukraine and allows Russia to keep strong impact on Ukraine.

The last hypothetical scenario is “Stalemate” when democratic process in Ukraine quickly end. The economic benefits of some “groups” lead Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic

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Union that equals to Russia’s strong influence. The relations with the EU are put on hold for uncertain period.

I consider that the scenario “Road with a speed limit” is most possible in contemporary situation. During the 2020s, Kyiv can apply for EU membership candidate and be ready to join the Communities in 2030. Profound economic and democratic reforms may make Ukraine ready to respond the Copenhagen criteria, join the EU and stop being treated as a “bridge” between the West and Russia because nobody co-operates with bridge, they pass it.

III. 3. Final synthesis to Chapter III.

The relations between the EU and Ukraine in 1990s had limited development due to geographic component (there was no common border until 2004) and the Russian factor in post-Soviet space. Ukraine and the European Union have a new approach of relations, Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, different from Association Agreements with in Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States that have prospect of accession. The EU policy on Ukraine has gradually evolved from general declarations of support for political and economic transformation to more technical and functional approach in late 1990s. However, due to well-founded doubts about the success of the system transformation in Ukraine, the EU until the early 2000s. The situation has significantly changed only after the enlargement to the East in 2004 together with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan, signed in 2005, became impetus to political and economic reforms in Ukraine. However, it had some limitations due to selective and incomplete implementation. The political instability in Ukraine, lack of effective management and weak institutional basis for the integration and no membership prospects are the main reasons for insufficient implementation of the accord.

In 2007, the EU and Ukraine commenced negotiating on Association Agreement. The negotiations on a new enhanced agreement created a problem of balance between the expectations of Ukraine (which mainly focused upon a symbolic recognition of its European

254 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) prospects), obstacles in further reforming of the country, and constraints within the EU coming from positions of the Member States.

The presidency of V. Yanukovych can be described as a slow change of foreign affairs priorities – from integration with the EU to closer relations with Russia and Russia-led integration projects. The final step in this transition was refuse to sign the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit in November 2013. This caused widespread discontent that gave origin to the Revolution of Dignity. As a result, Ukraine was back on pro-EU path, signing the AA in 2014.

In 2016, the Association Agreement came in force providing a gradual integration of Ukraine with the EU without determining of the final aim. Main component of the AA is economic integration, which has been implemented through a deep and comprehensive free trade area.

From my point view, Ukraine should use experience of Central European countries and Baltic States in adoption of the EU legal legacy. Legislative and executive branches of power have to work harder; not waiting the EU does first steps in the integration process. Ukraine has also to ensure political stability in the country that is crucial for any country that intends to become EU member. The political culture in the EU is a culture of compromises, mutual concessions and achievement of mutual understanding on many political levels. The political culture in Ukraine, however, fails to reach consensus, contains mechanisms of confrontation to resolve conflicts. Moreover, instability of the political situation creates a negative image of the country, which becomes an obstacle for productive dialogue with the EU.

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CHAPTER IV – RELATIONS WITH MOLDOVA AND BELARUS: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP “POSTER CHILD” AND “PARIAH”

IV.1. Moldova and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003-2016).

After Moldova gained its independence on 27th August 1991, the country entered into a tough period of social, political and economic problems. The conflict on Transnistria in 1992 divided Moldova into two parts.

The first official document that stated gradual integration of Moldova into the European Union as a strategic objective of the country was “Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova” adopted on 8th February 1995 (Registrul de Stat al Actelor Juridice al Republici Moldova, 1995). This point was indicated in agendas of all Moldova’s Governments. In 1994, Moldova and the EU signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) that entered into force on 1st July 1998 and presented a framework of bilateral co-operation for the next ten years (European Council, 2014d). The accord showed that the European Union acknowledged Moldova as a partner for judicial and economic co-operation and political dialogue. Moldova was the first CIS Member State to join the Council of Europe – on 13th July 1995, which was an important step on the way to accession to the EU.

The next important step of Moldova towards Eurointegration was December 1996, when a new elected President P. Lucinschi addressed his letter to President of the European Commission Jacques Santer, where it was expressed for the first time the will of Moldova to obtain a status of an EU associate member by the year 2000 as the Moldovian authorities realised that the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement meant only co-operation, not integration. Mr Santer did not answer the letter and so did not the other heads of the EU member States that had received similar letters from Moldova.

The PCA came into force in 1998 and set up the legal basis for the implementation of TACIS Assistance Programme. In spring 1999, the new Government of Moldova of Ioan Sturza, despite the reticent positions of the EU, declared European integration as the prior strategic objective of the Moldova’s foreign policy. In spite of dismissal of the Sturza’s Government in late 1999 and omission of Moldova in conclusions concerning the EU enlargement to east, the country kept involving into European and international circuits: in 2001, Moldova joined the World Trade Organisation and is the only CIS country to be a member of the South-East Europe Co-operation Initiative and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Another 256 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) important factor of bilateral co-operation is geographic proximity to the EU, and its enlargement becomes momenta for tying relations – in 2004 ten Central Eastern European states joined the EU and brings Moldova closer to the European Union.

The anti-democratic character of administrative reform adopted on 27th December 2001 caused freezing relations between Brussels and Chișinău. Nonetheless, the political crisis in country was not followed by deepening of the authoritarianism. On the same day, the European Commission adopted a 2002’2006 Country Strategy Paper for Moldova that defined objectives of the bilateral co-operation and focused upon the implementation of the reform support programme (European External Action Service, 2001).

President of Moldova V. Voronin, a leader of Communist Part, stated at the summit of South East Europe Cooperation Process in April 2003 in Belgrade that Moldova was willing to speed up the European integration (Wróbel, 2014: 64).

During next several years, European Union developed a number of concepts and policies towards its neighbours, including Moldova. The first concepts was entitled “New Neighbours Initiative” was proposed by the Prime Ministers of the UK and Sweden in 2002. The policy was focused upon Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Lagucka, 2010: 62). In 2003, Poland proposed another concept (“Eastern Dimension”) that encompassed four Eastern European countries and was to co-ordinate the EU activities in Eastern Europe to overcome the separation of Europe after the EU enlargement waves.

The Communication of the Commission “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” in 2003 and the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 made a new impetus in relations between Brussels and Chișinău.

A great influence on transformation of EU-Moldova relations made Party of Communists of Moldova, which gained parliamentary majority on Moldova’s Parliament in 2001 and ruled until 2009. In 2001, the Party won the elections declaring Moldova’s joining the Union State70 and making Russian language official second language. The next 2005 parliamentary election, the Party of Communists changed entirely its programme and supported European integration of Moldova. The reasons of this drastic change of views came from the European Union and

70 Union State (Union State of Russia and Belarus) is a supranational entity comprising Russia and Belarus that was formed in 1999. The Union aimed at achieving a Soviet-like federation with common institutions. 257 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Eastern Europe. First of all, after the 2004 enlargements of the EU and NATO, Moldova became a regional neighbour of the EU and caused increased interests of European institutions in Moldova’s internal affairs. Secondly, the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) made the Moldovan authorities to be more cautious to internal and external influence of this wave of revolutions and to impede similar agitations to happen in Moldova. Another reason was deterioration of Russian-Moldova relations that Moldova refused to sign Kozak Memorandum concerning regulation of Transnistrian conflict.

The next important step towards eurointegration was signing the Moldova-EU Action Plan (EUMAP) on 22nd February 2005 in Brussels that does not substitute the Partnership and Co- operation Agreement of 1994 as the main accord of the EU-Moldova co-operation, but supplements it. Hence, the Action Plan is a political document, not a legal act like the PCA as seven out of ten priorities refer to the political dimension of the co-operation. The EUMAP has 46 pages, 80 objectives and 294 actions/measures to be implemented. The strategic objectives of the document were support of economic, political and institutional reforms. The other reforms are: “sustained efforts towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict”; stability and effectiveness of institutions that guarantee democracy and the rule of law; strengthening the freedom of the media; reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity; improving investment climate (European External Action Service, 2005: 3-4). The list of the priority reforms also includes an issue of improving the border management with the support of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM); signing of the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the European Union and obtain Autonomous Trade Preferences for Moldova by signing an agreement in this regard. After the signing the Action Plan on, Moldova’s European integration policy was based upon two prime pillars: first of all, it is an implementation of the Action Plan; the second pillar was participation in all regional initiatives (Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, South Eastern European Cooperation Process and Central European free Trade Agreement).

