Intergovernmentalism

Home , Intergovernmentalism

MI CHELLE CINI

Chapter Contents

• Introduction

• What is intergovernmentalism?

• Hoffmann and his critics

• Beyond classical intergovernmentalism

• Liberal intergovernmentalism and its critics

• Conclusion: the future af intergovernmentalism

Reader's Guide

This chapter provides an overview of intergovernmentalist integration theory, focusing ticularly on the works ofStanley Hoffmann and Andrew Moravcsik.ltfirst introduces tbe premises and assumptions of intergovernmentalism, identifying its realist underpinnin the state-centrism which provides the core ofthe approach, before examining in more the specific characteristics of Hoffmann's work. The subsequent section also examines ofthe ways in which intergovernmentalist thinking has contributed to different conce zations of European integration. The topics covered in this section are confederalis domestic politics approach; and institutional analyses that emphasize the 'locked-in' of nation states within the integration processoLast, but certainly not least, the chapter vides a brief review of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism, which since the mid 1 has become the main focal point for intergovernmentalist research. Intergovernmentalism 87 ntroduction

m the mid 1960s to the present day, intergovern- intergovernmentalism?' This section outlines the ntalism-in one shape or another-has pro- general characteristics of the approach. The section ed students of the European Community/Union that follows introduces Hoffmann's early ideas; this a conceptual account of the European integra- section also addresses the main criticisms of his n processo For decades, students of European particular brand of intergovernmentalisrn, ation learnt about the two competing Hoffmann's groundbreaking insights into the phe- roaches which explained (and in some cases nomenon of European integration, together with icted) the course ofEuropean integration: neo- critiques of his work, led to new developments in ionalism (covered in Chapter 5) and intergov- European integration theory from the 1970s entalism. Although this dichotomy was onwards. Although these might not always be plemented by a new division, in response to the termed 'intergovernmentalist' in any narrow sense ernance turn' (see Chapter 7), intergovernmen- of the word, they are premised upon a 'state- , or rather, contemporary variants of inter- centrism' which owes much to Hoffmann's work. mmentalism, continues to dominate much of Important examples of these 'variants' of intergov- academic discourse on European integration. It ernmentalism are dealt with in the remainder of the this sense that one might see it still as the dom- chapter. The first highlights the confederal charac- t paradigm for explaining European integra- teristics of the European Union (EU). The second at the start of the twenty-first century, even if draws attention to the importance of domestic poli- researchers into EU politics might contest this tics; while the third groups together a more institu- tionalist kind of research that shows how states, still . chapter provides a general introduction to central actors, become 'locked into' the European arguments and critiques of intergovernmental- integration processo The final section-and perhaps ry. It does so by focusing on the works of the most crucial-Iooks at the work of Andrew Hoffmann (whose early writings date from Moravcsik and more specificaliy at his 'liberal inter- 960s), and Andrew Moravcsik (who began to governrnentalist' (LI) theory ofEuropean integration. an impact on the field in the early 1990s). It Although this is an extremely rich and influential packs some of the premises and assumptions theory, LI has been widely criticized. Some of these inning intergovernmentalist thinking. The criticisms are addressed towards the end of the er begins by addressing the question: 'What is chapter.

at is intergovernmentalism?

vernrnentalism provides a conceptual expla- fundamental issues of national sovereignty, and of the European integration processo In this argues that 'European integration is driven by the t, intergovernmentalism is characterized by interests and actions of nation states' (Hix -centrism. In other words, intergovernmen- 1999: 15). privileges the role of (national) states within Intergovernrnentalism is drawn, whether explicitly integration. It sees integration as a zero- or implicitly, from classical theories of international e in which the winner takes ali, claims that relations, and, most notably, from realist or neo- ited to policy areas that do not touch on realist analyses of inter-state bargaining. Realism 88 Michelle Cini

also makes the assumption that states have their .~ KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS 6.1 distinctive problems and concerns, and that inengaging face very different internal ircumstances. This m - =- to pro~ Intergovernmentalism astheory and method ~1 that their policy preferences (or interests) will peranon w In this chapter, intergovernmentalism is defined as a fail to converge. As a consequence, any attem serva tive an theory of European integration. What this implies is that build a community beyond the state will be fra intergovernmentalism is an approach that explains what European integration (ar European cooperation) is. with difficulties, and may even intensify the sense Intergovernmentalism may also serve as a model of difference felt across state borders. Néo-n European integration. This is something rather different. accept that international institutions of ali kinds This sort of intergovernmentalism is prescriptive in the established to reduce the level of anarchy within sense that it is likely to advocate reducing the role ofthe states system, and see the European Union as - supranational institutions (European Commission, another of these institutions, albeit within a .. European Parliament, and the Courts) in favour of a greater role for the European Council and EU Council, institutionalized setting. While neo-realists have representing national governments.lt might also imply a been particularly interested in any explicit w; reinstatement of unanimous voting in the Council and European integration (yet see de Grieco 1995, 1 the repatriation of European policies to the national their influence on intergovernmentalism is leveI. (Rosamond 2000: 132). It should be stressed h ever, that intergovernmentalism and (neo- )re are not synonymous (Church 1996: 25). incorporates the claim that international politics Intergovernmentalism is not just associated concerns the interaction of self-interested states in EU politics. It also refers to a type of decisi an anarchic environment, where there is no global making that occurs within ali internatio authoritycapable of securing order (Morganthau organizations. lnternational organizations are int 1985). From this perspective, states are rational, governmental bodies, in that they serve as arenas unitary actors that define their interests based on an which states meet to discuss common issues, evaluation of their position in the system of states share ideas and to negotiate agreements. They (Rosamond 2000: 131). State interest is, therefore, usualiy based on international treaties, and mem- primarily about survival, with other concerns, such bership is voluntary. They tend not to have pow as economic growth, of secondary importance. of taxation, and rely therefore on member-s Thus the theory 'is centred on the view that nation contributions for their operation. Generaliy, tb states are the key actors in international affairs and do not have independent powers, and usualiy find - the key political relations between states are chan- difticult to enforce decisions where individ nelied primarily via national governments' (Nugent members are recalcitrant (McCormick 2002: 4 1999: 509). While some international organizations stray fro Neo-realism (Waltz 1979), like realism, sees states this model, intergovernmentalists apply this kind as self-regarding actors co-existing in an anarchical framework to their understanding of the European system. However, it also understands that there is Union, albeit with some modification. some potential for order, on the basis of interna- According to intergovernmentalists, there are co tional cooperation (see Axelrod 1984; Keohane and benefits attached to involvement in Europ 1988) if only as a rational means to state survival. integration. (Note, however, that intergovernmental- According to neo-realists, regimes are arenas for the ists may prefer to talk ofEuropean cooperation, rather negotiation of zero-sum agreements, with the out- than of integration). Participation in cooperation comes of those negotiations shaped by the distribu- this kind will rest on a weighing up of the pros tion of state power within the regime. Yet,despite the cons of membership and on the extent to whi promise of international cooperation, neo-realism European integration improves the efficiency Intergovernmentalism 89

