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Rethinking an Old Approach An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS

Randy Burkett

Ask any CIA National Clandes- outlived its usefulness. Today’s tine Service officer what his or her recruiters of agents abroad often mission is and the likely reply will pursue non-state actors with com- be “to recruit spies to steal secrets plex mixtures of competing loyal- and conduct covert action.” This ties, including family, tribe, , mission has been relatively ethnicity, and . unchanged since the founding of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) I argue that today’s recruiters must on 13 June 1942. What has changed learn and use the significant break- Today’s“ [agent] is the profile of the people we ask to throughs in understanding of human recruiters must learn and become agents to steal the secrets motivations and the means for influ- use the significant and engage in covert action. In this encing people that have occurred breakthroughs in article I will discuss how we trained since the early 1980s. In particular, I understanding of human OSS and CIA officers to find and will discuss the work of Dr. motivations and the recruit the people who became our Cialdini and how his six influence agents. factors, reciprocation, authority, means for influencing scarcity, commitment (and consis- them that have occurred The story starts with World War II, tency), liking, and social proof— since the early 1980s. when OSS officers were largely RASCLS—could be applied to focused on appealing to the patrio- motivate potential agents to agree to tism of people to resist foreign occu- spy and to improve the productivity piers. There was no overall strategy of existing agents. for finding the right agents other ” However, before I look at how we than linking up with local activists and appealing to their national pride. have trained officers to recruit in the The paper then moves to the Cold past and how we should recruit in War when the focus for recruitment the future, I think we should first shifted to state actors who had the examine what we are asking people placement and access to betray the to do when they become spies. secrets of the communist govern- ments in power. During the Cold Is Spying Rational in the Face of War period and today, agents who the Risks? agreed to spy are said to do so for reasons that imply weakness or vul- On the surface, committing espio- nerability: money, , black- nage appears to be less than ratio- mail, or ego. These factors are nal. Agents risk death, either at the captured in the mnemonic MICE. It hands of an enemy or by their own is a framework that I believe has legal systems. Even some countries that do not impose the death penalty

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern- ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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Despite the contributions of OSS psychologists and psychia- training OSS officers received in the trists, there was much more art than science in training OSS of- recruitment and handling of agents. ficers to recruit and handle agents. While most histories of the OSS tend to focus on its paramilitary for criminal acts make exceptions war appeared to turn against the activities under the Special Opera- for spies. Axis powers and tions (SO) branch, the lesser known increased on citizens of occupied Secret Intelligence (SI) branch was Spies risk lengthy imprisonment if countries to prove they played some also a core part of the OSS from the caught. Even in peacetime settings, part in resistance movements and start. The SI branch opened its for- if not imprisoned, exposed spies will were not collaborators. In both war mal training school in May 1942, almost certainly lose whatever job and peace, the potential agent had to when OSS was still the Office of the they had, their reputations, and pos- come to the conclusion that the Coordinator of . While sibly their families and friends. potential benefits of agreeing to spy SO students focused on learning Given these risks, why would a were greater than the potential costs basic commando skills, leading rational person agree to become an of inaction. 1 resistance groups, and penetrating agent for a foreign power? Why defense plants to collect informa- endure the fear of compromise, The need to address and minimize tion, SI students concentrated on less make the effort to collect and deliver risks while maximizing benefits is at direct measures—agent recruitment, secrets, and live a double life for the heart of successful agent recruit- handling, and communications. years on end when the rewards for ment. From the beginning, OSS pro- However, both the SO and SI your work cannot be openly enjoyed fessionals recognized that art and branches included elements of the without risking being caught and science was involved in recruiting others’ training. 4 punished? agents for paramilitary and clandes- tine intelligence missions. The same A review of the syllabi for the Pre- Arguably, this question was more was true in the training of the OSS liminary Training School, the easily answered during WW II and officers who would acquire and han- Advanced Training School, and the the , when enemies were dle agents. 2 Psychologists in the still SI Specialist School of the OSS encountered daily and relatively eas- developing field of “operational psy- shows agent recruitment and han- ily identified. repre- chology” were integral to selecting dling was not discussed at all in the sented opportunities to strike back. OSS officers and teaching them to Preliminary Training School. Only However, even in wartime, it is eas- recruit foreign agents in the field. 3 two of the 50 blocks of instruction in ier for individuals to sit back, let the Advanced Training School were others take the risks, and hope their focused on this subject. SI officers work will result in victory and Agent Recruitment Training in received one additional block of rewards for everyone. the OSS instruction on “rating of sources” in Despite the contributions of the the 10 classes that made up their Overcoming this “free rider 5 operational psychologists, there was “Specialist School.” dilemma” may have been easier for still more art than science in the the OSS officer working in occu- Despite the relatively short time pied countries, particularly as the spent on these subjects, OSS offi-

