Lebanon's Long Road to National Reconciliation

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Lebanon’s Long Road to National Reconciliation The dynamics of the Lebanese Civil War

Kyra N. Luchtenberg

Supervisor dr. Alastair Reed Second reader prof. dr. Edwin Bakker Student ID s1589997 Date 13-1-2016

MSc Crisis & Security Management Public Administration Leiden University Campus The Hague

“Don’t blame me if I don’t discuss my country, don’t say I have become mute. My tears are choking me, locking my screams in my tattered chest.

The land of the light, the master of the alphabet, the nation of the coast, the generous sun and golden sands. All of this was Lebanon but now it’s in the past.

My nation, my sweet, has divorced my distant past and built a new glory. All that is of thought and letter has been destroyed and between us a present more anchored and great that emptied the streets of its people in fear and replaced them with guns instead.”

– Poem by Sharif Al Akhawi

*This thesis is part of the capstone project: ‘Conflict dynamics: Understanding the escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflict’.

Abstract

Many factors cause and influence the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. Scholars either focused on single factors influencing conflict dynamics, the causes or the de-escalation of the conflict. Additionally, changing popular discourses in conflict studies influenced the way conflict has been researched. In order to identify the factors that could have driven the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict, a holistic analytical framework has been developed. The overall purpose of this project has been to create an extensive framework that can be used to research the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts.

The development of the analytical framework has been done by exploring the literature on conflict. Based on these insights, the framework included fifteen factors that seem to influence the dynamics of conflict: 1) social cleavages; 2) popular support; 3) grievances; 4) local politics; 5) national politics; 6) international politics; 7) natural disasters; 8) state action – coercive force; 9) state action – policy solution; 10) state capacity; 11) strong/weak government; 12) strategy of armed groups; 13) capacity of armed groups; 14) factionalisation; 15) criminalisation.

The framework has been applied to four historical cases, conflicts which experienced periods of escalation and de-escalation. The historical analysis offered in-depth knowledge on the changing dynamics of the following conflicts: the Israeli Independence War (1947-1948), the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Namibian Independence War (1966-1990) and the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009). Information about the cases has been gathered by analysing primary sources and secondary literature, and conducting interviews. To structure the analysis, the conflicts have been divided into distinct phases. In order to gain new insights and improve the analytical framework, a comparative analysis has been conducted.

The comparative research offered several new insights. First, regional politics was considered to play a significant role in changing the dynamics in all four cases. Second, geography influenced the dynamics in both the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Therefore, these factors have been added to the analytical framework. Third, the comparative research indicated that the factors influenced the dynamics of the conflicts in different ways. Fourth, the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Still, several factors played a significant role in all four cases, for example, social cleavages, popular support and regional politics. Fifth, a combination of factors tends to explain the dynamics of the conflict throughout the phases,

which indicates that focusing on a single driver or discourse is insufficient. This shows the importance of using a holistic approach.

The research has also revealed several limitations of the analytical framework. First, it must be noted that the analytical framework offers limited insights with regard to the direction of the interaction. Second, a combination of factors might influence the dynamics rather than one factor on its own, for instance, armed groups use grievances, caused by social cleavages, to acquire new recruits. The analytical framework might cause that the researcher focuses too much on individual factors rather than the interaction between them. Third, the exploratory nature of the research does not allow generalisation of the outcomes yet. Hence, further research is necessary to improve the quality and applicability of the framework.

Keywords: conflict studies, irregular armed conflict, conflict dynamics, the Israeli Independence War, the Lebanese Civil War, the Namibian Independence War, the Sri Lankan Civil War.

Table of content

1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Literature review ...... 8 2.1. Conflict emergence ...... 9 2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation ...... 15 2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution ...... 25 2.4 Conflict theory ...... 27 2.5 Conceptualisations ...... 31 3. Methodology ...... 41 3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods ...... 41 3.2 Comparative historical analysis ...... 43 3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies ...... 43 3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies ...... 44 3.5 Method of data-gathering ...... 45 3.6 Analytical framework ...... 46 3.7 Case selection ...... 58 3.8 The utility of using phases ...... 63 4. Case study of the Lebanese Civil War ...... 64 4.1 Introduction ...... 64 4.2 Case-description ...... 66 4.3 Case analysis ...... 142 4.4 Conclusion & discussion ...... 200 5. Comparative analysis ...... 203 5.1 Context ...... 203 5.2 State ...... 211 5.3 Non-state ...... 214 6. Conclusion ...... 217 6.1 Context ...... 217 6.2 State ...... 218 6.3 Non-state ...... 219 6.4 Analytical framework ...... 220 7. Discussion ...... 222 8. Bibliography ...... 224

9. Appendices ...... 240 9.1 Appendix I: List of abbreviations ...... 240 9.2 Appendix II: List of persons ...... 241 9.3 Appendix III: Interview guide ...... 245 9.4 Appendix IV: Interview transcripts ...... 246

1. Introduction

The post-cold war world has been marked by a number of high profile irregular wars, starting with the Balkan wars during the 1990s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s and the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolt’ that began in 2010. The total number of conflicts is high. This research will focus on identifying the factors driving the dynamics of irregular armed conflicts. In other words, what factors drive the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict?

Post-Napoleonic interstate wars receive a lot of research attention from scholars, who research the mechanisms and variations of conflicts, which contributes to developing the academic discipline. Irregular armed conflicts on the contrary, are less studied and draw less attention in the scholarly debate. Notwithstanding the fact that the body of knowledge on irregular armed conflicts is evolving and growing, most of the research focuses on causes and reasons of conflict. Limited research focuses on the mechanisms that influence de-escalation of the conflict. The least research has been done on the dynamics of irregular armed conflict. This appears to be an under-researched topic.

Irregular armed conflicts are often complex occurrences and scholars attempting to analyse modern day irregular armed conflicts are prone to failure. The academic literature demonstrates a gap of knowledge with regard to a holistic analytical framework. Previous research, focusing on single drivers and their effects, often analysed a small number of cases or even a single case. This research project attempts to contribute to narrowing the knowledge gap in irregular armed conflicts dynamics. New insights of the factors influencing the dynamics of conflict might contribute to more effective policies regarding irregular armed conflicts. Politicians, policymakers and NGO’s might benefit from an improved understanding of the effect of actions and policy. Additionally, the research aims to offer insights to future scholars exploring the subject, and analysts working in the field of irregular armed conflicts.

The central research question is: what causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflicts? The research consists of a comparative historical case study. Four historical cases are selected, researched and analysed, followed by a comparative analysis. The following cases have been selected for reasons that will be explained in a subsequent section: the Israeli independence war, the Lebanese civil war, the Namibian independence war, and the Sri Lankan civil war.

This thesis is structured as follows: first, an extensive literature review is provided, which offers an broad overview of the existing academic literature on conflict studies and, more specifically, on approaches used to research the emergence and termination of conflicts. Subsequently, the methodology chapter discusses, amongst others, the methodological choices, the method of data gathering and the case selection. It will also present the analytical framework that has been developed. This is followed by the case description and analysis of the Lebanese Civil War. The other individual cases are not included in this document. After this, the main findings of the comparative analysis are presented. The thesis concludes with several comments on the findings of the comparative analysis, and the discussion, in which is reflected upon the limitations of the analytical framework and recommendations for future research.

2. Literature review

The review of the extensive body of literature on conflict indicates that the Cold War is a turning point in the history of conflict studies. The occurrence of conventional wars with states fighting states, such as World War II, diminished over time. Simultaneously, another type of conflict emerged in the post-Cold War period: unconventional conflicts, also called irregular armed conflicts or civil wars. Despite the fact that civil wars have been the most common type of armed conflict since the 19th and 20th century, the field of conflict studies mainly focused on interstate warfare during the Cold War period. In the 1990s, a wave of civil conflicts took place (see figure 1) that, in combination with the end of the Cold War, shifted the focus of conflict studies (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601). Ever since, irregular armed conflicts have increasingly received attention from scholars, which leads to a wide range of literature, theories and conceptualisations. The research focuses for a large extent on finding out what factors cause conflicts and, to a lesser extent, on what factors explain their dynamics (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Figure 1: Number and percentage of countries with ongoing civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999 (Source: Fearon & Laitin, 2003)

2.1. Conflict emergence

2.1.1. Greed and grievance

The growing number of unconventional conflicts raised an interesting question: what causes these conflicts? The conceptual distinction between greed and grievance instigated one of the most influential theoretical debates in conflict studies. In 1990, Paul Collier analysed statistical data of civil wars since the mid-1960s, and concluded that the grievance-based explanations of civil war were invalid. He argued that, in order to understand the causes of civil war, the focus should be on greed aspects (Berdal, 2005, p. 687). The greed thesis of Collier defines the circumstances under which greed driven wars are likely to break out, namely: a state that relies on primary commodity exports, in which the unemployment rate is high, and young, poorly educated men are in abundance. If such a state also experiences a period of rapid economic decline, a conflict is likely to break out. However, unconventional conflicts cannot be explained by economic factors only. They interact with grievances of socio-economic and political nature, which triggers the outburst of warfare (Berdal, 2005, p. 691). Grievance can cause a conflict when state actions fuel feelings of grievance among a minority population. For instance, when a minority group experiences a high level of exploitation for a long time, they can be tempted to start a rebellion. The grievances can be political, caused by the absence of suffrage, but also economic and social of nature (Collier & Sambanis, 2002, p. 4; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 88).

2.1.2. Greed or grievance

A new perspective on conflict dynamics is given by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, who performed 18 case studies of internal insurgencies. Collier and Hoeffler, like Fearon and Laitin, concluded that there is a significant correlation between a country's dependency on primary commodity export and civil war, and the role of the ethnicity. The findings of Collier and Sambanis suggest that these conclusions needed to be revised. In short, their research indicated that ‘resource predation might be the result of pure ‘greed’ or only a side product of ‘grievance’’ (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). This led to a clear, twofold conclusion. First, resource predation is not a correlation but a mechanism. Second, the correlation between the presence of natural resources and civil war is compatible with several alternative mechanisms (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Collier and Sambanis’ other major finding relates to the issue of ethnicity and its role in triggering a civil war. In contrast to earlier quantitative studies, which suggested that ethnic fractionation was not important in triggering civil war, several of their case studies

led to different results. When ethnicity is operationalised into ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, the former can even contribute to peace by increasing the costs of coordinating rebellion across ethnic lines, whereas the latter can increase the risk of civil war.

Tarrow explained this contradicting finding by using the work of Collier and Sambanis, and other researchers to define three possible mechanisms: mutual recognition between members of the same and/or different ethnic groups; fear of victimisation or exclusion, especially when ethnic divisions overlap with class cleavages; and civil society segmentation or interaction, where ethnic differences are bridged by instrumental interdependencies among ethnic groups, and their interactions undercut political entrepreneurs’ calls for ethnic mobilisation (2007, p. 595). In addition to resource predation and ethnicity, Collier and Sambanis indicated other possible relevant factors that might complicate the analysis. Examples are neighbourhood and spill-over effects, as a nearby insurgency might spread to countries, whose internal indicators did not predict disturbances. Furthermore, civil wars may be part of regional cycles of violence (Tarrow, 2007, p. 595). Finally, Collier and Sambanis promoted the following hypothesis: ‘government repression increases opposition and, if repression is incomplete, it can lead to violence’ (Collier and Sambanis, 2003, vol. 1, p. 318, referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 595).

2.1.3. Weak and failed states

Fearon and Laitin wrote that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that increase the risk of insurgent wars. They argued that these factors are better predictors of insurgent wars than ethnic or religious diversity, or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination. They concluded that economic growth may only correlate to a limited extent with civil wars, but that the best chance for preventing civil wars is to make sure that the government is well-financed and administratively competent (2003, p. 88).

Rotberg focused on the dynamics of nation-state failure. A state fails due to internal violence and the inability to ensure political goods to the public (2010, p. 10). The government loses its legitimacy, and the public does no longer see the nation state as legitimate. Rotberg distinguished strong from weak states. The capacity of a state is defined by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. Strong states have control over their territories and deliver a variety of high quality political goods to the public, such as the

political good of security. In contrary, in weak states the ability to provide an adequate measure of political goods is diminished (2010, p. 4). Overall, the idea is established that weak states are at risk of transforming into failed or collapsed states, which increases the risks of a civil war.

François and Sud (2006, p. 143) reinforced this idea that fragile states involved in civil wars are at risk of a conflict trap: a civil war causes the collapse of an economy and compromises the state system, which increases the level of conflict. Berdal (2005, p. 697) argues that the appearance of a conflict trap may actually be the evolution of a state. An alternative system of power might occur at a local level that takes over the core functions of government. While the international community perceives the state as fragile, the state is establishing a new social order amidst the chaos.

2.1.4. Motives for rebellion

Two leading researchers on the dynamics of contention in civil wars are Jeremy Weinstein and Stathis Kalyvas. Weinstein’s book Inside Rebellion represents a rational choice institutionalism approach, as it focuses on the organisation of rebellion by analysing the recruitment strategies of insurgency groups. Weinstein argued that recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. To make a distinction, he called highly committed individuals investors, and poorly committed individual’s consumers. He argued that individuals make rational choices reflected by deliberate decisions, designed to maximise payoffs (Weinstein 2006, p. 8-9). Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency based on a horizontal paired comparison between two forms of organisation of insurgency: activism and opportunism. The first is opportunistic rebellions, where participation involves fewer risks, short-term gains are more likely, and low-commitment participants resemble consumers, whose commitment to the organisation is weak and who expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement (Weinstein 2006, pp. 9-10). The second type is called the activist rebellions. Here, participation is risky, short-term gains are unlikely, and high-commitment participants resemble investors dedicated to the cause of the organisation and willing to make costly investments of time and risk-taking in return for the promise of rewards in the future (Weinstein 2006, pp. 8-9). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence (Weinstein 2006, p. 7).

2.1.5. Civil war organisation

Kalyvas analysed vertical relationships between centres and peripheries within civil wars. That is, relationships between the central ideological/political cleavage at the macro level, and the congeries of local conflicts and violence, which these relationships either trigger or adapt to. Like Weinstein, Kalyvas rejected the idea that people join insurgencies either to satisfy their greed or to right their grievances (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). Instead, he sought to explain civil war organisation by two parallel classical disciplines: a Hobbesian model and a Schmittian model. The Hobbesian model is ‘stressing an ontology of civil wars characterised by the breakdown of authority,’ in which violence is privatised. The Schmittian model ‘entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract group loyalties and beliefs’, which ‘stresses the fundamentally political nature of civil wars and its attendant processes’ (Kalyvas 2006, p. 376). As Tarrow (2007) pointed out, Kalyvas found elements both from the Hobbesian and the Schmittian model in the civil wars he studied. His major finding indicates that the peculiar dynamic and the extreme brutality of civil war cannot be explained from either one of these models alone. As Tarrow summarised, Kalyvas saw violence as a process linking core and peripheral actors, which are connected by alliances – despite their differences in motives and ideologies.

Perhaps a more general comment with regard to the methodological discussion that both Weinstein and Kalyvas made, is that there is a wide variety of motives that drives participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592). This reaches beyond the ‘greed and grievances’ approach, and their detection requires a rich combination of methods.

2.1.6. Social cleavages: a sociological approach

Social cleavages derive, for instance, from religious, ethno-linguistic, center-periphery, and urban-rural differences. Every society has a cleavage structure. If the cleavage is not accommodated by responsive policies of the government, the divisions can lead to civil war or other types of severe conflict (Eagles & Johnston, 2008, p. 219). Rotberg (2010, p. 5) argued that most civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The presence of social cleavages within a society creates horizontal inequality, which leads to resentment or demands for equity. The lack of inclusiveness makes the costs of insurgency acceptable, increasing the probability of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002, p. 29) confirmed that divided societies are more prone to social-ethnic conflict. Disputes among religiously divided societies are particularly difficult to mediate, raising the probability of

conflict. Religious differences, more than other social cleavages, can generate violence due to the exclusivity of religion (2002, p. 32). A person can only have one religion, whereas a person can speak multiple languages. Østby (2008, p. 144) argued that if the group aspect of inequality is considered, it can be observed that inequalities between ethnic or religious cleavages enhance both grievances and group cohesion, thereby facilitating the breeding ground for conflict. These systematic inequalities between societal groups reflect socio- economic polarisation, and can be defined as horizontal inequalities. He argued that horizontal inequalities increase the potential for a violent conflict (2008, p. 155).

In recent years, studies of civil war seem to have concluded that inequality created by social cleavages is not increasing the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other factors than ethnic or religious divisions are mentioned to explain the causes of civil war, such as economic variables, political systems, and geographical conditions that favour insurgency.

2.1.7. Contagion

According to Forsberg (2009, p. 9), contagion effects in internal armed conflicts can be defined as a process whereby an internal conflict in one country affects the likelihood of a new internal armed conflict erupting in a neighbouring state at a later point in time. Historical and recent examples clearly demonstrate that intra-state armed conflicts are often connected to each other. Among the many examples are the civil wars fought in West Africa. Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. This finding, often referred to as the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, is considered empirically robust. In fact, it has been shown to be one of the most important predictors of civil war. Forsberg argued that this validates a growing consensus: one cannot focus exclusively on the domestic attributes of countries to explain civil wars. Identifying events and factors external to the countries experiencing civil war may be just as important (2009, p. 13). Forsberg focused in her study on when, how, why, and where conflicts generate contagion effects. Her analysis suggested that, given an on-going ethnic conflict among a set of neighbouring countries, those that share members of the groups involved in conflict are more likely to be targets than those lacking such bonds (the effect of transnational ethnic kinship linkages) (2009, p. 31). Furthermore, concerning an on-going internal conflict (ethnic or non-ethnic), the variation in refugee flows to the neighbouring countries influences the

probability of being a target of contagion effects. In addition, countries that are ethnically polarised, in the sense that there are a few equally (or roughly equally) strong contenders, are more likely targets of contagion effects. Finally, there was no support for the claims that concessions granted to rebel groups inspire other groups to rebel (2009, p. 32). Her other findings suggest that contagion is not limited to direct spill-over from conflict areas, but may be the result of inspiration and conflict by example. It may even indicate that the latter type of contagion process is more salient (2009, p. 33).

Kathman (2010) reflect upon the question of civil war contagion from a third-party intervention point of view. He stated that civil wars have a tendency to be geographically contagious. In other words, neighbouring third parties face the threat of being infected by another civil war’s hostilities ( p. 990). According to Kathman, the main finding in his study of conflict processes is that violence tends to diffuse geographically. Research on the diffusion of inter-state war is well established. War is not randomly distributed across space. Instead, conflict tends to infect those states with links to the original belligerents. These links may include shared borders, a military alliance, or an adversarial relationship, leading wars to attract more participants. Therefore, civil wars exhibit a distinct interstate dimension, as the ramifications of civil conflicts are rarely confined to the original war state (p. 992). Kathman pointed out that more recent work has revealed a number of causal factors for the geographic diffusion of civil conflicts. Unrest tends to follow the flow of refugees. Cross-border ethnic ties also create opportunities for wars to spread. The territorial aspirations of rebel groups are also relevant, as secession breeds similar violence in contiguous territories, civil war creates demonstration effects for potential rebel groups in nearby countries, and civil war causes regional economic recessions. This can make rebel ideologies more appealing to recruits in neighbouring states (p. 992).

2.1.8. Geography

In three of the case studies of this research, geography appeared to be an important factor influencing conflict dynamics. Fearon and Laitin (2003) identified several factors leading to internal conflict in countries since 1945. They argued that ethnic or religious differences do not lead to conflict. Instead, they argued that the existence of conditions that enable rural insurgency cause the onset of a conflict. These include poverty (1) political instability (2) and geography (3). Geography, mountainous and rough territory in particular, is highly related to

the onset of a conflict. The countries with mountainous or rough terrain had a higher probability (a doubled risk) of civil war onset than countries with flat terrain.

With geography Fearon and Laiton (2003) referred to mountainous and rough terrain, in which insurgents can take refuge. In most cases, the insurgents are numerically weak in comparison to the state's security forces. Meaning, they need to be able to hide from the security forces and gain public support for their strife. Swaps and jungles, poorly served by roads, can be considered rough terrain that can be favourable to insurgents. Other aspects that might influence the conflict are the population distributions or food availability in mountainous areas. Do and Lyer (2010) reached a similar conclusion: geography is a predictor of conflict, since it influences the ability of the state to control insurgencies and the ease with which insurgents can start mobilising. Additionally, they argued that geography causes the intensity of the conflict to escalate after it has started, as the insurgency is able to persist. In this way, geography influences the persistence of rural insurgency.

2.2. Changes in conflict dynamics: escalation and de-escalation

As the previous chapter shows, many scholars are focusing on the causes of irregular warfare. However, the study of conflict dynamics is emerging. The extensive amount of research on the causes of irregular wars has led to the assumption that both greed and grievance can cause conflict. Some presume that by applying these theories to the dynamics of warfare, the continuation of violence can be explained. This seems to be too optimistic. Most of the insights on escalation of civil wars derived from Cold War research. Increasingly, research has focused on the factors that could explain escalation and de-escalation in irregular warfare (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 601-603). The next chapter will explicate theories on factors that might influence conflict dynamics.

2.2.1. Socio-political factors

Toft choose the factors ethnicity, nationalism, secession and self-determination to explain the onset of violence, how violence affects the dynamics of the conflict, and how violence ends (2012, p. 582). She concluded that groups that live in a self-claimed ethnic homeland and constitute the majority of the population are most apt to make ambitious claims about secession. If their claims are not accepted, they are most likely to use violence. Additionally, she also looked at the ending of conflicts. On this point, she concluded that in the case of secession wars, a negotiated settlement will only stop the conflict if the agreement includes a

credible threat of harm, should one of the parties infringe the settlement. Additionally, there should be credible guarantees of economic, diplomatic, and administrative support for the parties to keep their word. Toft concluded with the statement that these inclusive settlements are the only way to stop the violence and to prevent violence from coming back. The settlements should include these conditions in order to de-escalate the conflict (2012, p. 594- 595).

2.2.2. Wartime political order

Staniland (2012) argued that ´bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence´ (p. 243). According to Staniland, wartime political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. The political orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty, to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder (2012, p. 243). Staniland continued that state and non-state actors both have cooperative and conflictual relationships that create dramatic variation in who rules, and how, in war. In turn, these wartime political orders shape patterns of violence against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war politics (2012, p. 243).

Staniland (2012) constructed a conceptual typology of six distinct wartime political orders (i.e. relationship between an armed group and a state): 1) active cooperation / shared sovereignty: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organisation retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability. Violence between the forces is minimised and institutionalised mechanisms for achieving joint goals are devised, even without a monopoly of violence; 2) active cooperation / collusion: a situation in which the state actively cooperates with non-state armed actors that are geographically intermeshed with its areas of operation. The violence that accompanies these orders will be different than a purely adversarial clash of wills. It is coordinated to target mutual enemies and reflect the political bargains made between the relevant actors; 3) passive cooperation / spheres of influence: segmented areas of control in which the state and its armed group agree to limit the boundary violations across each sphere. Ceasefire, informal truces, and agreements about where and when state and insurgent forces will tread are intended to manage spirals of escalation; 4) passive cooperation / tacit coexistence: involves the interweaving of state and non-state violent organisations in the context of fragmented, overlapping control. This order involves

careful attempts to limit the degree of active conflict and violence between states and non- state armed groups in intermixed daily life. Violence follows the implicit rules of engagement about what is and is not acceptable to each side; 5) No cooperation / clashing monopolies: order characterised by violent competition between the state and an armed actor that each control a distinct territory. Politics shape war aims, but this contest is a primarily military struggle with an emphasis on logistics, manpower, and arms; 6) No cooperation / guerrilla disorder: situation of fluid violence in which there are few clear norms or rules about the infliction of lethal violence when insurgent and state forces are intertwined in the same physical spaces. Violence is an embedded part of political, economic, and social life, lacking clear or institutionalised rules for the management of lethality (2012, p. 248-253). Staniland concluded that the distribution of control and level of cooperation between states and non- state armed groups vary considerably, creating different forms of wartime order (2012, p. 255).

Mukherjee (2014) examined why the longest insurgencies are usually characterised by low violence. By analysing several insurgencies based on minority ethnic groups aspirations, Myron Weiner found that in the medium capacity states, given resource constrains, the political leaders of the state prefer to ‘live with’ an insurgency that is less threatening, rather than forcibly suppress it. This causes some of these conflicts to have both long duration and low severity (p. 173). Mukherjee elaborated that those insurgencies that occur in peripheral regions of the country and fight for these aspirations, are the ones for which their medium capacity states follow a policy of containment, resulting in a low-level equilibrium of persistence violence (2014, p. 173). In turn, while the rebels do not really quit the fight, they keep their level of violence below a threshold level and thus help maintain a low-level equilibrium of violence (2014, p. 184).

2.2.3. War economies

The greed and grievance debate of the 1990s is built upon by, amongst others, Malone and Nitzschke (2005). They performed an in-depth analysis of the economic framework of irregular armed conflicts, and analysed the ‘war economies’, as they refer to it, and their links with international actors. While Colliers' ‘greed thesis’ is partially supported, Malone and Nitzschke (2005) argued that the correlation in the data is not a direct one, as bad governance is a common explaining factor. While greed might not be directly related to the onset of conflict, the analysis of Malone and Nitzschke (2005) showed that there is a big influence on

conflict dynamics. These influences are direct, since, for instance, a grievance based conflict might transform and becomes difficult to terminate for economic reasons. This transformation also changes the dynamics of actors. If large amounts of revenue are easily accessed and claimed, this might result in factionalisation and spread of interests, increasing Stedman’s (1997) spoiler issues. An important policy implication is that, in order to create peace, it needs to be more profitable than war. Relating to this is 'military fiscalism', which implies that there is a functional relationship between increasing military expenditure and economic growth. Emile Benoit was one of the scholars that found this correlation in developing countries (1978). This situation can influence conflict dynamics, for instance, when military employment creates more stable socio-political conditions and it becomes beneficial for the state to prolong the war.

2.2.4. Public support

In her book, Elisabeth Wood (2003) analysed El Salvador’s civil war by applying a wide range of methods from historical ethnography, supported by comparative analysis, to the micro level study. She focused on how collective action on a local level sustained in the face of state violence. Her analysis suggested that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately (Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). However, her analysis also revealed that no standard economic or social measures can predict which areas will support the guerrillas, and which will either remain neutral or support the government (Wood, 2003, p. 17-18, referred by Tarrow, 2007, p. 593). Wood explained this by arguing that ‘an emergent insurgent political culture was key to generating and sustaining the insurgency despite its high costs’ (Wood 2003, p. 225, as referred by Tarrow 2007, p. 593). Meaning, people who joined the insurgency had a shared view or idea of justification and were willing to give the ultimate sacrifice.

2.2.5. State sponsored terrorism

Bapat (2012) started his work with the following question: 'why do some states engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals?' (2012, p. 1). This might give militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but also may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups to a level that sponsors cannot control anymore. To answer this dilemma, Bapat applied a game theoretical model of state sponsorship. He argued that state sponsorship represents a form of costly signalling that is useful in coercive bargaining,

as sponsorship increases the difficulty a target government will have in repressing the militants. This added difficulty can create a situation in which the government prefers making some policy concessions if the sponsor agrees to cease the militants’ attacks. However, with their new-found power, state-sponsored militants may be less willing to negotiate, and may punish the sponsor for making deals they believe are unacceptable. The increased risk of militant punishment can provide sponsors with substantial bargaining power (2012, p. 1).

The theoretical model argues that state sponsorship serves to signal the tying of hands in bargaining with rival governments in two possible ways. First, sponsorship decreases the probability of a militant group being repressed, thereby increasing the probability that the group will be effective in accomplishing the sponsor’s policy objective. This enables the sponsor to demand more in negotiations by improving the sponsor’s value for the outside option associated with bargaining failure. Secondly, sponsorship gives the militants the power to punish the sponsor if it negotiates an unfavourable deal, enabling the sponsor forces to demand considerable concessions from the target government in exchange for abandoning the militants. (2012, p. 26). Bapat concludes by stating that, while the previous literature supports the major power prediction, the empirical test in this study provides evidence that sponsorship is more likely to occur if the potential sponsor is moderately weak (2012, p. 27).

According to Byman (2007), there are many different reasons why states support terrorists. Starting from a historical context, he referred to an observation made by Boaz Ganor. Until the mid-1990s, international terrorism was generally considered to be state-sponsored, as two competing super-power blocs, USSR and USA, fought the cold war by supporting terrorist groups ´belonging´ to their ideological camp. These organisations were perceived as proxies, an inexpensive tool to promote the superpower´s interests around the world and in conflict areas in particular. For other states, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya, terrorism was considered a low-risk tool that could achieve various goals inexpensively in both the international and regional arenas (Byman, 2007, p. 87). Byman argued that among the reasons why states support terrorists, is that terrorists offer alternative means for states to influence their neighbours, topple a hostile adversary regime, counter U.S. hegemony, or achieve other aims of the state. Support for terrorism is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities, and it allows states to influence events far beyond their borders. Supporting terrorists can also serve a broader range of regime objectives from domestic to ideological (2007, p. 88).

Byman emphasised the need to make a distinction between different levels of state involvement in terrorism. He offers six categories of state support to terrorism: 1) strong supporters, 2) weak supporters, 3) lukewarm supporters, 4) antagonistic supporters, 5) passive supporters, and 6) unwilling hosts, each of them having its unique set of interaction dynamics. However, this co-operation might have negative consequences for the proxy organisations. They may find that they pay a high price for the support that they receive from a state, while losing their credibility, if it is perceived as being controlled by a foreign power. Furthermore, Byman concluded that a state’s influence sometimes leads a terrorist group to moderate its activities or become more pragmatic (2007, p. 88).

2.2.6. Terrorism and transnational criminal organisations

The decline of state sponsored terrorism led many scholars to believe that terrorists and transnational criminal organisations will engage in strategic partnerships. Dishman (2001, p. 43-56) reflects on the probability of cooperation between terrorist groups and transnational criminal organisation. He argued that the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation takes place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). Some terrorists might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to understand these transformations, Dishman looked into their aims and interests, and made the observation that terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). The conclusion is made that the two groups will not intensively cooperate with each other due to their different aims and interests. The terrorist group is searching for a revolution or an independent territory, while the transnational criminal organisation aims to benefit from illegal activities. Therefore, terrorist groups do not want to engage in activities that portray them as criminal, and transnational criminal organisations do not seek unwanted attention and pressure of the government (2001, p. 50). Thus, the groups are more likely to use their so-called 'in-house' capacities to undertake criminal or political acts.

2.2.7. Counterinsurgency

As Gventer (2014) pointed out, Douglas Porch’s book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war (2013), comprises a strong case study in the perils of using historical analogies to derive recipes for today’s problems: a practice embraced by too many counterinsurgency converts during and after the Iraq Surge (Gventer, 2014, p. 250). Porch

argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim (Gventer, 2014, p. 249). Even in Iraq, studies revealed that the upward spiral of violence had coarsened attitudes among US troops toward Iraqi civilians whom many saw as complicit with the insurgency (Porch, 2013, p. 299). Gventer pointed out that the stated purpose of the Iraq Surge and the alleged implementation of COIN techniques was to give ‘breathing space’ to the country’s warring factions so that they could reach a peaceful, political settlement. Instead, it seems to have facilitated a consolidation of power by the country’s leading Shia factions and their Iranian patrons. Meanwhile, true ‘reconciliation’ remains out of reach as the country’s internal conflicts simmer away (Gventer 2014, p. 250).

Solomon (2015), proponent of critical terrorism studies, argued that success (in using traditional counterinsurgency campaigns) in a traditional realist sense is far from assured. Traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter-productive, since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity, which is giving rise to radical Islamist movements. Therefore, traditional counterterrorism would only serve to perpetuate conflicts in these countries further, as is the case with, for example, the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency campaign against Islamist sect Boko Haram. Despite the enactment of an anti-terrorism bill, the closure of border, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of 30,000 security guards, the carnage in Nigeria continues (p. 219-220). Solomon aptly noted that the traditional counterterrorism perspective is short-sighted at best, as it has not served to ameliorate the terrorist threat in Africa (2015, p. 230).

In Nigeria, not only has the Nigerian state been unable to resolve Boko Haram’s challenge military, but its own counterterrorism violence has also rendered even more illegitimate in the eyes of northern Nigerians (2015, p. 231). Solomon argued that states are using the terrorist label to maintain the status quo and attract foreign support. This form of ‘othering’ allows states to delegitimise these non-state actors. The terrorist label also serves to deny the context and conditions that give rise to such movements. Additionally, it allows one to ignore the complexity and the individual character of each of the movements under discussion (2015, p. 231). According to Solomon, the lack of knowledge about the real grievances driving Al Shabab, makes it impossible to make the distinction between sub-state terrorism (terrorism

directed at local goals) and international terrorism, or instance a global Islamic Caliphate pursued by Al Qaeda. When international actors do not distinguish between the two and support an illegitimate state with military training and equipment as well as intelligence and financial assistance, these groups often turn to the likes of Al-Qaeda to provide them with the means to conduct their attacks against the state. In this process, sub-state terrorism then morphs into international terrorism (2015, p. 231).

2.2.8. Criminalisation of a conflict

To discover how international and national criminal law impacts insurgencies, McKnight (2015) analysed the various responses to violations in Uganda, focusing on, for instance, the Amnesty Act, International Criminal Court indictments, and International Crimes Division. She pointed out that ´the conflict in northern Uganda presents a unique study of international criminal law and different responses to prolonged conflict, as seemingly every tactical and ideological method that has been implemented to instil and secure justice has failed to achieve either goal´ (McKinght 2015, p. 193-194). As McKnight pointed out, in general the problem of bonding rebel groups to human rights treaties is the fact that those laws are established by state consent. Nevertheless, some human rights treaties place explicit obligations on non-state armed groups, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically applies to armed groups (2015, 198).

Any activity falling outside applicable treaties or humanitarian provisions may still constitute a violation of customary international law and jus cogens crimes, such as the acts of torture (McKnight, 2015, p. 198-199). In case of Uganda and the atrocities committed by LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation in 2004 and issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and war crimes. As McKnight pointed out, these were targeted only against few central LRA personnel, leaving out all other insurgency groups, and government officials who had also violated humanitarian laws. This led to a decade of claims against ICC of ineffectiveness and failure (2015, p. 199-202).

Furthermore, McKnight pointed out the ICC´s incapability to enforce its decisions, as one week after the ICC announced the opening of its investigations, the LRA killed 50 civilians in a refugee camp in Lira (2015, p. 206-207). This was followed by a creation of International Crimes Division, a national institution prosecuting international crimes through domestic legislation. When the organisation started prosecuting criminals who had originally received amnesty, public trust and respect towards this institution was also put in question (McKnight

2015, p. 205). McKnight drew the conclusion from these observations that putting justice first, can lead to the impossibility of peace, as an insurgency leader feels he has to fight not only the government, but also the entire international community. Furthermore, careful timing and effective execution seems to be among crucial elements when international or national juridical processes are planned against insurgencies (2015, p. 207).

Dudouet (2011) examined the impact of anti-terrorist legislation, in particular the so-called ‘blacklisting’ regimes, on targeted entities, as well as on third parties interacting with them for peaceful and constructive ends, and argues their impact to be ambivalent (p. 1). She pointed to the fact that the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are typically asymmetric in nature, with internationally legitimised state actors opposing non-state armed groups, often labelled or legally proscribed as ‘terrorist organisations’ (2011, p. 3). She described how one of the most immediate responses to the New York and Washington attacks was the establishment of so-called terrorist lists by the US government and the UN Security Council (and subsequently UN and EU member states). Dudouet pointed out that, as there is no internationally-accepted legal definition of ´terrorism´, the task has been left to individual UN member states, which have interpreted it according to their diplomatic agendas or domestic interests (2011, p. 5). This received criticism, for example, from human rights lawyers, who have denounced blacklisting as an ideological and politically-biased tool that is blurring the distinctions between acts of violence against civilians and legitimate struggles for democracy or self-determination, by turning unarmed activists and their communities into ´terrorists´ (2011, p. 5-6).

Dudouet argued that the behaviour of non-state actors, such as underground guerrilla organisations, is less likely to be affected by international sanctions, as they already perceive themselves as stigmatised and isolated. In fact, some organisations might consider proscription by their ‘enemies’ as a badge of honour (2011, p. 4). Furthermore, proscription can fuel radicalism and create direct impediments for humanitarian or political negotiations (2011, p. 5). For example, Dudouet described that while terrorist lists are supposed to encourage armed movements to adopt peaceful strategies, the proscription of such actors in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Colombia, the Philippines, Palestine, and Nepal took place precisely while they were demonstrating their readiness to engage in dialogue and consider non-violent political strategies, inevitably leading to their re-radicalisation (2011, p. 5). Therefore she concludes that the banning and criminalisation of unarmed political or social movements associated with blacklisted organisations has severe consequences for the peaceful resolution

of conflicts, by granting these organisations an air of ´victimhood´ and increase their popular support (2011, p. 7). Hence, when applied unwisely, terrorist lists might interfere with efforts to find a political solution to asymmetric intra-state conflicts (2011, p. 1).

2.2.9. Natural disasters

Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman (2008), and Beardsley (2009) looked at the influence of natural disasters on conflict dynamics. Beardsley focused on how natural disasters can influence the trajectory of conflict and peace processes in intra-state conflict. He stated that if the insurgent group is depending on local support, it will be more responsive to community needs and therefore welcome disaster relief and diplomacy after a disaster. This will advance the peace process (2009, p. 641-642). Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman stated that after a disaster, informal networks are created, and disaster relief and diplomacy will occur. These will influence peace talks positively. On the other side, if, for instance, relief aid is distributed unequally, the conflict can escalate again (2008, p. 515). Although natural disasters do not occur frequently during conflicts, there are some important examples that show how disasters change conflict dynamics, such as the 1998 drought in Sudan, the 2001 and 2005 earthquakes in India/Pakistan, and the 2004 tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka (Gaillard, Clavé & Kelman, 2008, p. 515).

Devit and Tol (2012) pointed out that ´existing empirical research on the role of climate change in violent conflict is limited and inconclusive. There is a consensus, however, that other, non-environmental factors dominate´ (p. 130). Researchers refer to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who were the first to suggest an ‘economic theory’ of civil conflict (rent-seeking by violence) and to test their predictions with data (Devit & Tol, 2012, p. 130). According to this strand of literature, people may fight over resources that are highly valuable and easy to smuggle, for instance diamonds, but they tend not to fight over bulky goods such as water and food. Climate- and weather-sensitive resources are therefore less conflict-prone (2012, p. 130-131). In an attempt to test this assumption, Devit and Tol developed a simulation model for the three-way interaction between civil war, climate change and development, in which they analysed civil wars in Sub-Sahara Africa. Their results indicated a clear statistical correlation between climate change and occurrence of civil war, therefore leading researchers to suggest that at least in certain situations and regions, climate change increases the probability of civil wars (2012, p. 141).

2.3. Dispute settlement and conflict resolution

2.3.1. Settlements and peace processes

Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) are not the only ones who have written about settlements and peace processes ending irregular wars. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012, p. 678-687) identified three paradoxes of negotiating with terrorist or insurgent organisations. The first paradox refers to the misuse of negotiations by the insurgents to stall time, in order to prepare for a next offense. It should be noted that the state can also misuse negotiations to stall for time. This abuse of negotiations is most likely to occur in the mid-phase of an irregular conflict, in which the state failed to defeat the insurgents, despite its advantages in power and resources. Insurgents misuse the negotiations to increase its military strength to ensure a decisive victory (2012, p. 678-681). The second paradox implies that negotiations may also lead to disagreements within the terrorist organisation, as not every member sees negotiations as a positive development. Thereby, negotiations can cause the group to split into factions, each subgroup defending their sphere of influence. The subgroups excluded from the negotiations might use violence to frustrate the process (2012, p. 682-684). Patrick Johnston (2007) suggested that some governments actually seek to fraction terrorist groups in order to exploit the largest factions, using them to combat the remaining subgroups. The third paradox relates to the durability of negotiated settlements. Negotiations sometimes lead to temporary peaceful settlements, but in most cases bring about lengthy peace processes. Also, parallel to the negotiations process, terrorist continue violent acts to increase their power. Therefore, it can be argued that military victories might offer better prospects for stability (2001, p. 685- 687).

2.3.2. Spoilers

Stephen Stedman (1997) also studied the dynamics of the peace processes, and looked specifically into the factors that influence the peace process in a negative way, which he called ‘spoilers of the peace process’. Since conflicts are seldom straight forward proceedings with simple aims, Stedman argued that the negotiations to settle for peace are often seen by some actors as against their interest. This makes peace-making a dangerous and difficult endeavour. If spoilers succeed, the results of ongoing conflict are often disastrous. Examples given by Stedman (1997, p. 5) are Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, where the casualty numbers of the ongoing conflict were multiple times higher than the number of casualties of the original conflict. Stedman argued that in order to prevent spoilers from succeeding, a

thorough analysis and strategy is needed to deal with them. He categorised spoilers based on their position, inside or outside the peace process, the number of spoilers, and the type of spoilers. The ‘type of spoilers’ is further divided into three types: limited, greedy or total. The framework also categorises strategies for coping with spoilers, inducement, socialisation and coercion. Choosing the right strategy is hampered by uncertainty in the analysis of the spoiler. Multiple factors should be taken into account when dealing with spoilers, amongst others, the strategic goals of the spoiler; the intent of its actions; the degree of commitment to the peace process; the degree of command and control on followers; and the degree of unity within the spoiler. There is often uncertainty regarding these factors and assessments have to be made based on estimations. A peacemaker has to take these complex factors into account and assess the effect of actions on the spoiler, other engaged actors and external stakeholders.

Reiter (2015) researched the occurrence of spoiling attempts during peace processes. He stated that the literature on civil wars points to the extreme difficulty of maintaining civil war peace agreements. Within this context, spoiling is defined by Reiter as: ´actions taken to disrupt, undermine, hinder, or delay a peace process´ (p. 92), who identifies it as a major threat to civil war peace agreements. For instance, Angola and Rwanda experienced catastrophic violence when peace agreements failed (p. 90). Reiter’s analysis finds that spoiling intended to terminate an agreement is not typically assumed as common, but still plagues a sizeable number of peace agreements.

According to Reiter (2015, p. 89), when spoiling does pose a threat to peace, it occurs under specific circumstances, such as the moment at which powerful actors initiate a peace process, or when paramilitaries and/or state security forces have been excluded from the peace agreement. He concluded that the vast majority of spoiling is often dangerous and disruptive for society. However, most actors who resort to the spoiling strategy typically fail in their goals and pose little risk to signed peace agreements (2015, p. 105). Finally, Reiter referred to recent research, which shows that the way the events are perceived by the public, influenced by media coverage, has a profound impact on the ultimate effect of spoiling, making the population either more or less willing to accept the loss of human lives as a cost of peace (2015, p. 107).

2.3.3. Governmental policies

The United States Institute of Peace´s special report addresses the following question: what are the most successful governmental policies aimed at ending terrorism? This research is

conducted by drawing experiences from several civil conflicts. The report suggests that one of the most efficient approaches might be to apply strategies aiming to diminish popular support for the terrorists, hence reducing their strength (1999, p. 1). The report stresses the importance of understanding how the terrorist organisation and its decision making process works, which is crucial in choosing the right governmental policies (1999, p. 11). According to Martha Crenshaw, this can be attempted by analysing terrorist groups’ internal factors on the one hand, such as decision making, internal psychological dynamics, and external factors on the other hand, such as organisation’s strength compared to government forces, motivation (ideological or ethnical) and ties with external support. In addition, other factors to analyse are the tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, such as deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations (1999, p. 2-3). Based on these factors, Crenshaw described that the end of terrorism may result from situations as success of terrorists, preliminary success, organisational breakdown of the terrorist group, dwindling support, and new alternatives (other options for political change emerge) (1999, p. 3). She pointed out that governments’ ‘get-tough’ approach can possibly only create more violence, leading to protracted conflict (1999, p. 4). Crenshaw emphasised the importance of a right timing for the peace process, ideally when the government is strong and the terrorist organisation is undergoing a period of introspection (1999, p. 1, 11).

2.4 Conflict theory

2.4.1.Theoretical foundations

The literature review indicates that the conflict theory domain can be divided into classics and contemporary scholars. The foundation of conflict theory is commonly associated with Marxism (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29-31), as Marx´s dialectical materialist account of history predicted that capitalism would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own destruction by a proletarian revolution, therefore emphasising the economic factors (Marx 1859, 1977). Two other classical conflict theorists are Ludwig Gumplowicz and Lester Ward, who introduced a more ethnological perspective to conflict. Gumplowicz´s approach emphasised that large complex human societies are evolved from war and conquest (Gumplowicz 1884, 1963), whereas Ward´s approach gave more attention to the ´human factor´ and emphasised that the root of the societal conflicts lies in the human conflicted nature itself (Ward 1897). Other classicists are Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim´s approach focuses on crime, which he saw as the chief form of the social conflict. He stated

that "crime plays a role in the evolution of morality and law" (Durkheim, 1938, p. 70-81). Whereas Marx emphasised the importance of "social structure", Weber emphasised the importance of "social action". This is the ability of individuals to influence the nature of their social relationships in sociologically significant ways (Livesay, 2015).

C. Wright Mills is usually credited as the founder of the modern conflict theory (Knapp, 2015). Central in his writing is the concept of 'power elite', as the 'national upper class' owns most of the country´s wealth. Mills was also concerned of the rise of militarism among the elites, because according to him, the rise of the military state serves the interests of the elite of industrial societies (Elwell, 2013). Another contemporary theorists is Gene Sharp, who argued that the source of any ruler´s political power derives from those over whom (s)he rules. Furthermore, the cooperation of those around a ruler is essential if (s)he is to have any power at all (Sharp, 2013). Finally, contemporary conflict theorist William Hulius Wilson emphasised the impact of racial inequality and rising economic inequality as a source of societal conflict (Wilson, 2003, p. 1096-1114). As a conclusion, Guy Hungerford presented a useful overview of the whole conflict theory domain by describing that conflict theorists see "that the society is made up of different groups who have competing or conflicting interests", and history "as the product of struggle" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, conflict theorists believe the main engine of change to be the "changing balance of power between different groups and especially different classes" (Hungerford, 2008, p. 29).

2.4.2. Modern approaches

While classic approaches have focused on certain factors as sources of conflict, modern conflict mapping recognises the need of analysing complex conflict systems. As pointed out by Ramsbotham (2011), this has been integral in the conflict resolution field from the beginning (p. 118). However, this does not mean that there is one overarching approach agreed upon by all the researchers of the field. On the contrary, there are several parallel and colliding approaches, emphasising different perspectives, factors and levels of analysis. This research attempts to combine the most essential approaches, and to present a holistic model coming together of different transdisciplinary frameworks. In the following part several interpretative frameworks for conflict analysis from established researchers will be presented, such as Wallensteen, Ramsbotham, and Pahlavi and Ouellet, to serve as the basis of this research's theoretical approach, which will be presented at the end.

2.4.2.1. Shared framework

According to Wallensteen (2007), the different modes of conflict analysis can be categorised under three headings, according to what kind of approach they emphasise: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) needs-based conflict origins, and 3) rational-strategic calculations (p. 31-32).

A classic understanding of conflict interprets conflict as a dynamic phenomenon: one actor is reacting to what another is doing, which leads to further action (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 32). The dynamic perspective on conflict analysis has been adopted by two well-known analytical tools, both developed in the 1960s: the game theory and Johan Galtung´s conflict triangle. The game theory is a way of illustrating how parties act within the confines set up by the game itself. If the parties follow the rules, the outcomes are predictable. However, it also raises the possibility that actors can change the dynamics by making particular moves or even breaking some of the 'rules' that the conflict has generated (2007, p. 32). Galtung´s model suggests that a conflict moves among the triangle´s three corners, where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behaviour and C to the conflict or contradiction itself (the incompatibility) (2007, p. 33). According to Wallensteen, understanding dynamics is the most important aspect in order to understand the transformational nature of conflict (2007, p. 33). However, this dynamic perspective is limited. As Wallensteen pointed out, the dynamic perspective is weak in its understanding of why conflicts starts, as the underlying assumption is that they begin with conflicting attitudes, without taking into account the possibility that such attitudes could be a result of previous behaviours and pre-existing incompatibilities (2007, p. 36).

The third perspective, represented by, for example, William Zartman, assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own judgements, make decisions, pursue strategies and, thus, initiate the chain of events that lead to war (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42). This leads to the assumption that the parties initiate wars to win them. They make internal calculations showing that the benefits outweigh the losses when escalating a conflict to a violent confrontation. As time passes and nobody wins, the initial calculations are affected and have to be revised. The potential benefits from victory are reduced as the costs increase. At the same time, the fact that so much time, energy, resources and human lives have been invested, makes it difficult not to continue, until the final moment of victory is reached. If the parties find this stalemate to be painful, it may lead them to strategic rethinking (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 42-43).

As Wallensteen points out, living with or dissolving incompatibility is a central element in conflict analysis, which has been learned from the dynamic approach to conflict as well as from the rational calculation approach (2007, p. 54). Wallensteen emphasised the focus on the needs and perceptions of parties, and the history behind the conflict (2007, p. 54). According to Wallensteen, these three approaches illustrate different elements in the conflict process, having many shared features, and are all useful, promoting a shared framework for the analysis (2007, 54).

2.4.2.2. Multilevel model

Ramsbothan et al. (2011, p. 111) recommended a five-level model focusing on the different levels of the conflict phenomena. These five levels comprise two 'international' levels (global and regional, and contextual factors), one 'state' level divided into functional sectors (structural factors), and two 'social' levels (conflict party and elite/individual, and relational factors). Global and regional levels represent contextual sources of conflict. The global level points at the global factors as a potential source of a conflict, such as the geopolitical transitions, global economic division, environmental constrains, weapon proliferation and ideological contestations (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 111). The importance of integrating a transnational perspective to the study of civil war is also emphasised by other researchers, such as Forsberg (2009, p. 35).

The regional level has been identified, since several sets of conflict data show clear regional differences in contemporary conflicts. Therefore, regional factors, which can be both outwards, such as spill-over effects, and inwards, such as intervention, should be carefully taken into account. In addition, internal wars can have external effects, for example, in the form of diaspora. Conversely, regional instability can affect the internal politics of states through, for example, patterns of clientelism (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 112).

The state level, which represents structural factors of conflicts, can be divided into social, economic and political functional sectors. The social sector focuses on the major types of social division around which conflict fault lines may develop. The economic sector refers to the assumption that protracted conflict tends to be associated with patterns of underdevelopment or uneven development. The political or governmental sector refers to the issues of political controversies, government legitimacy and state control (law and order and security sector) as potential sources of conflict (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 116).

Conflict party and elite/individual levels represent relational sources of conflict. While conflict party level focuses on the group mobilisation and intergroup dynamics, the elite and individual levels point at the importance of leaders and individual advocates of action (Ramsbothan et al., 2011, p. 117).

2.4.2.3 Sociological institutional analysis

Pahlavi and Ouellet (2011) used a sociological institutional analysis to gain insight in the logic of stability and dynamics of change in irregular warfare. They distinguished three dimensions for their research: the regulative, the normative and the cognitive dimension. They looked at the interaction between these dimensions, which includes values, norms, ideas, worldviews, rules and policies. Although their main goal was to find new insights on the military approach of fighting an insurgent enemy, they made some interesting conclusions on studying irregular warfare. It shows that using a more holistic approach will result in finding out more factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict. It shows that what they call ‘soft factors’ offer more insight. For instance, changing values or worldviews can change a conflict drastically. The problem with their conceptual framework of institutional analysis was that it was hard to divide the factors between the three dimensions. Using these factors can be interesting, but will be more effective by applying another conceptual framework (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011; Pahlavi & Ouellet, 2012).

2.5 Conceptualisations

This research focuses on conflict dynamics, more specifically, on violent conflicts between state and non-state actors. Although it seems as if 'war' would be the most encompassing concept, 'irregular armed conflict' as a type of war is more suitable, as the research focusses on conflicts that involve non-state actors as a combating party. Nevertheless, it is necessary to start from the founding concepts of conflict and civil war, and continue with the terms of irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism. The ambiguity of these concepts requires a clear conceptualisation.

2.5.1. Conflict and civil war

The heart of this research is understanding civil war and its dynamics, of which four cases are selected. A clear and precise definition of conflict and civil war is needed to sustain the understanding of this research. The definitions of conflict and war guide the types of information any research will collect (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18). According to Wallensteen, a

good definition should: 1) be sufficiently general, 2) capture conflict both between and within states, 3) be precise, so as to guide data collection (operationalisation), and 4) delimit a particular conflict in time and space (beginning and ending) from other conflicts (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18).

Additionally, three major competing or at least parallel projects exist within the peace research community, which all present their own approach and definition to civil war. These projects, which are continuously mapping armed conflict patterns, are: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), (Uppsala University); Causes of War program (AKUF), (University of Hamburg); and Correlates of War (COW), (University of Michigan).

Basic to COW is the delineation of an international system consisting of states. Thus, wars are conflicts between states, where at least two states are a member of the international system. In addition, there are extra-systemic conflicts, where only one state is a member. The COW defines these civil wars as having a minimum of two parties, where one is a government, and causing at least 1,000 battle fatalities per year, including civilian casualties. Therefore, COW focuses on understanding inter-state conflict by applying realist thinking with empirical approach, dealing with factors such as balance of power, military capabilities, interdependence and other variables of importance for the working of the international system. COW starts from the notion of a system that consists of a large number of independent states. Therefore, the problem is found in the strategies for survival used by different states (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).

On the contrary, according to the AKUF project definition, the membership of the international system is not a condition required for a conflict. However, it does require that a state is an actor on at least one side in a conflict. The actors should have, at a minimum, central command and practical control over the fighting. It is also stipulated that there has to be a measure of continuity in battle. There is no requirement for a particular number of deaths, which produces a broader set of cases than COW. The AKUF project draws from a fairly coherent theoretical approach, as it relates the onset of war to the development of capitalist societies and sees conflicts as a result of the new forms of production, monetarisation of the economy and the resulting dissolution of traditional forms of social integration. AKUF starts, on the contrary, from an understanding of an international system that is fairly integrated, almost having a purpose of its own, which is to promote a market economy and democracy. It is a highly hierarchical world, centred on the strongest actors in the system: the Western

countries. This international system penetrates around the world, creating instability and pushing aside traditional forms of social relations (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 18-21).

The UCDP uses the concept of 'armed conflict' and its definitions and understandings of conflict can be placed somewhere between the AKUF and COW projects. The conflicts included are those that have at least one state or government as a party. It covers conflicts from a threshold level of 25 battle-related deaths in a conflict in a year. There are two thresholds (25 and 1,000 battle-related deaths), resulting in three categories of intensity: 1) minor armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths but less than 1,000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict; 2) intermediate armed conflicts: conflicts with more than 25 deaths and less than 1,000 for a year, but more than 1,000 for the duration of the conflict; and 3) wars: conflicts with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year. The UCDP requires that the conflict should have an issue, an incompatibility, therefore drawing a clear line between political and non-political violence. The project includes only those events that concern control over government or territory, as armed conflicts. Control over government means that the issue is who should rule a particular state and demands for change include the change of rulers. Control over territory means that demands by one state for territory in another state, even the occupation of another state, are included, as are rebellions inside a state to achieve autonomy, independence or the joining of a particular territory to the neighbouring state. The inclusion of incompatibility into the conflict definition has theoretical reasons, as conflict theory suggests that parties act for particular purposes. Thus, they need to be taken at face value (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 22-23).

In this research, the definition of civil war from UCDP is used, namely the definition by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), which provides a deeper understanding of the civil war complexities. According to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is an armed conflict that meets the following conditions:

'1) Causes more than 1,000 deaths overall and in at least a single year; 2) challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognised state; 3) occurs within the recognised boundary of that state; 4) involves the state as a principal combatant; 5) includes rebels with the ability to mount organised armed opposition to the state; 6) has parties with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war.' (2000, p. 783).

This is based on the definition of civil war as given by Small and Singer (1982), who define war simply as a violent conflict with at least a 1,000 deaths. Internal war is a violent conflict

that occurs on state territory. The second condition is that the government that is in power at the beginning of the conflict is an involved actor. Thirdly, there must be effective resistance, to distinguish a war from, for instance, genocide.

2.5.2. Irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism

‘Modern warfare’, according to Boot (2015), refers to warfare where specifically trained, disciplined and deployed soldiers fight against other soldiers under a hierarchy. This first appeared around 3100 BC in het Fertile Crescent, and thus has a long history. Boot argued that irregular warfare is an evolution of tribal and nomadic warfare, which share many characteristics. He stated that the modern irregular guerrilla has inherited the tactics of small unit warfare, and linked those to an ideological agenda. This notion is shared by Pahlavi and Ouellet (2012), who found that irregular armed conflicts have a highly political nature. Two paradoxes are noted by Boot (2015). First, irregular forces are prone to become regular forces if great military success is achieved. Secondly, ever since the mid-19th century Taiping wars in China and the American Civil War most wars have seen elements of both regular and irregular armed forces. While elements of both might be found in most wars, both types of conflict can still be set apart, although their distinction remains unclear.

This long historic background is largely corroborated by Vacca and Davidson (2011), who argued that irregular warfare is actually a faulty term, because it sets irregular warfare conceptually apart from regular warfare, which it is not. Vacca and Davidson (2011) argued that irregular warfare is not only an integral part of the general warfare domain, it shares many characteristics with regular conflict. Underlining the notions of Boot (2015), they argued that irregular and regular warfare can occur within the same conflict, sometimes at the same time, while at other times during different phases of the conflict. By creating and accepting this artificial divide between both types of conflict, researchers are exposing themselves to both deductive as well as inductive logical failures, as they are not using the general body of knowledge according to Vacca and Davidson (2011).

While Boot (2015) and Vacca and Davidson (2011) seem to argue the existence of a more ‘mixed’ form of warfare, Jeffrey White (1996) has found nine dimensions in which irregular warfare can be set apart from modern or regular warfare. The first dimension regards the organisation characterisation. Modern warfare is characterised by formal hierarchies, while irregular forces often use a less formal or even informal organisation structure, for instance, on a clan, company, or religious or territorial basis. A hierarchical organisation is often

perceived by military scholars as the stronger military alternative. While the informally organised groups are often not able to achieve a military victory, they can still deal a blow to a regular force. The second dimension is technology. While technology plays a significant role in regular forces and regular conflicts, irregular units often use simple technology and light weapons, such as assault rifles and improvised explosive devices. This is exemplified by the Taliban, after the United States intervened in Afghanistan. Irregular forces might use, by exception, improvised, donated, captured or stolen heavy equipment. This has certain implications for the third dimension, logistics, as a lack of large troop formation and heavy military equipment means irregular forces are not as depended on or limited by logistical factors. This also reduces their vulnerability to strategic attacks.

The lack of military equipment and formal hierarchies also influences the fourth dimension of command and control (White, 1996). While conventional forces usually have a national authority that commands them, irregular forces are usually not directly commanded, but are far more loosely connected to the central leadership, if exists it at all. Command and control is often executed by local leaders with crude means, such as walky-talkies. The fifth dimension considers the doctrine, the way the actor fights, how they will deploy, what weapons will be used, and their effect at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Irregular actors often only have a limited doctrine. Yet, it does not prevent them from achieving tactical successes. The doctrinal dimension shows that regular forces, especially in the west, prefer to have a quick and decisive military victory, while irregular forces can usually not mount enough forces to decisively win a war in one large battle. Irregular forces are often more prone to responsive engagements, using their tactical mobility and knowledge of the environment to choose the moment of engagement. The seventh dimension makes a distinction between the soldier and the warrior, and focusses mainly on the recruitment process. While a soldier enlists and is taken out of civil life and transformed into a soldier, a warrior is part of a local culture, integrated in his society and fights with the equipment available to him.

Another differentiating dimension (White, 1996) is that of the allies or accomplices. While alliances in regular conflicts are usually based on shared long-term interest and trust, in irregular conflicts allies can be hard to understand. An example given by White (1996) is that of the Arab allies to General Allenby, while fighting the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East coming from a totally different culture and striving for different goals than the British military. Another risk that exists to a regular party in an irregular conflict is that an (accidental) alliance with an irregular party might make you an accomplice, making it harder to gain

legitimacy in the eyes of some parts of the population. The final dimension considers the relationship between the societies and the wars that they wage. While a regular conflict is often something that is segregated from society, constituting a front line and a hinterland, an irregular conflict is often waged throughout the society, forming an integral part of it. While Boot (2015) handed an analytical tool to organisationally set irregular and regular conflicts apart, he did merely that, and did not capture the essence of what makes irregular warfare.

Setting irregular warfare apart from regular warfare is however an important step in finding the essence of the concept. This is also acknowledged by Gustafson (2014), who argued that a clear definition might not even be needed. While many sub-definitions exist, the broadest view is that 'war is war, although the character of activities in the operational environment differs' (Gustafson, 2014, p. 42). While this hints to a traditional Western military perspective, it is also a broadening of the concept to overcome the difficulties in setting regular conflict apart from irregular conflict. Gustafson argued that while irregular conflict gained prominence in the military research community after 2006, it remained a less clear and more diffuse concept as opposed to more specific concepts such as (counter) insurgency, protracted war, and revolutionary warfare. Gustafson further argued that irregular warfare “is characterised by limited, physical structures and greater mental goals and drivers, the endurance and will of the people, limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect, requiring skills and capabilities for covert, clandestine and low visibility operations” (2014, p. 46). He continued to argue that parties in irregular wars are often not prioritising Western thought and standards when it comes to human rights. He stated that people are the target to be controlled by the irregular warfare actors, but does not differentiate between different forms of irregular warfare.

The United States Army has a similar definition of irregular warfare. They argued in their Field Manual 3-05.130 (Department of the Army, 2008) that irregular warfare is not as much about achieving military objectives by attaining a technological and military advantage, but by understanding the local politics and social structures. At the same time the notion exists that winning the population requires the specific resource of time, as irregular conflicts are often long and drawn out conflicts, which also require a long and substantial presence, both after conflicts and before conflicts erupt. This is one of the reasons for the U.S. Army to engage in long term partnerships with actors around the globe. Irregular warfare is seen as a broad overarching concept that harbours 14 core warfare activities. These activities include the waging of insurgencies, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defence and psychological

operations (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-5). One of the core aims of an irregular warfare is to acquire the support of the population or to assure that another actor loses the support of the population. Irregular warfare is defined as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (Department of the army, 2008, p. 1-8).

According to Larson, Eaton, Nichiporuk and Szayna (2008), irregular warfare can be divided into two distinct types. The so called ‘population centric irregular warfare’ and ‘counter terrorism operations’ (Larson et al., 2008, p. 14). The first one is said to focus on creating support among local populations for U.S. policy. This is a political goal rather than a military goal, such as the destruction of an opposing forces formation. The second type of irregular warfare, counter terrorism, is aimed at combatting small jihadist terrorist cells around the world. This does not require a large military footprint or a political effort. This type of warfare is mostly fought by special units, within the military but also from civilian institutions, such as the police and intelligence apparatuses. A big issue with this definition is that it is, just as the Department of the Army, United States centric.