gains struck among its member states. The main {1 CASE STUDY 6.2 in engaging in this qualitative cost-benefit anal- . is to protect their national interests. The European rescue ofthe nation state Cooperation within the EU, then, is essentially nservative and pragmatic. It rests on the premise In his book The European Rescue af the Natian State (1992), the economic historian Alan Milward analysed t common solutions are often needed to resolve European integration in the 1940s and 1950s. He argued mmon problems. To put it another way, coopera- that the European integration process in the post-1945 n has nothing to do with ideology or idealism, period 'saved' rather than undermined the nation state. t is founded on the rational conduct of govern- Governments at this time had a number of difficult nts as they seek to deal with the policy issues that problems to resolve, arising out of increasing interde- nfront them in the modern world. For intergov- pendence and increased disaffection from social actors. The successful delivery of policy programmes was a mat- entalists, European integration is normal or ter of survival forthe states ofWestern Europe (Rosamond n 'mundane' (O'NeillI996: 57) behaviour on the 2000: 138). European integration became a means to of state actors. There is nothing particularly this end. As Rosamond (2000: 139) notes, 'The idea of cial about it, other than it has taken a highly integration as a progressive transfer of power away from titutionalized form since the 1950s. As interna- the state managed by emerging supranational elites is given little credence by this hypothesis ' Rather, the key nal cooperation always occurs simultaneously on actors are governmental elites. variety of levels and taking many different forms, peration within the EU is deemed to be only one However, read in a particular way, Milward's work can be seen as challenging the standard polarization of inter- ple of a more general phenomenon. This is governmentalism and supranationalism. Integration y intergovernmentalists are reluctant to admit does not necessarily entail the drift toward suprana- t there is a European integration process, as such. tional statehood, and states can be seen as controlling ther, they see cooperation occurring in fits and agents with an interest in the promotion of degrees of s, and not as a trend heading inexorably in one integration (Rosamond 2000: 139) . ection towards some sort of European political mmunity or federal state. Thus, as an institutionalized form of inter-state implies 'the legal capacity of national decision mak- peration, European integration facilitated the ers to take decisions without being subject to exter- ival of the West European state in the bi-polar nal restraints' (Nugent 1999: 502); another claims ntext ofthe post-1945 period (see Box 6.2). It is that sovereignty is 'the right to hold and exercise rhaps not surprising to find, therefore, that in the authority' (McCormick 2002: 10). However, many early 1990s some intergovernmentalists supported use the word sovereignty as little more than a syno- e view that European integration would probably nym for 'independence', and this is particularly the t survive the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer case in public discourse (for example, when jour- 990). Yet even if this prediction has proved inac- nalists or politicians discuss sovereignty). ate, there is no disputing that the nation state has According to intergovernmentalism, not only are ived (O'NeillI996: 54). the member states deemed to be the most At the heart of the intergovernmental thesis lies a important actors by far, they also manage to involve .cular conception of the sovereignty of national themselves in European integration without ceding teso Sovereignty remains a very emotive word, sovereignty. This implies that states remain very icularly when used in the context of European much in control of the processo Accordingly, nion politics. It has various meanings, holding European cooperation implies at most a poaling or ociations with 'notions of power, authority, inde- sharing of sovereignty, as opposed to a transfer of ndence, and the exercise of will' (Nugent 1999: sovereignty from the national to the supranational 2). One useful definition states that sovereignty level (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990: 277). 90 Michelle Cini

Intergovernrnental cooperation might also involve tions may be permitted a more important role in le: European integra . a delegation of sovereignty. Intergovernmentalists controversial areas of policy, the functions they per- snowball effect kn accept that European integration can indeed involve form in more sensitive policy domains is severely arguing that this a transfer of functions from the state executive, and, curtailed. The European institutions that really mat- roven facto He st:ressIeIIIII to a lesser extent, from the parliaments of the mem- ter, then, are the EU Council (of national ministers remained characteri2Joll' ber states, to the European institutions-to the and the European Council (ofheads of state and gov- . terests (O'Neill Commission and the Court of Justice in particular. ernment), while the role of the other European insti- According to H The argument is that national governments find it in tutions is considered much more peripheral. :able about the pa their interest to hand over certain (regulatory) func- 999: 60) and fi . tions in order to make cooperation work more effec- ,:-",litical will to tively (that is, to make the commitments they have "Neill 1996: 63 " entered into more credible). This emphasis on dele- »-cr- did little more gation colours how intergovernmentalists under- • Intergovernmentalism has been influenced by realist of the nation stand the role of the EU's institutions. Rather than and neo-realist assumptions that privilege the role of - on a Europe:an the state and national interest in explaining European assuming that these institutions are capable of play- only did it i" integration (or cooperation). ing an independent or autonomous role within the ich Europe:an European integration process, intergovernmentalists • Intergovernmentalists believe that sovereignty rests zgued, it also missed •• with the EU's member states, although it may be in tend to stress that the so-called supranational actors, - ·encesthat werl states' interests to share/pool sovereignty and to del- the Commission in particular, are little more than the egate it to European-Ievel institutions. ....cei.. ved their in servants of the member states. While these institu- ~ ide:a of 'the I zeferred elogie - . t by statin ,.:iaJ.ectie of ~ Hoffmann and his critics . This cm-~ ---ue context ni n...I Intergovernmentalism, as a theory of European Ministers (now the EU Council) and institutional- factors integration, emerged in the mid 1960s, from a cri- ized the European Council as key decision mak ationals}"stem'" tique of neo-functionalist theory (see Chapter 5) within the Community (O'Neill 1996: 57-9), rable and as a reaction to federalist assumptions that the pointed to the limits of supranationalism and to European Community (EC) would eventually continued prirnacy of state actors in European poli transform itself into a fully-fledged state. By the end tics. That the Commission began to play a mo of the 1960s it had become the dominant paradigm cautious role post 1966 than it had done in the e used to explain European integration, replacing the years of the EC was also an important factor su earlier neo-functionalist orthodoxy and reflecting porting the intergovernmental thesis. more accurately, it seemed, the practice ofEuropean It was Stanley Hoffmann who laid the fo integration by that time. After the then French dations of the intergovernmentalist approaeh President General Charles de Gaulle's 'boycott' of European integration. Most of the state-cen the European institutions in mid 1965, his so-called variants of integration theory of the 1970s 'empty chair policy', and the signing of the accord afterwards drew on his work. Hoffmann's interg which carne to be known as the Luxembourg ernmentalism began by rejeeting neo-function Compromise in early 1966 (see Chapter 2), a tide theory, claiming that in eoncentrating on the pro turned in the history of European integration. The of European integration, neo-funetionalists persistence of the national veto post 1966, instabil- forgotten the context within which it was t ity in the international political economy, and insti- place (Rosamond 2000: 76). More specifi tutional changes which privileged the Council of Hoffmann rejected neo-functionalist claims Intergovernmentalism 91

