View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided No.by Archive 92 of European Integration November 2017

A World in Flux

Johan Verbeke

DIFFUSION OF POWER AND POWER Scholars and pundits alike have been SHIFT qualifying our times as of “transition and When you spread iron filings on a white sheet turbulence”, “disorder” and “strategic of paper, put a magnet below it and activate its unease”. Other concepts that recur in poles, you get a neat pattern of well-ordered discussions on the present state of the alignments. That is how the world map looked world are ‘uncertainty’ and during the Cold War era, the era of the Bipolar ‘unpredictability’. They all seem to point World. Kinshasa was aligned on Washington. to a world in flux. Let’s see what that Luanda, just slightly below on the map, on means. Moscow. A transparent world. A world in which power was distributed among, and concentrated in, these two capitals.

This paper sketches a macro-political view of While the Bipolar World might have been the current state of the world. The focus will intrinsically a rather dangerous place, its be on the forces at work in shaping our world, doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction on the underlying trends and tendencies. Not paradoxically led to stability and predictability. on the ‘events’ whose meaning depends on the As Ronald Steel put it: “In its perverted way, strategic framework in which you place them the Cold War was a force of stability” anyhow. (Temptations of a Superpower).

In a world where power is shifting and a new With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the but uncertain equilibrium is to be found, the implosion of the Soviet Union, disruptive State reclaim its own standing and strength, its forces which had been held in check by the full sovereignty, and becomes less dependent ‘ordering principle’ of the bipolar logic, were on and engaged with other States, in the unleashed. The lid went off the kettle. Ethnic process rewriting some of the rules of the tensions and national rivalries erupted in game. The diffusion of power, the questioning violence all over the place (South-East Asia, of the rules-based system, the retreat from Central-Africa, Caucasus, Balkans, to name multilateralism, the growing isolationism and just a few). With the Cold War gone, many the absence of global leadership are as many countries, particularly in Africa, lost their facets of one single new reality: power politics strategic interest. Not much people cared is back.

EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations anymore about where Kinshasa or Luanda but not necessarily will result in a stable were exactly located on the world map. Multipolar World. It is a world where as a result of the diffusion of power a lot of testing Enter the United States, the ‘sole remaining and teasing is going on, just to find out how superpower’ and with it a new era: that of the far one can go without going too far (Georgia, Unipolar World. In the early 90’ we see a Eastern Ukraine, North Korea, South China weakened Russia (Yeltsin), a China on the rise Sea). No outright confrontation among the big but definitely not yet a power to be reckoned powers seems to be in the offing. What we with and finally a European Union unable witness is a big game of ‘smoke and mirrors’, even to address the challenges in its own adding to the confusion. It is a world of power backyard (the Balkans). The resulting shift, not intrinsically dangerous, but where concentration of power in Washington made uncertainty and unpredictability reign Bill Clinton say in the mid 9O’ that “if the US unabated. isn’t going to lead, the job will not be done”. And the US did indeed, by and large, show EROSION AND FRAGMENTATION OF responsible leadership in world affairs during NORMS AND VALUES that period. The post-Cold War world order on which the big powers seemed to have implicitly if not But that period was short-lived, a ‘unipolar explicitly agreed in the early 90’, was a rules- moment’ indeed, as it has been remembered. based order. That order guaranteed a relative A new Russia woke up under a strong leader, stability in the inter-State relations. Putin, whose power base, however, seems International rules of conduct, among them rather thin. China made strident advances on the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the world scene, particularly in economic were felt not so much as external constraints terms but increasingly also in politico-military on behavior than as factors of stability and terms, thereby gaining in restrained self- predictability of behavior. confidence. The United States, while remaining strong and resilient as always, lost Things changed some ten years ago. Core some of its natural and unquestioned universal norms and values, meant to regulate leadership role as it became more inward- international relations started being looking, a trend set in motion under the increasingly questioned, sometimes openly. Obama-administration and apparently Established principles regarding nuclear non- reinforced by Trump (‘apparently’ because proliferation (Iran, North-Korea), the non-use with Trump one never knows for sure, as of force, the non-intervention in domestic words and deeds seldom seem to match). And affairs of other States and the respect of the the European Union, while overcoming its territorial integrity of States (Iraq, Kosovo, multiple crises (euro, terrorism, refugees), Georgia, Ukraine), rules regarding the prudently starts exploring some hard power protection of civilians in armed conflict (Syria, avenues (PESCO in the military field) Yemen) as well as basic principles of the law of supplementing its unquestioned soft power the sea (South China Sea) were repeatedly assets. The EU Member States, for their part, broken. Emerging norms such as the one have finally started increasing their defense regarding the responsibility to protect (R2P) budgets. were abused (Libya).