A distinction between two types of irregular warfare is also made by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009), which it is in some ways close to the one made by Larson et al. (2008). Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that the distinction between the two forms of irregular warfare should not be made at the tactical level or at the organisational level, but at the strategic level, as both are strategies in waging irregular war. Like the population centric irregular warfare (Larson et al., 2008), an insurgency strategy aims at capturing the population, which is to be used to affect political power. This means the support of the population for the insurgency is of great importance, as this is needed to give the actor the political strength and legitimacy as well as provide resources for the militant units. A traditional aim of the insurgency is to acquire control over all or part of the state functions, for instance, through secession or by a reorganisation of the state in general, as happens with federalisation. Less formal ways of control, or governance, can also be exerted. These do not entail the formal declaration of a state, or a settlement, but consolidation of some acquired powers, possibly by negative enforcement through intimidation. The ambition of an insurgence force to acquire governance in some form over a population and territory can result in the transformation of the irregular forces into a regular military force.

Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) pointed out that starting an irregular war with the insurgency strategy requires certain pre-set conditions, as control over population and territory requires a certain threshold minimal of conditions. This could, for instance, be modified by failing or collapsing of a state and its institutions, resulting in a power vacuum that can be taken advantage of by insurgent actors. If the relative strength needed for starting an irregular war with insurgency strategy lack, a terrorist strategy might be followed. The major advantage of a terrorist strategy according to Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) is that it requires relatively little resources to start, as a few people with simple weapons can commit terrorism. The aim of terrorism is not the overthrowing of a state or controlling a population, but is meant as a provocation or 'propaganda by deed' (p. 30). The terrorism strategy aims to provoke other actors into taking actions that the fighter desires, or not taking an action that is seen as damaging the interest of the terrorist forces, in which case any other action is preferable. This means in case of terrorism it is not the act itself that will bring the desired result, but the response of the provoked opposing actor. The population itself does not necessarily have a role and large popular support is not necessary for executing a terrorist campaign. Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2009) argued that often the strategy of terrorism is chosen because the actor lacks the political and military power to force the desired political change, and thus chooses a strategy that brings about change to a more favourable situation in which the end goal can be achieved. It should also be noted that terrorist tactics are not the explicit domain of actors that employ a terrorist strategy. Actors that are engaged in an insurgency can still use terrorist tactics, yet do this within the frame of the larger insurgent strategy. It will be obvious that an actor that follows a terrorist strategy cannot employ an insurgent tactic. As said before, a terrorist actor lacks the needed competences to wage an insurgency, which is often the reason in the first place that the terrorist strategy is pursued.

Schuurman (2013) has noted that a generally, academically accepted, definition of terrorism does not exist, thus hampering any research in the field. He however used the often used 2011 definition of Schmid and Jongman: ‘Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non- combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties’ (Schuurman, 2013, p. 5). He applied a framework consisting of five counterterrorism measures. First is ‘doing too little’, in which a government does not respond

adequately or even ignores the issue. Another category is a policy of reconciliation, trying to appease the terrorist by taking a root-cause solution. ‘Legal reforms’ is a measure of changing the laws, giving the government more capabilities in fighting terrorism. The fourth category is about restricting the terrorist forces, disrupting their organisational capabilities. The last category consists of the hardest countermeasures, using violence to eliminate the opposing forces. Schuurman (2013) argued that whichever policy category is employed, the public support does influence the outcome of the operation. This is true in his cases, Italy, Northern- Ireland and Canada, not only for the response by government supporters, but also for the effect it has on the supporters of the oppositional actors. If an actor uses more violence than the supporters deem necessary or legitimate for achieving its goals, a loss of legitimacy and support of the actor, be it government or oppositional actors, occurs. At the same time, if an actor is following a low activities policy to prevent alienation of the constituency of the opposite actor, it risks losing its own constituency as it might be perceived as not doing enough.

In this research the concepts as presented by Duyvesteyn and Fumerton (2008) will be used, since these have a neutral framework and allow, due to the focus on strategy instead of tactics or organisation, to explain possible changes in the organisation and policy of the actors that will be investigated in the four case studies.

2.5.3 State-building

State-building is an important concept in conflict studies. First, a weak state-building process of a state can prelude and cause internal conflict. Second, a state-building project can be established by an insurgent movement during a conflict as a first step towards the secession of their 'state'. Therefore it is important to include a clear conceptualisation of state-building.

State-building coheres with the capacity of the state. Hendrix (2010, p. 273) divided state capacity in three different capacities: military capacity, the bureaucratic/administrative capacity and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Sobek and Thies (2015, p. 52) discovered several relations between state-building and civil wars. Civil wars reveal underlying grievances. Therefore they see a civil war as an opportunity of the state to redress these grievances, which will result in a stronger state. According to them, an important part of state-building is the capacity of the state to address its population’s grievances.

A state-building process can be implemented by a government within its own state; implemented by other states or the international community within another state; and within a region in a state, implemented by an insurgent group. In the first situation, the state-building process is implemented by the state itself, which, for instance, happens after independence. Fukuyama gives a clear and concise definition of state-building for these kinds of situations: 'a process by which new governmental institutions are created and existing ones strengthened' (2004, p. 17). Migdal has a corresponding definition, although his is more complete: 'to denote the various dynamic formal and informal processes and the shifting linkages between the state (or state institutions) and society' (Migdal, 2001, p. 11). This definition will be used as addition to the definition of Fukuyama. In the second situation, state-building is mostly implemented by Western countries in other states, where the concept can be defined as 'the attempt to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that can survive the withdrawal of external support' (Monten, 2014, p. 175-176). In the last option, state-building can de conceptualised as in the first situation. However, here the implementation is done by a group that wants self-determination and the state-building process might be the start of a successful secession.

3. Methodology

3.1 Quantitative or qualitative methods

After the Cold War, theories of conflict studies needed to be reconstructed in order to explain the phenomena of civil wars. Simultaneously, new theories emerged, such as the greed thesis that focused on the causes of wars. Paul Collier, like other scholars, relied on statistical analysis, which does not provide a deeper understanding of the conflicts (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Although his method and theory have been criticised, many scholars used Collier's theory, which identifies greed as a trigger of war, as a starting point (Kalyvas, 2001; De Soysa, 2002; Regan & Norton, 2005). David Keen argued the weaknesses of Collier’s work in his article greed and grievance in civil war (2012). His criticism focused in particular on the quantitative method that Collier used. The quantitative method in conflict studies refers to the use of databases that are, especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries, not completely reliable. Keen argued that the problem of missing data has been the exception rather than the rule (2012, p. 767). Duyvesteyn added that research cannot rely on data from the state-level only, since it cannot explain sub-state violence. A scholar needs reliable data from, for instance, the local level to investigate the course of conflict resolution, negotiation and settlement in the final stages of armed conflict (Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 602). Collier even suggested himself in his book Understanding Civil Wars, that the main shortcoming of the Collier-Hoeffler model is the lack of data. He claimed that the model would still be able to offer insights in the factors that cause violence or peace – despite this shortcoming.

Mats Berdal (2005) also questioned the use of the quantitative method in conflict studies. In his opinion, the truly interesting questions regarding violent conflict remain unanswered when quantitative method is used. A statistical analysis offers limited insight in the identification of factors that trigger and sustain civil war, the interaction between these factors, and the mutation of these factors over time. In order to gain a deeper understanding of conflict dynamics, it is advised to use a qualitative method. A quantitative approach can be interesting for research looking for a precise percentage, such as the chance the returning of a conflict. Unfortunately, it offers limited knowledge on the specifics of individual cases or the actual conflict dynamics. Another important limitation of the quantitative method that Berdal (2005, p. 690) mentioned is the requirement to choose empirical data that might leave out highly relevant factors of the case. In order to gain a deeper understanding of a conflict and its

dynamics, one should select a small N and consider many variables. It calls for a qualitative approach.

Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (2003) confirmed that statistical methods can be used to identify key variables across cases, which only highlight part of the situation. It proves a correlation between two factors, such as economic factors and intra-state conflicts. The explanatory weight of statistical methods is limited, as to whether and how specific factors promote or sustain conflict remains unclear (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 5). Qualitative methods can be used to go beyond the revelation of correlation and identify causality. In contrast to the quantitative approach, which assesses the occurrence of specific factors in an isolated manner, these qualitative methods can be used to ascertain the causal impact on conflicts of specific factors (for instance economics) in relation to and combination with other possible significant factors (for instance culture, ideology or politics) (Ballentine & Sherman, p. 6). While a case- specific approach might lack the rigor of large-number quantitative studies, it does offer a more precise understanding of how specific factors ignite a conflict, the extent to which the factors explain a conflict, and the influence of other factors.

The latter is also confirmed in Tarrow’s article Inside Insurgencies: ‘…not quantities but interactions are the key to the dynamics of violence in civil wars’ (2007, p. 596). In this article, Tarrow argued why he thinks the quantitative method is not right in conflict studies. He stated that much of the used data in quantitative conflict studies is over aggregated and that analytical distinctions are ignored, such as the distinction between civil wars as a whole and violence in civil wars as a variable. Secondly, the operationalisation of variables is often incomplete, using only crude, incomplete or indirect indicators. Thirdly, a variable can have different effects in different phases of the war or in other wars, which is often not taken into account in many of the conflict studies using the quantitative method. The fourth comment reflects the same concern as Keen (2012) and Duyvesteyn (2012) had expressed with regard to the missing data from the subnational actors in civil war. The majority of the data is received from state actors. Finally, Tarrow stresses the lack of research on mechanisms or processes of civil war insurgencies, which is hard to measure using quantitative approach. Opposed to the quantitative study, a qualitative study enables better assessment of contextual factors, which gives more insight into the mechanisms and processes of irregular wars (Tarrow, 2007. p. 589).

3.2 Comparative historical analysis

Berdal (2005, p. 690) explained that case studies offer context related insights. The fundamental limitation of using statistical analysis is the incapability of capturing conflict dynamics. It has been claimed that statistical analysis is more objective in analysing a conflict and offers opportunity for generalisations. However, statistical methods lead to static research results, which lack cultural sensitivity and a historical background, as stated by Berdal (2005, p. 690). The outcome of statistical analysis also remains a description of the probability of risks, rather than factual descriptions of the dynamics of violent conflict.

In this research, the comparative historical analysis approach has been selected because of its beneficial features. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2008, p. 6) outline three features of comparative historical analysis: a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualised comparison. These features make the comparative historical analysis suitable for research on conflict dynamics.

First, the comparative historical analysis focuses on explaining and identifying causal configurations that generate major outcomes of interest. In other words, the analysis concentrates on the causes of important outcomes. This feature conflates with this research's aim on conflict dynamics to unravel its causal mechanisms. Secondly, the comparative historical analysis recognises the influence of temporal sequences and the unfolding of events over time. The research objects are not static occurrences that took place at one point in time. These are rather processes that unfold over time and intersect with one another. This enables this research to consider the effects and timing of events in relation to each other. Thirdly, the comparative historical analysis enables systematic and contextual comparisons of either similar and contrasting cases. It reflects the aim to explore causal effects in different contexts rather than produce universally applicable knowledge. This type of analysis enables this research to explore how variables may have different causal effects on the dynamics of conflict across heterogeneous contexts (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 6-13).

3.3 Single case study or comparative case studies

Comparative historical analysis is applicable to both single case studies and a multiple case studies. Single and a multiple comparative case study have different possibilities. The advantage of a single case study is that the case can be intensively examined. However, the outcomes of a single case study are can be less generalised than outcomes of a multiple case

study, since the last might provide the same information in more than one case (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Rueschemeyer (2008) elaborated on the possibilities of single case studies. He argued that a single historical case study can yield significant theoretical gains, as it can contribute to the generation of new hypotheses and test and re-test theories. A single case study does not imply that there is only a single observation, he stressed, as within-case comparison enables analysis of factors that have been returning in the case over time (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 332). Single case study offers the exquisite opportunity to find out empirical relationships among a couple of variables, while all other variables are held constant. This ceteris paribus condition strengthens the observation of causal mechanisms and related variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683).

As single and multiple comparative case studies both have their advantages and disadvantages, a combination of both provides the opportunity to combine the advantages of both methods in a single research project. This can be done by analysing the factors in a single case study first, followed by a cross-case analysis of similar cases. This combination has three advantages. First, it offers the possibility to explore complex interactions and causal mechanism while other factors remain the same. Secondly, it enables to trace multiple paths of causation. Thirdly, it dismisses the assumption of a linear relation between dependent and independent variables, thereby, allowing a multiple regression analysis (Rueschemeyer, 2008, p. 324).

The main advantage of the multiple comparative case study design is that it enables the researcher to gain insights in new variables, influencing the dynamics of the conflict. This can be done by comparing the variables that occurred throughout the conflict in one case, and compare it to the variables found in the other cases. This way, similarities and differences between cases and even patterns of frequent occurrence can be identified (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 1-2), in order to develop an extensive analytical framework that can be applied to other irregular armed conflicts in research of conflict dynamics.

3.4 Empirical or theoretical case studies

Lijphart (1971) discerned six types of case studies: the atheoretical, the interpretative, the hypothesis-generating, the theory-confirming, the theory-infirming and the deviant case study. The atheoretical case study and the interpretative case study are conducted due to an interest in a specific case. The former is a traditional single-case analysis and is mainly descriptive. This analysis does not have immediate theoretical value, as it is not led by established theoretical propositions or aimed to formulate hypotheses. The atheoretical case study is

useful for data-gathering, which can contribute to theory-building in a later stage. The interpretative case study does make use of explicit theoretical generalisation and applies these to a specific case. The aim is to gain insight in the case rather than to improve the generalisation. The other four types of case studies have a theory-building purpose. Hypothesis-generating case studies start with a possible hypothesis and aim to formulate a definite hypothesis. Their goal is to develop theoretical generalisations in research areas where no sufficient theory yet exists. The theory-confirming and the theory-infirming case studies test established generalisations by analysing single cases. Finally, the deviant case studies focus on cases that deviate from established generalisations. These aim to weaken probabilistic hypotheses in order to identify unknown variables or refine known variables (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691-693).

This research has an exploratory character and aims to generate theoretical generalisations with regard to the escalation and de-escalation of irregular warfare. Theoretical insights are limited, as most scholars focus on a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a theoretical model that explains the dynamics of a conflict is lacking. The existing theories focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not yet possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations and mechanisms that might become visible in the case studies. This research contains two parts. The first part consists of the analysis of four, both a-theoretical and interpretative, single case studies. This offers the opportunity to gather more specific data on the specific cases, in which existing theoretical generalisations are used to create a better understanding of conflict dynamics. The single case analysis will compare factors along the timespan of the conflict. Nevertheless, these single case studies will function as hypothesis- generating case studies by comparing them with the other three cases. Hence, the second part consists of comparing the outcomes of the single case studies in a comparable cross-case study, with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework for irregular armed conflicts.

3.5 Method of data-gathering

This research project consists of two separate parts, both using different methods of data- gathering. The literature study consists of a literature review of different methods, theories and perspectives on irregular warfare. The review does not only offer an opportunity to find the best method for studying conflicts, it will also provide an overview of the many existing

theories on escalatory and de-escalatory factors. The ultimate aim is to merge the theoretical insights into one analytical framework that can be used to research irregular armed conflict. In order to improve the clarity of the framework, the factors will be structured along three dimensions: the state, the non-state and the contextual dimension. The second part of the project – the atheoretical and interpretative single case studies – focuses on gathering data and of the specific case. Different methods of data gathering will be adopted. First, secondary literature will be used to describe the main events of the conflict and analyse the cases. Additionally, reviewing the available secondary sources of the cases will indicate possible knowledge gaps and/or misperceptions. Subsequently, information will be gathered from primary sources to fill these gap(s). Newspaper articles, biographies, news films or interviews in documentaries or news shows will be used for this. Finally, an attempt will be made to conduct interviews with persons that have experienced the conflict first hand or can be considered experts, such as researchers, diplomats, or practitioners working for NGOs that have been involved in the conflict.

The use of different types of data sources strengthens the research, since data triangulation enables the researcher to cross verify the same information and recognise inconsistencies. The semi-structured interviews will offer in-depth knowledge on the course of the conflict and the factors driving the conflict dynamics. These insights are used to strengthen the analysis. Therefore, the advantage of conducting interviews is two-fold: the information will be richer in detail and offer a deeper insight into the dynamics of the conflict under study. The semi- structured nature of the interviews allows the respondents to reflect on a variety of factors. An interview guide will be developed to structure the conversation. The guide enlists specific questions and topics that need to be covered during the conversation. However, the researcher is able to follow up on topics that deviate from the guide. It must be noted that the central difficulty of using qualitative data is that the method of analysis is not specified (Verd, 2004). In the Lebanese case, the analysis will consist of ‘quote-research’. The researcher will use quotes from the respondents to illustrate or confirm findings.

3.6 Analytical framework

3.6.1 Grounded theory approach

This research is of explanatory nature. In order to answer the research question, parts of the grounded theory approach are used. Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 274) defined grounded theory as an approach for developing theory that is "grounded in data systematically gathered

and analysed". The approach consists of a flexible research design for a constant comparative analysis. A simplified explanation: the researcher starts with a phase of data collection and data analysis, which is followed by a phase of reflection on concepts or categories. These reflections influence the choices made in the next phase of data collection. The approach offers the researcher the possibility to switch back and forth between data collection and analysis, in order to gain in-depth knowledge on concepts or categories. The ultimate goal is the development of a substantive theory.

The literature review reveals that the theoretical insights on the dynamics in irregular warfare are limited, as most scholars focus on a single variable or a range of variables in an isolated way. Meaning, a comprehensive theoretical model that explains the dynamics of an irregular armed conflict is lacking. The existing theories only focus on parts of the conflict, such as the outburst, the peace processes or the ending of a conflict. It is not possible to combine these theories into a theoretical model that can be used to answer the research question. Nevertheless, the established generalisations explain specific situations that might become visible in the case studies. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the outcomes of the single case studies will be subjected to a comparable cross-case study with the aim of generating a holistic analytical framework.

In this way, elements of the grounded theory approach are used, as the researchers start with a phase of data collection and analysis, in which previously identified key factors that might influence conflict dynamics are analysed. This is followed by a phase of reflection, which includes a comparable cross-case study. This phase of reflection might offer new insights into the previously identified or new key factors. The outcomes can add to the final phase of data collection and analysis.

3.6.2 Structuring the analysis

The literature review offers a broad overview of the research that has been conducted to understand the dynamics of conflicts. The theories have been divided in those exploring the causes of the onset of a conflict, the causal mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the war, and the conflict resolution. In this research, we will focus primarily on the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation of an irregular armed conflict. The aim is to find out the drivers of the dynamics. In order to identify these drivers, an integral approach is adopted, which will result into a comprehensive overview of the factors driving conflict dynamics. Stokke (2006) argued that the conflict resolution school only pays limited attention to the long-term

developments of grievances, forces and strategies, focusing too much on negotiations and peace processes. Pahlavi and Ouellet underscore that using an integral approach, which will result in finding more factors that influenced the conflict. For instance, changing values, worldviews or strategies can change a conflict drastically.

The integral approach requires a certain degree of structuring, which is ensured by the following analytical framework. Stokke (2006) argued that conflicts should be approached broadly. However, he warned for becoming too vague and all-inclusive in analysing the conflict dynamics. The analytical framework was constructed to structure this study. Additions can be made after the single case, and the comparative analysis, since the grounded theory approach is used. The framework consists of factors that have either been identified in previous research projects or could be related to the state or the non-state dimension.

Thus, the analytical framework combines several theoretical insights that have been discussed in the literature review. By identifying the factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, an analytical framework is built. The framework has been translated into a conceptual model. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, the conceptual model is a schematic representation of the key factors that influence conflict dynamics, and how they relate to each other. The framework is divided into three realms: context, state perspective and non-state perspective. The framework will be applied to the cases and used to answer the research question. However, the framework is not static, since a grounded theory approach is used. New findings in the case studies expanded the framework with two more factors. Firstly, regional politics are distinguished from international politics, making it a separate factor. In all four cases it appeared that regional politics had a big impact on driving conflict dynamics. This new factor is added to the analytical framework, since the regional dynamics were significantly influencing the conflict in four of the studied cases. Secondly, geography has been important in three of our cases. Geography played an important role in, for instance, determining strategy of armed groups, state action and social cleavages. This had a significant impact on conflict dynamics in three of the studied cases, which is why geography had been added to the analytical framework. Theoretical foundation of the two added factors has been added to the literature review afterwards. A visualisation of these realms is shown in figure 2, explanations follow below.

Figure 2: The analytical framework

3.6.3 Three realms of analysis

State perspective

The state is one of the principal actors when it comes to wars and politics in general. The concept of what the state is exactly, has famously been worked out as a political science concept by Garner (1910). A state is “a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control and possessing an organised government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience” (p. 41). In order to grasp the role of state actors, first, the influence of governmental action on conflict dynamics will be considered. Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969) explained that governmental action follows from the process of public policymaking. The outcomes are policy responses that take different forms (regulations, subsidies, quotas and laws), and are implement at different levels (local, regional and national level). Stewart (2002) explained how state actions in Aceh, Indonesia, and Guatemala fuelled and prolonged the conflicts. The analysis will also take into account the influence of the capacity of state actors on the conflict dynamics. Rotberg (2010) explained the dynamics of nation-state failure, and defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. The underlying rationale is that a weak state is at greater risk of civil war.

Non-state perspective

As non-state involvement is a crucial element of the concept of irregular warfare, it is needed to analyse non-state actors as an important factor in the conflict. The actions of militant insurgent group are assumed to change the dynamics of the conflict due to their characteristics. One observation that continues returning in the theories on insurgent groups is the criminalisation of the militant groups. This criminal behaviour consists of trafficking arms and narcotics and other smuggling related activities, extortion, robbing banks or houses, amongst other things (Clarke, 2011, p. 163). Militants groups can use criminal activities only for financial support, but they can also engage in strategic partnerships with criminal organisations (Dishman, 2001). This criminalisation can influence the conflict, for instance, when it becomes financially profitable for civilians to engage with the militant group, because of their lucrative criminal activities. Factionalisation is another characterising factor of the non-state actor that can influence the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Duyvestein & Schuurman (2012) explain that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.

Contextual factors

The contextual factors refer to the remaining factors that influence the dynamics of a conflict, which cannot be related to the actions of the state or the non-state actors.

The grievance-based explanations of civil war can be considered to explain a contextual factor. Tarrow (2007, p. 593) is one of the scholars stating that the repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Grievance will be considered as dissatisfaction or discontentment arising from acts that are perceived as unjust or unfair.

Rotberg (2010, p. 5) explains how conflicts may be rooted in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. The existence of social cleavages creates horizontal inequality. Here, Neto and Cox's (1997, p. 152) definition of social cleavages will be used: "social differences that might become politicised, or might not, differences of ethnicity, religion, language or occupation […]".

The local, national, and international politics are also considered to be contextual factors. As exemplified by Berdal (2005) sub state polities, sometimes considered as fragile, may have

the capacity to provide some of the core functions of government. This way, developments in local politics have explained the striking success of the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. One can also imagine how foreign support, as an outcome of international politics, might influence the dynamics of a conflict.

3.6.3 Operationalisation of the factors

3.6.3.1 Context

Social cleavages

The presence of social cleavages within a society can result into inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional communities, which cause inter-communal tensions. Rotberg (2010) argued that civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. De Rouen (2007) identified the processes of dominance and polarisation in highly divided societies. The first occurs when one group forms an absolute majority; while the latter occurs when society is split into two groups. Internal divisions can spark sectarian violence and escalate the conflict, if the indifferences cannot be resolved peacefully.

Popular support

Popular support, or the lack of it, relates to both the state- and non-state perspective. Popular support is needed to legitimate their action, whether this is armed resistance (need of recruits, access to local resources etc.), or counterterrorism operations (support of the citizens for government action). According to Wood (2003), repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances leads to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force was used indiscriminately. Crucial for this support is an emergence of insurgent political culture, providing a shared view/idea of justification and nurturing a will of ultimate sacrifice. From state-actor point of view, Schuurman (2013) argued that public support is an important factor in counterterrorism operations, as it legitimises the applied policy. However, it also sets boundaries to that same policy for both the state as the non-state actors. The rise and fall of public support for both the government and the oppositional actors can partly explain the developments in levels of violence.

Grievances

Grievances are often invoked in a conflict as legitimation by parties in explaining the origin of the conflict or their motivation for continuing the conflict. Grievances, based on Collier and Sambanis (2002), can follow from different sources, such as economic, political or social basis, and are either objective or perceived. Objective grievances can be measured, such as the distribution of wealth according to the Lorenz curve. Perceived grievances are about the amount to which certain populations perceive the existence of a grievance that does not necessarily exist. Economic grievances constitute, for instance, the extent to which parties share in sources of national wealth. Political grievances are about power relations in communities, and can relate to, for instance, the legitimacy of the governance system. This refers to questions such as, whether there is democracy, what form of democratic system applies, and whether there is a form of political exclusion. Social grievances consider social issues, such as ethnic or religious dominance forms of social exclusion. Grievances are not limited to current grievances, but can also be the result of perceived past injustices that have not been acknowledged.

Local politics

Local political dynamics can be a casual mechanism for conflict dynamics, for example, new elections that change the political strategy of the region. It is also possible that the militants of a specific region are extremely divided, which can result in regional power struggles and rivalries between (political) leaders. Furthermore, when an insurgent group has the ambition of self-determination and secession, it is possible they begin a process of state-building in their region during the conflict. This creates a separate political institution, with its own sphere of influence. Strong state-building can result in a larger cleavage between the insurgents and the rest of the population and it can increase the popular support for the insurgents, since they provide welfare and security (Stokke, 2006; Berdal, 2005; White, 1996).

National politics

The significance of national politics in explaining civil wars is related to the question which system is better to implement in order to reduce conflict. Reynal-Querol (2001) observed that countries with alternative political systems have different probabilities of civil war. The central idea is that in a consociational, inclusive political system, the opportunistic cost of an insurgency rises, and lowers the probability of an insurgency. Therefore, besides the level of

civil liberties and freedoms, the level of representation of the population in government can be analysed. In this way, the political system might have an explanatory power concerning the outbreak of a conflict. Additionally, the type of politics, for instance, coalition politics or patronage politics, can be observed to explain heightened levels of violence. Political turbulence can significantly impact the dynamics of the conflict, as a dysfunctional political system can cause significant tensions. From a different perspective, the political arena causes ongoing power struggles with great ramifications for society. In this way, national politics can also offer indications of a weak or strong government. At last, national political processes, such as elections, are an indicator for national politics.

Regional politics

Regional politics, as opposed to the national and international politics, is defined by Dreyer (1994) as ranging from such phenomena as cross-border movements to regional diplomatic, economic and military strategies. Therefore, what includes to the domain of regional politics are actions and decisions that do not occur and are not focused solely on national level, but on regional level, involving neighbouring countries and actors. Indicators for regional politics are support for the insurgent movement, an intervention of the conflict, or pressure exercised by the regional power. Regional politics in the context of civil wars can be seen closely related to the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, as pointed out by Forsberg (2009). Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. Therefore, there is a need to analyse also external events and factors in civil wars, such as ethnic kinship linkages, the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries, ethnical polarisation, and impact of inspiration and example of existing conflicts.

International politics

The conflict dynamics can often not be perceived as occurring in an international vacuum, and the nature of the interaction will influence the conflict for the state and often for the non-state actors as well. Wallensteen (2007) argued that the western dominated international system penetrates into all parts of the world, forming a distinct form of social relations which sometimes replaces the traditional local traditions. Dudouet (2010) argued that non-state actors are less sensitive to international sanctions, as they are already operating in an often isolated position. Concurrently, Byman (2007) argued that non-state actors can benefit from cooperation with state partners, but risk losing credibility with the local communities.

Ramsbothan et. al. (2011) provided another indicator by arguing that irregular armed conflict can result in diasporas, that itself influence the conflict, for instance, by ideological or financial support. A more economic explanation is used by Malone and Nitzchke (2005), who argued that international actors often get involved in the war economy. Foreign military intervention is the most pervasive form of international politics influencing the conflict dynamics. Accordingly, Bapat (2012) added that state sponsorship can be a form of strategic communication, and result in an improved negotiation position for an international actor, but comes at the cost of potentially losing control over the supported non-state actor.

Natural disaster

Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman conducted research about what influence a natural disaster can have on a conflict. Indicators for natural disasters can be tsunamis or volcano eruptions, but also drought. A disaster can de-escalate the conflict, for instance, because disaster relief and diplomacy can have a positive effect on the peace process. Both parties share grief caused by the same external factor that brings them together. However, natural disasters can also escalate the conflict, for instance, in the case of unfair distribution of relief aid.

Geography

Fearon and Laitin (2003) implicated that geography influences the nature and the outcome of a conflict. They found that rugged terrain increases the probability of the onset of a civil war. This can be related to the strategic advantages that can be derived from geographical settings. In particular, rain forests and mountains complicate locating non-state armed forces. Thereby, the rugged landscape becomes an incentive to initiate a conflict. It also impacts the course of the conflict, as it influences the strategic choices of state and non-state actors. Another indicator for geography is the geographic diffusion (Kathman, 2010).

3.6.3.2 State

State action – coercive force

According to Schultz (1979), the core of this strategy is to employ ´pain and violence´ to make resistance ´terrible beyond endurance´. In the civil war setting, use of coercive force by the state actor against dissident groups is usually labelled as counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism. According to the United States Institute of Peace´s special report (1999), these tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, including deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations. In this framework, negotiations will belong to

state action – policy solution. In addition, Solomon (2015) mentioned the closure of borders, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of additional security troops. As pointed out by Wood (2003), coercive force used to repress deeply felt grievances can lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Also Collier and Sambanis (2003) promoted a hypothesis that government repression increases opposition, especially in the case when repression is not total, which can promote and lead to violent confrontations. Porch (2013) argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim. Furthermore, Solomon (2015) argued that traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter- productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity giving rise to opposing movements.

State action – policy solution

Policies adopted by states influence the dynamics of a conflict. Schuurman (2013) developed a framework of five categories in which policies can be determined. This framework can be useful in indicating policy solution used in the conflicts in this research, since it provides a broad picture of possible policies. The categories are: the lack of response, where the issue is ignored; reconciliation policies; legal reform policies, which consist of changing laws to increase the capability of the government to combat the terrorist groups, such as anti-terrorism legislation; policy that actively disrupts the terrorist group organisational capabilities; and active repression, including the use of violence to destroy a terrorist group. Is had to be noted that in our research, the last category is part of state action – coercive force.

Complementary to these categories, Dudouet (2011) argued that proscription of non-state actors can result in increased radicalism, and is a direct impediment to negotiations and reconciliation. Adding to this, Mukherjee (2014) argued medium capacity states often prefer a containment policy, which could fit in several of the policy categories proposed by Schuurman (2011).

State capacity

Besley and Persson (2010) analysed the cohesion of the capacity of state actors and conflict dynamics. They state that states with a low capacity, which they call weak states, have a

higher risk of conflict. Conflict theories mainly consider state capacity as an exogenous factor. However, in this analysis it will be treated as part of the state and possible causal mechanism to drive conflict dynamics, for instance, the quality and quantity of the army, and the state’s economic situation. They also concluded that a conflict is an incentive to invest in state capacity. A larger state capacity will increase the state's chances to control the insurgent conflict. Rotberg (2010) defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. This includes the capacity of providing security for its citizens.

Weak or strong state

Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that enlarge the risk of conflict. The capacity of a state is reflected by effective delivery of political goods to the public, which requires a well-financed and administratively competent government. This can be analysed by assessing the social services offered by the state, but also by reviewing the legitimacy of (para) military forces and the police. Other indicators for weak or strong state are weak or strong political coalitions, or the weak or strong control over the state apparatus.

3.6.3.3 Non state

Strategy of armed groups

Strategy of armed group in civil war context can be approached from the motivation perspective, as motives for rebellion can be argued to be represented in organisation´s strategy. According to Weinstein (2007), insurgency group´s recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. Following this, Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency, namely opportunistic rebellions (less risky, possibility for short-term gains, low-commitment participants), and activist rebellions (risky participation, unlikely of short-term gains, high-commitment participants willing to contribute for future rewards). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence. Other used indicators for strategy of the armed groups are the use of terrorist tactics (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2009), using peace processes, having ulterior motives (Stedman, 1997) and involving the international community to gain support for their

cause. Nevertheless, researchers recognise that there are a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592).

Capacity of armed groups

The capacities of the non-state actor can differ markedly from that of states. After all, as pointed out by Pearlman and Cunningham (2012), ‘the imperatives and possibilities of a collective striving to attain statehood, secede from a state, or seize control of a state are quite different from those of the duly constituted government of a state with a monopoly on violence and internationally recognised sovereignty’ (p. 4). The capacity of non-state armed groups to effectuate authority and violence is determined by several factors. Legitimacy or public support is a factor in the capacity of armed groups, especially in relation to the policy of the non-state actor (Schuurman, 2013) or the relative legitimacy of the group versus the legitimacy of the government (Dudouet, 2011; Solomon, 2015). Furthermore, non-state actor´s affiliation with political organisations is an important indicator of its capabilities and motivation to push for policy change (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013, p. 521). In addition, according to Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2013) factors such number of troop size (p. 521), how capable the rebels are at procuring arms and at fighting (p. 522), and whether they have centralised command structure (p. 522), and do they control territory (p. 523), are essential indicators of the capacity of armed groups.

Factionalisation

The factionalisation of an armed group can drive conflict escalation or de-escalation in several ways. Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) described the possibility that armed groups split into factions, each defending its own sphere of influence. Groups might use violence to frustrate the process, for instance, when they are not invited for peace negotiations. Jonhston (2007) even stated that governments could seek to divide armed groups in order to exploit one or several of them to fight the others. The factionalisation of an armed group can also result in the end of the conflict, when the factions have not the sufficient capacity to fight the state actor anymore. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012) explained that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.

Criminalisation

Dishman (2001) reflected upon the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation, which is believed to take place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). The terrorist groups might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to analyse the transformation, the aims and interests must be assessed. Terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). Indicators for criminalisation of an armed group are, aside from the presence of criminal activities as, for instance, bank robberies and drugs smuggling, the change of nature or motive of the armed group from the political goal to crime.

3.7 Case selection

Four cases are selected to provide insight into conflict dynamics. Similarities between the cases are required, in order to make a viable comparison. The selected cases are all irregular armed conflicts. They share the similarity of a conflict between a state and a non-state actor. The non-state actor is an insurgent group with the primary aim to control a territory and a population, which they try to achieve by using violence, including terrorism tactics. To ensure enough information can be found, the conflicts have been brought to an end for at least five years. Also, the conflicts should be recent, which means that they took place in the 20th and/or 21st century. Finally, all cases have a colonial history. The cross-case analysis will offer insight into the causal mechanisms of conflict dynamics in the four cases. The possibility of a deviant case is taken into account. The deviant case might point out a different causal factor, offering a new, unspecified explanation for changing conflict dynamics. If applicable to other cases, it could culminate into a general proposition.

Israeli Independence war

The Israeli independence war (1947-1948) can go by many names, showcasing its enduring effect even on modern day politics. The conflict took different forms, at times consisting of riots and use of terrorist tactics by some actors, growing into a full scale interstate war after initial insurgent successes. While many terrorist groups were active in the conflict, the main non-state actors had clear insurgent goals, the capture of territory and people and the creation of a state. Various non-state actors had different war goals, for instance, the Jewish groups

were fighting for a Jewish state, while Arab groups wanted an Arab state in one form or another.

The area has a long colonial past. In the early 1500s it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, who maintained rule until the British conquest of the region during the Great War. At the end of the insurgency, rule of the British Empire had ended, and a new state was born. While the root of the broader conflict can be traced back to the late 19th century, the insurgent war started only during the 1940s, with the end of World War Two in sight and the beginning of the period of decolonisation.

Lebanese Civil War

The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975, after the Lebanese Army was deployed to end a fisherman’s strike. The controversy of the army being deployed against a civil demonstration was reinforced by the fact that the fisherman were Sunni Muslims and the Lebanese Army was seen as a tool of power of the Maronite Christian president. This fuelled inter-sectarian violence. However, it must be noted that the Lebanese had lived with ethno-religious tensions since its independence. Although the issues appeared to be religious, they were of political and economic nature (Ofeish, 1996, p. 432).

The sectarian tensions erupted in hostilities between the Lebanese army and armed factions. With the arrival of the Palestinians, the Maronite Christians and Muslims interests were driven further apart, and the Lebanese state collapsed in a civil conflict. A coalition of Christians-rightist parties was placed against the joint forces of the Muslim-rightist parties. The civil war in Lebanon would last for 15 years. In 1989, the Taif Accord is signed, establishing a relative equitable political system, in which Muslims are given a greater voice in the political process and sectarian divisions are further institutionalised.

The region of modern Lebanon came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918. After World War I, the provinces constituting modern Lebanon were mandated to France. The French declared the Lebanese Republic in 1926. The colonial enclave was separated from Syria, but it was still administered under the French Mandate for Syria. In 1941, French and British troops occupied Lebanon out of fear that Germany would gain control of Syria and Lebanon. After Wold War II, the French dominance declined as a result of wartime losses and rising Arab nationalism. After 20 years of French mandate, Lebanon gained independence on the basis of the 1943 National Pact.

Namibian Independence War

As British historian Marion Wallace (2011) has pointed out, Namibia is 'one of Africa´s least understood and studied countries' (Wallace, 2011, p. 13). Namibia acquired its modern boundaries in 1884-1885 when the European emperors divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference. The majority of Namibia went to the Germans and was given the name German South West Africa, while Britain held on to the tiny, natural deep-sea harbour of Walvis Bay. After the outbreak of the First World War, the South African army invaded Namibia and took control of the colony on behalf of the anti-German alliance. With the declaration of peace in 1918, South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer 'South West Africa'. By the end of the Second World War the United Nations took over responsibility for all League of Nations mandates with the purpose of leading the nations towards independence. In Namibia’s case these plans were thwarted by the rise to power in 1948 of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which instead incorporated Namibia into South Africa as its fifth province. South African government imposed its policies of apartheid throughout the country, forcing indigenous population to live on segregated tribal 'reserves', providing only meagre resources for living, giving a first pulse for the resistance movement, later to become the leading liberation movement SWAPO, South West Africa People´s Organisation.

The first significant wave of black resistance to white minority rule emerged in December 1959, which South Africans responded by firing on unarmed demonstrators killing 12. Since then freedom fighters started to advocate Namibia´s independence for the United Nations. The UN called on South Africa to withdraw, but took no concrete action to back up this demand. Liberia and Ethiopia took Namibia´s case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but after four years of deliberation, the court dismissed the case in 1966.

After these continues setbacks and forceful oppression by South Africa, SWAPO launched the armed struggle in a bid to forcibly remove South Africa from Namibia. The first clash between Swapo´s armed wing, the People´s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African security forces took place on 26 August, 1966. This started the decades long violent independence struggle, ended only by the 1989 UNTAG-mission and subsequent independence in 1990.

Sri Lankan Civil War

The Sri Lankan Civil War officially started in 1983, after a violent riot that killed thousands of Tamils. However, the post-colonialisation period is already characterised by discriminatory laws against minorities, non-violent demonstrations and eventually violent riots and terrorist attacks. The civil war began with several violent Tamil insurgent groups, but over the years the LTTE succeeded in eliminating the others. For 26 years, until the crushing 2009 military campaign by the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil Tigers fought their battle for secession against the government. They used terrorist tactics, such as political assassinations and suicide bombings, but they also stood out in conventional warfare practices. The LTTE had one goal: their own state called Tamil Eelam.

The island has a history colonisation by several Western powers. Portugal first discovered the island in 1505, calling it Ceilão. The stories about the fruitful island reached Holland and in 1658, the Dutch took over the island, which they called Zeylan. The British conquered Ceylon in 1796 and stayed until Ceylon became an independent state in 1948. The island’s population has always been diverse. However, after independence, peaceful coexistence became less easy because of several factors. The Ceylon Tamils benefitted from the British rule since they went to British schools, spoke English and worked together with the British occupier. Meanwhile, the Sinhalese population went to Sinhalese Buddhist schools and had a disadvantaged position compared to the Ceylon Tamils. The nationalist feeling of Sinhalese also rose because of the colonisation. The British occupiers slowly changed the political system from representation based on hierarchy to representation based on ethnicity, which declined political power of the minorities. This was the foundation of circumstances that eventually resulted in the irregular armed conflict in 1983.

Overview Period State vs Non-state Groups with Colonial Insurgent history strategies

Israeli 1947-1948 British Empire vs. Found on both the Ottoman Independence Jewish non-state vs. Jewish and Arab Empire (1500s- War Arab foreign state side 1917) and and non-state actors British Empire (1917-1948)

Namibian 1966-1990 South Africa vs. South African German South Independence SWAPO/PLAN security forces, West Africa War PLAN (1884-1914), South Africa (LN mandate 1915-1945, as a captured province 1948- 1990)

Lebanese Civil 1975-1990 Blurred lines Communal Ottoman

War between state and mobilisation along Empire (1517-

non-state: a pro- ethno-religious 1918) status quo camp lines French (Christian-rightist mandate parties) vs. the anti- (1920-1943) status quo camp (Muslim-leftist parties)

Sri Lankan 1983-2009 Sinhalese Several Tamil By the Civil War government vs. insurgent groups, Portuguese several Tamil non- later all eliminated (1505-1658), state actors by the LTTE the Dutch (1658-1796) and eventually the British (1796-1948)

3.8 The utility of using phases

Some conflicts have a timespan of more than 20 years. Other conflicts have a dense character with a high frequency in important events. To provide a clear picture of a conflict and to structure the analysis, the conflicts will be divided into phases. This gives the opportunity to study a smaller part of the conflict more intensive and to expose more details. Furthermore, breaking the conflicts down into smaller parts, also gives a structure for the within-case analysis. It emphasises the changing character of conflicts and will show the different influences the factors can have within a single conflict, in different phases.

The division into phases will not be done on the basis of specific pre-determined factors, but this will be conflict-specific. The only condition will be that a new phase should herald a change in the nature of the conflict. For instance, when an actor’s strategy changes, or when elections have taken place and a new government has been installed. The division can also be based on a frequent returning factor, like peace processes or foreign support. The motivation or grievance behind the violence can change over the conflict, which can define phases. In each case the choice of basis of the division will be explained, using the in-depth study of the conflict.

4. Case study of the Lebanese Civil War

4.1 Introduction

From 1975 to 1990, the confessional groups of Lebanon waged a dreadful civil war. During 15 years of conflict, Lebanon suffered major losses of human life, which is estimated at 150,000 (Hanf, 1993, p. 339). Besides the losses of life and property, the country experienced a routinisation of violence, which led to the erosion of public life (Khalaf, 2002, p. 232). The damage to the social structure of the state were concerning: community relations were ruptured, sectarian tensions were high and nation building was disrupted. In retrospective, the conflict seems to revolve around three issues: reforming the political system, deciding upon a national identity, and protecting state sovereignty (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 2).

The post-independence period of Lebanon has been marked by intercommunal tension. From the early 1960’s, the largest confessional blocs – the Maronite Christians and the Sunni and Shia Muslims – were increasingly at conflict with each other. This can be related to the establishment of the PLO headquarters in Lebanon, supported by several Arab nations; the increased Arab nationalist feelings in the region; and the Shia call for reforms of the power structure (Khalaf, 2002, p. 235). The significant Palestinian influx, the rise of Arab nationalism among Muslims, and the strong Shia leadership of Imam Mousa Al Sadr – were developments perceived by the Maronites as a threat to the existing power structure, who feared the intercommunal power relations might change in favour of the Muslim community.

This led to the creation of two camps with diverging interests in changing the existing power structure. The status quo coalition hold on to the existing power structure, as it offered them privileged functions, while the anti-status quo sought to change the power structure, in order to increase their share of power (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 4). It was not a religious strife between Christians and Muslims, an ideological clash between leftist and rightist, an identity struggle between Arab and Lebanese nationalists, or a conflict between rich and poor that created the two camps. It was a power struggle over positions of authority, since the political groups continued to disagree over the distribution of political resources. Each camp was concerned with a set of issues that distinguished it from the opposing camp. At different stages of the conflict, the dividing lines shifted from religious to ideological divisions, and so on, depending on the issue at stake (Khalaf, 2002, p. 235). Thus, there were no consistent, clear- cut divisions among the Lebanese population across all of the issues.

Haley & Snider (1979) focused on the origins of the Lebanese civil war and distinguished causal from contributing forces. The former refers to factors related to the social and political structures of Lebanon. For example, the social fragmented society, the rigid and sectarian political system, the gaps between the deprived and privileged, the corrupted government apparatus, and the social unrest generated by the laisses faire economic policy. While the latter, the contributing forces, refers to factors aggravating the internal conflicts and fuelling confrontation, such as the PLO’s armed presence, the raids of Israeli air forces, the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 3). This dichotomy reveals that the Lebanese civil war seems to have resulted from highly interconnected internal and external conditions.

In the case of Lebanon, the lack of political integration in the fragile, pluralistic society has been repeatedly identified as the major cause of political unrest (Khalaf, 2002, p. 234). In the same way, the destabilizing impact of socio-economic disparities, the influx of Palestinian refugees, and the military involvement of foreign powers have been researched. Most explorations of the Lebanese war focus on the origins of the conflict. The body of literature extensively discusses the preconditions, the international developments, economic disparities, cultural and ethnic cleavages, which led groups to mobilise along sectarian lines. However, research on the dynamics of the conflict is limited. This research will explore the driving mechanisms of the conflict to gain insight into the factors that escalated and de-escalated the Lebanese civil war.

4.2 Case-description

4.2.1 Introduction

The case description of the Lebanese civil war offers an overview of the developments of the conflict. It does not aim to offer an exhaustive listing of the violent clashes that took place from 1975 to 1990 in all parts of Lebanon, and continued to take place for many more years. It rather aims to give a description of the violent clashes that may enhance the understanding of what drove the conflict – by offering the state and non-state perspective. The information is mainly collected from primary and secondary sources. The case description does not necessarily challenge the existing body of knowledge with regard to the events of the conflict.

The case-description is divided into seven phases. Each phase represents a juncture in which certain coalitions among the various participants dominated the conflict. The phases begin and end with the involvement of a new coalition member in the war, as it leads to a renewed contest over political control. The transition from one phase to the next phase was accompanied by an ever greater escalation of violence. This pattern of behaviour contributed significantly to the changing complexion of the civil war. It also reflects an observation made by Tilly (1977) about the interaction of political contenders. He argues that the introduction of a new actor to the political arena will often lead to new coalitions, which initiates a new round of questioning the distribution of political resources. In the case of Lebanon, the contenders’ positions are politically and militarily tested.

The phases of the conflict Phase 1: February 1975 – May 1976 (Start: the Two-Year War)

Phase 2: June 1976 – February 1978 (Start: the Syrian hegemony)

Phase 3: March 1978 – December 1981 (Start: the Israeli invasion of the South)

Phase 4: March 1982 – February 1984 (Start: the second Israeli invasion)

Phase 5: March 1984– September 1988 (Start: the return of the Syrian hegemony)

Phase 6: October 1988 – September 1989 (Start: the War of Liberation)

Phase 7: October 1989 – October 1990 (Start: the Taif negotiations)

Table 1: Overview of the phases

The structure of the phases follows the division of the analytical framework. First, the context is discussed, which describes the events driving the dynamics of the phase. Second, the events are reflected upon from the state perspective. The government will be operationalised in a subsequent section to enable the analysis of the state perspective (4.2.4: operationalising the government). Third, the events are reflected upon from a non-state perspective. Both the state- and non-state perspective aim to offer insights into the motivations of the actors involved rather than reflect on all the events, since it would cause repetition.

Before the phases of the civil war are described (4.2.6), the main actors are introduced (4.2.2), the state-based conflicts are distinguished from the non-state conflicts (4.2.3), the Lebanese government is operationalised in order to describe the state perspective (4.2.4) and a few notions are made with regard to the sources (4.2.5).

4.2.2 The actors

The introduction offers a glimpse of the complexity of the Lebanese civil war, as it reveals that the conflict cannot be simply defined as a religious strife, class struggle, or Palestinian- Lebanese conflict. Therefore, the classification of the actors in the Lebanese civil war is not by religion or class – it is by the division of those aiming to maintain the existing power structure from those seeking structural change. This overview will discuss the actors within the national context, as well as external actors. It must be noted that the alliances changed throughout the conflict at several times. Actors shifted from being friends to foes and vice versa, depending on the issue at stake. An explanation of these shifts, in relation to the conflict at large, is included.

Two domestic camps

The Lebanese conflict led to the polarisation of the Lebanese society into the extreme right and extreme left. The two warring factions are often defined as Christian and Muslim, but it would be more accurate to divide them between pro- and anti-status quo camps. The researcher chose to use the distinction of Christian-rightist and Muslim-leftist parties, but recognises that Lebanon is too complex to be divided into a binomial dichotomy.

The extreme right mostly consisted of Maronite Christian parties, militias, leaders and organisations – supported by several Arab reactionary governments, Israel and the West (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 4). The extreme right can be seen as the pro status quo camp. They sought political stability that would preserve the confessional system, which structured the political, judicial and bureaucratic institutions of Lebanon (Rasler, 1997, p. 24). In case the status quo could no longer be preserved, the camp could agree upon an establishment of a federal system of government, if the Palestinian armed forces and refugees would be evacuated to other Arab nations, and all foreign forces would withdraw their troops from Lebanese territory (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 4).

The pro status quo camp called itself the “Lebanese Front”. It consisted of 1) the Phalange Party (Al Kataeb), a political party led by Pierre Gemayel and his sons Amin and Bachir; 2) the National Liberal Party, a political party led by the Lebanese ex-president Camille Chamoun; 3) the Marada movement of the Lebanese ex-president Suleiman Frangieh and his son Tony; 5) factions of the Lebanese Army; 6) the South Lebanon Army of Saad Haddad; and 7) other smaller organisations. In 1976, the Lebanese Forces were created as an umbrella organisation to coordinate their actions. The Lebanese Front will be referred to as the Christian-rightist camp.

In opposition, the extreme left was formed by the PLO and the Muslim-leftist parties, militias, leaders and organisations – supported by a few Arab governments and some socialist movements (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 4). The Muslim establishment included the Sunni, the Shia and the Druze religious organisations. The anti-status quo camp strived for political reforms in order to obtain equal representation in Lebanon’s parliamentary system and the demise of sectarianism throughout the entire political system (Rasler, 1997, p. 24). It supported the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 5).

The anti-status quo camp called itself the “Lebanese National Movement”, which was later renamed to the “Lebanese National Resistance Movement”. It consisted of 1) the Progressive Socialist party, a (Druze) political party led by Kamal Jumblatt; 2) the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP); 3) the Lebanese Communist party (LCP); 4) the Organisation for Communist Action; 5) Independent Nasserite Movement (Al Mourabitoun); 6) the Arab Ba’ath socialist party; 7) the Palestinian Liberation Organisation; 8) factions of the Lebanese Army; and 9) other smaller organisations. The Shia Amal Movement and (later) Hezbollah did not join the camp, but closely coordinated activities with it. The camp included diverse

groups with ideologies related to nationalism, socialism, and religious-conservatism. The Lebanese National Movement will be referred to as the Muslim-leftist camp.

The Lebanese civil war is characterised by complex relations between and within Lebanese sectarian groups. For instance, the rightist camp headed by Maronite leaders received significant support from a number of traditional Muslim leaders. Although the latter opposed the political dominance of the Christian community in Lebanon, they did not support the Muslim-leftist camp either, as it strived for a secular political state. The traditional Muslim leaders sought reforms within the existing structure of government, as they benefited most from the established sectarian structure of the government (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 7). Furthermore, the complexity is exemplified by the segment of Christians that choose to side with the Muslim-leftist camp; the attacks of Christian communities on the rightist camp; low class Christians fighting for the leftist camp; and upper class Muslims fighting on the rightist side (ibid.).

Table 2 offers an overview of the two camps. Many persons will be mentioned throughout the case-description. For the list of persons, see appendix II.

Pro-status quo camp Anti-status quo camp : Christian-rightist parties : Muslim-leftist parties

Phalange Party (i.e. Kataeb Party): Pierre Progressive Socialist Party (Druze): Kamal Gemayel, Amin Gemayel and Bachir Jumblatt, Walid Jumblatt Gemayel Militia: People’s Liberation Army (1975- Militia: Kataeb Regulatory Forces (1975–80) 1990)

National Liberal Party: Camille Chamoun Syrian Social Nationalist Party (nationalism) Militia: Tigers militia Militia: SSN

Marada movement: Suleiman Frangieh, Lebanese Communist party: Khaled Tony Frangieh Hadadi

Militia: Zgharta Liberation Army or Marada Militia: Popular Guard Brigade

Lebanese Forces: Elie Hobeika, Samir Organisation for Communist Action Geagea Lebanon (Shia)

Militia: OCA

Factions of the Lebanese Army: Independent Nasserite Movement (Al- - Upper echelons regrouped into the Mourabitoun) (Socialist): Ibrahim Kulaylat Army of Free Lebanon (1976) Militia: Sentinels

South Lebanon Army: Saad Haddad Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party

Militia: Assad Battalion

Amal Movement (Shia): Musa Al Sadr, Nabih Berri

Militia: Amal militia and Islamic Amal

Hezbollah (Shia)

Militia: Jihad Council

Palestinian Liberation Organisation: Yasser Arafat

Factions of the Lebanese Army: - First brigade regrouped into the Arab Army of Lebanon (1976) - Shia-dominated 6th Brigade

Table 2: Two domestic camps

External actors

The listing of the rightist and leftist camp is not complete, since a number of external actors was also involved in the conflict. Syria and Israel were the most visible foreign forces in the Lebanese conflict because of their high-impact military interventions. Throughout the conflict, France, Great-Britain, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, the USSR and the United States will play their parts. Their roles and actions will be explained in detail in a subsequent section.

The case-description will reveal that Syria is present in almost each phase of the conflict due to their historically close ties with Lebanon and national security concerns. For example, in 1976, Syria attempted to mediate a resolution of the conflict in the earlier stages of the war (El Khazen, 2000, p. 280). The role of Syria as mediator, conciliator and occupier at different times of the conflict will also be explained in detail in a subsequent section.

The Israeli invasions resulted from military activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which started attacking Israeli targets from southern Lebanon after 1970. The Israeli troops launched series of counterattacks against Palestinian refugee camps and other cities in both southern and northern Lebanon. The economic strains resulting from these attacks increased the dissatisfaction with the PLO presence in Lebanon (El Khazen, 2000, p. 290). Military interventions of the Lebanese government led to a series of clashes with PLO fighters during the pre-civil war years. Eventually, the PLO joined the coalition of the national movement.

Shifting alliances

In order to comprehend the course of the conflict, the shifting alliances must be reflected upon. Hereafter, the confessional communities of Lebanon and their role in the civil war will be briefly described.

The Christian community

The Christian community was the first to mobilise out of fear that their existence and political power would be threatened. In 1976, the Lebanese Front was created, consisting of the Christian-leftist militias, such as the Tigers and the Kataeb Regulatory Forces (Hanf, 2015). Internal power struggles would eventually dissolve the Lebanese Front. In 1980, the Lebanese Forces (hereafter: LF) would unite the Christian-rightist militias under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel. East Beirut would become a state within a state under strict rule of the LF.

The Christian-rightist militias received military equipment and training from Israel. In return, the Christian-rightist militias could be “deployed” by the Israeli troops, as observed with the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The Israeli invaded West Beirut but did not enter the Palestinian refugee camps. Instead, the Christian-rightist militias entered the two camps and massacred thousands of people (El Khazen, 2000).

The Sunni community

The Sunni community was located in different geographical areas (Harris, 1997). The influx of Palestinian refugees, who were predominantly Sunni, created a fear that the changing demographics of Lebanon would disrupt the fragile sectarian balance (Johnson, 2001). The communal mobilisation of the Sunni Muslim communities proceeded more slowly, who felt that the Palestinians represented their interests in the war. The Sunni militias were influenced

by the ideologies of Nasserism and Pan-Arabism. Within the sectarian groups internal power struggle took place between Sunni Muslims (Hanf, 2015). Their attacks targeted the Christian communities and Northern Israel.

In the first year of the conflict, the Palestinians enjoyed support from Syria, who supplied weapons and ammunition. In June 1976, Syria decided to shift alliance due to the Palestinian victories, which could result in an Israeli invasion of Lebanon or attract other foreign powers, who could pose a threat to the Syrian regime. Syrian troops started fighting alongside the Christian-rightist militias against the Palestinians. In 1978, the Syrian regime choose to support both the Christian and Palestinian militias, and continued to support both sides throughout the conflict (Hanf, 2015).

The Shia community

The Shia community would not participate in the fighting until 1978, when the Shia militias started growing. This can be related to the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), which increased military and financial support for the militias, as well as symbolical power for the Shia community. It reflected the prospect of religious and social change in Lebanon (Deeb, 1988).

The Amal movement and its militia gained political and military strength from 1984 onwards, which surprised the leaders of other confessional. The Amal militia formed an alliance with the Druze, countering the Lebanese Army in West Beirut. In 1982, following the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah would be established. After the 1988-1990 Shia infighting, Hezbollah became the strongest Shia militia in South Lebanon and South Beirut (Hanf, 2015).

The Druze community

The Druze community supported the Palestinians. Kamal Jumblatt pursued an alternative political solution for the conflict, namely, the creation of a secular state (Richani, 1990). The Druze lived in the Chouf mountains, also called “Jabal Druze” (Druze mountains). Jumblatt had not allowed the Palestinians to settle in the region or use it for military purpose.

The Druze community did not mobilise until 1982, when they felt threatened by the Christian Lebanese Forces entered the Chouf mountains. The LF’s authoritarian force sparked the mobilisation of 30.000 men. It resulted in violent clashes between the Christian-rightist militias and the Druze militias until 1983. Eventually, the Christian-rightist militias were driven form the Chouf (Hanf, 2015).

In 1985, the Druze militias became involved in new clashes, when the Progressive Socialist Party (hereafter: PSP) and Amal were destroying West Beirut. Sunni Muslims residing in this part of to Beirut demonstrated against the violence. The confrontation between the Amal and the Palestinians was caused by the Druze support for the latter (Richani, 1990).

4.2.3 State-based versus non-state conflicts

Between 1975 to 1990, the majority of the fighting occurred in non-state conflicts. A non- state based conflict involves the use of armed force between two organised groups, neither of which is the government of a state, whereas a state-based conflict refers to a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, one of which is the government of a state. Both type of conflicts result in 25 or more battle-related deaths in a calendar year (UCDP, 2010). The case-description will focus on the conflicts involving incompatibilities over the Lebanese government (1975-1976, 1982-1986, 1989-1990), as well as the non-state conflicts. In order to clarify the scope of these conflicts, the larger non-state conflicts are identified and briefly explained below.

Israel versus Palestinian groups

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinian groups continued throughout the Lebanese civil war and claimed thousands of lives, which is attributed to the latter conflict. The conflict evolved around the territory of Palestine rather than the government of Lebanon. The Palestinian groups were Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (Suleiman, 1999). Notable confrontations are the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, the expulsion of PLO fighters from Beirut in 1982 and the heavy fighting in Southern Lebanon during the entire civil war. The Israeli invasion of 1982, in particular, caused many casualties (Hiro, 1993).

Israel versus Shia groups

Israel and its proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (hereafter: SLA), clashed with Hezbollah and Amal in Southern Lebanon. The conflict was about the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. However, the government of Lebanon was no party to the conflict. The conflict resulted in hundreds of deaths between 1985 and 1990. Noteworthy, the conflict shortly continued after the 1989 Taif agreement, ending the civil war, had been signed and ratified (Hanf, 2015).

Palestinian infighting

The fighting of rivalling Palestinian groups throughout Lebanon can be held accountable for hundreds of deaths. Especially in refugee camps, the high concentrations of different Palestinian groups resulted in violent confrontations about external support (Suleiman, 1999). Some groups were supported by Syria, while others were supported by Iraq and Libya, which caused friction. Confrontations also took place between the groups receiving external support and the more independent groups of the PLO (e.g. Fatah). Most notable were the confrontations between Fatah and the Fatah Revolutionary Council during the 1980s (Wege, 1994).

War of the Camps

In the War of the Camps, the Shia Amal movement fought against Palestinian groups from 1985 onwards. Although the Palestinian groups received support from the PSP of Jumblatt, the incompatibilities did not revolve around the Lebanese government. Amal besieged and destroyed the Palestinian refugee camps. The massacres caused thousands of battle-related deaths, mostly Palestinian refugees. The PLO was able to retain some control in the camps (Peteet, 2005).

Maronite infighting

The right-wing Christian groups also engaged in fighting, which resulted in a thousand deaths. At times, the infighting can be regarded as a state-based conflict over government power. Notable events are the fighting between the Geagea and Hobeika factions of the Lebanese Forces the clashes between the Zgharta Liberation Army (hereafter: ZLA) and National Liberal Party (hereafter: NLP) in 1978, the crushing of the Tigers militia by the Phalangist in 1980, and clashes between the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army of General Aoun in 1989 and 1990 (Hanf, 2015).

Amal versus Hezbollah

Fighting occurred between the two dominant Shiite groups, Amal supported by Syria and Hezbollah backed by Iran. The conflict can be regarded as a power struggle, since both groups wanted to dominate the Shiite sect in Lebanon, as well as a proxy conflict for Syrian and Iran interests in Lebanon. Heavy confrontations took place between 1998 and 1990, taking the lives of hundreds of people in battle-related events (Hadad, 2006).

4.2.4 Operationalising the “government”

Before the case-description is offered, attention is paid to operationalising the “government” in the Lebanese civil war. In general, the government of a state can be operationalised as the party or group controlling the capital. In this case, militias of the Christian-rightist camp controlled East Beirut, while militias of the Muslim-leftist camp controlled West Beirut. The area under control of the Lebanese Army was reduced to the presidential palace in Baabda. Throughout the conflict different factions controlled sections of the capital.

In a strict sense, it could be argued that Lebanon lacked a government for many years, dismissing the Lebanese civil war as a state-based conflict. However, although the government might not have exerted complete control over the capital, none of the warring factions called into question the existence of the central state or proclaimed an alternative administration. Only shortly, the failure to elect a new president led to the unique situation of two governments from October 1988 to September 1989. No faction denied or claimed to replace the legitimate government throughout the rest of the conflict. This exceptional situation makes it possible to analyse the state dimension of the conflict.

Another challenge is posed by the Lebanese context in terms of establishing ‘who’ the Lebanese government was. In most political systems, the political party with a cabinet majority controls the state apparatus. However, the Lebanese confessional system led warring factions to be part of the same cabinet, while their militias were involved in inter-sectarian clashes. This is complicated by the fact that most political parties had established militias to fight other militias, regardless of their seats in cabinet. This complicates the analysis at times, as the analytical framework presupposes a strict division between state and non-state actors.

