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An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: from MICE to RASCLS

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An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: from MICE to RASCLS Rethinking an Old Approach An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS Randy Burkett Ask any CIA National Clandes- outlived its usefulness. Today’s tine Service officer what his or her recruiters of agents abroad often mission is and the likely reply will pursue non-state actors with com- be “to recruit spies to steal secrets plex mixtures of competing loyal- and conduct covert action.” This ties, including family, tribe, religion, mission has been relatively ethnicity, and nationalism. unchanged since the founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) I argue that today’s recruiters must on 13 June 1942. What has changed learn and use the significant break- Today’s“ [agent] is the profile of the people we ask to throughs in understanding of human recruiters must learn and become agents to steal the secrets motivations and the means for influ- use the significant and engage in covert action. In this encing people that have occurred breakthroughs in article I will discuss how we trained since the early 1980s. In particular, I understanding of human OSS and CIA officers to find and will discuss the work of Dr. Robert motivations and the recruit the people who became our Cialdini and how his six influence agents. factors, reciprocation, authority, means for influencing scarcity, commitment (and consis- them that have occurred The story starts with World War II, tency), liking, and social proof— since the early 1980s. when OSS officers were largely RASCLS—could be applied to focused on appealing to the patrio- motivate potential agents to agree to tism of people to resist foreign occu- spy and to improve the productivity piers. There was no overall strategy of existing agents. for finding the right agents other ” However, before I look at how we than linking up with local activists and appealing to their national pride. have trained officers to recruit in the The paper then moves to the Cold past and how we should recruit in War when the focus for recruitment the future, I think we should first shifted to state actors who had the examine what we are asking people placement and access to betray the to do when they become spies. secrets of the communist govern- ments in power. During the Cold Is Spying Rational in the Face of War period and today, agents who the Risks? agreed to spy are said to do so for reasons that imply weakness or vul- On the surface, committing espio- nerability: money, ideology, black- nage appears to be less than ratio- mail, or ego. These factors are nal. Agents risk death, either at the captured in the mnemonic MICE. It hands of an enemy or by their own is a framework that I believe has legal systems. Even some countries that do not impose the death penalty All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern- ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 7 Six Principles of Agent Recruitment Despite the contributions of OSS psychologists and psychia- training OSS officers received in the trists, there was much more art than science in training OSS of- recruitment and handling of agents. ficers to recruit and handle agents. While most histories of the OSS tend to focus on its paramilitary for criminal acts make exceptions war appeared to turn against the activities under the Special Opera- for spies. Axis powers and peer pressure tions (SO) branch, the lesser known increased on citizens of occupied Secret Intelligence (SI) branch was Spies risk lengthy imprisonment if countries to prove they played some also a core part of the OSS from the caught. Even in peacetime settings, part in resistance movements and start. The SI branch opened its for- if not imprisoned, exposed spies will were not collaborators. In both war mal training school in May 1942, almost certainly lose whatever job and peace, the potential agent had to when OSS was still the Office of the they had, their reputations, and pos- come to the conclusion that the Coordinator of Information. While sibly their families and friends. potential benefits of agreeing to spy SO students focused on learning Given these risks, why would a were greater than the potential costs basic commando skills, leading rational person agree to become an of inaction. 1 resistance groups, and penetrating agent for a foreign power? Why defense plants to collect informa- endure the fear of compromise, The need to address and minimize tion, SI students concentrated on less make the effort to collect and deliver risks while maximizing benefits is at direct measures—agent recruitment, secrets, and live a double life for the heart of successful agent recruit- handling, and communications. years on end when the rewards for ment. From the beginning, OSS pro- However, both the SO and SI your work cannot be openly enjoyed fessionals recognized that art and branches included elements of the without risking being caught and science was involved in recruiting others’ training. 4 punished? agents for paramilitary and clandes- tine intelligence missions. The same A review of the syllabi for the Pre- Arguably, this question was more was true in the training of the OSS liminary Training School, the easily answered during WW II and officers who would acquire and han- Advanced Training School, and the the Cold War, when enemies were dle agents. 2 Psychologists in the still SI Specialist School of the OSS encountered daily and relatively eas- developing field of “operational psy- shows agent recruitment and han- ily identified. Espionage repre- chology” were integral to selecting dling was not discussed at all in the sented opportunities to strike back. OSS officers and teaching them to Preliminary Training School. Only However, even in wartime, it is eas- recruit foreign agents in the field. 3 two of the 50 blocks of instruction in ier for individuals to sit back, let the Advanced Training School were others take the risks, and hope their focused on this subject. SI officers work will result in victory and Agent Recruitment Training in received one additional block of rewards for everyone. the OSS instruction on “rating of sources” in Despite the contributions of the the 10 classes that made up their Overcoming this “free rider 5 operational psychologists, there was “Specialist School.” dilemma” may have been easier for still more art than science in the the OSS officer working in occu- Despite the relatively short time pied countries, particularly as the spent on these subjects, OSS offi- 1 Overcoming the “free rider dilemma” is the reason CIA case officers are taught to “put the benefits up front” in their recruitment pitches, though it is unlikely that more than a handful could justify this approach beyond saying, “That is how I was taught.” 2 The word “agent” was often used in the OSS to refer both to OSS officers and the people they recruited, which can often be confusing. I will only use the word to refer to the person being recruited to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities. I will refer to the person recruiting the agent as either “officer” or “case officer.” 3 For a full account of this process in the early days of the OSS, see OSS Schools and Training Branch, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services, available in GoogleBooks. 4 For details of OSS training see John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 2 (June 2010), available on www.cia.gov. 5 SO Training Syllabus No. 42, approved by OSS Director Colonel Donovan, 30 August 1942. Accessed on CIA FOIA website, June 2012. 8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) Six Principles of Agent Recruitment cers were instructed that “Recruit- People,” constituted the founda- The Cold War Perspective ing is a very vital operation and tion of agent recruitment tradecraft The warning at the end of this list, requires firstly—good information. for the OSS officer. While some of “Do Not Try to Buy People,” marks Secondly—successful and careful the suggestions may sound famil- a sharp distinction between WW II planning.”6 OSS recruiters were iar to current trainees, much of approaches and those of the Cold instructed to approach recruiting what would now be considered key War, when the injunction lost much agents along the lines shown below. first steps of the agent recruitment of its force. Today, when asked the cycle were left to the imagination question “Why do people spy?” the This list of suggestions, starting and creativity of the OSS officer.7 with “survey the pool of potential average case officer would respond agents and put quality first” and with four words: “Money, Ideology, ending with “Do Not Try to Buy Compromise, and Ego”—MICE— and money would be the motive that most quickly comes to mind. OSS Steps to Recruitment • Survey the locality: state of local opinion, industry, and occupations. MICE: Money • Consider the types of spies needed—insiders, specialists, cutouts, accommodation On the surface, money, or what addresses, couriers, collectors of imported material, stores of material, headquarters, money can provide (such as secu- women. rity, education for children, a better living standard, or a ticket out of an •Survey potential agents—It is from ranks of an informant service that first recruits are most likely to be drawn (emphasis added)—many of the remainder will be indicated undesirable environment), seems to by the same means.
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