On 24th March 2005, the Parliament of Moldova adopted a Declaration on the political partnership for the achievement of the objectives of the European Integration by the coalitions of four pro-European parliamentary fractions on the first day of new-elected parliament. “We start from the fact that further development of the Republic of Moldova can be ensured only through consistent and irreversible promotion of the strategic course towards

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European integration71”, it is said in the Declaration. The document stipulates that the implementation of the EUMAP the main objective, and mentions the other objectives of the Action Plan (Parlamentul Republici Moldova, 2005).

On 23rd March 2005, the European Union appointed its Special Representative for Moldova – Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged in order to monitories the situation in the region (Official Journal of the European Union 2005: 50). On 6th October 2005, the European Commission opened its Delegation in Chișinău.

In 2006-2008, the EU and Moldova developed their co-operation at economic and political by signing complementary agreements and making visits: on 11th April 2006, there was signed the Republic of Moldova-EU Agreement regarding some aspects of air transit; a month later – a Perspective Agreement regarding external assistance. In October 2007, the parties signed some agreements regarding visa regime facilitation for the citizens of Moldova and the readmission. In June 2008, there was signed a Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership aiming to facilitate legal immigration and fight against illegal immigration (Council of the European Union, 2008c).

The European integration of the Moldova was manifested by a number of specialised institutions: in November 2000, there was established a National Commission for European Integration that developed the Concept of integration of Moldova into the EU. There were also a Parliamentary Committee for European Integration; in 2003, a Department for European Integration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. On 4th November 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even changed its name into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (Kunert-Milkarz, 2013: 48). In December 2004, the President of the Republic of Moldova issued a decree to appoint the Foreign Minister as Vice- Prime Minister in order to assure the effective implementation of the Action Plan.

On the 1st of January 2006, Moldova was granted the General System of Preference (GSP+) that had been previewed by the Plan of Action RM-EU.

According to the EU requirements, Moldova elaborated the Conception for Guarding the National Frontier for 2007-2010 and National Strategy for Integrated Management of the State Frontier of the RM (2010).

71 Original text: “Noi pornim de la faptul ca dezvoltarea de mai departe a Republicii Moldova nu poate fi asigurata decit prin promovarea consecventa si ireversibila a cursului strategic spre integrarea europeana”. 259 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

In May 2011, the Moldovan authorities have issued a non-paper document addressed to the EU: “Proposals of the Republic of Moldova on the future development of the Eastern Partnership” (Kunert-Milcarz, 2013a: 54-55). In the document, Moldova expressed its positions concerning Eastern Partnership as a political instrument that should contain a clear statement of membership prospects for those countries that would be able to meet the requirements of the Union with following redefining the priorities of the initiative. Chișinău stressed the Eastern Partnership would be vastly important for Moldova in a long-term perspective and will make the state closer to achieving the objective of joining the EU (Horbowski, 2011).

Despite internal crisis and the difficult geopolitical situation, Moldova has sought to take measures of the democratisation of the state. On 24th April 2010, Vlad Filat, Prime Minister of Moldova in 2009-2013, presented a recovery plan for the country entitled “Rethink Moldova” at the Moldova Partnership Forum in Brussels (Government of Moldova, 2011). The plan included the main challenges for the new government of Moldova: integration with the EU, economic growth, building and strengthening the rule of law, de-centralisation of administrative and fiscal systems and unification (reintegration) of the state (Government of Moldova; 2011; p. 5). The plan of the structural reforms was support by international financial donors and declared a sum of 1.9 million euros for the period 2010-2020 (Kunert- Milcarz, 2013b: 52). The European aspirations of Moldova were supported by the EU in form of founding in May 2011 in Brussels a European Union-Moldova Forum. The Forum had to become a multilateral platform of experts focused on the integration of Moldova into the EU. “The willingness to support Moldova is strong within the EU. We have a moral commitment to support the Republic of Moldova on its European course”, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the member of the European Parliament stated during the Forum (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, 2011). During the sessions of the Forum, there was established an informal group of Friends of Moldova, Romanian-French Initiative, which were supported by Germany, Poland, the UK and Italy (Table 26).

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Table 26: EU-Moldova Co-operation Timeline

Date Feature

1998 EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

2005 Inclusion Moldova in ENP, ENP Action Plan launched

2005 Start EUBAM border mission

2009 Start Autonomous Trade Preferences

2009 Start EU Confidence-Building Measures programme Transnistria (in UNDP framework

January 2010 Start of negotiations on AA/DCFTA

May 2010 Moldova joins Energy Community

June 2010 Start EU-Moldova Visa Liberalisation Dialogue

April 2014 Moldovan citizens gain visa free travelling to the EU

June 2014 Conclusion of AA/DCFTA and provisional application

June 2014 ENP Action Plan replaced by Association Agenda

July 2015 EU suspends budget support after bank frauds

July 2016 AA fully into force

Source: Montesano, F. & van der Togt, T, & Zweers, W. (2016). The Europeanisation of Moldova: Is the EU on the Right Track? Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, July 2016, p. 9.

Visa Dialogue. Visa liberalisation with the European Union is one of the major incentives for Moldova’s greater involvement in the Eastern Partnership. This sphere of bilateral relations is very important because more than 20 per cent of the Moldovan population emigrated legally or illegally to the EU.

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Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the EU was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2008. The visa dialogue was initiated in 2010 and both partners signed an Action Plan in January 2011 where they specified reforms to be implemented by Moldova, very similar to those to be carried out by Ukraine:

 Document security;  Irregular migration;  Public safety;  Foreign relations and fundamental rights.

As the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) granted to Ukraine, this one was divided into two parts (phases): the first phase focuses upon legislation, the second one is about successful implementation of the adopted legislation.

During the two phases, the Commission had been giving Moldova positive scores on the reforms implementation: e.g., anti-discrimination law was considered as one of the milestones on the Moldova’s visa-free regime path.

According to the Action Plan, a joint committee of representatives of the European Commission and the administrative authorities of the third country should regularly assess progress in the implementation of the necessary legislation, and later in its implementation. This “technical” aspect, present also in the case of Serbia, was complemented by a “political” aspect: after a positive recommendations on visa liberalisation, the European Parliament and the Council of European Union have to make a decision based on technical criteria and taking into account the general political relations with the country, e.g. Moldova. This aspect aimed to guarantee the EU right to slow down or even stop the process of visa regime liberalisation with countries, regardless of their technical readiness and based more or less migration risks or for other reasons.

After five reports on progress in implementing the Action Plan (September 2011, February 2012, June 2012, June 2013 and November 2013), on 27th November 2013, the European Commission recommended the introduction of visa-free regime for Moldovan citizens who have biometric passports. The decision came into vigour on 18th April 2014. Moldova was the first of the six countries of the Eastern partnership who has visa-free regime with the EU.

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Researchers of the Institute of World Policy (Kyiv) state that the impact of liberalisation of visa regime for Moldova still needs evaluation. On the one hand, visa liberalisation as a practical element of European integration for ordinary citizens. On the other hand, the abolition of visas for Moldovan citizens with biometric passports has not significantly affected the support of the European integration process. Moreover, did not lead to significant quantitative and qualitative changes in migration processes (Benedychak & Litra & Mrozek, 2015: 7).

Transnistria. In the time, when Ukraine and Georgia are about to have visa-free regime with the EU and Moldova already has it, a question of unresolved frozen conflicts must emerge. Despite similarities with the situation in the East of Ukraine in terms of sources of instability and the origins of the conflict72, the Transnistrian conflict is frozen inactive. The Action Plan with Moldova did not contain unambiguous references about frozen conflicts, and, therefore, the issue of border control in the territories controlled by the separatists seems very important.

One of the main factors that caused concern to experts from the EU was that the authorities in Tiraspol could give false documents to persons who could be wanted for various reasons. From Moldova’s point of view, the occupied territory of Transnistria is a part of Moldova and its inhabitants are Moldovan citizens respectively. They may obtain Moldovan documents and passports, giving public authorities a certificate issued in Transnistria. In order to prevent getting Moldovan passport based on forged documents, the Moldovan authorities developed a law that provides a special procedure for the identification.

Financial Assistance. The financial aspect of the EU-Moldova relations was regulated by the EC Communication, according to which the current level of financial support within the ENPI amounted to €450 million euros in 2008 with increase to about €785 million in 2013.

The financial support of the EU on the bilateral level has increased significantly in recent years, being one of the highest funding support per capita in the region (European External Action Service, 2016b). According to implemented in 2011 the more-for-more principle, a new additional instrument programme was launched – the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC), which added more €130 million for democracy building and economic reforms. The Commission distributed funds (a total of €87 million) in the second edition this programme in 2013 between the three countries: Armenia (€25 million),

72 Since 2014 Ukraine is at war with Russian separatists in Donbas, eastern industrial region. 263 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Georgia (€27 million) and Moldova (€35 million). This is an increase of almost one third comparing to 2012, when these three countries received a total of €65 million. In case of Moldova, projects, supported under the EaPlC, were directed for economy development, support for rural areas.