The consociational political system complicates to pinpoint ‘who’ the government. During the Lebanese civil war, the president held considerable powers. One of the incompatibilities of the civil war being that the presidency needed to be assigned to the Maronite Christian. In order to gain a workable operationalisation, the focus will be on the political party of the President. This enables the researcher to analyse the state perspective. It also reflects the reality of the situation of the civil war, since Muslim-leftist camp were challenging the Christian-rightist dominance of the state apparatus.

4.2.5 Sources

The case study is based on secondary literature and analysis of primary sources, such as documentaries and newspapers. Additionally, interviews have been conducted with 2 scholars, 2 senior policy-makers and 1 practitioner to gain insight on the course of the conflict. These insights are mostly used to strengthen the analysis.

The literature on the Lebanese Civil War is extensive. Different perspective are offered on the causes of the conflict, the driving factors, but mostly on who is to blame. The sequence of sub conflicts makes the Lebanese civil war complex. The spiral of violence makes it even harder to distinguish action from reaction, provocation from acts of retaliation. The conflict polarised the Lebanese community, which reinforces the idea that there are two sides of the story. An attempt is made to capture all these nuances.

Figure 3: Violent clashes in Beirut (Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013)

Figure 4: Violent clashes in Lebanon (Source: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013)

4.2.6 Phases of the conflict

4.2.6.1 Prologue

Since 1943, Lebanon's independence was characterised by alternating periods of political turmoil. In 1952 a major political crisis occurred, a short-lived armed conflict took place in 1952, and a series of crises from 1962 onwards culminated in the Civil War of 1975. All crises – except for the armed conflict of 1952 – can be linked to a change stemming from regional politics, which highlights the external dimension of these crises.

1943 Independence

After World War II, the French dominance in Lebanon declined due to military defeats and rising Arab nationalism (Haugbolle, 2010, p. 8). In March 1943, the Lebanese constitution was restored and the national independence was declared based on the National Pact. This pact held several compromises: the Muslim political leaders agreed to abandon all demands for unification of Lebanon with Syria to recreate the Greater Syria of the past, while the Christian leaders agreed to renounce dependence on any foreign ties and acknowledged Arabic as the official language and identity (ibid., p. 11). The French would not leave Lebanon until December 1946.

The confessional system

The mediation between the two parties resulted in the establishment of a confessional system. It stipulated that the Lebanese president should be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the parliamentary president a Shia Muslim and his deputy a Greek Orthodox Christian (Hiro, 1993, p. 5). Based on the last census of 1932, the political representation would be redistributed with the ratio of six Christian Parliamentary seats to five Muslim ones. The first parliament along these lines came into effect in August 1943 (ibid.). This distribution of political authority proportionally among religious communities came to be known as confessionalism.

In 1943, the first president of the independent Lebanese republic, Bechara El Khoury, was elected. Charges of corruption and declining popular support led to his resignation in 1953, and gave way to Camille Chamoun, who headed the Progressive Socialist Party. Chamoun showed more interest in foreign than domestic affairs (Rasler, 1997, p. 53). In 1956, Arab nationalism revived, amongst other in Lebanon, when the Egyptian president Gamel Abdel

Nasser managed to nationalise the British-French Suez Canal Company. The rise of Arab nationalism can partially be explained by the strong desire to eliminate the influence of Western powers and fill the regional power vacuum with a strong Arab political entity (Hanf, 2015, p. 143).

After the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, Egypt was attacked by Britain, France and Israel, which increased Anti-Western feelings in Lebanon, except amongst the Maronite Christians (Jankowski, 2002). Muslim politicians pressured Chamoun to cut-off relations with Britain and France. Instead, Chamoun subscribed to the 1957 Eisenhower doctrine, along with Nuri al Said, the prime minister of Iraq. At that time President Eisenhower promised economic and military aid to Middle Eastern states, who sought protection from the aggression of any nation controlled by international communism. This doctrine aimed to undermine Nasser, who maintained close ties with Moscow (Yagub, 2004).

1958 crisis

In 1957, President Chamoun became increasingly intolerant of opponents and tried to secure a second term of office by amending the Constitution (El Khazan, 2000, p. 19). By interfering with the election process, several community leaders lost their parliamentary seats, amongst others Kamal Jumblatt. This led to disapproval of the Muslim Socialist National Front (hereafter: SNF) and a great part of his Muslim followers. The formation of the United Arab Republic (hereafter: UAR) in 1958, uniting Egypt and Syria, increased the popular support of the SNF (ibid.). When Nasib Metni – a liberal Christian and critic of President Chamoun – was assassinated, anti-government riots occurred in Tripoli. In Lebanon, SNF followers openly criticised the president and organised a three day strike. The SNF leaders urged Chamoun to step down and prevent a civil crisis. Instead, he declared a state of emergency (ibid.).

On the 12th of May 1958, the civil war breaks out. Lebanon was about to fracture along sectarian lines. The pro-Western followers of Chamoun opposed the nationalist-leftist followers of Jumblatt, while the 8.000 armed forces of General Fuad Chebab (commander of the Lebanese Army) remained neutral. Barricades were established in Beirut. Jumblatt established local administrations in the Shouf region and gathered Druze militia to capture Beirut in late June. The fighting’s with the Maronite militia were intense, and the Lebanese Army had to intervene several times to end it (Hiro, 1993, p. 5).

On the 14th of July 1958, King Faisel of pro-Western Iraq was overthrown and executed by republican army officers. Chamoun lost his strongest ally in the region and requested military assistance from Washington, invoking the Eisenhower doctrine. Around 10.000 marines backed by another 35.000 man on the Sixth fleet were deployed “to preserve Lebanon's independence”. This would later be known as Operation Blue Bat (Yagub, 2004). The violence intensified briefly, before General Chebab was accepted as presidential candidate, and took office. The civil strife was brought to an end by American intervention and caused between 1.400 and 4.000 deaths (Hanf, 2015).

1958-1964

Hiro (1993, p. 8) argues that the 1958 civil war offered opportunities for socio-economic reforms,, since it temporarily disabled the political-administrative system. President Chebab tried to merge the Christian with the Arab identity of the country, and modernise the political- administrative system. His attempts failed due to the strong opposition of politicians and senior civil servants, who advocated maintaining the status quo (ibid.). The confessional nature of the Lebanese polity was not to be changed. Chebab did manage to enhance the infrastructure in rural areas, which created urban cities for the poor Shias (Rasler, 1997, p. 34).

1967 Arab Israeli War

Lebanon’s military interventions can be limited to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The defeat was less significant for Lebanon than it was for other Arab states, since it did not perceive itself as a defender of Arab interests against Israel or Western imperialism (El Khazen, 2000, p. 105). The founding of Israel in May 1948 did result into a large influx of Palestinian refugees, who built refugee camps in the South and the Beqaa valley of Lebanon. The 1949 agreement between Lebanon and Israel re-confirmed the international borders, which had been established in the early 1920’s. The agreement was respected by both parties, until the late 1960s, when the Palestine Liberation Organisation violated it (ibid., p. 131).

The successor of President Chebab, Charles Helou took office in 1964. The October summit of the Arab League endorsed the proposal for the United Arab Command (hereafter: UAC) for the Arab nations bordering Israel. The UAC was initiated by Egyptian president Nasser, who was accused of being reluctant towards a military confrontation with Israel (Pogany, 1987). In June 1967, the third Arab-Israeli war (i.e. Six Day War) placed Israel against an alliance of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Lebanon played a passive role and did not suffer any

territorial losses. Nevertheless, Lebanon was affected by its aftermath, when ten thousands of Palestinians fled from the West Bank into its Southern provinces. Even more, some Palestinians militiamen started using Lebanon as a base for attacks on Israel (ibid., p. 106).

The PLO armed presence

The Palestinians were represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), a political- administrative body established in 1964 (Shemesh, 1984). The Palestinians were labelled as intruders and perceived as a threat to Lebanon’s social stability and national security by the Christian-rightist parties (Zahar, 2005). In contrary to the Muslim-leftist parties, who advocated providing shelter to the Palestinians and reminded opponents of the Arab face of Lebanon, as laid down in the 1943 National Pact.

In December 1968, Israel retaliated as Palestinian commandos attacked an Israeli plane on the airport of Athens. The commandos landed on Beirut airport and exploded thirteen civilian airliners. The Christian political leaders organised a strike in Beirut against governmental incompetence, which led to the resignation of the Prime Minister Yafi. This shows that the PLO’s resistance movement had become an integral part of the political debate in Lebanon. The aggressive stance of Palestinian organisations was inherently different from the traditional confessionalism in Lebanese politics (Falk, 1969, p. 418).

A new government headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami took office in January 1969. Clashes continued to take place between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian commandos near the borders with Israel and Syria. In April, pro-Palestinian protests caused a state of emergency, and Karami resigned, stressing the impossibility to deal with the Palestinian issue without causing a division in the nation (El Khazen, 2000, p. 141).

1969 Cairo agreement

The October clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian commandos received strong criticism from Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Syria. President Nasser of Egypt offered to mediate between General Boustani and the Palestinian commandos (Zahar, 2005). The Egyptian mediation led to the 1969 Cairo agreement, which recognised the legitimate armed presence of the PLO, allowed them to administer the Palestinian refugee camps and establish armed units within the camps, and undertake operations against the Israelis from southern Lebanon, in return for respecting Lebanese sovereignty (Hiro, 1993, p. 11).

The Christian-rightist leaders immediately called for the abolition of the Cairo agreement, fearing a breach of the state’s sovereignty. Tensions between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian commandos increased. Additionally, Lebanese political parties used the clause of the Cairo Agreement defining the PLO could establish armed units, to legitimate the establishment of their own militia. Lebanese politics became increasingly divided. The Christian parties called for governmental restraints on Palestinian organisations, while the Muslim demanded focused on government protection from the Israeli attacks in the South (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 30).

Renewing the political arena

In august 1970, the ban on political parties with links to foreign organisations was lifted, which increased the number of Lebanese parties. Amongst others, the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, entered the political arena. The open political climate encouraged new groups to engage in political life (Hanf, 2015), but also offered foreign powers the opportunity to influence Lebanese internal politics.

The election of Suleiman Frangieh, a Maronite from Zhargta (South Lebanon), ended a twelve-year Chebabist reign. Chebabist elements were eliminated from the army and civil service, and the Chebabist military intelligence services were dispersed. This resulted, as later would be known, in the loss of valuable information of the Palestinian commandos. The election of Frangieh also predicted the return to the balanced confessional system. The city of Zhargta had strong ties with the Sunni-dominated Tripoli rather than the Maronite areas (El Khazan, 2000, p. 20).

Jordanian civil war

From September 1970 until July 1971, the Jordanian Armed Forces of King Hussein fought the PLO led by Yasser Arafat (El Khazan, 2000, p. 123). King Hussein succeeded in removing the PLO leadership and their headquarters form Amman. Thousands of PLO fighters fled to Southern Lebanon to regroup, and Beirut became their new headquarters. The PLO increased its anti-Israel raids during 1971 and 1972, causing an intensification of Israeli retaliatory strikes (Falk, 1969). The increased violence along the Israeli-Lebanon borders fuelled internal unrest in Lebanon.

In May 1971, the Lebanese Army fought the PLO forces for the Palestinian refugee camps based in Burj al Barajina and Shatila (Hudson, 1978). The militias of the Muslim-leftist parties choose to fight alongside the PLO forces: a coalition was created that would persist in the civil war that would erupt two years later. Although the Lebanese Army lifted its blockade of the refugee camps , the issue was not resolved. Militias of both sides sought to ensure more fighters, arms and ammunition. On a political level, President Frangieh had gradually adopted an anti-Palestinian policy with support of Christian-rightist parties, which increased the frustration amongst the Muslim-leftist parties (El Khazan, 2000, p. 128).

Parliamentary elections of 1972

With the rise of Arab nationalism, the popular support of traditional Sunni and Shia leaders increased, which made the Maronites more eager to establish Christian hegemony and disregard the National pact. These developments led to an alliance of anti-status quo political parties in 1972, under leadership of Kamal Jumblatt (Hiro, 1993, p. 13).

The new Shia leader, Imam Musa Al Sadr, changed the Shia politics radically in 1974. He criticised the government for its incapability of protecting Shia Muslims from Israeli raids in southern Lebanon, and established training camps in the Beqaa valley. The Shia’s were a socially deprived and economically exploited group in Lebanon. Sadr organised rallies and demonstrations to strengthen the Shia morale (Cunningham, 2011, p. 11).

President Hafiz al-Assad tried to exert influence on Lebanon to diminish the strategic opportunities of Israeli Defence Forces. However, the military strength of Lebanon did not improve, while the private militias grew stronger, and Israeli troops continued to violate Lebanon’s state sovereignty. The Lebanese Army recorded “1.4 Israeli violations of Lebanese territory per day from 1968–74" (Noam, 1983, p. 191).

October 1973 war

By 1973, the demographic changes favoured the Muslim parties: 54 per cent of the Lebanese population was Muslim. However, the balance of power between the confessional groups was not changed (El Khazen, 2000). During the October 1973 war, also known as the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon did not join the Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria in fighting against Israel. The war resulted in heavy casualties and paved the way for the peace processes, resulting to the Sinai Interim Agreement (i.e. the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement) and the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985).

The Arab coalition used the so-called ‘oil-weapon’ against Israel’s allies, which changed the international power play. The oil price quadrupled due to the oil embargo and the global production control of the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). Western states realised the impact of the oil weapon, and intensified ties with petroleum-producing Arab states. Meaning, preserving a Christian power structure in Lebanon was of lesser importance. Therefore, the Maronites turned to Israel for moral and military support (Hiro, 1993, p. 16).

In October 1974, the Israeli announced it would start regular patrols and place roadblocks on Lebanese territory to prevent infiltration. Two months later, the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila located in Beirut were heavily bombed. The Lebanese military was unable to take counter actions, and the Lebanese government resigned. In January 1975, a new cabinet was formed, which lacked the cohesion and power to prevent the final breakdown of the state (El Khazen, 2000, p. 205).

Economic climate

The post-civil war economy experienced rapid economic growth between 1946 and 1975. The limited natural resources (e.g. limestone, iron ore, and salt) resulted in a thriving service- based economy. The private sector played a central role in the economic development because of the non-interventionist governmental policy encouraging private sector initiatives. With the free foreign exchange system, trading, banking and financial facilities, Lebanon grew out to be a major commercial centre of the region (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

Regional crises

It can be concluded that regional crises have affected Lebanese politics from independence to the mid-1970s. First, the independence of Lebanon changed its relation with Syria, especially because of the economic separation of the two countries. Nevertheless, the historical ties of the two countries would be used to legitimise persisting Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. Second, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the creation of the state Israel led to a huge refugee influx in Lebanon. Third, the introduction of Nasserism in Arab politics in the 1950s directly resulted in the creation of the Independent Nasserite Movement in Lebanon in 1957. Fourth, the 1956 Suez War led to regional and international repercussions, which were felt in Lebanon. Fifth, the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 worried President Chamoun. Clashes between pro-Nasser factions and Maronites culminated in the 1958 civil war. Sixth, the Arab Cold War of the 1960s. The inter-Arab relations cooled due to

the power struggle between the revolutionary regimes (i.e. the Nasser regime of Egypt) and the conservative regimes (i.e. the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria). The power struggle led to extensive interventions in the affairs of other states, as seen in Lebanon. Seventh, the 1976 Arab-Israeli war and the establishment of the militant PLO. Eight, the military confrontations between the PLO armed forces and the Jordanian Army in 1970-1971 led to the relocation of the PLO headquarters to Beirut. Ninth, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the dissolving coalition of Egypt and Syria in the post-1973 period changed the regional balance (El Khazen, 2000, p. 104).

Some of the above mentioned regional crises were contained and did not highly impact Lebanese politics, while others led to internal disagreement and further destabilised Lebanese politics. Either way the developments stemming from regional politics is believed to have influenced the socio-political structure of Lebanon.

4.2.6.2 Phase 1: The Two-Year War (February 1975 – May 1976)

Context

The Lebanese civil war, which would fragment the Lebanese population, polarise politics, disintegrate state institutions, and destroy the economy, erupted in February 1975. Most scholars argue that armed clashes between the Phalangists and the PLO in April 1975 mark the beginning of the conflict (El Khazen, 2000; Khalaf, 2002; Rasler, 1997). Other scholars identify the confrontation between the Lebanese Army and Sidon fisherman in February 1975 as the starting point (Hiro, 1993; Salibi, 1976). The latter is identified as starting point for this research, since it reflects the moment at which a significant higher level of violence occurred and sustained.

Fisherman’s strike

On February 26, Sidon fisherman protested against the licensing of a large modern fishing company headed by ex-president Chamoun (Harik, 1982). The company would mechanise the fishing industry, and the fisherman feared that the granting of such a license deprived them from their sources of livelihood. The local mayor and demonstration’s leader, Maruf Saad, was assassinated by unknown assailants at the demonstrations (Abdelnour, 2002). The PLO immediately enforced its checkpoints. In various parts of the city gunfire’s and explosions took place, and the Lebanese Army was deployed in order to restore order (Al Balad, 2008). On March 1, the troops engaged in gunfights with Palestinian commanders. The controversy

of the confrontation centred on the deployment of the army against civilian protesters. At that time, Christian Maronites dominated the army’s command council. Other confessional groups perceived the army as a tool of power and social control of the Maronite president (Rabinovich, 1985).

On March 5, the Phalangist and National Liberal Party organised a demonstration to advocate for the continued deployment of troops in Sidon. Muslim political parties reacted with a demand of reforming the command council of the army, in order to guarantee impartiality in resolving internal conflicts (El Khazen, 2000, p. 274). The political polarisation had started.

Ain al-Rummaneh massacre

The Ain al-Rummaneh massacre, also known as the Bus Massacre, refers to a series of armed clashes between Christian and Palestinian militias in Beirut, which can also be considered as the clashes instigating the conflict.

On April 13, Pierre Gemayel, the head of the Phalanges Party, was attending the consecration of a Greek Catholic church in a suburb of Beirut, when armed men started shooting from a car (Hiro, 1993, p. 31). Militiamen of the Phalangist Party took the streets and enforced roadblocks, assuming that Palestinian commanders orchestrated the assassination attempt. A bus carrying (armed) Palestinian passengers was ambushed by Phalangist militias in retaliation. Armed clashes between Phalangist militias and Palestinian commandos erupted across Beirut. These incidents instantly caused fighting between the opposing camps in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon (El Khazen, 2000, p. 285).

By September, the militias had ensured control of strategic points and, in December, they started cleansing their territories from any hostile presence (Shehadeh, 1999).

Political war

During the Lebanese civil war, the Arab League played a limited role in negotiating peace. Technically peace negotiations were organised under the League auspices. However, individual powers, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia, were the driving force behind these initiatives (CFR, 2014).

On April 16, the Arab League pressured the warring factions into accepting a ceasefire, as the government was not able to end the fighting (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003). The Muslim-leftist camp advocated for political isolation and economic boycott of the Phalangists party by the

Arab world. This led to the resignation of the Phalange party and the National Liberal Party ministers on May 7. In parallel, Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, attempted to keep the conflict within a political context and discourage the PLO to take military action (Richani, 1990).

By now, the Phalangist Party enjoyed support from more than a minority of the Christian community. The Phalangists were increasingly perceived as the protectors of Lebanon against a hostile take-over by the PLO (El Khazen, 2000, p. 288). The Solh Cabinet began to disintegrate, especially after a speech of Rachid Solh, in which he stated the Phalangists were to blame for the Ain al-Rummaneh massacre and the confessional system needed to be restructured (ibid., p. 289). The political centre was decimated as the conflict continued and the moderate politicians started joining either the rightist (Jumblatt) or leftist (Chamoun) camp.

In May 1975, the PLO and Phalangist militias were fighting over the Palestinian refugee camp Tal-Za’tar, which resulted in many casualties (Hudson, 1978). Lebanese, Palestinian and other Arab officials gathered in order to defuse the violence – without any results. Frangieh resorted to his presidential constitutional powers by creating a military cabinet controlled by military officers on May 23. The establishment of a military cabinet and the use of presidential constitutional powers were both unprecedented in Lebanese politics (El Khazen, 2000, p. 295). The military cabinet was short lived: Nureddin Rifai served only three days as prime minister before resigning due to the strong opposition from the Shia, Sunni, and Druze political and religious leaders.

The Karami Cabinet

President Frangieh asked Karami to form a new government, which was formed on the first of July 1975. Defence and Prime Minister Karami managed to improve the strained relationship between the Phalangist party and the PLO (Hiro, 1993, p. 32). Six hours talk between Arafat and Frangieh, under supervision of Egyptian and Saudi ambassadors, led to a statement of the PLO, in which it assured it would respect Lebanon’s sovereignty. Leaders of the Phalangist and Palestinian militias continued to discuss their disputes. The Karami Cabinet succeeded in stabilizing the security situation for a short period of time. In July, the Beqaa village of al- Qaa’, a Christian village isolated in a remote area, was attacked (Al balad, 2008); the new sectarian (Shia) militia Amal was publicly acknowledged (Cunningham, 2011); and an American officer was kidnapped (Hanf, 2015). In August, the ceasefire of 16 April ended, and

political polarisation deepened, as the Muslim-leftist camp announced a transitional programme for reform.

By the end of August large-scale fighting broke out between the Zgharta Liberation Party and the Palestinian commandos backed by Sunni militias in Zahleh and Tripoli (Al balad, 2008). The Lebanese Army was deployed to intervene, but the killing of Sunni militiamen led the Muslim parties to withdraw their support, which paralysed the army (El Khazen, 2000, p. 298). Therefore, Karami sought the support of Syrian President Assad, who send troops of the Palestine Liberation Organisation based in Damascus to Tripoli. President Frangieh was not informed about the PLO troops crossing the Lebanese northern border, and the government became more divided. Meanwhile, Phalangist militias moved from East to Muslim neighbourhoods in West Beirut, and bombed the commercial district of Beirut (Hiro, 1993).

Foreign mediation

As early as September 1975, Syria attempted to mediate a resolution between Lebanese and Palestinian leaders through the National Dialogue Committee (Lajnat al-Hiwar al-Watani) (Rasler, 1983, p. 423). This committee consisted of twenty politicians and intellectuals from Lebanon’s diverse communities, who discussed the alternatives for political, social, and economic reform. Within these discussions, the leftist-Muslim faced the rightist-Christian camp. The former demanded reform of the confessional system, and the later demanded respect for state sovereignty, referring to the PLO’s armed presence. Both issues could not be resolved, but the discussion diffused some of the tensions. Syria played an important role as power broker in the committee, which reflects its increasing influence on Lebanon’s sectarian politics (Rasler, 1983, p. 424).

In October 1975, violence spread throughout the country. The hotel district of Beirut was ruined by attacks and counter-attacks of the different factions (Al Ablad, 2005). More fights took place in the suburbs of the industrial Mkalles area, which left many factories ruined. The fighting in Zgharta and Tripoli were neither settled. Meanwhile, abductions and murder of civilians based on their sectarian denomination continued to take place. The periodic massacres were most frightening (ibid.). The deteriorating security situation led Karami to form a security committee to restore law and order, and organise a sit-in in Sérail (El Khazen, 2000, p. 318). By the end of October, the Intelligence Chief of the Lebanese Army, Colonel Jules Boustany, organised secret talks between Palestinian and Christian leaders. This resulted in a Lebanese-Palestinian Pact, but the agreements were not put into effect.

In November, the Vatican envoy and the French presidential envoy visited Lebanon to influence the course of events (Henley, 2008, p. 358). Neither was able to spark the peace process. On 6 December a series of massacres and armed clashes took place in Beirut, which came to be known as Black Saturday. Phalangist militia started shooting in East Beirut and killed more than a hundred Muslim civilians, as a retribution for the murder of four of their militia commanders and the injury of a fifth. The massacres occurred while Phalangists’ Gemayel was visiting Syria to talk with President Assad (Rasler, 1983, p. 50). A remarkable visit, since a campaign had just been launched by the PLO and leftist parties to isolate the Phalangist party from Lebanese and Arab politics.

Karantia and Damour Massacre

In January 1976, Maronite militias blocked all access to the Palestinian refugee camps of Tal Zaatar and Dubaya. They also attacked the slums of Karantia and Maslakh, which led to the murder of 1.500 Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims (Al balad, 2008). After these attacks, the PLO moderates, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, decided to join the Muslim-leftist camp. It also led to PLO attacks on the Christian coastal towns of Damour, Jiye and Saadiyat. The Christian residents who had not fled these towns were massacred. The cycle of retaliation had taken off: Maronite militias captured Karantia and Maslakh, Sunni Muslim and Palestinian militias sieged Damour, Jiyeh, and Saadiyat in retaliation. The massacres led to a mass exodus of Christian and Muslims to areas under control of their own sect, as they feared retribution (El Khazen, 2000, p. 320).

Vital state institutions such as the Lebanese Army and the internal security forces collapsed as the violence spread across the country (Haugbolle, 2010, p. 40). Government offices were destroyed, prisons were raided, and residents of refugee camps were displaced. As a result of these disturbances, Prime Minister Karami resigned on 18 January (Hiro, 1993, p. 34). President Frangieh turned to Syria for help, who send a strong delegation to monitor the ceasefire, which went into effect on January 21. Meanwhile, the Maronite leaders decided to merge into the Lebanese Front (i.e. Christian-rightist camp), in order to improve the military coordination of the Christian-rightist militias. the Front started advocating for the partitioning of Lebanon and the creation of a Christian state (ibid., p. 35).

Constitutional document

In February 1976, Syria attempted to mediate a resolution of the conflict, and President Frangieh adopted the Constitutional Document after a visit to Damascus (Rabil, 2003, p. 52). The confessional system of the National Pact would remain intact, but the document would enforce Muslim-Christian parity in parliament, as it revoked the president’s right to appoint the prime minister. It also guaranteed electoral and socio-economic changes. The document addressed Muslim grievances by curtailing the presidential power – without undermining Lebanon’s confessional representation (El Khazen, 2000, p. 232). It also proclaimed Lebanon’s Arabism, while stressing it remained a sovereign state. Although Syria was able to influence the Maronite leadership, and had strong ties with the Sunni and Shia religious and political leaders, the conflict was not ended.

Rebellion within the Lebanese Army

Early 1976 political tactics and allies changed, but the possibility of military escalation was most worrisome. In January, Fatah, a fraction of the PLO, caused rebellion within the Lebanese Army. It started at the barracks in Hasbayya, and spread to other barracks across the country. The Muslim parties claimed it had support of the majority of the Lebanese Army, and renamed it the Arab Army of Lebanon (hereafter: AAL) (El Khazen, 2000, p. 332). The strategies of the ALL involved sectarian kidnappings and killings in areas under its control in the north, south, and Beqaa province. The creation of the ALL occurred at a time that Lebanese leaders were willing to accept a Syrian military intervention (ibid.).

On March 11, the resignation of President Frangieh was demanded by the Sunni Brigadier- General Aziz, which fuelled tensions at both the political and military level (Hiro, 1993). Two days later Colonel Antoine Barakat, a Maronite from Frangieh’s hometown Zgharta, declared his support to Frangieh. His example was followed by several Maronite majors. Barakat ended up creating the Army of Free Lebanon. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army led the troops and commanders to join the warring factions according confessional loyalties. The Army Chief Hanna Said was in charge of the remaining troops. On 13 March, two third of the chamber signed a petition which demanded the resignation of President Frangieh ‘to persevere legality and the effectiveness of constitutional institutions’ (Al Nahar, 1976).

Syria’s change of heart

By early April, the PLO continued to win territory at the expense of Maronite militias. The Maronites turned to Assad for help, who agreed to support the Christian-rightist camp. Assad reasoned that a radical Lebanon, in which the PLO was dismissed from its responsibilities, was likely to provoke Israel and several Western states (Salloukh, 2005, p. 16). In mid-march, Syria took several measures: the PLO military academy near Damascus was closed, the Syrian ports did no longer allow for the transfer of combat supplies and a PLO battalion was deployed to the PLO headquarters in Beirut (ibid.). Damascus took a hard line, since the escalation of warfare in the south might lead to an Israeli invasion. In the same time period, the PLO-leftist forces started the Mountain War in the Upper Matn region in mid-March (Hiro, 1993, p. 37). The military operations would expand rapidly to other parts within the next three months.

1976 election

On a national level, the presidential elections in Beirut caused commotion, as President Frangieh refused to resign. Chamoun and Gemayel supported his choice, since guarantees preventing a constitutional vacuum – should Frangieh leave the office – were not in place (El Khazen, 2000, p. 331). Jumblatt and Arafat demanded his resignation, and Arafat sought support from Assad to convince Frangieh to resign. Syrian President Assad favoured a situation in which the successor of Frangieh would already be known prior to the elections (Salloukh, 2005, p. 17). Damascus send three special envoys to negotiate the terms with Frangieh. Elias Sarkis was proposed as a candidate by the Christian leaders and Syria supported this choice. An amendment of the constitution was needed to allow an election six months before the end of Frangieh’s term, reflecting the extent to which Syria was able to influence Lebanese politics.

US-Middle East diplomacy

In April and May 1976, Washington send special envoy L. Dean Brown on a fact-finding mission to Beirut. In practice, Brown’s mission was to contain the conflict through avoiding a constitutional power vacuum, setting boundaries to a Syria’s military intervention and preventing spill-over effects onto the regional level (El Khazen, 2000, p. 342). The US diplomacy also led to the red line agreement between Syria and Israel. This agreement laid down several agreements regarding the deployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon along a line

east from Sidon toward the east of the Beqaa valley. It also limited the presence of Syrian brigades on the Beirut-Damascus Highway and the deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon (Salloukh, 2005).

In mid-May 1976, the international community realised that President Assad was going to intervene, and the USSR started to pressure Syria should not intervene. France ended Assad’s dilemma by offering to send troops on May 22. The return of a Western power in Lebanon was seen as extremely undesirable, and Assad decided to act (Salloukh, 2005). He assured Washington that it wished to stabilise Lebanon, and the intervention would not threaten the security of Israel. On the night of May 31, Assad deployed Syrian troops into Lebanon, which heralded a new phase.

State perspective

The majority of the fighting took place between the Christian parties allied with the government, and the PLO supported by a coalition of Lebanese political parties. The city of Beirut was divided. The Lebanese Army and the Christian parties controlled East Beirut, while the Palestinian organisations had effective control of West Beirut. The political centre was decimated as the conflict evolved and the moderate politicians started joining either the rightist or leftist camp (El Khazen, 2000). By the end of 1975, the state of Lebanon would be divided into these two camps.

The Christian-rightist camp sought to preserve the confessional system, claiming it would bring political stability. It advocated for the evacuation of PLO fighters to other Arab nations. The PLO used south Lebanon to launch operation on Israel. Christian leaders feared that Lebanon’s independence was threated. The large influx of Sunni Muslim Palestinians allying with the Sunni Muslim community also turned the Christians into a minority, which they feared would result into a loss of political resources. The Muslim-leftist camp sought political reform to establish an equal representation in Lebanon’s parliamentary system and the demise of sectarianism throughout the entire political system. It supported accommodating Palestinians in Lebanon, calling into memory the Arab face of the nation. However, the aim of their solidarity was to change the political system by stressing the Palestinians had shifted the Christian-Muslim balance (Zahar, 2005).

The Palestinian issue can be described as Lebanon’s most divisive domestic issue (El Khazen, 2000). The Palestinian organisations were perceived as a threat to the state’s sovereignty by the Christian-rightist parties. President Frangieh decided to engage in talks with Arafat and pressured him into making a statement, assuring that the PLO will respect Lebanon’s sovereignty (Hiro, 1993). Frangieh reasoned it would “comfort” the Christian-rightist parties and result in a return to calmer waters. However, the level of violence was on the rise and the government failed to stabilise the situation. Sectarian kidnappings and killings continued to take place and pressured the government to prevent sectarian violence from escalating.

A new cabinet was created by Prime Minister Karami in July 1975. It can be argued that the cabinet formation was a direct result of Syrian influence on President Frangieh rather than the outcome of a negotiated settlement. In 1973, President Assad had intervened in Lebanese politics for the first time. By 1975, he was able to influence the course of the political process. This is reflected by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and General Jamil to Beirut to pressure Frangieh into disassembling the military government he had created in May 1975. This cabinet only lasted for three days, after which Karami created the new cabinet (Hanf, 2015).

Another example of Syrian influence on the Lebanese government is the Constitutional Document, which President Frangieh adopted after a visit to Damascus. Although the Christian leaders publicly approved the document, it disapproved of the many concessions the Christian community had to make. The Muslim community had more to gain, since several provisions addressed reassessing the balance of confessional representation. Overall, the document addressed Muslim grievances without changing the confessional nature of the political system, which satisfied the Christian parties. The progress was derailed by a rebellion within the Lebanese Army (El Khazen. 2000).

President Frangieh, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army, decide to deploy several troops to intervene in August 1975. The death of Sunni militiamen led to heavy criticism of the Muslim-leftist political parties. The deployment of the army by the Maronite president was interpreted as an act of oppression against the Sunni Muslim community. This not only resulted in sectarian clashes, the government was reticent to deploy the army throughout the rest of the phases, fearing it would fuel sectarian tensions (Hanf, 2015).

Non-state perspective

The heavy fighting between Phalangist militia and Palestinian organisations took place in the suburbs of Beirut, including the Palestinian refugee camps. Both sides reasoned it could increase its territory, since the Lebanese army was divided and refused to intervene (Hanf, 2015). The militias established illegal checkpoints to disrupt movement of adversaries. The fighting ended with the Phalangist taking control of the refugee camps in the northeast suburbs of Beirut. The Christian cities located south of Beirut, such as Damour, were taken by Palestinian and allied Lebanese militias. Atrocities were committed by both the rightist and leftist camp (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

Abductions and murder of civilians based on their sectarian denomination by the different factions became common practice (Hanf, 2015). The capital became increasingly segregated between East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut. The militias adopted a strategy of retaliation to deter their adversaries from initially attacking. It must be noted that the militias held different views about the solution to the internal struggle: the Christian-rightist militias argued a military intervention against the Palestinian organisations would stop the process of disintegration, while the Sunni-Leftist parties did not support such an intervention (Hiro, 1993). The differing views combined with the cycle of retaliation offers an explanation for the continuous fighting.

The Conceptual Document was Assad’s peace initiative, who sought to satisfy the Muslim leaders and strengthen its ties with the Christian leaders. The progress was derailed by the rebellion within the Army orchestrated by Fatah leader, Khalil Al Wazir. The dissident Sunni Muslim groups created the Lebanese Arab Army. The PLO considered the document as an attempt to restrain its political and military actions. The PLO had already started high-level talks with Egypt, which aggravated its relations with Syria, to counter these developments. The failure of the Constitutional Document changed the dynamics of the war. Any political or military action from the PLO (or its Lebanese allies) to escalate the conflict would be interpreted by Assad as an act against Syria (El Khazen, 2000, p. 296).

In October 1975, peace talks between PLO officials and Christian politicians and intellectuals attempted to resolve the tensions between the Palestinian and Phalangist militias. The warring parties joined these two-day talks, which resulted in a draft ‘Lebanese-Palestinian Pact’. The pact demanded an immediate ceasefire, a resolution of the conflict through dialogue, an end of the media campaigns (i.e. propaganda) by all parties, and the establishment of a follow-up

committee. The PLO officials agreed to the pact, but the agreements were never put into effect (El Khazen, 2000). The peace talks merely served as a diversion to gain time to strengthen their troops. If the talks were intended to end the war and neutralise increasing Syrian influence, the militias would have realised the pact would not sustain without Syria’s backing and would have invited Syrian officials to the table (ibid.).

4.2.6.3 Phase 2: The Syrian Hegemony (June 1976 – February 1978)

Context

The Palestinian-Syrian war

In January 1976, the Syrian proposal to restore the limits of the Palestinian armed presence was supported by Maronites and many conservative Muslims, but rejected by the Palestinian organisations and their leftist allies (Sorby, 2011). At this point, Syria’s military intervention was limited to deploying Palestinian fighters under its control.

The PLO-Leftists attempted to prevent a siege of the Tel al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp by capturing several Christian villages in the Upper Matn region in March 1976 (Al Hayat, March 29). The opening of a new front by Palestinian commanders exercised military pressure on the Christian-rightist militias (Hiro, 1993) and would be used by the Syrian government to legitimate its intervention (Weisburd, 2010). In June 1976, Syria deployed Palestinian units under its control and its own troops to Lebanon. The Syrian government claimed it responded to appeals from Christian villagers under attack by the PLO-Leftists (ibid.).

In July 1976 the fighting between Christian-rightist militias and PLO-Leftist forces intensified (Shemesh, 1984). Although Syrian forces needed to become familiar with the terrain at first, the tide turned for the Christian-rightist militias, who severely harmed the Muslim enclaves within the Christian territory (Abraham, 1996, p. 69). The decision can still be perceived ill conceived, as Syrian forces suffered many casualties. Moreover, the Syrian siding with the Christian parties provoked outrage throughout the Arab world. Despite these military and diplomatic failures, Syria decided to intensify its attacks on the Palestinian-Leftist forces (Rolland, 2003).

Tel al-Zaatar massacre

With the breakdown in authority of the Lebanese government, the Christian-rightist militias were able to captured and destruct Tel al-Zaatar on August 12. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (hereafter: UNRWA) the Palestinian refugee camp housing approximately 50.000-60.0000 refugees in northeast Beirut (Halaf & Khoury, 1993, p. 253). Cobban (1985, p. 142) estimates that “1.500 camp residents were killed in one day, and a total of 2.200 were killed throughout the attacks”. The PLO housed the survivors in the sieged Christian town of Damour.

The Tel al-Zaatar massacre would result into a cease-fire between Syria and the Palestinian- Leftist forces, since President Assad was strongly criticised by (pro-Soviet) Arab states for his involvement in these massacres. It also caused internal unrest in Syria, since Assad was an Alawite ruler in a majority Sunni country (Abdelnour, 2002). Syria would temporarily break off its offensive against the PLO-leftist forces after the Riyadh Summit (see below).

Foreign mediation

On July 22, Libya mediated a Syrian-Palestinian accord, which led to an immediate cease-fire. It recalled the regularisation of the PLO’s armed presence in Lebanon, as laid down in the 1969 Cairo Agreement and the 1976 Constitutional Document. Assad also agreed upon an Arab League summit to discuss further measures (Hiro, 1993).

President Sarkis was inaugurated on September 23, who stressed the need for Syrian military intervention in his inaugural speech. Assad deployed troops to fight the PLO-Leftist forces in the Christian areas of Aley and Metn, as negotiation attempts of the Arab League had failed to pressure the PLO-leftist to withdrawal from these areas (El Khazen, 2000, p. 347). Syria was successful in expelling the forces from the areas.

Riyadh Summit

On October 16, 1976, Saudi Arabia gathered the belligerents to formulate a peace plan (El Khazen, 2000, p. 354). Representatives from Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the PLO participated in the talks and agreed upon an immediate truce. The peace plan proposed to replace the Syrian troops with a small Arab peacekeeping force. This grew into a large (30.000) Arab Deterrent Force (hereafter: ADF) consisting of primarily (27.000) Syrian soldiers and officers. De facto, the Syrian forces that made up the majority of the ADF were

already in Lebanon (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003). In this way, the Syrian military intervention was legitimised and financially supported by the Arab League.

The decisions were formalised during the Arab summit in Cairo, also in October, which placed the ADF under authorisation of President Sarkis. It also appointed a working committee of officials from Syria, Saud-Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait to support the president in restoring order (ibid., 348). President Sarkis would request renewal of the ADF's mandate a number of times due to the difficulties in reforming the Lebanese Army.

1976 ceasefire

By mid-November 1976, the deployment of the ADF signalled the end of a nineteen-month civil war, which resulted in 10.000 deaths (Hiro, 1993, p. 44). The Riyadh summit did, however, not resolve the following aspects of the conflict: Syria’s quest for hegemony, the Palestinian armed presence, the Israeli threat, and the domestic political conflict.

A period of national reconciliation started, as reflected by Jumblatt’s public acceptance of President Sarkis as the nominal commander of the ADF. The Prime Minister, Selim Al Hoss, selected eight technocrats for its cabinet. In South Lebanon, the Phalangists tried to hinder the return of PLO armed forces to the region (ibid., p. 45). The Syrian-dominated ADF troops continued to monitor the Palestinian refugee camps.

Syria remained involved through its ADF soldiers and officers. It made Chamoun wonder if the ADF troops were not simply another name for the Syrian troops (Rasler, 1983). President Sarkis visited Damascus in February 1977, and made a joint statement with Assad, stressing the importance of coordination between the two countries. The chiefs of the army and military intelligence were replaced by pro-Syrian commanders, which resembles the institutionalisation of Syrian influence on Lebanese internal affairs (Hiro, 1993). Furthermore, the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army went slow, and the mandate of the ADF was extended with six months, until November 1977 (ibid.). The mandate involved the implementation of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which was not supported by the Maronites.

Druze leader Jumblatt condemned the presence of Syria as sole power broker (Hiro, 1993, p. 46). He attempted to spark anti-Assad feelings in Syria, which he believed would lead to a coup. On 16 March 1977, Jumblatt travelled through a Druze village, when the car was attacked by gunman. Following the assassination, Druze militias murdered 177 Christian

civilians in several villages in the Chouf, and other areas in West Beirut (Al Anba, 1977). This reflects the sectarian tensions lingering underneath the surface.

South Lebanon

The Riyadh Accords officially ended the Civil War. However, one of its terms – the PLO armed forces need to vacate central Lebanon – caused unrest in the south. The gradual return of PLO armed forces to the south deteriorated the security situation in Lebanon (Hudson, 1978).

For a long time, the Israeli-Lebanese border was used by Palestinian commandos to attack targets within Israel (El Khazen, 2000, p. 361). The disintegration of the army had placed the border security in hands of the AAL in January 1976. The Christian-rightist militias set up their own security barriers. In order to strengthen these borders, Israel allowed Christian officers to work inside its territories. This was known as the ‘good fence' policy (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 97). The tensions between Palestinian and Christian enclaves increased with the massacre of Tel al Zaatar, which relocated Palestinian commandos to the south.

The 1928 red line agreement between Syria and Israel hindered the deployment of Syrian troops in the South (Rabil, 2003). The Christian-rightist militias collected information on Palestinian attacks and functioned as an early-warning system to the Israeli armed forces. In March 1977, the Christians tried to unite their enclaves, which provoked clashes with Palestinian commandos, who opposed the idea of a pro-Israel border security (Hiro, 1993).

However, Christian and Palestinian militias soon resorted to violence due to enduring disagreements about protecting the Israeli-Lebanese border (Rabil, 2003). The NLP’s Tigers militia declared it had been executing joint operations with Israeli armed forces against Palestinians (Al Anwar, 1977). Likewise, Israeli support had enabled Christian-rightist militias to take over the city of Khiam. The Palestinians retaliated with heavy air strikes. American mediation would lead to another truce between Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians on September 25 (Spiegel, 1986).

In early November, the ceasefire ended, as Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli targets led to Israeli air strikes on Palestinian targets (El Khazen, 2000, p. 362). The visit of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November changed the regional balance of power, since the sudden Egyptian-Israeli cooperation took most Arab nations by surprise (Jonkers,

personal communication, December 5, 2015). President Sadat was isolated in the Arab world, and he was assassinated in Cairo within a year.

In late December, a Phalangist newspaper demanded the resignation of Sarkis for placing Lebanon under Syrian occupation (Al Anwar, 1977). Anti-Syrian demonstrations in Beirut led to clashes between the Christian-rightist militias and the ADF. President Assad felt the Christian-rightist militias would not accept Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, and started supporting the PLO-leftist militias (Ellis, 1999). Palestinian Commandos increased their attacks Christian villages in the South (ibid.).

Syrian-Christian relations

In 1978, the mandate of the ADF was not renewed by the Arab League and President Assad pressured President Sarkis to sign a defence pact with Syria (Hiro, 1993, p. 51). At this time the strategic alliance between the Christian-rightist militias and Syria started to deteriorate, as reflected by the attacks on the ADF troops by the Lebanese Army in February 1978.

The Lebanese Army officers had a close ties with Chamoun. Therefore, the ADF stroke back by occupying the headquarters of the (Chamounist) National Liberal Party. The Lebanese Army quickly agreed upon a ceasefire on 11 February. Assad demanded the retirement of Colonel Barakat, and trials of the involved army officers. By now, Chamoun and Frangieh called openly for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and minor incidents occurred between Christian-rightist militias and the ADF troops in north Lebanon (Al Hayat, 1978).

Between February and June 1978, other incidents took place that reflected the confrontation between the Christian leadership and militias and Syria, which paved the way for the Hundred-Day War (El Khazen, 2000, 370). For example, Syria attempted to increase its influence at the Lebanese-Israeli border: a Christian enclave was attacked by pro-Syrian Saiqa, a Palestinian party that had not yet been active in South Lebanon.

State perspective

The rebellion within the army led to the breakdown in authority of the Lebanese government, and the rise of militancy of radical factions. The Christian-rightist camp fully supported President Frangieh, when he invited Syrian troops to Lebanese territory in May 1976. They reasoned that Syria would be able to impose a ceasefire on the Palestinians and protect from any attacks. Additionally, Christian leaders feared that the PLO’s military dominance would

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result in the Sunni Muslim community gaining political power (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003). A Syrian military intervention would prevent such a shift in the balance of power.

The military intervention led to heavy clashes between the Syrian forces and the Palestinian and allied Lebanese militias. Syrian pressure is believed to have led to the election of Sarkis as president, who was Syrian- (Hudson, 1997). President Sarkis made several attempts to negotiate a settlement of the conflict, which failed utterly (Krayem, 1997). Saudi Arabia initiated the Arab summit in Riyadh in the aftermath of the Tel al-Zaatar massacre. The summit called for a ceasefire and ensured the establishment of an Arab peacekeeping force. Lebanese political discontent existed with regard to the composition of the ADF, since it consisted primarily of Syrian troops. Thereby, the creation of the ADF legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Christian parties increasingly perceived Syria as occupier rather than saviour (Weisburd, 2010).

The Syrian government continued to enjoy support from President Sarkis, while the strategic alliance between the Christian-rightist militias and Syria started to deteriorate. It must be noted that two third of Lebanese territory was under control of a foreign power, and private militias (independent of government control) were controlling most of the remaining territory (Picard, 2000). By now, the role of the Lebanese government was reduced to the side-lines. Sarkis struggled with reforming the Lebanese Army. Therefore, he requested the renewal of the ADF mandate several times, as the ADF's nominal commander (Hanf, 2015).

The Riaydh Summit had resulted in the Cairo Agreement, which caused an unforeseen escalation in the South. The clause prescribing the evacuation of PLO fighters from central Lebanon led to a deterioration security situation in the South. President Assad pressures the Lebanese government to mediate between the warring parties, which resulted in a ceasefire for three months and ADF troops taking over the positions of the Palestinian commandos. Nevertheless, the militias soon resorted to violence (Rabil, 2003).

Non-state perspective

By the end of the Two Year war, Beirut was no longer unified, despite of five main crossing points, which symbolises the polarisation of Lebanese society at large. Beirut was divided into East (Christian) and West (Muslim) by the so-called Green Line. Militias of both camps made efforts to consolidate their territory.

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Differences between the PLO and Syria had grown wider. Both prepared for a military confrontation. Assad deployed Syrian commando battalions to Beirut, while Arafat sought to strengthen its relations with Egypt and started transferred PLO units from Egypt and Iraq to Lebanon. Both parties prepared for the military escalation of the conflict. The PLO chose the presidential election of Sarkis was not worth to incur the tensions with Damascus. Fatah shelled the parliament building to express its dissatisfaction, but not enough to block the election (El Khazen, 2000). The first Syrian offensive began in June and the PLO-leftist leaders declared its intention to halt the Syrian invasion of Lebanon.

The Tel al-Zaatar offensive changed the dynamics of the conflict in several ways. First, it turned the tide for the Christian militias, who could claim a decisive victory over the PLO in the fight for the refugee camp. The camp was seen as a thorn in their side, since it was a PLO- ruled camp located in the Christian East Beirut. Second, the massacre led to tactical changes on the PLO-Leftist front, which started coordinating their activities with the AAL (Abdelnour, 2002). Lastly, the Syrian involvement in the massacre was strongly criticised by the Arab world and caused internal dissent. Assad was an Alawite ruler in a majority Sunni country. This resulted in a cease-fire in his war on the PLO and Lebanese allies (ibid.).

Early settlements of the conflict failed because of the militia’s diverging motivations (Krayem, 1997). The Christian-rightist militias gradually strengthened their position, awaiting favourable regional developments to impose its own goals. The PLO-Leftist militias were dependent on the Palestinians and unable to initiate a political negotiation process in ceasing the civil war. Neither the Christian-rightist or the PLO-Leftist camp was interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations at this time (ibid.). The Riyadh Summit formally ended the civil war, but did not eliminate the underlying causes.

The PLO fighters expelled from central Beirut regrouped in South Lebanon, where they had established a quasi-state. It had been using the border region to attack northern Israel, which resulted in massive retaliation of Israel. The Israeli raids targeted towns and Palestinian camps in South Lebanon. The rural poverty and Israeli air and ground attacks brought in motion migration flows. The (predominant) Shia population ended up living in slums around Beirut. The Organisation of Communist Action Lebanon (OCA) succeeded in recruiting the Shia, whose traditional landowning families had been forced to flee the South, for their armed struggle (Reilly, 1982).

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The militias of both camps were highly dependent upon receiving foreign support. The Christian-rightist militias started to condemn the Syrian military presence and sought to strengthen their relations with Israel (Hanf, 2015). Especially in the southern region, Christian-rightist militias pursued to strengthen the border security with support of Israel. The Syrian regime strengthened its ties with the PLO, while its ties with the Christian-rightist militias weakened. This increased the confidence of the PLO-leftist militias, which motivated its leadership to attack Christian towns (Shehadeh, 1999).

4.2.6.4 Phase 3: The Israeli invasion of the South (March 1978 – December 1981)

Context

First Israeli invasion

The truce of 1976 led to a return to normalcy, except for those living in south Lebanon. The conflict between the border militias continued to take place. Israel supported Christian-rightist militias in their fight against the PLO-Leftist militias. The attacks and counter-attacks resulted in a large number of civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the Israel Defence Forces started deadly air raids, which resulted in a full-fledged military operation (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 97).

On March 11, 1978, Palestinian militants infiltrated northern Israel by boat and attacked a bus, killing 35 passengers (Al Anwar, 1978). Israel decided it needed to eliminate the threat of the Palestinian militias and their bases along the Lebanese-Israel border. On the night of March 14, Operation “Stone of Wisdom” better known as “Operation Litani” was launched, as 25,000-30,000 soldiers invaded Lebanon (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 98).

Israel took control of the area south of the Litani River. On March 19, the Israeli Air Force bombed heavily populated areas with US made cluster bombs. Christian border militias killed hundreds of civilians. Israel succeeded in occupying half of south Lebanon, which consisted of 10 percent of the Lebanese territory. Israeli troops started building roads and made Christian settlements economically dependent on Israel by offering them employment in Israel (Hiro, 1993, p. 52).

Foreign mediation

The Israeli military operation received strong criticism from the international community. On March 19, the UN Security Council (hereafter: UNSC) adopted resolution 425 and 426 (Esman & Telhami, 1995, p. 48). The first urged Israel to cease the fire and withdraw its

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troops from Lebanese territories, while the latter created UNIFIL (hereafter: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). The UN peacekeeping force had to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli troops and support the Lebanese government in restoring its authority. The Israeli troops were withdrawn on June 13.

UNIFIL positioned its troops along the Lebanese-Israeli border, where Israel had created a “security belt” along the 100 km long border (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 98). The buffer zone was controlled by the SLA of Saad Haddad, a Christian militia funded by Israel. Thereby, Israel had succeeded in eliminating Palestinian presence and infrastructure from the border region. It continued to exert influence by offering financial and material support to the Christian-rightist militias (Hiro, 1993, p. 53).

Hundred Days War

In April, 1978, fighting took place between the Christian and the Muslim Shia districts in Beirut (Al Hayat, 1978). President Sarkis was heavily criticised for deploying the ADF troops by the Christian leaders. Sarkis agreed to replace the Syrian with the Saudi and Sudanese ADF units along the Green Line (O’Ballance, 1998). He also agreed that the changing circumstances (i.e. the Israeli invasion and the UNIFIL posting) demanded a new agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese Government. President Assad pressured the PLO that the conditions of the Cairo agreement should not be changed.

Meanwhile, intra-sectarian political tensions sparked intra-sectarian violence in the Maronite community. Bahsir Gemayel sought to monopolise the power of the entire Maronite community. Frangieh left the Christian-rightist camp in May 1978 because of his pro-Syrian sentiment, which resulted in clashes between the Phalangists and the Frangieh clan in June. The massacre of the Frangieh family by Phalangists in Ehden sparked intra-sectarian violence. The Frangieh clan retaliated by murdering Phalangists in the Baalbek area (El Assed, 2008).

President Sarkis developed a security plan with the foreign and defence minister Fuad Boutros (Hiro, 1993, p. 57). Lebanon would be divided into three zones of which one was allocated to the Lebanese Army, another to the Lebanese Army and the ADF, and the last to the internal security forces and the ADF. President Assad was not consulted and disapproved of the exclusion of the Syrian ADF units from a certain region of Lebanon.

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The Syrian ADF units responded by heavily bombing Christian populated areas of Beirut on July 1, 1978 (Rabil, 2003, p. 55). This marked the beginning of the Hundred-Day War, in which residences, schools, hospitals, and factories in Christian strongholds across Lebanon were systematically targeted. By September the ADF had took control of a third of the Maronite heartland . The attacks undermined the position of President Sarkis in the Christian community, and he announced his resignation. Eventually, Sarkis retracted his resignation under pressure of Riyadh and Washington.

On October 6, the UNSC called for a ceasefire and urged the warring factions to reach national reconciliation (Esman & Telhami, 1995). During the October Bayt al-Din conference, President Sarkis sought a solution that would limit the Syrian power in Lebanon. In contrary to the Arab nations, who sided with Assad and reaffirmed Syria’s dominant role in the ADF (Ellis, 1999). The Follow-Up Committee – composed of representatives Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – was created to supervise the implementation of the conference resolutions.

Syrian-Christian fighting

In the following months, the fighting between Syrian ADF troops and the Christian-rightist militias continued (Hiro, 1993, p. 61). The Syrian ADF units left East Beirut only to reposition in the Beqaa valley. Nevertheless, the presence of Syrian ADF troops was perceived as a stabilizing factor. By November 1978, the troops were as large as the Lebanese Army and Christian-rightist militias combined. Assad used the threat of withdrawing the troops as leverage (Rabil, 2003). For example, foreign and defence minister Fuad Boutros resigned in mid-December 1978, under Syrian pressure, while two parliamentary committees were debating a defence bill.

In mid-March 1979, the parliamentary committees reached an agreement, and a new law was adopted leading to several reforms (Hiro, 1993, p. 83). The President would no longer be Commander-in-Chief and controlling the entire armed forces. Instead, the armed forces would be jointly controlled by the president and the cabinet. Additionally, a Military Council and a Higher Defence Council were established to examine the military aspects of the national defence policy.

In April, 1979, the Arab League extended the mandate of the ADF with three months (Pogany, 1987). The departure of the troops from Sudan, Saudi-Arabia and United Arab Emirates changed the composition of the ADF: only Syrian ADF units were left. The Syrian officials

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decided to align with Lebanese and Palestinian commanders to coordinate their military and political actions, which resulted in the Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese movement.

The relation between Syria and the Maronite Christian leaders did not improve. Christian- rightist militias continued to closely cooperate with Israel, and call for the creation of an autonomous Christian state (Hiro, 1993, p. 65). In May 1979, Prime Minister Hoss tried to mediate between Sarkis and Assad, who made several agreements. Assad would start transfer the tasks of the (Syrian) ADF to the Lebanese Army after a new cabinet was formed, in return, Sarkis would coordinate his policy choices with Damascus.

Israeli air campaign

In mid-May, intra-sectarian violence increased, as the Phalange militias clashed with Maronite militias. An attempt to end the fighting by merging the militias failed, and President Sarkin was asked to deploy the Lebanese Army to East Beirut in June. In parallel inter- sectarian violence intensified in the South, as Israeli General Rafael Eitan implemented a new Israeli strategy to attack Palestinian targets on the ground, in the air and from sea. This would leave the PLO militias to focus on defence and prevent armed attacks on Israel. Against this background, Prime Minister Hoss formed a new cabinet on 16 July, 1979, which took on the task of restoring stability throughout Lebanon.

The exodus of Palestinian fleeing the south alarmed Syria. Assad ignored the red line agreement with Israel and deployed Syrian air forces to the Lebanese areas under Israeli attack (Haley & Snider, 1979, p. 99). Syrian warplanes tried to intercept Israeli ones, which forced the IDF to scale down its air strikes. Israel continued to bomb targets from June to mid-November. The Israeli air campaign resulted in 1.000 casualties and the displacement of 260.000 inhabitants (ibid., p. 101).

Foreign mediation

President Sarkis organised a small-scale Arab summit in mid-September to deal with the crisis in south Lebanon. However, the resolution on the south Lebanon crisis was not adopted until the Arab summit of November 1979 in Tunis. The resolution called for pressure on Israel to withdraw and underlined the right of armed Palestinian presence in the area. It also allowed for the Lebanese Army to enter south Lebanon, but attempts to deploy the army in December and January failed (Hiro, 1993, p. 69).

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On 23 January 1980, the ADF mandate was extended for six more months, and Damascus decided it would deploy the Syrian troops more evenly between Christian and Muslim controlled areas (Pogany, 1987). In mid-February intra-sectarian clashes occurred between the Phalangist militias and the Frangieh clan in the north, and between the PLO and the (Shia) Amal. Nevertheless, Syria announced the withdrawal of its troops from the north, Beirut and the mountain areas (Rabil, 2003). The Palestinian and pro-Syrian Lebanese forces took over the positions.

National reconciliation

President Sarkis attempted to secure national reconciliation and formulated fourteen principles for the Lebanese state in March 1980 (Hiro, 1993, p. 67). The cabinet endorsed the Sarkis principles, but they did not impact Lebanese politics. The tensions between the Christian-rightist and the Muslim-leftist camp remained worrisome (El Khazen, 2000).

The failed attempt of national reconciliation led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hoss in July (Hiro, 1993). Gemayel capitalised on the political vacuum and sought to expand its territory in East Beirut. The intra-sectarian clashes between the militias of the Phalangist and the National Liberal Party in November 1979 served as a predictor for the heavy clashes in May 1980 (Picard, 2002). The skirmishes between the Gemayels and the Chamouns would result into bloody clashes.

The Lebanese Army failed to prevent the Phalangist attacks on the NLP’s Tigers militia in Zahle – a Christian community located in the suburbs Beirut. The attacks were part of Gemayel’s effort to consolidate all Christian-rightist militias under his leadership in the Lebanese Forces. Likewise, the Safra massacre or Day of the Long Knives occurred in the coastal town of Safra. At last, Gemayel and Chamoun succeeded in merging their militias, creating the Lebanese forces (Haugbolle, 2010).

Christian state

Gemayel launched the manifesto of the Lebanese Front (i.e. Christian-rightist camp) in December 1980 (Hiro, 1993, p. 70). The document communicated the Maronite position: if the Christian power structure was to be changed, a Christian (con)federation will be established within Lebanon. Furthermore, it stated that the Syrian hegemony was to be ended, and the permanent settlement of Palestinians was not be recognised (ibid.). The creation of the Lebanese forces and the guarantee of Israeli backing in case of a confrontation with Syria,

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seem to have encouraged the Christina militias to launch the manifest. At that time Syria’s decision to back Iran in the Iran-Iraq war had isolated Assad from the Arab world (Rabil, 2003, p. 64).

The battle of Zahleh/Zahleh campaign

In December 1980, the Battle of Zahle took place between the Lebanese forces and Syrian ADF units. The importance of the battle is twofold: 1) politically, in generating a series of developments that led to American involvement in the conflict; and 2) militarily, in forcing Syria to reconsider its tactical organisation of combat. Furthermore, the Lebanese Forces gained recognition of the international community, as it claimed to have protected the city from Syrian control.

The Syrian ADF units surrounded the town of Zahle in the Beqaa valley with 20.000 men. Inside the town were 200 militias of the Lebanese Forces and around 2.500 armed supports (McLaurin, 1986). The Lebanese Forces agreed to a ceasefire and the Lebanese internal security forces moved into the city to ensure its security. Early 1981, the Lebanese forces sought support from Israeli military advisors to strengthen their military posts in Zahle (Abraham, 1996, p. 117).

The battle of Zahleh broke out in late March, 1981. The Lebanese Forces sought to regain control over Zaleh, as it was a strategic location. It lies close to the most important north- south crossroad in Lebanon, which runs from Beirut to Damascus. The road could link the Lebanese Forces in the north to the SLA in the south-east (Rabil, 2003). The road also functions as the supply line from Damascus to the Syrian troops in Lebanon. The eight days of fighting took the life of 250 people and injured another 500.

Foreign mediation

The battle of Zahle caused frictions within the government: the majority of the Christian leaders backed by President Sarkis vowed for a ceasefire, while the other leaders backed by Prime Minister Shafik Al Wazzan opposed it (ibid.). The UN, US and France advocated for a ceasefire, while Israel criticised the Syrian hegemony and attacked bases of the PLO, the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL (Esman & Telhami, 1995).

Peace talks continued to take place, when Syrian ADF units infiltrated the hills located around Zaleh (Weinberger, 1986). The importance of the Battle of Zahle derives from the fact that

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Syria placed surface-to-air missiles in the Beqaa valley, which triggered the US diplomatic intervention. The US government feared the outbreak of an Israeli-Syrian conflict and deployed special envoy Philip Habib to end the battle. The Lebanese Forces recognised that the battle of Zahle could be used to increase international attention and involvement for the conflict (McLaurin, 1986).

In parallel, Arab nations ensured President Assad of military and financial aid in his fight against Israel (Pogany, 1987). Thereby, the military threats of Israel ended the Syrian isolation caused by its pro-Iran stance in the Iran-Iraq war. The Arab nations initiated peace negotiations between the Lebanese Forces and the Syrian ADF units, resulting to a ceasefire in June. This national reconciliation process was hindered by the Lebanese Forces, who continued to launch air raids on Palestinian targets with support of Israel (Pogany, 1987).

Similarly, the attempt of the USC to establish a ceasefire failed, as Israel continued air raids in mid-July 1981. After the cities of Sidon and Tyre were severely attacked, the Arab League Joint Defence Council assembled to make a public statement. The Arab nations condemned the Israeli aggressive attacks, and warned states that supporting Israel will lead them to take far-reaching measures (Hiro, 1993, p. 73).

Finally, the US special envoy Habib succeed to establish a ceasefire between Israel, Syria and the PLO on July 25 (Korbani, 1991). The Arab League would ensure Gemayel would consider Sarki’s fourteen principles of March 1980 (Pogany, 1987). Assad pressured Chamoun to withdraw from the military alliance with Israel (ibid.), which symbolised the return to Arab mediation to establish national reconciliation.