Such is the somewhat uncertain world we At the domestic level basic political rights (fair currently live in, a world of powers – some and free elections, fair trial) and fundamental rising, others slightly falling - in search of a freedoms (of assembly, press…) seem no new power-equation, a new balance that might longer unassailable (Turkey). Even within the

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European Union some Member States openly governmental organizations and transnational question the validity of its foundational corporations) or even anti-state actors (such as principles regarding democracy and the rule of terrorist organizations or transnational criminal law, such as the independence of the judiciary groups). But what is relatively new is the re- (Poland, Hungary). Presumably universal emergence of the ‘strong’ State, the self- human rights are being “relativized” and assertive State, often linked to some kind of “contextualized”. Respect for non- renewed or reinvented nationalism or discrimination principles (gender, race, religion, patriotism. ethnicity…) and basic norms regarding the physical and moral integrity of the person are One consequence of the return of the strong, disregarded in many places (China, Myanmar, sovereign and independent State is the Zimbabwe). resurgence of classical bilateral diplomacy, no longer as a complement to multilateral One should avoid exaggerating or dramatizing diplomacy, but to some extent as its these developments. It is not as if the world replacement. The strong State has indeed less has become in just a few decades an utterly appetite to be just a member of a larger, often nasty place. But some places in the world have bureaucratic organization where its voice gets definitely become nastier (Turkey, Egypt) as a diluted in majority decision making processes. rules-based order is being replaced by an The strong do-it-yourself State prefers to either interest-based system where the rights of States simply act by itself (unilaterally) or else in a and citizens are made subservient to the (geo- direct State-to-State relationship (bilaterally). )political interests of governments seeking primarily to perpetuate their grip on power William Hague, who joined the Cameron- (Russia, China). What we witness, as regards government in May 2010 as its new Foreign norms and values, is a transition, in some Secretary, soon packed out with his ‘New countries at least, from a shared universalism Bilateralism’, predicated on the premise that (the UN managed ‘Universal Declarations’) what one does alone, one does better (heir of towards a local particularism (so-called Asian the older more cooperative principle: ‘acting or African values) where the State fixes its own together when you can, alone when you must’). cocktail of rules as it sees fit. There is an Trump too is distancing himself of unquestionable parallel here with the post- multilateralism in favor of bilateralism. Witness truth world of alternative facts, where the State his unpacking of the Trans Pacific Partnership (or individual) is allowed to fabricate its own (TPP) which he hopes to see replaced by a set cocktail of truths, those with which it feels of parallel bilateral Free Trade Agreements. most comfortable. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) too is up for a downward revision. THE RETURN OF THE STRONG STATE Further signals pointing in the same direction AND THE RESURGENCE OF are Trump’s refusal to nominate the US judge BILATERALISM on the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, thus The State has never been away from disrupting this important mechanism for the international politics, contrary to what a trendy maintenance of an orderly world trade system, post-modern, post-Westphalian conception his decision to have the US withdraw from does want us to believe. Indeed, the State has UNESCO-membership and his threat of remained center stage on the international diminishing the US share of obligatory UN scene, even when in the meantime other actors budget contributions. besides International Organizations have joined that scene, including the group of so- Multilateralism is on the defensive. The called non-state actors (in particular non- concept of ‘effective multilateralism’, once a