Generally speaking, the EU is one of the biggest donors for Moldova: since 1991, the EU allocated more than €1 billion (Table 28). Not taking into account the European Neighbourhood Instrument funds, the EU assisted 84 projects within its foreign policy (European External Action Service, 2016b).

EU financial aid to Moldova has funded numerous and diverse projects, including (Table 27):

 improving public administration and financial management;  reform of the social aid system;  emergency aid responding to increases in heating tariffs;  energy production based on solar and agricultural waste, waste collection;  health care reform and equipment;  care centres for the young and old;  natural disaster relief;  rural economic activity;  water supply and waste water treatment infrastructure.

Table 27: Main Bilateral Programmes of EU assistance to Moldova

Date Programme Allocation

2007-2010 National Indicative Programme

2011-2013

2007-2013 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 273,13

The Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB)

EU High Level of Advisers

Cohesion Policy 6,98

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Policy Support Programmes

2007 Social Assistance Sector 21

2008 Health Sector Policy Support Programmes 52,6

2009 Water Sector Policy Support Programme 50

2010 Policy Support Programme for Economic Stimulation and 59 Rural Areas

2011 Policy Support Programme for the Reform of the Energy 42,6 Sector

The Energy and Biomass Project

2012 Justice Sector reforms 60

2013 Vocational Education Training Action Plan 25

2013 Support for visa liberalisation 21

2010 Building Measures Programme

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Non-State-Actors and Local Authorities, Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility

Source: Formulated based on Delegation of the European Union to Moldova. (2016). Overview: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/moldova/projects/overview/ Viewed 25.09.2016.

Table 28: Financial Support for Moldova within the ENPI, million euro

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL

40 62,3 57 66 78,2 122 100 525,9

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Source: Author based on European External Action Service. (2016b). EU-Republic of Moldova relations. Fact sheet, Brussels, July 2016: http://eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/docs/eu-moldova_factsheet_en.pdf Viewed 25.09.2016.

In order to support the implementation of the Association Agenda, the EU developed s Single Support Framework that is based on consultations with bilateral donors, international financial institutions, civil society organisations, the Government and international organisations. This assistance support has three priority sectors, stemming from bilateral accords, the Government’s programme “European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare 2011-2014” and the National Development Strategy (“Moldova 2020”):

1. Public administration reform –modernisation of the central and local public administration through the introduction of a result-oriented management approach; 2. Agriculture and rural development – to strengthen Moldova’s economic, social and territorial cohesion in an environmentally sustainable fashion; 3. Police reform and border management. The main objective is “The police force is professionally trained, accountable, efficient and professional” (Delegation of the European Union to Moldova, 2016b) On 2014-2017, the bilateral allocation can range from €335 million to €410 million based on successful implementation of the programmes.

Since 2008, the European Union has progressively become Moldova’s main trade partner with share approaching a half of Moldova’s total annual foreign trade (46.4%) and reached €3.5 billion in 2014. The situation will be improving as the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area are in force. The trade between the EU and Moldova grew by 8% in 2014 due to the strong growth of imports from Moldova. Moldova exports the EU textile and clothing products, and animal and vegetable products. The EU exports to Moldova the same products plus machinery and equipment and mineral fuels, as well as transport equipment and chemical products.

Energy sector is another sphere of co-operation between the EU and Moldova. In 2010, Moldova became a member of the Energy Community (together in Ukraine), and was President-in-Office in 2011. Moldova introduced a number of EU directives in the field of energy (gas, electricity and energy efficiency) aiming to prove its integration into the European energy market, In mid-October 2011, Prime Minister Filat assured European

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Commissioner for Energy Oettinger, that Moldova was ready to implement Third Energy Package” that determines rules for the energy market of the European Union.

Gas pipeline constructions is other issue in the energy sphere. The EU financed construction of a gas pipeline “Ungheni – Iași” (total length is about 40 km) through Romanian territory in amount of 26 million euro. The construction ended in August 2014. However, the actual pumping of gas to Moldova started only in March 2015.

EUBAM. The main objective of the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine is to fight cross-border crime and contraband on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. The Mission officially launched on 30th November 2005 and was composed by 69 EU experts working in the field of customs control and border police, and about 50 Moldovan and Ukrainian specialists. EUBAM is headquartered in Odesa, Ukraine (Isachenko, 2010: 2). From the very beginning, the Mission closely co-operates with the Office of the Special Representative of the EU in Moldova. Since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, the importance of the Mission has sharply increased due to possible attack of Russsia from Transnistria.

IV.2. Belarus – European Union. Main problems of the Partnership.

“What haven’t I seen there, in Europe? Everything is dirty.

People rub one another.”

A. Lukashenka, President of Belarus

Belarus, known as the “last dictatorship” in Europe still remains authoritarian and isolated country, where basic European values are violated. In foreign relations, Minsk had stable and solid relations neither with the European Union nor with other European organisations. Belarus is the only one Eastern European state that does not have Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU. It is the only state that is not a member of the Council of Europe (Ferreira, 2009: 74).

Nonetheless, Belarus is one of the few countries that have a common border with the EU on East after the 2004 enlargement; it has more than 1 000 km common border with three EU

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States (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) (Gromadzki, 2005: 5). Moreover, Belarus is an important transit state for the Russian gas and oil to the EU.

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Belarus and the European Union were established in 1992. That year marked the beginning of development of mutually beneficial forms and directions of co-operation, creation of legal frameworks co-operation between Belarus and the EU. In March 1995, Belarus and the European Communities and their Member signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Council of the European Union, 1995). Unfortunately, the Agreement was not ratified and entered into force due to the denial of basic democratic rights and freedoms in the country An Interim Agreement on Trade was signed in March 1996. TACIS programme in Belarus was funded by a number of projects totaling approximately $100 million. The TEMPUS programme has also successfully developed.

Year 1996 was a turning point in Belarus-EU relations. The main reason for the deterioration of relations was a referendum on amendments and additions to the Constitution of 1994. In October 1996, accredited in Minsk ambassadors of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy sent a statement to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry. On behalf of the EU, they expressed concern about the threat of violation of Constitution and noted that the chances of the Republic of Belarus to play an active role in Europe and deepen co-operation with the EU were threatened. The differences among the parties concerning the legitimacy of the referendum, led to the fact that a so-called “Belarusian Issue” was supplied in European politics (Sydoruk, 2012: 29).

On 15 September 1997, the situation in Belarus was an object of discussions at a special Meeting of the EU Council of foreign ministers. The outcome of the Meeting was to minimise contacts with Belarus. The Statement of relations with Belarus noted that the EU Member States would speak out against Belarus’s membership in the Council of Europe, will not conclude either interim agreement or PCA and would develop bilateral relations solely through the EU institutions. The European Union also decided to suspend an implementation of technical assistance programmes in Belarus (TACIS and TEMPUS) except for humanitarian or regional projects, which supported the process of democratisation. As a result of the Resolution, the political dialogue at the highest level between Belarus and the EU States had been suspended.

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The EU policy towards Belarus was closely co-ordinated with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): the Council of Europe suspended the Belarusian application for membership in 1997; the OECD decided to establish an Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) in Minsk to help promote democracy and human rights in Belarus (Kreutz, 2009: 7). The following year the “European Troika” (the EU, the Council of Europe and the OECD) adopted a policy of conditional engagement with Minsk and named four criteria that needed to improve in the parliamentary elections 2000: “the return of substantial power to parliament, opposition representation in electoral commissions, fair access to state media for the opposition, and electoral legislation in line with international standards” (Marples, 2004: 30).

A diplomatic crisis developed in spring 1998 when President A. Lukashenka issued an order to ambassadors of 22 states release their residences by June, the 10th that were located in elite compound “Drozdy” near Minsk and had to be renovated. The EU Ambassadors complained that the renovation was a cover up for an attempt by Lukashenka to take over the entire compound. After water and electricity were cut off in the embassies, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, the USA and Japan recalled their ambassadors from Minsk and argued that the Vienna Convention was violated (Kreutz, 2009: 7). On 9 July 1998, the Council of the European Union imposed a visa ban against A.Lukashenka and other 130 Belarus’s highest officials (Ulakhovich 2011: 92). The visa ban was lifted in February 1999 after an agreement had been reached regarding EU diplomatic residencеs in Minsk. Upon advicе from the AMG, the оther EU sanctions were also gradually removed the same year (Davodinis, 2001: 33).