In late November 1981, Gemayel announced his candidacy for the presidential elections, which was opposed by Assad, considering Gemayel repeatedly expressed his wish of Syrian withdrawal. The relations cooled even more in early 1982, when Gemayel was being accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and meeting Israeli Defence minister Ariel Sharon in secret (Salloukh, 2005).

The Amal movement

In early 1982 in West Beirut, the Muslim-leftist camp worried about the rise of Amal. The main objective was to allocate a larger share of governmental resources to the Shia dominated southern region of Lebanon. Amal’s militia actively and successively recruited Shia emigrants in West Beirut, who fled from the south during the Israeli air raids. Until the creation of the

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Higher Security Coordination Committee in July 1981, Amal was not formally recognised as a political movement.

Amal continued to clash with the PLO-Leftist leadership over the holding of elections in West Beirut, which Amal saw as a step towards a partition of Lebanon. On April 13, fighting erupted between Amal and Leftist militias in south Lebanon, and the local elections were postponed (Cunningham, 2011). This reflects how the conflict also disrupted local governance practices.

State perspective

After the ferocious attacks on south Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Begin called upon President Sarkis to negotiate a peace treaty. The Lebanese government struggled to frame a response to the Israeli proposal out of fear for the reaction of Syria and PLO, who could isolate Lebanon from the Arab world. Additionally, the peace treaty might have sparked sectarian tensions. Instead, President Sarkis called upon the UN for a peacekeeping force for the area that Israel had occupied. UNIFIL was created to support the Lebanese government in restoring its authority in the south

The Lebanese and Syrian government agreed that the Lebanese Army should take control of the south. President Sarkis had tried to (re)construct an armed force of patriots on the basis of confessional parity. The troops did however collaborate closely with the Syrian Army from the start. In April 1979, the troops were deployed to the south – under protest of Israel and General Haddad. Until this moment, the south was controlled by the South Lebanon Army of Haddad, who had considered himself being part of the Lebanese Army. He objected handing over the south to these “unreliable troops” and proclaimed “Free Lebanon”. The Lebanese government made no further attempts to deploy troops of the Lebanese Army to the south, which enabled Israeli troops to exert their influence inside “Free Lebanon”.

The Lebanese government also struggled to respond to the clashes between the Christian- rightist militias and the Syrian ADF-troops. Whereas the Lebanese government had continued to support the Syrian government in previous phases, it now had started to distance itself from Syria. President Sarkis had turned down the defence pact with Syria and expressed his support for the Christian parties on the Palestinian issue (Hiro, 1993, p. 55). During the Bayt al-Din conference, Sarkis pressured other Arab nations to accept the replacement of Syrian ADF troops in Eat Beirut. He succeeded in replacing the Syrian with Saudi and Sudanese troops

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from the ADF. He also visited Arab capitals in search of a solution that would limit the Syrian power in Lebanon.

President Sarkis tried to negotiate national reconciliation with the warring factions. His failed attempts can be explained by looking at the underlying motivations of the Christian-rightist and the Muslim-leftist camp. The Christian--rightist parties focused on dissolving the Palestinian armed presence and the Syrian influence, which would weaken the position of the Muslim parties and strengthen their own. The Muslim leftist parties focused on reforming the political system, while its Palestinian and Syrian allies were still present, as their presence strengthened its bargaining position (Krayem, 1997). Sarkis was characterised as a president in office, but not in power (O'Ballance, 1998).

Lebanese Army was divided along sectarian lines and deployed in different areas, which continued to limit its effectiveness (O'Ballance, 1998, p. 82). The parliament adopted a defence bill leading to several reforms. One of the reforms stated that the President would share the control of the armed forces with the cabinet. This reform resulted from the complaints of former cabinet ministers, who could not prevent President Frangieh from deploying the army to Sidon. However, the joint control of the armed forces formed an obstacle in restoring order in south Lebanon. The cabinet was too divided to reach an agreement on deploying the Lebanese Army (Hiro, 1993, p. 83).

Non-state perspective

The third phase revolved around the intra-sectarian fighting in order unify the Christian- rightist militias, as well as the inter-sectarian fighting that occurred between the Lebanese forces and the Syrian ADF units.

A significant event, changing the dynamics of the conflict was the unification of all Christian- rightist militias into one organisation. Their motivation was that the central coordination would strengthen the Christian-rightist camp against the challenge presented by the Muslim- leftist camp, who had organised itself in the Lebanese National Movement. The Phalangist militia attack on the Frangieh Clan consolidated the alliance of Christian parties. All Christian-rightist militias were dissolved and united – with the exception of Frangieh’s militia (ZLA) (Collier & Sambanis, 2005).

The growing capacity and confidence of the Christian parties combined with the Israeli support and temporary weakness of the Syrian regime – motivated the Christian-rightist

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leadership to establish its military and political presence in the Zahle region in the Beqaa Valley. Syria interpreted the action as an attempt to undermine its position in the Beqaa and responded with heavy shelling. The Lebanese Forces had to retreat in March 1981 (Shehadeh, 1999). The Lebanese Forces continued to seek to protect the town of Zahle from Syrian control. It started a psychological operation to deter Syria from initially attacking. The Lebanese Forces also hoped the struggle would increase the international attention for the conflict and recognition for the militia itself. Israel might consider scaling up the financial and material support. They succeeded in drawing attention, as a series of developments led to American involvement in Lebanon (McLaurin, 1986).

Although it had caused a lot of damage to the Christian population, the confrontation with Syria slightly improved the military positon of the Lebanese Forces. They were convinced that they needed to eliminate the Syrian influence and that their salvation lay in close ties with Israel (Hanf, 2015).

4.2.6.5 Phase 4: The second Israeli invasion (March 1982 – February 1984)

Context

The Second Israeli invasion

In March 1982, American intel revealed the stationing of Israeli troops along the Lebanese border. Israel realised that the PLO problem in the southern region could not be solved independently of the wider conflict, and it became convinced a large-scale invasion of Lebanon was inevitable. Israel started conducting air raids in South Lebanon, which led to many civilian casualties. The conflict between Israel and the PLO continued to intensify from June to mid-September 1982 (Hiro, 1993, p. 81).

The assassination of an Israeli ambassador in London ended the 1981 ceasefire between Syria, PLO and Israel (Rabil, 2003). Operation ‘Big Pines’ was presented to the cabinet of Menachem Begin. This operation sought to create a 40 km buffer zone north of the border and extrude the PLO commanders, while avoiding encounters with the Syrian ADF troops. The alternative operation ‘Peace in Galilei’ needed US backing, as it sought to evacuate all foreign forces from Lebanon’s territory. The cabinet chose the latter (Hiro, 1993, p. 82).

On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon by launching land, sea, air attacks on 38 villages in South Lebanon, which killed 158 civilians and injured another 250 (ICTJ, 2013, p. 34). The

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Israeli army carried out mass arrests: thousands of people were detained in Israeli-controlled prisons between June and September 1982 (ibid., p. 35). The UNSC adopted resolution 508 calling for a ceasefire, and resolution 509 demanding for Israeli withdraw from Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002). The demands were completely ignored by Israel.

Syria suffered extreme air losses, as IDF warplanes destroyed 64 Syrian warplanes. President Assad approached Moscow for protection, who turned to Washington, which resulted in the deployment of special envoy Habib to intensify the peace-making efforts. On June 11, a ceasefire was brokered, ending the Israeli-Syrian fighting in the central and eastern regions. On June 12, a ceasefire came into effect between Israel and the PLO regarding the western region (Hudson, 1978).

The siege of Beirut

The ceasefire did not mark the end the Israeli invasion. The IDF had arrived at the gates of Beirut within one week of the invasion. The Green Line was seized, and the IDF divided West and East Beirut. The IDF backed by the Lebanese Forces tried to force out the Syrian and PLO troops from West Beirut in two waves of attacks (ICTJ, 2013). Additionally, the attacks on the Palestinian camps of Sabra, Shatila and Burj al Barajina failed as the PLO offered strong resistance (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985). The PLO’s morale remained high with Arafat traveling freely through West Beirut.

The Israeli army expelled President Sarkis from the official palace in Baabda (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985), while half a million Lebanese and Palestinian civilians remained trapped. The army adopted a strategy of starving the inhabitants of West Beirut to surrender. The supply routes for food, water, fuel and electricity were cut off, while intense shelling of cluster bombs continued. The Lebanese Army was instructed not to intervene and the blockade would last for nine weeks (Shehadeh, 1999).

Foreign mediation

The Arab League foreign ministers gathered in Tunis between June 26-27. The ministers declared that the armed presence of the PLO should be removed from Lebanon, and support was offered to the Lebanese government to exercise its authority (Pogany, 1987). The ADF´s mandate was not extended, and would expire late June, which unsettled the Muslim-leftist camp. The withdrawal of Syrian ADF troops and PLO forces would leave them in the hands of the Maronite-Israeli alliance (Hiro, 1993, p. 84).

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US special envoy Habib reached an agreement between Israel and the PLO on August 6, which included a plan for the evacuation of PLO fighters. Nevertheless, on August 12, later to be known as Black Thursday, Sharon ordered the heavy bombing of West Beirut with use of concussion and cluster bombs. IDF forces set up new roadblocks to prevent water, food or fuel entering the area. Israel was heavily criticised by the international community and pressured into accepting the US proposed PLO evacuation plan (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985).

The Lebanese government requested a 2.000 strong Multinational Force (hereafter: MNF) to oversee the evacuation of the PLO fighters to several Arab nations and Greece. On August 21, American, British, French and Italian troops arrived and the first PLO members handed over their weapons and left by boat (Pogany, 1987). Until their departure in February 1984, the MNF sought to assist the Lebanese government in achieving stability and ending the factional fighting (Frank, 1987). The war seem to have ended.

At the international level, US President Reagan proposed a Middle East peace plan on . The plan recognised the rights of the Palestinians and favoured Palestinian self-government with support Jordan. The Israeli Prime Minister Begin rejected the Reagan initiative immediately, while Arab nations felt supported in the wake of the Israeli aggression in Lebanon. The Arab League summit of September 1982 resulted in a similar peace plan, demanding the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territories it had occupied since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 (Siegel, 1986).

1982 Presidential elections

In the midst of the Israeli bombings of West Beirut, Bachir Gemayel had announced his candidacy (Hiro, 1993, p. 85). After Gemayel was elected president, he began formulating policies for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. He also visited the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, who asked him to sign a peace treaty. Gemayel stressed that he will not sign it without national consensus. He continued to advocate for the end of the Israeli occupation, and the dissolution of all Christian and Muslim-leftist militias (Picard, 2002, p. 122).

This was not to be: Gemayel was assassinated by a bomb explosion at the headquarters of the Phalangist Party on September 14 (Picard, 2002, p. 125). The Lebanese Forces arrested an anti-Phalangist of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which had close ties with Assad. The assassination sparked inter-sectarian tensions. On September 15, violating the terms of the

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agreement, Israeli troops moved into West Beirut and took control of it within a day (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985).

Sabra and Chatila massacre

In retaliation of Gemayel’s assassination, the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila were brutally attacked by more than 300 militiamen of the Lebanese Forces. In the first hours, hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians were killed, as the PLO commanders had been evacuated from the camps (ICTJ, 2013, p. 49).

By September 29, the international community succeeded to pressure Sharon into withdrawing from West Beirut (Hiro, 1993, p. 88). The Israeli troops were redeployed in south Lebanon. A critical report of the MacBride Commission held Israel responsible for the massacre, as it was an occupying power from the time its army entered West Beirut. This lead to the forced resignation of Sharon in February 1983. In subsequent months, a new wave of sectarian-based violence erupted in the Chouf and Aley regions (ICTJ, 2013, p. 50).

Amin Gemayal was elected president, who had a different conception of the conflict and the way to peace (Shehadeh, 1999). The assassination of his brother, Bachir Gemayel, and the brutal murder of 2.000 men, women and children in the Palestinian camps strengthened national unity (O'Ballance, 1998).

Re-establishing the Lebanese Army

President Gemayel attempted to re-establish authority of the Lebanese Army, which was needed to take over positions after the Israeli withdrawal. One of the first decisions of his Cabinet was the introduction of conscription. In light of the agreements on the evacuation of the PLO, Gemayel ordered the Lebanese Army to search for illegal Palestinians in West and South-Beirut. He defined illegal Palestinians as those who had arrived in Lebanon after 1948, which was estimated to be half of the 500.000 Palestinians (Dixon & Sarkees, 2015).

In mid-November, 1982, Gemayel visited the United States, France and Italy, and continued to adopt a pro-Western stance (Korbani, 1991). He was pressured to sign a peace treaty with Israel, but Gemayel did not enter bilateral negotiations and kept seeking a third party to mediate these negotiations. Late December, trilateral talks started between Israel and Lebanon under supervision of the US. President Gemayel demanded the Israel withdraw from

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Lebanese territory, while Sharon sought to keep several bases in south Lebanon and transfer authority to the South Lebanese Army led by Saad Haddad (ibid.).

Greater Beirut

In January 1983, President Gemayel managed to unite the capital into Greater Beirut (Hiro, 1993). He deployed 5.000 troops of the Lebanese Army to consolidate Greater Beirut, who managed to take control of East Beirut by March. Meanwhile, the Shia community condemned the pro-Israeli and American stance of Gemayel. The creation of the Islamic Amal Movement (IAM) in July 1982 occurred against the background of the searches for illegal Palestinians (Cunningham, 2011). The movement grew stronger as the searches of the Lebanese Army started targeting the houses of Shia immigrants. The IAM can be held responsible for several anti-Israeli and anti-American attacks, such as the bombing of the US embassy in West Beirut in April 1983.

Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty

The US presented a draft peace treaty to Israel and Lebanon In May 1983, which would end the state of war (Hirst, 2010). The draft treaty was not backed by Assad, who argued that it rewarded Israel for its military aggression in Lebanon and curtailed Lebanon’s state sovereignty (Rabil, 2003). He brought into memory the 1982 UN resolutions 508 and 509, demanding Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. On May 16, the Lebanese parliament approved the treaty (Al Anba, 1983), hoping it would lead to the Israeli troops to withdraw. Israel signed the treaty the next day.

President Assad was not the only one opposing the treaty. Several prominent leaders of the Lebanese Christian and Muslim community, such as Frangieh, Karami and Jumblatt, denounced the Lebanese-Israel treaty (Hiro, 1993). It resulted in violent clashes between the demonstrators and the Lebanese internal security forces (Al Diyar, 1983). The opposition unified in the National Salvation Front and demanded the resignation of Gemayel, the abandoning of the peace treaty, and confronting the Israeli occupiers (Hiro, 1993).

Emergence of Hezbollah

The establishment of Hezbollah in 1982 can be placed into the context of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the second Israeli invasion (1982) (Mackey, 2008). The primary aim of Hezbollah was establishing Islamic rule in Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2000). Another aim was the

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elimination of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory, which had been repressing the Shia community and threatening the Islamic order (Saab, 2008). The leading role of Iran in the establishment of Hezbollah can be explained by its historical ties with the Shia community, since the Safadi Empire in the sixteenth century (Harris, 2006).

Most importantly, the emergence of Hezbollah changed the division of Lebanese territory. Hezbollah filled the political-military vacuum in West Beirut and the Southern region, which had been created by the expulsion of the PLO armed forces by Israel (Owen, 2004). It must be noted that the organisation would not be fully operating until the mid-1980s.

Shia uprisings

Before the establishment of Hezbollah, the emancipation process of the Shia community had already been instigated. The Shia cleric, Musa al Sadr, had sought political and religious reforms for the Shia community in the 1960s (Mackey, 2008). Another development had been the establishment of the Amal movement and its militia at the outset of the conflict (Owen, 2004). In the early 1980s, Islamist Shia clerics gained influence in the Amal movement and its militia was created.

Mid-August 1983, a general strike escalated in armed clashes between the militia of the Amal movement and the Lebanese Army. Amal militiamen succeeded in taking control of West Beirut and the Shia suburbs in the south. Gemayel chose to deploy the Lebanese Army with support of the MNF to re-establish control in these areas. The Shia uprisings continued to take place for several weeks, and marked the entering of Shias into the political arena. Until now, the Maronites had been allying with the Sunnis in order to marginalise the Shias, and deprive them from a chance to rule (Cunningham, 2011).

The Mountain War

Besides the Shia uprisings, armed clashes took place in the Chouf Mountain (ICTJ, 2013). The Lebanese Forces entered the Chouf in June 1982, which resulted in clashes with the militia of the Druze (i.e. People’s Liberation Army). The Israeli army took a neutral stance, since Israeli Druze were represented in the IDF. During the peace negotiations with Israel, the Druze militia warned the Lebanese government that it would not allow the Lebanese Army to enter the Chouf without an agreement on their representation in government. An agreement was not reached, which allowed violence to erupt in the Chouf (Grosswasser & Cohen, 1985).

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The Mountain War started in September 1983 with the sudden withdraw of Israeli troops from the Chouf. The Lebanese Army was not warned, which left the Druze in hands of the Lebanese forces. Christians and Druze started fleeing their villages, as mass killings took place on a daily base (ICTJ, 2013). The Lebanese Forces were led by Samir Geagea, which received material support from the Israeli Army. The Druze received support from the pro- Syrian Palestinian factions, which received support from the Syrian Army (Hiro, 1993, p. 90).

The Mountain War resulted in the defeat and expulsion of the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army from the Chouf. Additionally, a high number of Christian and Druze civilians were displaced from Chouf and Aley villages. Lastly, the Mountain war, and the 1983 Beirut Barack Bombing in particular, would result into the departure of the MNF in February 1984.

National Reconciliation Committee

When the Druze threatened to take over Beirut in September 1983, the Multinational Force were deployed to restore order in West Beirut and the southern suburbs (Esman & Telhami, 1995, p. 48). This fuelled anti-Western sentiments amongst the Druze community, who condemned the military intervention of foreign troops that President Gemayel had asked for.

The Druze, Sunni and Shia religious leaders presented a ten-point charter that demanded decentralised authority, which would end the political sectarianism. On September 25, a ceasefire came into effect. In return, a national reconciliation congress would be organised based on the ten point charter and a National Reconciliation Committee was formed (Hiro, 1993, p. 93).

The national reconciliation process was hindered by the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing. The Islamic Amal Movement killed 241 American Marines and 58 French paratroopers with trucks carrying explosives (Al Amal, 1983). Subsequently, the National Reconciliation Committee gathered in Geneva discussing the Lebanese-Israeli accord of May 1983. Gemayel agreed it would not be should not be ratified and a replacement document would ensure the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

International pressures

President Gemayel’s attempt for national reconciliation would fail due to developments at the international stage. President Reagan discussed the Lebanese-Israeli Accord with the Israeli

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Prime Minister Shamir in mid-November. During his visit to Washington in December, President Gemayel is being told that the Lebanese-Israeli accord is not to be changed.

This increased tensions between the Lebanese Army, the Druze and Shia militias, which resulted in an armed conflict. Again, the MNF was deployed to restore order. Druze leader Jumblatt and Amal leader Berri demanded the president’s resignation, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the end of political sectarianism (Hirst, 2010).

Disintegration of the Army

In February 1984, Gemayel ordered the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese forces to take control of West Beirut and the southern suburbs. The Druze-Amal alliance drove out the Lebanese Army and re-established the Green Line dividing West from East Beirut (Gilmour, 1987). The decisive defeat of the Lebanese Army on both fronts demoralised the Muslim soldiers and resulted in the disintegration of the army along confessional lines. Additionally, Nabih Berri called upon the Muslim soldiers to defy the combat orders, which led to the desertion of the predominantly Shia Sixth Brigade to Amal (O’Ballance, 1998).

In response to the latest developments and the pressures for troop withdrawal by Congress, the US chose to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. The lead was followed by the other Multinational Force nations, Britain, France and Italy. The MNF departed without accomplishing its main objective (Hirst, 2010). President Gemayel defied Washington’s orders and denounced the Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty of May 1983. He argued that if he would have to choose between the treaty and national reconciliation, he would choose the latter. At this moment, President Gemayel turned to Syria for help (Hiro, 1993, p. 99), which results into the return of the Syrian hegemony.

Economic situation

Between 1982 and 1990, the intensification of the fighting resulted in a deterioration of the economic conditions. The poor financial situation accelerated emigration. After 1984, the nominal and real value of the Lebanese pound declined rapidly. The financial reserves of the Central Bank started to decline sharply. The government struggled with budgetary deficits and the rising inflation (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 22).

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State perspective

In this phase, the conflict has severely weakened the judicial, political and administrative branches of government (Shehadeh, 1999). The presence of the state’s security forces was limited in contrary to the foreign security forces. Syria controlled two-third of the territory; UNIFIL controlled parts of south Lebanon after the 1978 Israeli invasion; and Israel controlled the “safety zone” by the border with support of the SLA (El Khazen, 2000). After the 1982 Israeli invasion, the Lebanese government asked the MNF to oversee the expulsion of the PLO.

The Lebanese government struggled to return to normalcy, while international players continued occupying Lebanese territory. Sarkis was to be succeeded by Bachir Gemayel. The strategy of Gemayel was to assume office, demand the withdrawal of Syrian troops with the help of the Israeli army, who would withdraw its troops pending negotiations with the Lebanese government. The Lebanese Forces militiamen were prohibited from wearing army clothing. It was a first attempt to restore the authority of the Lebanese Army. The economic market resumed its activities and the Beirut seaport was reopened. After 21 days in office, Bachir Gemayel is assassinated. His brother, Amin Gemayel, was then elected, who adopted a different strategy (Shehadeh, 1999).

In 1983, Parliament ratified an agreement stipulating the withdrawal of Israeli troops, which was not signed by the president and, hence, not enforced. The Israeli withdrawal to southern Lebanon resulted in clashes with Amal in West Beirut and the Druze in the Mountain War. By February, 1984, the Lebanese Army faced disintegration and its authority collapsed. The demoralised soldiers began to join the militias or return home. The disintegration was a major blow to the government, since it perceived as the end of social cohesion in general. It suggested that ethno-religious cooperation was impossible. Thereby, questioning the peaceful coexistence of the numerous groups. The Green Line dividing West from East Beirut was re- established. Reagan announced the withdrawal of the American Marines from Lebanon, which led the entire MNF to withdraw. Gemayel had no one to turn but Syria (Hanf, 2015).

The lack of central authority also led to a deterioration of Lebanon´s public finances. Under President Amin Gemayel, the government experienced difficulties with regard to collecting income taxes. Although the government controlled the main port and the airport of Beirut, militias had started controlling the ports and major cities, and collecting the tax revenues themselves. In this way, the state’s economic capacity started to decrease (Sab, 2014).

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Non-state perspective

This phase witnessed heavy fighting between the Druze PSP and the Lebanese Forces in the Chouf mountains. The fighting resulted from the sudden withdrawal of Israeli troops from the region. Militias grabbed the opportunity to take control of the areas. The fighting lead to the destruction of Druze and Christian towns, mass exodus of Christian communities from the region, and the killing of hundreds of civilians (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

A similar observation can be made in West Beirut, where Amal and Druze militias took control of the area. The Lebanese Army was forced to withdraw from West Beirut, as the parties controlling it opposed the government. The civil strife between East and West Beirut was re-instigated (El Khazen, 2000). The militias were not only involved in inter-sectarian fighting. Intra-sectarian fighting occurred in both city parts, in particular in the heterogeneous West Beirut. The old ruling Muslim families argued over control of territories. Furthermore, Hezbollah had started to gain status in the Shia dominated regions of Lebanon – resulting in clashes with Amal over political control in West Beirut. In contrary to the Lebanese Forces, who managed to create a state within a state (Hanf, 2015).

The militias used the deteriorating economic situation by creating a parallel economy. They took over the basic functions of government in the areas they controlled, such as tax collection. Additionally, militias provided security and infrastructure to enable the conduct of commerce and other economic activities. Militias upheld custom duties and regulations on conduct of business, while providing internal security. In return they receive a percentage of their profits (Chesterman, 2001). In other words, the government maintained a financial role of in the economy, in terms of controlling the main port and airport, but its role in the daily economic affairs of the Lebanese people declined (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

4.2.6.6 Phase 5: The return of the Syrian hegemony (March 1984 – September 1988)

Context

1984 National Reconciliation Conference

After President Gemayel failed attempts of national reconciliation, he reached out to President Assad. In March 1984, the National Reconciliation Conference was organised in Lausanne. The vice president of Syria mediated between the Christian-rightist and Muslim-leftist camp. The warring factions had diverging perspectives and the proposals differed from the

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development of a federal system or new electoral and citizenship laws to the establishment of a senate (Rabil, 2003).

On April 9, 1984, the Lebanese factions declared a total ceasefire after nine years of fighting (Hiro, 1993, p. 111). In June, the Bikfaya agreement was reached. The agreement consisted of a security policy for Beirut, military reforms, and an oversight mechanism to assure the constitutional amendments of the National Reconciliation conference would be implemented (Picard, 2002).

West Beirut

In June 1984, the Lebanese Army attempted to re-take control of West Beirut, while the Druze and Amal militia had denied them access (ICTJ, 2013). West Beirut suffered from heavy fighting between Druze, Sunni and Shia militias and the security situation started to deteriorate. President Assad managed to enforce a ceasefire and developed a two-stage operation to take control of the coastal highway (Rabil, 2003).

In this period of time, anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments increased. For instance, the Islamic Jihad Organisation attacked the US embassy in East Beirut in September, after the US vetoed a UN resolution condemning the Israeli military presence in south Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002). Also, the leadership of Amal decided to increase the amount of attacks on Israeli forces (Hanf, 2015).

Israeli withdrawal

The September 1984 general election in Israel could have changed the political situation, since the new Israeli government decided to withdraw its troops from south Lebanon to the international border. It would continue to exert influence through the pro-Israeli SLA. In February 1985, the Israeli troops withdrawing from Sidon faced attacks by Shia militias. Clashes between Israeli and Shia forces continued to take place for several months. Israeli troops would eventually withdraw from the Beqaa valley and Tyre, but reinforced the security zone in Southern Lebanon (Spiegel, 1986).

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War of the Camps

The War of the Camps refers to the struggle for control over West Beirut, which resulted in heavy attacks on the Palestinian refugee camps by the Amal militia. After the MNF withdrew, Amal had taken control of West Beirut. A number of checkpoints were installed around the Palestinian refugee camps located in West Beirut (Shehadeh, 1999).

In May, 1985, Amal believed that PLO fighters had infiltrated the Palestinian camps. Amal felt their position was threatened, as the militia had only been able to take control of the camps after the 1982 PLO expulsion. This resulted in heavy fighting between the Syrian backed Amal movement and several Palestinian militias. Amal – supported by the Shia- dominated Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese Army – attacked the Palestinian camps of Sabra, Shatila and Burj al Barajina (Hiro, 1993).

By early June, Amal had destroyed Sabra and Shatila, and blockaded Burj al-Barajneh (Rabel, 2003). The Palestinian organisations had repositioned in the Chouf and attacked the southern suburbs of Beirut, the home base of Amal’s leadership. Meanwhile, Lebanese and Syrian officials worked on the Damascus Plan that would provide a solution to the deteriorating security situation in West Beirut. Syrian troops would eventually stop the attacks on the Palestinian refugee camps (ibid.).

Hijacking of TWA Flight 847

Mid-June 1985, regional tensions increased as militia of Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad hijacked a Trans World Airways plane. The hijackers demanded the release of 753 Shia Muslims from the Israeli Atlit prison. The aircraft continued to shuttle between Beirut and Algiers for negotiations. Syrian intervention ended the hostage taking on June 30 (ICTJ, 2013).

During the hijacking, Nabih Berri turned into a persuasive communicator, who succeeded in attracting extensive media coverage. Thereby, the militias were able to establish recognition for the Shia cause, gain support for their demand of releasing the Shia prisoners from Israeli detention, and strengthen the Shia political power in the Middle East (Brown, 1990).

Tripartite Accord

In July 1985, President Assad organised a summit in Damascus to accelerate the national reconciliation process. Political and religious leaders of the Druze, Sunni and Shia communities attended the summit. Earlier this month, Berri and Jumblatt had taken the

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initiative to launch the National Union Front (NUF), advocating replacing the sectarian structure with a secular system. This would have negatively impacted the relationship with Syria (Hiro, 1993, p. 118). Therefore, the time arrived for Syria to regulate the conflict in its own best interests.

The attempt to pressure the Lebanese political leaders into adopting a reconciliation plan failed, and Assad choose to focus on the three major militias (Weinberger, 1986). In September, a reconciliation meeting was arranged for Berri (Amal), Jumblatt (Progressive Socialist Party) and Hobeika (Lebanese Forces) to negotiate a peace settlement. The warring factions signed the Tripartite Accord on December 28, which demanded an immediate ceasefire and an official proclamation of the end of the state of war within one year. (Shehadeh, 1999).

More specifically, the agreement called for a new government, the number of parliamentary seats would be redistributed more evenly among the confessional groups. The militias would be disarmed and disbanded. The Lebanese internal security forces and the Syrian army would take over control, while the Lebanese Army would withdraw to the barracks and militias would be disbanded (Abul Husn, 1998, p. 105). Overall, the agreement managed to assure Lebanon’s unity, as it rejected all partition or political decentralisation plans (Hanf, 2015).

Geagea-Hobeika conflict

The Tripartite Accord was opposed by the Command Council of the Lebanese forces headed by Geagea, who demanded that the transitional period would be twenty instead of three years. Hobeika was heavily criticised for signing the agreement, since the Lebanese Forces Command Council had been divided on the issue (Shehadeh, 1999).

The intra-Maronite tensions aggravated into intra-Maronite fighting, when Geagea and president Gemayel decided to not accept the agreement. The pro-Geagea militia attacked the pro-Hobeika militia. Pro-Hobeika militia worsened the conflict by attacking the Phalangist militia of Gemayel. President Gemayel sought an alliance with the anti-Hobeika militia, which led Hobeika to flee the country. The Tripartite Accord lost its impact, as the Maronite component was gone with Hobeika. National Reconciliation without the Maronite community was simply not possible (Hiro, 1993, p. 107).

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Iran-Contra Affair

In November 1986, a political scandal came to light, which caused commotion. The US had secretly facilitated arms to Iran, which was subjected to an arms embargo. In return, Iran would pressure the Islamic Jihad Organisation to release several US hostages (Freedman, 1991, p. 15). It became known as the Iran-Contra Affair or Irangate Scandal, since only a few American hostages were released, while the US became a weapons supplier to Iran (ibid.).

High-level talks between the two countries remained rare. The US decided to request Israeli support, since the relations with Iran improved slowly and it encouraged pro-Iranian groups to continue hostage-taking. The US policy of not dealing with hostage-takers and terrorists was no longer credible. This increased the hostage-taking by anti-American militias in Lebanon, such as the Islamic Jihad Organisation and Hezbollah (Hiro, 1989, p. 125). The 96 foreign hostage-takings that occurred between 1982 and 1992 in Lebanon is referred to as the hostage crisis (Jaber, 1997).

Inter- and intra-sectarian clashes

In April 1986, PLO fighters started returning to the Palestinian camps in West Beirut. President Assad pressured Amal to resume its attacks on these camps. The PLO stroke back with support of the Druze militia of Jumblatt. A ceasefire was successfully negotiated within three months (Hiro, 1993, p. 123).

Between 1986 and 1988, the fighting that continued to exist was mainly the Amal militia fighting against the new alliance of the PLO, the Druze, and other Muslim-leftist groups. The fights over West Beirut’s neighbourhoods and roadblocks used to collect tolls, escalated in violent clashes between the militias (ICTJ, 2013, p. 52). The Syrian government was concerned its most reliable ally would suffer heavy losses, which led him to deploy Syrian troops into West Beirut on February 1978 (Shehadeh, 1999).

The Syrian government also counted on the Amal militia to curb Hezbollah in the southern region, when it would turn into a Syrian-Israeli conflict, Assad might use Amal militia to curb Hezbollah (Shehadeh, 1999). Hezbollah continued to attack Israeli targets. Israel responded with air raids, causing many civilian deaths, which reminded Lebanese of the 1982 Israeli invasion (Rabil, 2003). The fighting between the Syrian backed PLO and the Israeli backed SLA would continue until February 1988.

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The situation deteriorated as abductions, bomb attacks, and targeted assassinations took place across Lebanon. Prime Minister Karimi was assassinated on June 1, and Maronite leader Chamoune on August 7. The prospect of a political solution declined with their deaths. On August 20, 1987, hundreds of Lebanese citizens demonstrated against the civil war and formed a human chain that crossed West and East Beirut (ICTJ, 2013, p. 40), expressing their war weariness.

1987 National Reconciliation attempt

Selim Al Hoss was appointed as the new prime minister (Hiro, 1993, p. 128). The Sunni political force had declined along with its military force. By now, President Assad realised the damage the attacks on Palestinian camps had done to the Syrian image in the Arab world. President Assad took another shot at National Reconciliation, while the nationalist and progressive parties allied in the Unification and Liberation Front on June 23 (Salloukh, 2005). Sectarian violence worsened as these national reconciliation attempts continued to fail.

US-Middle East Diplomacy

The US was disturbed by the (First) Palestinian intifada against the Israeli occupation in December 1987, and tried to mediate between east Beirut and Damascus (Al Nahar, 1987). The US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, Richard Murphy, succeeded in negotiating political reform with the Christian politicians, who accepted an equal amount of Christian and Muslim parliamentary seats and reduction of confessionalism, but sought to ensure the Maronite presidency and central political authority (Freedman, 1991).

Assad did not agree to the terms, but continued the negotiations with Murphy, which resulted in a joint policy on political reform in Lebanon. The Assad-Murphy proposals were rejected by President Gemayel and Lebanese Forces’ chief Geagea, who described the proposals as an attempt to impose the Tripartite Accord of December 1985. The failed attempt cooled the relations between the American and Syrian government (Hiro, 1993, p. 131).

Syrian-Hezbollah fighting

In March 1988, President Assad suddenly decided to uphold his side of the bargain, which entailed dispelling Hezbollah from the South (Salloukh, 2005). He pressured Amal to attack and capture the district, which led to the expulsion of Hezbollah fighters and their supporters to the Beqaa Valley. Hezbollah militia responded by attacking Amal militia in the southern

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suburbs of West Beirut, where it enjoyed the support of Palestinian fighters based in the Shatila and Burj al Barajina camps (Hiro, 1993, p. 132).

Amal discovered Hezbollah had infiltrated their militias, as it lost the central and southern suburbs of West Beirut to Hezbollah. Now, Assad deployed Syrian troops to the southern suburbs, which intensified the violence. Amal was expelled from the northern suburbs, and Assad called for a summit in Latakia on May 26. A five point agreement led to a ceasefire om May 28. Meanwhile, Assad kindly rejected Teheran’s proposal to create a joint Syrian- Iranian security force (Hiro, 1993, p. 133).

The ceasefire did not immediately led to a decline of the Syrian presence in the southern suburbs of West-Beirut, as Assad instructed the pro-Syrian Palestinian militias to attack PLO forces in the Shatila and Burj al Barajina camps. The Syrian troops succeed in the expulsion of PLO and Hezbollah forces from the Sidon region, and handed over their posts to the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (Picard, 2002, p. 138).

The consolidation of Syrian influence in West Beirut was meant to offer Assad leverage to gain support from East-Beirut in the September 1988 presidential elections. However, East Beirut had grown politically, military, and economically stronger. The intra-sectarian Shia violence had increased the morale of the Christian-rightist militias, which continued to enjoy the support of Israel and Iraq. The latter sought retaliation for Assad’s backing of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 (O'Ballance, 1998).

State perspective

The failed attempts of national reconciliation by President Gemayel indicate the lack of central authority of the Lebanese government. This enabled Syria to regain its hegemony, which it had lost in 1982 (Hiro, 1993). The security situation in West Beirut had significantly started to deteriorate with the fighting between the Druze, Sunni and Shia militias. At request of the Lebanese government, Syrian troops re-entered West Beirut in February 1987 to maintain order and prevent intra-militia clashes (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

Between 1984 and 1988 several attempts were made to establish national reconciliation. The Lebanese government remained highly divided, as reflected by the 1984 National Reconciliation congress, which produced 23 position papers and 7 manifestos. The output resembles the diverging perspectives of the political leaders (Hiro, 1993). It also explains the

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stance of the Lebanese government, who relied heavily on Syrian mediation to achieve national unity.

The Tripartite Accord was negotiated and signed by militia leaders. It laid down several political reforms with regard to the political representation, the command of the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese-Syrian relation. President Gemayel was only informed on the contents of the agreement after the militia leaders had signed the agreement. He refused to sign the accord, which contributed to the failure of the accord. He publicly stated that the militias were not empowered to make amendments of the constitution or abrogate international treaties (Hanf, 2015). The Syrian government announced political and military sanctions: it would no longer engage in negotiations with Gemayel. Muslim-leftist Lebanese politicians joined the boycott, possibly out of fear of Syria. Nevertheless, it resulted in the disintegration of the consensus government. The Gemayel government continued to function as an administrative body (ibid.).

It can be argued that the Lebanese government hindered the national reconciliation attempts, since they clashed with personal interests. Gemayel was aware that the Tripartite Accord would lack legitimacy without his consensus (Abul Husn, 1998, 106). The agreement called for a new government and reduced the president’s power, which was an unfavourable outcome for the Gemayel. Another explanation for the accord’s failure is the assassination of Karami, which contributed to the political paralysis (Krayem, 1997). Either way, the political and military boycott weakened the Lebanese government, which hindered further national reconciliation attempts.

Non-state perspective

With the failed attempts of national reconciliation, the factional conflict worsened. Between 1986 and 1988, the fighting that continued to exist was mainly the Amal militia fighting against the new alliance of the PLO and the Druze (Shehadeh, 1999). For instance, the Amal militia blocked the Palestinian camps Shatila and Burj al Barajneh in January 1987. Jumblatt responded by provoking clashes between Druze and Amal militias in West Beirut, possibly, to remove some of the pressure on the Palestinians (Hudson, 1978).

The War of the Camps consisted of massive internal fighting in the Muslim-leftist camp. In areas beyond Syria’s control, the independent Palestinian organisations enjoyed strong support. Therefore, Amal was recruited by Assad to take control of the areas. Amal was eager

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to attack because of the decades of Palestinian control of predominantly Shia populated parts of Lebanon (Forest, 2009). By mid-1985, the relation between Amal and the Druze began to deteriorate, while the PLO re-established its relation with the Druze.

In 1987, thirteen Muslim-leftist parties allied with Syria, forming the Unification and Liberation Front (ULF). The front opposed the PLO, the Christian-rightist parties and Israel, but mainly formed “to resist Israeli occupation”. The alliance included the Amal movement and the Druze PSP, who continued fighting each other in West Beirut. This reveals the complexity of the conflict: parties fought each other in one area, while at the same time cooperate in a different area. Since the start of the conflict, several Syrian initiated and sponsored fronts were declared. The fronts faded away or dissolved over factional disagreements. Here, the friction between Amal and the PSP caused splits in the new front (Rabinovich, 1989).

In this phase, the three major militias (i.e. the Shia Amal, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and the Christian Lebanese Forces) were invited to participate in the national reconciliation process, which resulted in the Tripartite Accord. After lengthy negotiations, the militias agreed to a new constitution, which would abolish the system of proportionality. Noteworthy, the militia leaders rejected all proposals of partition, cantons and decentralisation (Hanf, 2015). The fact that the accord was signed by the actual combatants rather than politicians can be considered as a unique situation in the Lebanese case. The implementation of the Tripartite Accord eventually failed due to intra-Christian fighting.

In December, 1985, intra-Christian tensions rose between Geagea and Hobeika in light of the Tripartite Accord. Although the Lebanese Forces’ Command Council was divided, Hobeika (head of the council) signed the agreement on behalf of the Lebanese Forces (El Khazen, 2000). In particular, Geagea, Lebanese Forces’ Chief of Staff, opposed the agreement. Hobeika was accused of treachery for signing the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Accord. The agreement would not only legitimise the presence of Syrian forces, it would also entail a “strategic integration” of the Syrian and Lebanese military affairs, national security and foreign relations (Shehadeh, 1999).

The disagreement led to violent clashes between the LF-units of Geagea and Hobeika. With the fleeing of Hobeika to Paris, the Tripartite Accord was considered failed, which resulted in a loss of Syrian prestige. Syria retaliated by pressuring the Muslim-leftist militias to attack Christian areas. Geagea challenged president Gemayel and the Phalange Party, but the LF-

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units loyal to Hobeika managed to prevent an invasion of the presidential palace. They launched a surprise attack from the Muslim-dominated West Beirut against East Beirut (Hanf, 2015).

4.2.6.7 Phase 6: The war of liberation (October 1988 – September 1989)

Context

1988 presidential elections

In August 1988, Suleiman Frangieh and General Michel Aoun both announced their candidacy for the presidential elections. Still, the parliament failed to elect a new president. President Gemayel appointed General Aoun (commander of the Lebanese Army) to head an interim military government. Prime Minister Hoss declared the appointment unconstitutional and continued to lead the civil government. He received backing from President Assad, who publicly rejected the Aoun government. In Lebanese society, Aoun was seen as the courageous man, who will offer resistance to the Syrian Army and the militias’ rule (Shehadeh, 1999).

Lebanon was now divided in a civilian and military government. Aoun controlled the Christian enclave (including East Beirut), while Hoss governed West Beirut and the areas controlled by Muslim-leftist militias and Syrian forces (Hiro, 1993, p. 135).

The War of Liberation

On March 14, 1989, General Aoun declared the War of Liberation against Syria. He called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from West Beirut, the southern suburbs of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the Northern Metn (ICTJ, 2013, p. 65). The alliance with Geagea, commander of the Lebanese Forces, assured Aoun of military support in West Beirut. Aoun was confident that the military as institution would be able to spark nationalism among all Lebanese, despite the sectarian differences (Al Nahar, January 1989).

The heavy bombing of the densely populated areas of East Beirut by Syrian troops led to a high number of civilian casualties, which increased due to the lack of access to medicine and health care (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 107). Normal life came to an end, as shortages on water, food and fuel occurred. Aoun retaliated by bombing West Beirut and Syrian troops in the Beqaa, but the Syrian forces were stronger. The War of Liberation would continue until a

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ceasefire was accepted in September 1989 and the Lebanese parliamentarians were invited to convene in Taif.

Intra-Christian tensions

The Aoun-Geagea alliance received support from Israel and Iraq. Aoun had to deal with the imbalance between the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces. The militia had established its superiority over the troops of the Lebanese Army by adopting a strategy of aggressiveness and subversion in their fighting. This had created admiration amongst the regular troops (Picard, 2002).

Beside differences in military strategy, Aoun and Geagea had different political perspective. Aoun favoured political reforms in order to secure Christian supremacy. In contrary to Geagea, who argued Christian supremacy could no longer be upheld and would be best preserved at a lower level. He wanted to create a federal Lebanon consisting of different cantons (Hiro, 1993, p. 140).

The Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces set aside their differences for the War of Liberation, until General Aoun visited Tunis for an Arab League meeting in January 1989. Geagea was not informed about the diplomatic visit and he responded by creating a National Development Council. In February, Aoun ordered the Lebanese Army to attack the Lebanese Forces in East Beirut and North Metn, and called their militiamen criminals.

Clashes continued to take place between February 1989 and August 1989 (Picard, 2002, p. 145). The Lebanese Army had a greater military capacity, as it was equipped with sophisticated American military hardware. Geagea accepted the ceasefire, but he refused to subordinate its troops to the Lebanese Army (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 108).

Additionally, in March 1989, General Aoun had ordered to block the ports controlled by Amal and Druze militias in West Beirut. The blockade of the Beirut Port triggered clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Druze militia, which continued to take place until September 1989 (ICTJ, 2013, p. 67).

Arab League Committee of Six

The Arab League feared the formal partition of Lebanon. Arab nationalism failing to unite different religious communities within one country could affect the entire Arab world. In

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January 1989, the Arab League Foreign ministers met in Tunis and agreed that an Arab League Committee of Six started working on a national reconciliation plan (ICTJ, 2013).

The Committee of Six consisted of the foreign ministers of Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAE. Syria pressured the Committee of Six to refrain from discussing the Palestinian camps and foreign presence in Lebanon. It also advocated for a consultative rather than executive authority. In February 1989, the committee gathered to discuss the national reconciliation plans with the two competing governments of General Aoun and Prime Minister Hoss (Hiro, 1993, p. 144).

The continuous fighting weakened Aoun’s capability to solve the issue militarily, and he turned to the Committee of Six for an immediate truce in March 1989 (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 109). The Christian-rightist militias started to distance themselves from Aoun to establish a definite truce and lift the blockades.

The talks with the Committee of Six continued, which called for the presence of an Arab Observer Force and presented a four point plan. Syria blocked the plan, since it demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon (Hiro, 1993, p. 147).

Iraqi missiles

Regional tensions increased when President Assad discovered that Iraq was shipping Soviet made missiles to General Aoun via Jordan in July 1989. Assad imposed a sea blockade on East Beirut and warned the red line should not be crossed. He called upon King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt to stop the shipments. Their lack of action led Assad to threaten that he would attack the arms ship Hiro, 1993, p. 150).

The American ambassador pressured the Iraqi government to avoid a confrontation with Syria, and warned Moscow that a confrontation might lead to a full-scale war. In the end, Moscow managed to stop the shipment from taking place by pressuring the Iraqi president to order the return of the arms ship (Hiro, 1993, p. 150).

Besides increasing regional tensions, the Iraqi missiles complicated the work of the Committee of Six. They had to shift their attention from discussing the Lebanese internal situation to the regional security situation. Nevertheless, the Arab League continued to press for an informal meeting of the Lebanese parliament outside Lebanon (Hanf, 2015).

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Lebanese National Front

In August 1989, the Iraqi government assured Aoun its support, which again increased tensions between Sadam Hussein and his long standing rival Assad (Seavar, 2000). On the same day, Muslim-leftist and Palestinian organisations gathered in Damascus and decided to form the Lebanese National Front. The Front sought to defeat Aoun; eliminate the confessional system; end the presence of Israeli troops; and limit the influence of other foreign powers (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 96).

Aoun chose to intensify the violence and severe fighting broke out in the regions of Beirut and Batrouns. The UNSC issued a statement on August 16, asking the warring factions to accept a ceasefire. The UNSC relied on Moscow to undertake positive diplomatic action, as France was expressing anti-Syrian feelings, Britain did not have ties with Syria, China was too busy dealing with its domestic problems, and the US expressed a lack of interest (Hiro, 1993, p. 156).

Troika proposals

In mid-September, General Aoun turned down the seven-point plan of the Arab League Troika (Saudi Arabia, Marocco, Algeria). He stated that reform could take place after Lebanon was freed from all foreign occupations (Picard, 2002, p. 151). Subsequently, a National Reconciliation Charter was drafted to discuss at the Taif meeting of the Lebanese parliament session in September. Christian leaders pressured Aoun to accept the “Troika’s proposals”, which laid the ground for the truce. His change of heart might have been caused by the military defeat on the domestic front (Hiro, 1993, p. 160).

From September 23 onwards, the Joint Security Committee started to assemble on a daily base, in order to consolidate the ceasefire. In the following days, the Beirut Airport was reopened, the sea ports resumed their activities as the blockades were lifted, and displaced residents started returning home (ICTJ, 2013, p. 79).

State perspective

The failure to elect a new president led to the unique situation of two governments. President Gemayel appointed General Aoun as interim-prime minister of a military government pending elections. Gemayel’s appointment of a Maronite Christian to the Sunni post was interpreted as provocative. Hoss opposed the “unconstitutional” appointment and continued heading the

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civil government in West Beirut. Although the government of Hoss was recognised by the international community as the sole representative of Lebanon, Aoun refused to resign. The two governments started fighting over the presence of Syrian troops (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003).

In this phase, the Lebanese government failed to make use of the mediation offered by the Arab League. First, the Arab League’s Committee of Six proposed a peace plan. The plan was accepted by Prime Minister Hoss, but rejected by Nabih Berri. Aoun consented to the plan, since it introduced an Arab Observer Force. Aoun expected it would pave the way for the expulsion of Syrian forces. On the Casablanca summit, the plan was sabotaged by Syria, who stressed Syrian forces would only leave Lebanon on request of a Lebanese national unity government. It must be noted that no representation of Lebanon was present on the summit. The Committee of Six was replaced by the Tripartite Committee. The new committee cooperated with the Lebanese Members of Parliament to settle the crisis, who had the authority to adopt political reforms. They failed to reach an agreement. Next, the leaders of the militia were invited to the negotiation table.

The departure of Gemayel resulted, for the first time since 1975, into a total collapse of government institutions. The term of office of the Speaker of Parliament expired, which hindered the parliament from reconvening until 1989. Only the Central Bank retained its position and continued to finance both governments. The budgetary deficits and inflation lead to a rapid decline of the Lebanese pound after 1984 (Shehadeh, 1999).

Non-state perspective

General Aoun launched the War of Liberation against Syria and its Lebanese Muslim-leftist allies. During the War of Liberation, Aoun and Geagea set aside their military and political differences, and allied to offer resistance to the Syrian forces. Aoun called for the closure of all illegal ports. These ports were mainly controlled by Syrian backed militias. In response, Syria started shelling East Beirut. A seven-month period of shelling began.

Meanwhile, intra-Christian tensions arose due to the unresolved power struggle over the Christian leadership. The power centres of the Christian community had reduced to the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces. Aoun’s authority was increasingly challenged by Geagea’s Lebanese Forces, which had transformed into a professional force with a strong hierarchical structure (Hiro, 1993).

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Prime Minister Hoss controlled the Muslim-leftist militias, who supported the Syrian forces. In August 1989, Saddam Hussein publicly expressed Iraq’s support for General Aoun. Thereby, President Hussein attempted to exert pressure on Syrian President Assad to withdraw from Lebanese territory. In response, fourteen Muslim-leftist factions gathered in Damascus and agreed to form the Lebanese National Front to defeat Aoun’s political and military program (Hiro, 2003). The continuous inter- and intra-sectarian fighting eventually weakened Aoun’s military strength and pressured him to join the peace negotiation efforts of the Arab League.

4.2.6.8 Phase 7: The Taif negotiations (October 1989 – October 1990)

Context

Taif agreement

On September 30, 1989, the Lebanese Members of Parliament (MP) gathered in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The Christian MPs were instructed by Aoun that political reform could not take place before Syrian troops withdraw from Lebanese territory, while the Muslim MPs held the believe that such a withdrawal would not be guaranteed until reforms had taken place. Aoun’s efforts failed: all MPs agreed to the National Reconciliation Accord on October 22, 1989 (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 110).

The National Reconciliation Accord, also known as the Taif Agreement, proposed the same reforms that had been mentioned in earlier peace negotiations in 1976, 1983, and 1985. The sectarian-based political structure was limited to the administration; the issue of Lebanese state sovereignty was addressed; and the dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias was demanded. The Syrian forces were to “assist Lebanon to spread [its] sovereignty over the whole country” during a period of two years (Krayem, 1997, p. 411).

The government of General Aoun rejected the Taif Agreement. He called for a referendum on the agreement, which was unthinkable due to the civil disorder at that time (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 111). Aoun then turned to the UNSC, formally protesting the presence of foreign troops. The UNSC backed the Taif Agreement, after the US, USSR, Britain, France, and the Vatican had articulated their support. The number of foreign powers backing the Taif agreement led to the diplomatic isolation of the Aoun government (ibid., p. 112).

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National unity government

René Moawad was elected to be president and Prime Minister Hoss was asked to form the national unity government. Moawad refused to replace Aoun by taking over as army commander. Like Bachir Gemayel, Moawad was assassinated within a few weeks. The power vacuum shortly caused commotion. The Lebanese MPs were quick to elect Elais Hrawi as president, who dismissed Aoun. Hoss was able to present an equally divided Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian orthodox) and Muslim (Sunni, Shia, Druze) cabinet (Hiro, 1993, p. 166).

The Muslim-leftist camp had accepted the Taif Agreement under pressure of Damascus. Most frustration existed amongst the Shia community, who was still not granted political authority. Amal blamed Saudi-Arabia for the lack of change, who was the leading figure of the Arab League Troika. Hezbollah described the agreement as an obstacle to creating an Islamic state (ICTJ, 2013, p. 91). Note that Amal and Hezbollah continued fighting over Shi’a control of West and South Beirut and South Lebanon (ICTJ, 2013, p. 65).

Removing Aoun

The National Reconciliation Accord and the election of a new president did not dissolve the popular support for General Aoun (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 112). A period of ferocious fighting followed between the army led by Aoun and the Lebanese Forces (1) and between Aoun and the Syrian forces (2).

Even after the dismissal of his cabinet on November 26, Aoun refused to vacate the Baabda palace. In an attempt to decrease Aoun’s power, he was dismissed as military chief of staff. This action seemed to have only increased the loyalty of his followers (El Assad, 2008). Syria attempted to militarily intervene, but President Hrawi advocated for a diplomat solution. He called upon Washington, Moscow and Paris to pressure Aoun into evacuating the presidential palace (Hanf, 2015).

Aoun asked Geagea for assistance, who assured to deploy the Lebanese Forces in case of a Syrian attack. However, the moment the Syrian threat had faded, tensions between Aoun and Geagea arose again. Inter-Christian fighting continued to heighten the level of violence between January and June 1990, causing many civilian casualties. The international community continued to exert pressure, but Aoun refused to step down (Hiro, 1993, p. 182).

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The Hrawi government intensified its diplomatic and financial campaign against Aoun in July. It proceeded implementing the constitutional reforms as laid down in the Taif agreement in August. Amendments were made to the Constitution, which curtailed the powers of the President, and increased those of the Cabinet. President Hrawi signed the legislation into law, which enabled him to use of force against Aoun (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 112).

President Hrawi met the US secretary of state James Baker and President Assad in Damascus in September. He succeeded in assuring foreign approval to intervene militarily against Aoun. The Lebanese Army backed by the Lebanese Forces crossed the Green Line into East Beirut. Syrian troops joined to reinforce the position of the Lebanese Army on October 13 (Salloukh, 2005) and started a full-fledged military operation. Aoun fled to the French embassy and asked for political asylum (Hanf, 2015). By the end of the day, the fifteen year long civil war came to an end.

Securing national unity

The Lebanese Army dismantled the Green Line and removed the barricades between East and West Beirut on October 15. The Lebanese Army released hundreds of prisoners that had been held by Aoun. President Hrawi and President Assad agreed to several measures, including the formation of Greater Beirut by expanding the city’s boundaries, appointing a national unity government, continuing cooperation on security issues; and disbanding all militias (Seaver, 2000).

On December 3, Greater Beirut was officially declared, and served as symbol of national unity (Al Safir, 1989). Prime Minister Hoss succeeded in implementing the first two stages of the Taif Agreement: securing constitutional reform in parliament and removing Aoun’s military government. He resigned on December 1989 to pave the way for his successor, who needed to implement the last stages of the agreement: dismantling all militias and formalizing the Lebanese-Syrian relation (Hiro, 1993, p. 182).

In the past two years, the intra-Shia war in South Lebanon between Amal and Hezbollah had continued. On November 5, 1990, Amal and Hezbollah decided to bury the hatchet, as a result of Syrian and Iranian negotiations. Both agreed to withdraw their militias from the disputed areas, allowing the Lebanese Army to take control of these areas (ICTJ, 2013, p. 81).

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State perspective

The Taif agreement, drafted by the Lebanese Members of Parliament, was the first step towards reconciliation and peace. The agreement focused on internal Lebanese conflicts, as well as the relationship with Syria on the military and political levels. The Lebanese government described the role of Syria as “helping the Lebanese government to restore its authority” for a period of two years (Shehadeh, 1999, p. 22).

General Aoun refused to leave the presidential palace and continued to offer resistance. At first, the Lebanese government dismissed the use of force, as Aoun still enjoyed a high level of popular support. The day Aoun was dismissed as commander-in-chief of the army, tens of thousands of people marched to the palace. A sit-in started that lasted for several weeks, which pre-empted any attack on Aoun. Therefore, the Lebanese government sought a diplomatic solution (El Khazen, 2000).

Geagea continued to seek military support of President Hrawi to defeat Aoun’s troops. Hrawi was reluctant, since the Lebanese Army lacked troops to gain authority in the Christian enclave. He feared that the Lebanese Forces would take over control, after they had defeated Aoun. Additionally, the Lebanese government calculated that President Assad would condemn an alliance with the Lebanese Forces, which accepted military aid from Israel and Iraq (Hiro, 1993, p. 175).

In the end, the Lebanese government sought foreign approval to intervene militarily against Aoun. President Hrawi visited Washington and Damascus, who gave him the green light considering other regional developments. The US turned against Aoun in return for Syrian support in the Gulf War. The Lebanese Army was deployed to remove Aoun with support of the Lebanese Forces. President Assad joined by launching a full-fledged military operation against Aoun (ICTJ, 2013).

Non-state perspective

This phase consists of a period of ferocious intra-communal fighting, in particular within the Christian community. General Aoun refuses to accept the Taif Agreement, since it did not include timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops. This resulted in fighting between the army led by Aoun and the Lebanese Forces, and then between Aoun and the Syrian forces.

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The Lebanese government could have asked the Muslim-leftist militias for support in removing Aoun from the presidential palace. However, Muslim-leftist militias chose not to intervene, as it might bring about a repeat of the past: Geagea’s Lebanese Forces might have allied with Aoun to fight the non-Christian fighters (Hiro, 1993, p. 172). Now, the Lebanese Army was backed by the Lebanese Forces and Syrian Forces. The destruction of the East Beirut suburbs led Aoun to lose his popular support (ICTJ, 2013).

The intra-Christian fighting caused thousands of lives and material damage. It also led to the collapse of Christian resistance to Syrian presence in Lebanon. This enabled the government to disarm the militias on May 1, 1991 – with exception of Hezbollah. Hezbollah was considered to be fighting the Israeli occupation of the south. It was able to tremendously increase its power, since it was the only remaining militia. Other former militiamen were offered rehabilitation and training, after which they were integrated into the Lebanese Army (Shehadeh, 1999).

4.2.6.9 Epilogue

The Civil War in Lebanon ended in 1990. The country was left in ruins with a wrecked economy, infrastructure, education system, and a traumatised population. The Taif Agreement would not resolve the deep-rooted political fragmentation. Also, the state’s authority remained fragile with the presence of Israeli troops in the South, and Syrian troops controlling the rest of the country.

Security situation

In December 1990, Omar Karami presented a new cabinet, in which the Muslim and Christian community were equally represented. Noteworthy, seven out of the thirty-member national unity cabinet were former militia leaders, such as Walid Jumblatt (Progressive Socialist Party), Nabih Berri (Amal), and Samir Geagea (South Liberation Army). Furthermore, the cabinet’s composition was condemned for being pro-Syrian (Hiro, 1993, p. 185).

In January 1991, the US-led coalition against Iraq increased anti-Western feelings in Lebanon, and led to several protests in the Palestinian camp of Rashidiya. The US embassy in Beirut was evacuated out of fear of an attack. In the same time period, PLO fighters launched rocket attacks against Israel, which responded with attacks on the Palestinian camps. Despite the PLO-Israeli fighting, the Lebanese Army started deploying its troops to the Sidon district (Seaver, 2000).

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The Great Beirut security plan that went into effect in December 1990 had improved the security situation in Lebanon. The supply of energy and water became increasingly regular. Health and educational facilities were functioning again. Economic activity increased at all levels within society, and the exchange rate started to improve. The reconstruction of the devastated economic infrastructure was accomplished by the government’s control of all economic facilities (ICTJ, 2013, p. 84).

The political assassinations and car bombs continued to occur. Elei Hobeika, head of the Lebanese Forces’ security agency (Jihaz al-Amin), survived an attack. As did the Defence minister Michel Murr, who was responsible for dismantling the militias. In March 1991, a ministerial declaration announced the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias before April 30. Hezbollah was excluded from the declaration: Iran-Syrian talks had led to the decision to postpone disarmament of Hezbollah until July (Hiro, 1993, p. 191).

In August, the amnesty law passed in parliament, which absolved politically motivated crimes committed before March 28, 1991. With the exception of (attempted) assassinations of diplomats, political or religious leaders. This was followed by integrating 20.000 of the 40.000 militiamen into the army and police (Hanf, 2015).

Foreign presence and withdrawals

The new cabinet also attempted to extend central authority to South Lebanon. The major obstacle being the Israeli-dominated SLA and the Israeli self-proclaimed security zone. The conflict in South Lebanon would carry on for many years, with heavy Israeli attacks in 1993 and 1996. The Israeli and SLA troops would continue to arrest, detain and torture people in their detention centres. It would not be until May 2000 that the Israel forces withdrew, and the SLA dissolved (Rabil, 2003).

By April 1991, the removal of Great-Beirut checkpoints ensured the return to some form of normalcy. Nevertheless, human rights violations continued to take place, as Lebanese and Syrian forces abducted, arrested and detained Lebanese and Palestinians militiamen. They were transferred to detention centres in Syria on a large scale, as seen during the civil war. The detainees also included people with politically dissenting voices. The use of torture to obtain confessions or information against (political) detainees was common in both Syrian and Lebanese detention centres (ICTJ, 2013, p. 76).

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The parliament approved a draft Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, which formalised Lebanese-Syrian relations. On May 22, 1991, the treaty was signed by President Hrawi and President Assad in Damascus, ensuring their partnership in the political, security, and cultural domain. It explicitly stated that Syria would not threaten Lebanon’s security, independence or sovereignty. However, Syrian forces would stay for 14 more years, until April 2005 (Rabil, 2003).

At the background of the 1990 Gulf War, the pact resembled a new balance of power in the region. The US left Syria to ensure the stabilisation of Lebanon. The decline of US interference was criticised by Israel, who argued that the presence of Syrian troops remained an occupation of Lebanon, which infringed upon its state sovereignty (Freedman, 1991).

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4.3 Case analysis

4.3.1 Introduction

The Lebanese Civil War is a complex and multifaceted conflict to analyse due to its hybrid nature, coalescing of state and non-state actors, and foreign interventions. This section analyses which factors drove the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict between 1975 and 1990. The analytical framework that will be applied to the case is presented in paragraph 3.6.2 “Structuring the analysis”.

The case description suggests that the majority of the fighting and deaths occurred in non- state conflicts, for instance, between the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National Movement, Israel and Palestinian organisations, the War of the Camps (Amal versus Palestinian militia), Palestinian infighting in refugee camps, Maronite infighting (Geagea and Hobeika factions of the Lebanese Forces) and Shia infighting (Amal versus Hezbollah). Additionally, the conflict witnessed coercive involvement of third parties, such as the Arab Deterrent Force and Multinational Forces. Finally, major military interventions of foreign powers, in particular Syria and Israel, occurred. This needs to be taking into account when reading the analysis. The question might arise whether it was a conflict of “others” on Lebanese territory or a “Lebanese civil war” which lured in external actors.

4.3.2 Context

4.3.2.1 Social cleavages

The Lebanese civil war is frequently interpreted as a struggle between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. The Christian community feared that the Muslim community wanted a pan- Arab and Muslim greater nation. They argued that Muslims lacked nationalist feelings and endangered the independence of Lebanon. The Muslim community assumed that the Christian community wanted to turn Lebanon into a Christian state. They claimed Christians behaved as enemies of the Arab nation by denying Muslims from their rights (ICTJ, 2014). Preconceptions related to religious sects paved the way for the Lebanese civil war. However, it will become clear that Lebanon is too complex to be divided into a binomial dichotomy.