1 Overcoming the “free rider dilemma” is the reason CIA case officers are taught to “put the benefits up front” in their recruitment pitches, though it is unlikely that more than a handful could justify this approach beyond saying, “That is how I was taught.” 2 The word “agent” was often used in the OSS to refer both to OSS officers and the people they recruited, which can often be confusing. I will only use the word to refer to the person being recruited to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities. I will refer to the person recruiting the agent as either “officer” or “case officer.” 3 For a full account of this process in the early days of the OSS, see OSS Schools and Training Branch, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services, available in GoogleBooks. 4 For details of OSS training see John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 2 (June 2010), available on www.cia.gov. 5 SO Training Syllabus No. 42, approved by OSS Director Colonel Donovan, 30 August 1942. Accessed on CIA FOIA website, June 2012.

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Six Principles of Agent Recruitment cers were instructed that “Recruit- People,” constituted the founda- The Cold War Perspective ing is a very vital operation and tion of agent recruitment The warning at the end of this list, requires firstly—good information. for the OSS officer. While some of “Do Not Try to Buy People,” marks Secondly—successful and careful the suggestions may sound famil- a sharp distinction between WW II planning.”6 OSS recruiters were iar to current trainees, much of approaches and those of the Cold instructed to approach recruiting what would now be considered key War, when the injunction lost much agents along the lines shown below. first steps of the agent recruitment of its force. Today, when asked the cycle were left to the imagination question “Why do people spy?” the This list of suggestions, starting and creativity of the OSS officer.7 with “survey the pool of potential average case officer would respond agents and put quality first” and with four words: “Money, Ideology, ending with “Do Not Try to Buy Compromise, and Ego”—MICE— and money would be the motive that most quickly comes to mind. OSS Steps to Recruitment

• Survey the locality: state of local opinion, industry, and occupations. MICE: Money

• Consider the types of spies needed—insiders, specialists, cutouts, accommodation On the surface, money, or what addresses, couriers, collectors of imported material, stores of material, headquarters, money can provide (such as secu- women. rity, education for children, a better living standard, or a ticket out of an •Survey potential agents—It is from ranks of an informant service that first recruits are most likely to be drawn (emphasis added)—many of the remainder will be indicated undesirable environment), seems to by the same means. be a rational reason to take on the risks of spying. Certainly a long list •Put quality first—a bad agent will jeopardize an organization. Get full information of individuals who have volunteered about a potential agent before approaching him e.g. interests, weaknesses, character, to provide intelligence to their coun- religion, politics, nationality, etc. try’s enemies have cited the need for •Approach to potential agents—Get to know your man. money as their reason. In a study of 104 Americans who spied and were •Self-introduction caught between 1947 and 1989, the •Introduction by mutual friend majority, indeed an increasing num- ber over the years studies, reported •Coming down to business—Change your line of appeal to suit the case, e.g. for a that money was their sole or pri- priest, based on religious grounds, etc. mary motivator. 8 For example, early •Let any concrete suggestions come from him in the first stages. Cold Warrior, GRU Lieutenant Col- onel Pyotr Popov, sold Soviet secrets •Test reactions thoroughly before coming out into the open. to in in 1953 •Sound by half-suggestions. in order to maintain both a wife and a mistress. Starting during the Cold •Leave yourself a way out in the event of refusal. War and continuing after the Iron •From the first give him an impression that we are part of a powerful and well orga- Curtain had fallen, CIA officer nized body—prestige counts heavily. , arrested in 1994, sold American secrets to for an • DO NOT TRY TO BUY PEOPLE (emphasis in original) estimated $2.7 million. 9

6 Ibid, 4–5. 7 The agent recruitment cycle will be more fully discussed in the next section. For purposes of this paper it is the process of obtaining HUMINT agents to meet national intelligence needs. The six stages of the cycle are spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, handling/training, and turning over the agent to a new officer or terminating contact with the agent. 8 Katherine L Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007, Department of Defense Technical Report 08-05, March 2008. During the initial 32 years of the study, 47 percent of the spies then active claimed to be in it for the money. That percentage grew among those revealed between 1980 and 1989 to 74 percent.

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To understand what factors were really at play, we will have to said they spied for the same reason, look beyond MICE. ideology.