European integration was driven by a sort of their significance. National sovereignty and the snowball effect known as spillover (see Chapter 5), nation state were being tamed and altered, he guing that this was more an 'act of faith' than a argued, but the latter was not being superseded roven facto He stressed that international politics (Hoffmann 1966: 910-11); and while the national mained charaeterized by a perpetual conflict over dimension may well have seemed less important in terests (O'Neill1996: 61). the immediate post-1945 period than it had in ear- According to Hoffmann, there was nothing inevi- lier times, it had not taken long for states to reassert ble about the path of European integration (Cram themselves (Hoffmann 1995: 867-9). Indeed, 999: 60) and neither was there evidence of any national states had proven themselves extremely litical will to create a federal state in Europe resilient actors in international politics (O'Neill O'Neill1996: 63). If anything, the federalist rheto- 1996: 60). 'The nation -state is still here, and the new . did little more than highlight the enduring qual- Ierusalern has been postponed because the nations ies of the nation state, in that it sought to replicate in Western Europe have not been able to stop time on a European scale. As for neo-functionalism, and to fragment space' (Hoffmann 1966: 863). Thus, t only did it ignore the global context within from the title of one of his best-known articles, he .ch European integration was occurring, he claimed the nation state to be 'obstina te' not 'obso- ed, it also missed the importance of cultural dif- lete' (Hoffmann 1966). Despite the fact that societal ences that were continuing to influence how states changes posed real challenges for the nation state, eeived their interests. Thus Hoffmann contrasted state governments remained powerful for two rea- idea of 'the logic of integration' against his own sons: first, because they held legal sovereignty over ferred 'logie of diversity; hammering home the their own territory; and second, because they pos- int by stating that European integration involved sessed politicallegitimacy, as they were democrati- dialectic of fragmentation and unity (Hoffmann callyelected (George and Bache 2001: 13). 6). This diversity was a consequence of the Although he recognized the successes ofEuropean ique context of internal domestic politics, and of cooperation, its distinctive characteristics, and the bal factors (that is, the situation of the state in the possibility that it may produce more than zero-sum ernational system), both of which contributed to outcomes (Hoffmann 1995: 4), Hoffmann argued orable centrifugal forces placing limits on that the events of the 1960s highlighted the differences opean integration (Rosamond 2000: 76). between member states as much as pointing to Hoffmann's intergovernmentalism offered a 'sys- common interests. This was an important argument, atic contextualization' (Rosamond 2000: 75) of since 'preference convergence' was deemed a prereq- events of the mid 1960s, drawing on empirical uisite for European integration. Thus where states dies of French presidential politics under met with uncertainty, and as supranational institu- ident Charles de Gaulle. ln this sense it was tions began to develop agendas of their own, national ueh more than just an application of realist theory governrnents would respond by going their own way. the European Community case. Indeed, Hoffmann's starting point was the political rather ffmann's view was that in the post-1945 period, than the technocratic (Rosamond 2000: 78). Crucial ion states were dealing with regional issues in in this account was the distinction that he made . different ways than had earlier been the case. between high and low politics. Whereas high politics . e he accepted that traditional, exclusive notions (the political sphere) was said to touch on national overeignty were now obsolete, and that there sovereignty and issues of national identity, low poli- a blurring of the boundaries between the tics (the economic sphere) tended to be more tech- ional state and international organizations nocratic and much less controversial. According to offmann 1966: 908), this did not mean that Hoffmann, there were clear boundaries between ion states and national governments had lost more dramatic economic integration possible in 92 Michelle Cini areas oflow politics, and the 'impermeable' and very single currency and the common foreign and 'political' domain ofhigh politics (O'Neill1996: 61), rity policy, point in that direction as well. In where integration would not occur. While func- since the 1960s, Hoffrnann has softened his line tional spillover might occur in the former, there this issue, accepting that there are limits to the could be no assumption that states would allow it to fulness of the traditional distinction between be transferred to the latter. and high politics. Although Hoffrnann's analysis was based very Hoffrnann was also criticized for playing generally upon realist assumptions, he differed from the constraints imposed on states as a consequ realists in his approach to the concept of the state. of their increasing 'interdependence' (O'Neilll Indeed we might say that: 65; see Box 6.3). Moreover, it was argued that failed to take into consideration the novelty and {EY POINT~ , , Hoffmann's intergovernmental position was more complexity of the European integration p - sophisticatedthan that of realists ... and his politicalaware- The EC, it was claimed, was about more than ness wasalso greater than that ofthe neo-functionalistwrit- the creation of a regional regime, and bar: ers whotended to adopt a rather simplifiedpluralistviewof struck at European level could not simply be red politicalprocesses., , to a set of national interests (Rosamond 2000: (Georgeand Bache 2001: 13).

