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entitled Spy Handler, are the main voices pointing out III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT anomalies that suggest the existence of such a person. Let us explore the times, the cases, the context, and some other intelligence professionals’ observations that were secured in the development of this article, to see if the fourth ’s presence can be discerned.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKING BACK

It is particularly important for new intelligence A officers to study this time period, when from File within our own government resulted in the deaths of some of the bravest and most extraordinary men The Fourth Mole in the (now the Russian Federation) who had risked everything to help America main- tain peace. Today we face an threat that Mike Mattson is greatly expanded and well equipped to steal our secrets and weaken our security. As Michelle Van Cleave, the former head of U.S. Counterintelligence s you read this, is there somewhere in the envi- at NCIX from July 2003-March 2006 pointed out in rons of Washington, sitting in a comfortable her February 8, 2009 editorial in arm chair, an individual who has successfully A on the importance of CI, “If left unanswered, these eluded all of the counterintelligence (CI) efforts growing foreign intelligence threats could endanger employed to search out THE FOURTH MOLE, a mys- U.S. operations, military and intelligence personnel terious character who holds the key to answering and even Americans at home.”2 The lessons learned numerous anomalies that resulted in the loss of U.S. beginning in, “The Year of the Spy,” 1985 and con- operations and assets’ lives starting in 1985? Genera- tinuing through the arrest of Hanssen in 2001 tionally, of course, this person could be lying in the are critical; first, in determining if we missed a mole shade of a leafless oak, six feet under. But the imagi- along the way, and secondly, to reinforce the National nation prefers the former to the latter circumstance, Counterintelligence Executive’s (NCIX) emphasis on as it leaves the door open for discovery, arrest, trial, CI awareness and practice. conviction and incarceration. Might there also be a retired U.S. Intelligence Officer (IO), a foil to the aforementioned individual, who while sitting in his armchair, finds himself rumi- THE ATMOSPHERE nating on the years spent assessing the damage done by the spies of the infamous ‘Decade of the Spy’? Do his The American and Russian systems of govern- thoughts always return to the feeling that something ment were intrinsically different throughout the didn’t add up; something was missing, concluding that Cold War. Their intelligence apparatus however, were there could have been someone else? As retired former similar in one particularly disturbing sense. Both Assistant Director of the FBI and former NSC staffer offered unlimited opportunities for the well-placed, John Lewis points out, “the CI mindset that there was enterprising intelligence officer (mole) to betray his another one still keeps him up at night.”1 loyalty oath, and to commit treason with some degree Interestingly enough, open source literature does of comfort in regards to his safety and financial well- not abound with ruminations of such a mole. A true being. CIA legend, Milt Bearden in his book with James Risen Whether the penalty for treason results in the “9 entitled The Main Enemy and his KGB opposite number, gram” solution, referring to the weight of the bullet Victor Cherkashin in his book with Gregory Feifer used by the KGB for executions, or the sentence of long- term or available in both nations,

1. John Lewis (Retired FBI), interview by author, 22 July 2008, 2. Van Cleave, Michelle, “Foreign Spies are Serious. Are We?” Washington, DC, phone. The Washington Post, 8 February 2009, sec. B, p. 3.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 39 it is questionable whether all of those who were these agents were given up to protect another highly apprehended and punished would have spied regard- placed or penetration, for political gain, or just less, had they known the outcome to be obtained in strictly to shove it in the face of the opposing service, their case. Did they all have the belief that “it won’t making an international media splash. These end happen to me,” or was their motive, reward, sense of games depended only upon the Soviet Unions’ goals, adventure, or confidence in their own particular “spy political intentions and motivations at the time. expertise,” sufficient to propel them on regardless When Dr. Charney posited this theory to Earl Pitts of the historically inevitable consequences, and the during one of their early interviews after his arrest in mathematical certainty of eventual betrayal, capture 1996, Pitts seemed to agree. More intriguing still was or death? Or was it a sense or the feeling of destiny the revelation that not only did this idea make sense to famously displayed by the former GRU (Soviet Military him, but that he also believed he fell into this category Intelligence) Rezident in India, Dimitri Polyakov, who and had been given up to protect another high ranking had been recruited in 1961 and was working for the U.S. mole within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). government known to the CIA as agent BOURBON and That man, as Pitts began to describe the behavior of to the FBI as agent TOPHAT? Perhaps the psychiatrist the employee who had hacked into another officer’s Dr. David Charney, an expert on the psychology of the computer system and explained lamely that he was spy, can shed light on this mindset. trying to expose vulnerabilities in IT security, was the FBI’s . Had Earl Pitts’ suspicions been taken seriously, could the FBI have caught the man I N T E R V I E W W I T H who some consider to have been the most damaging DR. DAVID CHARNEY spy in American history, a full five years before his eventual capture? Dr. Charney gained his expertise Dr. Charney also stated his theory to Hanssen into the spy’s mind after working as the once he had begun interviewing and consulting with psychiatric consultant to Earl Pitts (FBI him from behind bars. While Hanssen acknowledged Special Agent and KGB spy), Robert Hanssen (FBI Spe- that about a month or so before his eventual capture, cial Agent and GRU/KGB spy), and Brian Regan (USAF he did get the sense that something fishy was going and NRO/TRW employee who attempted to spy for on and that there was an increased interest in him Iraq, Libya, and China) after they had been arrested. while not being overtly shown, he could not completely Hanssen gave permission to author to accept Dr. Charney’s belief that the KGB “tosses” interview Dr. Charney for Wise’s book detailing the assets. “Hanssen would not rule it out,” says Dr. Hanssen case (SPY: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Charney, whose beliefs on this run contrary to others 5 Hanssen Betrayed America).3 I sat down with Dr. Charney as we will see further on in this article. Hanssen did and discussed the spy’s mindset, the Soviet/Russian make it clear that if this was, in fact, the practice of approach to espionage, and his thoughts on the fourth the KGB, then it must have been a very closely held mole theory. secret because if that had leaked, it would have had a 6 Dr. Charney began our conversation with a devastating effect on asset recruitment. quote from the stockyards: “...(in their line After years of dealing with spies, Dr. Charney of business) we use every part of the pig except the squeal!”4 sums up his beliefs by encompassing a few factors. Dr. Charney relates this to the same way the Soviet First, he acknowledges that Russians are the best Union used to, and possibly still does, run certain chess players in the world. With that comes a strate- agents against the U.S. and other nations. The quote gic thought process which is always looking for the highlights Dr. Charney’s view that most spies who advantage and plans for the future rather then the had worked for the Soviet Union were exploited for immediate time period. The Soviet Unions’ policies everything they could provide, for as long as pos- regarding intelligence and statecraft then, and Rus- sible, then somehow they were given up and left to sia’s now, are driven by politics and long-term visions, fend for themselves. He argues that most of the time while we in the U.S. are short-term players, as he says, “an ADD7 nation.”8