Both men were caught and pun- MICE: Ideology Clearly an agent committed to an ished. Popov, who was probably ideology can be a powerful weapon. paid a few thousand dollars over the More than the “venal” recruit who One wonders how agents like Mon- course of his agent career, spent his pursues money, an ideologically tes and Philby could not only func- money carefully and was most likely driven agent is seen as a much tion year after year while immersed betrayed by the British spy, George greater threat by in a political system they opposed Blake. 10 Ames helped reveal him- (CI) officers. For CIA recruiters, but actually thrive and be repeatedly self by spending his ill-gotten gains agents who serve for reasons of promoted by the very people they openly. As a GS-14 making less than are the only agents that most were betraying.15 Both Montes and $70,000 a year, Ames not only pur- officers can truly respect. US Philby only ended their spying chased a house for more than Defense (DIA) careers when exposed or about to be $500,000 in cash, he made the addi- senior analyst Ana Belen Montes exposed. Montes was arrested, tried, tional mistake of buying a $40,000 admitted to spying for Cuba for convicted, and sentenced to a long Jaguar he drove to work. 11 more than 16 years and was paid no prison term. Philby defected to the salary other than her DIA GS-15 USSR, where he lived as a Soviet

Popov’s career as an agent ended wage.12 GRU Colonel Oleg Pen- citizen until his death in 1988. Was in 1958 with a bullet to the back of kovsky, sometimes called “The Spy it just zealotry that drove individu- the head, and Ames’ employment as Who Saved the World” for his con- als like Montes and Philby to live an agent ended in 1994 with a life tributions during the Cuban Missile double lives for decades? Or were sentence. Looking at the monetary Crisis, spied for the CIA and British there other factors at work? benefits alone, it would be hard to MI6 jointly between 1961 and 1963, argue that the short-term rewards— with only the promise of being five years of the good life in Popov’s “taken care of” if he decided to leave MICE: Coercion or Compromise case and nine years for Ames—was the and settle in the Coercion or compromise (black- worth the price each paid. However, West.13 mail) provide relatively easy-to- as we will see, it is likely that money understand reasons agents take on One of the most amazing agents of was not the only motivating factor in the risks of espionage—as seen in all, MI6’s Harold A. R. () either of these cases. To understand countless movies and CI training Philby, who was considered a candi- what factors were really at play, we films.16 Both factors appear in many date to lead Britain’s Secret Intelli- will have to look beyond MICE. past spy cases. Compromise most gence Service in the 1950s, spied for often occurs when potential agents the Soviet Union without compensa- make mistakes and come to believe tion from 1933 until he defected to they must seek the assistance of a the USSR in 1961. 14 All three agents

9 For good discussions of Pyotr Popov see John L. Hart’s, “Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The Tribulations of Faith,” Intelligence and National Security 12 (1977) or William Hood’s, : The True Story of the First Russian Recruited by the CIA (Norton and Company, 1982). 10 Norman Palmer, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage (Random House Reference, 1996), 446. 11 Ibid, 22. 12 See Steve Carmichael, True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba’s Master Spy (US Naval Institute Press, 2007). 13 Although Penkovsky was never able to enjoy his life in the West, his family was cared for, both through money banked for him and the proceeds of the com- mercial sale of a book based on his life. The CIA secretly arranged the publication of The Penkovsky Papers, presented as his “diary” and funneled the bulk of the profits to his family. See the CIA FOIA under “Penkovsky.” 14 An exhaustive study of both and his equally fascinating father can be found in ’s, in the Blood (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994). 15 Montes received multiple awards for “exceptional analytic work” and was promoted to GS-15. Philby was repeatedly promoted, to the point that he came very close to becoming director of MI6. 16 A large sample of such films is available on YouTube. One good example is “The Enemy Agent & You,” a counterespionage film made by the Department of Defense in 1954 (DOD IS 7).

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People coerced into espionage rarely make ideal agents. foreign intelligence agency to avoid punishment. MICE: Ego or Excitement Compromise and coercion were confidence, or ego, can go a long clearly prime concerns of CI offi- The final letter in MICE can stand way toward maintaining the agent’s cials during the Cold War. Anyone for “Ego” or “Excitement.” Of the productivity. As part of this with a security clearance was two, ego satisfaction appears to be the dynamic, one often finds a desire for warned that any illegal or “deviant” more prevalent driver. revenge or retaliation as a motiva- behavior as defined in the day put a may portray espionage as an exciting tor. Examples include the disgrun- person at risk of being blackmailed world of gun battles, explosions, car tled professional diplomat; the into spying. Stories abound in both chases, and sexual adventures, but passed-over military officer who fiction and nonfiction of officials anyone who has lived in this world would not “play politics”; the intelli- being coerced on account of their knows the truth is very different. For gence officer sidelined for a drink- illicit sexual behavior, whether it every hour spent on a street a case ing problem; or the law enforcement was homosexuality or adultery officer will spend many hours more official forced to moonlight as a resulting from being caught in the writing up the results of the last meet- security guard to make ends meet. “honey traps” by the infamous ing, preparing for the next meeting, Under the MICE framework, these