At the outset of the conflict, the political protest of the Muslim communities was considered to be targeting the state. The state that was criticised for its Christian dominance, as will be explained in a subsequent section (see: 4.3.2.5 national politics). Resentment was fuelled by

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the Arab-Israeli conflict and Nasser’s nationalistic policies in Egypt (De Rouen & Heo, 2007, p. 476). The social demands of the Muslim communities were framed as demands against a Christian-dominated state. They called for a redistribution of power, which involved revising the National Pact. Subsequently, the Lebanese Christians felt the balance of power was endangered (Hanf, 2015, p. 555). The ethno-religious sectarian cleavages existing between the numerous Christian and Muslim denomination is considered to have contributed greatly to the outbreak of the conflict.

However, it must be noted that long before the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war, struggles between denominations had been taken place with regard to the Lebanese political system. The Lebanese Muslims, who felt economically deprived, had sought political change, while Lebanese Christians sought to defend the political status quo. Despite the fact that the social conflict worsened in the first half of the 1970s, it rarely led to intercommunal strife. In contrary, Christians and Muslims both advocated for social and political reforms (Hanf, 2015, p. 556). It can be questioned whether social cleavages as such led to the outbreak of the civil war, as Lebanon had long lived with these tensions. The analysis indicates that the interaction between different factors, namely, social cleavages, grievances and popular support caused escalation rather than social cleavages itself. Inequality and poverty occurred along ethnic, sectarian and religious cleavages. Politicians and militias used ethno-religious cleavages and feelings of relative communal deprivation to gain popular support, which fuelled inter- sectarian tensions (ibid., p. 540). This will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section (see: 4.3.2.3 grievances).

In this way, the sectarian divisions can be used to explain the outbreak of the conflict, but to characterise the Lebanese civil war as a Christian-Muslim struggle would not do justice to the complex society of Lebanon (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). Lebanon is too complex to be divided into a binomial dichotomy of Christians and Muslims. This is also reflected by the heavy fighting within the religious groups, which consisted of some of the most violent periods of the conflict. The Sunni Palestinian militias fought against the predominantly Sunni Syrian army, the Shia Hezbollah militia against the Shia Amal movement, the Muslim militia Amal against Muslim Palestinians, and the Christian units of the Lebanese Army against the Christian Lebanese Forces.

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Social cleavages played an escalatory role throughout the conflict in terms of the communal mobilisation along sectarian lines. The threat of violence was seen as an effective mean to reach a political goal (Hanf, 2015, p. 325), as reflected by the continuous spiral of violence. The fear of communities to be marginalised, assimilated or expelled from their enclaves increased the intensity of hostility towards other communities. Each community had formulated its own narrative of victimisation (Rosiny, 2013). The more threatened a community felt, the more they resorted to violence. It also resulted in a lack of confidence in peace negotiations. Memories of hostility and violence along sectarian lines determined the perceptions and behaviour of the key actors. While clinging onto their own primordial identity and community, the intercommunal and national solidarity was hard to achieve (Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015). This wariness could explain the many failed negotiation attempts and the continuous pursue of separation of their territories. In this way, sectarian divisions contributed to prolonging the conflict.

Clan system

Besides sectarian associational affiliations, families were organised into clans (ashair) that have existed for many years. It can be argued that ethnic and religious cleavages were, at times, overruled by clan or family relationships. People from different sects could belong to the same clan or family, which was considered more important. The state involvement in these clans was minimal. Clan members had to follow the clan’s rules and feuds were resolved by their own judges (Hamzeh, 1994). This introduces a new dimension to the power struggle. The politics of the region were characterised by clan feuds and alliances, which local politicians exploited (Collelo, 1987). The local clan leader held a powerful position, as he was able to influence the local police and/or the local militia. A struggle for power existed between clans (e.g. small and large clan associations), as well as within clans (e.g. different families). Concerning power shifts, a clan is highly dynamic, which might have influenced the dynamics of the conflict. One family might be more willing to cooperate with other clans for economic or security reasons, while other families chose to only cooperate with clans from the same religious denomination (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015).

Furthermore, clans exerted influence throughout Lebanon’s administrative system, in order to shift the balance of power. For example, clans sought to consolidates high-level positions within the administration. This offered opportunities to appoint clan members, develop trade relationships with other clans, protect illegal actions of clan members, and disrupt

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disadvantageous law making processes (Keshishian, 2013). This underlines the importance of taking into account the clan structures of Lebanon.

Clan ties created solidarity. Even more effective was the pervading sense of threat amongst neighbours in the suburbs (Hanf, 2015, p. 331), where families have lived for generations. These residents were members of the same extended family or clan from the same religious denomination. A certain family would assume responsibility for a demarcated residential area and a neighbourhood enforcer (qabaday) was appointed, in order to protect the other clan or family members. The widespread random shelling attacks increased these feelings of anxiety. It must be noted that family and communal loyalties were lower in neighbourhoods with large fluctuations in the population, such as Ras Beirut (ibid.). Solidarity between clans can be observed in the fight for the Beqaa. In the 1980s violent clashes took place between Hezbollah, Amal, and the clans of the Beqaa. Hezbollah and Amal both attempted to take control of the territories of these clans, which resulted in violent clashes. The clans of the Beqaa formed an alliance and were able to withstand the threat (NATO CFC, 2013).

Nevertheless, intra-sectarian fighting also occurred between clans. The power struggles between clans might have played a more significant escalatory role in the conflict than previously has been estimated. Powerful families controlled large areas of Lebanon and created their own militias to fight their rivals. For example, the prominent Frangieh clan ruled in the mountainous area of northern Lebanon. The clan created the Marada Brigade, also known as the Zgharta Liberation Army, in 1975 (Knudsen, 2010). The militia was involved in an intra-Christian fight with the Phalangists party of the Gemayel family. This illustrates how clan ties caused intra-sectarian fighting, and served as an escalatory factor.

4.3.2.2 Popular support

During the conflict, the Lebanese government found itself suffering from hyperventilation and anxiety. The government (or cabal) was constantly seeking for legitimacy by seeking to comply with all the different demands (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). This can be related to the consociational character of the political system in Lebanon, which demands power sharing along confessional lines. It lacked the capacity to provide services and goods as the conflict aggravated, which resulted in a low level of popular support. The militias enjoyed foreign financial support, which enabled them to provide these public services. This resulted in a higher level of popular support for militias, which contributed to prolonging the conflict.

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Popular support: Lebanese government

At the outset of the conflict, the PLO received support from wide segments of the Lebanese population, which complicated the conflict. The confessional political system restrained politicians from making the needed political concessions (Latif, 2005). The delicate sectarian balance could not withstand the pressure, as will be explained in detail in a subsequent section (see: 4.3.2.5 national politics), which contributed to escalation of the conflict.

People across the Lebanese communities did share one sentiment: distrust in the political leadership and government structures. The state was viewed as incapable of impartial institutional reform, which was needed for transitional or peace processes. The ability and the intentions of the national political leaders to play a constructive role in the peace process was distrusted by many (ICTJ, 2014; Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015). The Lebanese people lost trust in the state’s capacity to protect them. In general, the population displayed low levels of trust for the performance of the state and its institutions – with exception of the Lebanese Army. While 41 percent of the Lebanese agreed with the statement ‘Lebanese trust the state and its institutions’, 75 percent agreed with the statement ‘Lebanese trust their army’ (Gaub, 2010, p. 49). Remarkably, the Lebanese Army was criticised for its passivity, but it was able to preserve a positive image within society. The army received positive news coverage, which stressed its legitimacy, unitary and trustworthiness – even in the year of its disintegration (1984) (ibid., p. 50).

The low level of trust for state performance was combined with a positive stance on democracy. In other words, the Lebanese people did not question the idea of a central government (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). In the post-independence period, Lebanon had developed in a democratic and stable state. The highly urban and educated society was called the “Switzerland of the Middle East” (Goldenschmidt, 2000). The confessional political system regulated the sharing of power amongst the confessional groups and allocated collective rights to these groups. Neither the Lebanese population nor militias sought to overthrow the state, but supported the idea of a central government – despite the long period of violence. They preferred changing the distribution of power rather than tearing apart the system itself. The state Lebanon, on paper, was still considered exceedingly legitimate by all warring factions (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). This unique situation makes it possible to argue that the government still enjoyed legitimacy to a

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limited extent. The popular support might even have played a de-escalatory role in the conflict, in a very indirect manner, as it discouraged militias from overthrowing the government.

The Lebanese wanted to preserve the Lebanese state, since the majority of the population did not support the fragmentation of the Lebanese state along religious lines. Even at the peak of the conflict, the creation of a state for each religious group was favoured by only 4% of the Lebanese population, while 80% supported the establishment a of a national unity government (Gaub, 2015). This shows that public opinion differed tremendously from the conflict rhetoric used by militia and political leaders, who claimed the communities sought autonomy. For example, the leadership of the Kataeb party sought to create an autonomous Christian mini- state within Lebanon in 1978 (Hiro, 2013). This demonstrates that it should not be assumed that the political and militia leaders enjoyed popular support for their proposals.

Popular support: militias

At first sight, the Lebanese civil might appear to be a Muslim-Christian conflict. However, the conflict was of political rather than religious nature. It was a civil strife caused by political tensions (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015). The ethnic and religious divisions were used (or manipulated) by militias to gain popular support. The militiamen displayed themselves as the defenders of their respective communities. It should also be taken into account that the popular support for militias might not have derived from political or ideological affiliations. In the absence of physical safety, Lebanese people might have made pragmatic choices. Militias might have channelled popular support in exchange for protection. The Lebanese people simply adopted a strategy of survival (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). The militias might not even have offered the Lebanese people protection, but goods and services that were needed for their survival (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015).

Furthermore, the forced taxation, looting, extortion favoured the working classes, the suburban areas and the peripheral areas, the deprived groups of the Muslim communities (Hiro, 1993, p. 78). In other words, the militias generated a redistribution of wealth, which favoured the underprivileged and the lower middle class. In this way, the economic resources of the militias generated popular support throughout the conflict. For instance, the popular support of the Amal movement grew rapidly after its creation due to the poor socio-economic conditions of the Shia community. It grew strong with the support of the 300.000 Shia

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internally displaced persons caused by the Israeli invasion of the south. The militias actively and successively recruited Shia’s by guaranteeing them financial security (Hamzeh, 1993).

The militia were able to create parallel systems, which provided social services to their respective communities. Especially, Hezbollah strongly profiled itself as a social organisation, which was able to ensure social security to a large amount of people, who have never enjoyed social security (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). This reflects that militias not only gained popular support because of their military strength. They secured popular support by offering social security and guaranteeing basic human needs besides.

It must be noted that the coalescing of political parties and militias makes it hard to assess the level of popular support for militias. Lebanese might have supported a political leader representing their community’s interest, who was also responsible for creating the party’s militia. Nevertheless, the findings show that the level of popular support for militias highly interacted with the capacity of the state to 1) offer the population physical protection and 2) provide social services (2). The declining state capacity drove Lebanese into the hands of militia, who guaranteed to offer protection and social services. Thereby, militias did not experience major resistance of the Lebanese population, which offered them the opportunity to continue their armed struggle. In this way, it can be argued that the popular support for militias contributed to the commencement, escalation and continuation of the conflict.

4.3.2.3 Grievances

Historical grievances might have contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, since Lebanon did experience intercommunal hostility in the past, such as the intercommunal massacres in the 1860s and the political crisis of 1958 (Fawaz, 1994). The collective memory of these events might have made communities more receptive to an ideological struggle and strategic mobilisation (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 24). It can be questioned whether historical grievances can be seen as a driving factor of the civil war, as the Lebanese people had long lived with these feelings. Still, the historical grievances needs be taken into account, as militias used them to justify the violent attacks against other communities. For example, the Maronite militias brought into memory the 1958 crisis, in which the Muslim communities pushed the Lebanese government to join the newly created UAR (ibid.).

The political grievances of the Sunni and Shia Muslim community played a significant role in the conflict. Both communities voiced their dissatisfaction with the consociational system of

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power sharing that favoured the Maronites (Dekmejian, 1978). They demanded political reform in order to establish a more equitable system. For example, the Shia community was denied political authority, experienced economic impoverishment and resided in the most deprived areas of Lebanon. This created strong feelings of alienation and grievance. Until the 1978 Israeli invasion of the south, the violence plaguing the south from 1969 onwards was largely ignored by Lebanese politics (Hanf, 2015).

In 1974, the Shia religious leader, Musa al Sadr, launched the political movement Amal (Hamzeh, 1993). The movement called for an enhanced position of the Shia community in the sectarian system, and state intervention to limit the Palestinian influence in the south. Amal was identified as a “movement of the dispossessed”. After 1982, Amal would develop into one of the major warring factions. Although Hanf (2015) argues that the discrimination against the Shia community was already a product of war rather than an instigating factor, the relative feelings of socio-economic deprivation certainly played an escalatory role in the conflict. Shias joined the militias to draw attention to the neglected grievances.

In the 1960s, the social policies of president Chebab had attempted to narrow the income and education inequalities between the communities. In 1974, the per capita income was about $1,200,-, which was quit a high average for a developing country at that time. In the same year, educational standards were relatively high, as the gross enrolment ratio was 74 percent (El-Khazen, 2000). However, Lebanon was challenged by socio-economic disparities, wealth and income was unevenly distributed. Social mobility hardly cut across ethno-religious cleavages (Rosiny, 2013). The Shia Muslims did not even distinct between their communal deprivation and their economic impoverishment. Community and class were considered more or less identical (Hanf, 2015).

Feelings of relative deprivation were fuelled by the depart from Chebabist policies. Additionally, numerous graduates were unemployed. The labour market could not absorb the abundance of graduates that the expansive educational policies had produced. The high unemployment rate drove many of the graduates into the hands of militias (Hanf, 2015, p. 555), which contributed to escalation of the conflict. This underlines the observation that the dominant perception of the conflict was not religion. Politicians made the fight “into a religious war to cloud the issues” (Majaj & Amireh, 2002, p. 133).

Lebanon was indeed challenged by political and religious differences, but the differences between rich and poor were more alarming (Hanf, 2015). For example, the confrontation in

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Sidon, which marked the beginning of the conflict, can be related to feelings of relative deprivation. The fisherman’s strike should be seen as a protest movement that transformed into a violent confrontation (Khalaf, 2002, p. 227) rather than a result of sectarian tensions. The fishermen were one of the deprived groups of Lebanon, and were most likely already frustrated by the lack of governmental action to counter the Israeli attacks in the Southern provinces. Now, they had to face the threat of a large modern fishing company that would deprive them from their livelihood, which resulted in a protest movement.

The socio-economic grievances can be linked to the uneven economic development amongst the various regions of Lebanon. The relative deprivation of the rural and peripheral areas caused social strain. Governmental efforts to narrow the gap between the high and low income groups were limited (Makdisi, 2004). The passivity of the government contributed to higher levels of polar support for militias, as explained earlier (see: 4.3.2.2 popular support). The disparities in the income distribution led many to migrate from rural areas to urban centres. Major cities, such as Beirut, experienced a rapid growth of suburbs. The poor living conditions of these suburbs made people more vulnerable to recruitment by militias. The confessional dimension of the regional inequalities is revealed at close observation. The middle class Sunni Muslims in Beirut and the Christians in the central mountain region enjoyed a better position than the lower class Shia Muslims in regions of the south, the Beqaa valley, and Akkar district (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 9). In this way, the absolute and relative deprivation can be related to a community rather than a social class, region or age- group (Hanf, 2015, p. 554).

Grievances amongst the Palestinian refugees also contributed to escalation of the conflict. From 1948 onwards, the UNRWA had registered 455.000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Bouziane, Harders & Hoffmann, 2013). Around 62 per cent of the refugees were confined in the 12 officially recognised refugee camps, which strictly excluded refugees from Lebanese society. Refugees suffered from brutality and oppressive measures of the police, army and Deuxième Bureau – the Lebanese military intelligence service (Hanafi, 2008, p. 85). The Lebanese government violated basic rights of refugee care and camp conditions, such as the access to clean water and education.

The refugees were also deprived from labour and property rights because the Lebanese government feared that any form of engagement would result in the definitive settlement and neutralisation of refugees (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015). This

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resulted in nation-wide legal and institutional discrimination of Palestinian refugees. Besides the legal and social exclusion, the refugees were at times physically excluded from the rest of society by fences and walls (Meier, 2010). The Palestinian organisations recruited militias by stressing the inhumanity of the camp circumstances and exploiting the refugees’ grievances. This underlines the previous observation that the factor “grievances” highly interacts with the factor “strategies of armed groups”.

It must be noted that the conflict gradually shifted from an inter-sectarian to an intra-sectarian struggle during the 1980s. Fighting occurred among groups that belonged to the same socio- economic category (World bank, 2004), as exemplified by the Shia infighting between Hezbollah and Amal. At first sight, the intra-sectarian conflict does not seem to correspond with the argument that the poor socio-economic position led to grievances, which resulted in acts of violence. However, a community is not homogenous. It consists of privileged and less privileged families. In certain neighbourhoods of Beirut, family and clan ties experienced intense pressure, as the civil war offered a window of opportunity to express past or present frustrations (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). Feelings of grievances within a group or clan resulted in feuds between families or clans from the same denomination. In this way, intra-sectarian tensions contributed significantly to prolonging the conflict.

Overall, it can be observed that feelings of grievances motivated militias to start and continue fighting. Additionally, grievances were used as a recruitment strategy by all militias. Militias paid attention to the otherwise neglected historical, political and socio-economic grievances, and guaranteed improvement. In this way, grievances had an enormous escalatory impact.

4.3.2.4 Local politics

Lebanon is divided into six governorates (muhafazat) with their own district administration. The provinces are subdivided into districts (aqdiya), municipalities and villages. Municipal elections appointing the head of the local government (muhafiz) and public servants (mukhtars) were not held between 1963 and 1998 (Salamey, 2013). Confessional elites benefited from the weak local governance structures, since village elders or heads of families or clans took over the governance in most villages (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015).

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Local community leaders played a significant role in the onset and prolonging of the conflict. The ethnic and religious cleavages within Lebanon were used by several prominent families to mobilise militiamen. These families gained power from landownership or other economic resources. The communal mobilization of militias offered protection to their respective communities, but also consolidated the power of powerful families (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015). Fighting for the interests of the community became an acceptable mean of preserving or improving the communal balance of power. The confessional system did not only isolate the communities from each other, it also created a system that local leaders could manipulate to pursue personal interests. The political representation based on communal identity instead of the free choice of individuals gave local leaders excessive power and led to communal competition (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015).

The Lebanese confessional political system fostered personality based politics. The majority of the parliamentarians were driven by confessional and local interests rather than the political party (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015). The political blocs were formed by personal or family bonds rather than political affinities. National politics was highly dependent on the support of unelected local community leaders. De facto, the political parties consisted of lists of candidates supported by a prominent local leader (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). Several powerful families and clans played a significant role in the mobilisation of votes for local and national elections, such as the Gemayel family. The elections itself tended to focus more on local than national issues.

The formation of a coalition was merely needed for electoral purposes, and negotiated at the local level by the local community leaders and respective candidates. This reintroduces the clan aspect, which shows the interaction between clan ties, local and national politics. For example, the Druze clan of Kamal Jumblatt had a great deal of power in comparison to the amount of people he represented. Although the Druze constituted not more than 7 percent of the Lebanese population (Richani, 1990), Jumblatt was successful in mobilising political resources. The clan was highly structured, effective and represented the entire ethno-religious group. At the outset of the war, Jumblatt even headed the entire Lebanese National Movement (i.e. the Muslim-leftist parties). In this way, the clan structure can also be considered a strategy in order to gain political power.

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The strong dependency on local community leaders resulted in politics that is based on satisfying the grassroots support rather than ideological principles. The political candidates seek approval of their local community leader, which places the latter in a position of power. This is related to the clientelism of the political system (see: 4.3.2.5 national politics). A member of a community can ask the local community leader to compensate the state’s failing, help circumvent the law or enforce a specific law. The local community leader notifies the political leader, who receives electoral support in return (UCLG, 2015). In this way, the political leader is representing a community rather than a political agenda. This relationship of double-dependency strengthened during the civil war. It corrupted the administrative and legal services to the extent that it was impossible to ensure one’s rights outside these channels (ibid.). In this way, the unelected local community leaders contributed to wrecking the political system.

Traditionally, public life was governed at the local level through informal processes (e.g. traditions), and conflict resolution was based on a shurah (consultation) system (Salem, 1965). Disagreements between (political) contestants led to fighting between families, in which physical force was not uncommon. The traditional local governance practices might partially explain the occurrence of acts of retribution in the conflict. If a family was under attack, a befriended family would offer them shelter and align with them to perform counterattacks (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). The local community leaders (i.e. clan leaders) could decide on the use of violence, as they controlled the local police force and/or the local militia. Another aspect that should be taken into account is the power struggle that took place over political resources at local level between families and clans, which has been discussed extensively in a previous section (see: 4.3.2.1 social cleavages, clan system).

With regard to the Palestinian refugee camps, the 1969 Cairo Agreement allowed the PLO to take control of these camps and ban the Lebanese security forces from entering the camps (Suleiman, 1999). This resulted in a state-within-a state, reflecting new modes of governance at the local level. The Lebanese authority was replaced by popular committees, in which family heads or village elders represented the different Palestinian organisations. The popular committees re-established the traditional authority of elders and religious norms, and became the most important local governing body in camps throughout the conflict (Peteet, 1996). Their tasks resemble those of a municipality, as they took responsibility for the infrastructure, water and electricity supplies in the camps. The established security organs, called the security committees, functioned as an internal police force (Hanafi & Long, 2010). These

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committees also participated in conflict resolution within the camp, and between the camp and Lebanese authorities (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015). This indicates that the Palestinian security committees played a de-escalatory role the conflict.

In general, it can be observed that the local community leaders held powerful positions. At several times in the conflict, the local leaders contributed to escalation of the conflict, by deploying their local militia. However, it must be noted that the local governance structures also contributed to de-escalation of the conflict, as can be observed by the effects of their collapse. After the 1982 Israeli invasion, the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut resulted in the collapse of their institutions, leading to significant higher levels of violence. Christian militiamen massacred 1.700 refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps (Fisk, 2012). The expulsion also resulted in the removal of the social and economic institution within the camps – with that employment and income – causing new grievances.

4.3.2.5 National politics

The confessional nature of Lebanese national politics played a significant role in the emergence of the conflict and in the escalation and de-escalation of violence throughout the conflict. The confessional system reinforced sectarian identification and consciousness. Sectarian leaders incited the use of mass violence, committed human rights violations and invited foreign military powers – in order to preserve their privileges in the confessional system.

In the years preceding the conflict, Lebanon was experiencing political tensions and confrontations. The sectarian system called for a distribution of power along sectarian lines. The National Pact of 1943 specified that the religious communities would be equitable represented in public employment and cabinet posts. In practice, the cabinet posts were dived among the six largest religious communities, and the smaller ones were often excluded from cabinet representation (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 10). This type of system indicates that citizens derive rights from their communal affinity instead of individual rights. Underprivileged communities, such as the Shia community, had a secondary status. In this way, the sectarian balance in the state and its institutions conserved the unequal treatment of weaker groups.

The confessional system created Christian dominance, as it prescribed that the head of state should be a Christian and a small majority of the parliamentary seats would be held by

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Christians. De facto, decisions needed the consent of both the (Maronite) president and the (Sunni Muslim) prime minister. The mere comparative advantage of the president’s office was the ability to appoint the higher administrative positions (Hanf, 2015). The nature of the political system fuelled political and socio-economic grievances amongst the Muslim community, who claimed the socio-economic disparities were caused by their lack of political resources. In this way, confessionalism contributed indirectly to escalation of the conflict. Especially, the Shia community was pushing political reform, since the National Pact of 1943 assigned the power to the Maronite and Sunni political elites.

National politics were increasingly strained by domestic political calls. From the onset of the civil war, Muslim political leaders called for a more equal balance of power between the Christian and the Muslim communities. They claimed that the National Pact did no longer apply, since the demographic composition of Lebanon had changed with the influx of 400.000 Palestinian refugees by the mid-1970s, who were predominantly Sunni Muslim. The Palestinians comprised almost 15 percent of the Lebanese population (El Khazen, 2000). In other words, the Palestinians formed a demographic threat to the Christian community. The political leaders also focused on improving the economic position of the Muslim community. The Maronite politicians feared that an improved economic position of Muslims would mean political reconfiguration of powers (Khalaf, 2002). They reasoned that the economic position of the Muslim community would only improve, if it would enjoy a greater share in the public sector employment and the control of private companies. Therefore, calls of the Muslim community were ignored, which contributed to the outbreak of the conflict.

Additionally, national politics were also strained by an external factor, the armed presence of Palestinian organisations. In particular, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereafter: PLO). This issue can be considered to be Lebanon’s most divisive domestic issue (El Khazen, 2000). After the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, the south of Lebanon had become the main base for PLO operations against Israel (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). The military activities of the PLO continued, regardless of the state’s military interventions. Periodic clashes occurred between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Army or the Christian militias (Hanf, 2015). These tensions ultimately led to the armed clashes in Beirut between members of the Phalange party and the Palestinian organisations, known as the Ain al-Rammaneh massacre, which instigated the civil war.

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While the Palestinian organisations claimed to focus on the Palestinian cause, their presence in Lebanon became intertwined with Lebanese domestic politics. The strained political system and sectarian tensions were used by the Palestinian organisations to consolidate their political position (Abul-Husn, 1998). Alliances were sought with both sectarian (Muslim) and non- sectarian political parties to pressure the Maronites to adopt political reforms. The sectarian parties sought a redistribution of power in favour of the Muslim community, while the non- sectarian wanted a less confessional system (Hudson, 1976). Both were acceptable to the PLO. The sectarian tensions evolved into different forms of sectarian conflict throughout the conflict.

On multiple occasions, the national reconciliation attempts of the government failed, which contributed to escalation of the conflict. Since, the government was unable to reach political consensus, a political vacuum existed. Militias were aware of the fact that the Lebanese Army could not be deployed due to the joint military command. Both the president and the parliament commanded the army. This encouraged militias to expand their territory to the point of provoking the Lebanese Army (Hanafi & Long, 2010). In other words, the militias were aware of the fact that the government could not act against them due to the political impasses. This is illustrated by the heavy attacks of Bachir Gemayel’s forces on the militiamen of his rival Chamoun in August 1980, after Prime Minister Taqi Al Din had failed to form a government (Harris, 1985). Gemayel seized the window of opportunity, which indicates the interaction between “national politics” and “strategies of armed groups”.

It must be noted that parliament themselves played a less significant role in Lebanese politics than observed in other parliamentary democracies. The parliament operated in line with the government and served as a mean to legitimise its decisions (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015). It was not an independent body overseeing the government. The coalitions were formed on a local level by negotiations between clan leaders and candidates representing the religious communities (see: 4.3.2.4 local politics). These loose coalitions were established for electoral purposes. No single party had been able to win more than 12.5 percent of the parliamentary seats, and no coalition had ever won more than 35 percent (IBP, 2012, p. 98). This lack of cohesiveness resulted in a volatile political climate, which contributed to escalation of the conflict.

Overall, it can be observed that the deep rooted confessionalism in national politics did not only instigate and escalate the conflict, it also prolonged the conflict. Peace negotiations in

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Lebanon deviated from the textbook example of conflict resolution because of the confessional system. This system laid down – constitutionally and specifically – the balance of power, which complicated the peace negotiations. The different communities were unwilling to change the confessional balance, as they feared compromises would result into a reduction of their power in decision-making bodies. Thereby, the power of other confessional groups would be increased. It reflects a prisoner’s dilemma in peace negotiations. In this way, the institutionalised confessional balance resulted in a lack of flexibility amongst the warring factions, which complicated the peace negations (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015).

4.3.2.6 Regional politics

Regional events put immense burdens on the political system. The rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s fuelled sectarian tensions. Additionally, the Sunni Muslims supported the anti- western policies of Egyptian president Nasser, while the Maronites opposed them. Lebanon was facing a civil war in 1958 when the Maronite president called upon the United States for help. The arrival of American marines in Beirut instigated the violence between Christian and Muslim communities. After the Six Days War and the PLO expulsion from Jordan in 1970, the PLO headquarters were moved to Beirut. This changed the demographic ratio in advantage of Sunni Muslims. It also provoked Israeli reprisals, who held the Lebanese government accountable for the attacks of the PLO. The Lebanese Army was unable to control the PLO or defend its southern region form Israeli attacks. The latter resulted in the emigration of Shias from rural to urban areas. Meanwhile, Syrian president Al Assad adopted a more assertive foreign policy towards Lebanon.

The above mentioned regional developments had shaped the background at which the Lebanese Civil War would take place. Regional politics continued to play an escalatory role throughout the conflict.

Arab-Israeli conflict

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the issue had affected relations between the Arab and Western world, relations between the Arab nations and their domestic politics. The Arab- Israeli conflict influenced the Lebanese civil war in several ways.

In 1967, Egypt, Syria and Jordan were overwhelmingly defeated by Israel in the Six Day War. This defeat followed the earlier Arab defeat in the 1948 First Arab Israeli War and the

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disintegration of the UAR in 1961. The Lebanese Army had participated in the 1948 First Arab Israeli War without major losses. The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon had established mutual respect of their shared border (Hanf, 2015). Until the mid-1960s, Israel was perceived as the least hostile neighbour. The Arab states had respected the decision of Lebanon to no participate militarily in the struggle against Israel. The 1967 Khartoum summit recognised that the armed resistance of the PLO would take place from Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and not Lebanon (Bickerton & Klausner, 2007).

Still, it can be argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict played a significant escalatory role in the Lebanese civil war. The Arab defeat of 1967 paved the way for two developments that would influence the political stability of Lebanon: the Palestinian national movement (1) and the revival of Islamic fundamentalism (2).

The Palestinian National Movement

In 1948 the Arab nations were confronted with the unforeseen fact that Israel controlled more territory than laid down in the partition plan of the United Nations (Hanf, 2015, p. 147). The neighbouring states housed tens of thousands Palestinian refugees, and supported the creation of the PLO. After the crushing defeat of 1967 Six Days War, the PLO’s expulsion From Jordan, Palestinians felt forced to take matters into their own hands and Palestinian nationalism surged. The Cairo agreement of November 1969 between Lebanon and the PLO, gave the latter extraterritorial rights (Suleiman, 1999).

The rise of the Palestinian National Movement and their settlement in Lebanon contributed significantly to the outbreak of the civil war, as it compromised the armed forces, polarised Lebanese politics, and increased the number of refugees. The PLO established bases in the south-east of Lebanon, recruited in Lebanese refugee camps, and increased acts of violence along the Israeli-Lebanese border in 1968. The PLO attacks from Lebanese territory on Israel led to insurmountable disagreements between the political parties. This led to destabilisation of the political relationships between Lebanese and Palestinians, which resulted in armed clashes. Attempts of the government to control the PLO situation failed utterly (Bickerton & Klausner, 2007).

The Palestinian National Movement continued to play an escalatory role throughout the conflict. Israel responded to the PLO attacks with heavy air raids and reprisals, including civil targets, which heavily contributed to the breakdown of political life in Lebanon (Hanf, 2015).

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It would eventually lead to the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasion. The Syrian government supported the PLO’s resistance role and their attacks on Israel, which reflects their broader aim to control the region and push Israel to the side-lines. It would temporarily withdraw its support for the PLO in 1982, as it feared a military confrontation with Israel (Rasler, 1983). The conflict offered both Israel and Syria the opportunity to influence internal Lebanese affairs and regional affairs, which escalated the level of violence.

Important to note is that the mutual interaction of the regional conflict – eventually leading to multiple foreign interventions – and sectarianism, led to the outbreak of violence in 1975. The sectarian tensions were used by the PLO to consolidate its position in Lebanon. They agreed to support the political parties opposing the Christian hegemony in return for support in its own struggle with the Lebanese state (Makdisi, 2004). The PLO was supported by other Arab states, such as Libya and Iraq, who felt that Lebanon should offer the PLO freedom of actions. Both states provided financial and material support to the Palestinian forces throughout the conflict, which led to prolonging the conflict, as it made the costly war affordable (Hanf, 2015).

Besides the settlement of the Palestinian National Movement, it can be observed that the refugee flows itself played an escalatory role. The population movements functioned as a mechanism by which conflict spread across the region. The presence of Palestinian refugees played an escalatory role in Lebanon, as refugees expanded the PLO’s social networks. Although a minority of the refugees engaged directly engage in violence, refugee flows still facilitated transnational arms trade, insurgents, and ideologies; changed the ethnic composition of the state; and increased economic competition (Saleyhan & Gleditsch, 2006). In this way, the presence of Palestinian refugees contributed to the escalation of the conflict.

The revival of Islamic fundamentalism

After the crushing defeat of 1967 the moral crisis paved the way for Islamic fundamentalist movements in several Arab countries. In earlier times, the pan-Arab socialist governments in Egypt, Syria and Iraq had marginalised Islamic fundamentalist movements. Although secular movements, such as Nasserism and Baathism, were seen as modern progressions of Arab nationalism, repression was used to suppress supporters of radical religious movements (Zakaria, 2007). The Arab defeat became a crisis of Arabism, as it revealed the weak political and social situation in the Arab East. Islamic fundamentalists rose to the occasion and argued that the Arab defeat was an evident failure of secular Arabism. According to them, the

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solution was to be found in re-establishing the Islamic foundations of Arab states. New political movements caused unease to the established regimes across the region, amongst others in Lebanon (Hanf, 2015).

The Arab crisis – the military defeats by Israel, the unequal socio-economic development, the political repression, the unequal distribution of wealth and the cultural impact of Westernisation – was intensified by the Lebanese sectarian system. These developments influenced the political dynamics of Islamic militancy in Lebanon, escalating the conflict. Islamic fundamentalist groups were formed in the late 1970s and found themselves in constant struggle with the Lebanese political system. Their militias also experienced major opposition from the Christian, Druze, moderate Sunni and Shia militias, as well as from Syria and Israel (Jaber, 1997), which resulted in escalation of the conflict.

The Islamic fundamentalist organisations were extremely fragmented, which undermined their strength. At least 20 Islamic organisations existed in Lebanon, but only two Islamic movements were able to gain organisational and political functions similar to the political parties (Hamzeh, 2000): Hezbollah and Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah. Other organisations relied upon an individual religious or clan leader in their functioning. This does not mean that other movements, such as the Amal movement, did not enjoy popular support.

The Shia Islamist political party, Hezbollah, was established with support of Iran in 1985. The government’s neglect of the rural areas heavily populated by Shia, the disregard of Shia’s call for political power, and the lack of action against the Israeli attacks fostered the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon. The feelings of deprivation amongst the Shia secured Hezbollah of popular support, which evolved into an effective network of supporters (CIA, 1987). The Sunni Islamist political party, Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah, was established in 1964. It is considered to be the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the strongest Sunni Islamist organisation in Lebanon. The group aimed to establish an Islamic order based on shari’a law. Both organisations found themselves ideologically and strategically challenged by the Lebanese political system (Hamzeh, 2000) and resorted to violence.

On the one hand, Islamic fundamentalist organisations offered a range of social welfare services (e.g. education, health care, and housing) and participated in political life. Hezbollah controlled 3 hospitals, 17 medical centres and a commercial network that included supermarkets, petrol stations, department stores and construction companies. Al-Jama’ah al- Islamiyah offered similar services, although less professionalised (Hamzeh, 2000). The

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organisations gained popular support by offering these social welfare services (see: 4.3.3.1 strategy of armed groups).

On the other hand, the organisations established militias to perform their military activities. Hezbollah created al-Jihad, while Al-Jama’ah created Qwat al-Fjar (the Dawn forces). The Islamist groups had established along sectarian and geographical lines (Byers, 2003). Shia Muslims living in southern Lebanon joined Hezbollah, while Shia Muslims in the Beqaa valley (eastern Lebanon) joined Islamic Amal. Sunni Muslims joined Al-Jama'ah or Al- Ahbash. The resulting wave of Islamic militancy heightened the level of violence throughout the conflict. Intra-sectarian fighting between Hezbollah and Amal underlines the escalatory role the militias of Islamic fundamentalist organisations have played.

Syrian military intervention & Israeli military invasion

Between 1976 and 2006, Lebanon was confronted with major military interventions of Syria, and military invasions of Israel. This foreign involvement would have a tremendous escalatory effect on the conflict. The most loss of life was caused by the Syrian intervention of 1976, and the 1982 Israeli invasion. Both confrontations involved foreign forces: Numbers of the casualties vary widely due to the chaos of war, mass graves and the absence of impartial organisations (Shipler, 1982). The incentives of both foreign forces seem to be a) offering support to one of the warring factions or b) establishing hegemony over Lebanon (Hanf, 2015).

Both the 1976 Syrian military intervention and the 1982 Israeli military invasion increased the levels of conflict – on the short and long term. It can be observed that the Syrian and Israeli government differed in the strategic timing of their intervention. The Syrian troops were deployed in a period of de-escalating conflict in Lebanon, while the Israeli troops took positions during a period of escalating conflict (Rasler, 1997). Social cohesion between Lebanese non-governmental groups was still relatively high prior to the Syrian intervention, while social polarisation was high at time of the Israeli invasion. Lastly, the cooperation between Syria and Muslim-leftist groups had diminished prior the Syrian intervention, while cooperation between Israel and Christian-rightist groups had increased before the Israeli invasion (ibid.).

The observations offer several insights in the intentions of Lebanon’s neighbours. The Syrian government sought to mediate the conflict in 1976. The Lebanese civil war – and the PLO’s

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armed presence in particular – had caught Syria’s attention. The signing of the 1973 Sinai Interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel had changed the regional power balance. If it could gain influence in Lebanese internal politics, it would positively influence Syria’s position in Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab politics (El Khazen, 2000). Syria legitimised its intervention by stressing its historical ties with Lebanon and their mutual security interests. As stated by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Khadam ‘Syria’s security is a function of Lebanon’s security’ (Al Nahar, 23 September 1975).

More specifically, the Syrian interventions can be placed in the context of the simmering Arab Cold War of the 1960s. The inter-Arab relations cooled due to the power struggle between the revolutionary regimes (i.e. the Nasser regime of Egypt) and the conservative regimes (i.e. the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria). Both sides intervened in the internal affairs of other Arab states (i.e. Jordan, Yemen and Lebanon) and used civil conflicts to fight proxy wars (Ryan, 2012). In other words, the Assad regime pursuit to consolidate Syrian influence by deploying Syrian troops on Lebanese soil in the first phase of the conflict. In later phases, it would do so by introducing pro-Syrian political elements in Lebanese politics. The attempts of Syria to restore the security vacuum intensified political polarisation in Lebanon, which increased the levels of violence throughout the conflict.

The Israeli government argued that the 1982 Israeli invasion attempted to eliminate the security threat posed by the PLO along the Israeli-Lebanese border. At close observation, it becomes clear that General Sharon attempted to annihilate the political infrastructure of the PLO throughout Lebanon at large and assure the installation of a pro-Israeli (Phalangist) government. Like President Assad, he sought to shift the regional power balance in his own advantage. However, Israeli misconceptions about Lebanese politics and society led to strategic miscalculations. Sharon only succeeded in expelling the PLO armed presence from Lebanon. The Israeli invasion divided Lebanon politically and economically. This caused Lebanese to feel even more frustrated about the PLO armed presence (Hiro, 1993).

Besides Syria and Israel, other states tried to influence the conflict’s outcome. For example, Libya, who supported the Palestinian and Sunni militias, while it fulfilled the role as a mediator between the PLO and the Syrian government at multiple occasions. Another party to the conflict was Egypt, who tried to limit the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, and supported those who opposed the Syrian authority, such as the Christian-rightist militias. Later in the

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conflict, Egypt chose to support the Palestinians as the Syrian government shifted from ally to enemy of the Palestinian groups (Hanf, 2015, p. 184).

In the end, foreign military intervention would contribute to de-escalation of the conflict. In 1990, the Lebanese government struggled to remove General Aoun from the presidential in Baabda. A military campaign was launched, after President Hrawi had secured international approval to militarily intervene. Syria supported the Lebanese Army with a full-fledged military campaign. Syria was also given an international green light for the military intervention in return for more material support in the Gulf War (Harris, 1997). Although the intervention escalated the conflict on the short term, the dissolution of the military government of Aoun marked the end of the civil war.

Overall, the foreign interventions and foreign invasion contributed to the long duration of the conflict. It can be argued that the domestic struggle could have ended in October 1976, but the presence of foreign powers internationalised the conflict in the post–Riyadh Conference period. In particular, the governments of Syria and Israel continued to fulfil an escalatory role by providing (financial) support to the warring factions. More specifically, from the late 1970s, the Syrian government attempted and succeeded to dominate Lebanese politics, establishing what is described as a Syrian hegemony (Hiro, 1993).

4.3.2.7 International politics

Foreign military intervention

The Lebanese civil war had a strong external dimension considering the military interventions of foreign forces. Syrian troops were the first to intervene in 1975 and remained stationed throughout the conflict. In fact, the troops would not withdraw until 2005. The Syrian troops occupied East Lebanon with 20.000-40.000 troops. In 1978, the first Israeli invasion led to the deployment of 4.000-15.000 troops of UNIFIL, which remain operational to this day. In 1982, the second Israeli invasion led to the Israeli occupation of 10% of Lebanese territory. Around 1.000-1.500 Israeli troops would remain deployed until 2000. Also, in 1982, the MNF was deployed to support the Lebanese Army with the expulsion of the PLO armed forces. The MNF consisted of 6.000 American, French, Italian and British troops, which would withdraw in 1983, after heavy attacks on their barracks, causing almost 300 casualties (Heiberg & Holst, 1986).

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The weakness of the Lebanese government derived from foreign dominance. The presence of tens of thousands foreign troops in Lebanon altered the dynamics of the conflict significantly. These foreign military interventions escalated rather than de-escalated the conflict (see: 4.3.2.6 regional politics). The most likely reason being the lack of a comprehensive agreement involving and supported by the warring factions in Lebanon.

Foreign mediation

The war derived from regional tensions but the involvement of international mediators increased tensions rather than ensured stability. Foreign mediation contributes to escalation of the conflict at several moments.

Between 1975 and 1989, most conflict resolution initiatives came from Saudi Arabia under the flag of the Arab League. Lebanon, Syria and the PLO participated in the 1976 peace talks in Riyadh. The peace agreement resulted in an immediate truce, as well as the creation and deployment of the ADF in October 1976. Both the truce and the imposition of the ADF troops can be considered to have failed. The truce was only temporarily and resulted in higher levels of violence. The ADF was mainly composed of Syrian soldiers and officers (27.000 out of 30.000), while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait mostly offered financial support (Hiro, 1993). The ADF was placed under authorisation of President Sarkis. De facto, the agreement endorsed Syrian involvement to restore order in Lebanon (De Rouen & Heo, 2007, p. 485). The Syrian armed presence fuelled internal tensions, and also resulted in higher levels of violence. Another failed attempt of the Arab League was the creation of the Arab Tripartite High Commission in May 1989. The ensuing Tripartite Accord was only short lived and lost its impact, as the Maronite leadership abandoned the agreement. National Reconciliation without the Maronite community was simply not possible (ibid.). The failed national reconciliation attempts were followed by higher levels of violence, as the militias would express their dissatisfaction of the input or outcome with attacks.

The UN would only start its mediation efforts after the Israeli invasion of 1978. The Israeli occupation of the southern region led the UNSC to call for a ceasefire and the establishment of a peacekeeping force in South Lebanon. UNIFIL was created to assure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its authority (O’Ballance, 1998). The second Israeli invasion of 1982 led to an adjustment of the mandate. The United States started pressuring Israel to withdraw its troops from Beirut, end the siege of West

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Beirut, and evacuate the Palestinian militias (Hanf, 2015). Simultaneously, the international peacekeeping force known as the MNF was created in September 1982.

The MNF consisted of American, French, and Italian troops, which arrived in October 1982. Following the October 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, which caused 307 soldiers their lives, the MNF was dissolved in March 1984, and UNIFIL took over its mission (O’Ballance, 1998). This indicates that the militias considered the US to be a participant of the civil war rather than an observer, which made them a legitimate target (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015). This resulted in the 1983 Beirut Barack Bombing.

Foreign mediation also played a significant role in de-escalation of the conflict. The Arab league was able to exert pressure and to offer a forum for negotiations. In January 1989, the Arab League asked the king of Saudi Arabia, the king of Morocco, and the president of Algeria to resolve the Lebanese conflict (Norton 1991). Their efforts resulted in the Taif Agreement (i.e. National Reconciliation Accord or Document of National Accord) consisting of political and administrative reforms that “provided the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon” (Krayem, 1997, p. 411).

The agreement was negotiated, signed and ratified by the surviving members of the 1972 Lebanese Parliament (El Khazen, 2000). The accord slightly modified the balance of power in Lebanon resulting to an enhanced position of Sunni and Shia Muslims. This reflects that the tensions diffused when initial grievances were addressed. It must be noted that the negotiations did not dissolve the sectarian system. It only used a different formula for the division of power. Furthermore, the agreement enshrined Syria’s influence in Lebanon, as it called for Syria to help the Lebanese government spread its authority over Lebanese territory. This loss of sovereignty caused a new political grievance (Lawson, 1984). Nevertheless, the elite peacebuilding would result into de-escalation of the conflict by 1990. The accord reasserted Lebanese authority in Southern Lebanon (occupied by Israeli troops) and specified a time frame for the withdrawal of Syrian troops (El Khazen, 2000). In the post-war period, it would become clear that structural reforms to promote reconciliation would be delayed or blocked by the same political elites (Conciliation Resources, 2012). This reflects the limits of the confessional system.

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Diaspora

The GDP of Lebanon dropped with 30 percent in 1975 and another 40 percent in 1976 (Picard, 2000). Both the population and the militias turned to external actors for financial support. In this way, the Lebanese who had fled the deteriorating security situation became the financial supporters of those who had stayed behind. The diaspora positioned around several political issues: the relations with Israel, the role of Syria, the identity of Lebanon, the recovery of Lebanese sovereignty (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 45).

The financial support was provided to militias on a sectarian base. The conflict was regarded as an issue of sectarian balance, and diaspora sought to show their sectarian solidarities. For example, the Shia organisations Amal and Hezbollah received support from Lebanese in West Africa, while the Lebanese Forces collected financial support from Australia and the United States. The support from Lebanese diaspora was detached from the local priorities. It mostly increased the military capacity of various militias, which raised the level of fighting (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 29). The revenues obtained from diaspora sources were estimated at the time to be $1.5–2.5 billion per year (Picard, 2000). The international funding of arms led to an escalation of the conflict. It also prolonged the conflict, since it enabled militias to fund for the costly war.

Cold War dynamics

The Middle East had become an arena of the Cold War. The USSR challenged the Wests pre- dominance in the region. It could profit from Europe’s mistakes, the anti-Israeli bias, and its lack of neo-colonial intentions. The US tried to counterbalance power shifts by introducing the Eisenhower Doctrine, promising economic and military aid to Middle Eastern states that felt threatened by nations controlled by International Communism (Yagub, 2004). Arab states were urged to band together against the threat of the USSR, while the US ignored the threat of Israel. This doctrine aimed to undermine Nasser, who maintained close ties with Moscow and responded by declaring war on all such Western plots (Hirst, 2010). Syria chose to deepen Arab relations with the USSR, and entered into a short lived political union with Egypt in 1958. It was followed by the military coup in Iraq, which suggested more pro-Western bastions might fall (Yagub, 2004).

The regional and international contest shifted to the small, sectarian state of Lebanon. The Cold War dynamics played an escalatory role in the conflict, as it accelerated the pace of

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polarisation within Lebanese society: a process that had been taking place since the 1958 political crisis. The Christian-rightist camp sided with the West, while the Muslim-leftist camp sided with Soviet-aligned Arab states (Hirst, 2010). The USSR and USA fought the cold war by supporting militias’ ´belonging´ to their ideological camp. The militias were perceived as proxies: an inexpensive tool to promote the superpower´s interests. Militias of both camps received foreign support in terms of military equipment, which will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section (see: 4.3.3.2 capacity of armed groups). The total foreign support Lebanese militias received is estimated at $30 billion, which is twice the amount the militias were able to generate themselves (Makdisi, 2004). In this way, the Cold War dynamics contributed to prolonging the conflict.

Additionally, it has been suggested that the Cold War contributed to de-escalation of the conflict. In the mid-1980s, the calls for national independence in Central and Eastern Europe became louder. This would result into a wave of revolutions that led to the collapse of communist regimes in 1989. It can be argued that the warring factions in Lebanon had been taken into account the changing Cold War dynamics in the negotiations in Taif. They might have realised that the collapse of communist regimes would change the regional and international power balance, resulting to the loss of unconditional foreign support they had been receiving from their allies (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). In this way, the Cold War dynamics might have (indirectly) played a de-escalatory role in the conflict.

4.3.2.8 Natural disasters

In Lebanon no natural disasters occurred during the conflict.

4.3.2.9 Geography

Geography was a significant factor in determining the onset and the duration of the conflict. The conflict was mostly fought in rugged terrain or urban settings. The mountainous landscape created an incentive for armed forces to initiate a conflict, since the state’s security forces may have difficulty locating those forces (Fearon & Laiton, 2003). The mountainous landscape did not only serve to hide militias, it also offered them opportunity to take control of a specific area. High levels of ethnic and religious concentration occurred in different parts of Lebanon (see figure 5). The mountainous landscape had been isolating, protecting, and developing numerous factional groups based on religion, clan, and ethnicity throughout

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history (Hiro, 1993). For instance, the Christian community was able to isolate themselves from other communities because of their location in Mount Lebanon.

Figure 5: Ethno-religious concentrations (source: ICTJ, 2013)

The geographical settings offered the local militias strategic advantages. A local militia with the right military equipment (e.g. anti-tank rocket) and familiar with every inch of the terrain will outrun a military superior enemy. The mountain and city warfare made rapid advances almost impossible. The militias were mostly on the defence, and rarely gained some of the territory of their opponents (Hanf, 2015), which contributed to prolonging the conflict. The defensive mode might have also derived from the idea that militias were believed to be fighting for the survival of their communities, and, therefore, lacked the motivation and/or capability for offensive operations. In short, militias were capable of defending their own territory, but inadequate when it came to invading others territory.

The type of warfare was also influenced by the geographical features of Lebanon. Conventional warfare relies on mobile warfare in spacious territory. ‘Tanks can’t climb like

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goats’ as stated by a Lebanese general explaining the lack of motorised infantry (Hanf, 2015, p. 336). In 15 years, only two instances of conventional warfare can be observed. First, the Palestinians attacked the Christian Heartland in 1976, which came close to conventional warfare, but remained a frail attempt. Second, the 1982 confrontation between the Israeli and Syrian armies can be seen as conventional warfare. At first, the Israeli troops did not storm cities or Palestinian camps and the Syrian troops only withdrew to positions from where they could protect an Israeli attack after Syrian air forces were shot down (ibid.).

The level of violence was higher when fighting took place in urban settings, in which no sect was dominant. The conflict began in Beirut, where all ethnic and religious factions resided and the highest number of casualties occurred during the conflict. After the Battle of the Hotels in Beirut (1975-77) between the Christian-leftist and Muslim-rightist camp, the ‘sitting’ war began. Militias started shooting and shelling attacks across the green line, but did not overstep the line (Fisk, 2001).

Finally, the geography influenced escalation of the conflict in a different way. The Lebanese government was blamed by citizens for its lack of action in the southern region (Hanf, 2015). In these remote areas, the lack of government control led to a deterioration of the security situation. A similar observation can be made in the Beqaa valley, where the geographical disconnection from the rest of the country caused a lack of governmental control, which offered militias the opportunity to engage in illegal activities, such as drugs production and trafficking (Boon, Lovelace & Huq, 2010) (see: 4.3.3.4 criminalisation).

Strive for water resources

Water resources remain a fundamental issue of Middle East politics that can easily be forgotten. The constant struggle for the Middle East rivers, such as the Joran, Litani, Orontes and Yarmuk, is considered to be a cause of the 1976 Arab-Israeli war (Cooley, 1984). The strive for water resources can also be related to the Lebanese civil war.

In 1978, Israel launched “Operation Litani” ostensibly in response to the Coastal Road Massacre by the PLO faction Fatah, which killed 38 Israeli civilians. An alternative explanation is that the Israeli troops invaded the southern region to take control of the Litani River and direct it into Israel. For years, Israel suffered from a severe water shortage. Besides influencing the economic development, the water shortage is argued to have caused the

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political strife between Israel and Arab nations (Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015).

The 1978 South Lebanon Conflict shows the strive for water resources resulted in high levels of violence, causing 2.000 deaths (Fisk, 2001). UN involvement de-escalated the conflict and enforced a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops, which would last until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Again, Israel claimed it invaded Lebanon to expel Palestinian fighters from the southern region. Only now, Israel had acquired almost complete control of the Jordan River flow, which increased their fresh water supplies by almost 50 percent (Wessels, 2015, p. 608).

Strategic water resources influence a state’s development. Although Israeli troops left southern Lebanon in 2000, it continues to control the Golan Heights to protect the water security and economic growth of Israel (Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015). Both Israeli invasions indicate that the scarcity of water resources played an escalatory role in the conflict.

4.3.2 State perspective

4.3.2.1 State action – coercive force

The intense fighting between the Christian-rightist and Muslim-leftist militias reduced the government’s role to the side-lines. In the pre-civil war period, the government was already struggling with the PLO activities in Lebanon and the lack of consensus on the solution. The Lebanese government attempted to control the PLO situation in 1969 and 1973. Both attempts failed and resulted in heavy fighting between the Palestinian militias and the Lebanese Army, fuelled by mistrust and diverging objectives (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 14).

The outbreak of the war can be linked to repressive state action, as the Lebanese government attempted to stabilise the Sidon situation by deploying of the army (Hirst, 2010). The clashes between the Lebanese Army and Sidon fisherman in April 1975 resulted in significant higher level of violence. The controversy of the confrontation was not only the deployment of the army against civilian protesters. It was also perceived as an act of repression against Muslims. At that time, Maronites dominated the army’s command council, and the Muslim militias perceived the army as a tool of repression for the Maronite president (Rabinovich, 1985). The sectarian structure caused a structural impasse that withheld the government from deploying

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the army. In other words, the government was afraid deploying the army would increase sectarian tensions and chose not to act, which eventually resulted in higher levels of violence.

For instance, in the first phase, the government was sharply divided on the issue of the Palestinian (armed) presence in Lebanon. It could not take effective action, as the (Maronite) President and (Sunni) Prime Minister were unable to agree on whether or not to deploy the army (Hiro, 1993). In this way, the sectarian tensions prevented the government from taking coercive measures to repress acts of violence by the Palestinian organisations. In the second phase, the Israeli invasion led to attacks on Palestinian and Lebanese targets. The Israeli military retaliation intensified the dividedness between politicians supporting and opposing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon (Hirst, 2010). Lebanese felt that every community or family needed to be able to protect themselves, when there is no government to protect them (Gaub, 2010). In this way, the lack of coercive force resulted in escalation of the conflict (see figure 6). The communal mobilisation of militias by all major sectarian groups eventually led the Lebanese government to lose its monopoly of coercive power.

Figure 6: Incidents over time (source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015)

The state’s possibility to take coercive action extremely diminished with the disintegration of the army. In 1984, around 900 Sunni Muslims refused to fight against their fellow Muslims. The AAL was established, which would fight along the side of the Muslim-leftist parties’ militia and the PLO. The revolt spread to other barracks and within a month, 2.000 soldiers deserted, taking with them heavy equipment. By the end of March, the entire army of 19.000 had dissolved. Around half of them had joined the militias, while the other half had returned

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home (Yapp, 2014). The revolt resulted from discontent with the pre-dominant Christian leadership (Rabinovich, 1985; Hagopian, 1989). Another argument is that the revolt was orchestrated by the PLO (El Khazen, 2000). Either way the disintegration made the militias, instead of the Lebanese national army, the primary combatant force. By mid-1984 the men of the Lebanese Army were scattered across the regions. The competition for the army men’s support would continue throughout the rest of the conflict.

Thus, the Lebanese Army as a peace keeping institution fell apart. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army can be linked to Lebanese national politics, in particular, the nature of the political system. The confessional system demanded a sectarian balance in the Lebanese Army. The higher echelons (i.e. the officer corps) consisted mostly of Christian Maronites. Conditions to enter the officer corps included the baccalaureate (i.e. high school diploma), high performance on tests, no criminal record and adherence to the confessional quota (Gaub, 2010). However, the confessional quota did not guarantee equal representation, since access to education and a certain political mind-set were also part of the prerequisites. This decreased the chances for Shia Muslims to enter the officer corps. In general, Christian Maronites had acquired the important economic and political position in the post-independence period (ibid.). Therefore, the army was considered to be a tool of power of the Maronite president, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the entire armed forces (Kechichian, 1985), ensuring the existence of the predominant Christian confessional system (Rabinovich, 1985).

Towards the end, the Lebanese Army would play an active and de-escalatory role in the conflict. The Lebanese parliament and Syria could not agree upon the successor of President Amin Gemayel, causing an institutional crisis (Hiro, 1993). Therefore, General Aoun – Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces – was appointed prime minister, who is in fact a Maronite Christian. Gemayel reasoned that in the case of a presidential vacuum, the prime minister acted as president, and an exception could be made. The act was interpreted as provocation by the Muslim community, who considered the solution unconstitutional, since the Prime Minister was supposed to be a Sunni Muslim. The previous Prime Minister, Hoss, declared the appointment invalid. The situation spiralled out of control, when General Aoun provoked intra-Christian fighting and declared a War of Liberation against Syria (Gaub, 2010). After diplomatic efforts failed, President Gemayel secured international support for a military intervention. The Lebanese Army was deployed against General Aoun with support of Syrian forces. At last, Aoun left the presidential palace and fled to the French Embassy.

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Although the state’s use of coercive force led to a higher level of violence for a short period, the dissolution of the military government of Aoun marked the end of the civil war.

Coercive force and human rights violations

From the beginning of the conflict, sectarian abductions and killings by militias targeted civilians. Other civilians were arbitrarily detained, tortured, and even executed in detention centres and prisons by the state. The use of torture was common in Lebanese state prisons, as well as in the Israeli and Syrian detention centres (ICTJ, 2013). For instance, human rights organisations reported about death subsequent to torture and ill-treatment of prisoners in the Khiyam Detention Center, which was the main detention centre of the SLA. Although the detention centre was staffed by the SLA, the evidence suggests that Israeli officials have been directly involved in affairs, such as interrogation and torture (Amnesty International, 1992).

Most of the detainees belonged to militias opposing Israel and the SLA, such as Hezbollah (ICTJ, 2013). For example, on January 11, 1985, the South Lebanese Army abducted Jamal Nejib Sharara from his home and detained him without charge or trial. He was detained in “Center 17” in Bint Jbeil and later in the Khiyam Detention Center, where he was tortured. The methods included being giving electric shocks and being dragged behind a moving car. He would not be released until May 1, 1996 (Amnesty International, 1992). These deliberate human rights abuses were seen as an appropriate response to the hostility of other confessional groups.

Besides suffering from torture and ill-treatment, the detainees were held without a trial and without contact with their families. In the first place, the unlawful processes can be related to the collapse of the judicial system during the conflict, which made it virtually impossible to prosecute militiamen within the existing legal framework (Hanf, 2015). It might also relate to the confessional nature of the judicial system. Confessional identity had been integrated into the administrative and judicial structures of the state. Traditionally, each community had managed the communal affairs under its own leadership (Johnson, 2001). The judicial system that was in place at the start of the conflict still allowed confessional law in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance. In the more remote areas, such as the mountains, the judicial systems were virtually autonomous from the central authority (ibid.). The Druze and Shia governed by their own principles. The collapse of the central judicial authority might have re-established judicial systems at community level along confessional lines. This raises the question whether strengthening the judicial system might have contained the human rights

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violations by state institutions. Even more, it might have significantly limited the level of violence between confessional groups.

4.3.2.2 State action – policy solution

The conflict was framed in ethno-religious terms, but the perseverance of the confessional system might have been government policy in order to serve those in power. The very fact that political rights were defined in terms of communities rather than individuals caused communal tensions. The policy solutions offered by the Lebanese government reinforced the confessional system rather than diminished its significance.

The confessional system sought to preserve the sectarian balance between the two dominant religious groups (the Maronite Christians and the Sunnis). This balance intended to prevent the hegemony of one political or religious group. At the same time, disagreements between the president and the prime minister divided the cabinet along sectarian lines (Hiro, 1993), which contributed to the breakdown of the state’s authority. Nevertheless, in the post- independence period, the confessional balance promoted political liberalism. The Lebanese people enjoyed periodic parliamentary elections and freedom of religion, expression and association.

Over time, upholding the sectarian balance grew more and more difficult. The parliamentary members increasingly adopted a pacifist stance as they believed it would lower sectarian tension (Hanf, 2015). They clung onto pacifism throughout the civil war, which would lead to a government characterised by political immobilisation and stagnation. The parliamentary members avoided discussing any political and economic issues, as the discussion itself might imply the privileging of one sectarian group, which would affect the position of another group (El Khazen, 2000). For example, the issue of social or economic inequalities would not be discussed, as it was intertwined with the issue of political power. If the state would decide upon policy reforms to improve the social or economic position of one sectarian group, it would inevitably raise sectarian suspicion and feelings of marginalisation amongst other sectarian groups. The sectarian rivalry prevented the government from taking effective policy decisions. Still, the fact remains that some political leaders might have stressed the need for confessional balance in order to preserve their own personal interests. As exemplified by the fact that the ruling parties hindered the formation of opposition alliances by drawing up new administrative regulations (Hirst, 2010).

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The previous section (2.3.1 state action – coercive force) explains that the Lebanese government feared deploying the Lebanese Army would increase sectarian tensions. Eventually, it would lose its means of coercive force with the disintegration of the army in 1984. In between, the parliament adopted a new law to reform the command structure of the Lebanese Army. The president would no longer be controlling the armed forces on his own. Instead, the army would be jointly controlled by the president and the cabinet (Shehadeh, 1999). The law was meant to prevent another escalation, as witnessed in Sidon with the fisherman’s strike, where the President had deployed the army without consent of the Prime Minister. In reality, the law further complicated deploying the army because of the diverging interests within the cabinet, which also caused escalation of the conflict. The Christian-rightist camp focused on eliminating the PLO armed presence and the Syrian influence, while seeking to preserve the political system. In contrary to the Muslim-leftist camp, which focused on reforming the political system, while its Palestinian and Syrian allies were still present (Hanf, 2015).

The passivity of the Lebanese government has been criticised by both the Lebanese population and the international community. No elections took place between 1975 and 1989 (Gaub, 2010). The lack of government control in the drug producing Beqaa Valley, Palestinian refugee camps, and the southern border region received strong criticism of the international community. With regard to counter terrorism efforts, Lebanon rejected US demands to turn over Lebanese terrorist involved in the abduction and murder of US hostages that had been taking place from 1984 (CFR, 2007). The international community also expressed its criticism with regard to the lack of state action to control or dismantle militias, such as the PLO.