To Hoffrnann states were more than just 'black boxes'; they represented communities of identity and belonging: Interdependence and intergovernmentalism

, , [T]heyare constructs in which ideas and ideais,prec- Interdependence theory emerged in the 19705,its edents and politicalexperiencesand domesticforcesand rul- proponents being Robert Keohane and Joseph (1975).ltsmain influenceon intergovernmentalism ers aliplaya role. , , to set it in a broader context than had earlier been (Hoffmann 1995: 5). case. It was argued that 'Manyof the factors that influenced... [the]development[ofthe EC)haveap Hoffrnann was particularly critical of the earlier to it alone, but many have no!' (Nugent 1999: 511 other words,in many instanceswhat we might con theorists of European integration who had adopted to be the effects of Europeanintegration are really a simplistic and unrealistic view of how govern- effects of a much wider phenomenon. Changesto ments defined their interests. He argued that these internationalpoliticaleconomy-international m interests were not reducible to power and place izationin particular-have ledto greater and greater alone (Hoffrnann 1995: 5), but were calculated on eisof interdependence,and these havechangedthe in whichstates and other non-state actors relateto the basis of various historical, cultural, and indeed other in the internationalsphere (Nugent1999:511). political concerns. However, Hoffrnann's intergovernmentalism has Whileinterdependence theory cannot reallybe co ered a discrete theory of European integration,it been subject to a number of critiques. Many of these add to our understanding ofthe backgroundcondi' involved a rejection of his rigid demarcation that facilitate or constrain the integration process, between high and low politics (O'Neill 1996: 65). helpsto makethe point that the ECmight not be q Even in the 1970s, there were claims that the exist- as unique as some (suchas the neo-functionalists) ence of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the claimed.Whileit highlightsthe fact that states may alwaysbe able to act unconstrained withinthe inte forerunner to today's European foreign policy (see tional system,it is best viewedas a responseto a Chapter 15), and an area of'high politics', seemed to specificweaknessin intergovernmentalism,rectified disprove this particular aspect ofhis theory. Similarly, an increasingemphasison the globaldimension. recent events, most notably the establishment of the Intergovernmentalism 93

e Hoffmann's intergovernmentalism was not taken in the field of integration theory from the ory in any systematic sense (Church 1996: 1970s onwards. Thus, accepting the limits of but was, rather, part of an approach which Hoffmann's approach as it was constructed in the with the wider phenomenon of regional 1960s did not mean opting for a supranational ration, it was extremely influential in shap- theory of integration. Rather, it allowed the door the way scholars of European integration to be opened to new variants of intergovernmen- ght about the (then) European Community. talism, some of which are dealt with in the section ch it set the agenda for future research under- that follows.

StanleyHoffmann was the key proponent of intergov- • Critics have questioned Hoffmann's use of the high/ ernmentalism in the mid 1960s. His work on French, low politics distinction, based on empirical evidence European,and international politicsled him to critique (such as recent moves towards foreign policy integra- the workofthe neo-functionalists. tion) and for not taking into consideration the novelty and the complexityofthe Europeanintegrationproject. Hoffmanndistinguishedbetween high and lowpolitics, However,his approach has been extremelyinfluentiaL arguingthat whilefunctional integrationmight be possible in less controversialareas (the economic sphere), states would resist any incursion into areas of high politics(the politicalsphere).

eyond classical intergovernmentalism

section presents some examples of how of a common institutional framework (O'Neill ffmann's intergovernmentalism has been sup- 1996: 71). O'Neill calls it the antithesis of federal- ented and adapted since the 1960s. While set- ism, a concert of sovereign states. Wallace stresses aside for the moment the most important that there must be no assumption that confedera- ple of this adaptation (liberal intergovern- tion willlead ultimately to unity. Rather, it implies talisrn), which is dealt with later in the chapter, that the 'Community is stuck, between sovereignty section first deals with confederalism; second, and integration' (w. Wallace 1982: 65). the 'domestic politics approach' to European Confederal approaches draw attention to the gration; and finally with a number of analyses institutionalized nature of the European integration t have sought to explain how states beco me process, recognizing (in contrast to intergovernmen- ed into the European integration processo talism) its distinctiveness. Along similar lines, Paul Taylor (1975) has argued that confederation (or confederalism) is a helpful supplement to intergovernmentalism, allowing us to move beyond its inherent a model or framework for European integration, constraints, while retaining its state-centric core. In idea of confederation (Forsyth 1981) seems this respect, Wallace points to the importance of sely allied to intergovernmentalism. A confeder- supranationalJinternational law in differentiating ion may be viewed as a particular type of confederalism from intergovernmentalism. Taylor tergovernmental arrangement, in which national puts it rather differently. He suggests that '[ t1he vereignty remains intact despite the establishment salient feature of confederal Europe is that the scope 94 Michelle Cini

of integration is extensive ... but the level of integra- depth case studies of the European policy P' tion is low' (Taylor 1975: 343). Moreover '[tlhe which allowed researchers to establish varia' Europe of this Confederal phase of integration is ... patterns of policy rnaking, ernphasizing the .. decentralized but highly interdependent, potentially between the national and supranational dim autarchic but in practice united by intense practices of European politics. Bulmer was particularly of consultation' (Taylor 1975: 343). It is also charac- ested in two dirnensions of dornestic politics: terized, he claims, bythe defensive posture of national making structures and attitudes towards governrnents against the further extension of the (Bulrner 1983). powers of supranational actors, by an interpenetra- There are a number of elernents involved . tion of European politics into the domestic sphere, approach, which when taken together pro - and by an oscillation between advanced proposals frarnework for analysing the behaviour of rn for integration and retreats into national independ- states. First, the national polity was conside ence. Much of this argument is state-centric, with basic unit of the EC/ED. Second, each national Taylor arguing that the nation state is likely to be was acknowledged to be different in terms strengthened through confederation. As such it adds unique socio-econornic characteristics; and it to intergovernmentalist understandings ofEuropean these differences that shaped national int integration by characterizing the frarnework within Third, European policy was deemed to be only which cooperation and integration take place. facet of national political activity. Fourth, the na . polity lay at the juncture of national and Em politics. And finally, an important lens The damestic pai itics which one rnight understand these elernents was appraach of the 'policy style' concept (Bulmer 1983: 360," The importance of the dornestic politics app In the 1970s and 1980s, an approach that focused on is that it demonstrated how intergovernmen domestic politics and policy making becarne fashion- had failed to look in any coherent way within able in the field of European integration studies. member states when analysing the European . Although not a theory of European integration per gration process (Bulmer 1983). Although it se, the approach was critical of intergovernmental- stated earlier in this chapter that intergover isrn's failure to capture the transnational nature of the talism is closely related to (neo- )realism EC policy process (Church 1996: 26) and sought, as a international relations, newer variants of interg consequence, to focus attention on the impact of ernrnentalism have also been greatly influenced dornestic politics on EC policy making (Bulrner neo-liberal ideas. Neo-liberalism, as an approach 1983). In this we can identify the origins of what today the study of international relations, is conce would be called the 'Europeanization' literature (see with the formation of state preferences (Rosamo Chapter 25). We rnight also see this approach as one 2000: 135) or 'national interests'. Whereas n that links Hoffrnann's intergovernrnentalism to later realism is focused exclusively on politics betw state-centric research projects-and particularly to nations, neo-liberalism draws attention to the o liberal intergovernrnentalisrn (Rosarnond 2000: 76). tent of the 'black box' of domestic politics and . The idea behind the dornestic politics approach to address frorn where national interests origina was that it was said to be impossible to understand It therefore places the national polity, rather th the European Comrnunitywithout taking dornestic just national executives, or governments, at politics into consideration (Bulmer 1983). Thus heart of the European integration project. Althou Bulmer sought to identify the domestic deterrni- the influence of neo-liberal ideas in the domes- nants of preference forrnation (Rosarnond 2000: politics approach may not be explicit or direct, tbe 80). One way of doing this was to undertake in- concerns are very much the sarne. This is a poi