Soviet “sparrow squads.”17 and endlessly evaluating current are all agents waiting to be recruited. cases and constantly looking for new They only need to have egos stroked In addition to these sordid stories, assets. For the agent’s part, the life is and to be given the chance to harm a CIA officers also knew that many of usually equally dull and demanding. system that has wronged them. Such their brethren in the FBI and other Successful agents must continue to reasons may provide good begin- US law enforcement agencies regu- perform in whatever jobs provide nings on the road to espionage, but larly coerced informants, often over- them the access for which they were will they keep agents on that road looking criminal offenses or recruited in the first place, all the for decades? How then might case working to mitigate consequences in while meeting the tasks levied by officers move beyond MICE to exchange for cooperation. case officers. solidify and optimize the long-term People coerced into espionage Agents must also prepare for and commitment of a productive agent? rarely make ideal agents. While FBI securely move to and from meet- and other law enforcement officials ings, and, if they are good, they will From MICE to RASCLS may be able to offer a choice constantly be looking for new ways between jail and cooperation, it is to meet the information needs of the Although MICE provides superfi- actively discouraged in CIA train- organization they secretly serves. A cial explanations for spying, it fails ing. Coercion often creates agents double life is not an easy life as evi- to capture the complexities of human who are angry, resentful, and only denced by the number of agents who motivation. For example, let us willing to do just enough to avoid burn out, break down, or simply return to the case of Aldrich Ames. whatever punishment may await decide they cannot continue, particu- In 1985, he walked into the Soviet them. This is not the type of agent a larly in high risk environments. embassy in Washington DC with the case officer wants to meet in a for- Agents often either stop producing stated intent of avoiding bankruptcy eign country, where both may be or start making so many mistakes by trading information on assets sus- violating local laws by their interac- that case officers must suspend the pected of being double agents for 18 tion and where agents have more relationships for the safety of both $50,000. opportunities to double cross or take parties. This was to be a one-time only violent action against a case officer. Excitement, if it exists, is fleeting, exchange. The Soviet embassy’s but reinforcement of an agent’s self- KGB chief of counterintelligence,

17 Even the Russian news organization openly reported on the use of sexual blackmail by the KGB, see “KGB Sex Espionage,” Pravda, 7 August 2002. 18 Pete Earley, Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames (Berkley Books, 1998), 147.

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By subscribing too fully to the limited MICE framework, officers Time and again I have seen risk misreading their agents. American case officers resort to cutting off funds to enforce Victor Cherkashin, accepted Ames’ out the page and handed it to discipline over an agent. One information, paid him the $50,000, me. I was shocked. That piece effect of this maneuver, if suc- and then masterfully ensured that of paper contained more cessful, is ultimately to reduce this first encounter would not be the information about CIA espio- the agent to the status of a last. Cherkashin did not threaten or nage than had ever before mere pensioner. In espionage otherwise coerce Ames. Instead, he been presented in a single operations this can, and often worked to earn his confidence and communication. It was a cat- does, result in highly unreli- drew him into a shared effort to pro- alog of virtually every CIA able information; in a tect him: within the Soviet Union. political operation it can be Ames said nothing about fatal. 20 “Look,” I continued, exag- whether the men he’d listed gerating, but not really should be arrested or Case officers who rely exclusively dissembling, “our main con- removed. “Just make sure on the MICE framework risk failing cern—our one concern—is these people don’t find any- to see the full complexities involved your security. I want you to thing out about me,” he in an agent’s decision to spy and will know that for certain. Every- said. 19 miss opportunities to persuade and thing else is secondary. You motivate agents to improve their per- tell me what you want us to What happened here? Was this a formance. Instead, they will focus on do and we’ll do it. We’ll play simple case of money starting a rela- taking advantage of vulnerabilities by any rules you give us.” tionship, with concern about compro- to exercise control. Over time, the mise just adding to it? Are these two negative focus could lead case offi- Cherkashin continued: motives sufficient to explain the cers to view and treat their agents as actions of Ames? The MICE frame- fundamentally flawed human beings It’s in your interest to tell us work, even allowing for two factors who need to be punished or coerced as much as you can about any at work, is not sufficient to under- into . of your agents inside the stand his motivations and behavior. KGB.… How can we protect The work of psychologist Dr. Rob- you if we don’t know who’s in Human motivations are far more ert Cialdini offers more positive a position to inform the CIA complex. By subscribing too fully to approaches. His six “weapons of about you? If you’re con- the limited MICE framework, offi- mass influence”— reciprocation, cerned about your security, cers risk misreading their agents and authority, scarcity, commitment/con- it’s up to you and us to mini- take actions harmful to their opera- sistency, liking, and social proof— mize the danger for you. We tions. For example, by attributing an provide a better foundation for agent need to know whom to pro- agent’s cooperation to a simple need recruitment and handling. 21 tect you from. for money, a case officer makes the mistake of causing a committed With that, agent to feel merely like hired help. Cialdini’s Six Principles [Ames] took out a notepad Post-WW II operations officer To understand why the RASCLS and paper and began writing Christopher Felix put it this way in principles are so important, case down a list of names. He tore his Short Course on the Secret War: officers must understand that humans have developed shortcuts to