Years 2000 and 2001, Belarus had parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. The elections were recognised by the AMG as non-democratic. Then President A. Lukashenka accused the OECD Advisory and Monitoring Group of supporting the opposition and operating out of mandate (Marples, 2004: 37-38). Consequently, Belarus renounced to renew visas to the Group members in October 2002, which caused the Advisory and Monitoring Group to stop its functioning (Kreutz, 2009: 7). The EU’s respond was quick: all the EU Member States (except for Portugal) introduced limitations on trip to the EU to the Belarusian high-level authorities on 19th November 2002 (Kreutz, 2009: 7). The sanctions were cancelled though when OECD opened its office in Minsk at the beginning of 2003.

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First concepts of EU’s eastern policy, as New Neighbours Initiative, Eastern Dimension and Wider Europe, encompassed Belarus, as well as following European Neighbourhood Policy (Tyshchenko, 2013). Nonetheless, the Minsk’s participation in the programmes was very limited. Moreover, the wave of Colour Revolutions in post-Soviet states (2003-2005) did not touch Belarus. In 2003, Belarus had been still mentioned, together with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU Partner within the ENP. Soon Belarus was in fact excluded from it though: the EU imposed visa and bank sanctions on Belarus, meanwhile, the EU was preparing and discussing Action Plans with Ukraine and Moldova in 2004.

The same year, the Parliament Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) discussed a report of Cyprian deputy Christos Purgurides, which had been prepared during the Purgurides’ stay in Minsk since December 2003 (Viasna, 2003). PACE accused Minsk of blocking investigations of disappearance of three opposition politicians and one journalist in 1999-2000. The resolution and recommendations call for further actions, including sanctions against Belarusian authorities (Council of Europe in Ukraine, 2004). The EU imposed visa sanctions to four Belarusian high-ups related to disappearances. In the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary elections in Belarus, the Council stated “its hope that Belarus will take its rightful place among European democratic countries” (Gänzle, 2008: 218). Nevertheless, the sanctions against Belarus were extended because of the parliamentary elections and referendum73 on October, 17 2004, which were not acknowledges as free and were accompanied by mass demonstrations and clashes with police (Lang & Koopmann, 2011: 24).

Council of the EU harshly reacted to the Belarusian referendum and parliamentary elections in October 2004, and announced a number measures against the Belarusian authorities in November:

- Reduction of contacts with the Belarusian authorities to a minimum;

- Visa restrictions against certain members of the Belarusian authorities, responsible for organisation of non-democratic elections, human rights abuse and violent elimination of peaceful demonstrations.

- Asset freezes of the Belarusian authorities (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 3).

73 On 17 October 2004, a referendum eliminated the rule that the President of Belarus could not elect for more than two terms, which was criticised by national and international experts. The day and after the referendum, several protesters were arrested and beaten by police (United Nations General Assembly; 2013: 7). 270 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

It is also noted that the EU remains open to bilateral co-operation if Minsk takes specific actions and shows a sincere desire to develop the relations.

After the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Council of the European Union sought new assistance tools in co-operation with Belarus, reshaped and reinforced the EU policy. Brussels developed a two-prolonged approach – “policy of restricted contacts with the authorities, and a policy of engagement with civil society” (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 3). On the one hand, Brussels attempted to identify and co-operate with “reformers” in the Minsk administration and work together to maintain a financial co-operation with the government. On the other hand, the EU made critical statements on the regime’s actions, increased contact with opposition figures, stepped up pressure on Belarus in the area of labour rights. Moreover, Brussels proclaimed an aim of diverting its financial resources to education, media and civil society initiatives where the Belarus government approval was not needed74 (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 3).

In 2005, the EU decided to open an official delegation to Minsk, although Belarus delayed its approval. Then, the European Commission appointed a Chargé d’affaires75 for Belarus, who was based in Kyiv and travelled frequently to Belarus.

End of 2005 and beginning of 2006, were characterised by attention of Europeans on the upcoming Presidential elections in Belarus in 2006. In March 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Belarus before the presidential elections (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006: 404-407). In the resolution, the European Parliament recognised the 2004 referendum concerning the alteration to the Constitution as non- democratic and “deplores the continuing deterioration of the political situation and the continuing violations of the civil and human rights of the Belarusian people” (Point 1). The Parliament also deplores the fact that neither the European Parliament nor the Council of Europe received invitations to observe the elections (Point 8).

74 In November 2004, the EU organised three meetings on Belarus, in Lithuania, with the participation of the representatives of the civil society groups from the EU and Belarus. These meetings aimed at the EU strengthening its support for civil society and democracy, making the funding rules more flexible. It was also discussed need to increase the EU visibility and presence in Belarus (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 3).

75 Chargé d’affaires is a diplomat who heads a diplomatic mission if its titular head is absent. These diplomats are usually diplomat secretaries or counselors. The Chargé d’affaires can be ad interim (temporary head) or en pied (permanent head). 271 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

The presidential election was held on 19 March 2006. According to the suffrage results, the incumbent President A. Lukashenka gained 84% at first tour and was re-elected. The candidate of the united opposition A. Milinkevich76 had only 6%. Authorities detained many opposition and civic activists during the campaign and used force against demonstrators protesting the fraudulent election (Global Edge, 2012). The day after the election, OSCE released a report where stated that “the “presidential election failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections” and was characterised by a disregard for the basic rights of freedom of assembly, association, and expression, and included a highly problematic vote count. It was also concluded that it was evident the President Lukashenka “permitted State authority to be used in a manner which did not allow citizens to freely and fairly express their will at the ballot box, and a pattern of intimidation and the suppression of independent voices” (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2006). On 24 March, the EU leaders agreed to impose new sanctions on the Belarus authorities at a summit. “The European Council has therefore decided to take restrictive measures against those responsible for the violations of international electoral standards, including President Lukashenko”, was mentioned in the Declaration on Belarus (Council of the European Union, 2006b: 35).

After the presidential elections, on 5th April 2006, the European Parliament had debates concerning the results of the election. The State Secretary at the Austria’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which held the presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2006, Hans Winker had a speech assuring that the Council had already prepared a list of sanctions against the Belarus authorities. The European Commission for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner also stated that the European Commission was going to sustain and broaden contacts with representative of the Belarus civil society (European Parliament: 2006d).

The Resolution of the European Parliament on the results of the presidential elections strongly condemns the unfair elections and names the Lukashenka regime as “the last dictatorship in Europe” (European Parliament, 2006e). Furthermore, the European Parliament called on the Council and the Commission to expand the sanctions against the Belarus authorities

76 Aliaksandr Milinkevich is a Belarusian politician, was chosen by the United Democratic Forces of Belarus as a joint candidate of the opposition in the presidential elections in 2006. A. Milinkevich was awarded the Sekharov Prize by the European Parliament the same year. 272 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

(President Lukashenka and his immediate entourage) by expanding the list of those covered by the visa ban and freezing the economic assets (Point 5). At the same time, the Parliament called to facilitate visa requirements for ordinary Belarusian people (Point 6) (European Parliament, 2006b). A few days later, Council of the European Union unanimously adopted restricted measures against A. Lukashenka and 30 officials responsible for “the violations of international electoral standards and international human rights law, as well as for the crackdown on civil society and the democratic opposition” (Official website of the European Union, 2006).

In March 2006, the International Labour Organization (ILO) recommended the EU to cancel the commercial preferences if the Belarusian authorities did not ameliorate the workers’ rights in six months (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 8). The workers’ rights condition was objective of an investigation initiated by the European Commission. The Commission concluded that there were serious and systematic violations of a freedom of association and protection rights for collective negotiation protected by Conventions No. 87 (Co87 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948) and No. 98 (C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949), which the European Commission considered justified a temporary suspension of the economic preferences (Lázaro, 2009: 17).

Some neighbouring to Belarus EU Members States were against this decision as they had tied economic relations with Belarus. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland said “nay” where Czech Republic and Slovakia abstained. The Lithuania’s Foreign Minister P. Vaitiekūnas voiced the reason of such decision claiming that the economic sanctions against Belarus “[…] the populations, rather than the authorities, would suffer” and only worsen the Belarusians’ attitude towards the EU (Jarabik & Rabagliati, 2007: 8). Hence, the European Commission made a new proposal concerning withdrawing Belarus from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) on 21st December 2006. According to the withdrawal conditions, another six months were given to Belarus to comply with the ILO recommendations (Rusakovich, 2012a: 80). On 21st June 2007, Belarus was withdrew from the GSP of the EU. The ILO said that Minsk had fulfilled only four out of twelve necessary pro-trade union reforms that “cost the country around €400 million a year (Rettman, 2007).