An attempt to turn the tide was made in 1982, when the Lebanese government adopted new legislation to deal with illegal Palestinians. However, “illegal” Palestinians were defined as those who had arrived in Lebanon after 1948, which was estimated to be half of the 500.000 Palestinians. The Lebanese Army was ordered to search and capture illegal Palestinians in West and South-Beirut. The army captured a few hundred Palestinians and demolished the homes of “illegal” Shiites (Dixon & Sarkees, 2015). This form of ‘othering’ allows states to delegitimise these non-state actors. The terrorist label also serves to deny the context and conditions that give rise to such movements (Solomon, 2015, p. 231). The government adopted a strategy of coercive force to implement its policy, which increased the feelings of grievance amongst the Palestinian and Shia community and fuelled inter-sectarian violence.

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During the conflict, the Lebanese government tried at least 12 times (small initiatives excluded) to implement a national unity agreement. This can be explained by the heartfelt grievances and strong feelings of identity. If insufficient attention is being paid to the lack of cooperation between parties because of their differences in religion and identity, it is unrealistic to expect that the parties will cooperate (Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015). It can be argued that the warring factions were not able to find common ground due to these differences.

The Taif Agreement of 1989 would eventually lay the ground for the end of militia rule. All confessional groups were represented in the committee of parliamentarians, which negotiated the conditions of the agreement. The parliamentarian agreed that the consociational power sharing had caused the conflict, and they demanded the abolishment of political representation along confessional lines (Rosiny, 2013). The absence of a timetable for the transition from consociational to centripetal system would eventually prevent any political reform from taking place. Remarkably, the disputes at hand did not change significantly over time. The 1989 agreement revolved around issues that had been discussed in every round of the negotiations: the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, militia disarmament and foreign relations (Gaub, 2015). The Lebanese government was not able to change the perception of the warring factions, mobilise the commitment needed to implement a peace agreement nor did it have the capacity to do so. This made conflict resolution particularly hard in the first three years of the conflict. Therefore, the state heavily relied on foreign mediation.

Government officials of Syria, Saudi Arabia, France, the US, the UN and the Arab League attempted to end the war (see: 4.3.2.7 international politics). The involvement of foreign powers contributed to diminishing the role of the Lebanese government in the peace process. Also, the involvement of international mediators increased tensions rather than ensured stability (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). The international mediators appointed a clan or community member as the negotiator. They assumed the person is able to represent the clan or community, if not; the person acquiring the position of power had to declare so. This instigates power struggles at the local level, which has been described more extensively in a previous section (see: 4.3.2.4 local politics). The fact that a third party decides upon the representation – instead of the clan or community itself – raised intercommunal tensions. It reflects an unnatural, power-based process of determining clan leadership or denominational group leadership. Inside the Palestinian refugee camps, such a “leadership shuffle” was identified (ibid.). People seized the opportunity to take the leadership

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upon them. Meaning, people who were not the leader traditionally, suddenly adopted leadership roles because they were legitimised by external parties, which resulted in intercommunal tensions. In this way, foreign mediation contributed to escalation of the conflict.

Additionally, the negotiation processes offer insight in the way parties acquired legitimacy, which can be linked to the Lebanese political context at large. During the conflict, traditional legitimacy shifted to charismatic legitimacy, as legitimacy was acquired by personality rather than authority (Jonkers, personal communication, December 5, 2015). In Lebanon, the confessional system establishes power allocation along fixed lines, which means that the communities are assured of political resources. The denominational groups operate within these fixed lines. Meaning, the leadership within the denominational group becomes highly important, as well as its ability to build alliances with other denominational groups (ibid.). This reveals the importance of coalition building in the Lebanese political context, which was lacking throughout the conflict.

4.3.2.3 State capacity

Military capacity

In the post-civil war period, the Lebanese government had pursued a policy of neutrality with regard to national security. Political leaders reasoned that Lebanon would not be seen as a threat by other nations due to the weakness of its armed forces (Hirst, 2010). Lebanon had a professional army of 15.000 men, and no conscription. The army was small with only 100 tanks, 150 artillery and anti-aircraft guns, 24 fighter jets and 5 patrol boats (Hanf, 2015, p. 161). The sectarian balance was to be upheld in the army as well. Around 65 percent of the officers were Christian, eighteen of the thirty-seven highest ranking officers were Muslim, and the majority of the volunteers came from the peripheral areas, in which the Shia resided (Rabinovich, 1985). The idea of conscription was dismissed by most politicians, who argued that a strong army might be tempted to interfere with politics (ibid.). Other politicians reasoned it would put their community at a disadvantage. For instance, Jumblatt opposed conscription, since the Druze not constituted more than 7 percent of the total population (Al Nahar, 1975).

The government’s military incapability to react on acts of violence led to a rapid deterioration of central authority. By March 1976, Lebanese government could no longer counteract the

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state security fragmentation (Hiro, 1993). President Frangieh solely controlled the presidential palace in Baabda, which he eventually had to leave. Moreover, the lack of public services and internal security fuelled the privatisation of these services. The political parties formed militias. These militias received foreign support to purchase small and heavy arms (see 3.4.2 capacity of armed groups). On rare occasions the militias intervened to restore order – instead of pursuing the creation of homogenous cantons by using a method of ethnic cleansing (Hanf, 2015, p. 329).

In the 1980s, the state collapsed. With the disintegration of the Army in 1984, the state had lost its means of coercive force. The main issue being that the Lebanese Army broke down along sectarian lines (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015). Half of the army’s low- and middle-ranking officers, as well as non-commissioned officers joined the militias (Yapp, 2014). Within one year, the militias were able to replace the state’s collapsing institutions. The remaining Lebanese security forces were unable to offer resistance to “the militia’s size, firepower, and ruthlessness” (Rotberg, 2003, p. 317). By 1984, the state controlled not even a tenth of Lebanon’s territory, and it no longer controlled its financial resources. In the last phase of the conflict, the Lebanese Army was reformed and deployed to remove General Aoun form the presidential palace. The success of the army offered the state the needed legitimacy to become the main security provider again (Gaub, 2015).

Economic capacity

In 1975, the service sector made up 70 per cent of the gross national product, as Lebanon did not have a significant natural resource wealth (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 7). Lebanon formed the economic hub of the region with its commercial, banking and tourist industries. Throughout the conflict, the Lebanese economy proved to be highly flexible. Commercial and financial companies were decentralised or transferred abroad, only to return to Beirut after each ceasefire.

At the outset of the conflict, the Lebanese government made use of its considerable economic reserves (1), experienced a rising demand for labour in the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of the oil price boom (2), and was challenged by a steady inflow of foreign political money to fund the militias (3) (Hiro, 1993, p. 77). However, the high levels of violence had a direct impact on the ability to produce and distribute goods (Gregorian & Kock, 2014, p. 9). The Lebanese economy suffered from the deteriorated infrastructure and facilities. The mass emigration disrupted the flow of goods due to the loss of professional skills and capital flight.

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Moreover, the lack of central authority led to a deterioration of Lebanon´s public finances. The Lebanese government was unable to collect revenues or provide minimal public services (Sab, 2014). In 1976, state authority broke down, which diminished the capability to collect tax revenues. Between 1977 and 1981, the deficits were moderate. In 1980, the Lebanese government was still able to collect 90 percent of revenues from tariffs. Although the ports of militias were closed for several months in 1983, which should have improved customs revenues, the percentage dropped to 60 percent (Hanf, 2015, p. 354).

The disintegration of the Lebanese Army in 1984 diminished the military capacity, as well as the economic capacity of the state. First, military equipment worth several billion dollars fell into the hand of militias with the disintegration. This equipment had been bought from the USA to rebuild the Lebanese Army. Second, the collapse of the army undermined confidence in the pound and resulted in a massive devaluation (see figure 7). International factors, such as the repercussions of the 1984 oil crisis, increased the decline of state revenues and resulted in a national condition of economic crisis (Hanf, 2015). The percentage dropped another 10 percent in 1986 due to the re-emergence of fifteen private sea and airports managed by various militias (Heydemann, 2000). The militias had created a parallel economy by that time – based on smuggling; illegal ports and private custom duties; forced taxation, protection money and racketeering; drugs cultivation and trade; and arms and ammunition trade (Nasr, 1990).

In sum, by the mid-1980s, the public and private economic reserves were exhausted (1); the country’s economic infrastructure was damaged severely (2); a sharp decline in the oil price dropped the number of Lebanese working in the Gulf states from 150.000 in 1982 to 65.000 in 1987 (3); the removal of the PLO form West Beirut wiped out the contribution it had made to the national GDP (4); and caused foreign paymasters to lose interest in the Lebanese war (5) (Hiro, 1993, p. 78). The long duration of the conflict negatively impacted the economic capacity, which aggravated the deteriorating situation.

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Figure 7: Inflation and exchange rate (source: Sab, 2014)

A final observation that can be made is that economic motivations played no significant role in the onset of Lebanese civil war, as claimed by the ‘greed and grievance’ thesis of Collier. In the Lebanese case, the influence of natural resources can be dismissed, as Lebanon did not have a significant natural resource wealth. The Lebanese economy heavily dependent on trade and services. This excludes the risk of conflict associated with “lootable” natural resources. According to Collier & Hoeffler (2004), the risk of conflict is higher in states with negative economic growth, while Lebanon actually experienced rapid economic growth preceding the conflict. Nevertheless, economic factors did play an important role in prolonging the duration of the conflict.

4.3.2.4 Weak/strong government

The political dynamics highly influenced the conflict, mostly causing escalation of the conflict. These political dynamics resembled a continuation of Lebanon’s history of weak government.

In the first phase, the weakness of state government led to insurmountable disagreements on the presence of Palestinian organisations in Lebanon. By 1976, the conflict led to the polarisation of the Lebanese society into the extreme right and extreme left. The competing factions had formed two opposing camps: the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National (Resistance) Movement (Hiro, 1993). Although the camps were divided along ethno-religious lines, the camps pursued political objectives. The status quo coalition sought to preserve the confessional system that structured the political, judicial and bureaucratic institutions of

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Lebanon (Rasler, 1997, p. 24). The anti-status quo coalition sought to reform the political system in order to stimulate equal parliamentary representation and the demise of sectarianism (ibid.).

The continuous need to uphold a sectarian balance resulted in weak government. It prevented the Lebanese government from taking significant administrative reforms. It also resulted in a political system that fostered corruption, nepotism and clientelism (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003). Especially the latter – political arrangements involving the exchange of money, goods and services for political support – fuelled sectarian tensions. Politicians sought to serve the interests of their electorate rather than national interests (Owen, 2004). This can be related to the National Pact, which limited state authority and increased the autonomy of sectarian groups. Lebanese politicians are deemed to feel more loyal towards their community than the country (Hafez, 2008). Upholding the public interest was neglected when it clashed with private interests (Van de Riet, personal communication, December 3, 2015). Note that the 1990 cabinet consisted of those ruling Lebanon before the civil war and the patronage networks re-emerged quickly (Mackey, 2008).

Lebanon can be considered a weak state, since the minimal state intervention had resulted in weak state institutions, which made Lebanon vulnerable to infringement of its sovereignty. This can be related to the neutrality policy it pursued with regard to its military. The government had decided to minimise the military strength of the Lebanese Army in order to assure that Lebanon would not pose a security threat to other (Arab) nations (Gaub, 2010). “The desire to clip the institutional wings of the army was stronger than any fear of the consequence of its impotence (Hanf, 2015 p. 162)”. The lingering threat of the Middle Eastern politics had not impacted the Lebanese neutrality policy. It can be questioned whether abandoning the neutrality policy, and increasing the military strength, could have prevented the Syrian interventions and Israeli invasions.

Until the end of the conflict, the Lebanese government was weakened due to several factors. The consociational political culture continued to hinder governmental action (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003), as the government was anxious not to increase the risk of escalating communal strife. The Lebanese Army faced desertion and disintegration, while the militia groups abounded (Gaub, 2010). Syrian and Israeli troops hold on to their occupied territories, which even led the Lebanese government to decide that Hezbollah should not be disarmed at the end of the war, as it functioned as a national resistance movement (Suleiman, 1999).

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Additionally, the Taif Agreement increased Hezbollah legitimacy, as it states that Lebanon shall resist Israel in all possible ways (Fayyad, 2014). Another factor diminishing the authority of the state was the financial and material support communities received from foreign nations. In this way, foreign forces were able to influence community leaders and, thereby, Lebanese internal politics (Hiro, 1993).

In 1988, the Lebanese parliament and Syria disagreed on the successor of President Gemayel, who appointed the commander-in-chief of the armed forces as interim Prime Minister (El Khazen, 2000). The decision was highly criticised, since the National Pact prescribed that the prime minister needs to be a Sunni Muslim. The previous Prime Minister, Hoss, declared the appointment invalid and refused to resign. This resulted a short period of time, in which the government of Hoss in West Beirut opposed the government of Aoun in East Beirut (Gaub, 2010). The existence of two competing governments reflects the failure of the Lebanese government. The costs of government fragmentation were high, as it resulted in one of the bloodiest periods of the conflict. This demonstrates the escalatory effect of a weak government.

In 1989, newfound political consensus ended the rule of militia. The remaining members of the parliament convened in Taif in October 1989 in order to negotiate and consolidate a peace treaty (Rosiny, 2013). Members of all warring factions resided in the National Committee, which consolidated the truce. In total, 58 of the 62 Lebanese Members of Parliament approved a national pact of reconciliation (ibid.). The successful instance of negotiation was a first step towards peace. The establishment of a national unity government led the militia to lose their legitimacy and raison d’être (Hanf, 2015). Although a military intervention was needed to remove Aoun from the presidential palace, it was political consensus and concessions that ended the Lebanese conflict. In other words, a strong government was needed to de-escalate the conflict.

4.3.3 Non-state perspective

4.3.3.1 Strategy of armed groups

The conflict led to 700,000 internally displaced persons, as the militias systematically divided Lebanon into confessional zones (i.e. cantons) (Hamzeh, 2000). Militias created semi- autonomous regions with different political, social and economic intuitions. Many people were forced to move out of their houses. All warring factions committed and suffered from

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massacres. Property damage occurred regularly. Houses were plundered and burned down; religious sites were destroyed and desecrated. It can be observed that the militias adopted a method of ethnic cleansing. The attacks on other communities were justified by focusing on the risks of exile, marginalisation or assimilation of their own community (Haugbolle, 2005).

Precise targeting was an exception rather than the rule. This can only be partially explained by the lack of trained artillerymen within militias (Hanf, 2015, p. 325). The bulk of the random shelling, targeting the civilian population, was intentional. It was common knowledge that the shelling in the urban areas would not lead to a military victory. In fact, the militias were aware of the fact that the shelling had little military impact at all. Nevertheless, the shelling continued in order to disrupt civil life and increase the feelings of fear. When violence becomes deeply embedded in a society, feelings of distrust and suspicion towards the “others” increase (Wessels, personal communication, November 25, 2015). The same strategy of fear can be observed in their military operations of sieging towns or refugee camps. The militias drove civilians out and massacred civilians rather than captivate them, which sparked sectarian tensions, as seen in the massacres of 1976. The Karantina massacre targeted the Muslims in that Christian area, the Damour massacre killed Christians; and the Tell el-Zaatar refugee camp was an attack on Palestinian refugees (Fisk, 1993).

The “othering” process can be related to the psychological warfare operations of militias. Militias’ leaders spread misinformation to intimidate the adversary’s militia, to weaken the moral of the adversary’s civilian supporters or to strengthen the moral of their own fighters and supporters (Saab, 2014). The militias channelled information – by downplaying or exaggerating events – for strategic purposes. Misinformation about financial support was spread to disconnect other militias from their supporting political party. A similar strategy was adopted by politicians, who also channelled information to their advantage (ibid.). The Lebanese communities seem to have increasingly established their own identity through opposition and vilification of the “other” (Maasri, 2012). It must be noted that an unconscious “othering” process might also have taken place and contributed to the escalation and duration of the conflict.

Psychological operations were dominated by the Lebanese Forces, who used it to intimidate and to persuade an adversary to adjust its behaviour. In the battle of Zahle, psychological warfare was used to maximise the pressure on Syria by influencing international public opinion. The militia demonstrated how a small, highly organised militia can use the media to

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gain international attention. The small town was isolated, but the Lebanese Forces managed to channel information to foreign news, describing any Syrian move as an aggressive act against the Christian community (McLaurin, 1986). Psychological operations attempted to influence enemy troops to not pull the trigger – instead of killing or wounding. However, the Lebanese militias used psychological warfare in addition to other tactics. Therefore, the debut of psychological warfare did not result into lower levels of violence.

The militias used propaganda, such as political posters, to influence the public perception of the “other” and incite military action. Posters displayed martyrs, political leaders and religious references. The poster “Our Lebanon needs you” displays Bachir Gemayel and intended to recruit fighters for the Christian militia, the Lebanese forces (see figure 8). The posters did not only refer to a militia’s power or strength, but could bring into remembrance a particular person or era of dominance (Miller, 2014). Additionally, Militias organised military parades to show their strength. The parades showcased tanks and armoured personnel carriers that they had purchased or captured from the Lebanese Army or other militias (Hanf, 2015).

Figure 8: Pierre Sadek, Our Lebanon Needs You, YOU!, Lebanese Forces (Source: Maasri & at-Tarabulsi, 2009)

Besides political posters, militias used media under their control to spread disinformation. For example, the Shia community suffered severely from the 1978 Israeli air strikes against civilian targets. Many people were forced to flee their homes. Amal began to argue that the Palestinian armed presence caused these continuous attacks. The Free Lebanon radio station, controlled by Haddad of the SLA, drove this point home by continuously repeating it (Reilly, 1982). This resulted in heavy clashes between the PLO and Amal. Similarly, other militias controlled radio stations, which they use for propaganda. It must be noted that the government

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also used the media under their control to downplay the danger of the situation. It is even argued that many kidnappings and killings of civilians took place because the public TV or radio stations had downplayed the events (Saab, 2014).

Diplomatic or political actions were followed by periods of heavy gun-fighting. When negotiations brought the envoys of foreign powers to an Arabic capital, the level of violence rose in Lebanon. The militias increased the shelling to voice their opinion, and “to bomb their way to the negotiation table” (Hanf, 2015, p. 159). For instance, on the 23rd of June 1976, the prime ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia gathered in Riyadh to discuss a peace plan presented by the Arab League (Ellis, 1999). This plan would replace the Syrian troops with an Arab Security Force, which would oversee a ceasefire. The plan was supported by the PLO-Leftist forces. However, on the same day, Phalangist militiamen attacked the Palestinian camps of Tel al-Zaatar and Jisr Bashaa, who opposed the proposition (Hiro, 1993). It must be noted that if invited to the negotiation table, militias also made strategic use of the ceasefires to increase the strength of their troops and improve their tactical positioning (El Khazen, 2000).

The warring factions fought a war of reciprocity and relative victories. Shelling was responded with counter-shelling. Raids were retaliated with reprisal raids: an eye for an eye. When militiamen sought retaliation for their losses, the chance of revenge on members of any community perceived as opponents increased, whether they had been involved in the initial fighting or not (Kalyvas, 2000). The acts of retaliation set in motion a spiral of violence, which heightened tensions between the confessional groups. While Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shi Muslims, and Druze fought for power, family rivalries within these groups aggravated the situation. For example, the intra-Maronite feud resulted in the Ehden massacre. A local Phalange commander was massacred by orders of Tony Frangieh. The phalange leader decided to retaliate with a reprisal raid in the summerhouse of the Frangieh family in Ehden, killing 40 people (Johnson, 2001).

Since the beginning of the war, the shelling by confessional affiliation was extended with taking local hostages for political reasons or ransom (Kliot, 1986). The kidnapping was also based on the principle of reciprocity. Militia kidnapped a person to offer in exchange for the release of one of their own community member. The foreign-hostage taking started mid- march 1982 when four Iranian diplomats were kidnapped by Maronite militiamen (Hemmer, 1999). The Islamic Jihad Organisation, financed by Iran, decided to retaliate with the kidnapping of the president of the American University in Beirut in July (Deeb, 1986). The

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kidnapping of Western nationals by Lebanese and Palestinian militias would continue to take place, under the control of Hezbollah. The foreign-hostage taking had the same political objective as the local one: fuelling feelings of fear. Additionally, it generated Western-media attention for the militia (Hiro, 1993, p. 153).

Other tactics used by militias were suicide attacks and political assassinations (see figure 9). In the 1980s, Hezbollah approved suicide attacks or “martyrdom operations” as a legitimate and efficient strategy. Hezbollah is believed to have been among the first armed groups to have used tactical suicide bombing in the Middle East. Hezbollah grand tactic invention was copied by other militias, due to the low-cost and high-impact character of suicide attacks (Reuter, 2004).

Figure 9: Type of attacks (source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015)

The redistribution of wealth, brought about by the militias, favoured the underprivileged and the lower middle class (Hanf, 2015). This offered militias possibilities for recruitment. They recruited young people, aged between twelve and seventeen years, from the urban lower classes. With the end of the two-year war, the recruits had to return to the classrooms, which they found extremely difficult, as they were confronted with the limited future prospects. Also, the young from the rural areas had either been forced to flee or driven from their homes in the Christian north, the Beqaa, the Chouf or Damour. These developments facilitated the recruitment of youths at later stages of the conflict (ibid., p. 332).

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The Palestinian organisations mostly recruited in the Palestinian refugee camps, where they also provided military training (Hanafi, 2008). Militias linked the atrocious conditions in these camps to the unjust balance of power. Palestinian refugees were denied basic rights, in order prevent their permanent settlement, which would change the sectarian balance in favour of the Muslim community (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015). Militias argued the camps symbolised the predominant Christian political system, which restricted refugees from basic human rights. This increased the discontent of the under-privileged Muslim community with the predominant Maronite Christian system (Hanf, 2015, p. 331). The heartfelt grievances were used in the recruitment process of new fighters by militias.

The militias sought to consolidate practices of governance in the economic and political realm. Various militias created social networks to uphold institutional arrangements (Peteet, 2015). In order to provide social services to their communities and maximise the economic opportunities created by the conflict. The various militia groups were dependent on their symbolic power (i.e. cultural and social domination), their access to external support, and their relations to the standing state apparatus (Picard, 2000). It seems inevitable that the high degree of polarisation between the Lebanese communities limited the options for cooperation. However, in the economic realm, the markets did not operate only within the new territorial borders, but also across these borders. The militias relied upon personal trust and family affiliations (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 33).

Picard (2000) introduced the idea of militia economy to explain the various strategies of militia groups to turn the wartime economy into a strategic resource. In the Lebanese case, the Palestinian economy estimated to generate 15 per cent of the GDP in 1981. Moreover, the budget of the PLO superseded the Lebanese government’s budget. The PLO upheld its own bureaucracy, army, institutions, 100 schools, 8 hospitals, 108 diplomatic missions, and employed 15.000 fighters (Hiro, 1993, p. 78). Similarly, Hezbollah controlled 3 hospitals, 17 medical centres. They had clearly taken over the states’ role as supplier of basic services (Van de Riet, personal communication, December 3, 2015).

4.3.3.2 Capacity of armed groups

The war started long before a single bullet was fired. Among each of the seventeen groups forming the Lebanese nation, the view prevailed that the survival of their community was threatened by other hostile communities (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 24). Politicians accused

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each other of receiving support from foreign forces. The “other” was no longer viewed as a citizen, but as a traitor.

After the outbreak of the war, the religious communities mobilised and militias were created along ethno-religious lines (Hanf, 2015, p. 331). The communal mobilisation of one militia led another community to feel threatened, which responded with the same mobilisation of militia. The Christians mobilised in 1975-1976, while the Shia followed in 1979 and the Sunni in 1981. The mobilisation of the Druze followed the entering of the Lebanese Force in the Chouf in 1982 (ibid.). The military structure and organisation of these militias differed because of their differences in ideology, resources and strategies. However, a long-term trend can be observed across the militias. The longer the conflict lasted, the more civil militias transformed into professional militias. The professionalisation was reflected by their efforts to enlarge the militia, and to imitate the organisation structures, weaponry and discipline of a regular army (Hirst, 2010).

The Christians (in particular the Maronites) were the first to mobilise, as they felt they faced a deadly threat. The communal mobilisation of the Muslim communities proceeded more slowly, who felt that the Palestinians represented their interests in the war. The Shia started mobilizing at the end of the 1970s, as they began to fall out with the Palestinians. The Sunnis started to mobilise from 1981 onwards in opposition to Syrian occupation forces (Hanf, 2015, p. 332). After Shia militias took control over Sunni residential areas in 1984, the Sunni were still not able to mobilise effectively and felt threatened. However, not all communities chose to mobilise their own militia. The smaller Christian communities joined forces with the Maronite militia. In the first phase, the militias lacked organisation and there were no fixed battle lines (Hiro, 1993).

The capacity of the Christian Lebanese Forces was unrivalled for a long time. By 1981, the Lebanese Forces had established military and political administrations. It consisted of military intelligence units, military and civilian police units, press and information agencies, social welfare organisations, radio and television stations and offices in several western capitals (Snider, 1984). The extensive administrative body offered opportunities for the recruitment of militiamen, and other young professionals, in a time that career prospect were nihil in the public or private sector. They even introduced conscription, which replaced the voluntary mobilisation with a compulsory military service. Conscription was not even considered by the neither PLO nor Lebanese state (Hanf, 2015).

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Until 1982, the Muslim-leftist militias could not achieve the level of organisation of the Lebanese Forces (Snider, 1984). In time, fulltime militiamen of the same age and social background voluntarily subscribed. Political offices, radio stations and newspapers were established. The militias gained civil administrations and financial autonomy. However, the militiamen did not live in barracks, and the institutions were not professional (ibid.). This changed in the third phase, when the Druze and Shia communities felt their existence was threatened, which resulted in mass mobilisation. The increased amount of supporters enabled them to establish full-time militias. By 1985, the militias Amal and PSP had their own political organisation, and were no longer mass movements of their respective communities (El Khazen, 2000).

The differing capacity can be related to the sources of revenue. All militias needed independent sources of revenue. The Christian, Druze and Shia militias demarcated territory (i.e. cantons), and took control of ports (Makdisi, 2004). ‘Indirect taxes’ were imposed on the people within their territory. They also established taxes and custom duties at the ports. Although the Muslim-leftist militias raised incomes from levies, illegal ports and foreign patron, the Lebanese Forces were able to establish a more regular flow of funds due to their high level of organisation and low dependence upon third parties. In contrary to the Muslim- leftist militias, who remained dependent upon the PLO for weapon supplies, military training, and financial support (Snider, 1984).

Overall, the militias adopted similar behaviour. They controlled more or less homogenised territory, generated independent sources of revenue by controlling ports, established an independent civil administration or controlled the state facilities. The creation of political offices shifted the power from civilian politicians to the militias’ political leaders (Hanf, 2015, p. 562). However, the prospects for these leaders in a non-military political system were limited. The political members of the militias did not expect to be elected or acquire administrative positon in a civilian government. Therefore, the political leaders of the militia – besides the militiamen and their commanders – had an interest in maintaining tensions between the warring factions. Their power, prestige and income depended upon the existence of the militia (ibid.). This contributed to prolonging the conflict.

Foreign support

From the onset of the conflict, the militias were able to secure resources for the procurement of weapons. The Christian-rightist militias received financial support from diaspora,

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foundations, and pro-American states (i.e. Egypt, Saudi Arabia). Weapons were bought from Bulgaria, Czech-Slovakia and East Germany, and later, Belgium, France, Italy and West Germany. The Muslim-leftist militias relied upon Syria for their weapons supplies, which bought weapons from the USSR and eastern European countries (Hiro, 1993, p. 77). The SLA cooperated with Israel in the southern region of Lebanon (Gaub, 2015).

The Syrian and Israeli forces sought to maintain their influence and protect their interests through local Lebanese allies. The total foreign support Lebanese militias have received is estimated at $30 billion, which is twice the amount militias were able to generate themselves (Makdisi, 2004). The financial and material support offered by external actors has prolonged the conflict, as it made the costly practice of war affordable. The steady inflow of foreign support enlarged the capacity of Lebanese and Palestinian militias, as well as seventeen intelligence services (Hiro, 1993, p. 77). In the end, the declining external support might have contributed to de-escalation of the conflict (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015).

The support was, however, not sufficient enough to lead one party to victory. For example, the conflict between Shia militias maintained due to the rivalry between Iran and Syria. Amal and Hezbollah were both confident that the foreign support would lead them to a victory, which resulted in the War of the Camps in 1984 (Hirst, 2000). The massive internal infighting diminished the public support of Muslim-leftist militias and destroyed their perception of unity rather than appoint a decisive winner (Hamzeh, 2000).

All Lebanese militias sought help from external actors throughout the conflict. The search for protection did not always lead to the wanted outcomes (Hanf, 2015). At the beginning of the war, the Sunni Muslims considered the Palestinian armed presence as a development that would change the balance of power in their advantage. The Christian-rightist militias sought help from Syria, Israel and the United States simultaneously in order to increase their power. The common denominator is that the Palestinians and the Syrian, as well as the Israeli and Americans had interests of their own. For example, the Americans attempted to use the situation in Lebanon as a mean to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, when the Lebanese conflict itself spiralled out of control, following the collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, the American troops were quickly retrieved (Kechichian, 1985).

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4.3.3.3 Factionalisation

The internal dynamics of the various militias also influenced the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. From the onset of the civil war in 1975, two warring camps can be divided: the status quo (rightist-Christian) and the anti-status (leftist-Muslim) quo camp (Hiro, 1993). The power struggle did not only take place between these camps, also within these camps different parties and factions sought to consolidate their power. This resulted in, for instance, bickering over the distribution of the foreign support. The competition for influence caused continuous disagreements and infighting (Temming, personal communication, December 3, 2015), which heightened the level of violence.

The composition of the camps changed throughout the conflict. For instance, Maronite Christian Frangieh from Zgharta initially aligned with the status quo camp. In early 1978, he broke with the Christian-leftist parties. The regional traditional relations offer a possible explanation for the factionalisation. The town of Zgharta had closer relations with the Sunni Muslims of Tripoli rather than the Christian heartland, since Tripoli was part of the hinterland (El Khazen, 2000). This shows militias did not only align and factionalise based on their denominational background, but also took into account traditional (clan) relations.

From the beginning of the war, feelings of threat quickly led to communal mobilisation along sectarian lines. The exact number of fighters is hard to estimate due to the significant differing available sources. Also, not all fighters were full-time soldiers (Hanf, 2015). As their capacity grew and animosities intensified, the rule of militias took over. In practice, the high level of factionalisation resulted in the lack of a central command structure. The inter-sectarian killings caused higher levels of violence, as the victimised militia reacted with acts retaliations. This could happen out of sight of the commanders. In reality, it meant that even a low-ranking militiaman could break a ceasefire out of a disagreement with a superior (Leenders, 2012). In this way, factionalisation contributed to escalation of the conflict.

The factionalisation of the camps limited the options to create a united front that could offer resistance to the other camp. For instance, in 1978, the Christian Maronite camp was highly divided and consisted of eight fractions: Force 75 led by President Gemayel; the Lebanese Forces of Geagea; the dissident Lebanese Forces headed by Hobeika; the National Liberal Party of Chamoun; the Phalangist Party; the Guardians of the Cedars; the militia of the Frangieh clan; the Maronite Church Leaders (Hiro, 1993). This also reflects the coalescing of political parties and their militia. Multiple attempts have been made to reunite, for instance,

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the Lebanese Forces of Geagea and Force 75 of Gemayel. However, underlying tensions between the lower-middle class ranks of the Lebanese Forces and the upper class leadership of the Phalange Party drifted and caused a split (Hiro, 1993).

Another implication is that factionalisation weakened the position of the militias. This is reflected by the factionalisation of the Shia militia. By May 1987, Hezbollah overruled Amal and continued to receive financial support from Iran to increase its capacity. Amal was financially baked by Syria, who relied upon Amal to control Hezbollah – in case the attacks on Israel would start to cause serious friction between Israel and Syria (Hanf, 2015). Consequently, the militias spend resources and energy on fighting militias of their own sectarian groups, causing weariness. The outbreak of the fighting between Amal and Hezbollah (both Shia) in late 1989 demonstrates that the factionalisation of militias increased the level of violence. Even more, the large scale infighting caused severe damage to the public image of Muslim-leftist militias and destroyed the perception of unity. The inter- factional violence exemplifies the shift from conflict between communities to conflict within communities. In this way, factionalisation played an escalatory role throughout the conflict.

4.3.3.4 Criminalisation

The criminalisation of militias contributed to the outbreak and the prolonging of the civil war, as well as to the changing levels of violence. The illegal activities of militias, such as drug trafficking and oil smuggling, provided sources of revenue (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015). This enabled militias to recruit more men, as they were able to offer financial security, which, in turn, facilitated expanding the territory under the militia’s military and economic control.

Lebanon was challenged by the continuous spiral of violence, the implosion of the economy and the breakdown of state institutions. The deteriorated situation doubled the amount of militiamen, from 20.000 to 40.000, who sought (economic) security (Hanf, 2015). The militia salaries offered a solution to those who lacked a job and lived in poverty. These salaries were collected through violent and illegal activities. Militias generated revenues by drugs and oil smuggling, looting, bank robbing and contraband trade. The illegal activities generated an estimated $15 billion during the conflict (ibid.). This introduced stakeholders with an interest in prolonging the conflict: warlords emerged who had no desire to see the conflict end.

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It must be noted that revenues probably increased the power and influence of specific units within the militias, which might have undermined the central command structure and the political agenda of the militia at large.

Illegal drugs production

In the pre-civil war period, political and judicial branches chose to turn a blind eye to illegal drugs production and trafficking for their own benefit (Arnson & Zartman, 2005). Hashish and poppies were cultivated in the Beqaa Valley and Hermel. These remote areas enjoyed the absence of administrative agencies, police and security services (Leenders, 2013). Although the war did not initiated illegal drug production as it had existed before, a strong association exists between the illegal drugs production of militias and the continuation of the conflict (Balentine, 2003).

The conflict increased the level of illegal activity, as drugs consumption amongst militiamen was common, with the exception of strictly religious militias, such as Amal (Hiro, 1993). The disruption of the food market and mass migration to urban centres almost dissolved traditional agriculture. The production of hashish and poppy was a more profitable crop for the remaining farmers, and drugs production became a massive industry. The areas used for production doubled between 1976 and 1984, and again in 1988 (Arnson & Zartman, 2005).

During the 1980's, the production and export of drugs was able to rise due to growing international demand and the lack of control by the central government (Leenders, 2013). Syrian military and intelligence officials offered support to smuggle drugs out of the country. In the post-war period, it would be revealed that several high ranking officials, including the Minister of Defence, Mustafa Tlass, were directly implicated (Marshall, 2012). Tlass provided visas for smugglers traveling to Argentina, Germany and Spain. According to some estimates, the illegal drugs production and trafficking generated over $2 billion a year in profits (Joffe, 2000). Other might have profited from the war by selling scare goods, such as generators or water (Nabaltian, personal communication, December 17, 2015), which is referred to as a war economy.

The development of a war economy in Lebanon confirms the greed thesis of Collier. Besides making the costly war affordable, the high profits from the drugs production provided for massive capital accumulation among militia leaders and middleman (Tilly, Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985). The economic logic did not necessarily lead to higher levels

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of conflict. The leaders of different sectarian groups were willing to trust each other, despite their ideological differences, in order to maximise their economic gains. For example, the pro- Israeli SLA shelled Zahrani, the oil terminal, which it knew would increase the price of oil imported and sold by its adversary Amal (Picard, 2005, p. 35). Another example is Camille Chamoun, who reached out to his rival Bachir Gemayel after a crushing defeat by the Lebanese Forces in 1980, offering peace as long as he could continue making use of the illegal harbour at Dbayeh (ibid.).

The return of a strong state would threaten the profits made from drugs and oil trafficking. Profit might have become the driving force behind the fighting instead of political objectives (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p. 29). The illegal activities increasingly provided financial resources for various militias. Militias developed an economic objective, which differed from their political objectives. The economic logic of seeking profit might have continued after the conflict and demobilisation of the militias, as reflected by the post-war Lebanese government, who legalised the oil terminals established along the coast, and approved the establishment of an oligopoly of six private companies, each linked to an ex-militia group (Picard, 2005, p. 35).

Apart from ensuring popular support and commitment, economic resources redefined the purpose of struggle. The economic resources emerged not as mean but as the object of the struggle (Arnson & Zartman, 2005). Still, it can be argued that the political rationale of the militias did not change; it only changed their strategic behaviour. The economic power of militias increased during the 1980s, which changed their position towards resolving the conflict. This is reflected by the short-lived 1985 Tripartite Accord between the three major feuding factions. The agreement could have ended the conflict, but the Lebanese Forces command council opposed it. Economic strength appears to have bought them the most valuable good: time. In other words, they had the economic resources to continue fighting the Amal movement and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (Shehadeh, 1999). On several other occasions, the militias postponed negotiations in order to make more profit, enhance their military strength, and adopt better bargaining position (Arnson & Zartman, 2005).

It must be noted that the distinction between ordinary and political crime is unclear. At different phases of the conflict ordinary crime arose. In many kidnappings ransom was demanded, but it is difficult to determine whether the kidnapping had an economic or political reasons (Hanf, 2015). A different observation that is made refers to the criminalisation of the

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state. The focus has been on criminalisation of armed groups, while the state and non-state actors coalesced in the Lebanese context.

4.3.4 Overview of the factors per phase

In order to assess the significance of the factors, the following section will summarise each of the phases and describe the main factors driving the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Several contextual factors continued to play a role throughout the conflict. For instance, the influence of geography remained consistent throughout the conflict, since the mountainous landscape isolated and protected the militias.

Phase 1: The Two-Year War (February 1975 – May 1976)

The first phase of the Lebanese civil war comprises of two year war, in which Lebanon is confronted with the first heavy inter-sectarian violence. The clashes between the Lebanese Army and Sidon fisherman instigated the conflict. The process of normalisation of violence was set in motion by the re-occurrence of assassinations, disappearances and massacres followed by counter-massacres.

Main drivers

One of the main factors driving the conflict in the first phase was social cleavages. Ethno- religious sectarian cleavages existed between the numerous Christian and Muslim denomination, which contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. The fighting was sparked by heartfelt grievances. The Christians and Sunni Muslims were involved in a political power struggle. The Shia community suffered from a low socio-economic status, leading to the creation of the Amal movement. Additionally, the poor living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps caused grievances amongst Palestinians. Furthermore, the confessional nature of national politics reinforced the sectarian differences and the Solh Cabinet began to disintegrate over the Palestinian issue. Lastly, regional politics was a driving factor from the start, since Syrian attempted to mediate to conflict as early as September 1975.

Phase 2: The Syrian hegemony (June 1976 – February 1978)

The second phase starts with the Syrian military intervention in June 1976. The intervention instigates a ceasefire six months later, ending the Two Year War. This is followed by a year of relative peace. Slowly, the alliance between Syria and the Christian parties started to weaken. The Syrian regime started to strengthen its ties with the PLO. The Christian

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discontent with Syria as occupier rather than saviour culminated in the 1978 War (February- July 1978).

Main drivers

A first main factor driving the escalation of the conflict was the diminished state capacity. The disputes in national politics continued to paralyze the government, who feared that deploying the army would increase the sectarian tensions. Therefore, the Lebanese government became highly dependent on Syrian troops for maintaining order. Regional politics contributed to escalating the conflict, as the Arab League legitimised the Syrian presence by creating the Arab Deterrent Force, primarily consisting of Syrian troops, at the Riyadh Summit. The Christian dissatisfaction with the Syrian presence would increase the level of violence. Militias expressed their dissatisfaction by attacking the Palestinian camps of Tel al-Zaatar and Jisr Bashaa on the day of the Riyadh summit. This offers an insight in the strategies of armed groups.

Phase 3: The Israeli Invasion of the South (March 1978 – December 1981)

The third phase starts with the Israeli Operation Litani, which marked the beginning of the south Lebanon conflict. Israel attempted to remove the PLO from the southern region. Furthermore, the truce of 1976 was elusive, and Lebanon soon found itself admits series of sectarian-clashes, mostly taking place in the Chouf region. Besides the Israeli troops, the Syrian troops joined the sectarian fighting. The levels of violence continued to rise with the Syrian bombardment of East Beirut, the Day of the Long Knives, and the Zahle campaign.

Main drivers

Regional politics in the form of the Israeli invasion drove the escalation in the third phase. The invasion fuelled the grievances amongst the Shia community. Many had to migrate from the rural areas from the Southern region to urban centres. Major cities, such as Beirut, experienced a rapid growth of poor suburbs. The popular support for the militias increased as the security situation deteriorated. The capacity of militias grew rapidly with the increasing popular and foreign support, which continued to escalate the conflict. Social cleavages continued to be an important driver, since the communal mobilisation took place along sectarian lines. Local politics played an important escalatory role, since the local community leaders fuelled the communal competition.

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State actions indirectly contributed to escalation, since the parliament reformed the command structure of the Lebanese Army, which ruled out the possibility of deploying the army. The state strategy was to call for the deployment of the Multinational Force (MNF) to oversee the evacuation of the PLO fighters and restore order, which de-escalated the situation. The changing strategy of armed groups is revealed by the Zahle campaign of the Lebanese Forces. The militias had started using psychological warfare, which went beyond spreading political posters, to intimidate or to persuade an adversary to adjust its behaviour.

Phase 4: The second Israeli invasion (March 1982 – February 1984)

The fourth phase starts politically and militarily with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Between 1982 and 1984, all sub-conflicts escalated. Lebanon was faced with a second Israeli invasion leading to the siege of Beirut, fighting in and around Palestinian camps led to the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Bomb attacks, abductions, and targeted assassinations evolved during this period with the abduction of foreigners, such as journalists and diplomats.

Main drivers

Regional politics in the form of the 1982 Israeli invasion was one of the main driving factors. The invasion sparked grievances amongst the Muslim communities. The Israeli invasion can be linked to the establishment of Hezbollah and the continuous spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region. Only after the 1982 Israeli invasion, the attention of international politics was grabbed. The UN started mediation initiatives and created UNIFIL to oversee the evacuation of the PLO fighters. The withdrawal of the MNF forces escalated the violence, since it created the momentum for the Christian-rightist militias to attack the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila. The Lebanese government attempted to take state action and contribute to the expulsion of PLO fighters by deploying the army to search and capture “illegal” Palestinians. It also decided to attack “illegal” Shias, which increased the feelings of grievances amongst both communities. The fourth phase also witnessed a change in the strategy of armed groups: militias started foreign-hostage taking in mid-march 1982.

Phase 5: The return of the Syrian hegemony (March 1984 – September 1988)

The fifth phase starts with the return of the Syrian hegemony. The sub-conflicts continued to escalate, as the Shia Amal militia started fighting the Palestinian militias supported by the Druze and other Muslim-leftist parties in the War of the Camps. With the signing of the Tripartite Accord, the warring factions seem to have reached national reconciliation. However,

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intra-Christian fighting prevents its implementation. Inter- and intra-sectarian clashes continue to take place. By the end of the phase, Syrian-Hezbollah fighting continued to raise the level of violence.

Main drivers

In the fifth phase, regional politics continues to drive the conflict with the return of Syria to Lebanon. The diminished state capacity led to failed attempts of national reconciliation, which enabled Syria to regain its hegemony it had lost in 1982. The state’s opportunity to use coercive force diminished even more with the disintegration of the army in 1984. The lack of central authority also weakened the states’ economic capacity, since militias started collecting the taxes. The strategy of armed groups of creating a parallel economy succeeded. The criminalisation of militias accelerated in the fifth phase, since militias engaged in drugs cultivation and trade.

Phase 6: The War of Liberation (October 1988 – September 1989)

The 1988 presidential election created a two-government situation, ushering a new phase. The two prime ministers, Aoun and Hoss, got involved in a conflict over Aoun’s refusal to accept the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese territory. Consequently, Aoun declared the War of Liberation against Syria. Syria responded to Aoun’s declaration by heavy shelling on the Christian enclave in East Beirut. Intra-Christian fighting and inter-sectarian fighting with the Druze and Amal militia would eventually militarily weaken Aoun. Under pressure of the Arab league, he accepted the Troika proposals, which paved the way for the Taif agreement.

Main drivers

In the sixth phase, weak government was an important driving factor, as it created the unique situation of two governments. The military government of Aoun opposed the civil government of Hoss, resulting to violent clashes. Regional politics played an important de- escalatory role, since the Arab League Committee of Six was able to pressure Aoun into accepting a ceasefire.

The conflict gradually shifted from an inter-sectarian to an intra-sectarian struggle during the 1980s. Grievances and local politics sparked tensions within the Christian community in the sixth phase, leading to the heavy clashes between Aoun and Geagea. In the fifth phase, factionalisation appears as an important driver of the conflict. The factionalisation of the

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Shia militia increased the level of violence tremendously: the intra-Shia war in South Lebanon between Amal and Hezbollah continued to take place for two years.

Phase 7: The Taif negotiations (October 1989 – October 1990)

The War of Liberation ended on September 24, 1989, when a ceasefire was declared and the Lebanese Members of Parliament were invited by the Saudi government to reconvene in Taif. The Taif Agreement was reached, but did not immediately lead to national unity. General Aoun continued to offer resistance. In the end, the new government militarily intervened and removed Aoun with force.

Main drivers

In the seventh phase, several factors are important to ending the civil war. Strong government is resembled in the political compromises parliament made to reach the Taif agreement. After receiving international backing, the Lebanese government decides to use coercive force and starts a military intervention against Aoun’s military government. Regional politics in the form of a Syrian full-fledged military intervention contributed to the removal of Aoun. The military intervention shortly raised the level of violence, but contributed to ending the conflict. Additionally, Saudi Arabia offered a platform to negotiate the Taif agreement.

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4.4 Conclusion & discussion

The Lebanese Civil War was largely an epiphenomenon resulting from conflicts to which Lebanon was incidental, but which took place on Lebanese territory. Six of twenty-six major confrontations involved non-Lebanese parties. Nine confrontations involved foreign forces and in three other confrontations an alliance of foreign forces and Lebanese parties existed. Only nine confrontations exclusively involved Lebanese parties, and six of these confrontations took place within rather than between the two domestic camps (Hanf, 2015).

From the summer of 1975, the civil war is resembled by the clashes occurring along confessional lines. Christian-rightist militias fought against the Palestinians supported by the AAL. The struggle for the Chouf took place between Christian-rightist militias, and Druze militias receiving Palestinian support. The Druze and Shia struggled with the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army over the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. From late 1985, the instances of civil war were clashes within the confessional groups, as exemplified by Shia infighting between Amal and Hezbollah (Hiro, 1993).

The most numerous confrontations involved foreign forces. The strong external dimension of the civil war resulted from the objective to help one of the warring factions and/or establish external hegemony (Fisk, 2001). The resulting heavy clashes caused tremendous losses of life. In particular, the 1976 Syrian intervention – to subordinate the Christian and Palestinian militias, and the 1982 Israeli invasion – to drive out the PLO. While Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire by the Arab League, but managed to preserve its presence through the Arab Deterrent Force, the Israeli failed to establish ascendancy of pro-Israeli forces due to Syrian and Shia opposition. Between 1982 and 1984, the French and American intervened to expel all foreign forces and restore the authority of the Lebanese state. These attempts were frustrated by Israel (Hanf, 2015).

At first sight, the conflict erupted because of clashes between the Christian and Palestinian militia over the military operations against Israel from Lebanese territory. However, the conflict evolved into a struggle of the Lebanese state and its political system. This can be derived from the political negotiations of 1975, and the Israeli invasion leading to the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation from Lebanon in 1982. Both occasions demonstrate that the conflict had developed beyond its initial causes (Gaub, 2015). The issues fuelling the conflict changed throughout time, which underlines the importance of researching the dynamics of a conflict.

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In researching the escalation and de-escalation of the Lebanese civil war, several factors have been identified that drove the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Lebanon was a deeply divided heterogeneous society. The social cleavages of ethno-religious, ideological, economic and regional nature appears to have been a very important driver of the conflict. These cleavages caused grievances, which motivated the communal mobilisation along confessional lines. The deep rooted confessionalism in the political system did not only cause the conflict, it also prolonged the conflict, since the warring factions feared compromises would result into a reduction of their power. This lack of flexibility complicated the peace process. National reconciliation attempts continued to fail, which resulted in escalation of the conflict. Foreign interventions played a major role in provoking, prolonging and ending the conflict, which reveals the strong external dimension of the conflict. The nature of the conflict changed significantly due to the aggressive acts of Lebanon’s regional neighbours Syria and Israel. The infringement of state sovereignty pushed the government further to the side-lines.

The state’s authority had already diminished at the outset of the conflict, when the militias had started mobilising. With the disintegration of the Lebanese army, the state lost its mean of coercive force, after which the rule of militia triumphed. The economic capacity of the state diminished, as the militias were able to create a parallel economy and take over state functions, such as tax collection. Militias started providing social services and used the narrative of the “failing state” to gain popular support. Remarkably, the low level of trust for state performance was combined with a positive stance on democracy. Neither the Lebanese population or militias sought to overthrow the state. The costly war of the militias was funded by foreign support, which contributed to prolonging the conflict. Additionally, illegal activities generated sources of revenue. Warlords emerged who had no desire to see the conflict end. The capacity of the militias continued to increase, as their organisation started to imitate the conventional army.

The research reveals that the factors highly interact, when influencing the dynamics of the conflict. For instance, escalation resulted from the interaction between social cleavages, grievances and regional developments. More specifically, the Shia community lived in the rural areas of southern Lebanon. The community was denied political resources and suffered from poor socio-economic conditions, which caused grievances. Against the backdrop of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the Amal Movement identified itself as a “movement of the dispossessed”. The militia of Amal succeeded in recruiting living in the slums of West Beirut,

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who fled from the south during the 1978 Israeli air raids, by acknowledging their otherwise neglected grievances.

Further development of the analytical framework is needed to offer insight in the interaction between factors, as well as the direction of the interaction. Does criminalisation cause a breakdown of state institutions – or does the breakdown of the state institutions cause criminalisation? With regard to the content of the analytical framework, it can be suggested to include the elite or individual level point, since the case study revealed the importance of several prominent families and local community leaders, advocating for communal mobilization. It can also be suggested to include a factor on the socio-psychological dimension of conflict. When discussing the strategy of armed forces, propaganda and deliberate “othering process” are mentioned. However, the research found that unconscious “othering process” and prejudices significantly contributed to instigating and prolonging the conflict. The communities established their own identity through opposition and vilification of the “other”. The dynamics of the conflict changed as the various actors adopted different roles and the violence shifted from inter- to intra-sectarian level.

This research was highly explorative of nature, and mostly depended on secondary sources. Additionally, some of the findings may be open to interpretation due to the coalescing of the state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, the research revealed several new insights with regard to factors influencing conflict dynamics, which could not be explored in depth. First, the research indicated that foreign mediation merely resulted into escalation of the conflict. This is partially explained by the way mediators appoint a representative of a clan or community without paying sufficient attention to the internal dynamics of a clan. This resulted in heightened intercommunal tensions. Future research could evaluate the effect of foreign mediation on the course of the conflict by conducting an in-depth analysis of the foreign mediation process. This relates to another finding that local community leaders played a significant escalatory and de-escalatory role in the conflict. The political representation based on communal identity gave local leaders excessive power and increased communal competition. This was reinforced by the corruption, nepotism and clientelism nature of the political system. Future research could further explore the effect of clan structures on the dynamics of the Lebanese civil war.

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5. Comparative analysis

This section analyses the escalatory and de-escalatory role of the factors in the four researched cases (i.e. Israel, Lebanon, Namibia, and Sri Lanka) to illustrate the similar and different drivers found in these conflicts. The analysis is structured along the lines of the analytical framework.

5.1 Context

Social cleavages

In all four cases, social cleavages can be seen as a highly significant causal mechanism leading to the start of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the social cleavage between the Tamils and the Sinhalese is the most important. However, the caste system created a hierarchical cleavage within each community, which also contributes to the onset of the conflict. On the other hand, in the case of Namibia social cleavage manifested itself in the form of political and centre-periphery divisions, originating from the South African oppressive apartheid-policies. Ideological division strongly influenced the social cleavage in the case of Israel, as there were two blocks with conflicting ideologies. In the case of Lebanon, ethno-religious sectarian cleavages existed between the numerous Christian and Muslim denominations, which caused inter-sectarian tensions. Additionally, the urban-rural cleavage created tensions within the Lebanese society. It can be observed that social cleavages played a significant role in all four cases facilitating the outbreak of the conflicts. In three cases, Lebanon, Namibia and Sri Lanka, the social cleavage also had an impact the conflict dynamics, in driving at least some of the (de)escalation of the conflicts. In Namibia social cleavages caused an internal power struggle within SWAPO between the younger and older generations. A similar trend occurred at the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, in which a social cleavage existed between the eastern and northern Tamil community. In Lebanon social cleavages escalated the conflict due to communal mobilisation along sectarian lines, which resulted in higher levels of inter- and intra-sectarian violence at several times.

Popular support

In all four cases popular support seems to be related to the conflict dynamics. However, popular support mostly appears to be an indirect influence, since changing levels of popular support did not necessarily lead to changing levels of violence. In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the central government commanded a general low popular support (within a

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certain community), while the main oppositional actors enjoyed a high level of popular support. In Sri Lanka, the popular support of the non-Tamil population was not necessarily low, but the population voted and supported along party lines, due to the rivalry between the two most important political parties. The idea of a central government was not challenged, but the policy concerning the insurgency was. This resulted in a lack of popular support for the actions of the state, sometimes resulting in anti-government riots. In the case of Lebanon, society was highly divided on the organisation of the state apparatus, but the idea of a central government was supported throughout the conflict. The conflict was more about the division of power within the government. In Israel, the central government lacked legitimacy due to British presence preventing the formation of an Israeli or Arab state. In contrary to the case of Namibia, whereas the central government of South Africa did enjoy popular support from the white voting electorate both in South Africa and Namibia. In the case of Namibia, South Africa´s occupation over Namibia was seen by white ruling minority as historical continuation.

Popular support for non-state actors could be argued to be a contributing factor to both the commencement and continuation of the conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the state-building project of the LTTE created a high level of popular support because of the provision of security. However, the majority believed their strategies to be too violent. A similar observation can be made in the case of Lebanon, where militias enjoyed popular support due to the protection they offered to their respective communities. Several militias pleaded for the division of Lebanon in different cantons, which was only supported by a small minority of the Lebanese people. In the case of Israel, all non-state actors enjoyed popular support amongst their constituencies. In contrary to Namibia, where the SWAPO did not offer any protection to communities, partly due to its limited military capacity, and mostly enjoyed popular support because of its non-biased, all including nation-wide independence strife.

The direction of the relation between the two variables works both ways. On the one hand, high levels of violence can lead to lower levels of popular support. On the other hand, high levels of popular support for non-state actors can result in escalation of the conflict, while low levels can de-escalate the conflict.

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Grievances

In all the four cases, grievances fuelled the motivation of non-state actors to escalate the conflict. Economic, political and social grievances played a role in the conflicts. Therefore, it had an enormous escalatory impact, mainly in the beginning of the conflict.

In Namibia grievances can be linked to the apartheid. Oppression of the black population and their poor social and economic conditions caused political grievance. In the case of Israel, the main grievance involved with the escalation of violence was the obstruction by the central authority to comply with prior political commitments on power transfer. In Sri Lanka, the grievances mostly derived from discriminatory policies of the state against the Tamils, which resulted in political, economic and social grievances. For example, the Tamil language was not recognised as an official language. Even though the Tamils were seated in parliament, they had de facto a lack of influence. In the case of Lebanon, political and economic grievances existed amongst the Muslim denominations. The Lebanese confessional system had formalised the division of power, which caused political grievances. The Christian community was granted most political power, which seems to have also resulted in better economic positions, thereby, causing political and economic grievances amongst the Sunni and Shia Muslim community.

It can be observed that within communities, feelings of grievances can prevail. In Lebanon, the Shia Muslim community suffered from a low socio-economic status in comparison to the Sunni Muslim community. This is reflected in Sri Lanka by the caste system, which created differences and grievances within the Tamil community.

In Sri Lanka, Lebanon and Israel, grievances continued to be one of the main drivers of escalation and use of violence for the insurgent(s) throughout the conflict. In contrast to Namibia, where grievance lost its high impact on conflict dynamics, although new grievances arose, for instance, because of poor conditions in refugee camps, which resulted in internal power struggle within SWAPO. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the LTTE was excluded from peace negotiations, which intensified the feelings of exclusion. Additionally, the grievances were so high that decentralisation solutions were not believed to be possible, and they continued devoted to a separate state solution. In the case of Lebanon, the political grievances were deep-rooted and the confessional system hindered political reforms. The Muslim-leftist parties went to great lengths to change the political system. Additionally, the militias were not invited to the negotiation table for a long time, which fuelled their feelings of grievance.

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Another aspect is the cycle of retaliation, which continued to cause grievances and heighten the level of violence. In Israel, acts of retaliation and inflicted harm caused grievances amongst all actors driving further escalation of the conflict. Interestingly, in all cases acts of retaliation seems to have played a significant role in the escalation of the conflict.

Local politics

Local politics can be linked to the onset of the conflict in three cases. In the case of Namibia, local politics in the northern region supported the emergence of the SWAPO´s liberation struggle, but it would not impact the conflict dynamics as SWAPO disregarded the local political dimension. Similarly, local politics in Sri Lanka can be regarded as an escalating factor in the beginning, since the rivalry between groups and local leaders resulted in a high level of violence. The LTTE turned out to be the strongest and became the only Tamil militant group for years. Their local political system enhanced public support from the community. Eventually, local political dynamics escalated the conflict again when a new leader started to participate. Likewise, in Lebanon local leaders played a significant role in the onset of the conflict, in terms of communal mobilisation. Lebanese community leaders continued to contribute to the escalation of violence as the conflict progressed by supporting and deploying their respective militia. With the collapse of the central government, communities increasingly relied on the traditional clan structures, in which the local community or clan leader controlled the local police or militia. In all three cases, local politics were highly interrelated with the existence of social cleavages, grievances and the level of popular support. The fourth case, Israel, showed less conclusive results on the specifics of local politics. This might have resulted from the fact that the conflict occurred in a region that is small in many respects, intertwining local and national politics. The Jewish actors maintained a centralised government, while the Arabs were divided more prominently along clan lines. The relevance of either the central government or the clan structures might explain the relative absence of historical accounts on local politics.

National politics

It can be argued that national politics played a role in all conflicts. In all four cases, the nature of the political system functions as a causal mechanism of conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia, the national governments ignored the demands of the non-state parties and continued with their original problematic policies, leading to the outbreak of the conflict. In contrary to Israel and Lebanon, where the non-state actors were not ignored. In some

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instances, the government even cooperated with the non-state actors. In the Israeli case, for example, during the hunting season, the Hagan militia cooperated with the British in suppressing the other Jewish militias. In the case of Lebanon, the militias functioned as paramilitary wings of political parties. Militias of both the Christian-rightist and the Muslim- leftist parties supported the Lebanese Army at different times in the conflict. The complexity derived from the fact that the militias' leaders could be involved in an armed struggle, while the political leaders were part of the same government. Both political and militias' leaders incited the use of mass violence. In the case of Sri Lanka, it seems that the national politics through national elections de-escalated the conflict due to changing policy in most of the times. Similarly, in Israel, the election of a perceived pro-Zionist government in London during the 1945 elections, influenced de-escalation of the conflict, as political goals could be achieved by cooperation. In contrary to Lebanon and Namibia, where national elections and a change of government mainly escalated the conflict. In Lebanon, political assassinations occurred after a new government had been formed, in order to destabilise the political situation.

Regional politics

All cases had a strong external dimension, in which the regional balance of power played a significant role in the dynamics of the conflict. In the case of Israel, regional politics resulted in a large scale military intervention in the conflict by regional actors. During 1948, the political objectives under consideration by various Arab governments regarding intervention in Palestine were as much or more dominated by regional political considerations than the destruction of Israel. These regional considerations included maintaining popular support amongst the broader Arab public and increasing political standing, in a bid to become the leader of a Pan-Arab world. Positive considerations were combined with negative regional political considerations, such as preventing other regional actors from expanding territorially, or gaining influence. Regional politics resulting in large scale military interventions is an example of how regional politics can drive escalation. In the same way, foreign invasions of Lebanese territory caused escalation of the conflict. Both Syria and Israel invaded Lebanon multiple times, causing substantial higher levels of violence. Additionally, both states offered financial and material support to the militias, which contributed to prolonging the conflict. Likewise, in the case of Namibia, the Cuban intervention was seen as a major threat by South Africa, leading to its involvement. The South African government also tried to destabilise neighboring countries, which were supporting and/or hosting SWAPO. Lastly, the support of

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India for the Tamil militants contributed to escalation of the conflict. Notwithstanding the escalatory role of regional politics, in Namibia, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, a foreign military intervention would eventually lead to de-escalation of the conflict. More specifically, India stopped the military campaign of the Sri Lankan government, which resulted in a three-year ceasefire. However, escalation led to the withdrawal of the Indian forces. In Lebanon, the Lebanese Army supported by Syria, who launched a full-fledged military operation against General Aoun, ended the war.

International politics

International actors proved to be a major factor influencing the conflict dynamics in all four cases. Although, in all cases, international politics contributed to reaching a settlement, international politics often led to or contributed to escalation throughout the conflicts. Escalation was caused by direct military interventions or international pressure on actors to join peace negotiations. In the case of Sri Lanka, the UN tried to pressure the government to find a diplomatic solution towards the end of the conflict, which failed. In the other cases, international negotiations were initiated by the international community. However, the impact of negotiations depended on local receptiveness. For example, in the case of Lebanon, militias who were not invited to the negotiations table responded to international peace negotiations with fighting. This was not the case in Namibia, where SWAPO was also not included in the leading negotiation. However, they did not even take into account or responded to the international peace negotiations. Eventually, UN recognition for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of Namibian people would consolidate its national position.

In two cases, Israel and Lebanon, escalation occurred as a result of withdrawal of the foreign actor. In the case of Lebanon, the Multinational Forces supported the Lebanese government in the expulsion of the PLO. The withdrawal of the MNF led to severe attacks on several Palestinian refugee camps, as they no longer enjoyed protection from either the PLO or foreign troops. In the case of Israel, the withdrawal of Central British Authority caused escalation, as all parties started fighting to take control. Indirect involvement in the form of diaspora populations supporting specific actors occurred in all four conflicts. This contributed directly and significantly to increasing the strength and capabilities of the supported actors.