19 Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, Spy Handler, Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man who Recruited and Aldrich Ames (Basic Books, 2005), 27–29. 20 Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963), 54. 21 Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of (Quill/William Morrow, 1984). Cialdini is the source of the six principles of influence, but my friend and colleague Steve Kleinman was the first to codify these principles under the mnemonic RASCLS.

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function in a world full of sights, Some individuals [“compliance professionals”] have become sounds, and other stimuli flooding quite skilled in using these principles to manipulate others into human senses. These shortcuts taking actions that are not necessarily in their best interests. Cialdini calls “fixed actions pat- terns,” which are patterns of behav- RASCLS in the Agent ior that occur in the same order and Recruitment Cycle many of the principles of RASCLS sequence every time a given stimu- without realizing the psychology lus is introduced. In the animal Before diving into the details of behind their successes. Within the world these fixed patterns are easily RASCLS, we need to understand CIA these officers are often called observed in courtship and mating rit- more deeply how case officers work. “natural recruiters,” and because uals. They have evolved because The systematic method for finding their skills are not well understood humans need them too. Otherwise, agents who will meet national intel- and believed to be inherent, CIA as Cialdini observes, “We would ligence information needs is called trainers miss opportunities to help stand frozen—cataloging, apprais- the Agent Recruitment Cycle case officer trainees develop their ing, and calibrating—as the time for (ARC). It consists of six steps: potential to become compliance spe- action sped by and away.” 22 cialists capable of fully applying the • spotting (or identifying) individu- RASCLS principles. The universal human responses to als who can meet intelligence these six principles help people needs as identified by analysts or interact with less friction and, for the policymakers RASCLS: Reciprocation most part, provide benefits. How- • assessing whether the spotted indi- “Always provide amenities.” This ever, some individuals have become viduals have the placement and is one of the earliest lessons taught quite skilled in using these princi- access to provide desired informa- to case officers in their training. ples to manipulate others into acting tion as well as beginning the pro- Whether the meeting is to be an against their best interests. These cess of determining their extended discussion in a hotel or a “compliance professionals,” as motivations, vulnerabilities, and quick talk in a moving car, the case Cialdini labels them, are found, for suitability officer is told to always have some- example, among sales people, fund- thing for the role-player agent to eat raisers, and “confidence artists.” The • developing a relationship with the and drink. If a student asked “why,” keys to their success, according to individual to further assess the fac- (which was never encouraged), the Cialdini, are that they understand the tors above and to explore whether likely reply would be “to build rap- principles of influence and persua- they will be responsive to initial port” or the old standby, “that is the sion and they have learned how to tasking for intelligence informa- way I was taught.” It is an honest manipulate without appearing to be tion question that deserves a better manipulative. response. • the actual recruitment By understanding Cialdini’s six The true answer lies in the princi- principles, case officers could also • training and handling meetings ple of reciprocation: all humans feel become, in effect, better compliance with the agent, including taskings an obligation to try to repay in kind specialists, with deeper understand- and debriefings what another person has provided. ing of their tradecraft and greater According to Cialdini, there is no ability to see opportunities to find • either turning an agent over to human society that does not abide by and recruit agents from a population another case officer or terminating this rule. 23 We see the power of this beyond those defined by the vulnera- the relationship principle reflected in innumerable bilities exploitable in the MICE cultures that insist on sharing tea or Successful case officers move framework. other refreshments before “getting agents through this cycle by using down to business.” In American cul-