..,..-'~.. , . ,"', .A -- . Intergovernmentalism 95 will be picked up again when we come to look lost the ability to act autonomously, blurring the e work of Andrew Moravcsik. lines of accountability and responsibility that con- nect citizens to the state. He claims that it is increas- e 'locking-in' of states ingly difficult to reverse these trends without drastic action being taken. more recent example of how intergovernmen- Also grounded in state-centrism, Fritz Scharpf has evolved, a number of analyses explain (1988) drew an analogy between German federal- states have become locked into the European ism and the European Community. He did this to ation processo These draw heavily on a partic- explain how European integration has beco me . German approach to the study of federalism, almost irreversible because of the intense institu- ich 'interlocking politics' (Politikverflectung), tionalization to which it has been subject. Like cterizes interactions between different levels Wessels, Scharpf focuses on how EC decision mak- vernrnent (Risse-Kappen 1996: 60-1). While ing offered states the ability to solve problems jointly. approaches rest on state-centric premises, they He argues, however, that the outcomes of these deci- e quite far beyond classical intergovernmental- sions are likely to be suboptimal, in that they do not and show how European integration is about emerge from any assessment of the best available more than inter-state bargains. ln the process, solutions, but are reached through a process of bar- . emphasize the importance of institutional fac- gaining which inevitably leads to compromises ee Chapter 7) and show how intergovernmen- being struck. In other words, as national interests ideas may provide a starting point from which determine policy positions, creative (and rational) arguments about and analyses of the European problem solving is not possible (Scharpf 1988: ation process develop. 255). As such, no member state is likely to be .olfgang Wessels (1997) has advanced an argu- entirely satisfied by what the process of integration t about European integration that rests soundly has to offer. This is something that will contribute over te-centric premises in that it sees national time to the slowing down of European integration. ts as the primary driving force of integration. Yet the institutionalization of the decision-making , however, links 'integration processes to the process means that retreating from integration is tion of the state' (Wessels 1997: 274-5). He not an option. As such, states are trapped in a this his 'fusion thesis'. ln this approach, Community from which they cannot escape, ls argues that after 1945, West European states in a paradox characterized by Scharpf as 'frustra- e increasingly responsible for the welfare of tion without disintegration and resilience without citizens, enhancing their legitimacy as a conse- progress' (Scharpf 1988: 256), which he labels a e. But for the welfare state to persist, national 'joint decision trap'. omies needed to be strong. ln order to main- More recently, historical institutionalists have economic growth to this end, states recognized sought to explain how states become locked into need to open up their markets, which led gov- the European integration process through a process ents to rely more and more on the joint man- of path dependence. The argument, advocated by ent of shared policy problems. This is what Paul Pierson (1998) amongst others, is that the ls means when he talks of the 'fusion' of the more states integrate, the more future options European states (1997: 273)-in essence a become constrained (see Chapter 7). While this er of public resources located at several state does not imply an inevitability about the 'process' whereby steering instruments are increasingly of integration, it does mean that the only way of in concert' (Wessels 1997: 274). This amounts escaping from further integration is by provoking a uch more than a pooling of sovereignties. As dramatic break with past practice, a so-called 'critical have become more interdependent, they have juncture'. 96 Michelle Cini

.:oordination. The ::rawn from the ' • Confederalismcomplements intergovernmentalism,by • Wessels'sfusionthesis,Scharpfs joint decisiontrap urnes that states acknowledgingthe institutionalized character of the Pierson's path dependence explain how states ha at the actions of EuropeanCommunity. overtime, become lockedintothe Europeanintegrar zrilizing what are o processo • Thedomestic politicsapproachclaimedthat it isirnpos- eans of achievin sibleto study European integrationwithout lookingat true intergove policymakingwithinthe member states. .eimportance o bile national t reflect domesticPII de by the El.l o: amongst stat a lowest-commee-ê Liberal intergovernmentalism its placed on zarional agents, and its critics ,he broad lin 55 reflect three In 1988, Robert Putnam published an influential Moravcsik's Liberal rantage, the relatilll article in which he explored the dynamics of domes- t governments tic and international politics using the metaphor of Intergovern mental ism cedibility of in 'two-level games' (Putnam 1988). To explain this : 3). When Since the early 1990s,Andrew Moravcsik's theory concept we need to understand that 'two-level liberal intergovernmentalism has become one of- games' are played by states. The first game deals with not the-most important account of the Euro how states define their policy preferences (or integration processo It has become a touchst national interest) at home within the domestic envi- against which ali integration theory is now jud ronment. The second game is played on the interna- 'a model of parsimony and clarity' (Risse- Kap tional stage and involves the striking of inter-state 1996: 63), even for those who do not agree with . bargains. assumptions, its methods, or its conclusio Putnam's core point is that national executives Drawing on and developing earlier intergove play games in two arenas more or less simultane- mentalist insights, it offers a theoretical appr, ously At the domestic level, power-seek.ing/enhancing office holders aim to build coalitions of support that is much more rigorous than its antecede among domestic groups. At the internationallevel, (George and Bache 2001: 13), incorporating wi the same actors seek to bargain in ways that enhance it both realist and neo-liberal elements (Rosamo their positions domestically bymeeting the demands 2000: 136), and dealing explicitly with the inte of key domestic constituents (Rosamond 2000: between domestic and international politics. It