The limited contacts between the EU and Belarus made Brussels to reconsider the relations. The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy B. Ferrero-Waldner prepared a non-paper document “What EU could bring to Belarus” on 21st 273 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

November 2006. It was proposed to Belarus to become a full partner of the European neighbourhood Policy, but Belarus had to take some necessary measures concerning democratisation and human rights. These are the most important benefits that would be gained in bilateral co-operation (European External Actions Service, 2006a):

 “Easier travel by Belarusian citizens to EU countries”;

 Supporting the development of small and medium enterprises that would create more jobs and provide better perspectives for the younger generations. It could be achieved through economic reforms to improve the investment climate for foreign investors;

 Increasing a cross-border co-operation and for economic development;

 Modernisation of transport and energy network;

 Improve the quality of the environment;

 Offering the Belarusian students more scholarships and study in EU universities;

 Reform of judicial and legal systems to ensure equal rights;

 Increase financial support.

Belarus could use all these benefits if Minsk fulfills the main conditions: begins democratising the country and ratifies the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Hence, the European Union requires from Minsk specific actions that will ensure the rule law, democratic elections, freedom of speech and the rights of national minorities.The document names twelve points (rights of non-government organisations, release all political prisoners, abolish the death penalty &c).

The political sphere of bilateral co-operation has no results as the incumbent President A. Lukashenka will not agree to alter the form of government. Moreover, Belarus is not a solid partner in a security sphere. Hence, the European Union pays a great attention on the economic aspect of the co-operation.

A vast step towards the political dialogue is opening Delegation of the European Commission in Belarus on 7th March 2008 (Vieira, 2008: 3). Belarus did not recognise the independence of Abkhazia and North Ossetia, which was well perceived by Brussels. In August 2008, the Belarusian authorities also decided to release all the political prisoners and initiated to liberate the economy, improve electoral legislation, broaden dialogue with opposition parties, &c.

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Nonetheless, albeit these steps of democratisation, the parliamentary elections on 28th September 2008 in Belarus did not meet the OSCE democratic (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2008: 1-2). The Council of the European Union also notes that the parliamentary elections were undemocratic but the Council notes being satisfied about the progress that had been made during the electoral campaign compared with previous elections, “cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR and broader access for the opposition to the media” in particular (Council of the European Union, 2008d: 1). The Council decided to suspend the travel restrictions on certain leading figures in Belarus for six months, “with the exception of those involved in the disappearances which occurred in 1999 and 2000 and of the President of the Central Electoral Commission”, and to restore political dialogue between the EU and Belarus (Council of the European Union, 2008d: 2). In December 2008, Belarus and the EU signed the Framework Agreement about technical co-operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, 2008).

Eastern Partnership. Year 2009 marks a new phase in the EU-Belarus relations. On February 2009, J. Solana and A. Lukashenka had meetings where they discussed the problems and perspectives of bilateral relations. The main point of the discussions was Belarus participation in EU Eastern Partnership initiative (Rusakovich, 2012b: 139). In March 2009, the European Council officially invited Belarus to the Eastern Partnership launching summit on 7th May 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009a: 12). Belarus was represented by First Deputy Prime Minister U. Siamashka and Foreign Minister S. Martynau. Belarus signed a Joint Declaration of the summit in which the main goal of the Eastern Partnership was proclaimed the creation of the necessary conditions for the development of political association and economic integration between the European Union and interested Partner States. The Belarusian delegation also signed a Declaration of co-operation between the Belarusian government and the European Council in energetic sphere (Rusakovich, 2012a: 81). There were meeting during 2009-2010 between Belarus and the EU on political as institutional levels:

- A visit of the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy B. Ferrero-Waldner to Belarus on 21-22 June 2009 where it was discussed the reduction the cost of visas for the Belarusians (from 60 euros to 35 euros) and “[…]the possibility of the EU providing macroeconomic assistance to

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Belarus, as well as assistance in terms of Europe's financial institutions” (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2009);

- President of Belarus visited Lithuania in September 2009. President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė made a return visit to Belarus on 20th October 2010 (Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the Republic of Lithuania, 2014);

- Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi visited Belarus in November 2009. It was the first visit among European leaders to Belarus since the start of isolation policy (Official Website of the Republic of Belarus, 2009);

- Federal Foreign Minister G. Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart R. Sikorski visited Minsk in November 2010 (Federal Foreign Office, 2014).

On 25th October 2010, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union adopted a decision to extend the restrictive measures against certain Belarus officials until 31st October 2011. The Council also reaffirms its readiness to deepen its relations with Belarus “depending on developments in Belarus towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as its readiness to assist the country in attaining these objectives” (Council of the European Union, 2010a: 12-13).

The next step of the bilateral relations was the presidential elections in December 2010. According to the data of the Central Election Commission of Belarus, the incumbent President A. Lukashenka gained almost 80% of votes. The opposition leader Andrej Sannikaŭ gained 2,43% (Central Election Commission of Belarus, 2010: 1). The European countries subjected to severe criticism the actions of the Belarusian authorities concerning violent suppression of anti-government meetings on the squire in from of the building of Government, arresting ex-candidates harassment of the opposition leaders. On 20th December 2010, the next day after the elections, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy C. Ashton made a statement condemned the violence during the election night and recalled to respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Council of the European Union, 2010d). Three days after the elections, Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Germany, Poland and Czech Republic made a joint statement declaring that (Bildt, Schwarzenberg, Sikorski & Westerwelle, 2010):

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There can be no business-as-usual between the European Union and Belarus’

president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, after what has happened since the presidential

election in Belarus[.] [...] continued positive engagement with Mr. Lukashenko at the

moment seems to be a waste of time and money. He has made his choice — and it is a

choice against everything the European Union stands for.

On 24th December 2010, the US Secretary of State H. Clinton and the EU’s counterpart K. Ashton made a joint statement where they condemn all violence called for immediate release of all 600 detained demonstrators and all president candidates. They also mentioned that “Respect for democracy and human rights remain central to improving Belarus’s relations with the United States and the European Union”, which will not improve without substantial progress in these spheres (Council of the European Union, 2010e).

The OSCE stated that Belarus “still has a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments, although some specific improvements were made” (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2010a). In the end of December 2010, the Belarusian authorities claimed not to prolong the mandate of the OSCE office in Belarus (Eastern Partnership, 2011).

The situation in Belarus was discussed in the European Parliament on 20th January 2011. It is indicated in the adopted resolution, that the European Parliament condemns “the use of brutal force by the police and KGB services against the protesters on Election Day” (Point 2) and “[…] the arrest and detention of peaceful protesters and most of the presidential candidates”(Point 3) (European Parliament, 2011b). On 31st January 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council meeting discussed the situation in Belarus and adopted the following conclusions that “the Presidential elections demonstrated that Belarus still has a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments” (Point 1) (Council of the European Union, 2011d: 10). The Council also condemns the arrest of several presidential candidates, activists, journalists and civil society representatives, arrests and prosecution the opposition for political motives. The Foreign Affairs Council demanded to release and rehabilitate all the arrested for political reasons after the elections on 19th December and called on the Belarusian authorities to reverse the decision not to extend the mandate of the OSCE Office in Minsk (Points 2-4).

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The Council resumed the sanctions regime against a number of the Belarus officials. The European Council also stated to strengthen relations with the Belarusian people and civil society and confirmed its intention “to the start of negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Belarus and readmission” (Point 7). The EU also remains committed to its policy of “critical engagement”, that including dialogue and the Eastern Partnership, and recalls on deepen its relationship with Belarus. The Foreign Affairs Council mentions that the bilateral relations depend upon Belarus respecting the democratic principles (Council of the European Union, 2011d: 11).

The Belarus-EU relations were characterised as “frozen” with deteriorating in 2011. Brussels enlarged regularly the visa-ban list and there were discussing concerning imposing economic sanctions – The European Commission decided to freeze assets of the three Belarusian companies prohibited from export of arms and materials that “may be used for repression inside the country” (Rusakovich, 2012a: 83). As a response, Minsk did not release the political prisoners. In September 2011, Belarus did not agree with the participation format in the second EaP summit in Warsaw and sis not participate in it. Minsk refused to take part in the EaP Parliamentary Assembly in the end 2011 either.

The Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union decided to enlarge the travel-ban list of the Belarusian officials on 27th February 2012 (Council of the European Union, 2012b: 13). The Minsk’s response was quick: the permanent representative to the EU and the ambassador of Belarus in Poland were recalled for consultations in Minsk. At the same time, the Head of EU Delegation to Minsk and the Polish ambassador in Belarus were proposed to leave the country (Rusakovich, 2012a: 83-84). Then, the EU countries recalled their ambassadors from Minsk. The resolution of the conflict was found in March-April 2012 when a status quo was restored. Nevertheless, the political relations did not improve. The EU member States consolidated their position in the “Belarusian issue” and agreed to co-ordinate their relations at the international level. It was clearly perceived when the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament and the UN Council on Human Rights adopted resolutions on Belarus in July 2012. The UN Human Rights Council resolution calls upon (Human Rights House, 2012):

the Belarusian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all political

prisoners, to investigate fully and transparently into all allegations of torture and

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inhumane treatment of political prisoners to immediately cease the practice of

administrative arrests of the opposition, civil society, journalists and human rights

defenders and not to hinder their free movement, including the departure from the

country.