3. Wise, David. Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert 5. Charney Interview. Hanssen Betrayed America. New York: Random House, 2003. 6. Ibid. 4. Dr. David Charney, interview by author, 11 November 2008, 7. Attention Deficit Disorder. Alexandria, VA, tape recording. 8. Ibid.

Page 40 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 Dr. Charney believes we could well have missed the Bureau’s leadership with his findings on the Pitts somebody who was at a very senior level of govern- case in a 250-page report in March 1999.11 It was not ment. If his theory of Pitts being given up to divert until April 1999 that a separate short memo, circu- U.S. counterintelligence from the trail of Hanssen, and lated by Kimmel, specu- Hanssen being given up, as well, in 2001, the person lated that the FBI might he was to protect had to be at the upper echelons have another mole on of government. He believes this person would have their hands.12 The chal- been a career employee who had come up through the lenge Mr. Kimmel had ranks rather than a presidential appointee who would throughout his damage have had only access to material during the term of assessment was that he Brian Kelley, CIA Counterintelligence that appointment. Whoever this person is or was, Officer was not allowed access they would have risen through the ranks, held all the to the files he required, to necessary clearances, and attained a level of employ- be able to study all relevant “anomalies” in the process ment that guaranteed them cross-community access of developing specific evidence and documentation. As and oversight to covert missions, asset operations, former CIA CI officer Brian Kelley proposed, it was a counterintelligence measures employed at home and case of institutional blindness on behalf of the FBI CI abroad, and current intelligence on the KGB/SVR at officials who would not let Tom pursue his thesis that the time.9 there was another mole.13 That access was denied because the Bureau had a mole-hunt underway in the most compartmented ANOMALIES ARE IMPORTANT manner which would necessarily have precluded Mr. Kimmel from accessing the data he needed to deter- The following incident exemplifies the internal mine if his “hunch” was verifiable. As a former Marine struggle within the CI discipline between investi- Captain and, at that time, Assistant Director, National gating all the facts, leads and hunches, versus the Security Division (since February 1997), John Lewis inevitability of ruffling feathers and running into states in David Wise’s Book Spy, “We were not about compartmentalization roadblocks. It also helps to to allow him to be privy to all those files. My job as show why the conduct of damage assessments must Assistant Director was to protect sources and meth- not be hampered, leads followed, and our CI mindset ods. I was not going to open up our entire innermost always be to find the facts, no matter how narrow, secrets to someone who had never even worked with 14 secured or blocked the compartmented zone. this stuff.” Lewis did not disagree with Kimmel’s In 1996, two years after the dis- theory that the KGB’s handling of Pitts might suggest covery of Ames’s treachery, FBI Special another mole. He states, “The fact that the Russians Agent Thomas K. Kimmel Jr., who was had not tasked Pitts – we knew that. It was common 15 already working at FBI headquarters, sense there might be somebody else.” What Lewis is was tasked to conduct the damage trying to convey here is the idea that once the KGB had assessment on the Earl Pitts espio- a man inside the FBI they should have been exploiting Tom Kimmel, FBI nage case. Pitts, following the earlier (tasking) him left and right to collect valuable intel- treason of FBI agent , was arrested ligence. Since that did not happen, one could only in 1996 after having spied for assume Pitts was not the only FBI source they had, the Russians from 1987-1992 and that another source(s) was providing better intel- and taking in over $200,000 ligence. It was only after the unmasking of Hanssen dollars. In the course of the that Kimmel was informed that his “hunches” were damage assessment, where the right, but at the time he voiced them, they had not been supported by facts.16 Richard Miller, FBI goal was to discover and report what Earl Pitts compromised and the damage caused to the IC, Kimmel came across by author, fall 2008, Washington, DC, conversation. indicators and formulated a “hunch” that there was 11. Wise, 181. another mole within the FBI.10 Agent Kimmel provided 12. Ibid. 13. Kelley interview. 14. Wise, 180. 9. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 10. Brian Kelley (Former CIA CI Operations Officer), interview 16. Ibid., 182.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 41 THE “FOURTH MOLE” PHENOMENA