136). 'initially presented as a framework for synthesi o Putnam's main aim was that of providing a theories into a coherent account of large EU d framework for analysing the myriad entanglements sions taken under unanimity, though it can involved in domestic-international interactions applied to other types of decisions as weli' (DO (Putnam 1988: 433). This image of the two-Ievel 2000: 280). game is helpful in that it provides a starting point The European Union is identified as a success for understanding Moravcsik's influential theory of intergovernmental regime designed to manage e liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). nomic interdependence through negotiated po' o Intergovernmentalism 97

rdination. The theory is based on assumptions arising out of inter-state negotiations, are irnpor- drawn from the 'rational actor model', in that it tant in understanding European integration out- umes that states behave rationally, 'which means comes. To explain the link between the demand and at the actions of states are assumed to be based on supply sides, the theory is divided into three steps, Idilizing what are judged to be the most appropriate each of which is explained by a different set of fac- eans of achieving their goals' (Nugent 1999: 509). tors (and drawing on different theories): economic true intergovernmentalist fashion, LI emphasizes interest; relative power; and credible commitments irnportance of the preferences and power of states. (Moravcsik 1998: 4) . . e national politicians embody state interests First, drawing on liberal theories of national pref- t reflect domestic policy preferences, all decisions erence formation, and applying a domestic politics de by the EU are ultimately the result ofbargain- approach, Moravcsik shows how 'state goals can be amongst states.Agreements are (usually) reached shaped by domestic pressures and interactions a lowest-common-denominator basis, with clear which in turn are often conditioned by the con- .ts placed on the transfer of sovereignty to supra- straints and opportunities that derive from eco- tional agents. Thus, according to Moravcsik, nomic interdependence' (Nugent 1999: 509). Thus he broad lines of European integration since he identifies underlying societal factors that pro- - 5 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial voke an international demand for cooperation. antage, the relative bargaining power of impor- National political institutions are subject to myriad t governments, and the incentives to enhance the pressures from nationally based interests, provok- ibility of inter-state commitment' (Moravcsik ing a process of preference formation. State prefer- 8: 3). When economic or commercial concerns ences are formed, and these feed into inter-state verge, integration takes place. negotiations, as groups compete with each other for There are two separate dirnensions to LI: the sup- the attention of government elites. To put it another ide and the demand side. The argument is that way, policy preferences at national level are con- the demand for cooperation, which derives strained by the interests of dominant, usually the national polity, and the supply of integration, economic, groups within society. Resting on a very

re 6.1 The liberal intergavernmentalist framewark of analysis

Liberaltheories Intergovernmental theories (Internationaldemand for outcomes) (lnternatianalsupplyof outcomes)

Underlyni gsocietalfactors: Underlyingpoliticalfactors: • Pressurefromdomesticsocietal • Intensityof nationalpreferences actorsas representedin • Alternativecoalitions politicalinstitutions • Availableissuelinkages

Nationalpreference Configurationof state Interstatenegotiation formation preferences ~ outcomes 98 Michelle Cini pluralistic understanding of state-society relations, restrictive range of possible integration out national governments end up representing these Yet Moravcsik accepts that inter-state barg . interests in international forurns. Thus Moravcsik lead on occasion to positive-surn outcom sees national interests as derived from the domestic 1999: 15).As a consequence, governments . politics of the member states and not the 'sovereign gain hard to gain the upper hand. Not surpri state's perception of its relative position in the states the power of individual states is very impo system' (Rosamond 2000: 137), that is, from geo- determining whose interests matter. And as political concerns. As Moravcsik has claimed: 'the Moravcsik focuses his attention largely 00 vital interest behind General de Gaulle's opposition preferences of the largest EU states: UK, F to British membership in the EC ... was not the and Germany. ln stressing the point that in pursuit of French grandeur but the price of French tion benefits states, that states face few cons wheat (Moravcsik 1998: 7). in the Council, and that inter-state negoti The second and supply-side strand of LI is based enhance their domestic autonorny, the iss on intergovernmentalist theories of inter-state rela- why governments engage in European inte tions, with European integration supplied by inter- when it might otherwise seem like an irra' governmental bargains (such as treaty reforms) thing to do is addressed by this part of the (Moravcsik 1998: 7). This part ofLI 'draws on gen- (Rosamond 2000: 138). eral theories of bargaining and negotiation to The third element within LI is that of in argue that relative power among states is shaped tional delegation. The argument here is that . above all by asymmetrical interdependence, which national (European) institutions are set dictates the relative value of agreement to different improve the efficiency of inter-state bargai governments' (Moravcsik 1998: 7). Thus, this sec- 'To secure the substantive bargains they had ond element in the theory emphasizes the central- ... governments delegated and pooled soverei ity of strategic bargaining among states and the in international institutions for the expres importance of governmental elites in shaping pose of committing one another to coop inter-state relations. At this point, states are con- (Moravcsik 1998: 3-4). Thus, the European . sidered as unitary actors, and supranational institutions create linkages and compromises a tutions are deemed to have a very limited impact issues, where decisions have been made under on outcomes. In other words, the theory focuses ditions of uncertainty, and where non-compli mainly on the European and EU Councils. This would be a temptation. In other words, in generally involves a two-stage process of negotia- tional delegation reflects the desire for 'cre tion. First governments must resolve the policy commitments'. problems that confront them, taking decisions to In this respect Moravcsik's work has been . that effect; and only second do they try to reach enced by the liberal institutionalism of R, agreement on institutional mechanisms that would Keohane (1989). Keohane views institutions as allow them to implement those decisions. The of facilitating positive-surn bargaining ('upgra process by which states engage in inter-state the common interest') among states, but claims bargaining is important. Various strategies and there is no evidence that supranational instituti techniques, such as 'coalitional alternatives to bias the outcomes of decisions away from agreernent; the linking of issues and threats of longer-term self-interest of the member s exclusion and inclusion, shape outcomes. A bar- (Rosamond 2000: 143). In line with this sort gaining space (a sort ofwindow of opportunity) is thinking, according to Moravcsik, 'The entrep formed out of the amalgamation of national inter- neurship of supranational officials ... tends to ests, with the final agreement determining the dis- futile and redundant, even sometimes counterp tribution of gains and losses. This points to the ductive (Moravcsik 1998: 8). Intergovernmentalism 99

