COMPETING AND COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE EU AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTOR: An Examination of the Common Security and Defence Policy through the Lenses of Idealism and Realism DISSERTATION to obtain the degree of Doctor at the Maastricht University, on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof.dr. G.P.M.F. Mols in accordance with decision of the Board of Deans, to be defended in public on Thursday 25 November 2010, at 14:00 hrs by Dennis Gyllensporre ii Supervisor: Prof.dr. C de Neubourg, professor of International Comparative Studies, UM. Co-supervisor: Dr. H. Edstr¨om,department of Strategy and Doctrine, the Norwegian Defence Com- mand and Staff College, Oslo, Norway. Assessment Committee: Prof.dr. S. Vanhoonacker, professor of Administrative Governance in the EU, UM (chairman); Dr. W. Hendriks, assistant professor of the School of Business and Economics, UM; Dr. J. Hoogenboezem, assistant professor of Arts and Social Sciences, UM; Prof.dr. K. E. Jørgensen, professor in International Affairs, Aarhus University, Denmark; Prof.dr. R. Wessel, professor of the Law of the European Union and other International Organizations, University of Twente, the Netherlands. Financial Contributor: the Swedish Armed Forces. iii Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) c 2010 Dennis Gyllensporre All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing, from the author. Cover image by Caroline Gyllensporre: The EU flag with the globe embedded on it depicts the global reach of the CSDP. In the margins a `war hawk' and a `peace dove' are shown, representing the influences of Realism and Idealism, respectively. ISBN 978 90 8666 172 5 Published by Boekenplan, Maastricht. Abstract This thesis applies policy analysis to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to explain the actions of the European Union (EU) as an international crisis management actor. The ability to intervene in conflicts, including the use of force, dis- tinguishes the CSDP from other policy areas of the EU. There are several key challenges associated with the study of the EU as an international actor. As a foreign policy ac- tor, the EU is a sui generis, one of a kind, being neither a state nor an international organisation. It therefore lacks strict conformity with most of the models and theo- ries within the realm of international relations (IR) theory, which, in general, takes a state-centric view of the interaction between international actors, and its applicability to the EU is questionable. Within this policy field, the EU portrays itself as an altruistic and unselfish `force for good'. This self-image is shared by other Western states and organisations. Its uniqueness is defined by the strong correlation that exists between the self-image and the representation of the CSDP by the research community, where the EU has captivated the majority of CSDP scholars. This idealistic description of the EU raises some questions. When the EU describes itself as a beacon to the rest of mankind, it implicitly elevates European values and norms to a cosmopolitan level, thus claiming moral primacy. It could be argued that the global proliferation of values and norms is an act of a hegemonic power that aspires to shape the world in its favour, surely neither a noble nor an altruistic act. The notion of unselfishness also raises other questions from a domestic perspective. Is it not reasonable to expect that the CSDP first and foremost safeguards the interests of the EU citizens? Moreover, portraying the EU as a civil and soft power does not adequately explain the rapid development and frequent use of intrusive crisis management instruments outside the EU, and in particular, its military deployments. A few scholars have taken another approach by regarding the EU as a power-maximizing actor. This can neither explain the EU as an ardent advocate of international law and multilateralism, nor constitute a perspective that explains its relative weakness in the military arena, despite being a global economic power that has aspired towards defence cooperation since the 1950s. Moreover, it does not provide a compelling argument for the rapid expansion of civilian assistance missions that do not seek to enforce the will of the EU. Abstract v This research project is framed by the overarching question as to how the Council's decision to engage in crisis management missions be explained and is divided into two phases. Its primary objective is to contribute to a more detailed perception of the motivations behind EU crisis management missions. It subjects the explanatory power of Realism and Idealism, respectively, to critical examination by means of empirical analysis. Accordingly, the research revolves around two seminal questions: 1. How effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor? 2. What is the explanatory power of various schools within Realism in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor? Based on official EU documents, the first phase investigates how effective Realism and Idealism are, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor by examining the decision-making for the twenty-three CSDP missions decided on from 2002 to 2009. Scientifically the work is positioned within the realm of International Relations, and more specifically, it relates to the sub-field of Security Studies. It is there- fore important to identify relevant independent variables for the research that are rooted in the scientific discipline of Security Studies. When reviewing the body of literature in this discipline, six pertinent questions emerge that relate to distinct interrogatives. In order to operationalise the aforementioned six independent variables, they need to be tailored to reflect the CSDP context: • Why is CSDP action justified? • What is the nature of the threat? • How should a CSDP response be tailored? • Where is the conflict taking place? • When is CSDP action needed? • Who is engaged in resolving the conflict? The investigation produced indecisive results in that neither Realism nor Idealism gener- ated a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP. Contrary to the prevailing perception of the EU as a soft power, only some 55% of the empirical output collected indicated idealist preferences. This finding is even more striking when one considers that the em- pirical work was limited to official EU documents and statements. Consequently, the commonly held view that the EU is an altruistic foreign policy actor must be rejected, as it is too simplistic. Since neither Idealism nor Realism possess sufficient explanatory vi Abstract power to explain decisions to launch CSDP missions, branches of the latter in these meta-theories should be further explored. The second phase of the research investigates the explanatory power of various schools within Realism by drawing on four CSDP missions that revealed the pre-dominance of realist traits in the initial research, as well as on secondary empirical data. The realist schools considered include Classical Realism, Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism. Sev- eral key aspects of the research design are configured differently in comparison with the first part of the research. While the first phase of the research employs CSDP missions as the unit of analysis and produces an investigation of all CSDP missions, this phase takes a qualitative approach with selected realist theories as the analytical object, or unit of analysis. This allows an investigation of the explanatory power of these realist theories in the context of the CSDP. Hence, in order to test these realist theories, the selected CSDP missions become the independent variables that allow the theories to be populated with empirical data. Two of the most commonly utilised levels of analysis models for IR theory are used as a point of departure. The first model has been designed by Kenneth Waltz, who seeks to explain war as a product of a political process, at three levels, or by using three images. The second model has been developed by Graham Al- lison, who examines the USA's decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis by applying a three-level analysis. Based on these models and the work of two influential CSDP scholars who represent the realist tradition, Barry Posen and Adrian Hyde-Price, an analytical framework has been developed, as shown in the table below. Level of Analysis Criteria Mission Mission Mission Mission 1 2 3 4 D1: Competition with the USA External Level D2: Reducing security dependence on the USA D3: National interests of the EU3 Internal MS Level D4: Security in the neighbourhood D5: Ability to act Internal EU Level D6: Prestige and Promotion of the CSDP Table 1: Analytical Scheme Part II This empirical investigation generated a somewhat indecisive result in that none of the six criteria produced a compelling explanatory power. Only when the realist schools are regarded as complementary and their results are combined, do they provide an explanatory power for Realism, and some 58% of the output generated was positive. If competition with the USA is eliminated as a criterion, the result improves, with an Abstract vii overall output ratio of 65%. Significantly, this criterion is one of the most common arguments advanced by scholars in arguing for a realist perspective of the CSDP. This inconclusive result must also take into account that the four most `realist-prone' missions were subjects of the study. A synthesis of the findings suggests that the EU pursues crisis management based on an evenly balanced mix of realist and idealist influences. CSDP missions are as much about satisfying vital self-interests as advancing universal value interests.