22 Ibid., 7. 23 Ibid., 18.

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Case officers also must understand the power inherent in their body—prestige counts heavily,” still relationships with agents. rings true. From childhood we are taught that compliance with author- ture the counterparts are business lowing up with a different offer— ity brings rewards while resistance dinners, luncheons, or cocktail hours before the first was openly brings punishment. Most opera- used for rapport-building and devel- rejected—the scout appeared to tional cover stories are built to give opment of a shared sense of obliga- make the first concession, which CIA officers the air of authority— tion. immediately triggered in Cialdini a through some official government feeling of obligation to supply a status or the appearance of a suc- The principle of reciprocation is reciprocal concession. cessful businessperson. In both almost always employed at the cases, officers are encouraged to beginning of a recruitment cycle. As he did with all the influence “look the part” in their dress or with One of the easiest ways for a case principles in his book, Cialdini field props. officer to initiate and develop a rela- tested the theory of reciprocal con- tionship with a potential agent is to cessions through a series of well- The air of authority gives case offi- fill some small need the agent has documented experiments in which cers advantages in the agent recruit- revealed. Whether this is help with a unwitting subjects were offered a ment process. In the development visa, information on academic poor choice and less onerous second phase, case officers will often dem- opportunities in the , or choice. In a statistically significant onstrate their authority by indicating just advice on a minor problem, by number of the cases, those offered they have special positions or pow- the small gesture a case officer cre- the “rejection and retreat” scenario ers beyond whatever jobs they claim ates a sense of obligation. At a mini- agreed to the secondary request, to hold in the US government or mum, the gesture provides a reason while those offered only the lesser business. These may include, for for further contact and sets the stage choice declined. As a bonus, example, the power to hire and for a case officer to seek a favor in researchers found that once a com- richly reward consultants. This air of return. mitment was made to the less oner- authority can be especially magni- ous choice, the subject was even fied in the recruitment phase, partic- A feeling of obligation can be cre- more susceptible to future requests. ularly if case officers can suggest ated without actually giving any- These phenomena will be further they have the prestige of the US thing of real value. Cialdini calls this discussed under “commitment and government behind the developing psychological concept “reciprocal consistency,” but the benefits for the relationship. concessions” or “rejection and case officer are clear: favors or gifts retreat.” To illustrate this concept, he given to a potential agent early in a Case officers also must understand tells the story of being approached relationship are more likely to cre- the power inherent in their relation- by a Boy Scout. The boy asked ate feelings of obligation. Then as a ships with agents. As Felix pointed Cialdini if he would like to buy a relationship develops, case officers out, “The case officer represents the ticket to a “Boy Scout Circus” for can use rejection and retreat to make authority which defines the objec- five dollars. When Cialdini did not initial taskings seem less burden- tives of the operation, and he con- immediately respond, the scout some and create an atmosphere in trols the resources which make the added “Or, you could buy one of our which future taskings will appear to operation possible.”25 Optimally this big chocolate bars. They are only a be less onerous. control will be implicit rather than dollar each.” As expected, despite explicit. Threatening to withhold the fact that Cialdini claims not to money to exert control represents a even like chocolate, two dollars and RASCLS: Authority failure to develop optimal influence two chocolate bars soon changed over the agent. In addition to the The OSS advice, “From the first hands.24 By first offering tickets to give an impression that we are part authority inherent in a case officer’s the circus, and then immediately fol- of a powerful and well organized position relative to an agent, the case