Former CIA SE division chief Milt Bearden is the In the summer of 1983, the Soviet leading open source voice for the idea of the likelihood embassy in Switzerland received a letter of a “fourth mole” after the following traitors were from an American accompanying an exposed – Edward Lee Howard, and application for a tourist visa to . Robert Hanssen.17 Victor Cherkashin (former KGB The letter proposed a meeting with the handler of both Ames and Hanssen) and Gregory KGB where he would hand over information they Feifer in Spy Handler also state, “That the KGB ran a might find “interesting.” 20 The Soviets initially turned “fourth mole” is undeniable. It is also true the CIA ran him down for fear of an FBI trap, but the letter’s agents that we (KGB) never caught.”18 author, Ed Howard, would soon resurface along with Perhaps, at this point, it would be appropriate to his wife. Howard enrolled in 1982 and had completed acknowledge a countervailing view often expressed the CIA’s Internal Operations course at the Farm.21 within the IC from time to time—especially when While at the Farm, Howard was exposed to fellow case confronted with a particular case, or cases, that have officers’ identities, sensitive operations taking place fallen apart or ended. This contrarian view suggests in Moscow, and the skills used to deceive that a case gone bad, or an asset lost, is not due to our Cold War foe. Just before deployment, Howard betrayal but rather bad luck, or the diligent work of failed (after four attempts) a routine , finally the opposition’s CI service. Explained another way, admitting he had used drugs and cheated on training there could be other means by which the KGB/SVR exercises at the Farm. He was fired in May 1983 and left could have gotten on to U.S. agents through SIGINT, the Agency poised to make them pay for their betrayal physical measures, chance encounters, or of him. Howard quickly turned to alcohol and was a report to the police/military by a concerned citizen descending into a very troubled state. The CIA failed who witnessed strange behavior. The fact that these to notify the FBI about his condition even though he methodologies exist could be employed to argue was a potential risk to national security. against the search for a mole within the U.S. IC. As Milt The KGB re-contacted Howard, tracking him Bearden explained, some IO would express this idea down in New Mexico, a year after his first attempts to in the following way, “every case contains the seeds work with them.22 According to former KGB General of its own destruction.”19 Bearden did acknowledge , over the course of his espionage career, that this is probably true but, in looking at all that Howard provided most of his information to the KGB happened starting in 1985, his belief is that there was while on trips to Vienna, , from 1984 through a person we missed, a fourth mole. 1985. Kalugin described the intelligence provided as Many of the names and operations that were “reams of information on U.S. moles in the KGB and exposed are attributable to the espionage activi- GRU.”23 Bearden points out in his book The Main Enemy, ties carried out by the main three moles of the era: and in his interview account with the author, that Edward Lee Howard (CIA), Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Howard had no access to operatives outside of Moscow Robert Hanssen (FBI). All three of these moles gave but that he did have access to SIGINT information. As up considerable information to the GRU/KGB/SVR, Bearden said, “we assumed they had it all (referring essentially putting in jeopardy almost every Soviet/ to the Soviets), our HUMINT and SIGINT information Russian asset the U.S. had. The important things to was all tainted.”24 We are left to assume that although note in these cases are the timelines of betrayal and Howard’s betrayal was extremely damaging, he could how they correspond to the losses and anomalies not have physically had access to, or provided, certain the U.S. encountered starting in 1985. The following names/operations that would answer the anomalies brief overview of these traitors, and the damage they described later in this article. caused, are illustrated for the reader below.

17. Cherkashin, Victor and Gregory Feifer. Spy Handler: the True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames. 20. Cherkashin, 146. New York: Basic Books, 2005. 253. 21. Ibid., 147. 18. Cherkashin, 254. 22. Ibid., 148. 19. Milt Bearden (Former CIA Chief of Station and Operations 23. Kalugin, Oleg, The First Directorate, New York: St. Martin’s Officer), interview by author, 24 February 2009, Washington, Press, 1994. 130. DC, tape recording. 24. Bearden Interview.

Page 42 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 A L D R I C H A M E S ROBERT HANSSEN

For nine years, until his arrest Robert Hanssen, on the other on February 21, 1994, Aldrich Ames hand, began spying for the GRU in 1979 single-handedly crippled CIA opera- then went dormant for the next six years, tions within the Soviet Union, pro- as far as we know.32 During that initial viding information that led to the betrayal, Hanssen would not have known about CIA deaths of at least ten U.S. and allied agents.25 Ames recruitments overseas because of his position within first approached the KGB on April 16, 1985, when he the FBI, though he did learn of TOPHAT (Dimitri handed a guard in the lobby of the Soviet embassy an Polyakov) which started out as an FBI operation, run envelope addressed to the Washington KGB Rezident later by CIA. As to this case, the question remains: Stanislav Androsov.26 According to Victor Cherkashin, how did Hanssen learn of TOPHAT, because this was who was the KGB number two man in the U.S., the not in the purview of his normal access, leaving us to letter (signed by a ‘Rick Wells’ from CIA) contained wonder if the information was leaked or told to him the names of two Soviet traitors: Valery Martynov in confidence? He reconnected with the Soviet Union and Sergey Motorin, as well as other very sensational this time in service of the KGB on October 1, 1985, and important information on Western spies who and continued to work for them and their successor had penetrated our service.27 Open sources do not organization, the SVR, until his arrest on February 18, disclose what exactly “very sensational and important 2001. The damage done by Hanssen was enormous, information on Western spies who had penetrated betraying human and technical operations, costing our service,” consisted of. Ames is best known for the U.S. millions in damage and the lives of many his June 13, 1985 major intelligence handover to the foreign assets who had risked everything to spy for KGB at Chadwick’s restaurant in Georgetown. There the U.S. are varying accounts here as to how many assets and During interviews and conversations with former operations he compromised, but what is agreed upon IC officers, the theory has been expressed that there is that it was the most damaging asset leak the IC had was another person(s) at a grade level higher than ever faced up to that time. Ames and Hanssen, somebody with an overarching Cherkashin states that according to author view of not just their organization but also every activ- , the CIA stumbled upon Aldrich Ames ity that the U.S. IC was involved with regarding the after a high-ranking SVR officer who fled to the U.S., Soviet Union. But that would be the easy explanation: codenamed AVENGER, betrayed him.28 This person the more complex rebuttal would have you believe also led the CIA to another top-level KGB officer who that any read-in, information technology (IT) savvy, handed them the KGB/SVR file on Hanssen in Novem- confident and careful analyst at a lower pay grade ber 2000.29 Cherkashin goes on to say that the SVR, as could have also caused this unexplained damage. One well as himself, know who this person is in both cases thing remains, it has been over two decades since these but are probably sitting on the information because cases and anomalies became known. Both the U.S. said person(s) are out of their reach.30 The important and have released much information regarding thing he points out is that the U.S. does not know who these issues, yet there is hardly any reference in open their AVENGER(s) are and have not found at least one source to the possibility that someone else was—or more mole from the CIA or FBI responsible for some still is—working as a deep cover mole or penetration of the losses starting in 1985.31 within the U.S. IC. ♟ ♝ ♜ ♛ ♚ ♞ 25. Pound, Edward T., and Brian Duffy, “The Ferret and the Moles,” U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 31, Issue 9, (10 September Below, I provide a summary of the period, along 2001): 30; available from Academic Search Premiere http://search. ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=5100549&site=e with a comprehensive analysis of the anomalies based host-live; Internet on evidence from open source material and first hand 26. Earley, Pete. Confessions of a Spy. New York: G.P. Putnam’s accounts from former Intelligence and CI officers who Sons, 1997. 176. 27. Ibid., 177. either had direct involvement in these cases, or were 28. Cherkashin, 251. active in the community at the time. Intelligencer 29. Ibid., 254. 30. Ibid., 253. 31. Ibid., 254. 32. Wise, 24.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 43 readers will be left to make their own interpretation officers.34 His career in espionage was short-lived how- as to whether or not they believe there ever existed, or ever, because a year and a half later he was arrested, still exists, a spy we missed. A caveat is in order. This charged, convicted and sentenced to twelve years in author does not argue, and it is not the position of prison for the murder of a homeless man in a Moscow this article, that the anomalies discussed herein are park who had happened upon Vetrov engaged in a the only anomalies that may point to the existence of a “French liaison” with a woman.35 After stabbing the fourth mole. What is presented here is limited to open man to death, Vetrov feared the woman would tell the source materials, constrained by a lack of access to authorities, so he killed her as well.36 In 1984, while classified information. Of course, this author would in prison, the rumors started to swirl that Vetrov – welcome any additional non-classified material that aside from being a murderer – was also a spy working may have been overlooked and that would strengthen for the French under the codename FAREWELL.37 the evidence for a fourth mole. Send such comments or As Bearden and Risen point out in The Main Enemy, suggestions to me as indicated at the end of this piece. (while in the U.S. October 25, 1985) believed that Vetrov had been betrayed by the letters he had been writing to his wife while incarcerated, essentially pouring his heart out and disclosing he was T H E 19 8 0 S ANOMALIES FROM THE a spy. Yurchenko also suggested that perhaps it was a “DECADE OF THE SPY” prison informant who had discovered Vetrov’s espio- nage.38 Either way both of those stories seem unlikely and un-verified. Nobody would believe that a hardened By 1985, the unexplained losses of U.S. foreign and trained KGB officer would have divulged his deep- agents and increasingly foiled operations, alerted est secret, the one that would really get him killed in members of the IC that something was wrong. In order the Soviet Union, through letters or by confiding in a to provide the reader with a context for these anoma- fellow inmate. Thus, the story began to change. Soon lies, I will also refer to cases that are not anomalies but the information circling was that the woman Vetrov are, instead, traceable to the U.S. moles listed here. In killed was a known KGB First Directorate sex groupie addition, the inclusion of these other cases provides who had bedded down with many a KGB officer. 39 The the reader a sense of the scope of damage wrought homeless man, as well, took on the new identity of a commencing in early 1980s, as well as providing a jealous KGB officer who had happened upon Vetrov more precise, however incomplete, timeline of events in the park.40 due to space limitations in trying to list the varied It is important to note that the CIA did not know estimates of 30-40+ cases. The unexplained losses/ Vladimir Vetrov by name, but the Agency had been anomalies that point to the possible existence of a briefed on the intelligence he was providing to the fourth mole consist of the following: Vetrov, Bokhan, French as early as 1982.41 Bearden and Risen argue that Polyshchuk and Gordievsky.33 this was critical because it means that someone at CIA Vladimir Mikhailovich Vetrov — FAREWELL was in a position to report to the KGB that one of their The first of such anoma- S&T collection officers was working for French Intel- 42 lies was the case of Vladimir ligence. Armed with that information, it would only Mikhailovich Vetrov, a KGB have been a matter of time for the KGB to figure out Line X (Science and Technol- Vetrov was the mole and handle him accordingly. So ogy Collection) officer work- the question is: who gave this information to the KGB? ing for the French Intelligence What makes the case an anomaly is that the answer to Service, the DST. He started who compromised him did not come from Edward Lee working for the DST in 1981 and between then and the fall of 1982 provided them 34. Cold War Project; available from http://coldwarproject.com/bio/ with over 4,000 documents regarding Soviet S&T vetrov_bio.htm; Internet. 35. Bearden, 131, 180. collection and the names of over 200 KGB Line X 36. Ibid., 180. 37. Ibid., 131, 180. 38. Ibid., 131. 39. Ibid., 180. 33. Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside 40. Ibid., 131, 180. Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown With the KGB, New York: Random 41. Ibid., 516. House, 2003, 516. 42. Ibid.

Page 44 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 Howard, Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen. Howard Ames provided at this first contact besides Marytnov had been fired from CIA in 1983 and, according to The and Motorin, so it remains possible that Bokhan’s Main Enemy, would only have had access or knowl- name was included. Yet Milt Bearden believes that edge of agents being handled and run in Moscow, none of the known traitors compromised Bokhan. not in other countries. Vetrov was discovered to be Also, Kelley states that Hanssen did not know about a spy in 1984, at least a year before Robert Hanssen the Bokhan case, eliminating him as the source.49 In re-approached the KGB to begin spying again. Ames regards to Edward Lee Howard, Bearden suggests had provided his listing of all Soviet assets to the KGB in The Main Enemy, “Bokhan was being handled with on June 13, 1985, after the date of Vetrov’s arrest and rigid compartmentalization by the CIA station in eventual execution in 1984.43 What we do know is that Athens, so Howard was eliminated as the source of Vladimir Vetrov was the first asset that falls into the compromise.”50 anomalous betrayal category, the focus of this article. Paul Stombaugh and Sergei Bokhan — BLIZZARD Adolf Tolkachev — SPHERE / VANQUISH Following Vetrov, Sergei Bokhan – codenamed CIA case officer Paul BLIZZARD – was called back to Moscow unexpect- Stombaugh was the next edly on May 21, 1985, when the KGB told him that victim of betrayal on June his eighteen year old son was having problems at 13, 1985. He was caught and his military academy. Bokhan was a GRU colonel arrested by the KGB while stationed in Athens, Greece at the time, spying for doing a surveillance detec- the CIA for ten years including informing them of tion run in preparation for at least two attempts to sell American military tech- a meeting with his agent the Paul Stombaugh, CIA, at left, in nology to the Soviet Union.44 The first case was CIA next night in June 1985.51 He 1985 KGB arrest. officer who attempted to sell U.S. was walking around Moscow spy satellite information, and the second was in 1984 attempting to “go black” – essentially meaning you when a Greek agent had sold the GRU plans for the have managed to elude your KGB surveillance and Stinger missile.45 When Bokhan received the summons can operate freely, if only for a short time.52 It was not to return to Moscow, he was highly suspicious. He until the next day that the details started to leak out of immediately began to feel as though this was a KGB Moscow informing CIA Headquarters that not trap and that he had been compromised.46 In turn, only was Stombaugh caught in the act, it meant Bokhan quickly contacted his CIA handlers who that another prized asset, Adolf Tolkachev – arranged an exfiltration plan allowing him to codenamed SPHERE and then VANQUISH – defect, which he did successfully in May 1985.47 had been compromised. Tolkachev was one The question remains, why was Bokhan of our most prized assets. He was a Soviet recalled? The KGB had requested he return a full scientist by trade who had worked for CIA month before Aldrich Ames identified him as a f o r the previous six years providing thou- spy on June 13, 1985 during his major handoff sands of top-secret documents from to the KGB in Georgetown, and five months his position at the Soviet aviation design before Robert Hanssen re-contacts the KGB to building in the heart of Moscow. The infor- start conducting espionage operations again.48 mation he provided allowed the U.S. to save According to Brian Kelley, it is possible that billions in weapons development, planning Ames could have betrayed him in April 1985 and intelligence. His value was truly priceless; when he first approached the KGB as stated earlier, now, he had disappeared. Tolkachev, in fact, was during his walk-in at the Soviet embassy in Washing- arrested in 1985 and subsequently executed in 1986.53 ton, DC. Open source does not indicate the names that The CIA would later find out that Tolkachev had been wrapped up earlier and was already in Lefortovo prison awaiting trial that would lead to his execution, unbe- 43. Ibid. 44. Cherkashin, 192. 45. Ibid. 49. Kelley Interview. 46. Spylist, (Eyespy Magazine); available from http://www. 50. Bearden, 515. eyespymag.com/spylist.html; Internet. 51. Ibid., 7. 47. Bearden, 152. 52. Ibid., 153. 48. Ibid., 515. 53. Bearden, 9.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 45 knownst to his case Moscow apartment, one near his parents, which he officer Stombaugh.54 had been looking for, had become available. He was Stombaugh’s mission notified by his father of the good fortune in early had been foiled from April 1985, leaving the reader to assume the KGB the start. Rem Krassil- made one available to get him back into the country nikov, the KGB’s head as expressed by Milt Bearden in The Main Enemy. The of the Second Chief CIA had deposited 20,000 rubles, he would need back Directorate’s Ameri- in Moscow, in a hollow rock in the capital near the can department, had Severyanin railroad station. The KGB witnessed the Arrest of Adolf Tolkachev by the KGB, 1985 orchestrated the arrest drop through their surveillance.63 Polyshchuk was of the young CIA case officer by having an actor pose arrested upon his arrival to Moscow. After the arrest, as Tolkachev in Moscow.55 As Stombaugh approached, an internal KGB story later leaked to the CIA and he was apprehended carrying rubles worth $150,000, FBI that, “the Second and Seventh Directorates had concealed miniature cameras, medicine for Tolkachev stumbled upon this great find while trailing a CIA and other incriminating material according to Cher- officer.”64 It appears that the KGB was tipped off in kashin.56 According to Brian Kelley, the only likely sce- the spring of 1985 of Polyshchuk’s role as a traitor. nario is that Edward Lee Howard gave up Stombaugh.57 This took place before Ames betrayed him on June This information is further vetted by Cherkashin in 13, 1985, and before Hanssen had re-contacted the his book where he states, “He’s [Tolkachev] been KGB in October 1985.65 It is assumed Howard did not betrayed by a CIA recruit preparing to take over his have access to this information because Polyshchuk handling from Stombaugh, Edward Lee Howard.”58 was operating outside of the Soviet Union which, as This is further evidenced by the date of his capture: pointed out by Bearden, Howard was not privy to that June 13, 1985, the same day that Aldrich Ames met information. Polyshchuk was later executed in 1985 with his KGB handlers in Georgetown and provided and remains one of the main anomalies pointing to a wealth of information.59 Thus, Ames could not have the fourth mole. been the source for Stombaugh being caught because Gennady Smetanin — MILLION that information would not have reached Moscow in time. Also, Hanssen had not yet reconnected with the Gennady Smetanin, codenamed GTMILLION, KGB until October 1985. was a GRU Colonel in Lisbon, Portugal, who in 1983 had secretly sent a letter to the Defense Attaché’s office Leonid Polyshchuk — WEIGHT at the U.S. embassy in Lisbon, offering his services to Leonid Polyshchuk was posted to Kathmandu, American intelligence.66 In June of 1985 he was com- Nepal in 1974 as a KGB officer. He had recently visited promised by Ames. On August 27, 1985, he requested a casino and gambled away all the money allotted to a meeting on the outskirts of Lisbon with his CIA him by the KGB, so the enterprising CIA stepped in, handler, informing him that his scheduled leave to providing him a loan to cover his losses.60 Polyshchuk Moscow had been moved up and he was to return in took the money and later agreed to spy for the CIA.61 the next two days, so that he could be back on the job While in Nepal, the CIA codenamed him GTWEIGHT in late September.67 As he prepared to leave, a follow up and trained him as their asset. The Agency lost con- meeting with his handler was scheduled for October tact with him and did not reconnect until Polyshchuk 4, 1985, a meeting he never made. As Bearden points was assigned as a Line KR officer in Lagos, Nigeria, out, the next day, August 27, 1985, Paul Redmond (then in February 1985 working until his arrest in August Chief of the Soviet/East European Division responsible 1985.62 In this case, Polyshchuk was lured back to for all clandestine operations inside the Soviet Union) Moscow under a false pretense. The ruse was that a knew that GTMILLION was gone.68 He hadn’t returned to his post in Lisbon and essentially vanished. It was 54. Cherkashin, 149. later discovered he had been executed in Moscow in 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Kelley Interview. 63. Ibid. 58. Cherkashin, 151. 64. Cherkashin, 192. 59. Kelley Interview. 65. Bearden, 516. 60. Cherkashin, 191. 66. Ibid., 104. 61. Ibid., 192. 67. Ibid., 103. 62. Ibid. 68. Ibid., 104.

Page 46 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 1985.69 Sergei Vorontsov — COWL Valeri Martynov — GENTILE / PIMENTA Ames also exposed Major Sergei Vorontsov, a On November 6, 1985, one of the counterintelligence offi- CIA’s assets in the KGB Rezidentura cer in the local Moscow in Washington, DC, Valeri Martynov branch of the SCD. codenamed GTGENTILE by CIA and Vorontsov had contacted PIMENTA by the FBI, went home to the CIA in February 1984 Moscow unexpectedly on the same plane as Yurch- by dropping a letter enko when he redefected.70 He vanishes as well and Arrest of Michael D. Sellers by KGB, 1986. through the window of it is later found out that he too was compromised (by a U.S. embassy car.78 He was code named COWL and both Hanssen and Ames) and executed by the KGB in provided the CIA with information about how the KGB 1985. His family was called back immediately as well, tracked American agents in Moscow, including the having been told that Valeri was involved in a serious use of a chemical substance – nitrophenyl pentadien accident.71 NPPD, called spy dust by the CIA – which the KGB had Gennady Varenik — FITNESS developed decades earlier to track targets.79 Vorontsov also provided the name of Father Roman Potemkin, KGB Lieutenant Colonel Gennady Varenik had a KGB operative working under cover as an Orthodox approached the CIA in April 1985 in Vienna, Austria, priest, as most of the Orthodox hierarchy was at the claiming he needed money.72 He was recruited under time.80 Potemkin successfully recruited American the codename GTFITNESS and warned the Agency journalist Nicholas Daniloff, who later was arrested that the KGB planned to damage relations between after being set up by a source who gave him photo- Washington and by bombing U.S. personnel in graphs of the Soviets Afghanistan campaign. Mean- Germany and blaming local radical terrorist groups while, after Vorontsov was arrested based on Ames such as the Baader-Meinhof or Red Army Faction information, the KGB set up a ruse to lure his CIA gangs.73 Cherkashin says in his book that Varenik, to handler. It worked, and Michael Sellers was expelled be noticed, most likely fabricated these claims since from the Soviet Union in March 1986. the KGB, says Cherkashin, did not condone or consider the use of terrorism.74 Varenik, who had been work- — TICKLE ing in the Soviet embassy in Bonn undercover as a Another anomaly of one of Tass correspondent, was suddenly called back to East the most tumultuous years in espi- Berlin in November 1985. His family was also ushered onage history occurred with the home, having been told their father had slipped on ice detainment by house arrest in 1985 and hurt himself.75 Former Case Officer Brian Kelley of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky worked this case, noting that we did find out Varenik codenamed TICKLE who was the had been arrested in 1985 by Soviet authorities. He Deputy Resident in London and also claims the case was heavily compartmented, sug- was working as a spy for MI6 (Brit- gesting that the source of this betrayal was someone ish Foreign Intelligence). He too from the inner circle of all CIA Soviet operations.76 was recalled to Moscow in May 1985 before Hanssen The Agency would later find out their asset had been approached the KGB and before Ames had provided executed by the KGB in 1986. Cherkashin claims (albeit the KGB with the listing of all our Soviet assets on vaguely) in his book that Ames “provided no precise June 13, 1985. Once he was back in Moscow he was intelligence about Varenik, requiring the Center to questioned extensively and placed under house arrest, conduct its own significant analysis.”77 which suggests the KGB was lacking the hard evidence they had against the other compromised agents who 69. Ibid., 152. were working for the American intelligence services. 70. Ibid. The main point in this case is that there is no doubt 71. Ibid. 72. Cherkashin, 198. Ames did give up Gordievsky, but when that took 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., 199. 75. Cherkashin, 199. 78. Ibid. 76. Kelley Interview. 79. Ibid. 77. Cherkashin, 199. 80. Ibid., 200.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 47 place (June 13, 1985) Gordievsky was already back in overall they did not land the asset who could provide Moscow and being subjected to hostile .81 the name of who was disrupting all of our operations, Milt Bearden argues that neither Hanssen nor Howard leading to the death of many of our assets. could have known about Gordievsky because of the As Lewis explained, there is a belief that informa- timelines of when they provided information to the tion within the Intelligence Community travels just as KGB and what they had access to at the time.82 effectively around the water cooler, on a smoke break or in the cafeteria, as it does in classified documents that need to be signed for and delivered amongst those A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT who have a “need to know.” To hear in passing, “guess JOHN F. LEWIS, JR. 83 who we’ve got in Moscow now,” is just as actionable as seeing the cable traffic for a particular activity. Lewis “There are anomalies that have occurred over believes that while Ames or Hanssen may not have the years that have kept many of the CI officers of the had direct classified case knowledge of some of these FBI and CIA up at night because they could not be anomalies (i.e. had not seen it on paper), they could explained,” John said during the author’s interview. have had verbal tip-offs and may have been able to These were especially prevalent in the most active decipher for themselves what was happening with any 87 spy years of the mid 1980s and ongoing until at least given activity throughout their espionage careers. 1991. Gardner “Gus” Hathaway, the former Chief of That said, John Lewis strongly believes that there Counterintelligence, reinforced this opinion when he are unexplained losses that he strongly suggests are 88 told John in 1988 that, “we have no more assets left in attributable to an uncaptured fourth mole. the Soviet Union.”84 These “anomalies” still exist because they could not be explained, reconciled, or have conclusions A VETERAN CI PROFESSIONAL’S drawn from them based on what we know Edward Lee P E R S P E C T I V E Howard, Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen provided to the Soviet Union during their betrayal of our country.85 One idea that John Lewis continually stressed During the 1980s, Mr. Lewis headed a very compart- is the fact that every time the FBI started to make mentalized operation codenamed COURTSHIP that progress or possibly came close to a major break in involved the FBI and CIA working together to target the mole hunt, a major event would take place that, KGB officers in the U.S. attempting to recruit the one he believes, was staged by the KGB.89 These who could provide us with the name of the mole within operations would provide us with a spy, or someone our government. One of the other agents assigned to who we could go after, all the while the real purpose the task force was none other than Robert Hanssen. was to avert the eyes of the CI community to the real Bob, as Mr. Lewis refers to him was, in his words, threat and danger posed by their most prized assets, “the guy that was always around, always listening and Ames and Hanssen.90 digesting everything around him, and yet nobody ever This was evidenced in the case of , knew he was there.”86 a former NSA employee who had retired in 1980 but Being assigned to this task force allowed Hans- had found a new career in espionage once outside. sen the unlimited access to all Soviet agents we were Pelton was in financial trouble and had declared running in Moscow and around the world. He had bankruptcy three months prior to retiring from NSA access to the files that provided an in-depth com- in 1980. Between 1980 and 1984 he held a series of munity-wide look at all Soviet assets and operations jobs, none requiring a security clearance but, with being run. Through the work of COURTSHIP the FBI mounting expenses, he decided it was time to secure did recruit some assets including Valery Martynov, an outside income. While on a trip to Vienna, Austria, who was later given up by Ames, then Hanssen, but he walked into the Soviet embassy and demanded he see the KGB Chief of Station wherein they discussed an undisclosed price for the secrets he was willing 81. Bearden, 516. 82. Ibid. 83. Former Assistant Director of the FBI National Security Division. 87. Ibid. 84. Lewis Interview. 88. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 90. Lewis Interview.

Page 48 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 to disclose. Pelton then orally recited his knowledge — P E R S P E C T I V E S — of , a highly compartmentalized FROM THOSE WHO LIVED IT (less then 100 people were read in) NSA and U.S. Navy joint project to secretly tap undersea cables to moni- tor Soviet military communications and track Soviet According to John Lewis, many CI professionals .91 The reader can reliably assume Pelton’s share the idea that “there is always one more.” He SIGINT knowledge proved very helpful to the Soviet asserts that the game of espionage was not always run Union. Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, a walk-in by the so-called “rules,” stating, “What would you do to the U.S. embassy in on August 1, 1985, later to protect the most important source you have and may exposed Pelton’s actions. While Yurchenko’s bona ever have? You give away anyone and everyone else you 94 fides have been controversial for decades within the have to in order to keep the best asset protected.” community, his information lead to Pelton’s arrest John believes in his, “cynical retired CI opinion,” that on November 25, 1985, and conviction, landing him this fourth mole did exist or still does, and that this 95 a life sentence. The KGB knew, with Pelton being out person was once at a high level of government. He of NSA, he was expendable: they had no more need believes the person is still alive because even unlike for him once he provided all he knew. So instead of other events from decades ago where intelligence and allowing him to continue and possibly giving up one of information has been subsequently leaked years later, their higher placed sources still providing legitimate there has been no progress or leads regarding this 96 information, they allowed him to be given up knowing theory and the unexplained compromises. He con- it would create confusion and a diversion of resources tinues to assess that most likely this person is retired within the U.S. IC. now from the FBI or the CIA, but maybe has not been Lewis believes the cases of Edward Lee Howard completely cut off from the flow of information or and Aldrich Ames fit into the same mold as the Pelton points of contact, thus the SVR finds them still of use case. As Robert Eringer points out in his book, Ruse: and in turn is either keeping quiet or actively working 97 Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence, Ed Howard’s to protect the individual at all costs. usefulness ended on July 12, 2002, when he “had an This belief is echoed by former CIA officer Milt accident,” supposedly tripping on some stairs in his Bearden who in his interview with the author stated Russian dacha, breaking his neck.92 The only problem: that, “the anomalies don’t add up, there had to be 98 there were no stairs leading to the laundry room; so, someone else.” Brian Kelley, who for four years was the story out of Russia quickly changed, referring to erroneously thought by some investigators to be the a car accident, as well. All these versions of the death mole that continued to damage the IC, after being fully are trivial because the authorities quickly cremated his exonerated by the capture of Hanssen, also believes in 99 body without an autopsy, thus washing their hands the fourth mole theory. of Edward Lee Howard forever.93 Russian ‘retirement parties’ take many forms. It could even be possible that somehow (whether from the fourth mole or THE UNFINISHED MOLE HUNT another source) the SVR knew that Hanssen was no longer useful and that he had been compromised or A spy can reach across the decades inflicting not looked after properly by the SVR. incalculable damage to operations, secrets, and careers, as well as causing the ultimate sacrifice. Whether there is a fourth mole remains likely but uncertain. But the strong possibility of his/her exis- tence merits further study and investigation. We study in retrospect all sorts of disasters, from airplane wrecks, fires, the response to natural disas- ters and issues of war, peace and diplomacy, always 91. Nytimes.com, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ timestopics/organizations/n/national_security_agency/ index.html?query=PELTON,%20RONALD%20 94. Lewis Interview. WILLIAM&field=per&match=exact (Last Accessed July 23, 95. Ibid. 2008). 96. Ibid. 92. Eringer, Robert. Ruse, Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence, 97. Ibid. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008. 98. Bearden Interview. 93. Ibid. 99. Kelley Interview.

Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 49 seeking to uncover unknown facts that will alter and revise our understanding of what happened and why. Indeed, historians continue to study the causes of World War I, and diligently attempt to unearth new facts that shed light on the causes of conflict. Despite the cloak of of this area of historical inquiry, prejudice against such analysis with respect to CI is lamentable since our country has paid such a high price for shortcomings in this area. While there are commonalities among many spy cases, each case has aspects that are unique and can inform even our handling of current cases, enabling better protection for our government from the ever growing threat of future espionage acts targeting us and our allies. H

Mike Mattson is the Project Leader of the Open Source Analyst team at Evidence Based Research, Inc. in Vienna, VA. He holds a B.S. degree in Busi- ness Administration from the University of Mary Washington and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts degree in Strategic Intelligence Studies at the Institute of World Politics.

AFIO thanks Mark Levin for his assistance with this article.

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