Cold War dynamics played a major role in three conflicts. In the case of Namibia, it influenced the conflict dynamics by preventing the peace-building efforts and negotiations. SWAPO was dragged into the fight for communist backed by Angola. In general, it was

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caught in the middle of U.S. led war against Communism. In Lebanon, the Cold War dynamics became most apparent in the foreign support for militias. The nations offering support were clearly divided along Cold War lines. In the case of Israel, Cold War dynamics are resembled in three different ways. First, British considerations included the strategic need for relations in the region, as being close to strategic supply routes, but also under consideration was the Arab oil, necessary for winning the coming war with the USSR. Secondly, on a political level Soviet opportunism played a role, as British and American policies on the issue of Palestine differed, the Soviets actively pursued a strategy to increase friction on the issue between the two major western allies. Third, as much of the Middle East was under British control, creation of the state of Israel, could serve to both impair British relations with the Arab countries. If Israel would successfully claim independence and statehood, this could possibly create a Soviet ally in the Middle-East possessing strategic Mediterranean ports, something the USSR identified as a strategic necessity. In the case of Lebanon, cold war dynamics are mostly resembled in the foreign support militias received. The Christian-rightist camp sided with the West, while the Muslim-leftist camp sided with Soviet-aligned Arab states. In this way, the cold war dynamics accelerated the process of polarisation. In the case of Sri Lanka, other international developments, such as the war on terror, influenced the dynamics of the conflict. The international narrative framed the Tamil Tigers as terrorist, and supported the governmental coercive action against these 'terrorists'. It also declined the financial support of Tamil diaspora, which had a negative impact of the capacity of the LTTE.

In Sri Lanka, Norway led peace negotiations, which seem to have de-escalated the conflict at first. However, they failed to bring all the parties together, which resulted in escalation of the conflict. Likewise, in Namibia peace negotiations were held without SWAPO by the Western Contact Group, which led to escalation of the conflict. In the case of Lebanon, several foreign powers initiated peace negotiations. However, the attempts failed utterly, which resulted in higher levels of violence, and pushed the Lebanese government even more to the side-lines. In the last phase, foreign mediation led by Saudi Arabia led to the Taif agreement, which formally ended the civil war. In Israel, foreign mediation influenced the negotiations in the first phases, in order to gain a position of strength. In the last phase, foreign mediation resulted in three truces. However, the truces were misused to regroup for combat operations.

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Natural disaster

Two of the four cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict. Namibia had a serious drought and Sri Lanka was struck by a tsunami. However, the impact of the natural disasters differed. In Namibia, the drought changed the circumstances of the conflict. For instance, the drought forced some tribes to work for the South African Defence Forces. Still, the drought is not considered to be a causal mechanism for escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. In Sri Lanka, it did influence conflict dynamics. The tsunami struck the island in times of relative peace. This united the population for a while, who all worked together in rebuilding the island. However, the rebuilding policy increased political tensions. This resulted in the collapse of the political coalition and increased the social tensions towards the Tamils. Eventually, this contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In Israel and Lebanon no natural disasters occurred during the conflicts.

Geography

In case of Israel, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon geographical settings prolonged the conflict, as the geography caused ethnic concentrations. The Sri Lankan thick jungle and the Lebanese mountainous terrain created an environment for ethnic segregation and bases for long resistance. Similarly, in Israel, segregated villages existed, providing both safe havens and clean targets. The remote and segregated villages provided secure bases for militias to operate from, controlling the village and much of the surrounding land and roads. This segregation also caused insecurity to the civilians, for it provided clean targets. Allowing perpetrators to act relentless, as when attacking a village, no account had to be held for the safety of civilians of their own group. Additionally, geographical factors played a decisive role in the type of warfare, as exemplified by the guerrilla warfare in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers controlling the coastlines in the East and the North, which increased their naval capacities. Similar warfare practices can be observed in the mountainous and urban areas of Lebanon.

In the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia a regional theatre of war occurred, leaving the rest (most) of the country to continue their more or less normal lives. In contrast, in the case of Namibia geographical setting naturally limited the reach of non-state actors’ armed operations. Since the operations were in the form of small-scale guerrilla attacks, it seems that geography did not impact the conflict dynamics. These attacks would also have taken place in a different environment, because non-state actor did not have resources for large-scale warfare.

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5.2 State

State action – coercive force

In all four cases, the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict. In Namibia and Lebanon, the use of coercive force proved to be a major contributing factor to the outbreak of the conflict. In Namibia, the violent breakdown of protests aggravated the population, and started the liberation movement. Similarly, the Lebanese Army was deployed against the Sunni Muslims to bring an end to the protests, which sparked the inter-sectarian fighting. For the remainder of the conflict, the Lebanese government was anxious to use coercive force, as it feared it would fuel sectarian tensions. Eventually, the state lost its coercive force with the disintegration of the Lebanese Army. The role of the state was reduced to the side-lines and the rule of militia triumphed.

Likewise, in the case of Israel, the restrained stance on the use of coercive force by the state actor contributed to escalation of the conflict, as the non-state actors were able to freely combat other non-state actors. In both the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the use of coercive force resulted in a cycle of retaliation. In Sri Lanka, the state's coercive force can be regarded as a response to the violent acts of the Tamil Tigers, although state personal took part in the escalating anti-Tamil riots at the onset of the conflict. In Namibia, coercive force was used to reinforce the apartheid policies, which aggravated the feelings of grievance. In the last phase of the conflict in Lebanon and Sri Lankan, coercive force of the state would result in higher levels of violence on a short term, but de-escalate the conflict on a long term. In the other phases, the use of coercive force by the state resulted in escalation of the conflict. Additionally, it has been observed that the use of coercive force influenced the levels of popular support for the ruling government and militias. Extensive use of coercive force can lead to war weariness, in which the population gets tired from the casualties and costs of war.

State action – policy solution

Policy solutions of the state have similar effects on the four cases. In Lebanon, policy solutions in the form of peace negotiations failed, which led to escalation of the conflict. The warring factions were not able to find common ground due to their diverging objectives, and ordered their militias to continue their attacks. At other times, the negotiations failed because not all factions were invited to the negotiation table. Eventually, peace negotiations initiated by Saudi Arabia would lead to political consensus, ending the conflict. Similarly, in Sri Lanka

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peace negotiation attempts failed, as the parties failed to make comprises, had ulterior motives, or the LTTE felt excluded, after which the Tamil Tigers returned to their violent strategies.

In Namibia independence negotiations were conducted on the international level without a non-state actor. South Africa made several attempts of self-governance in Namibia, allowing the creation of local parliaments. The SWAPO ignored these peace-making attempts and continued their strive for full independence. Eventually, the involvement of a foreign power and the UN led to de-escalation the conflict in both Lebanon and Namibia. In Israel, independence negotiations determined the strategies, thereby, influencing the dynamics of the conflict. It must be noted that the negotiations were also used as a strategy. The main armed group chose strategies aiming to de-escalate the conflict. While other armed groups, smaller factions, acted as spoilers.

Additionally, in all cases oppressive legislation was adopted to deal with the insurgent movements. In Namibia and Sri Lanka, the anti-terrorism act enlarged the repressive capabilities of the state, but resulted in more grievances among the minority population. In Israel, the same grievances resulted from the non-fraternisation act, forbidding any British citizen to economically or socially interact with a Jewish citizen. In Lebanon, the president ordered the Lebanese Army to search and capture “illegal” Palestinians. However, illegal Palestinians were defined as those who had arrived in Lebanon after 1948, which was estimated to be half of the refugees. This increased the feelings of grievance amongst the Palestinian population.

State capacity

In four cases the state capacity influenced the course of the conflict. The cases offer an insight in the effect of extensive and limited state capacity. In the case of Namibia and Sri Lanka, the extensive state capacity played an escalatory role in the conflict. This can be observed by the large military campaign that escalated the conflict in Sri Lanka sharply, and eventually ended thus de-escalated it. In Namibia, the SWAPO forces could not compete with the far greater military superiority of the South African Forces. Only at the end, the SWAPO-Cuban-Angola coalition was able to counter these forces.

In contrast to Lebanon, where the limited state capacity contributed to escalation of the conflict. The state lost its mean of coercion after the disintegration of the army, leading to the rule of militia, which escalated the conflict. Additionally, the parallel economy of the militias

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diminished the financial means of the state, as it could only collect a small percentage of its revenues. However, in the case of Namibia, the diminished state's economic capacity led to de-escalation of the conflict. The state was finally willing, or forced, to negotiate due to the deprived economic situation, high number of casualties, and weakened military capabilities. A related observation can be made in the case of Israel, where the British government withdrew partly due to the no longer economic viable situation. Furthermore, the British state´s capacity did not change throughout the first phases of the conflict. Yet, after the proclamation of Israel, the perception of it being a military weak state contributed other factions to attack, thereby escalating the conflict.

Weak or strong state

In the case of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the unstable political coalition and political polarisation hindered reaching a solution. In both cases a weak state drove the escalation of the conflict, which prolonged the conflict. In Sri Lanka, political polarisation prohibited the government to agree upon solutions, which resulted in the collapse of political coalitions. In Lebanon, the political parties were highly divided on the power sharing agreements, leading to extreme political polarisation, escalating the conflict. Political consensus on political reforms would lead to the end of the conflict.

In the case of Namibia and Israel, the state actor represented a strong actor, enjoying strong public support. Both were colonial powers ruling a native population, but were mainly accountable to their respective voters, causing native popular and political support to be less relevant, or at least national politics to be taken into account. The South African government enjoyed public supported of the white South Africans voters residing in Namibia. Thereby, the popular support enabled the government to take coercive measures and counter international pressure, which escalated the conflict. Similarly, in the case of Israel, the British strong state could rely upon its popular support to counter international pressures. Additionally, South Africa had a strong state apparatus and institutions, which efficiently delivered its oppressive apartheid-policies against the black population group. Determined strong state action led to the escalation of the situation and the emergence of the conflict. Therefore, the Namibian case shows that a strong government, in contrary to the in certain phases weak government of Sri Lanka and Lebanon, can also prolong the conflict.

In all cases the state´s inability to control its security organisations led to escalation of conflict. This can be observed in the Namibian case, when the position of the defence forces became

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stronger and more independent in conducting operations, escalating conflict dynamics. In contrary to Lebanon, where the dissolving state institutions, including the disintegration of the army, escalated the conflict. Half of the military joined the militias, which would eventually start to rule specific cantons. In Sri Lanka, the government could not control its security personnel and military from taking part in riots. The new proclaimed state of Israel also suffered from uncontrollable militias.

5.3 Non-state

Strategy of armed groups

The strategy of the armed groups in all four conflicts contributed to dynamics of the conflict. The use of different strategies by the armed groups in the different time-frames and conflicts leads to the argument that the strategy chosen by the non-state actor can either escalate or de- escalate the conflict.

Both the conflicts of Namibia and Israel experienced the strategic use of violence in order to achieve strategic rather than tactical goals. In both the case of Israel and Namibia, armed groups used diplomatic efforts to gain recognition of their new states with help of the international community. Namibia was able to acquire recognition for their independence struggle, but human right violations were largely ignored. This relates to the Sri Lankan case, in which the Tamil Tigers tried to change the narrative to gain international support for their cause. The international community recognised the human rights violations of the state, but they did not act thoroughly.

In the case of Lebanon, the non-state actors focused on tactical rather than strategic goals. The militias fought a war of reciprocity and relative victories. Furthermore, the warring factions were highly dependent on the financial and material support from foreign powers, which prolonged the duration of the conflict. It can even be claimed that the end of the Cold War in 1991 contributed to ending the civil war in 1989, since militias were aware that they were no longer assured of support and could not continue fighting without it.

In Namibia, the political struggle was more important than the armed struggle. The latter can be regarded more as a symbolic to the actions taken on the political level of the independence struggle. In contrary to Lebanon and Sri Lanka, where the high levels of violence blurred and at times even replaced the political goal.

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In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actor made strategic use of agreed ceasefires to improve its tactical position and regain strength, which resulted in escalation after ceasefires. A similar observation can be made in the Israeli case, where it was the state who misused the ceasefire in the last phase.

In all cases, terrorist methods, such as suicide bombings and political assassinations, were used to direct attention to their goals. These methods were chosen because of their low cost and high impact. The acts of terrorism led to escalation, as they fuelled the cycle of retaliation.

In the case of Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the non-state actors adopted an alternative strategy to intimidate their opponents. They organised imposing military parades and exhibition of weaponry. The intention of the parades and exhibitions was also to increase popular support.

Capacity of armed groups

In three cases, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, the capacity of the armed groups grew over the conflict as they became more professionalised and began to resemble a conventional army, thereby, contributing to the escalation of the conflict. Israeli armed groups had air forces, and the LTTE had a strong naval unit, air force, and specialised fighting units. The militias were highly organised, which increased their capacity. One of the Christian militias in Lebanon even started introducing conscription. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE introduced a similar concept, as every family had to send one child to fight. In the case of Namibia, the militia remained a guerrilla type organisation throughout the conflict.

Namibia’s conflict escalated clearly when the non-state actors’ capacity was increased with the influx of radical young people escaping into exile from Namibia to SWAPO´s camps to Angola, also resulting in an internal power struggle. A similar observation can be made in Lebanon, where the PLO recruited heavily in the Palestinian refugees’ camps in Lebanon. Militias capitalised on feelings of political, economic, social grievances. In all cases, the financial support of diaspores all over the world contributed significantly to the capacity of the armed groups. In Namibia, militias enjoyed a rather unique position, as they received financial support from the UN, since they were recognised as an official independence movement.

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Factionalisation

In four cases, the internal dynamics of the militias influenced the dynamics of the conflict. In three cases, Israel, Sri Lanka and Lebanon, the factionalisation of armed groups played an escalatory role in the conflict, as it increased tensions between groups, which resulted in higher levels of violence. In the case of Israel, the splinter factions separated from the Hagan to follow a more violent path. This did mean that they had to acquire legitimacy. In the case of Lebanon, the levels of violence heightened due to factionalisation, as the militias not only had to fight other sectarian militias, but also militias from their own confessional group. In Sri Lanka, it first escalated the conflict, as it created a battle on a new front. Later, factionalisation contributed to the collapse of the armed group, which contributed to the end of the conflict.

In the case of Namibia, the factionalisation did not seem to have influenced the conflict dynamics, as the armed struggle was centrally coordinated. Factionalisation led to internal power struggles and political division, as observed after the independence in the first voting. However, the internal power struggles did not influence the course of the armed struggle. In contrary to Lebanon, where internal power struggles contributed to higher levels of violence within the communities. This can be related to the significant role of local community leaders in the course of the Lebanese conflict.

Criminalisation

In the case of Lebanon criminalisation played an escalatory role in the conflict, where higher revenues enabled greater capacity and prolonged the costly conflict. It can be argued that some of the militias started resembling criminal organisations, as they were seeking profit rather than reaching a political goal. Criminal acts of armed groups also took place in the case of Sri Lanka and Israel, but only in small-scale. In these three cases where criminal activities existed, they did not change the political objectives (nature, motivation and popular support) of the groups, as their main motivation and goals remained political. In Namibia criminalisation did not play a part during the conflict. SWAPO did not have to resort on criminality to fund its activities because of its massive international financial support.

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6. Conclusion

The conclusion will return to the research question posed at the beginning of the research: what causal mechanisms drive the dynamics of escalation and de- escalation of irregular armed conflicts? The findings will be presented per realm. This research identified several causal mechanisms, which have significantly impacted the dynamics of all four cases. The exploratory nature of the research does not yet allow generalisation of the findings to other conflicts. Therefore, the discussion will refer to the limitations and recommendations for future research in order to improve the analytical framework.

6.1 Context

Some factors appear to be an important prerequisite for all the four conflicts. For example, social cleavages, which existed in all four cases before the conflict began, contributed to the onset of the conflicts. During these conflicts, the social cleavages remained an underlying, important factor in all cases. The social cleavages created different kinds of grievances that directly motivated actors to start a conflict. In some cases, the grievances were so strong that they continued driving the conflict, for instance, by determining the strategy of the armed groups.

Popular support is another contextual factor that has been a prerequisite for conflict. The lack of popular support for the government or, on the other hand, the growing popular support for an insurgent group, fuelled the conflicts. During the conflicts, this factor also contributed to changing conflict dynamics. Other than social cleavages or geography, popular support is a dynamic factor. Changing popular support changed the conflict dynamics most of the times. A common pattern that has been found in all the four studied cases is about war-weariness. When the level of popular support for the insurgent Low level High level of of popular group or the government is high, the level of violence violence support is likely to grow. A high level of violence leads to war-weariness among the population and eventually

Declining the popular support for the violent approach declines. High level level of of This leads to a declining level of violence, since the popular violence support insurgent group and the government need popular

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support for their strategy. Additionally, the changing level of popular support influenced other factors, such as a declining popular support for an insurgent group that caused the factionalisation of the group.

Politics has a large impact on conflict dynamics on a local, national, regional and international level. Local politics is intertwined with social Conflict dynamics Elections cleavages, popular support and grievances in all four change cases, for instance, social cleavages within a community determine the local parties or the grievances determine the political agenda. National politics are an important factor in explaining conflict New New policy government dynamics. Again a common pattern has been found in three of the cases. Elections lead to a new government with a new policy, which leads to, depending on the nature of the new policy, the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. New elections restart the cycle.

Regional politics appeared in all cases to be directly influencing the conflict, both escalatory and de-escalatory. This is also the case for international politics in three of the cases. All cases have a strong external dimension. In three cases, the conflict escalated when the military involvement of foreign forces declined. Additionally, international support from diaspora strengthened the insurgent groups in all our cases. Foreign mediation failed in all cases, which eventually resulted in escalating the conflict again after a small period of peace.

Two cases experienced a natural disaster during the conflict, however, with a different impact. It depends on the circumstances and other factors if and how it influences the conflict dynamics. Geography appears to be a constant factor that determines warfare and strategy. It prolonged the conflict in three cases, since rugged terrain and the adapted strategies made the warfare more complicated. Additionally, ethnic concentrations have strengthened social cleavages.

6.2 State

The use of coercive force is strongly intertwined with popular support. War-weariness among the population can contribute to a declining level of popular support, which can result in the need for the state to change their policy. Coercive force influences the conflict, however, it depends on circumstances and other factors, such as the capacity and the strategy of the state,

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whether it escalates or de-escalates the conflict. Escalation of the conflict happened, for instance, when coercive force contributed to a cycle of retaliation. When the state succeeds to end the conflict using coercive force, it escalates the level of violence for a while, but de- escalates the conflict eventually. This happened in two cases. The restraint stance on the use of coercive force has also contributed to escalation in two cases.

Policy solutions also had a different impact in driving the conflict dynamics. Failed peace negotiations escalated the conflict dynamics in all cases. They failed due to a lack of consensus, ulterior motives, or the exclusion of parties. Successful negotiations de-escalated the conflict by ending it in two cases. In four of the cases, the government implemented repressive legislation that resulted in grievances among a part of the population, which resulted in driving the escalation of conflict dynamics.

The state’s capacity determines its ability to use coercive force and the level of successfulness of these military campaigns. In several of our cases the coercive force did only escalate the conflict because a lack of capacity that was not enough to overthrow the other forces. Limited state capacity can also lead to the disability to use coercive force, which gives the opportunity to militias to take over control. In two cases, the military capacity of the state became high in the last phase, which created the ability to overthrow the other party and de-escalated the conflict by ending it. The weak or strong state factor is closely related to the state’s capacity. The collapse of state institutions, such as, the army led to escalation of the conflict in some cases, as it worked in advantage of the opposition. The lack of control over the state’s institutions contributed to escalation, and unstable political coalitions and political polarisation prohibited reaching a solution in two cases. Here a ‘weak state’ drove the escalation of the conflict dynamics. However, in the other two cases, a ‘strong state’, exemplified by a strong state apparatus and institutions, escalated and prolonged the conflict. It depends on the circumstances and the state’s capacity and strategy whether this factor escalates or de-escalates the conflict.

6.3 Non-state

There are many similarities between the strategies of the armed groups in all four cases. However, they had different outcomes. In three cases, the armed groups had an international oriented strategy in which they tried to gain international recognition of their cause. In two of these cases, they succeeded in acquiring the international recognition for their independence struggle. In the other case, human rights violations and maltreatment of the minority

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population by the government were acknowledged, but the independence struggle was not, since the main international narrative framed them as terrorists. Additionally, the armed groups focused on diaspora to get financial and moral support. The international strategy mostly prolonged the conflicts, although international recognition and support drove the escalation of the conflict partly in some phases. Additionally, in three cases the ceasefires were used strategically by the armed group to regain strength and resources. Almost every ceasefire resulted in the escalation of the conflict. In the fourth case, there were no ceasefires. In all cases the armed groups used terrorist measures to get attention for their cause. This fuelled the cycle of retaliation and resulted in escalation of the conflict.

The capacity of the armed groups is different. In three cases, the armed group had started to resemble a conventional army throughout the conflict, while in the other case the armed group remained a guerrilla type of organisation. Although the growing capacities broadened the opportunities of the armed groups, it is not necessarily considered as a driving factor of escalation, since the armed groups also managed to escalate the conflict with little resources. However, the growing capacity did prolong the conflict, as it enabled the armed groups to withstand the government forces.

Factionalisation of armed groups took place in all the four cases, however, they had a different outcome. In two cases, factionalisation led to the escalation of the conflict. In one case, factionalisation contributed to the escalation of the conflict dynamics at first, but later became one of the main factors that contributed to the end of the civil war, thereby, de- escalating the conflict. In the fourth case, factionalisation is not considered to be influencing conflict dynamics. Finally, in all cases the armed groups were taking part in criminal activities to get resources for their armed struggle. Only in one case the goal of some of the armed groups changed from political to criminal nature. This prolonged the conflict, since they benefited from the continuation of the war.

6.4 Analytical framework

The analytical framework has been created based on the extensive literature review and complemented after the individual case studies, which had revealed two new factors influencing the conflict dynamics. Firstly, in the case of Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka geography has been identified as a factor driving the conflict. Although it is a static factor, it determined other factors, for instance, the strategy of the armed group. Secondly, a distinction is made between international and regional politics. In all cases, it appeared that the regional

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circumstances and balance of power highly influenced the conflict dynamics. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between regional and international politics. A schematic overview of the new analytical framework is added in section 3.6.2. This analytical framework appeared to be equally applicable to the four studied cases and provided a holistic picture of the drivers of conflict dynamics. However, the direction of the impact and the significance of the factors differed per conflict. Some recommendations for further research and possible changes to the framework in future analysis are listed in the discussion.

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7. Discussion

In this research, an attempt is made to ´dissect´ four different civil wars to understand, ´what makes them tick´. Previous research has been focusing mainly on the origin of conflicts or their resolution. Additionally, scholars have developed frameworks to research conflict dynamics. The sociological-institutional analysis of Pahlavi and Ouellet presents a framework to research the internal factors influencing the dynamics of a conflict. They recommended adopting a holistic approach, which motivated the broad range of factors used in this analytical framework. The limitation mentioned by Pahlavi and Ouellet was the division of factors between the three dimensions. In this research, the challenge was to link the specific events or mechanisms to the factors of the analytical framework. This calls for further development of the analytical framework. Other insights were derived from the multi-level model of Ramsbotham. He focused on different level-phenomena, for instance, the international, regional and contextual level. The multi-level approach led to the inclusion of external factors in the analytical framework.

The focus of the research was on the individual factors that influenced the conflict dynamics. Nevertheless, the research showed that the factors also interact with each other. It is difficult to assess the direction of interaction and the correlation. For example, popular support can affect strategies of armed groups, and vice versa. Thereby, focusing on the escalation and de- escalation of conflict might lead the researcher to underestimate the importance of the underlying causal mechanisms driving the conflict. Other underlying factors that have impacted the factors identified as influencing the conflict dynamics might be underappreciated in the analytical framework. This is related to the common deduction- induction problem in scientific research. The analytical framework is extensive, identifying three realms and 15 factors. During the research, new factors were identified possibly influencing the conflict. The factors were placed within the existing framework rather than adding a new factor, since their significance might be too small to create a separate factor. However, this might have led the researchers to underestimate these events.

The analytical framework has only been applied to a limited sample. The four cases that have been researched showed many similarities in their conflict dynamics, despite their differences in timespan, location and circumstances. A more extensive ´N´ is required to test and improve the analytical framework. During the research, several possibilities for improvement have already been found. For instance, the factor state strategy is dived in coercive force and policy

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solution. It is recommended to combine the two in, for instance, state strategy, since the research has revealed that the state actions are highly intertwined. For example, the implementation of anti-terrorism policy resulted in the use of coercive force. Furthermore, the research found that the peace processes significantly influence the conflict dynamics. It is recommended to add peace process to the contextual factors, since it cannot be linked solely to one of the existing factors. Peace processes have now been placed under state action, policy solution, whereas peace processes can take place without involvement of the state, instead militias might be invited to the negotiation table.

This well-developed analytical framework is of academic relevance, since it contributes to the understudied field of holistic approaches in studying irregular armed conflict. In addition, the findings can also be relevant to practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. The framework points out factors that might contribute to preventing escalation and de-escalation of irregular armed conflict. In general, future research on irregular armed conflict should attempt to gather more systematic data on armed groups, as research on the dynamics of conflict is seriously hampered by a lack of it.

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9. Appendices

9.1 Appendix I: List of abbreviations

AAL Arab Army of Lebanon ADF Arab Deterrent Force DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice LCP Lebanese Communist Party LF Lebanese Forces MNF Multinational Force NLP National Liberal Party NUF National Union Front OACL Organization of Communist Action Lebanon PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PSP Progressive Socialist Party SLA South Lebanon Army SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party UAC United Arab Command UAR United Arab Republic ULF Unification and Liberation Front UN United Nations UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East UNSC United Nations Security Council ZLA Zgharta Liberation Army

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9.2 Appendix II: List of persons

Arafat (Yasser) Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, leader of the Fatah political party and paramilitary group.

Assad, Al (Hafiz) President of the Syrian Arab Republic (1971-2000).

Aoun (Michel) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (September 1988 – October 1990). Aoun was appointed PM of a military government.

Baker (James) United States Secretary of State (January 1989 – August 1992).

Barakat (Antoine) Founder and commander of the Army of Free Lebanon. A Christian splinter faction of the Lebanese Army.

Berri (Nabih) Leader of the Amal Movement.

Boustany (Jules) Intelligence Chief of the Lebanese Army.

Brown (Lewis Dean) United States diplomat. Deployed on a fact-finding mission to Beirut in 1976.

Chamoun (Camille) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1952 – September 1958).

Chebab (Fuad) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1958 – September 1964). Commander of the Lebanese Army.

Eitan (Rafael) Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Frangieh (Suleiman) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1970 – September 1976). Leader of the Zgharta Liberation Army (i.e. Marada Brigada).

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Frangieh (Tony) Commander of the Zgharta Liberation Army (i.e. Marada Brigada).

Geagea (Samir) Commander of the Lebanese Forces.

Gemayel (Amine) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1982 – September 1988).

Gemayel (Bachir) President of the Lebanese Republic (23 August 1982 – 14 September 1982). Commander of the Lebanese Forces.

Habib (Philip) United States diplomat. Deployed on a several peacekeeping missions to Beirut between 1980 and 1984.

Hadadi (Khaled) General-Secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party.

Haddad (Saad) Head of the South Lebanon Army.

Hobeika (Elie) Commander of the Lebanese Forces.

Helou (Charles) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1964 – September 1970).

Hoss, Al (Selim) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (December 1976 – July 1980) + (June 1987 – December 1990).

Hussein (Saddam) President of Iraq (July 1979 – April 2003).

Jumblatt (Kamal) Leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (Druze).

Jumblatt (Walid) Leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (Druze).

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Karami (Omar) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (December 1990 – May 1992).

Karami (Rashid) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (July 1975 – December 1975) + (April 1984 – June 1987).

Khoury, El (Bechara) First post-independence President of the Lebanese Republic (November 1943 – September 1952).

Kulaylat (Ibrahim) Founder and leader of the Independent Nasserite Movement.

Moawad (René) President of the Lebanese Republic (November 1989 – November 1989). Moawad was assassinated prior to taking office.

Murphy (Richard) United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs between 1983 and 1989.

Nasser (Gamal Abdel) Egyptian president (June 1956 – September 1970).

Rifai (Nureddin) Director of Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces. Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (24 May – 27 May 1975). Rifai was appointed PM of a short lived military government.

Sadat (Anwar) Egyptian president (October 1970 – October 1981).

Sadr, Al (Musa) Shia religious leader.

Sarkis (Elias) President of the Lebanese Republic (September 1976 – September 1982).

Solh (Rachid) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (October 1974 – May 1975). A few weeks after the outbreak of the civil war, Solh resigned from office.

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Wazir, Al (Khalil) Palestinian leader and co-founder of Fatah.

Wazzan, Al (Shafik) Prime Minister of the Lebanese Republic (October 1980 – April 1984).

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9.3 Appendix III: Interview guide

Introduction 1. Introduction of the topic and research. Taking in consideration the interviewee confidentiality. 2. General information of the interviewee. 3. Could you tell me about your affiliation with/research of the Lebanese Civil War?

General questions 1. What would you identify as the causes of the conflict? 2. What events have significantly changed the conflict throughout time? 3. Can you think of factors that contributed to the changing level of violence? Questions related to specific factors 1. What was the impact of social cleavages on the conflict? 2. What grievances might Lebanese have held that influenced the conflict? 3. How did local/national/regional/international politics influence the dynamics of the conflict? 4. How did the foreign interventions influence the conflict? In particular, the Syrian and Israeli invasions? 5. What role did the Lebanese government play? 6. What type of actions were taken by the state? How did these influence the conflict? 7. How would you describe the state’s capacity during the conflict? 8. Would you describe the Lebanese government as a strong or weak government? 9. What was the level of popular support for the Lebanese government? And for the militias? 10. What type of strategies did the militias adopt? 11. How would you assess the capacity of the militias? 12. How did the militias organise themselves? 13. To what extent did militias criminalise during the conflict? Did their objective change?

End of the interview 1. How did the conflict affect the Lebanese people? 2. Do you have any more suggestions on the topic? 3. Is it possible to contact you again in case I need to ask more questions?

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9.4 Appendix IV: Interview transcripts

9.4.1 Transcript: Jeffrey Jonkers

Interviewer: Kyra Luchtenberg

Interviewee: Jeffrey Jonkers, senior peacebuilding advisor

Interview details: December 5, 2015, 02:00 PM

The interview starts with an introduction of the thesis topic. I explain the objective of the research, and the approach. I tell him about the structure of the interview, including its confidentiality. The interviewee is triggered by the different dimensions of the research and starts off talking about criminalisation.

[Start of interview]

JJ: Criminalisering is voor de Lebanon context een lasting. Criminalisering impliceert dat er een gebrek aan legitimiteit zou zijn aan de kant van de personen die criminaliseren. Er is natuurlijk een grote.. Als er een woord is om Lebanon samen te vatten als het gaat om wie zwaartemacht heeft, dan is het dat er volledig disagreement is voor wie wat mag zijn. En daarom wie criminal actions uitvoert dan wel niet. Sorry, dat even terzijde.

KL: Nee, heel interessant. Dit zijn juist de inzichten die mijn analyse sterker gaan maken. Misschien kunnen wij eerst beginnen met jouw ervaring met Lebanon.

JJ: Ik ben, even kijken, op verschillende momenten betrokken geweest bij Lebanon, en op verschillende manieren. Ik ben eigenlijk vanaf 2005 – toen ik in de Palestijnse gebieden begon – al wel betrokken geweest bij Lebanon door mijn organisatie Palestinians for Peace and Democracy directe banden had met centers in Lebanon zelf. Die vooral te maken hadden met vrouwen rechten, jongeren activisme en ook democratie. Toen ben ik al vrij vaak, omdat mijn Palestijnse werkgever dat niet mochten, op en neer geweest naar Lebanon om workshops te doen en groepsgespreken te houden met politiek actieve mensen. Daarnaast ben ik gaan werken voor Christian Aid in 2007. Als eerste ben ik begonnen met een Israël-Palestina programma en als programma manager Midden Oosten. Toen werd Lebanon onderdeel mijn officiële portefeuille, met daarbij ook echt partners die in Lebanon werkten. Initieel partners die werkten met Palestijnse vluchtelingen. In het Zuiden, in Beiroet, maar ook in het Noorden.

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Die daarmee dus werken aan zowel de rechten van Palestijnen in Lebanon, als wel gehandicapten en vrouwen. Vervolgens, in 2008 was ik ook verantwoordelijk voor onze reactie op de humanitaire crisis en conflict. Dus hoe wij, hoe Christian Aid daar met eigen middelen, maar ook van de Disaster Emergency Committee, wat zeg maar Giro 555 van Engeland is, ging gebruiken. Daarbij was onze samenwerking vooral met mensenrechtenorganisaties, en met bijvoorbeeld de Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union, maar ook inderdaad met politiek activistische organisaties in Lebanon op de grond. Wat dus in hield dat ik zelf dus vrij vaak in Libanon was.

KL: Okay. En daar heb jij een beeld kunnen vormen van de Libanese samenleving. Hoe mensen naast elkaar leven, ondanks de sektarische verschillen?

JJ: Ja, dat denk ik wel. Voor Lebanon is het heel belangrijk dat je begrijpt dat je niet echt kan generaliseren. Als je kijkt naar Beiroet dan kan je generaliseren per stadsdeel, en verder moet je het vooral niet proberen. En dan zou ik voor Libanon zelf zeggen dat je kan generaliseren per geografisch gebied, en verder moet je het niet proberen. Lebanon is een soort artefact van de 20ste eeuw en de manier waarop wij in de 20ste eeuw een nation state konden zien. En dat zie je op de grond ook heel erg sterk. Het probleem daarmee is dat wanneer je het over de Beqaa Valley hebt, dan heb je het ook alleen maar over de Beqaa Valley. Als je het over Tripoli hebt, dan heb je het ook alleen over Tripoli. Als je het over Beiroet hebt, dan heb je het ook alleen over Beiroet. En vooral niet over enig ander gebied van Lebanon, en dat maakt Lebanon natuurlijk buitengewoon, zowel fascinerend als een moeilijke maatschappij om mee te werken.

KL: Hoe vertaalde dat zich in jouw werk? Wat voor uitdagingen kwam jij tegen?

JJ: Nou normaal gesproken als je kijkt naar… Nu in Syrië ook niet trouwens, en Afghanistan ook wat minder en in Irak ook. Maar je ziet wel dat normaal gesproken heb je wel een aantal… Als je gesprekken houdt met groepen over nou hoe kun je er nou voor zorgen dat er conflict reductie plaats vindt of er voor zorgen dat er bijvoorbeeld doorgang is dat er voedsel kan worden geleverd of dat er een vermindering van gewelddadige activiteit komt dan kun je heel vaak wel uitgaan van dezelfde principes en er zitten dezelfde ideeën achter menselijk gedrag en wat motivaties zijn. Voor mij was Lebanon echt de eerste keer dat ik dacht, oh wacht. Je moet letterlijk iedere keer voor een ontmoeting of voor een workshop vooral… Je hebt de neiging om te zeggen, de neiging voor ons is om te zeggen. Oh ik heb daar gewerkt, daar gewerkt, daar gewerkt, en dit is wat ik ervan heb geleerd, om jezelf te

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legitimeren. Dat moet je vooral niet proberen in Libanon, wan t dan weten zij meteen dat je het niet begrijpt. En dat was mijn eerste hele zware les denk ik wel, omdat mij daar ook meteen werd verteld, nou wij zullen jou eens wat vertellen jongetje. En dat was ook terecht, en daar hebben zij ook volledig gelijk in gehad, en dat was ook heel goed voor mij. Maar dat is een beetje het probleem. Als je kijkt naar peace studies en peace building studies, maar ook conflict resolution en conflict reduction, peacemaking, peacekeeping, stabilisation, democratisation – dat kun je nog steeds in vrij veel landen, als je het vrij vaag houdt op nationaal niveau doen. Ook in Irak, ook in Jemen, maar ook in Syrië, ook in Afghanistan, ook in de Palestijnse Gebieden, inclusief Gaza. Maar omdat Libanon zo specifiek en officieel is opgezet als een confessionele staat kan dat niet. Normaal gesproken als je kijkt naar, nu ook naar Syrië, maar zeker ook naar wat wij in Afghanistan hebben gezien en ook in Egypte eigenlijk met de kopten, daar heb je ruimte om te zeggen nou als je hier een beetje meegeeft dan krijg je daar een beetje terug. Op een hele flexibele manier gebeurt dat heel erg praktisch voor elke maand. Voor één maand doe je dit, voor twee maanden doe je dit, en dan ga je weer terug naar wat je wilt. Voor Libanon, omdat er origineel in de constitutie en natuurlijk zeker na 1989, heb je heel sterk het idee dat nee, dit is de lijn die wij hebben. En ook voor praktische overwegingen willen wij daar niet van afwijken, want het zou kunnen beteken dat als er morgen wordt besloten om weer naar Doha te gaan of weer naar Riyad te gaan, dat dat uiteindelijk heeft op onze percentuele aanwezigheid in macht, in besluitvormingslichamen. Juist omdat het confessionele systeem een balans vereist, wat natuurlijk nooit echt een balans is geweest. Maar omdat die balans zo officieel is maakt. En zo ongelofelijk leeft in de harten van de mensen, en in de minds van de mensen, is het juist moeilijker om die flexibiliteit te vinden, omdat mensen bang zijn dat die flexibiliteit direct leidt tot een vermindering van hun machtspositie en een vermeerdering van de machtspositie van anderen.

KL: Ik begrijp het. En zou ik daarmee mogen stellen dat het een van de redenen is voor de lengte van de burgeroorlog?

JJ: Ja, absoluut, zeker. Het probleem is dat je inderdaad… Het geval van Libanon was dat Lebanon eerst uiterst succesvol was door dit hele systeem, zo leek het. Het was heel erg goed in het verbergen van wat er onder de oppervlakte speelden. En vervolgens, omdat mensen er zo aan gehecht zijn en dat die macht.. Die balans was zo fragiel, dat zorgde ervoor dat het juist moeilijker was en het juist langer duurden. Wat wellicht in andere landen vrij snel kan worden afgesloten, duurde in Lebanon langer. En als je kijkt naar wat er in Lebanon gebeurd, is dat er wel elke keer aan de oppervlakte een oplossing komt, maar die oppervlakte

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bubbelt elke twee drie jaar, komt dat weer naar boven. En moet er weer gerepareerd worden. Dat is een beetje het probleem. Kijk in andere landen, je zou kunnen zeggen, in andere landen kan je een ander gebouw neerzetten. In Libanon is er een gebouw neergezet, dat niet meer werkt, maar je mag het niet aanraken. Dus elke keer gaat er een pleister over de verwarmingsbuis heen.

KL: Kan je een voorbeeld noemen van zo’n oppervlakte oplossing? Ik vind het lastig om te bepalen welke rol de nationale politiek heeft gespeeld in de burgeroorlog. Als jij bijvoorbeeld kijkt naar het gebrek aan oplossingen dat het parlement heeft aangedragen of de afwezige rol van het leger tot het uiteindelijk helemaal versplinterde. Wat voor invloed heeft de nationale politiek gehad op het conflict?

JJ: Een heel klein en een heel direct voorbeeld, en dan denk je bij jezelf zeg dit nou zoveel, maar ik denk dat het wel heel veel zegt, omdat ik zelf ook alles vertaal naar hoe mensen het beleven, is de Lebanese Handicapped People Union, de nationale koepelorganisatie. Dit is n iet een overheidsorganisatie, maar een civil society organisatie voor gehandicapte mensen. Zowel in 2006 tijdens de Israël-Libanon oorlog als in 2008 hebben wij geprobeerd.. Was het letterlijk zo, wij moeten deze mensen naar ziekenhuizen krijgen, want lokale ziekenhuizen en lokale klinieken, die zij normaal gebruikten, waren niet beschikbaar. En tijdens de gevechten moet je daarvoor een agreement krijgen met de strijdende partijen. Wij hebben 10 minuten nodig, of wij hebben een voertuig nodig dat van de ene naar de andere kant kan gaan. Dit ging letterlijk van de ene confessionele wijk naar de andere confessionele wijk. Hoe dat werkte, daar moet je dan een van de strijdende partijen bij krijgen en het leger was dan de meest neutrale partij. Bij gebrek aan een volledig neutrale partij. Maar je zag inderdaad dat het leger wilde best meewerken aan vervoer van gehandicapte patiënten tussen de ene wijk en de andere wijk. Maar zo snel dat de wijk in handen was van Hezbollah of in handen was van de Amal beweging, dan zei het leger, nee dat kunnen wij niet, want dit moet Hezbollah of Amal zelf doen, want zij hebben anders het gevoel dat wij hun autoriteit ondermijnen. Dus je moet letterlijk, dus op de grond.. Het had tot gevolg dat wij iedere keer heel gemakkelijk door heel veel gebieden konden bewegen. Behalve die gebieden die in handen waren van Amal of Hezbollah, omdat het leger heel erg bewust was van die gevoeligheden. Het leger had heel duidelijk in de gaten dat, Hezbollah kan ons zo in oorlog sleuren, dus laten wij dat koste van koste proberen te voorkomen. En dat ging zo ver, dat zelfs het vervoeren van die gehandicapte mensen daar aan onderhevig was. Dus alles was tip-toe.

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KL: Ja, ik begrijp waarom dat een goed voorbeeld is. Nu noemde je al dat het leger, bij gebrek aan een echte neutrale partij, de meest neutrale partner was. Vandaag de dag wordt het leger meer omschreven als voorbeeld van een succesvolle sektarisch balans. Terwijl in de burgeroorlog, het leger werd gezien als een tool of oppression van de Maronite president?

JJ: In de afgelopen… Sinds 1990 of 1989, kijk maar welke je kiest, want daar verschillen de meningen ook over. Zelf kies ik 1982 als een van de belangrijkste punten. Ik denk dat het leger wel ontzettend is veranderd. Het leger is veel meer… Wat je eigenlijk vroeger in Turkije zag, dat het eigenlijk meer een staatsorgaan op zichzelf is, maar niet gecontroleerd door de regering. Dat heeft voor- en nadelen. En zeker als… Zou Libanon een normale rechtstaat zijn dan zou het vooral nadelen hebben. Nu is Libanon niet een normaal volledig functionerende rechtstaat, dus daar kun je dan over debatteren. Maar ik denk wel inderdaad, dat je heel sterk ziet, het leger wel meer –sinds de jaren negentig. Het leger wel meer inziet, en misschien ook slimmer is in hoe het stabiliteit in het land kan bewaren. En ook dat het leger in plaats van een inclusieve organisatie. Kijk, het Libanese leger is wat mij betreft geen inclusieve organisatie, maar zij werken samen met de andere groeperingen om die balans te houden. Normaal gesproken zie je in een land, kijk naar Irak, wat je probeert dat je in het leger iedereen vertegenwoordigd probeert te krijgen. Nou, in Libanon niet, want dat lijkt mij duidelijk. Er zijn wel verschillende groeperingen, maar wat het leger doet is, nou niet iedereen moet onderdeel van ons zijn, maar wij geven iedereen het gevoel dat het leger met zij mee denkt. En dat vind ik, vanuit een bestuurskundig oogpunt, heel slim en heel erg werkbaar. Of het nou perse heel erg positief is. Kijk, positief op de lange termijn is heel moeilijk om te beoordelen, maar het is wel een productieve en werkzame relatie. Dat zeker, sinds na de Israël-Lebanon oorlog in 2006, sterker is geworden. Waarbij, omdat iedereen eigenlijk zei, nou Hezbollah heeft die oorlog gewonnen voor Libanon. Ik denk dat toen het Libanese leger heeft gezegd, ja maar dat kan niet. En ik denk dat daar, maar daar moet je voor in military intelligence spreken, maar ik denk dat daar een heel groot verschil heeft plaatsgevonden. Die overweging. Nadat libanon de populaire winnaar was van de oorlog tegen Israël van 2006, en daar kan je over debatteren natuurlijk, want zijn er winnaars? Maar ik denk dat dat heeft geleid tot een enorme verandering in de mentaliteit van het Libanese leger, en wellicht ook de manier waarop de Libanese politiek daar controle over uit kan oefenen. Dat heeft wel een zeer sterk stabiliserende factor gehad. En daarbij is het belangrijk om te onderstrepen dat stabiliteit

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natuurlijk aan de ene kant positief kan zijn. Maar ik stabiliteit ook graag vergelijk met zachte heelmeesters maken stinkende wonden. Want er blijft wat rotten onder de oppervlakte.

KL: Je noemde kort al even de rol van Hezbollah. Naar jouw mening, in hoeverre genoten de militias popular support en legitimiteit. Of steunden de verschillende gemeenschappen met name de militias vanuit veiligheidsoverwegingen?

JJ: Ik denk dat het wel zo was dat de staat eigenlijk in een soort, wat ik zelf, een situatie van hyperventilatie noem, terecht was gekomen. Dat zij niet meer wisten hoe zij moeten reageren, en daardoor voortdurend bleven reageren. Dat je geen stabiliteit meer krijgt, maar een staat of een overheid of een regering of een regeringsgroepje eigenlijk of een regeringskliek of een cabal zoals je dat zou noemen, die voortdurend op zoek was naar legitimering door voortdurend te reageren op verschillende demands. En dat is natuurlijk het grote probleem, dat de legitimiteit. Er was misschien nog wel legitimiteit, maar er was geen zwaartemacht meer, zoals wij dat kennen in de rechtstaat. Dus zij moeten voortdurend op zoek naar mensen die hun zwaartemacht konden bieden, op de een of andere manier. Dat ging natuurlijk per geografisch blok, per religieus blok. En dan binnen dat religieus blokken ook nog eens per clan groep of familie groep. Waarbij de voortdurend afspraken moeten worden gemaakt. Dus de legitimiteit… Wat natuurlijk wel zo is, is dat de mensen wel bleven open staan voor de staat an sich, en het idee van de staat. Dus er was de Libanese staat, en dat heeft dan natuurlijk wel weer te maken met hoe de staat is opgezet, bleef worden gezien, ik denk door iedereen… Natuurlijk hebben mensen gezegd dat het niet zo was of dat er twijfels waren, maar ik denk niet dat dat zo was, ik denk dat, zeker tijdens de burgeroorlog op zoek was naar het in stand houden van de staat, maar op zoek was naar controle over die staat. En dat is iets anders dan die staat omver willen werpen. Dus ik denk wel dat het idee achter de staat Libanon, zoals die op papier bestond, dat die in de ogen van vrijwel iedere betrokken partij buitengewoon legitiem was. En dat is heel erg uitzonderlijk als je kijkt naar dat Lebanon eigenlijk een adoptief kindje was, dat uit Syrië was gezet en van Syrië was losgemaakt, en buitengewoon gefabriceerde staat is wat dat betreft. Maar juist omdat tijdens die jaren van de burgeroorlog.. Syrië en Egypte kwamen pas net uit de United Arab Republic, je had opeens Egypte en Israël die het opeens met elkaar eens waren, wat een schok was voor vrijwel iedereen, en er gebeurde zo ongelofelijk veel in die periode. Ik kan mij voorstelen dat in zo’n periode, voor vrijwel elke Libanees, het idee van die staat een heel sterk gevoel gaf van dat willen wij houden, maar wij willen bekijken wie er controle over heeft. En Hezbollah, en eigenlijk alle losse Sjiitische groeperingen die daaruit bestonden. Hezbollah was ook eigenlijk

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maar een verzamelwoord vind ik zelf. Kijk nu is er echt een hele organisatie, maar je zou er vragen bij kunnen stellen of dat toen echt een centraal geleide organisatie was, vind ik zelf. Daar zijn verschillende meningen over. Maar je kan je afvragen wie had er duidelijk controle over wat het doel was. En dat hing vooral af van wie er het meest gesteund was en wie het meeste financiële steun ontving vanuit andere hoeken. Uit Syrië en uit Iran wat dat betreft. Maar Hezbollah had een bepaalde claim op de staat. Net als iedereen eigenlijk. En Hezbollah, omdat Hezbollah heel sterk heeft geprofileerd als niet alleen militaire, maar ook een sociale organisatie, hebben zij daarmee een hele grote mate van negativiteit weten te verwerken. Die ook rechtmatig is. Dat vind ik ook, en dat geld nu nog steeds wat mij betreft voor Hezbollah. Wat ik ook mag vinden van hun militaire ideologie. Zij zijn een van de weinige organisaties die in staat is gebleken om zowel in Lebanon, als in Syrië ook nog steeds, voor sociale zekerheid te zorgen voor ongelofelijk veel mensen die buiten Hezbollah nooit hebben kunnen genieten van sociale zekerheid. Dat is wel heel belangrijk. Als jij dan kijkt steunen mensen nou omdat zij militair machtig zijn. Ja, ook daarom. Maar ook omdat Hezbollah in staat is om ervoor te zorgen dat jij een dak boven je hoofd hebt. En dat is wel zo prettig als je kinderen hebt. En dat is natuurlijk, terug gaan naar die menselijke behoefte, die ik mijzelf voortdurend ook hoor herhalen de laatste tijd in radio en tv interviews. Ga terug naar die menselijke behoefte, en kijk naar die menselijke behoefte en gecombineerd met wat milities zeggen en probeer dat te veranderen, want daar zit de macht.

KL: Dit is herkenbaar voor mijn case, waarin milities in staat waren de sociale voorzieningen van de staat over te nemen en een parallel systeem op te bouwen. Hierdoor wonnen zij erg veel steun van de lokale bevolking. Net noemde je kort al even de rol van familie binnen bepaalde religieuze groeperingen. Wat was de rol van lokale community leaders en clan ties in het conflict?

JJ: Ja zeker. Door die confessionele opbouw van de staat. Mensen denken dan meteen aan religieuze groeperingen, maar binnen die religieuze groeperingen. Juist clan leiders nog belangrijker worden. Zij zijn de mensen die… zij zijn eigenlijk de herders. Letterlijk, ook de religieuze herders, maar ook de familie herders, die ervoor zorgen dat iedereen keurig binnen die lijnen blijft. En daar hoort ook, dat machtsaspect bij, en het feit dat zij allemaal gehoord willen horen. En natuurlijk heb je, je hebt verschillende machtsvormen, je hebt kleinere en grotere groeperingen, en clan associaties, groot en klein. Maar dat is eigenlijk wel heel erg belangrijk. Vooral ook weer omdat het geformaliseerd is en niet dat het ergens is opgeschreven, maar de inrichting van de Libanese staat. Vergelijk het met zuilenmaatschappij

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in Nederland, wat ik zelf een hele mooie vergelijking vind. Wie waren het sterkste, de lokale leiders van lokale instituties. En dat geldt net zozeer Libanon. Nog meer eigenlijk, in verband met het feit dat er geen andere optie is. Als je kijkt naar welvaartstaat en sociale zekerheid, de lokale clan leader heeft de meest invloed op de lokale politie of de lokale militie. Je kan aan niemand anders refereren. Dus die machtspositie was en bleef vrijwel onaangetast. Hij is natuurlijk wel scherp veranderd, omdat je natuurlijk verschillende familiegroeperingen hebt binnen zo’n clan. Verschillende familiegroepen dan de macht overnemen, die dan misschien wat meer open staan voor samenwerking of juist niet, dus dat veranderd dan wel. Er is veel dynamiek binnen zo’n clan, maar ook tussen de clans. Maar de kracht van de clan, heb ik zelf het idee, veranderd vrij weinig. Natuurlijk zijn er wel gebieden waar de clans minder machtig zijn geweest, en dat blijf ook zo.

Maar ik denk zelf, zeker als je kijkt naar, voor veel Libanezen, ten minste Libanezen die ik zelf ken uit het Zuiden van Libanon en Beiroet, dat zij een aantal keren hebben gezegd, dat als zij kijken naar hoe sterk de clan rond Jumblatt, dus de Druzen eigenlijk. En hoe sterk die clan structuur werkt en hoe ontzettend veel macht zij hebben voor de hoeveelheid mensen dat zij vertegenwoordigen. Is voor hun een teken, kijk dat is een goede strategie. Die clan structuur is een strategie, daardoor krijg je macht. Mensen kijken naar Jumblatt, en zij verafschuwen of zij mogen hem. Als zij kijken naar de manier waarop hij zijn religieuze etnische groep regeert eigenlijk dan zien zij iets dat werkt.

KL: Heel interessant. Dit biedt echt inzicht de social cleavages die er waren. Nu hebben wij het kort al gehad over de grievances die ontstonden door de ongelijke machtsverdeling. Kan jij andere grievances bedenken die mogelijk hebben bijgedragen aan het voortduren van het conflict?

JJ: Nou, er waren natuurlijk ook altijd al grievances tussen… Naast alle grote grievances eigenlijk heb je, en dat wordt vaak ondergeschoven, maar dat is wel heel belangrijk, dat is dat je binnen bepaalde religieuze groeperingen of devotionele groepen, ook weer familie of clan groeperingen hebt die het minder hebben of die op voet van oorlog staan met groepen binnen hun denominatie. En als je kijkt naar bepaalde neigboorhouds van Beirut, maar ook in het zuiden rond de Beqaa, zie je dat… Ten minste daar is wel eens aan gerefereerd, maar daar heb ik geen hard bewijs voor, omdat ik daar geen onderzoek naar heb gedaan. Maar mensen vertelden mij dat er heel veel familiebanden op spanning werden gezet, omdat mensen zien dat… Kijk, tijdens zo’n burgeroorlog zijn er heel windows of opportunity.

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Om frustratie uit het verleden of current frustration daar iets aan te doen. Dus je hebt ook dat er binnen die groeperingen spanningen ontstaan die ervoor zorgen dat zo’n burgeroorlog nog langer duurt, omdat zij… Er wordt dan gezegd, wij willen als hele clan vrede sluiten met die clan of groeperingen. En dan zegt een familie binnen die clan, nee, want wij willen eerst dit voor elkaar krijgen. En dat is wel iets wat ik zelf mis in evaluatie of beschrijvingen van burgeroorlogen, is dat clans worden gezien als een homogene groep. En dat is natuurlijk niet zo is. Een clan zelf is een powerplay. Ik denk dat het een grotere rol heeft gespeeld dan onderzocht is, maar dat is puur op basis van gesprekken die ik heb gehad. Zeker als je kijkt naar de burgeroorlog en naar wat verlengt nou zoiets, denk ik dat het inderdaad het feit is dat tijdens onderhandeling… Je hebt natuurlijk een clan leider. En op een gegeven moment word door iemand bepaald, en dat kan een externe partij zijn, wie de clan of de groep vertegenwoordig. Dat kan een familie clan zijn of een religieuze groep zijn. Je zou denken de hele groep besluit wie hun vertegenwoordigd. Dat is meestal niet het geval. Dat zie je nu ook Syrië. Het komt meestal vanuit een externe factor, die eigenlijk zegt wij willen met deze persoon praten en wij gaan er vanuit dat deze persoon zijn clan vertegenwoordigd. En als dat niet zo is dan moet hij dat zelf maar gaan regelen. Dat is een hele onnatuurlijke, op macht gebaseerde manier, om clan leadership of denominational group leadership te bepalen. Niet intern, maar bijna extern opgelegde keuze. Wij gaan met deze persoon praten, zorg maar dat het werkt eigenlijk. Juist omdat ik dat zelf nu in Syrië en nu nadenk over Libanon, denk ik bij mijzelf… ja kijk, dat zag je daar ook. Als je ook kijkt naar de Palestijnse kampen bijvoorbeeld, die natuurlijk ook een grote rol hebben gespeeld. Daar is ook natuurlijk dat, ondanks dat veel mensen uit dezelfde originele gebieden komen vanuit Israël of de Palestijnse gebieden, zie je wel dat zo’n shuffle. Alles gaat door de mixer heen, dat mensen de kans grijpen om het leiderschap op zich nemen. Mensen die eigenlijk niet traditioneel leider waren, krijgen opeens de kans om het leiderschap op zich te nemen, omdat zij worden gelegitimeerd door buitenstaanders. En dat heb je zeker ook bij de Phalangisten heel erg sterk gezien. Ja, waar kwamen zij opeens vandaan? Dat is eigenlijk echt een soort raadsel wat dat betreft. Als je kijkt naar Max Weber, waar komt legitimiteit vandaan. Dan is het natuurlijk zo dat tijdens die burgeroorlog de legitimiteit verschoof van traditional legitimacy naar charismatic legitimacy, en daarna gewoon een powerplay. Dat is iets wat mij heel erg fascineert, en volgens mij heel belangrijk is voor Lebanon. Als je kijkt naar de context van Lebanon, en als je kijkt naar zo’n staat waarin eigenlijk heel veel dingen vast liggen, dan wordt het leiderschap binnen die lijnen heel erg belangrijk. Dus niet zozeer het doorbreken van die lijnen, maar het leiderschap binnen die lijnen. Om vervolgens je macht te vergroten naar de andere groepjes, die ook

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allemaal binnen hun lijntjes opereren. In plaats van het vergroten van de volume van wat er binnen je lijnen ligt, wordt het belangrijker om je te presenteren als iemand die allianties kan opbouwen met mensen die zelf binnen hun eigen lijntjes wonen en leven. Het wordt niet zozeer overnemen, maar coalitiebouwen.

KL: Ik kan echt voorstellen dat het aanstellen van een militia leider door externe partijen heeft bijgedragen aan het verlengen van het conflict. En daar opportunisme bij kwam kijken.

JJ: Ja, wat interessant zou zijn voor je, is als je iemand kan spreken die sociologie van Arabische staten is het interessant om te kijken naar conflicten in het Midden Oosten door de eeuwen heen. En wat je ook ziet in Libanon. De leider van zo’n clan of leider van een familie groep of een religieuze leider, gaat nooit zelf meteen naar onderhandelingen toe. Dat gebeurt niet, die heeft een boodschapper, en dat is meestal zijn oudste zoon of tweede zoon of iemand anders die een familie relatie is. En die op een of andere manier gelegitimeerd is om hun te vertegenwoordigen en wat dan gebeurd is dat je die zoon of neef of jongere broer, je kan je voorstellen hoe dat zit. Die wordt dan door de buitenpartij gezien, als dit is de vertegenwoordiger, in plaats van, dit is slechts de boodschapper. En dat zorg voor spanningen binnen die familie groeperingen of religieuze groeperingen zelf. En dat vind ik echt interessant. Ik vraag letterlijk wel eens naar familierelaties, en als ik merk dat iemand niet de oudste zoon is, maar de derde of zevende, dan heb ik geen reden om verder te vragen, want daar moet iets achter zitten. En dat gelde voor Syrië, Irak, Lebanon, en dat geldt nog steeds.

KL: Okay, dan ga ik daar nog naar kijken. Aan het begin van ons gesprek spraken wij al even over de criminalisering van milities, daar wilde ik nog even op verder gaan. Ik heb met name gekeken naar de criminele activiteiten van milities, en in hoeverre hun politieke doel veranderde, maar jij gaf een nieuw inzicht.

JJ: Ja, het gaat er even om, wat betekent criminaliseren. Waar komt onze definitie vandaan en wat betekent het? Zeker als je kijkt naar situatie waarin de rechtstaat niet functioneert, wat is dan de definitie van een crime. Wat betekent criminaliseren? Is het dan de relatie tot de soevereine staat en criminele gedrag. Of is dan de relatie tot de oorlogsrecht en internationale afspraken?

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KL: In mijn geval heb ik meer gekeken naar de transformatie van een organisatie met een politieke boodschap naar een criminele organisatie. Neem bijvoorbeeld de drugs production in de Beqaa Valley of de vele kidnappings.

JJ: Ja, eigenlijk een soort maffia. Ik denk dat een two-way system is, waarbij je kijkt naar… Kijk, als er een politiek doel wordt nagestreefd dan zijn de politieke leiders nog steeds afhankelijk van de steun van lokale machtshebbers. Of dat nou power lords zijn of familiehoofden of lokale handelaren, of wat dan ook. En realistisch gezien, zij zijn natuurlijk heel bezorgd over wat doet dit met mijn economische positie, met mijn inkomen, en de mensen waarvoor ik verantwoordelijk ben. Dat gaat verder dan hun eigen villa’s en hun eigen landerijen. Dat heeft ook te maken met hun positie als persoon die ervoor moet zorgen dat andere families inkomsten hebben. Dat is natuurlijk heel erg sterk voor de Levant. The protectorate system, dat hele systeem van naar beneden druppelen. Dan krijg je een situatie, als je kijkt naar drugs productie of naar de productie van algemene landbouwgoederen, zelfs toegang tot water in Libanon. Wat daar belangrijk is, is dat er moet worden afgesproken of dat er een onderhandeling plaatsvinden tussen mensen met een politiek doel. En er wordt gezegd sluiten jullie bij ons aan en dan zeggen zij tuurlijk zijn wij jullie bondgenoten, want wij zijn ook Sunni, wij zijn ook Shia. Maar het moet wel praktisch op de grond leefbaar zijn en logisch zijn. Wij willen onze inkomsten niet naar beneden zien gaan. Dan kan het ook zo zijn dat, als je kijkt naar drugs, dat om ervoor te zorgen dat zij steun krijgen van drugs producerende groepen, zij zullen ervoor zorgen dat het exporteren en het verbouwen van drugs makkelijker wordt. Dus het is heel erg sterk strategy of survival. En dat kan praktisch zijn en dat kan strategisch zijn. Maar het is vaak praktischer dan mensen denken. Kijk, op de een of andere manier moeten mensen een dak boven hun hoofd hebben en voedsel op tafel, en als er iets is wat oorlog doet dan is het dat verstoren. Dus hoe zorgen wij ervoor dat het niet gebeurd, en dat jouw onderhandelingspositie niet wordt. Wij kunnen ervoor zorgen dat wat er ook gebeurd, of als wij gaan vechten dat jij kan blijven produceren en je geld kan blijven verdienen. En wij vragen daarvoor 20% van je opbrengst, maar jij kan door blijven produceren.

KL: Helder. Het kunnen dus ook praktische overwegingen zijn.

JJ: Ja, natuurlijk is het wel zo. Er zijn natuurlijk ook kleinere criminele organisaties, die de situatie dan gebruiken om te zeggen van wij steunen jullie of wij zorgen dat dit beschikbaar blijft en dan gooien wij het onder een ideologische paraplu. Dus het werkt naar

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beiden kanten. Maar ik denk dat de overgrote meerderheid, ik zou zeggen… De situatie in zuid Afghanistan was enigszins vergelijkbaar wat betreft drugsproductie naar criminele gangs die dat dan deden onder de paraplu van de Taliban of juist niet. Waarbij dan eigenlijk de afweging wordt afgemaakt: doen wij alsof wij bij de Taliban horen, zodat zij ervoor zorgen dat wij onze drugs kunnen blijven verbouwen of zeggen wij juist wij zijn tegen de Taliban, zodat de nationale politie ons niet lastig valt in onze drugs productie. Dat is echt voor Libanon zal verschillen per groep. Als je kijkt naar de Druzen dan zijn de economische activiteiten heel erg gecentreerd en heel centraal geleid. Maar dat is dan weer niet het geval bij de gemiddelde Shia in het zuiden of bij de Soennie in het noorden of oosten.

KL: Okay, wij hebben aardig veel besproken. Heb jij andere factoren waarvan je zegt dat heeft de dynamiek van het conflict echt veranderd?