In 2013, Belarus was invited to the third Eastern partnership summit in Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013. Minsk was represented by Belarus’s Foreign Minister U. Makei. During the summit he mentioned that Belarus would start negotiations on visa regime liberalisation with the European Union (Astapenia, 2013).

In 2012, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle launched the programme “European dialogue on modernisation with Belarusian society” aiming at exchanging the views and ideas between the EU and Belarusian civil society representatives and the political opposition upon the necessary reforms for the modernisation of Belarus. (Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, 2012). The work takes place in four thematic working groups: 1) political dialogue and political reform; 2) justice and home affairs, including mobility, people-to-people contacts; 3) economic and social reforms; 4) trade, market and regulatory reforms (Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, 2012). The meetings of these working groups are mainly tale place in Belarus, Minsk.

Although the Belarusian authorities were not invited to participation, the fact that the initiative was initially focused purely upon the Belarusian civil society and the political opposition, made the official Minsk perceive it negatively (Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, 2014: 8). In order to give new impetus to the “European dialogue on modernisation with Belarusian society”, the European Commission launched a REFORUM project in January 2014 for a two-year term, which is being implemented by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS), headquartered in Vilnius (Belarusian Reporter, 2014).

The REFORUM project aims at supporting the “European dialogue”, whose goal is to create sixteen concrete and realistic proposals of reforms needed to improve the competitiveness of the Belarusian society. The main idea of the project is to identify areas in need of reforms through communication with target audiences (e.g. business, civil society, government) and to develop concrete proposals with the assistance of international and Belarusian experts (Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, 2014: 8).

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Within the European Neighbourhood Instrument (2014-2017), the EU allocated ca. 89 million euro aiming to finance projects of three sectors: social inclusiveness (30%), environment (25%) and regional and local economic development (25%) (European External Action Service, 2014d). Strategy Paper and Multiannual Indicative Programme for EU support to Belarus (2014–2017) mentioned the interest of Belarus in participating in Eurasian integration processes (now it is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union) and wants to co-operate with the EU in spite of significant political problems.

During the last two years (2014-2016), Belarus has moved forward to improve the bilateral relations with the EU: the two side started negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement in January 2014, resumed EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue. They also signed a Cooperation Arrangement on an Early Warning Mechanism in the energy sector (European External Action Service, 2016c).

In August 2015, Belarus released all political prisoners and in this context, the Council did not extend the restrictive measures for Belarusian nationals (170 people) and three companies in February 2016. Taking into consideration 2016 Belarusian parliamentary elections, the EU urges the Belarusian authorities to take forward the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR’s final report on the conduct of the 11 October 2015 presidential elections (European External Action Service, 2016c).

Brussels and Minsk admit on the official level that there are areas of co-operation of a great significance and interest: economic co-operation, development of transit infrastructure, energy safety, agriculture. They acknowledge the importance of multiple collaboration but see different ways: the EU focuses upon political tools, human rights; Belarus sees only economic benefits in the co-operation with its western neighbour (Figure 9).

280 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Figure 9: Main Trade Partners of Belarus (January-February 2016)

Source: Naviny.by.(2016). Belarus i YES teryayut ekonomicheskiye svyazi: http://naviny.by/rubrics/eu/2016/04/26/ic_news_627_474111 01.09.2016 Viewed 30.09.2016.

IV.3. Final synthesis to Chapter IV.

The EU had limited interests in developing relations with Moldova due to small size of the country, small population and economy at the beginning. The enlargement of the European Union and the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the relations became wider and the parties were more interested in enhanced bilateral relations.

In 2005, the EU and Moldova signed an EU Action Plan that introduced deep structural reforms in Moldova and intensified trade and economic co-operation. In the initial stages of discussion of relations with new neighbours after the enlargement in 2004, Moldova was interested in how a future neighbourhood policy would affect the prospects of Moldova’s

281 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) participation in the processes of South-Eastern Europe (e.g., the Stability Pact for South- Eastern Europe).

Within the Eastern Partnership, Moldova’s movement towards European integration becomes much more dynamic than in the case of Ukraine. It makes Moldova a leader in Eastern Europe in reforms. In spring 2014, the visa facilitation agreement came into force that made Moldova first country among the EaP states to have visa-free regime with the EU. Two years later, on 2016, free trade area began to function. Nowadays, the EU financed a range of programmes in Moldova aiming to enhance economic and political conditions and standards in the country. The EU is also a party, not official, in settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Since 2010s, Moldova is being a leader in promoting reforms among all the EaP states.

The European Union has been pursuing a restrictive and reactionary policy towards Belarus since 1990s because of violation of democratic principles. However, there were periods when the bilateral relations improved: in 2008-2010 and in 2015-2016. Such limited co-operation is the reason for a minimal involvement of Belarus in the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU though participates with the civil society; it assists the public sector and the opposition in order to promote democratic standards in the country despite minimal affect on the political situation.

The EU policy towards Belarus was based on the same principles as other Eastern neighbours. However, there two big factors that differ Belarus from Ukraine and Moldova in negotiations with the European Union. Firstly, the EU has not a significant economic, political or cultural importance as to Ukraine and Moldova. Belarus is deeply involved in other pro-Russian integration projects. Secondly, Belarus does not aim to become an EU member, which is completely different from its Southern neighbours. The Belarusian officials saw the ENP as a tool of influence on Russia.

282 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

CONCLUSION

Conclusion about Hypotheses

The Hypothesis No. 1 was “The European Neighbourhood Policy is addressed to states which do not have the perspectives to become members of the EU at this moment or at all”.

Since the beginning, the ENP was directed to two regions – Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. For the countries of Southern Mediterranean, the ENP and Union for the Mediterranean is the best option to enhance co-operation with 500 million market. There cannot be any discussions about EU enlargement in that region simply because the states of Northern Africa and Middle East do not meet Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union that states that any European country that respects the principles of the EU may apply to join the EU. As to Eastern Europe, the ENP has become a good chance for co-operation for the EU with new direct neighbours after 2004 and 2007 enlargements. As these countries are in Europe, they meet the “geographical criterion” to join the EU. However, these countries does not respond Copenhagen Criteria for joining the EU. Ukraine and Moldova, for example, do not meet neither political, nor economic and legislative criteria. The countries are not ready in a medium-term future (ten years) to respond those criteria to join the EU. Moreover, the EU did not recognize officially that any of the Eastern European countries might join the block; there were only recognition of will to join the EU and praise for development in the integration processes. I think, the ENP and the Eastern Partnership are the finest tool to future integration to the EU giving the target countries a rage variety of the spheres of co-operation as Association Agreements, visa ban, free trade.

The second Hypothesis states, “One of the most important tasks of “neighbourhood policy” is the creation of “a prosperous and stable neighborhood” on the borders of the European Union, which would be characterized by “peaceful relations among nations based on cooperation” (European Commission, 2006: 5).

During the last twenty years, the EU has been increasing its participance in conflict resolution process in the neighbouring countries. E.g., the EU takes part in settlement of the Transnistrian conflict since 2000s, in Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-now) in form of Normandy Group. However, these conflicts are not being resolved, the EU only help transform them into “frozen” conflict, which will not definitely turn Eastern Europe into “a 283 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) prosperous and stable neighborhood”. On the other side, we should take into account other parties in these conflict, actually, there is only one other actor, the Russian Federation. Consequently, a single EU policy (the ENP) is unable to face interests of a such super power as Russia with its neo-imperial concept for Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy has not met this target yet.

The Hypothesis No. 3 is that the Eastern Europe is not a homogenous region, but rather different by internal diversification and polarisation of the foreign policy. Among the participating countries, there are several models of relations with the EU. In one of them, the EU is seen as a strong regional actor that ensures security and stability. In another model, it focuses primarily on the economic partnership, the attractiveness of the European market for national products.

