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Unauthorized Disclosure: What Leads Some to Violate Security Clearance View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-06 Unauthorized disclosure: can behavioral indicators help predict who will commit unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information? Sims, Karen Elizabeth Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45945 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE: CAN BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS HELP PREDICT WHO WILL COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION? by Karen Elizabeth Sims June 2015 Thesis Co-Advisors: Robert Simeral Kathleen Kiernan Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2015 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE: CAN BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS HELP PREDICT WHO WILL COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION? 6. AUTHOR(S) Karen Elizabeth Sims 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Federal government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal government classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national security information without authorization? Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a foreign government. The focus of this research is on the behavioral characteristics that are similar or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with the federal government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. Upon review of existing data, the prevalent behavioral characteristic of the cases is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/ disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern as an insider threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization and the nation for a myriad of reasons. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF insider threat, unauthorized disclosure, classified national security information, behavioral indicators, PAGES ideology, disillusionment, loyalty, intelligence community culture, Aldrich Ames, Robert Hansson, 153 Chelsea (Bradley) Manning, Edward Snowden, whistleblower, espionage, spy, patriot, traitor, Central 16. PRICE CODE Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Defense, financial gain, loyalty, trustworthiness, character, reliability, security clearance, adjudicative guidelines, continuous evaluation 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE: CAN BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS HELP PREDICT WHO WILL COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION? Karen Elizabeth Sims Senior Security Specialist, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Security Officer, Washington, DC B.A., Luther College, 1993 M.A., Montclair State University, 2005 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2015 Author: Karen Elizabeth Sims Approved by: Robert Simeral Thesis Co-Advisor Kathleen Kiernan Thesis Co-Advisor Mohammed Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Federal government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal government classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national security information without authorization? Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a foreign government. The focus of this research is on the behavioral characteristics that are similar or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with the federal government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. Upon review of existing data, the prevalent behavioral characteristic of the cases is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/ disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern as an insider threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization and the nation for a myriad of reasons. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. THESIS QUESTION .......................................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION BEING ANSWERED .............................1 C. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHOD USED ...................................3 D. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS ................................................5 II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7 A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................................8 B. SECRECY VERSUS TRANSPARENCY....................................................13 C. FINANCIAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED WITH THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM ..........................................................................15 D. EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE BY SECURITY CLEARANCE HOLDERS ............................................................................17 E. SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM CONCERNS .............................20 III. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION ...................................................................................................23 IV. DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE............................................................................................................33 V. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS— 13 ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES COMPRISING A RANGE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR USED TO ASSESS TRUSTWORTHINESS .......................................................................43 VI. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TODAY ......................................................................53 A. POLICIES AND PRACTICES .....................................................................56 B. RECRUITMENT METHODS ......................................................................56 C. PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING ..........................................................57 D. TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS ........57 E. CONTINUING EVALUATION AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................................................58 F. MANAGEMENT INTERVENTION: ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING ....................................................................................................58 VII. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KNOWN OFFENDERS ..............................63 A. ALDRICH AMES ..........................................................................................63 B. ANA BELEN MONTES ................................................................................69 C. CHELSEA (FORMERLY BRADLEY) MANNING ..................................72
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