24 Ibid., 36. 25 Felix, 47.

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By building this sense of urgency, a successful case officer will officer’s strongest claim to authority use scarcity to… get agents to commit to new and deeper rela- is greater knowledge of the opera- tionships. tional environment, of which the agent can only be partly aware. A case officer must be able to con- gives concerning methods of col- pitches should make clear to poten- vince an agent that, although the lecting information and moving to tial agents that they are being pre- agent is a key partner in an opera- and from meetings? sented with fleeting opportunities to tion, the agent is not the case offi- act on statements they have made cer’s only resource. Authority also plays a key role in concerning their beliefs, goals, or the handling, training, and turnover ideals. But, by emphasizing that any Under the MICE framework, case phases of the recruitment cycle. opportunity is fleeting and urging a officers too often have gotten caught Once recruited, an agent should rapid commitment, a case officer up in discussions over how much become both more productive (as a increases the value of the opportu- “control” they have over a source, result of more direct tasking) and nity to replace words with deeds. which often has led to attempts to tie more cautious (as a result of train- Case officers might emphasize, for control to something measurable, ing). Case officers must appear to be example, that they have superiors like money. This battle for control is confident and skilled in the tra- who need proof of their agents’ util- a reflection of the generally nega- decraft they impart to their agents ity or they will order relationships tive attributes of MICE. If an agent and, when the time comes for one ended. is only in a relationship for money, officer to move on and another to then money does represent control. take over, case officers must By building this sense of urgency, A better discussion would include smoothly transfer their authority to a successful case officer will use measures of case officer levels of their replacements. scarcity to overcome the free-rider influence over sources. Measures of dilemma and get agents to commit to influence that are sometimes misla- new and deeper relationships. beled as control include the follow- RASCLS: Scarcity ing: When an item is less available RASCLS: Commitment and humans tend to believe it is more Consistency • Does an agent fully disclose sub- attractive.26 Things that are rarer are sources of information? normally more expensive, and “Prominent theorists such as Leon humans tend to equate expense with Festinger, Fritz Hieder, and Theo- • Has an agent attempted to estab- quality. Also things that are less dore Newcomb have viewed the lished limits to subjects he will available may be rare because many desire for consistency as a central and will not report about? others want the same thing—the motivator of our behavior.” 28 In • Is an agent willing to admit when concept of social proof plays in here short, portraying ourselves as “con- he does not know about a topic (more on that concept later). On a sistent” speaks to who we humans and will he take reasonable risks to deeper level, when an item or option are at our essence. Society generally gain that information? is offered and then withdrawn, seems to spurn members who are humans tend to desire that item or inconsistent. They are labeled as • Is an agent knowingly providing option even more. This is the con- “untrustworthy” or, in more current information that would get him in cept of “psychological reactance,” or political terms, “flip-floppers.” At trouble if discovered? as it is more commonly known, we even appear to admire con- “Romeo and Juliet effect.” 27 sistency over correctness. However • How closely does an agent adhere we do not always cling to positions to the directions a case officer Scarcity is a recurrent element of a simply because we are stubborn. successful recruitment. Recruitment

26 Or, as Cialdini put it, “Opportunities seem more valuable when their availability is limited.” Cialdini, 238. 27 Cialdini, 244 and 248. 28 Cialdini, 59.

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Six Principles of Agent Recruitment

In the agent recruitment process, small commitments in the de- velopment phase … can grow into full recruitments. everyone enjoys being praised, and future meetings will come more eas- Studies have shown we actually tend In the agent recruitment process, ily. With additional meetings and to increase our confidence in a deci- small commitments in the develop- more “time on target,” a case officer sion once that decision has been ment phase—for example, mutual will be better able to conduct a made and particularly if that deci- agreement that two countries often sound assessment process. A warm sion has been made publicly. “Pub- need informal channels to better relationship is also likely to give a lic commitments create more lasting understand each other—can grow case officer insight into a potential change,” even more so if those pub- into full recruitments. Additionally, agent’s areas of low self-esteem or lic commitments are written or oth- by convincing a prospective agent to feelings of being undervalued—key erwise recorded. 29 provide the first piece of nonpublic pieces of knowledge for a recruiter. information (for example the classic Researchers studying Chinese “internal telephone directory”), the Liking matters throughout the techniques during the stage is set to ask for more closely agent recruitment cycle. A case offi- found that the Commu- held secrets and then use this behav- cer creates an ever deeper relation- nist Chinese exploited this quality of ior to justify further cooperation ship through the process—from human nature to elicit “confessions” through recruitment. This does not becoming an “associate” then a from US POWs to back allegations necessarily imply setting up black- “friend” in the assessment phases of US war crimes during the war. 30 mail, but rather an appeal to an and then moving to the role of They found that the Chinese and agent’s desire to remain consistent. “sounding board” and “confidant” as North Koreans managed to get US By highlighting past agreement to development moves to recruitment. Air Force officers to claim on film “share data” for the good of both A case officer’s goal should be to that they had dropped “germ bombs” countries, the relationship with a have a prospective agent come to and committed other war crimes, not case officer can evolve into one seen believe, hopefully with good reason, by threats, , or offers of as rewarding to both and lay the that the case officer is one of the few rewards for lying, but by getting ground for continued “cooperation.” people, perhaps the ONLY person, prisoners to make public admissions who truly understands him. The that life was not perfect in the agent then can look forward to each United States and then having them RASCLS: Liking meeting as a chance to spend qual- write, expand upon, and defend their “We like people who are like us.” ity time with a comrade he can trust declarations. Slowly, trying to be Every case officer is taught this sim- with his life. consistent, many of these men came ple idea in training. The larger les- to believe, at least for a time, that son is to find ways to connect with RASCLS: Social Proof they had indeed committed war potential agents—similarities in crimes. Going from “there is some background (the case officer and By observing others, particularly racial inequality” to “the United agent are both sons/daughters, hus- in unfamiliar environments, humans States is committing genocide in bands/wives, parents, have similar determine what is “correct behav- North Korea” was not a path every personality traits), shared interests ior.” This is what Cialdini and other prisoner would take, but it worked (sports, hobbies), and out- psychologists call “social proof,” often enough for some look (interested in world affairs, and it can be seen in long lines gains for the Chinese and Koreans. background, life-style). Flattery is behind velvet ropes at the hottest highly recommended, for virtually night clubs or, more darkly, in the