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key concept in European strategic thinking a new political reality, one in which the strong (Solana’s 2003 European Security Strategy) is State has come to reclaim its sovereign powers. today mocked as an oxymoron: to be effective, diplomacy must be bilateral, not multilateral. GROWING ISOLATIONISM Experience teaches that classical international Let’s start with a platitude: we live in a complex organizations (UN-style) are poor at real time world. Many people simply cannot catch up problem solving and crisis management with the rapid technological developments (witness the UN management of crises in (Artificial Intelligence, robotics, autonomous Rwanda (2004), Darfur (2006), Sri Lanka vehicles, big data-mining) nor with some of the (2009) and Myanmar today). International new social norms (LGTBI, euthanasia, even Organizations should conversely concentrate abortion) which they find disruptive and on what they are good at: treaty-making and unsettling. For them the world has become long-term norm setting (Sustainable opaque. They feel disconnected from it and Development Goals, Climate Change). increasingly disoriented in it: estranged, disenfranchised and disempowered. They feel This shift away from classical multilateralism is uncertain about their identity, their future. As a also felt in the so-called ‘supranational’ result, they turn inward within the narrow governance of the European Union itself, confines of a self-constructed, often self- where the increasingly prominent role of the imagined world of Selfies, Whatsapps, European Council has given a boost to the Facebooks etc. Add to it the unequal and ‘intergovernmental’ method to the detriment unfair distribution of globalization’s benefits of the orthodox so-called ‘community’ method (with income inequality its most visible centered around the Commission. As the EU expression), and you got all the ingredients of had to face multiple crises hitting it frustration and discontentment on which the simultaneously (euro, refugees, terrorism), the populist politician fully capitalizes, often shift towards ‘intergovernmentalism’ was not fueling these feelings through politics of fear just an option, but a necessity. It remained, and hatred. however, a shift within (be it at the margins of) the existing Lisbon institutional framework. This inward movement is replicated at the More significant is the fact that EU policies are State-level: States withdraw from the world at also increasingly being shaped by European large within the domestic safety of their capitals, in particular Berlin and Paris, but this national borders, which take the shape of walls time outside of the institutional framework. (Trump’s US-Mexico border) or fences (Hungary, Austria). The narrowly interpreted These developments are compounded by local interest comes first (Trump’s ‘America different forms of Euroscepticism promoted First’) and with it protectionism and anti- by populist parties (France’s Front National, globalism. As globalism turns into localism and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, cosmopolitan liberalism into populist Hungary’s Jobbik Party, Finland’s True Finns) illiberalism (Le Pen, Orban, Kaczynski) new that openly question if not the existence itself forms of aggressive nationalism, sectarianism of the EU, at least parts of it such as the Euro- and xenophobia come to the fore, as we saw or Schengen zone, thus contributing to its with the refugee crisis in Europe. unraveling. Brexit – the outright withdrawal from the EU - will be remembered by history With this new nationalism come identity as a major break in multilateral diplomacy. politics. With the closing of the borders comes the closing of the minds. A strong, narrow and One can either lament these developments or exclusive sense of belonging to a nation or a conversely try to understand them as reflecting particular group carries with it the perception

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of distance and divergence from other nations world where the big players are testing each or groups. Within-nation solidarity fuels other out to see what new power equation may between-nation rivalry. Sometimes, moreover, emerge the prevailing attitude is one of wait- these identities are mere political constructs and-see. Hence the sense of paralysis as regards (being Hutu or Tutsi in Burundi, being Roma global leadership. in Slovakia, being Rohingya in Myanmar) based on, if not illusory or fabricated, at least grossly Contrast Clinton’s 1996 statement already exaggerated beliefs in presumptively unique mentioned (“if the US isn’t going to lead, the ethnic, religious or other characteristics. In job will not be done”) with Obama’s 2015 many places, not just Europe (the Balkans), statement, referring to the Middle East turmoil, latent (Kashmir) or manifest (Myanmar) that “the people of these countries are going to conflicts are sustained by the illusion of one have, you know, find their own way”. And such single, unique identity (Hindu vs. Muslim, Trump’s retreating from world leadership is no Muslim vs. Christian, Sunni vs. Shia…). less clear: “we are not going to fight wars in countries we even don’t know the name of”. In parallel to the space-related withdrawal from the larger world into the smaller confines of So, who is going to fill the gap left by a the nation-state, there seems to be a time- disengaging America? No other power seems related withdrawal from the long-term (LT) willing (Russia, China) or able (EU) to step in. and structural to the short-term (ST) and Not Russia, which is not primarily interested in incidental, a phenomenon known under the securing peace and security in the world pedant name of ‘short-termism’. Granted, anyway, but rather in securing and extending its humankind has always been prey to the so- own power base, perhaps at the expense of called Hyperbolic Discounting Fallacy, but other’s insecurity. Would China be prepared to short term thinking seems more prominent do some of the global lifting? Not sure. today than in the past. Necessary LT policies, Although under Xi there are clear signs focusing on structural inter-generational issues pointing in the direction of a willingness to (such as climate change, food security, increasingly assume international demographics, pension schemes) are sacrificed responsibilities (climate change, UN for the ST electoral advantage by giving in on peacekeeping), China remains a stern defender the immediate gratification of a capricious of the principle of non-interference in other electorate. The politician in general, and the countries’ business, naturally leading to a policy populist politician in particular has a ST of non-engagement and therefore non- horizon: he works for the present and has no leadership. North Korea has been for too long key to the future. Long term strategic interests a case in point, but here too things are or investments (such as energy infrastructure changing. And what about Europe? The EU as or major defense platforms) are neglected in such seems to lack both the required political favor of short term tactical advantages or pet unity and political will to assume projects. responsibilities beyond its immediate (Eastern and Southern) neighborhood. If not the EU, RELUCTANT GLOBAL LEADERSHIP then perhaps some European capitals: but It is no surprise that in an uncertain and London has outflanked itself through Brexit unpredictable world where States turn inward and Paris, although naturally inclined to engage and seem less concerned about the larger internationally (Libya, Mali, Syria), cannot do it world around them, leaders feel less inclined to on its own, while Merkel’s Germany will most stand out and assume part of the responsibility probably continue to give priority to European that world governance would require. In a unity, perhaps in partnership with Macron,