and that the delegation of decision-rnaking authority to supranational institutions reflected the wishes of governments to ensure that commitments madewere adhered to (George and Bache 2001: 14). n his book The Choice for Europe, Andrew Moravcsik In short, Moravcsik is arguing that: 'European inte- applies his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism to gration can best be explained as a series of rational tive cases in the history of the European integration processo choices made by national leaders' (Moravcsik 1998: 18).

1. The negotiation ofthe Treaty of Rome (1955 -8) 2. The consolidation of the common market and the Critiques of Liberal Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (1958-69) Intergovern mental ism 3. Monetary Cooperation and the setting up of the European Monetary System (EMS) (1969 -83) Although Moravcsik's theory ofliberal intergovern-

4. The negotiation of the Single European Act (SEA) mentalism (LI) has been subject to criticism, there (1984-8) is no doubt that it remains an extremely useful way to organize data and to construct empirical studies. S. The negotiation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1988-91). At the same time, it presents a serious challenge for competing models that seek to explain the European each case, Moravcsik-drawing on secondary historical and some documentary sources-argues that what integration process (Rosamond 2000: 145). This is was important in driving elite support for European inte- largely because liberal intergovernmentalism has gration was national economic interest. This line of argu- been said to offer an 'almost uncompromising ent was contrary to conventional wisdom usually put framework' (Nugent 1999: 510), which can be hard, ard by historians at the time that geopolitical fac- if not impossible, to reconcile with alternative inter- rs were what mattered most in explaining European pretations of European integration and EU politics. egration. Moravcsik makes the case that geopolitics, such as France's pursuit of a policy of grandeur, though Perhaps the most often repeated criticism ofLI is not irrelevant, were merely a secondary consideration as that it simply does not fit the facts. This tends to be tional governments established their bargaining posi- argued on the basis of empirical analyses and spe- ns on history-making decisions. cific case studies of EU politics. This is, however, part of a related criticism, which is that Moravcsik's work has toa narrow a focus to be called a theory of ether, these three elements result in integration European integration, as it is 'too selective with his comes (treaty change, for example). Applying empirical references when seeking to demonstrate theory to actual cases in the history of European the validity of ... [the] framework in the EU con- egration, Moravcsik carne to the following context' (Nugent 1999: 510). In other words, thus far Íons. First, he concluded that the major choices liberal intergovernmentalism has been applied only de in favour of European integration were a to those cases that will (almost inevitably) result in ection of the preferences of national govern- proving that the theory is correct.1t has been claimed ts and not of supranational organizations. by Scharpf (1999: 165), for example, that applying ond, he stressed that these national preferences the theory to cases of intergovernmental negotiation, ected a balance of domestic economic interests, where economic integration is the main concern er than any political bias of politicians or and where decisions were taken on the basis of tional strategic security concerns. Finally, he unanimous voting in the Council, will invariably ed that the outcomes of the negotiations lead to the conclusions that Moravcsik reaches. ected the relative bargaining power of the states, 'Given this focus for his attention, it is hardly 100 Michelle Cini surprising that Moravcsik comes to the view that Third, and highly important as a critique the EC is primarily motivated by the aggregation eral intergovernmentalism, is that the theory and conciliation of national interests' (Wincott states the constraints faced by key policy 1995: 602). However, in 'h arder' cases, where inter- The case of the single market programme is national negotiations are not the primary form of used to back up this argument. There are, ho decision taking, and where majority voting applies, a number of dimensions to this general LI may not produce such clear-cut results. First, it is frequently argued that Moravcsik The critique is often set out in the following way: down to too great an extent the role of su that Moravcsik's theory may well apply for the tional actors within the European integration majority of 'history-making' decisions (Peterson ess. ln other words, he does not provide a full 1995) which deal with the future ofEuropean inte- account of the supply side of his model when gration: that is, high profile policy steps of major ing solely on inter-state negotiations. As the constitutional significance, which often involve the European Commission and the European treaty change and occur through inter-state negoti- of Iustice (ECn are deemed relatively unim ations (Wincott 1995: 602). However, LI is much if not entirely irrelevant in terms of poli less able to explain the way in which the EU works in comes, their interests and strategies do not matters of day-to-day politics. particularly strongly in Moravcsik's work. The second criticism that is often made of assumption about the supranational insti Moravcsik's work is that his conception of the state potential influence over integration outcomes is a rather narrow one. Liberal intergovernmental- at times in history-making decisions) has been ism pays little attention to the way in which the tested by many academics. 'state' may be broken down into its component Moravcsik's portrayal of the Commission as parts. Critics argue that in order to understand fully cising a role oflittle more than a facilitator in how governrnental positions (or preferences) are of significant decision making has attracted determined (Nugent 1999: 510), a more subtle anal- ular criticism, with numerous empirically ysis of domestic politics is required. lndeed, as studies claiming to show that the Commission George and Bache (2001: 14) claim: ' ... in some exercise an independent and influential d ways it [LI] was less sophisticated in its account of making role, be it as animateur, a policy en domestic politics than was that suggested by neur, or a motor force (Nugent 1999: 510-11). Hoffmann'. In Moravcsik's pluralist or liberal view, Cram (1994), for example, has provided ernpi the primary determinant of government prefer- evidence of how the Commission has been ences is the balance between economic interests influence policy outcomes, by means of its (George and Bache 2001: 14). But in practice, there entrepreneurship. Wincott (1994) and Burley is a huge range of diverse influences that are likely to Mattli (1993) have highlighted the ECJ's impa impinge on national preference formation. European integration through its innovative Risse- Kappen (1996: 63) points, for example, to the rulings in cases such as those pertaining to h potential importance of the impact of domestic rights (seealso Chapter 11). Pollack'sanalysis (1 structures. On this basis, Moravcsik's account is toa has shown how, despite the fact that suprana . simplistic when it focuses solely on economic and institutions tend to operate within the boun (to a lesser extent) geo-political concerns (Wincott set by member state preferences, they are ab 1995: 600-1). Moreover, it is argued that the two- exploit the differences between these preferen level game metaphor does not depict the reality of order to promote their own independent agend EU politics today-and that the EU is now much Rosamond (2000: 143) points out, this adds an . more of a multi-Ievel than a two-level polity (see tutional dimension to intergovernrnentalism, w Chapter 7). retaining many of its core characteristics. Intergovernmentalism 101

