CHAPTER 4 INTRODUCTION On 18 March 1999, the President requested the behind a photocopier close to the vault where President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board the drives were stored. The FBI, which had been (PFIAB), chaired by former Senator Warren investigating the disappearance of the hard drives, Rudman, to review the security threat at DOE’s believed that one or possibly more scientists took nuclear weapons laboratories and the measures that the drives from the vault in April and misplaced have been taken to address that threat. On 15 June them. Fearful of possible punishment for a security 1999, the PFIAB presented its report, Science at Its lapse, the scientist or scientists engaged in the Best—Security at Its Worst (the “Rudman report”), coverup—put the drives behind the copier. to the President. The report found that DOE “is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven During the previous seven years, new CI it is incapable of reforming itself.” The report mechanisms to address economic and industrial stated that the “nuclear weapons and research espionage were created and procedures functions of DOE need more autonomy, a clearer implemented to improve coordination among mission, a streamlined bureaucracy, and increased intelligence, CI, and law enforcement agencies. accountability.” It was felt that these measures had considerably strengthened the US Government’s ability to Following its extensive 1999 review of DOE counter the foreign intelligence threat. However, security and counterintelligence (CI) problems, there was a difference of opinion. the House Intelligence Committee continued its oversight over DOE’s CI and intelligence On 8 March 2000, during a closed hearing before programs. The Committee closely monitored the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence DOE’s implementation of Presidential (SSCI), DCI George Tenet, FBI Director Decision Directive-61 (PDD-61)—the DOE Louis Freeh, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Counterintelligence Implementation Plan and John Hamre unveiled a draft proposal entitled the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal “Counterintelligence for the 21st Century.” This Year 2000—to ensure that DOE followed through plan, generally referred to as “CI 21,” resulted from on these and other long-overdue reforms. The an extensive review assessing existing CI structures Committee was disappointed that, in DOE’s initial and capabilities to address emerging, as well as CI inspections of the major weapons laboratories, traditional, CI issues. The drafters of the CI 21 plan only one lab—Lawrence Livermore National found current US CI capabilities to be “piecemeal Laboratory—received a satisfactory rating. The and parochial,” and recommended adoption of a Committee was also concerned that neither the new CI philosophy—described as more policy- DOE Director of CI, the DCI, nor the FBI Director driven, prioritized, and fl exible, with a strategic, could certify to Congress that DOE’s foreign national-level focus—as well as a restructured visitors program complied with applicable DOE national CI system. CI 21 proposed signifi cant directives and PDD and similar requirements and changes in the way the US Government approaches did not pose an undue risk to US national security. and organizes itself to meet the threat of foreign espionage and intelligence gathering. Congressional concern over security at the nuclear weapons laboratories increased again in Congress noted that the FBI’s National June 2000 when several computer hard drives Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)—charged containing nuclear weapons information were lost with detecting, preventing, and responding at Los Alamos. The hard drives were later found to cyber and physical attacks on US critical 341 infrastructures—and the new Offi ce of National of the provision tried again after President George Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) had W. Bush came into offi ce, but nonsupport from the similarities in mission and interagency focus. This White House again killed the provision. prompted Congress to suggest that both these offi ces be co-located at one site. They directed Leaks continue to plague the government and the a joint written assessment be done by the NCIX Intelligence Community. This was quite evident by Executive, the DCI, and the FBI Director and information being made available to the media by provide to the intelligence oversight committees. Congress relating to the US war against terrorism This assessment, of the desirability and feasibility following the 11 September 2001 destruction of the (including a budgetary assessment) of colocating World Trade Center Towers in New York and part of the NIPC and NCIX at one site, separate and the Pentagon by terrorists using hijacked US airlines. apart from CIA, FBI, and Department of Defense President Bush ordered that only a few selected facilities, was due by sometime in late 2002. members of Congress were to be briefed. Still, the media obtained classifi ed information and published it. The Fiscal Year 2001 Intelligence Authorization Bill had provisions to establish criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of properly classifi ed information. Previous legislation established penalties only for disclosure of specifi c types of classifi ed material—codes and cryptographic devices and information related to nuclear programs. After some debate about the provision, President William Clinton vetoed the bill on 4 November 2000. Another version of the FY2001 authorization bill without the disclosure provision was enacted on 27 December 2000. Proponents 342 The Rudman Report reforms instituted by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, and other related initiatives. (Editor’s Note: The following is an edited summary of the Rudman Report.) • Additional measures that should be taken to improve security and counterintelligence at the On 18 March 1999, President William J. Clinton labs. requested that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) undertake an inquiry Foreword From the Special Investigative and issue a report on “the security threat at the Panel Department of Energy’s (DOE) weapons labs and the adequacy of the measures that have been taken For the past two decades, DOE has embodied to address it.” science at its best and security of secrets at its worst. Specifi cally, the President asked the PFIAB Within DOE are a number of the crown jewels to “address the nature of the present of the world’s government-sponsored scientifi c counterintelligence security threat, the way in research and development organizations. With which it has evolved over the last two decades its record as the incubator for the work of many and the steps we have taken to counter it, as well talented scientists and engineers—including many as to recommend any additional steps that may Nobel prize winners—DOE has provided the nation be needed.” He also asked the PFIAB “to deliver with far-reaching advantages. Its discoveries not its completed report to the Congress, and, to the only helped the United States to prevail in the Cold fullest extent possible consistent with our national War, but they undoubtedly will also continue to security, release an unclassifi ed version to the provide both technological benefi ts and inspiration public.” for the progress of generations to come. The vitality of its national laboratories is derived to a This report, including an appendix of supporting great extent from their ability to attract talent from documents, is unclassifi ed. A large volume of the widest possible pool, and they should continue classifi ed material, which was also reviewed and to capitalize on the expertise of immigrant scientists distilled for this report, has been relegated to a and engineers. However, we believe that the second appendix that is available only to authorized dysfunctional structure at the heart of DOE has too recipients. This report examines: often resulted in the mismanagement of security in weapons-related activities and a lack of emphasis on • The 20-year history of security and counterintelligence. counterintelligence issues at the DOE national laboratories, with an emphasis on the fi ve labs DOE was created in 1977 and heralded as the that focus on weapons-related research. centerpiece of the federal solution to the energy crisis that had stunned the American economy. A vital part • The inherent tension between security concerns of this new initiative was the Energy Research and and scientifi c freedom at the labs and its effect Development Administration (ERDA), the legacy on the institutional culture and effi cacy of DOE. agency of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and inheritor of the national programs to develop safe • The growth and evolution of the foreign and reliable nuclear weapons. The concept, at least, intelligence threat to the national labs, was straightforward: take the diverse and dispersed particularly in connection with the Foreign energy research centers of the nation, bring them under Visitor’s Program. an umbrella organization with other energy-related enterprises, and spark their scientifi c progress through • The implementation and effectiveness of closer contacts and centralized management. Presidential Decision Directive No. 61, the 343 However, the brilliant scientifi c breakthroughs at pattern of denial. For instance, even after President the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a very Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 troubling record of security administration. For ordering DOE to make fundamental changes in example: