A Counterintelligence Cold Case File

!"#$%&&'($)*+,-./*0$1,23$4./*55-6*."*,$728,.95($:-./*,;<+,-.6$%&&'$=0-/-2.($>25?$@A($B2?$@$ CDD2"-9/-2.$21$E2,3*,$4./*55-6*."*$F11-"*,D($GGG?91-2?"23$ entitled Spy Handler, are the main voices pointing out III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT anomalies that suggest the existence of such a person. Let us explore the times, the cases, the context, and some other intelligence professionals’ observations that were secured in the development of this article, to see if the fourth mole’s presence can be discerned. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKING BACK It is particularly important for new intelligence A Counterintelligence officers to study this time period, when treason from Cold Case File within our own government resulted in the deaths of some of the bravest and most extraordinary men The Fourth Mole in the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) who had risked everything to help America main- tain peace. Today we face an espionage threat that Mike Mattson is greatly expanded and well equipped to steal our secrets and weaken our security. As Michelle Van Cleave, the former head of U.S. Counterintelligence s you read this, is there somewhere in the envi- at NCIX from July 2003-March 2006 pointed out in rons of Washington, sitting in a comfortable her February 8, 2009 editorial in The Washington Post arm chair, an individual who has successfully A on the importance of CI, “If left unanswered, these eluded all of the counterintelligence (CI) efforts growing foreign intelligence threats could endanger employed to search out THE FOURTH MOLE, a mys- U.S. operations, military and intelligence personnel terious character who holds the key to answering and even Americans at home.”2 The lessons learned numerous anomalies that resulted in the loss of U.S. beginning in, “The Year of the Spy,” 1985 and con- operations and assets’ lives starting in 1985? Genera- tinuing through the arrest of Robert Hanssen in 2001 tionally, of course, this person could be lying in the are critical; first, in determining if we missed a mole shade of a leafless oak, six feet under. But the imagi- along the way, and secondly, to reinforce the National nation prefers the former to the latter circumstance, Counterintelligence Executive’s (NCIX) emphasis on as it leaves the door open for discovery, arrest, trial, CI awareness and practice. conviction and incarceration. Might there also be a retired U.S. Intelligence Officer (IO), a foil to the aforementioned individual, who while sitting in his armchair, finds himself rumi- THE COLD WAR ATMOSPHERE nating on the years spent assessing the damage done by the spies of the infamous ‘Decade of the Spy’? Do his The American and Russian systems of govern- thoughts always return to the feeling that something ment were intrinsically different throughout the didn’t add up; something was missing, concluding that Cold War. Their intelligence apparatus however, were there could have been someone else? As retired former similar in one particularly disturbing sense. Both Assistant Director of the FBI and former NSC staffer offered unlimited opportunities for the well-placed, John Lewis points out, “the CI mindset that there was enterprising intelligence officer (mole) to betray his another one still keeps him up at night.”1 loyalty oath, and to commit treason with some degree Interestingly enough, open source literature does of comfort in regards to his safety and financial well- not abound with ruminations of such a mole. A true being. CIA legend, Milt Bearden in his book with James Risen Whether the penalty for treason results in the “9 entitled The Main Enemy and his KGB opposite number, gram” solution, referring to the weight of the bullet Victor Cherkashin in his book with Gregory Feifer used by the KGB for executions, or the sentence of long- term or life imprisonment available in both nations, 1. John Lewis (Retired FBI), interview by author, 22 July 2008, 2. Van Cleave, Michelle, “Foreign Spies are Serious. Are We?” Washington, DC, phone. The Washington Post, 8 February 2009, sec. B, p. 3. Winter/Spring 2009 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 39 it is questionable whether all of those who were these agents were given up to protect another highly apprehended and punished would have spied regard- placed asset or penetration, for political gain, or just less, had they known the outcome to be obtained in strictly to shove it in the face of the opposing service, their case. Did they all have the belief that “it won’t making an international media splash. These end happen to me,” or was their motive, reward, sense of games depended only upon the Soviet Unions’ goals, adventure, or confidence in their own particular “spy political intentions and motivations at the time. expertise,” sufficient to propel them on regardless When Dr. Charney posited this theory to Earl Pitts of the historically inevitable consequences, and the during one of their early interviews after his arrest in mathematical certainty of eventual betrayal, capture 1996, Pitts seemed to agree. More intriguing still was or death? Or was it a sense or the feeling of destiny the revelation that not only did this idea make sense to famously displayed by the former GRU (Soviet Military him, but that he also believed he fell into this category Intelligence) Rezident in India, Dimitri Polyakov, who and had been given up to protect another high ranking had been recruited in 1961 and was working for the U.S. mole within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). government known to the CIA as agent BOURBON and That man, as Pitts began to describe the behavior of to the FBI as agent TOPHAT? Perhaps the psychiatrist the employee who had hacked into another officer’s Dr. David Charney, an expert on the psychology of the computer system and explained lamely that he was spy, can shed light on this mindset. trying to expose vulnerabilities in IT security, was the FBI’s Robert Hanssen. Had Earl Pitts’ suspicions been taken seriously, could the FBI have caught the man I N T E R V I E W W I T H who some consider to have been the most damaging DR. DAVID CHARNEY spy in American history, a full five years before his eventual capture? Dr. Charney gained his expertise Dr. Charney also stated his theory to Hanssen into the spy’s mind after working as the once he had begun interviewing and consulting with psychiatric consultant to Earl Pitts (FBI him from behind bars. While Hanssen acknowledged Special Agent and KGB spy), Robert Hanssen (FBI Spe- that about a month or so before his eventual capture, cial Agent and GRU/KGB spy), and Brian Regan (USAF he did get the sense that something fishy was going and NRO/TRW employee who attempted to spy for on and that there was an increased interest in him Iraq, Libya, and China) after they had been arrested. while not being overtly shown, he could not completely Hanssen gave permission to author David Wise to accept Dr. Charney’s belief that the KGB “tosses” interview Dr. Charney for Wise’s book detailing the assets. “Hanssen would not rule it out,” says Dr. Hanssen case (SPY: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Charney, whose beliefs on this run contrary to others 5 Hanssen Betrayed America).3 I sat down with Dr. Charney as we will see further on in this article. Hanssen did and discussed the spy’s mindset, the Soviet/Russian make it clear that if this was, in fact, the practice of approach to espionage, and his thoughts on the fourth the KGB, then it must have been a very closely held mole theory. secret because if that had leaked, it would have had a 6 Dr. Charney began our conversation with a devastating effect on asset recruitment. quote from the Chicago stockyards: “...(in their line After years of dealing with spies, Dr. Charney of business) we use every part of the pig except the squeal!”4 sums up his beliefs by encompassing a few factors. Dr. Charney relates this to the same way the Soviet First, he acknowledges that Russians are the best Union used to, and possibly still does, run certain chess players in the world. With that comes a strate- agents against the U.S. and other nations. The quote gic thought process which is always looking for the highlights Dr. Charney’s view that most spies who advantage and plans for the future rather then the had worked for the Soviet Union were exploited for immediate time period. The Soviet Unions’ policies everything they could provide, for as long as pos- regarding intelligence and statecraft then, and Rus- sible, then somehow they were given up and left to sia’s now, are driven by politics and long-term visions, fend for themselves. He argues that most of the time while we in the U.S. are short-term players, as he says, “an ADD7 nation.”8 3. Wise, David. Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert 5. Charney Interview. Hanssen Betrayed America. New York: Random House, 2003. 6. Ibid. 4. Dr. David Charney, interview by author, 11 November 2008, 7. Attention Deficit Disorder. Alexandria, VA, tape recording. 8. Ibid. Page 40 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter/Spring 2009 Dr. Charney believes we could well have missed the Bureau’s leadership with his findings on the Pitts somebody who was at a very senior level of govern- case in a 250-page report in March 1999.11 It was not ment. If his theory of Pitts being given up to divert until April 1999 that a separate short memo, circu- U.S.

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