29 Ibid., 76. 30 Cialdini, 71–72, and Albert D. Bidderman, “Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War,” presented at a combined meeting of the Section on Neurology and Psychiatry with the New York Neurological Society at The New York Academy of Medicine, 13 November 1956, as part of a Panel Discussion on “Communist Methods of Interrogation and .” The report is based on work done under ARDC Project No. 7733, Task 77314, in support of the research and development program of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Permission is granted for reproduction, translation, publication, use, and disposal in whole and in part by or for the United States Government.

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Six Principles of Agent Recruitment

It will be up to the imagination and creativity of individual case behavior of people in cults.31 The officers to take the principles and turn them into new approach- combined effects of social proof and es for recruiting and handling a new generation of agents. the power of commitment and con- sistency can explain tragedies like the mass suicide in November 1978 who provide constant reminders that cer reinforced Popov’s feelings that of the Jonestown cult in Guyana and an agent is doing the right thing. the Soviet state had betrayed Rus- can also be helpful in understanding sian peasants and only the United why Oleg Penkovsky continued to States was strong enough to eventu- spy even after it was clear Soviet Agents are RASCLS not MICE ally help these people free them- authorities were closing in on him. Frameworks for understanding selves from their oppressors Once individuals have invested agents have advanced significantly (commitment and consistency). deeply and sacrificed much, they with the science of psychology since will go to great lengths to hold on to the days of the OSS. While advice In the same way, Cherkashin the beliefs to which they had from that era can still be useful expertly turned Ames from a one- become committed. today, we now have a much better time contact in need of money into a understanding of the human mind productive agent by flattering him Although we cannot put a velvet and motivations. The MICE frame- (liking) and telling him the two men rope outside our facilities abroad and work was a good step in trying to were partners in keeping Ames have agents line up to provide social understand agent behavior but it has safe—a partnership that relied on proof that spying for the United often led officers to unduly focus on Ames’s help (authority, reciproca- States is the rage, the principle of vulnerabilities and caused case offi- tion). It was a partnership that would social proof does apply to agent cers to see their assets in a one- allow Ames to enjoy the compensa- recruitment and handling. In direct- dimensional and somewhat negative tion Cherkashin was ready to supply ing agents, case officers can say, light. on a steady basis (commitment and “Other partners I have worked with consistency). In the light of the have brought out documents by I believe the RASCLS model is RASCLS model, the actions of each doing X.” This both serves to more nuanced, effective, and of the spies discussed in this article, encourage an agent should not only founded on empirical data drawn Philby, Montes, Ames, and others to do “X” but reassures the agent from decades of experiments in the become more understandable, with that he is doing what others have field. lessons that can be applied to other done successfully as well. Addition- cases. ally officers can help agents over- By employing RASCLS we can come their understandable anxiety see that Pyotr Popov did not just spy The above suggestions for using by recalling cases of others who for money but because his case offi- Cialdini’s six principles, in my judg- have made similar choices, for cer, George Kisevalter, reminded ment, only touch on the ways in example, Ryszard Kuklinski or Ist- him strongly of his older brother, which these principles could be van Belovai, whose actions helped who had opposed the Soviet regime employed in operations. As always, free their countries. However, the (the liking and authority principles). it will be up to the imagination and ultimate social proof is the presence Kisevalter gave him the money he creativity of individual case officers of the case officer, and implicitly the needed, but he also helped him to take the principles and turn them organization behind the case officer, appear to be a competent intelli- into new approaches for recruiting gence officer in post-war Vienna and handling a new generation of (reciprocation). Finally, his case offi- agents.

v v v

31 Cialdini, 152–56.

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