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North East and Central Asia OSCE Focus Conference Proceedings OSCE Focus Conference Proceedings, 9–10 October 2015, Maison de la Paix, Geneva OSCE Focus Conference Proceedings, 9–10 October 2015, Maison de la Paix, Geneva OSCE Focus Conference Proceedings, 9–10 October 2015, Maison de la Paix, Geneva GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) isis anan internationalinternational foundationfoundation whosewhose missionmission isis toto assistassist thethe internationalinternational communitycommunity inin pursuingpursuing goodgood governancegovernance andand reformreform ofof thethe securitysecurity sector.sector. TheThe CentreCentre developsdevelops andand promotespromotes normsnorms andand OSCE Focus Conference Proceedings standards, conducts tailored policy research, identies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector 9–10 October 2015,North Maison East de and la Paix,Central Geneva Asia governance, and provides in‐country advisory support and practical assistance programmes. The Swiss Federal Department published by DCAF of Foreign Aairs (Geneva(Geneva CentreCentre forfor thethe provided support for the Democratic Control of organisation of the Conference Armed Forces) DCAF and funded the production of PO Box 1361 thisthis publication.publication. 1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland www.dcaf.ch DCAF DCAF DCAF photo: graduateinstitute.orgwww.d.dcaf.ch OSCEO SFoCEcO usFoSCE cus Fo cus EurooEuropeo inpeEuro C risis:inope Crisis: in C risis: ReneRweneedRw eneRelede wRelvancede vancRele ofeevanc th ofe thOSCEe eof OSCE th? e OSCE? ? 9-10 9-10October October9-10 2015 October 2015 2015 MaisonMaison de laMaison dPaie lax, PaiGenev dex ,la Genev Paia x, Geneva a Contents Foreword Raphael Nägeli, Minister, Head of OSCE Task Force, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs….…………………………………………………………………………………………………2 Food for thought papers Ukraine – How to resolve the conflict ? James Sherr…………………………………………………………………………………………………..……...11 The OSCE and resolving (un)frozen conflicts Pal Dunay…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…32 Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security Frank-Walter Steinmeier………………………………………………………..……………………………….57 European Security: The Future of European Security Hans-Joachim Spanger……………………………………………………………………………..…………....65 European Security: How to Strengthen OSCE Peace Operations Wolfang Zellner……………………………………………………………………………………….……………..92 Economic Connectivity Michael A. Landesmann……………………..…………………………………………………………........116 Annex 1: OSCE Focus Programme………………………………………………………………………...130 Annex 2: List of Participants………………………………………………………………………………….133 The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or represented in these conference proceedings. Contents Foreword Raphael Nägeli, Minister, Head of OSCE Task Force, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs….…………………………………………………………………………………………………2 Food for thought papers Ukraine – How to resolve the conflict ? James Sherr…………………………………………………………………………………………………..……...11 The OSCE and resolving (un)frozen conflicts Pal Dunay…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…32 Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security Frank-Walter Steinmeier………………………………………………………..……………………………….57 European Security: The Future of European Security Hans-Joachim Spanger……………………………………………………………………………..…………....65 European Security: How to Strengthen OSCE Peace Operations Wolfang Zellner……………………………………………………………………………………….……………..92 Economic Connectivity Michael A. Landesmann……………………..…………………………………………………………........116 Annex 1: OSCE Focus Programme………………………………………………………………………...130 Annex 2: List of Participants………………………………………………………………………………….133 The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or represented in these conference proceedings. Foreword While the OSCE was heavily rocked by the Ukraine crisis in 2014, it entered somewhat calmer waters in 2015. But even so the climate has changed, which left its imprint on the OSCE. 2015 was therefore not a year of normalization, but of a certain sobering up and realism. On the one hand, the crisis in and around Ukraine continued to show the renewed relevance of the OSCE. Here it proved its adeptness in managing the crisis, both in terms of mediation and in delivering highly relevant information from the conflict zone. The Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015, negotiated by the Trilateral Contact Group, became the cornerstone of both Russian and Western efforts to resolve the crisis. The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) continued to grow significantly and showed remarkable resilience and capacity to adapt to the evolving challenges on the