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including in the field of defense now that contained States playing a power game: power Europe can no longer outsource its security politics is back. across the Atlantic. “What we are seeing” – writes Paul Wilkinson We could perhaps try to look for leadership – “is evidence that, far from witnessing a roles at other advanced countries such as strengthening of multilateral institutions and Japan, Canada or Australia, but not much global political integration, what we are really seems yet to come from them. At some stage seeing is the enduring reality of our system of emerging countries such as Brazil, India and sovereign independent states: rivalry and South Africa, either separate or as a group conflict between the major and even the (within the BRICS), seemed promising medium and minor powers; continuing effects candidates for leadership, but we have come to of the security dilemma; and perpetuation of understand that the BRICS concept is an the balance of power as a central feature of the artifice rather than a genuine power to come. system, both at global and regional levels” So-called pivotal states, great countries to be (International Relations, Oxford, 2006, p. 27). reckoned with such as Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt seem more to be in need of responsible As the post-Cold War, rules-based world order leadership than in a position to provide for it. is increasingly and more openly questioned, people realize that history has not come to an A similar retreat in leadership is apparent at the end, indeed that history is reversible and, level of global governance structures such as collaterally, that security should not be taken the G7 (G8 minus Russia) and G20 that were for granted nor the steady progress of specifically meant to provide for leadership democracy and the rule of law to be over and above individual countries. But as of guaranteed. late their clout has been fading away so much so that we seem to have landed in Ian Nations are wakening out of the soft slumber Bremmer’s G-Zero world defined as “a world in which the fall of the Berlin wall and the order in which no single country or durable implosion of the Soviet Empire brought them. alliance of countries can meet the challenge of The much prized so-called ‘peace-dividend’ has global leadership”. been short-lived. What the Putins, Erdogans, Kim Jung Uns and Trumps of this world are CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF POWER telling us, all in their own way, is that POLITICS complacency is a self-defeating recipe and that The diffusion of power, the questioning of the the time has come to stop dreaming, to get rules-based system, the retreat from real. Diplomacy is no charity. multilateralism, the growing isolationism and the absence of global leadership are all facets ‘Realpolitik’ is back. ‘Power Politics’ got new of one single reality, they are convergent credentials. ‘Strategic Thinking’ is in the lift threads that mutually reinforce and explain again. All this can be seen in the shifting each other: in a world where power is shifting vocabulary of diplomatic discourse: power vs. and a new but uncertain equilibrium is to be authority; hard power vs. soft power; power found, the State must reclaim its own standing projection; containing vs. engaging; and strength, become less dependent on and constraining vs. influencing; disincentives engaged with others, in the process rewriting (sanctions) vs. incentives; vital or enlightened some of the rules of the game. Somehow, we interests vs. values; effectivity vs. legitimacy. seem to have come back to what some have With this renewed vocabulary comes a shift called the billiard-ball world, a system of self- from declarative policies to action-oriented