JJ: Wat ik al heb genoemd, de familie factoren en hoe macht daar werkt, wat ik zelf heel interessant vindt, maar vanuit politicologisch of bestuurskundig opzicht minder relevant is. Ik denk wat vooral heel erg belangrijk is, is dat je niet in de val trapt van het veralgemeniseren van mensen op basis van pure dit is Shia, dit is Soennie, dit is Druze. Dat doet teniet aan ontzettend veel interne politiek en interne machtsstrijd binnen in die groep. Er zijn bijvoorbeeld ook wel gevallen bekend waarbij Israël, maar ook Amerika en ook Syrië, succesvol zijn geweest in het overreden van machtshebbers binnen kleine groepen, die dan niet de leider waren, maar de tweede of derde personen. Om te kijken of zij hun konden aantrekken, om ervoor te zorgen dat groepen van posities zouden veranderen. Dat hele, eigenlijk maffia aspecten. Als jij kijkt naar hoe een regerende maffia werkt, dat speelt toch wel een rol in een land zoals Libanon, dingen worden uitgespeeld. Nogmaals, wat ik denk dat een hele belangrijke factor heeft gespeeld in de Libanese burgeroorlog is dat de manier waarop de staat is opgezet, het confessionele systeem, zorgt ervoor dat er hele duidelijke limieten zijn van hoever je kan gaan en waar je eigenlijk moet gaan. En dan is de vraag eigenlijk, is dan zo’n burgeroorlog makkelijker te managen omdat er bepaalde randvoorwaarden zijn waar mensen zich op de een of andere manier impliciet aan houden of maakt het juist moeilijker, omdat de manier waarop mensen denken. Normaals gesproken gaan burgeroorlogen natuurlijk over, nou mensen willen meer macht hebben en mensen strijden daarvoor en dat is heel helder. En omdat, wat mij betreft, bij deze burgeroorlog zoveel plaats vond binnen dat bestek van die staat, kun je je afvragen wat zijn dan de motivaties die de erachter zitten? Hoe zit dat dan? Dan wordt het al een stuk moeilijker natuurlijk. Dat vind ik zelf heel erg interessant.

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KL: Ja, ik herken ook dat het confessionele systeem leidde tot een geparalyseerde overheid. Dan is het gemakkelijk om te zeggen dat het een power struggle was, maar kunnen ook andere motiveringen achter hebben gezeten.

JJ: Ja, kijk normaal gesproken als je een burgeroorlog hebt of een semi-internationaal conflict. Het was natuurlijk geen puur…, het ging natuurlijk verder dan alleen een burgeroorlog. Dan is alles up for grabs en dan komt daaruit voort een nieuwe constitutie of een nieuwe regeling of een nieuwe internationale vredesregeling, maar in Libanon waren die er al en waren die ook al heel erg ingrained in people’s mind. Mensen waren zich er uitstekend van bewust en dat maakte het een stuk lastiger. Dat beperkt je onderhandelingsvrijheid enorm. Dan wordt het eigenlijk bijna moeilijker.

KL: Ja, hoe zou jij het einde van het conflict beschrijven? In feite werd er over exact dezelfde issues onderhandeld als aan het begin van het conflict, 15 jaar eerder.

JJ: Ik denk heel makkelijk, maar pure uitputting en puur het feit dat mensen gewoon echt niet meer wisten wat zij moeten doen. En dat is echt… Nou, het zal niet de eerste keer zijn geweest dat een conflict zo aan zijn einde komt. Maar gewoon puur het feit dat mensen gewoon echt niet meer wisten. Dat ook weer gekoppeld aan geopolitieke ontwikkelingen. Als je kijkt naar het tijdsperk, waarin je ziet dat de basis voor stabiliteit… Kijk, ik wil het ook niet te groot maken, maar het speelt wel mee. De koude oorlog, twee supermachten die ervoor zorgen dat… Syrië had duidelijke wapentoevoer uit de Sovjet Unie. En Iran steunde Hezbollah. Amerika had een duidelijke steun aan Israël, en dat is nog steeds zo. Iedereen wist waar alles vandaan kwam en dat is natuurlijk aan het einde van de jaren tachtig op losse schroeven te komen staan en heel onduidelijk geworden. Ik denk dat toch heeft meegespeeld, dat mensen begonnen in te zien dit gaat veranderen en wij hebben geen… normaal gesproken kon je eigenlijk alles doen en je wist toch wel zeker dat zij achter je bleven staan. Je kon grote fouten maken, maar je had nog steeds die steun. En dat werd veel meer gevoelig in de jaren tachtig. Dat zal ongetwijfeld toch wel een rol hebben gespeeld.

KL: Ja, de internationale politiek heeft ook weer een bepaalde invloed gehad op het conflict.

[End of interview]

I thank him for his help and ask him if I may contact him in case things come up. We agree that I send him the transcript of our conversation, and the final version of my thesis.

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9.4.2 Transcript: Tsolin Nabaltian

Interviewer: Kyra Luchtenberg

Interviewee: Tsolin Nabaltian, assistant professor at the Modern Middle Eastern History Department of Middle Eastern Studies of the Leiden University

Interview details: December 17, 2015, 2:30 PM

(Reconstruction and notes from non-recorded interview)

I started by telling the interviewee what I am doing for my research and explaining that I was interested in talking with her as a historian who focuses on Lebanon in the 20th century. I briefly explained that I am using the approach of grounded theory, which allows me sampling of persons who I believe to have interesting perspectives on the topic of conflict dynamics in the Lebanese Civil War. I started off by asking what she considered to be the root causes of the Lebanese Civil War (hereafter: the civil war).

TN started by stating that the causes of the 1975 war can be found before that time. Lebanon is a sectarian nation state that strictly divides the political resources amongst its sectarian groups. The cause of the 1975 civil war can be linked to the 1958 Lebanon crisis. A civil strife caused by political tensions, which resulted in a truce. This truce lacked a viable solution as the division of power did not change. This escalated in the 1970s. She says other factors can also be mentioned, such as the influx of Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, she considered the civil war to be a national issue.

I pointed out that others argue that the civil war had a strong external dimension, due to the involvement of foreign powers. TN confirms that, indeed, other nations were involved, but she considered the civil war to be a national issue, as it mainly evolved around the issue of the Lebanese confessional system. I asked her if the civil war can be considered a political strife rather than a ethno-religious conflict. She confirms that she would say as it was a struggle for power. The civil war was about more than ethno-religious differences. It is not possible to identify the individual actors. Also, it is not possible to see it as a conflict between Christians and Muslim. The conflict was more complicated.

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I asked her what role the state had played in the civil war, and to what extent the state capacity influenced the conflict dynamics. TN reacts by stating that I am assuming the state is a neutral party, which it was not. The state was lacking the capacity to react. The state failed due to the participation of Lebanese in militias. The Lebanese Army had broken down, which led to the collapse of the state. The problem in Lebanon was that the Lebanese Army broke down along sectarian lines. The state lost its monopoly of violence, and armed militias took over. I asked her what role the military had played, as it was considered by some as a coercive power tool of the Christian communities. TN notes that when the military gets involved, the situation will escalate into a civil war. She compares the civil war with the 2008 fighting in Lebanon, in which the army stood down. She argues that if the army had reacted differently, another civil war had broken out.

I asked her how local politics might have influenced the dynamics of the civil war. TN answers that the civil war was influenced by several prominent families. These families gained power from landownership or other economic resources. The communal mobilisation of militias offered protection to their respective communities, but also consolidated the power of powerful families. The creation of militias itself reinforced their position. I asked her to what extent she thinks that the militias criminalised. Meaning, the political goal was replaced by criminal activities, such as drugs production and trafficking. TN states that the militias in itself can be considered as criminal organisations. Logically, in times of war, the militias will resort to criminal activities to finance the procurement of arms. Drugs trafficking, for example, is a way to make quick money. It offered militias an economic opportunity to increase their resources. Others profit from the war by selling scare goods, which is referred to as a war economy. For example, a company may start selling generators or water to the population.

I asked her about the influence of factionalisation of militias. TN finds it hard to assess whether factionalisation led to an escalation or de-escalation of the civil war. She asks me how it would have de-escalated the conflict. I mention that the factionalisation might have lowered militia’s resources. Besides the inter-sectarian fighting militias joined in intra- sectarian fights. A short period of escalation might be followed by de-escalation, as the militias suffer from a lack of equipment and fatigue. TN mentions that she thinks the lack of external support might have been a more significant factor than fatigue.

I ask her what she would point out as factors contributing to the end of the war. TN mentions that she does not think fatigue played a role in ending the civil war. She points out the

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importance of the regional situation. Especially, the First Gulf War changed the regional power structure. It can be considered a game changer due to the shift from dual to singular power.

I asked if she considered the Syrian interventions and Israeli invasions to have played a escalatory or de-escalatory role. TN points out that she would look at the two foreign powers separately. Legally, they played completely different roles. Syria had been given the mandate to intervene and act as peace force, while Israel invaded Lebanese territory. I asked her about the Syrian hegemony to gain influence in Lebanese politics. She answers that Syria already consolidated its influence due to its strong historical ties with Lebanon. Also, she mentions that discussing the escalation or de-escalation means assuming a situation of stability or instability, which is subject to debate. The Syrian troops created relatively stability, and their departure caused instability, or could be seen that way.

I asked her about other foreign involvement that might have influenced the civil war. TN mentions the role of the US in the civil war. She explains that the US was considered a participant of the civil war rather than an observer, which made the US a legitimate target. She refers to the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings. I ask her about the role of the Arab League and the ADF. TN answers that the Arab League’s influence was limited. Their role was reduced to the sidelines as Lebanon and Syria were both members of the regional organisation.

As we rounded off the conversation, we briefly discussed the popular support for militias. TN mentions that you need to take into account that in times of war, people make different choices. The militias might not only offered the Lebanese people protection, but also goods and services that were needed for their survival.

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9.4.3 Transcript: Willem van de Riet

Interviewer: Kyra Luchtenberg

Interviewee: Willem van de Riet, policy officer at the North Africa and Middle East Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Interview details: December 3, 2015, 2:00 PM

The interview starts with an introduction of the thesis topic. I explain the objective of the research, and the approach. I tell him about the structure of the interview, including its confidentiality. We talk shortly about his work at the MFA before we start the interview. He stresses that he will try to link the current situation with the situation of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975.

[Start of interview]

KL: Welke factoren hebben naar jouw mening bijgedragen aan het escaleren en de- escaleren van geweld?

WR: Nou even kijken, wat zijn nu de dingen die stabiliteit van het Lebanon conflict mogelijk hebben beïnvloedt, dat is eigenlijk de vraag. Dan kan ik het beste beginnen met de invloed van Syrië op het conflict. Wat één heel relevant nu is, is het feit dat 20% van de bevolking Syrisch is, dat doet iets met de sektarische samenstelling van de bevolking. In het geval dat, er zijn natuurlijk allerlei scenario voor Syrië te bedenken, maar stel nou dat het ISIS gebied zich verder uitbreidt, wat aannemelijk lijkt. Stel nou dat sjiieten en alawieten zich, over een jaar, toch te bedreigd voelen om Damascus en in Latakia, en Aleppo bijvoorbeeld, te blijven, dan is de kans heel groot dat zij naar Libanon vluchten. En ik denk dat dat wel een behoorlijke impact kan hebben op de sektarische balans van het land.

KL: Okay. Ja, dat is vergelijkbaar met de komst van Palestijnse vluchtelingen in de jaren zeventig, waardoor de sektarische balans ook op scherp kwam te staan.

WR: Ja, en Hezbollah heeft inmiddels een kwart van zijn strijders verloren door de strijd in Syrië. Het heeft laatst een groot offensief gedaan in de Qalamoun regio. Maar dat houdt ook een beetje op nu voor Hezbollah. Ik weet niet, op dit moment zijn er intern nog niet zo heel veel dingen van te merken, maar ik kan mij voorstellen dat als je als organisatie

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opeens een kwart van je strijders kwijt bent, dat dat ook wel effect heeft op hoe het intern allemaal gaat veranderen, en de stabiliteit daarmee kan beïnvloeden.

KL: Ja, dat kan ik mij ook voorstellen. En nog even terug naar die sektarische balans, want in de burgeroorlog heeft de komst van de Palestijnse vluchtelingen het conflict gestart. Daar is ook het eerste gevecht over gegaan, de plek van Palestinians in Libanon, en hoe het de sektarische balans gaat verstoren.

WR: Ja, ik denk dat… Ik weet niet of je het nu ook echt ziet in de effecten op de Libanese politiek, omdat er nu gewoon niks gebeurd. Dat is een beetje het moeilijke. Wat denk ik wel interessant is aan Libanon, is dat het de politiek is uiteraard belangrijk voor een land. Maar het feit dat een land zonder president eigenlijk twee jaar ook wel okay functioneert voor zover je daar over kan spreken daar, dat zegt ook wel heel veel. Libanezen hebben geleerd om niet te veel op de staat te vertrouwen. Als hier twee jaar geen werkende regering zou zijn, dan zouden er echt problemen komen. Maar Libanezen zijn wat dat betreft gewoon wat anders. En hebben meer geleerd om voor zichzelf te zorgen.

KL: Ja, en in hoeverre worden de social services in stand gehouden?

WR: Ja, dat wordt in stand gehouden. Behalve dat er een groot probleem is met afvalverwerking. Verder de rest wordt dat volgens mij wel redelijk in stand gehouden inderdaad. Maar de afvalverwerking is meer een corruptieprobleem. Het feit dat er een zakelijk belang is bij mensen in de politiek die gewoon geen oplossing willen, omdat het hun eigen belangen schaadt. En wat je in Libanon met de politiek heel erg ziet, is dat het een heel erg gesloten systeem is, dat je ook uit bepaalde families moet komen om een politieke rol te spelen. Neem nu de man die nu misschien president wordt, zijn vader was president. Het is allemaal… Het is heel nepotistisch nog steeds.

KL: Okay, er zal een vergelijkbare situatie zijn geweest 35 jaar geleden. Een politiek systeem van belangenverstrengeling.

WR: Ja, en wat nog meer. Ondanks dat Israël de grote vijand is voor Hezbollah denk ik niet dat Israël echt… Tenzij Hezbollah iets uitlokt, kan ik mij niet voorstellen dat Israël nu het conflict op zoekt. Als je kijkt naar afgelopen jaren zie je eigenlijk vooral dat Israëli heel erg terughoudend is en eigenlijk alleen intervenen op het moment dat… Zij hebben een paar extracties gedaan in de Golanhoogten, waar dan per ongeluk toevallig een Iraanse generaal is gekomen, dat soort dingen. Maar ik geloof niet dat het verder een grote impact zal hebben.

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KL: Okay, want tijdens de burgeroorlog heeft de Israëlische bezetting zeker gezorgd voor een escalatie van het geweld.

WR: Ja, what else. Economisch, ik denk economisch dat je daar wel problemen ziet gewoon van een slecht functionerende overheid. En dat hervormingen nodig zijn om meer in de private sector mogelijk te maken. En dat je hervormingen nodig hebt om het mogelijk te maken dat dat soort dingen daar kunnen werken. Het kan op dit moment officieel niet, officieus gebeurd het wel, in de bouw vooral zitten heel veel vluchtelingen. Dus dat, dat gebeurd al. Wij zijn ook als Nederland aan het kijken naar een manier waarop wij de private sector kunnen stimuleren. En bijvoorbeeld in landbouwgebied, zorgen dat de vluchtelingen die daar zitten daar ook van kunnen profiteren. Maar ja het helpt wel als je dan de overheid mee hebt, en dat de overheid functioneert.

KL: Ja, ik probeer zelf nog te achterhalen op welke manier de economische situatie het conflict heeft beïnvloedt.

WR: Ja, wat een groot probleem is voor Libanon. En dat is ook meer een limitatie op de hoeveelheid buitenlandse hulp er gegeven kan worden. Dat is dat het een enorme schuldenlast heeft. En dat betekent gewoon dat op een bepaald moment IMF en Wereldbank… Ondanks dat er nu waarschijnlijk wel leningen binnen komen van de Wereldbank. Er zit wel een plafond aan. Anders dan in Jordanië waar de staatsschuld een stuk lager is. En dat komt dan toch weer terug bij de niet functionerende overheid. Want als er een president komt… Ja, de inschatting is nu van de post, dat als er een president komt en als dat nu niet lukt dan duurt het voorlopig nog wel een hele tijd. Als die er wel komt dan zou het wat meer perspectief bieden. Maar goed ik heb het idee dat ik de inhoud niet helemaal raak.

KL: Nee, ik kan juist al veel dingen die jij noemt terugkoppelen naar het conflict toen. Bijvoorbeeld, het nepotisme zie je erg sterk terug. Het is natuurlijk heel erg personality- based politics in Lebanon. Bepaalde families lijken echt een belangrijke rol te hebben gespeeld in het verloop van het conflict, door het mobiliseren van mensen uit hun community. Verder het feit, wat jij ook aangeeft, dat het nodig is om te kijken naar de invloed van foreign interventions. Natuurlijk was de rol van Israël toen heel erg anders. Maar ook bijvoorbeeld de hervormingen in de private sector. Wat jij aangeeft is dat in het landbouw sector...

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WR: Ja, maar dat is ook weer, omdat wij er als Nederland natuurlijk naar kijken. Het is ook een beetje uit ons zelf geredeneerd, maar ja, het is wel een van de sectoren die wij dan willen… Kijk Libanon heeft bijvoorbeeld… Er is olie gevonden, nee gas, geen olie, in de middellandse zee, waar Israël al een claim op heeft gelegd. En Libanon kan daar gewoon.. De overheid is natuurlijk der mate disfunctioneel dat zij het niet voor elkaar krijgen om daar een tender op uit te schrijven en een bedrijf de voorraden te exploiteren. Dat zijn natuurlijk dingen die niet helpen.

KL: En op internationaal politiek niveau?

WR: Ja, nog externer. Ik vraag mij af hoe lang de bereidheid… Nu is de bereidheid relatief groot van de internationale gemeenschap om hulp te verlenen aan Libanon. Vooral ook omdat vluchtelingen Europa hebben bereikt, dus wij gooien heel veel geld er tegen aan om mensen maar allemaal daar te houden. Ik weet niet of dat over twee jaar ook nog zo is. Als er dadelijk een soort oplossing voor het Syrische conflict komt. Wat je ook in Irak zag. Eigenlijk op het moment dat de oorlog voorbij was ging de aandacht gewoon verslappen. En ik kan mij voorstellen dat een vergelijkbare situatie zich nu zal voordoen. Goed, de truc is natuurlijk ook voor jou om het niet te groot te maken voor een dissertatie.

KL: Klopt. Tegelijkertijd is het echt verkennend onderzoek, om de factoren te achterhalen die een conflict laten escaleren en de-escaleren. Eerder noemde jij al de capaciteit van een militie als Hezbollah. Maar het kan ook een hele onverwachte wending nemen, zoals in de case van Libanon, dat internationale onderhandelingen juist leiden tot het oplaaien van het geweld, omdat milities een tegengeluid willen geven. Juist omdat zij niet aan de onderhandelingstafel zaten. Jij hebt nu ook een aantal factoren genoemd, waarvan ik kan kijken of het een rol heeft gespeeld in de burgeroorlog.

WR: Okay, duidelijk.

KL: Waar ik zelf ook aan dacht is dat de agrarische gebieden in het zuiden, voornamelijk bewoond worden door de Shia’s, die toch een vrij ondergeschikte positie hadden en hebben. Stel dat de investeringen leidt tot meer economische activiteiten en een welvarendere positie, dan kan je je afvragen wat het met de sektarische balans gaat doen. De burgeroorlog ging niet alleen om de politieke zeggenschap van de moslimgemeenschap in het confessionele systeem. Tegelijkertijd ging het ook om het verbeteren van hun economische positie. Het moment dat het om economic reforms ging

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wilde geen politici het debat aan gaan, omdat het zou beteken dat ook de politieke positie zou verbeteren.

WR: Ja, interessant. Je zou je ook kunnen afvragen wat het doet met het draagvlak van Hezbollah op het moment dat de mensen welvarender worden. Hezbollah is in feite… Het is en was een soort van parallelle supplier voor basis services in plaats van de staat.

KL: Ja, dan is de huidige situatie niet veel veranderd. Je kan je afvragen of het de lack of government, waardoor popular support voor milities heel erg groeide of dat zij simpelweg veiligheid zochten.

WR: Ja, precies. Liever dat dan helemaal niks. En zijn er andere dingen, waarvan je zelf dacht, dat zou een effect kunnen hebben.

KL: Ja, waar ik zelf ook aan zat te denken, naast contextuele factoren als social cleavages, grievances, politics, is geografie. Het feit dat de verschillende communities heel geconcentreerd In Libanon gevestigd waren maakte het een hele defensieve oorlog. Dat heeft mogelijk invloed gehad op de lengte van het conflict. Ook het feit dat het vooral in urban settings, zoals Beirut, en bergachtige gebieden zich afspeelden. Het kan ook vanzelfsprekend zijn dat terrein van invloed is op het verloop van een conflict.

WR: Ja, maar het maakt hem wel waarschijnlijker dat die meer protracted zal zijn en niet zoals in Nederland toen wij in oorlog waren. Ook hier was terrein belangrijk natuurlijk.

KL: Ja, en verder, ik vind het nog lastig te achterhalen wat de mate van popular support was. Was het meer omdat de milities een soort van fictieve bescherming boden dan dat de bevolking echt achter de milities stonden. Ik las ook een onderzoek waarin stond dat minder dan 10% van de bevolking was voor een oplossing waarbij Libanon zou worden opgesplitst in religieuze areas.

WR: Ja, dat is interessant.

KL: Ja, dus het is best wel lastig te onderscheiden wat is gebruikt als war rethorics door milities en politici en wat is een juist afbeelding van wat de bevolking dacht. Het is toch best wel lastig om te achterhalen.

[End of interview]

The interview is paused as Marius Temming arrives.

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9.4.4 Transcript: Marius Temming

Interviewer: Kyra Luchtenberg

Interviewee: Marius Temming, policy officer at the North Africa and Middle East Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Interview details: December 3, 2015, 3:00 PM

The interview starts with a short introduction of the thesis topic. I explain the objective of the research, and the approach. We start of by talking about the confessional system.

[Start of interview]

MT: Wat je ziet is dat die verschillende groepen affiliaties hebben met de landen erom heen. En dan meest nadrukkelijk, de sjiitische groepen Hezbollah en Amal met Syrië en in het verlengde daarvan Iran, omdat de binnenlandse politiek… De binnenlandse speelruimte afhankelijk is van wat zich buiten de muur afspeelt. Hetzelfde geldt voor het blok van Hariri, de Free Patriotic Movement, die kijkt veel meer naar Saoedi-Arabië. Begin dit jaar heeft Hariri in eigen persoon een miljard of twee miljard van Saoedi-Arabië toegezegd gekregen om te besten om de veiligheidssector te versterken. Dat is natuurlijk een hele unieke situatie, maar omdat je in de regio sprake… Omdat er in de regio sprake is van een koude oorlog, dat vind ik zelf altijd een goede manier om het mij in te beelden, tussen Iran en Saoedi-Arabië. Waar het Syrië conflict ook een manifestatie van is. Misschien niet een manifestatie, maar waarin dat ook zijn weerslag terug vindt. Dan zie je dat Libanon eigenlijk in een kramp zit, binnenlands, omdat eigenlijk alle besluitvorming die plaats zou moeten vinden, niet plaatsvindt, zolang het niet duidelijk is hoe die regionale machtsstrijd, en die strijd in Syrië zich uit gaat spelen. En gek genoeg als je daar komt dan zijn sommige mensen vrij laconiek, van ja weet je, het is allemaal heel erg wat er speelt, wij hebben anderhalf miljoen vluchtelingen en af en toe ontploft er eens wat, maar ja, als je het vergelijkt met hoe het hier is of hiernaast, dan valt het eigenlijk wel mee. Dus het systeem lijkt op een of andere manier wel door te functioneren, ondanks het gegeven dat er een politieke impasse is, daar ben je natuurlijk mee bekend, een president die niet verkozen kan worden. Dus dat functioneert, ondanks de politieke impasse.

KL: Interessant. En hoe zou jij dat uitleggen?

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MT: Een veel gehoord argument is, het land heeft zoveel ellende gekend, tussen 75 en 90 of 89, dat men niet terug wilt naar een burgeroorlog. Dus uiteindelijk, als de spanning te hoog oplopen dan komen die partijen er wel uit, om te zorgen dat het niet te veel uit de hand loopt. Maar wat je eigenlijk ziet is dat… Het is eigenlijk een systeem van verzuiling lijkt het wel een beetje wat wij in Nederland hadden. Alleen dan wat meer cliëntelistisch als dan dat het hier was. Hier hadden wij echt een consensuscultuur en daar is het meer voor je eigen achterban zorgen. Dat maakt het een heel fascinerend land, maar ook een heel ingewikkeld land.

KL: Ja, dit valt te herleiden naar het confessionele systeem, gezien heel duidelijk is vastgelegd hoeveel political power er toegewezen wordt aan elke gemeenschap. Het vasthouden aan de sectarian balance. Als wij daar even aan voorbij gaan, en bijvoorbeeld kijken naar non-statelijke actoren, zoals Hezbollah. In de burgeroorlog lijkt het erop dat de overheid zo paralyzed was en dysfunctioneerde dat een parallel systeem ontstond door het aanbieden van social services en veiligheid. Kan jij stellen dat milities ook een de-escalerende rol hebben gespeeld?

MT: Daar durf ik geen antwoord op te geven. Als het gaat om Hezbollah… Ja, hoe zou je dat kunnen omschrijven. Wij zien Hezbollah als een terroristische groepering, maar het is ook een politieke partij en het zorgt voor zijn eigen achterban. Social security, enzovoort, dat levert steun op. Je zei terecht dat het ook functies van de staat, op verschillende vlakken overneemt, zowel defensief en sociaal. En dat is iets dat nog steeds in grote mate gebeurd. Dat hele model, een democratisch model, zoals wij dat gewend zijn om te denken in politieke partijen, dat is een laag eigenlijk… Dat is een bril waardoor je naar Libanon zou kunnen kijken, maar eigenlijk niet zo functioneel is, omdat het systeem daaronder op een hele andere manier werkt. Dat verzet, die verzetsrol die Hezbollah zichzelf toedicht, dat doen zij nog steeds. Dat is ook een manier om zichzelf te legitimeren. In de onderhandelingen over de huidige regering. In het huidige regeerakkoord was het een heikel punt of daarin wordt opgenomen in woord, de zin… Ik weet het zo niet precies, maar in ieder geval de rol van Hezbollah als de legitimate resistance. Daarmee ook weer die rol van macht tegen Israël te legitimeren.

KL: Ja, dat is ook wat je heel duidelijk zag aan het einde, dat alle milities ontwapend werden behalve Hezbollah, die een verzetsstrijd aan het voeren was en zorgde voor high levels of violence.

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MT: Officieel is er natuurlijk afgesproken… In 2012 is de Baabda declaration opgesteld, waarin formeel werd vastgelegd tussen de partijen dat er een officiële politiek van dissociatie met het Syrië conflict zal worden gevoerd. Dat betekent niet bemoeid zich er tegen aan. Eigenlijk ook vanuit de beweging van als wij dat gaan doen dan gaan hier intern ook spanningen hoog oplopen. Wat ook zo is. Het is een tijdje goed gegaan, maar de afgelopen twee jaar is het in de praktijk rancuneus gebleken, omdat Hezbollah in Syrië zit. Dus die houden zich niet aan die dissociatiepolitiek en dat heeft ook… Dat is ook de reden geweest dat er aanslagen hebben plaatsgevonden. Telkens als er een bom in Beiroet afgaat, dan is dat in het zuiden. Dat is dan wat wij Hezbollah terrein noemen. Daar is ook wel eens kritiek op dat het zo genoemd worden, omdat het ook gewoon woonwijken zijn, die toevallig in het Sjiitische deel zijn. Waar ook zeg maar de Hezbollah hoofdkantoren, enzovoort. Dat zit allemaal daar. De Iraanse ambassade en Iraanse culture instellingen die zitten daar ook. Dus daar zijn een aantal keren aanslagen gepleegd. Dat is een hele tijd stil geweest tot… Wanneer was het? Twee, drie weken geleden. De week voor Parijs denk ik. Gebeurd er weer wat en dan zie je, oh ja, dat is weer dat Hezbollah gebied. En dat is eigenlijk een verlengde van wat er in Syrië gebeurd, namelijk partijen aan de ene kant, meer de oppositie kant, die zich keren tegen het Assad regime. Dus die dissociatiepolitiek die werkt daar eigenlijk niet. Op basis daarvan kan je je eigenlijk afvragen van in hoeverre is Hezbollah nou echt een partij die zelf… Een partij die echt autonoom is. In hoeverre worden zij aangestuurd vanuit Iran. Het is duidelijk dat zij afhankelijk zijn van Iran, maar hoe die verhouding nou precies werkt, dat is moeilijk om… Wij hebben daar ook niet voldoende belangstelling en capaciteit voor om daar helemaal zicht op te krijgen.

KL: Ja, begrijpelijk. Als je kijkt hoeveel er al is geschreven over de foreign support die milities kregen, dat is zo ondoorzichtig.

MT: Er zijn wel rapporten van het Amerikaanse… Ik denk van Defensie. Over buitenlandse steun aan Hezbollah. Ik geloof dat zij er vanuit gaan dat er op jaarbasis in ieder geval 100 miljard van Iran naar Hezbollah gaat. Maar die richt zich heel nadrukkelijk op Hezbollah, omdat dat de militie is waar het meeste aandacht voor is. Maar je ziet daaraan dus weer, dat Libanon het Midden Oosten is en dat het een speelbal is van wat er dus buiten gebeurd. De relatie met Syrië is natuurlijk traditioneel complex. Iemand in Syrië zei ooit tegen mij: When Syria sneezes, Lebanon catches a cold. Dus de relatie is echt… Het wordt ook gezien door vele als een provincie van Syrië.

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KL: Okay, dus een hele sterke externe dimensie. En als wij kijken naar de interne situatie. In de burgeroorlog viel het leger erg snel uit elkaar, waardoor de overheid geen coercive force meer had en de rule of militia het kon overnemen. Nu vraag ik mij nog wel in hoeverre de overheid nog in staat was om beleidsmaatregelen te nemen.

MT: Nou, in zijn algemeenheid ik ben in het parlement geweest op een woensdagmiddag en daar was vrijwel niemand. Er was wel iemand, want daar hebben wij mee gesproken. Het parlement is uiteindelijk ook een instrument dat verdeeld is langs diezelfde scheidslijnen. Volgens mij is zelfs de verhouding van het aantal zetels vooraf vastgesteld. En wat je dan ook ziet is dat het moment dat het parlement… Het parlement heeft zich trouwens nou al een paar keer verlengd, gezien er geen verkiezingen plaatsvinden, omdat zij het niet eens kunnen worden over die kieswet. Die kieswet zou weer tornen aan de machtspositie van de verschillende groepen. Maar zo’n parlement. Volgens mij moet je dat niet zien als een onafhankelijke club die de regering en de regeringspartijen controleert, maar als een verlengstuk daarvan dat ingezet kan worden om legitimiteit… of om besluiten te nemen die al voorgekookt zijn. Daarmee een mandaat geven. Daarom zie je nu dus ook dat er geen president verkozen kan worden, omdat al die verschillende partijen in het parlement. Ofwel zij zorgen ervoor dat het quotum niet gehaald wordt, ofwel stemverhoudingen of andere zaken. De parlementsleden staat helemaal in het verlengde van hun eigen club. Maar hoe dat in de burgeroorlog heeft gewerkt weet ik niet.

KL: Okay. Dit helpt mij ook weer om scherper te kijken naar de rol van het parlement, want je gaat er vrij snel vanuit dat het parlement een onafhankelijk orgaan is dat gelijksoortige taken uitvoert als hier. Maar het wordt mij duidelijk dat de parlementsleden meer bezig waren met sektarische belangen vertegenwoordigen dan consensus politiek.

MT: Het lijkt mij een aanname die ik kan volgen. Interessant aan het leger is wel, dat als je naar de Lebanese Armed Forces kijkt. Op dit moment zijn zij niet de sterkste. Hezbollah is eigenlijk sterker dan het leger. Zij zitten ook meer aan de zuidgrens denk ik. Het leger is tegelijkertijd een van de weinigen instituties in Libanon, die niet langs die breuklijnen verdeeld is en dat wordt echt ook gezien… Daar zijn onderzoeken naar gedaan. Hoe heet die club nou… Dat zal ik na moeten zoeken. Het wordt echt gezien als een symbool van… eigenlijk een van de weinige symbolen van nationale eenheid, dat die sektarische breuklijnen overstijgt. Het leger moet dan ook vaak optreden op het moment dat er in Tripoli, een stad

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waar veel onrust is, vaak tussen twee wijken. In de ene wijk wonen soennieten en de andere sjieten. Het ene deel sympathiseert met Assad regering, de andere met de Soenni rebellen. De straat dat die twee wijken scheidt dat is Syria street. Maar goed als er ergens de pleurus uitbreekt dan is het tussen die lui. Het leger moet daar heel vaak optreden om daar de orde te herstellen. En dat kunne zij doen, omdat zij dus een relatief neutraal orgaan worden gezien. Tegelijkertijd is er wel onderhuidse angst dat zij die neutraliteit verliezen. Op het moment dat je te hard ingrijpt tegen de een en minder tegen die ander, dan kan je die neutraliteit weer verliezen. Dus zij zijn wel heel… Het is een beetje koorddansen.

KL: Ja, dat lijkt dan wel een ontwikkeling van na de oorlog te zijn, want ik heb ook onderzoeken gelezen, waaruit blijkt dat de hogere officieren vaak christelijk waren, en het leger daarom werd gezien door de moslim gemeenschappen als een instrument van macht, gezien de president ook een Christen is. Dus er bestond een angst om het leger in te zetten.

MT: Hoe ver ben je eigenlijk met schrijven?

KL: Ik heb mijn case-description afgerond, en ik ben nu bezig met de analyse. Dus ik heb al aardig wat factoren waarvan ik weet dat het een rol heeft gespeeld, maar nog niet zeker van ben in hoeverre het direct een escalerende of de-escalerende rol heeft gespeeld.

MT: Sorry, dat was een vraag die opkwam. Andere dingen waar je naar kijkt en die onderbelicht zijn.

KL: Geen probleem. Even kijken. Waar ik verder naar kijk is de capacity en strategy van non-state actors, zoals de drugs production in de Beqaa Valley. Dat heeft enorm veel resources opgeleverd, waardoor het conflict verlengd werd. Verder kijk ik naar de versplintering van militie groepen, en of het een escalerende of de-escalerende rol heeft gehad. Het lijkt erop dat de huidige focus ligt op Hezbollah, maar er waren natuurlijk veel andere milities.

MT: Ja, ik heb niet zoveel kennis over welke militaire… Of welke militias er waren, maar je kan wel gewoon als basic assumption nemen dat die balans die er is. Dat is voor iedereen heel erg belangrijk, dat die niet verschuift. Dat is ook de reden, of een van de redenen, waarom al die vluchtelingen niet in officiële kampen worden opgevangen, want dat kan… De angst is dat dan een permanent status kan krijgen. En als die permanent status er zou komen dan zou de balans tussen die groepen verschuiven. Er zou een veel grotere groep

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Soennies zijn, waardoor die balans weer verstoord raakt. En dat leidt dan tot een soort van struisvogelpolitiek. We doen maar alsof het er niet is, om maar niet die balans te verstoren.

KL: Ja, dat komt toch herhaaldelijk terug, dat de sektarische balans behouden een erg belangrijke incentive is.

MT: Iemand heeft mij ooit verteld, als je wilt weten welke kant het opgaat in Libanon, dan moet je naar de Druzen kijken, want die geven altijd… Op het moment dat die van positie gaan veranderen dan is er iets gaande. Dan kiezen zij partij, omdat zij weten dat de machtsbalans gaat veranderen. Er is een vergelijkbare situatie in Syrië. Een paar maanden geleden weigerden de Druzen om nog dienst te nemen in het leger van Assad. Sindsdien zie je ook een escalatie van steun aan Assad, met name van Rusland. Het is een signaal dat het echt niet goed gaat met het Syrische leger. De rol van de kleine minderheid geeft inzicht in het geheel.

KL: Dat is inderdaad interessant om naar te kijken. Nog een laatste vraag. De Libanese politiek is meer personality based politics, waarin een aantal prominente families een belangrijke rol spelen. Bijvoorbeeld, local community leaders die een drijvende kracht vormen achter het mobiliseren van stemmen.

MT: Ik kan beamen dat inderdaad die familie structuur… Het is echt een patriarchale systeem eigenlijk. De leiders van nu zijn de zoons van de leiders van tijdens de burgeroorlog. Ik moet soms ook wel eens denken aan de godfather, omdat je een aantal families hebt die dienst uitmaken, dat is soms een meer bruikbare bril om door te kijken dan een democratie. Maar goed, dat is heel belangrijk inderdaad… en hoe dat lokaal verweven is weet ik niet precies. Maar je moet niet vergeten dat Libanon een piepklein landje is. Het is Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe qua oppervlakte en er wonen vier miljoen mensen. Dus het is niet verwonderlijk dat het lokaal heel erg. Iedereen kent elkaar, heel veel namen zijn het zelfde. Dus het verbaasd mij niks dat dat een grote rol speelt. Wat je wel ziet op lokaal niveau, en dat zien wij nu in ons eigen werk… Nou bijvoorbeeld projecten… Nou, heel concreet voorbeeld, wij geven geld aan het trustfond van de Wereldbank. Uit dat trustfond worden projecten gefinancierd die zich richten op stabilisering, vanwege de spillover vanuit Syrië. Daar moet de centrale overheid iets van vinden voordat het verder kan, zo’n project. Sommige dingen liggen dus stil omdat die centrale overheid, die regering in een impasse verkeerd. Dat lukt dus niet. Onze ambassade geeft op dit moment aan, waarom niet werken via lokale overheden, die hebben wat minder last van die verdeeldheid van dat centrale niveau. Dat kan er ook

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natuurlijk weer mee te maken hebben dat je lokaal minder verschillende partijen samen hebt, maar één van de partijen. Daar zijn wij nu naar aan het kijken. Niet alleen wij, ook de VN. Kijk, in het belang van effectiviteit wordt gekeken met welke partner het beste kan worden samengewerkt. Hetzelfde geldt voor NGO’s. Enerzijds heb je de overheid nodig, anderzijds kun je beter met NGO’s werken, omdat die niet gepolitiseerd zijn.

KL: Ja, lastig.

MT: Als je richting de Beqaa gaat dan zijn het een en al kampen, informal tented settlements, die maar tussen de wijnvelden opgezet zijn en waar mensen echt verschrikkelijk leven. Het is een ongelofelijk contrast. Hetzelfde geldt voor de Palestijnse kampen, die er nog zijn. Dat zijn een soort sloppenwijken waar een soort parameters omheen zijn om te controleren wat gaat erin en uit. De mensen die daar leven hutje mutje. Het zijn broeinesten van radicalisering. Ik ben een aantal keren in zo’n kamp geweest, en dan ga je met de kampleiding onderhandelen, een soort Political Committee heet dat, en dat zijn dan mensen van Hamas, Fatah, PLO. De clubjes die in de Palestijnse gebieden de dienst uitmaken, daar in het klein. Ja, dat zijn broeinesten van radicalisering. Mensen hebben geen burgerrechten, krijgen geen status. Ook weer om die balans niet te verstoren en dat is geen duurzame situatie.

KL: Ik vraag mij wel af… Tijdens de burgeroorlog werd het al duidelijk dat het geen structurele oplossing was.

MT: Ik weet niet precies… Je hebt het Taif Agrement heet dat, Brahimi is daar de grote meneer geweest achter de vredesonderhandlingen. Maar ik heb het nooit nader bestudeerd. Wat ik wel vaak gelezen heb en gehoord is dat men eigenlijk de collectieve verwerking van die burgeroorlog dat is eigenlijk nooit gebeurd. Het was klaar, wij hebben het niet meer over. Het werkt blijkbaar, tot op zekere hoogte, maar als je het hebt over de Neurenberg processen, de waarheidscommissie in Zuid-Afrika, dat soort zaken… Ik heb ook wel eens gelezen dat mensen de burgeroorlog niet bij naam noemen, maar het alleen maar hebben over de gebeurtenissen, de events.

KL: Als een van de redenen is dat er geen nieuw conflict uitbreekt: wij willen niet nog een keer zoiets meemaken. Dan is het mogelijk dat er opnieuw een conflict uitbreekt, omdat er een nieuwe generatie gaat komen, die zich de burgeroorlog niet herinnerd.

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MT: Dat is op zich geen slechte observatie , dat de jeugd… Misschien is juist daarom die verwerking ook belangrijk en er meer over spreken ook belangrijk. Maar goed, het is niet alleen, denk ik, collectief bewustzijn, maar ook gewoon partijen die… Men weet ook niet zo goed wat nou de endgame in de regio gaat zijn. Wie wordt dominant. Dat gaat heel belangrijk zijn voor wat er in Libanon gebeurd. Zij zijn gewoon afhankelijk van wat er buiten gebeurd. En zolang dat onduidelijk blijft, zal Libanon blijven voortmodderen. En als duidelijk wordt Assad blijft aan macht, dan betekent dat iets voor de binnenlandse politiek van Libanon. Het is echt wel een vergrootglas. Ja, dat maakt het heel boeiend.

[End of interview]

We talk about modern day Lebanon. I thank him for his help and ask him if I may contact him in case things come up. We agree that I send him the final version of my thesis.

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9.4.5 Transcript: Joshka Wessels

Interviewer: Kyra Luchtenberg

Interviewee: Joshka Wessels, Post-doctoral research at the Centre for Resolution of International Conflict at the University of Copenhagen

Interview details: November 25, 2015, 2:00 PM

The interview starts with an introduction of the thesis topic. I explain the objective of the research, and the approach. I tell her about the structure of the interview, including its confidentiality. We start by talking about research that has been done about hydro-politics in Lebanon.

[Start of interview]

JW: Ik weet niet wat je tot nu toe hebt gelezen, maar het werk van Mark Zeitoun… Hij heeft een heel goed rapport geschreven over voornamelijk zuid Libanon en de effecten van de Israëlische interventie daar op de infrastructuur, met name de water infrastructuur.

KL: Okay, nee ik was zijn werk nog niet tegen gekomen.

JW: Hij heeft sowieso heel veel geschreven over de rivier de Jordaan. Hydro hegemony dat is echt zijn onderwerp. Ik kan je dat wel sturen. Er zijn een aantal rapporten die zijn uitgebracht over specifiek hydropolitics. Hij is eigenlijk de enige die gekeken heeft naar de Upper Jordan river ten noorden van Libanon. Hij heeft ook een heel goed boek geschreven dat heet, power and water in the Middle East, dat is sowieso een interessante.

KL: Dank, dat is in ieder geval handig om naar te kijken.

JW: Ik heb samengewerkt met een dame, die nu haar PhD doet, Muna Tajani. Dat is een Palestijnse, maar die heeft heel veel met Mark Zeitoun samengewerkt. Ook op dit gebied. Dat is in ieder geval interessant om even op te zoeken.

KL: Zeker. En dan heeft u zelf voornamelijk onderzoek gedaan naar hydro-politics in de Golan Heights en Palestijnse gebieden?

JW: Ja, ook die artikelen kan ik je nog even toesturen.

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KL: Ik had er een tweetal gevonden, Challenging hydro-hegemony en Down to the River.

JW: Okay, die zijn allebei in 2015 gepubliceerd.

KL: Okay. Het is echt een hele interessante invalshoek, waar ik u graag naar zou vragen. Welke inzichten zou u mij willen meegeven als het gaat om de situatie in libanon?

JW: Ja. Nou, in Lebanon zelf is er natuurlijk niet echt iets van een waterprobleem als zodanig. Er is geen waterschaarste. Er is alleen wel een heel groot probleem met distributie. Dus er zijn een aantal… De distributie van grondwater die is heel ongelijk in Libanon. Daarnaast hebben zij meer in het zuiden als je het dan hebt over specifiek conflictsituaties, is daar met betrekking tot hydro politiek bezig tussen Libanon en Israël. Sterker nog, er zijn natuurlijk ook studies gedaan naar waarom bijvoorbeeld de 1967 oorlog is begonnen als zeg maar… De aanloop daarvan was bijvoorbeeld een conflict tussen Libanon en Israël over water en over de rivier de Jordaan. En Libanon dreigde om dammen te gaan zetten. Dat was een soort Arabisch plan om daar een soort, dat noemen zij een diversion plan, de rivier om te leiden. En dat was een aanleiding voor Israël om dus militair te reageren. Dus het is zeg maar… In hoeverre water in de aanloop naar de 67 oorlog en de Jom Kipoeroorlog of dat echt een link had. Ik denk zelf wel. Ik denk dat dat best een factor was waarom Israël zo sterk reageerde, en waarom Israël op een gegeven moment die Golanhoogten heeft veilig gesteld tussen twee aanhalingstekens, omdat de Golanhoogten strategisch een enorm… Zeg maar in water strategieën een enorm belangrijke catchment area is. En Libanon is wat dat betreft, als je kijkt naar de rivier de Jordaan bassin… Libanon is eigenlijk wat zij noemen de hegemon, de ecologische hegemon, omdat het meest upstream land is. En daardoor hebben zij ecologisch een soort machtspositie, maar zij zijn natuurlijk militair geen match voor Israël. En als je dan kijkt naar de reden, waarom de Golanhoogten geannexeerd is. Ja, de security narrative is natuurlijk dat zij het doen om een bufferzone, maar ik denk dat een groot gedeelte van dat als een soort cover wordt gebruikt, om het feit dat toch 30 procent van de nationale watertoevoer naar de staat Israël komt oorspronkelijk van de Golanhoogten in terms van cathment area. Dus het is gewoon qua toen, op dat moment, want nu is het zo dat er heel veel gaat veranderen in de water economie, omdat er ontzouting plaats vindt, maar in principe is dat ook een van de reden waarom de Golanhoogten ook geannexeerd is in 1982. Het is een soort koloniaal project zal ik maar zeggen.

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KL: Ja, dit is echt interessant om te horen, want weinig scholars leggen de link tussen de bufferzone en de water economy. De focus ligt met name om de expulsion of the PLO armed resistance.

JW: Ja, dit is namelijk niet is wat de Israëli’s graag willen horen, met reden natuurlijk. Je kan wel zien dat er een aantal hele kritische studies zijn geweest. Voornamelijk de Ben- Gurion universiteit binnen Israël, maar die worden gewoon overschaduwd. Er is natuurlijk een bepaald narrative wat geprefereerd wordt. En dat is niet alleen in de Golan, maar natuurlijk ook met het watergebied met de Palestijnse bezette gebieden. En daarmee is Mark Zeitoun’s werk denk ik heel belangrijk, die kijkt ook echt naar de actuele watersituatie, maar andere, die dan niet in Libanon of de upper Jordan river heeft gewerkt, is het werk van SIWI, het international water institute. En een Zweedse politicoloog, die daar veel heeft gewerkt, maar dat is meer wat zij noemen de lower Jordan river. Dus wat je ziet is dat er heel veel studies zijn geweest over de lower Jordan river, maar dat is ook precies het gebied waar de Oslo akkoorden en zeg maar de vredesakkoorden op zijn gericht. En studies die echt de hele rivier de Jordaan beschouwen, die zijn er stuk minder. Dus er is ook een reden waarom dat zo is. Het is natuurlijk wel zo dat als je naar de hele rivier de Jordaan kijkt, dan ligt een van de oorzaken van het opdrogen van de rivier van de Jordaan, ligt juist in de upper gedeelte van de Jordan river. Wat dat is het ook met Syrië. Syrië heeft zelf een gedeelte van de rivier de Jordaan omgeleid van de Yarmouk rivier. En Jordanië zelf neemt ook veel van de rivier de Jordaan voor landbouw, geïrrigeerde landbouw in de Jordan Valley. En dan het grootste gedeelte wordt afgetapt door Israël, door de national water carrier. Er zijn een aantal studies over de national carrier, en wat dat is. Dat is in de jaren zestig, jaren vijftig, is dat begonnen als groot project. Ook binnen de ideologie van de woestijn laten bloeien. Waarbij een groot gedeelte van het Tiberias meer… Een hele grote pijpleiding die dat helemaal door Israël langs de kustgebieden loopt. En dat is een groot gedeelte waarom dus de rivier de Jordaan, nu eigenlijk maar 5 procent van de originele discharge komt nu in de dode zee terecht. Je kan ook zien op de satelliet foto’s dat, sinds de jaren vijftig, de dode zee kleiner is geworden. Het is echt een dramatische vermindering. En er zijn nu ook grote problemen met die sink holes, wat nu gebeurd, en dat is voornamelijk dus door mensen gedaan, vanwege die aftappingen. Het heeft niet zoveel te maken met klimaatverandering of iets dergelijks. Het is met name een conflict doordat de landen niet kunnen samenwerken op integrated water management of enige vorm van river bassin management, omdat het gewoon niet mogelijk is op dit moment in deze situatie.

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KL: Ja, en in uw artikel playing the game gaat u in op het belang van de perception of the other voor water cooperation.

JW: Ja, kijk het is natuurlijk heel moeilijk voor mensen die elkaar niet vertrouwen, om samen te werken. En op dit moment is er een situatie in dat bassin, als je het zeg maar gewoon sec bekijkt als een rivier die gedeeld wordt door vijf landen. Ja, dan krijg je natuurlijk een situatie waarbij de landen gewoon niet samenwerken op cruciale punten. En waar zij dan samenwerken in het framework van een vredesverdrag, ja, is dat eigenlijk ook iets… Is het op een hele oneerlijke verdeling van macht gebaseerd. Een machtige riparian state, die dus eigenlijk alles bepaald, en dat zie je in heel veel kritische artikelen. Jan Selby heeft gekeken hoe de onderhandelingen met de water committees. Je hebt twee water committees. Eentje van Israël met de Palestijnse autoriteiten, en dan een water committee tussen Jordanië en Israël. De water committee tussen Jordan en Israël dat is redelijk op gelijk niveau. Er zijn een aantal verdragen en afspraken die dus nageleefd worden. Maar als je kijkt naar de meetings die zijn geweest, en de onderhandelingen in de water committee tussen Palestijnse autoriteiten en Israël, dan zie je dat daar een hele ongelijke verhouding is, waarbij de Palestijnse autoriteiten eigenlijk n iet zoveel voor elkaar krijgt. Vanuit de rivier gezien, is dat een hele ineffectieve manier om met water resources om te gaan. En dan komt daar dus bij identiteit en dat heb ik onderzocht met een spel wat wij hebben gespeeld met verschillende mensen en verschillende groepen. En dan zie je dus dat inderdaad… Ondanks het feit dat als je gewoon vanuit watermanagement dan zou het redelijk straight forward zijn. Op dezelfde manier als Duitsland, Nederland en België bijvoorbeeld samen werken op de Maas en de Rijn, maar dat kan niet, want zij hebben bepaalde ideeën over elkaar en heel veel angst komt daar bij kijken. En heel veel inderdaad, vanuit die identiteit, de ander als een stereotype neerzetten.

KL: Ja, had u dat verwacht?

JW: Het kwam niet echt als een verassing, maar niemand die daar naar had gekeken.

KL: En wat was de meest verassende bevinden als het gaat om de percepties zelf?

JW: Nou, wat het meest verassende was, is dat het zo sterk is. Daarom kijk ik ook naar, bijvoorbeeld, de verschillende… Je hebt dan core identity en fluid identity. Dus de core identity zit vaak religie in, mensen die een religieuze identiteit hebben. Ik denk dat wat je ziet is dat die religieuze identiteit zo sterk is, ook bij jongeren, want wij hebben dus met verschillende groepen gespeeld. En eigenlijk bij de mensen die dus wat meer seculier waren,

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zeg maar minder religieus, die waren ook meer bereid om vanuit de ogen van een ander te kijken en die wonnen het spel ook. En de groepen waarbij wij wat meer religieuze… Of dat nou Joods religieuze of Islamitisch religieuze waren, die waren veel meer van wij snappen wij het wel, maar… Dan was er iets en daar kunnen wij geen concessies over doen. Hele sterke religieuze identiteit werd vast gehouden. Dat is natuurlijk heel moeilijk om dat te doorbreken en dat zie je op die plekken waar hotspots zijn. Of dat nou Hebron is of Jeruzalem, daar waar het religieuze conflict zo enorm aanwezig is, dan is het heel moeilijk is voor mensen om daar uit te stappen. En daardoor vaak de optie geweld meer kiezen dan zeg maar proberen te zien, dit is een andere zienswijze. Dat komt toch, omdat het heel erg in die core identity zit. En zeg maar zelfs mensen waarvan je denkt, dat zijn gewoon jonge Canadezen, die net naar Israël zijn gekomen, omdat zij helemaal in de Joodse religie zitten, en hun hele identiteit daarin hebben gegooid zal ik maar zeggen. Dat die dan toch heel geagiteerd reageren op het moment dat het wordt bedreigd. Het is ook de perceptie van de bedreiging van de identiteit. Maakt niet uit over welk onderwerp je het hebt. Of het nou water is wat je deelt, want in principe is het een kans om samen te werken, omdat het iet is voor de duurzame toekomst van iedereen, zeg maar. Uiteindelijk, in het spel hadden wij dat erin gezegd, als je niet samenwerkt dan wordt het uiteindelijk environmental suicide. Maar zelfs de environmental suicide was geen reden waarom zij samen zouden gaan werken. Dan denk ik ja, je zou denken dat het een goede reden zou zijn, want je zit met zijn allen in dezelfde boot. Dat is natuurlijk zo met collectieve action, waaraan ik heb gewerkt voor mijn PhD, is dat het moment dat iedereen bedreigd wordt door een environmental threat, dat zij dan wel gaan samenwerken ondanks de verschillen in religie. En dat zie je hier bij deze groep heel sterk van niet. Een soort uitzonderlijke situatie. Misschien komt dat wel, omdat het met die religieuze identiteit te maken heeft. Aan de andere kant, als je kijkt naar conflict, dan heeft het heel weinig echt met religie te maken. Als je kijkt naar de bezetting van de Palestijnse gebieden, dat heeft helemaal niks met religie te maken, dat is gewoon puur land en resources. Er zijn natuurlijk heel weinig religieuze reden waarom een land bezet is of een bezetting plaats vindt. Dus het is niet alleen maar religie, maar dat het dus een sterke rol heeft in de vorming van identiteit, in die core identity, dat is wel duidelijk. Als je het hebt over watermanagement wat vaak heel rationeel wordt benaderd, is dat iets wat helemaal niet beschouwd wordt door watermanagers en engineers. Er is een hele technische benadering. Technisch is het vrij simpel, en dat is eigenlijk wat wij willen aangeven dat er hele goede voorstellen zijn geweest, maar als je geen oog hebt voor hoe moeilijk het is voor mensen om samen te werken als zij zo verschillend zijn in religie en identiteit, dan moet je

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eerst daar aan gaan werken voordat je überhaupt kan gaan verwachten dat zij gaan samenwerken als het gaat om water. Dus het is een beetje een catch 22 situatie.

KL: Inderdaad. Ik denk de link ook met Libanon te kunnen leggen, gezien het confessional system. De invloed van het gevoel dat de identiteit wordt bedreigd kan je mogelijk ook breder trekken.

JW: Ja, en weet je wat interessant is, er is een PhD studente van de VU, die is bezig met Libanon en peacebuilding. Gijs van Iterson Scholten, ik zal je wel even een link naar hem sturen. Zijn PhD doet hij over wat de Libanese, allerlei verschillende factions, wat zij verstaan onder het concept vrede. Dat zou misschien wel interessant zijn voor jou. Hoe verschillende groeperingen dat concept zien, dat vind ik wel interessant. Er wordt vaak met conflict studies gekeken naar conflict. Er wordt minder gekeken naar wat is dan die definitie van peace. Wat verstaan mensen daar dan onder? En hoe verschillend dat is? En dat doet hij. Ik weet niet hoe ver hij is, maar ik heb hem vorig jaar ontmoet op een conferentie, en toen dacht ik, dat is wel interessant wat jij aan het doen bent. Hij is antropoloog en hij heeft gewoon veldwerk gedaan en een heleboel verschillende groeperingen geïnterviewd over het concept vrede.

KL: Ja, dat is zeker interessant. Ik kijk echt naar het verloop van het conflict, en welke factoren de escalatie en de-escalatie van het conflict kunnen verklaren. Daar kunnen hele andere factoren een rol spelen dan op het eerste gezicht lijkt, zoals de Israeli invasion van 1982.

JW: Ja, en wat ook zeker in Libanon heel veel meespeelt is natuurlijk het gebrek aan vertrouwen in iemand anders. Er is enorm veel suspicion naar andere toe en zeker met de invasion van Israël, waarmee Israël heel goed gebruik heeft gemaakt van het verdeel en heers principe. En dan voornamelijk de samenwerking met bepaalde christelijke groepen. Daar hebben zij echt een wig in de Libanese maatschappij mee geplaats. En daarom is er vrij veel… en daarnaast natuurlijk groeperingen als Hezbollah, en andere groeperingen die gewelddadig zijn. Zodra geweld zo diep embedded is in een samenleving, dan komt er ook echt een dosis wantrouwen bij. En dan krijg je dus een situatie waarbij niemand meer de ander vertrouwd. En dat is in Libanon heel erg het geval geweest. Echt enorme divisies, diepe kloven heeft achtergelaten.

KL: En naar uw mening zijn die scheidingen vandaag de dag nog terug te vinden?

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JW: Ja, ik denk van wel. Zeker ook met het Syrië conflict, waardoor er weer een tweedeling is in Libanon. Syriërs hebben natuurlijk voor een langere periode Libanon bezet, en daar zijn ook enorm veel mensen verdwenen en mensenrechtenschendingen hebben plaatsgevonden. Mensen willen toch retributie en dan zie je dat een groot gedeelte van de Libanese samenleving dan toch aan de Syrische kant staat, of aan de Assad kant staat. En dan krijg je dus die tweedeling weer en natuurlijk wat is dan precies de ondersteuning voor Hezbollah. Dat is wat je nu dan ook ziet is dat Hezbollah in Syrië is gaan vechten, dat heeft toch ook weer een wig in de Libanese samenleving veroorzaakt als zodanig.

KL: En in hoeverre hebben die Syrische interventies de Libanese burgeroorlog beïnvloedt?

JW: Uiteindelijk is Syrië het land uitgegaan, in 2002 geloof ik. Daarvoor was het aanwezig in Libanon als bezetter. In principe had Libanon weinig over zichzelf te zeggen. En dat was ook onder een security narrative, om te voorkomen dat Israël binnen zou vallen. Israël heeft zich natuurlijk ook teruggetrokken en dat was dan binnengehaald als een grote overwinning binnen gehaald als een grote overwinning door Hezbollah. En ook de 2006 overwinning tussen aanhalingstekens. En Syrië heeft eigenlijk, het Assad regime, heeft Libanon eigenlijk altijd gebruikt als een vrijhaven voor economische activiteiten, zeg maar, dat wat je in Syrië niet kon doen als bedrijf, dat vonden de Assad gelieerde bedrijven wel in Libanon, waar een vrije markt economie was. Dat zie je dus echt dat dat jarenlang heeft plaatsgevonden. Uiteindelijk heeft Hariri het overgenomen, en Hariri was natuurlijk de zakenman in Libanon, en die is vermoord in 2005, maar dat heeft een bepaalde ontwikkeling in gang gezet, waarbij Hezbollah werd beschuldigd dat zij achter die aanslag zaten en daarna eigenlijk directe link gelegd met Assad zelf. En natuurlijk is dat tribunaal gekomen en dergelijke, en dan krijg je dus een situatie, waarin pure tweedeling is in de Libanese maatschappij. Mensen die natuurlijk van overtuigd zijn dat Assad en Hezbollah achter de moord van Hariri zitten. En vaak zijn dat de meer seculiere Libanezen, die Libanon gewoon in de wereld willen zetten. Het is natuurlijk gewoon een vrij liberaal land als zodanig. Heel open kan het zijn. En ook op hun manier erg democratisch als je kijkt naar het politieke systeem. Maar aan de andere kant heb je natuurlijk de diehard Shia supporters van Hezbollah. En dat zijn gewoon twee… Dat is gewoon gepolariseerd in de Libanese maatschappij. En dat komt in uitdrukking van wie er pro-Assad is en wie er anti-Assad is, en dan met… Je hebt natuurlijk een heleboel refugees die daar komen vanuit Syrië. een groot gedeelte van de Syrische vluchtelingen, die zijn vanuit de revolutie, dat zijn anti-Assad mensen, die worden dan weer

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bestempeld als terroristen. Dan krijg je natuurlijk dat labeling of othering proces. En je hebt situaties gehad, waarbij er enorm anti-vluchtelingen acties zijn geweest. Zelfs door het Libanese leger. Ik geloof dat zij zelfs een keertje een van de vluchtelingenkampen hebben ge- shelled en tenten brand hebben gestoken. Enorme armoede natuurlijk, de Libanese vluchtelingen die in Beiroet zitten worden gewoon gediscrimineerd. Er vindt pure abuse plaats van Syriërs. Syrische kinderen ook. En dat heeft voor een grote tweedeling gezorgd in Libanon. Waarbij natuurlijk een grote groep jongeren zegt hier staan wij niet achter, niet in mijn naam, dit kan gewoon niet. Die natuurlijk wel de vluchtelingen helpen. Maar het is een enorme burden voor Libanon. Een op vijf is geloof ik, van de Libanese bevolking, een Syrische vluchteling. Dus dat is een enorm aantal.

KL: Het gaat natuurlijk ook de hele confessional balans veranderen, dat spanning oplevert. Dat gebeurde ten minste bij de komst van Palestijnse vluchtelingen in de jaren zeventig.

JW: Jazeker. En natuurlijk de Palestijnen hadden en hebben de ergste behandeling. Ik heb daar een masterstudent ooit mee begeleidt, een onderzoek naar de civiele rechten van Palestijnse vluchtelingen in Libanon. Ja, ik kan je het ook wel opsturen, want hij heeft zijn masterthesis online gezet. Dat is gewoon natuurlijk echt drama, hoe die behandeld worden daar.

KL: Ja, en misschien dat het verleden ook enkele voorspellingen heeft voor de toekomst van Syrische vluchtelingen.

JW: Ja, dat is inderdaad erg instabiel lijkt mij. Er zijn natuurlijk een heleboel periodes geweest, maar op dit moment is er… Er is een bepaalde moeheid, mensen willen echt niet weer een burgeroorlog in Libanon. Zij zijn als de dood dat het allemaal naar Libanon komt, maar dat het gespannen is, dat is in ieder duidelijk. Helemaal met de aanslagen die zijn geweest in Beiroet. Het sentiment wordt wat betreft wel erg gespannen.

KL: Zou het geweld, naar uw mening, zo kunnen oplaaien dat het leidt tot verdere destabilisering van Libanon?

JW: Ik denk dat steden als Tripolie, dat zijn altijd een hotbed geweest, wat dat betreft, omdat daar ook gewoon een directe link is met Syrië. En is dan maar de vraag, in hoeverre Hezbollah dit vol kan houden. Ook met de hoeveelheid mensen die zij verliezen, want er komen natuurlijk ook heel wat body bags terug uit Syrië.

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KL: Duidelijk. Heel interessant.

[End of interview]

We agree that she will send the additional information. I thank her for her help and ask her if I may contact her in case things come up. We agree that I send her the transcript of our conversation, and the final version of my thesis.

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