ground. The fact that its mandate was prolonged twice – in 2015 and 2016 – is not only a result of successful consensus building by the Serbian and German chairs, but also a testimony to the quality of the SMM’s management and daily work. On the other hand, the harsher climate continued to reflect on the OSCE. Debates in the Permanent Council revealed little will for working together to rebuild co-operative security. Late-night negotiations during the Belgrade ministerial meeting did not reveal a co-operative spirit, either. In some respects, the OSCE seemed to be back to normal: its internal disagreements rendering it unable to formulate credible answers to the pressing problems of our time. Yet there was a slight wind of change. The final report presented by the Panel of Eminent Persons in Belgrade was realistic in its assessment of the different narratives persisting in the OSCE area. In providing recommendations and calling for a robust diplomatic process on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, it also laid the foundations Foreword While the OSCE was heavily rocked by the Ukraine crisis in 2014, it entered somewhat calmer waters in 2015. But even so the climate has changed, which left its imprint on the OSCE. 2015 was therefore not a year of normalization, but of a certain sobering up and realism. On the one hand, the crisis in and around Ukraine continued to show the renewed relevance of the OSCE. Here it proved its adeptness in managing the crisis, both in terms of mediation and in delivering highly relevant information from the conflict zone. The Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015, negotiated by the Trilateral Contact Group, became the cornerstone of both Russian and Western efforts to resolve the crisis. The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) continued to grow significantly and showed remarkable resilience and capacity to adapt to the evolving challenges on the ground. The fact that its mandate was prolonged twice – in 2015 and 2016 – is not only a result of successful consensus building by the Serbian and German chairs, but also a testimony to the quality of the SMM’s management and daily work. On the other hand, the harsher climate continued to reflect on the OSCE. Debates in the Permanent Council revealed little will for working together to rebuild co-operative security. Late-night negotiations during the Belgrade ministerial meeting did not reveal a co-operative spirit, either. In some respects, the OSCE seemed to be back to normal: its internal disagreements rendering it unable to formulate credible answers to the pressing problems of our time. Yet there was a slight wind of change. The final report presented by the Panel of Eminent Persons in Belgrade was realistic in its assessment of the different narratives persisting in the OSCE area. In providing recommendations and calling for a robust diplomatic process on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, it also laid the foundations James6 Sherr UkraineOSCE - HowFocus to Conference resolve the Proceedings, conflict? 9-10 October 2015 3 for a future dialogue on European security. The ministerial discussion in Belgrade showed that there is a nascent consensus on the necessity for such a dialogue and its priorities – even if political will is currently still lacking, in view of the ongoing fighting in Ukraine. Such a forward-looking yet realistic mindset was also characteristic of the OSCE Focus 2015 gathering. This year’s seminar was characterized by particularly focused, open and frank debates. Like every year it brought together selected representatives from the Permanent Council and the OSCE executive structures with inspiring speakers from think-tanks and academia. The discussions were a perfect precursor for the 2016 German chair. They focused upon its major priorities, such as conflict resolution in Ukraine and beyond, the strengthening of the OSCE’s instruments in the conflict cycle, economic connectivity, and dialogue on European security writ large. In 2016 the OSCE will have to adapt further to the rapidly changing Food for thought papers security landscape. While the crisis in Syria will continue to reflect on the OSCE, it will stay on the sidelines with regard to resolution of this armed conflict. But the related migration crisis is increasingly poisoning interstate relations, and is likely to become more and more relevant for the OSCE. For Switzerland, the OSCE continues to be the forum where European security issues can and should be discussed, and the organization where concrete steps can be facilitated to improve security on the ground. We will stay actively engaged with the German and future Austrian chairs. We will also push for a stronger OSCE
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