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strategies, or to put it in Stalin’s words, from situation, one of muddling through. As the “algebra of declarations” to the “practical they say, success in politics is not arithmetic”. perfection; it is going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm. Is a ‘dark POSTSCRIPTUM scenario’ to be excluded, with tension A macro-political analysis of the kind accumulating to the point of great power presented here necessarily proceeds by making armed conflict? No, it is not, but unlikely some simplifications and generalizations. for the time horizon we can currently Before closing, let me very briefly and on a oversee. more personal note, make some qualifications and self-critical remarks in this regard: - Neither have I said anything on how we will go from here to there. Most probably - On the Diffusion of Power. I have this won’t be just a linear process. It is implicitly assumed the EU to be, or rather quite possible that on the road to a possible to possibly become part of the ‘great Multi Polar world order intermediate, power’ game. Perhaps that is not correct, perhaps temporary, structures or processes and also misleading. Does the EU see itself (BRICS-style, or recent QUAD-style, i.e. as a great power? I doubt it. And I doubt US, India, Japan, Australia) will contribute, even more that outsiders see it as a great or conversely hamper, the shaping of the power. One could make a strong case, I final formula, if final formula there ever think, that only States can be great powers, will be. not International Organizations (IO), even when recognizing the hybrid character of - On the Erosion of Norms. When I spoke the EU, neither a State (which it will never about the transition, as regards norms and be) nor (no longer) an IO, but more State values, from a shared universalism towards than IO. This question is not without a local particularism I have entered a importance in terms of expectation minefield of contested East-West positions. management: if you (over-)sell the EU as a For one, the existence itself of so-called ‘great power’ and don’t live up to the universal values is a very Western concept; challenge, as is to be expected, the cost in the Asian concept of values is indeed much terms of credibility will be larger than more particularistic. The Chinese, for whatever benefit gained by the self-labeling instance, are at ease with the belief that as ‘great power’. what is right for China is not necessarily right for the world, and vice versa. - I have explicitly stated that the ongoing power-shift forth and back, up and down, - Similar ethno-cultural considerations could among the ‘great powers’ may, but need be made as regards the Return of the not necessarily have to result in a Multi Strong State and the Withdrawal from Polar world order. I could imagine, for Long-Term to Short-Term thinking. instance, that we end up with a Bipolar Chinese communitarianism (the interests of World, perhaps by default: a great Europe the community prevail on the rights of the not being a power, a powerful Russia not individual) almost logically implies the State being great. A Bipolar World, that is, with to be strong. Being strong is its natural the US and China as players, engaged state; so there is not much to return to perhaps in a mildly cooperative rather than here. A similar remark can be made as starkly competitive game. The ongoing regards long-term thinking. The very long power-shift could also result in a messy history of China has a direct effect on how

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the Chinese scale time: what we consider to thought that international politics could do be a long term (say 25 years), is for the away with power. Such objections are in Chinese just their short term. So no themselves unobjectionable indeed, but they exceptional foresight is involved in the miss a point. One can always refuse to see the Chinese capacity for what we in the West see forest and stick to its trees. as long-term planning. It’s just in their genes, or better: memes. Johan Verbeke is the Director-General of the Egmont – Royal Institute for A final self-critical point concerns the dynamical International Relations in Brussels. A dimension of the story presented here. Power former Ambassador to the UN (2004-08) shifting, norms getting eroded, the strong State where he represented Belgium before the returning, isolationism growing, power politics Security Council, he later served as Ban-ki- being on the way back… An easy objection to Moon’s Special Representative for Lebanon all of this is that we’ve been there before. and Georgia (2008-10) with rank of Isolationism? Has this not been a recurrent Undersecretary General. His most recent feature of US foreign policy? The return of the postings were in London (2010-13) and (strong) State: but the State was never gone Washington (2014-16). Johan Verbeke anyway, and the Chinese State, as we saw, has obtained his LL.M. at the Yale Law always been a strong one. The return of power- School. politics? Only the naïve (European) could have

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The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research. www.egmontinstitute.be

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