Aldrich Ames, Aldrich Ames Was the Oldest of Three Children and the Only Son
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103D CONGRESS P . S. PiR. 2d Session COMMITTEE PRIN 103-90 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ALDRICH H. AMES ESPIONAGE CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION NOVEMBER 1, 1994 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 84-046 .WASHINGTON : 1994 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona, Chairman JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio ALFONSE M. DAMATO, New York JOHN GLENN, Ohio JOHN C. DANFORTH, Missouri J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska SLADE GORTON, Washington RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada JOHN H. C-AFEE, Rhode Island BOB GRAHAM, Florida TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana MAX BAUCUS, Montana MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LouisianaN GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine, Ex Officio BOB DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio NoRmArJ K. BRADLEY, Jr., Staff Director JuDiTH A. ANsLEY, Minority Staff Director L. BRITT SNIDER, General Counsel KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, Chief Clerk PREFACE On the morning of February 21, 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence was advised by the FBI of the impending arrests of CIA employee, Aldrich Hazen Ames, and his wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, on charges stemming from espionage activi- ties allegedly undertaken since 1985. While the extent of these ac- tivities was uncertain at that time, it was clear that Ames, an em- ployee of the CIA's Directorate of Operations for 31 years, was in a position to have done grievous harm. The Committee, like most Americans, was eager to know pre- cisely what Ames had done and how these espionage activities had escaped detection for nine years. At the same time, it was para- mount that the ongoing criminal investigation be completed and that the Committee refrain from activities which could complicate or hamper the ability of the Department of Justice to prosecute the case. Indeed, the Committee anticipated that a trial of the case would provide the most complete factual record of Ames's activities. When Ames and his wife entered guilty pleas on April 28, 1994, to certain of the charges levied against them, the need for a trail was obviated. A "statement of facts" agreed to between the Govern- ment and the defendants was entered into the court record, but fell far short of providing a complete account of Ames's activities and did not explain how Ames was able to carry out these activities so long without detection. To address these matters, within days of Ames's arrest, the Com- mittee requested the Inspector General of the CIA to undertake a comprehensive inquiry. Over the ensuing months the Committee it- self held a series of closed hearings and briefings to explore the handling of the case in detail. In August the Committee obtained access to the debriefings of Ames and his wife and to the FBI inter- views related to the criminal investigation. Finally, on September 24 the Committee was provided a draft of the CIA Inspector Gen- eral's report, with a final version provided on September 29. The report, which provided a wealth of new information, had been re- quested several months before. Part One of this report summarizes the information produced as a result of these investigations. Obviously, we have had to summa- rize the story in a way that does not itself reveal classified informa- tion, and, for this, we have sought and received the assistance of the Executive branch. IV Part Two contains the Committee's conclusions and recommenda- tions. The failures evident in the Ames case were numerous and egregious. To prevent similar failures in the future will require more stringent policies and procedures, and, above all, strong lead- ership from CIA managers at all levels. We hope that this report will be reviewed as a constructive contribution to the process of change. DENNIS DECONCINI, Chairman. JOHN W. WARNER, Vice Chairman. CONTENTS Page In trodu ction ............................................................................................................. 1 Part One: Factual summary of the Ames case ................ .................. 4 A. Ames's professional and personal life prior to his espionage activities: 1. 194 1- 1969 .......................................................................................... 4 2. 1969-198 1 .......................................................................................... 5 3. 1981-1983 .......................................... 7 4. 1983-1985 ........................................................................................... 9 B. Ames's espionage and the Government's attempts to catch a spy: 1. April 1985-July 1986 ........................................................................ 11 2. July 1986-July 1989 ......................................................................... 21 3. August 1989-February 1994 ............................................................ 33 Part Two: Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................... 53 Additional views of Senator Metzenbaum ............................................................. 73 Part Three: Appendices ........................................................................................... 75 1. Internal CIA memo describing Ames's unexplained wealth (De- cem ber 1990) ........................................ I.......................................... 76 2. Committee letter to CIA Inspector General requesting a review of the Ames case (February 1994) ................................................. 78 3. August 1994-Chairman DeConcini interview with Aldrich A m es ................................................................................................ 80 4. September 1994-Statement of CIA Inspector General on the Am es investigation ......................................................................... 129 (V) INTRODUCTION On February 21, 1994, agents from the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation (FBI) arrested a 52-year-old employee of the Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA), Aldrich Hazen Ames, outside his Arlington, Virginia residence, on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. According to the affi- davit supporting the arrest warrant, these activities had begun in April 1985, and continued to the time of the arrest. Ames's wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, was arrested inside the residence on the same charges shortly after her husband was taken into cus- tody. Announced publicly the following day, the arrests prompted out- rage and alarm across the country. Ames had been an employee of CIA for 31 years, with most of his career spent in the Directorate of Operations, which is responsible for carrying out CIA clandestine operations around the globe. While the precise extent of Ames's es- pionage activities was unclear at the time of his arrest. Justice De- partment officials confirmed that Ames was believed to have caused the death or imprisonment of a number of Soviets who had been sources of the CIA and FBI. There were calls in Congress for curtailing aid to Russia, and legislative proposals were introduced within days of the arrests to bolster government security practices. A CIA team was sent to Moscow to speak with the Russian intel- ligence services, but return empty-handed. President Clinton directed that the senior intelligence officer at the Russian Embassy in Washington be expelled from the United States in retaliation, while at the same time cautioning against treating the episode as a cause for disrupting the fragile political relationship with Russia. The affidavit made public at the time of the arrests also con- firmed that Ames had received substantial payments for the infor- mation he had provided-money that he had used years earlier to purchase a new Jaguar automobile and a $540,000, home, with cash, in Arlington. Apparently, these seemingly large expenditures by an employee making less than $70,000 a year had not raised questions at the CIA. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter "the Committee") received its initial briefing regarding the case on the day the arrests were publicly announced. The facts contained in the affidavit supporting the arrest and search warrants were summa- rized by representatives of the FBI. While recognizing the need to avoid actions that might complicate or hamper the ongoing FBI in- vestigation and ultimately the Justice Department's prosecution of the case, the Committee was deeply concerned that Ames had been able to carry out his espionage activities without detection for a pe- riod of nine years, despite the presence of circumstances which in- dicated a security problem. What had gone wrong? To answer this question, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee wrote to Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA on February 23, 1994, requesting a comprehensive investiga- tion of the Ames case. On March 1, the Committee met in closed session with Mr. Hitz to discuss the plans to investigate the Ames case. In the meantime, the Committee continued to receive off-the- record briefings from the FBI and CIA regarding the progress of the ongoing investigation. The searches of Ames's office and resi- dence conducted after the arrests yielded additional evidence of his relationship with the KGB and, since 1991, with its successor intel- ligence service, the SVR. Indeed, it appeared that Ames may have received approximately $2.5 million for the information he pro- vided.