All three Eastern European countries have one thing in common in their foreign policy – all of them aim to obtain economic benefits as much as they can from the co-operation with the European Union. Although, in term of political and social co-operation, there have emerged two models of negotiations. Belarus is interested only in economic relations; moreover, Minsk has been successfully using the EU-Russia trade war for its benefits. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and does not intend in improving political relations with Brussels. Ukraine and Moldova have completely different position: they see the Eastern Partnership as the EU pre-accession period, a phase for adoption of acquis communautaire in order to facilitate further integration with the Union. In South Caucasus, Georgia is willing to enhance relations with the EU in all areas, while Armenia and Azerbaijan are only interested in trade. Such polarisation within the Eastern Partnership was called “Two-Speed Eastern Partnership”.

As to H.4. “The European Neighbourhood Policy is the foundation of a common EU foreign policy formation”, the ENP is a significant step in development of the common foreign policy of the European Union and can be considered foundation, basis of the policy. The negotiations concerning new EU policy in 2002-2003 towards its neighbours has made a great contribution to consolidation of positions and interests of each Member State. Nonetheless, lack of unanimity within the EU concerning its single foreign affairs was clear during the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Such diversity of positions contributed to further development of the ENP, namely the launch of the Eastern Partnership. Further factors

284 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) as foundation of the European External Action Service and Russia’s war in Ukraine also incremented the common EU foreign policy. Exempli gratia, the approval of sanctions against Russia needed unanimity among the EU countries in spite of significant losses in trade co- operation with Russia because of contra-sanctions.

The thesis raises the question of what might be the consequence of “neighborhood policy”, if it is not a temporary stage before joining the EU, the countries to which it is addressed. As a possible answer to this question is the hypothesis that the ENP can lead to the evolution of the political situation in neighbouring countries, the partial transformation of the governance models by convergence and the emergence of forms of political regimes. This raises the question (H.5) of how deep can be convergence of political systems and societies of the EU and three Eastern European states.

The answer is definite – the ENP and the Eastern Partnership have been contributing significantly to political situation in Eastern Europe. In terms of quality, the political regimes in Moldova and Ukraine have improved slightly, but in a better way. There two main factors for this: firstly, the EaP lasts only six years and the results of the policy cannot be obtained convincing. Moreover, new states had no democratic tradition of governing for a long time and the reform implementation was not rapid. Secondly, the time of functioning of the EaP coincide with world economic crisis and internal crises in the target countries. The situation in Belarus has not improved significantly, but Minsk declared clearly that the EaP and integration with the EU is not aim of the Belarus’ foreign policy. However, the EU-Belarus relations are getting better taking into account lifting most of the sanctions against Belarus by the EU and releasing political prisoners in Belarus.

Therefore, during the investigation, five hypotheses were tested, four of which were proved. The failed hypothesis mentioned, “One of the most important tasks of “neighbourhood policy” is the creation of “a prosperous and stable neighborhood” on the borders of the European Union, which would be characterized by “peaceful relations among nations based on cooperation”, which does not correspond the current situation in Eastern Europe.

285 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Conclusion about Problem of Investigation

During the 1990s, the European Union began to develop a strategy and a framework towards new-independent post-Soviet countries. The first universal model of relations was Partnership and Co-operation Agreement signed with the Eastern European countries. However, this model did not work as the three countries began transforming into authoritarian regimes. In 2000s, a new conception developed by the Commission “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” and later transformed into the European Neighbourhood Policy, gave a new shame for relations with the neighbours in the East. Besides, the parties got a common border after the EU enlargement in 2004 (Belarus and Ukraine) and 2007 (Moldova).

The Eastern Partnership, founded in 2009, aimed to strengthen the ENP and was a response to calls from the EU Members and the Partner States to closer co-operation with each of the partners. The regional approach, nonetheless, was not utilised fully for developing of priorities with the partners. As a result, the Eastern Partnership includes countries that have completely different goal on co-operation with the EU.

Since the beginning of the Eastern Partnership, the policy did not have a lot to propose to Ukraine, as the bilateral accords were more specific and effective. The policy became however an instrument for integration with the EU with further prospect of membership. During the last two years, Ukraine has made a big step on its way to integration with the EU in both dimensions – bilateral level and with the European Neighbourhood Policy. Two years ago, the Association Agreement was signed seven years of negotiations and came into force in 2016. This new accord creates tier economic and political relations and together with free trade are between Ukraine and the EU countries. The visa liberalisation regime will also be functioning in the end of 2016.

The reason why the EU has failed to strengthen its political influence in Moldova is lack of strict conditionality between progress in internal reforms and rewards from the EU. Moldova require a clear conditionality with more rewards in order to EU could influence on the process of internal transformation. The Association Agreement (2016) and visa-free regime (2014) were real proposals and incentives for Moldova as a compensation for lack of a political decision.

As to Belarus, the EU policy towards Belarus remains ineffective due to the lack of institutionalised partnership, specific and limited scope of trade, economic relations between 286 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) the parties and weak relations in other areas. It is because Belarus in not present in the European Neighbourhood Policy (except for some assistance programmes) as the EU, basing on shared values, encourages Belarus to the necessary internal transformations.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has little capacity to influence political elite, domestic and regional processes in Eastern Europe, because depoliticised functional approach and the EU long-term incentives are not enough for the partners. The current domestic political context in the Eastern European countries and presence of Russian factor influence more on the countries than the process of integration with the EU. In order to improve the efficiency of the Eastern Partnership, the EU can enhance the conditionality, thereby reducing the cost of the reform compared with the potential benefits, and implement short-term incentives compatible with short-term thinking of Eastern European political elites as visa liberalisation regime, free trade, bigger financial support.

After more than twenty-five years after collapse of the Cold War, it is evident that the gap between European Union and the countries that formed in the post-Soviet space does not become small but rather bigger. There are several reasons that do not only come from Eastern Europe, but also come from Brussels and ineffective solutions that the European leaders adopt in a short-term prospective.

First of all, Europe lost favourable historic moment for building a truly united Europe. In early 1990s, Europe did not recognise prospects of membership of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in the European Union. It was partially the reason to transforming them into authoritarian and economically undeveloped states. Perhaps, such limited co-operation with Eastern Europe can be explained by idea that the Soviet Union would revive in a softer project;

Secondly, over the past 20 years, the EU has had limited resources for implementation of coherent and ambitious policy towards its eastern neighbours. There is a great variety of factors that significantly weakened the role of the EU in post-Soviet space: verbi gratia, lack of a common vision of development of the EU, economic and financial crises, several enlargements (since 1991 there were four enlargements – 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2013), foreign challenges.

Thirdly, the EU spent a long time on definition of the format of relations with its eastern partners. This time was used by Russia that gained strength and began geopolitical game for 287 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014) strategic advantage. The essence of the game is simple: take full control of as many as possible post-Soviet countries, and conduct its neo-imperial policy in every geopolitical or geo-economic parties in the region and the world. Today, the EU has to focus on integration process of the Eastern countries using tools of normative power. A new dimension of relations with Russia also has to be created in order to deactivate Russia’s soft and hard power instruments in that region.

During the last decade, the EU’s policies towards three Eastern European countries were heavily reliant on economic and political conditionality. In case of Ukraine, the EU negotiated on the Association Agreement and focused on its empirical (economic and military) capabilities to gain influence. However, it is noteworthy that the EU chose to apply these empirical capabilities in a normative way. It exerted economic power through positive conditionality, which is indicative of normative reflexivity, and its use of military capacity took a mainly “other empowering” approach as it was only to be utilised in accordance with the framework that the EaP partners had agreed on. The EU also worked through policies that were neither economic nor military. It supported the development of civil societies, strived to achieve a high degree of local ownership, and established the European norms in the EaP in a non-coercive manner.

Because of the EU’s strong normative power of attraction, the Yanukovych regime could not afford to distance itself from the EU since the people would not let it. After the Revolution of Dignity, and the instalment of the pro-reformist government, there was no need for a strong conditionality to be applied to the economic assistance the EU provided. Ukraine had already chosen a closer association with the EU, and the key prioritisation was therefore to stabilise the country rather than to persuade it.

The successful signing of the AA/DCFTA with Moldova and Ukraine meant that the EU could put a greater emphasis on its ideational impact. The EU’s normative power of attraction was paramount in the Ukrainian and Moldovan approximation to the rest of Europe. However, normative power is fragile and can be damaged by inconsistencies, lacking coherence and waning credibility.

288 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

Сontribution to science

Almost all of the existing studies about the European Neighbourhood Policy have political character of science. In some cases, this leads to prevalence of interpretations on the factual part. Researches from the Partner States concerning the ENP study mainly cases of each country with partial comparison. The studies of the EU countries ignore in their turn most documents from the EaP countries. There are no comprehensive, retrospective studies based on a wide and diverse range of sources. This thesis does intend to fill these gaps.

