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Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: the Second Lebanon War

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Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: the Second Lebanon War Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: The Second Lebanon War Master’s Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies Kanan Makiya, Advisor In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Master’s Degree by Miriam Ganem-Rosen February 2011 Copyright by Miriam Ganem‐Rosen © 2011 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to express her deep gratitude to Samy Cohen at the CERI in Paris, who gave her the opportunity to research such a fascinating topic and planting the seeds for this thesis over two years ago. She would also like to thank Professor Kanan Makiya, who gave his time and advice in the preparation of this thesis. Finally, she would like to thank her family and friends for their unwavering support in her academic pursuits. iii ABSTRACT Deterrence and Proportionality in Israeli Military Doctrine: The Second Lebanon War A thesis presented to the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Waltham, Massachusetts By Miriam Ga nem‐Rosen This paper asks whether Israel’s strategy of deterrence through disproportionate retaliation is effective in its asymmetrical conflicts against non‐state actors. It begins with an analysis of the Israeli strategy of deterrence and retaliation methods against non‐state actors, surveying the application of deterrence and retaliation strategies from 1948 through the 1982 Lebanon War. It culminates in an analysis of Israeli involvement in Lebanon, the rise of Hezbollah, and the Second Lebanon War of 2006. The paper finds that Israel has developed an overreliance on military force, which leads it to use it excessively in situations where it is ineffective, such as in asymmetrical conflict. It concludes that not only does the use of excessive force in asymmetrical conflict fail to affect the motivation or capabilities of the non‐state adversary which would enforce Israeli deterrence, but it also creates humanitarian catastrophes, which in turn bring about diplomatic isolation and the delegitimization of Israel’s struggle against terrorism. iv “Waging war when they must, warriors are suspected by the many to have an interest in war as an end in itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. No one doubts the utility of war more than the professional warrior, no one shuns it more actively. ‘Violence rarely settles anything’ are the most memorable words I have ever heard, because they were spoken to me by a former Chief of Defence Staff, our country’s most senior serviceman. Equally, both he and I know that there are some things that, when the threat of violence has failed, can be settled by violence alone. Violence is the most terrible instrument that the rule of law can take into its use. If we hope to see war driven towards its end, we must not shrink from seeing its causes addressed. Equally, we must not shrink from seeing violence used‐ nor from according honour to those honourable warriors who administer force in the cause of peace.” ‐ John Keegan, War and Our World “He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. He will win who k nows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.” ‐ Sun Tzu, The Art of War v TABLE OF CONTENTS MAPS vii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF DETERRENCE 10 ISRAEL’S NATIONAL GOALS 10 NATIONAL SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS 11 THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE AND DISPROPORTIONALITY 18 CHAPTER TWO: EARLY USES OF DETERRENCE DISPROPORTIONALITY 23 THE BEGINNING OF LOW‐INTENSITY WARFARE 24 ANTI‐ISRAEL GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS 29 FROM ONE BORDER TO ANOTHER 32 CHAPTER THREE: DETERRENCE AND RETALIATION IN LEBANON 36 THE RISE OF THE SHIAH IN LEBANON 36 ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON AND THE 1982 LEBANON WAR 51 THE RISE OF HEZBOLLAH 44 ISRAELI REACTIONS TO HEZBOLLAH, 2000‐2006 64 OVERVIEW OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR 67 THE DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE IN THE 2006 WAR 72 CHAPTER FOUR: CONSEQUENCES OF DISPROPORTIONATE RETALIATION 79 RESULTS OF THE 2006 WAR AND THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE 79 THE DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 89 RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 MORALITY IN WARFARE 97 CONCLUSION 104 BIBLIOGRAPHY 110 vi MAPS Map 1: Lebanon, Beirut, and the Israeli­Lebanese Border Source: “Middle East crisis: Key maps.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/629/629/5177932.stm vii Map 2: Southern Lebanon and the Israeli­Lebanese Border Source: Wikipedia. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/10/BlueLine.jpg. 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