A similar point also applies to non-state 'transna- Ç1 CASE STUDY 6.5 tional' actors, such as European fums and European interest groups. Cowles (1995) has demonstrated, for The Maastricht Treaty and the UK's bargaining example, the importance of business groups in the position: a critique of liberal 19805 in influencing the single market project (see intergove rn me ntal ism o Chapter 16). While she accepts that these groups In an interesting article published in 1998, Anthony ere not the sole cause of the ' 1992' programme: Forster sought to test the liberal intergovernmentalist (LI)thesis in three policy cases, each ofwhich relates to , [I]ntergovernmental theory cannot explain the activi- the UK's role in the negotiation ofthe Maastricht Treaty s ofthe keynon-state actors in the 1992 processoThe single (Forster 1998). The three dossiers covered in the article rket programme was not merely the result of conventional were (a)social policy; (b)foreign and security policy;and ecraft. Nor were Member States' actions predicated solely (c) increasing the powers of the European Parliament. the basis of domestically defined interest group activity,as The article, which is grounded in the empirical study of ggested bya recent version ofintergovernmentalism [LI]. the three cases, casts doubt on LI's explanation of eed, the story of the ERT [European Round Table of national preference formation. It also questions the extent to which governments always act as purposive ustrialists] points to the fact that non-state actors-and in and instrumental actors; whilst challenging the LIcon- icular, multinational enterprises-also play two-Ievel ception of bargaining. es in ECpolicy making , , Moreover, in a critical final paragraph, Forster states wles 1995: 521 - 2). that:

. point is not just about which actors and insti- ... this article can only conclude by expressing serious ions matter in the process of European decision doubts about LI'sambitious claim to provide a parsimo- . g. It also reflects Moravcsik's emphasis on the nious predictive and explanatory theory. From a meth- re formal aspects of that process, at the expense odological perspective, the theoretical approach is sim- the informal, 'behind-the-scenes' dimension. If ply toa complex, often requiring unknowable or ormal politics matter in shaping policy outcomes, nonexistent information, to provide a 'toolkit'for explain- may mean that actors who appear on the sur- ingand predictingthe actions of governments (Anderson to be responsible for decision taking may not 1995). Above ali, however, LI'sempirical foundations are y be in control of the processo As Wincott has weak. In particular its inadequate conceptualization of ed-again of the single market case-' ... the the state raises very large question marks over the value of an approach consciously 'derived independently of 'c, innovative policy techniques required for the the matter being studied', rather than based on empiri- al market programme had been fashioned in cal evidence (Moravcsik 1993: 477). In the final analysis, daily work of the supranational institutions long LIis thus perhaps best regarded less as a theory of inter- re the Member States considered these issues' governmental bargaining, than as pre-theory or analyti- 5: 606). As such, the substance of inter-state cal framework. It provides some very useful insights but, tiations had already been framed well before as empirical testing proves, it must be supplemented by overnmental conferences and European sum- other models in order to explain fully how and why a met to take their formal decisions (see also Box government chooses among various outcornes. Similarly, which argues some similar points from the per- other models are needed to explain the determinants of ive of a number of different cases). politicians' choices among competing alternatives. The Finally, Wincott has criticized LI for not being a irony is that, like neo-functionalism, LI's aspiration to ry, at least in his understanding of the termo He generality ultimately renders it 'oddly apolitical' this claim, as he believes that a rigorous the- (Moravcsik 1993: 477). ought to spell out the conditions under which it Source: Forster(1998). t be refuted or disproved. Wincott argues that 102 Michelle Cini

LI does not do this, but engages in an act of closure institutional delegation) to provide a 'pre-th on certain types of argument about European inte- 'analytical framework' (Forster 1998: 365) gration. As such, he claims that LI should be consid- be applied to the European integration proo ered an 'approach' rather than a theory-one which surprisingly, these points, along with all the brings together three existing theories (preference mentioned above, are vehemently reject formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and Moravcsik .

• Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a tripartite is mainly powerful domestic economic interests explanationof integrativeoutcomes: as national prefer- determine national interest. ence formation; inter-statebargaining;and institutional • Moravcsikiscriticizedforfocusingonlyon'histo delegation. decisions'(treatychange in particular)and for i • The theory supplements a rich account of bargaining day-to-daypoliticsand the multi-Ievelcharacter insidethe Council,witha concernfor hownationalinter- EuropeanUnion. ests(orpreferences)areformed.Moravcsikarguesthat it

Conclusion: The future of intergovern mental ism

This chapter has reviewed the general approach to developments within the study of the E European integration known as 'intergovernmental- Union have tested the resilience of intergove ism' Associated in its classical form with the work of talist arguments. Yet intergovernmentalism has Stanley Hoffmann, the chapter has shown how inter- flexible enough to adapt to new conditions and governrnentalist premises (and more specifically,state- theories that appearto resonatewith today's EI centrism) have provided the foundations for a range of integration process, whether in the fo theories and models that have sought to specify the Moravcsik's 'liberal' variant of the theory, structure of the EC, the nature of decision making, and Schimmelfennig's account of liberal interg the 'locking-in' of states within the European integra- mentalism as a partial explanation of the e tion processoAndrew Moravcsik's work now provides ment case (2004) (see Box 6.5). As we shall see i the core of the intergovernrnentalist thesis, one that next chapter, there are many who contest the (li allies intergovernmentalism to neo-liberalism. intergovernmentalist account of European in But what future might we imagine for intergov- tion. But for anyone wishing to study the EU, it ernmentalism? While it continues to provide inspi- an important contribution to our understan ration for scholars of European integration, new what European integration is or might be.