The origin and evolution of the ENP concerning three Eastern European countries, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is analysed in several spheres, taking into account impact of a wide range of factors:

 Influence of internal situation of the EU as a unique integration project on formation of a common policy towards its closest neighbours;  Role, positions and interests of the EU Member States on the development of the ENP;  Peculiarities of perception of the ENP by Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and its place in the co-operation between the EU and these countries at different stages;  Factors of power of the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe;

The results of this research can be used in constructing of training courses, can be useful to various international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and institutions studying issues of co-operation the EU and Eastern European countries.

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Ukraine Today. (2016). EU may finally cancel visas for Ukrainians in early autumn – European Commissioner: http://uatoday.tv/politics/eu-might-finally-cancel-visas-for- ukrainians-in-early-autumn-european-commissioner-692962.html.

Ukrayinska Pravda. (2014). YeS nr vysnaye psevdoreferendum I ne slav cposterihachiv u Krym: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/03/16/7018943/ Viewed 18.05.2015.

Ukrayinska Pravda. (2016). Deputy PM: Number of Heavy Weapons in Donbas Has Multiplied: http://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2016/08/26/7118736/ Viewed 18.09.2016.

Unian. (2008). New enhanced agreement between Ukraine and EU called “Agreement on Association”: http://www.unian.info/world/131960-new-enhanced-agreement- between-ukraine-and-eu-called-agreement-on-association.html Viewed 18.04.2014.

Unian. (2009). Polshcha ta Frantsia sperechaiutsia za hroshi dlia “Skhodnoho partnerstva”: http://eunews.unian.ua/202171-polscha-ta-frantsiya-sperechayutsya-za-groshi-dlya- shidnogo-partnerstva.html Viewed 22.03.2015.

Unian. (2015). “Stena” na granitse s RF budet stoit Ukraine yeshche pochti polmilliarda griven. http://www.unian.net/society/1113257-stena-na-granitse-s-rf-budet-stoit- ukraine-esche-pochti-polmilliarda-griven.html 08/09/15 Viewed 18.06.2016.

Zaxid.net. (2016). “DNR” nazvaly tretioyu v reytynhu aktyvnykh terorystychnykh orhanizatsiy v sviti: http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?dnr_nazvali_tretoyu_v_reytingu_ aktivnih_teroristichnih_organizatsiy_v_sviti&objectId=1404708 Viewed 25.09.2016. 349 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

350 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

APPENDIX 1

Package of Measures appointed in the Minsk II accord77

1. Immediate and comprehensive bilateral ceasefire, which was to take effect in separatistheld territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from 00:00 local time on 15 February. 2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, which would create a buffer zone of: at least 50km (30 miles) separating both sides for artillery systems of 100mm calibre or more; 70km for multiple rocket systems; and, 140km for the heaviest rocket and missile systems. 3. Effective monitoring and verification regime for the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons, which would be carried out by the OSCE. 4. Dialogue on the holding of local elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which was to be in line with the Ukrainian law on temporary self-rule for parts of these same regions. 5 5. Pardon and amnesty by banning any prosecution of figures involved in the Donetsk and Luhansk conflict. 6. Release of all hostages and other illegally detained people, which was to be completed no later than the fifth day after the military withdrawal. 7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian aid to those in need, on the basis of international supervision. 8. Restore full social and economic links with affected areas, which would include social transfers, such as payment of pensions, and the restoration, by Ukraine, of its banking services in regions affected by the conflict. 9. Restore full Ukrainian government control over the state border, throughout the conflict zone, the process of which would begin following local elections and be completed by the end of 2015. 10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons and mercenaries from Ukrainian Territory, which would be monitored by the OSCE. 11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with the adoption of a new constitution by the end of 2015, which would include the decentralisation of power to the separatist-held territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the adoption of permanent laws on the special status of those territories. 12. Hold local elections in the separatist-held territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are to be held in accordance with the relevant OSCE standards and monitored by the OSCE.

77 Roxall, A. (2015). The Ceasefre Illusion: An Assessment of the Minsk II Agreement Between Ukraine and Russia Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper The Henry Jackson Society, No. 8 (2015) 351 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which includes representatives from the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine.

352 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

APPENDIX 2

NORMANDY GROUP MEETINGS

Participants (Heads of States/Government + Foreign Affairs Ministers):

Germany – Angela Merkel, Frank-Walter Steinmeier,

Sigmar Gabriel (since 27th January 2017)

France – François Hollande, Laurent Fabius

Jean-Marc Ayrault

Emmanuel Macron, Jean-Yves Le Drian

Ukraine – Petro Poroshenko, Pavlo Klimkin

Russia – Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov

Date Place Format Main Results

1 6th June Château de Heads of the first meeting in celebration of 2014 Bénouville, State/Government the 70th anniversary of Operation Normandy, France Overlord

2 16th–17th Milan, Italy Heads of as part of Asia-Europe Meeting. October State/Government Discussions of new law status of 2014 occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions

3 12th January Berlin, Germany Foreign Minsters Discussions concerning future 2015 Astana meeting (cancelled later). Urged immediate Contact group meeting

4 09th January Berlin, Germany Foreign Minsters Discussions about future meeting 2015 in Minsk

5 11th-12th Minsk, Belarus Heads of A Declaration of Normandy Four February State/Government was adopted after a 17-hour-long

353 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

2015 meeting

6 19th Telephone Heads of Consultations of Minsk February conversation State/Government + Agreement implementation 2015 Foreign Ministers

7 24th Paris, France Foreign Ministers Discussion of Debaltseve78 and February Mariupil 2015

8 02nd March Telephone Heads of Discussion of possible OSCE 2015 conversation State/Government mission and release of Nadiya Savchenko

9 06th March Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministries ______2015 Representatives

10 13th April Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministries Statement where all parties call 2015 Representatives off tanks and artillery of a calibre 100 mm from the collision line

11 30th April Telephone Heads of Discussion on the issue of the 2015 conversation State/Government introduction of peacekeepers and expansion of the OSCE access to the conflict zone

12 10th June Paris, France Foreign Ministries Foreign Ministers meeting 2015 Representatives preparation

13 23rd June Paris, France Foreign Ministers 2015

14 17th July Telephone Heads of Discussion of the Minsk 2015 conversation State/Government Agreement implementation

15 23rd July Telephone Heads of Discussion of the implementation 2015 conversation State/Government of the Minsk agreements. Agreed to accelerate the withdrawal of weapons with a calibre of up to

78 Battle of Debaltseve took place in mid-February in 2015 when separatist and some regular Russian units tried to recapture the city of Debaltseve in Donetsk Oblast, which had been under Ukrainian control since a counter- offensive by government forces in July 2014 (Katchanovski, 2017: 62). Losses reached 300 KIA and, a thousand WIA and more than 500 civilians found dead 354 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

100 mm, the demilitarisation of Shyrokine and the conclusion of the Ukraine-EU-Russia agreement on gas supply from Russia to Ukraine.

16 20th August Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministries 2015 Representatives

17 09th Telephone Heads of agreed on a personal meeting on September conversation State/Government 2nd October in Paris and a meeting 2015 of Foreign Ministers of the Normandy Four on 12th September in Berlin; the implementation of the Minsk agreement was discussed

18 12th Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement September implementation 2015

19 02nd October Paris, France Heads of Discussions on Minsk agreement 2015 State/Government implementation

20 06th Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement November implementation 2015

21 30th Telephone Heads of Discussions on Minsk agreement December conversation State/Government implementation 2015

22 13th Munich, Germany Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement February implementation 2016

23 03rd March Paris, France Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement 2016 implementation and holding of local elections in uncontrolled territories until the end of the first half of 2016

355 Dmytro Evolution of European Union Neighbourhood Policy Tyshchenko towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (2003-2014)

24 11th May Berlin, Germany Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement 2016 implementation

25 24th May Telephone Heads of Discussions of possible expanding 2016 conversation State/Government of the powers of the special OSCE mission in Donbass

26 19th October Berlin, Germany Heads of Discussions on Minsk agreement 2016 State/Government implementation

27 29th Minsk, Belarus Foreign Ministers Discussions on Minsk agreement November implementation 2016

28 24th July Telephone Heads of Discussions on Minsk agreement 2017 conversation State/Government implementation. President Macron took part for the first time

Sources: Youngs, R. (2017). Europe’s Eastern Crisis: The Geopolitics of Asymmetry. Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-152 Sokor, V. (2015). The Normandy Format and Ukraine: Doing More Harm Than Good. The Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/the-normandy-format-and-ukraine-doing-more-harm-than-good/ Viewed 16.08.2017. Petro, N. N. (2017). Ukraine in Crisis. London and New York: Routledge. Wilson. A. (2015). The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, Fourth Edition, New Haven and London. Cole, J. (2018). Russia’s Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 107-108.

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