STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY Department of Economic History and International Relations Master’s Thesis in International Relations with specialization in GPE Spring Term 2021

Student: Tobias Michael Eichinger Supervisor: Stephanie Winkler

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN DEFENCE - EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP AFTER BREXIT THROUGH A MECHASIM-BASED APPROACH

Abstract

The Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) of the European Union has experienced a surprisingly active period shortly after the Brexit referendum which led to various initiatives that moved the Union towards more integration in defence and security. This thesis investigates the development of CSDP after Brexit through an explaining-outcome process tracing approach. The activities of France, Germany, and the EU from mid-2016 until the end of 2017 have been traced to reach a detailed account of what has happened in European politics during that time. It was found that common International Relations (IR) and European Integration studies theoretic frameworks like neorealism or intergovernmentalism reach their explanatory limits for this specific historic case. The empirical work has identified three key factors responsible for the move towards more integration: urgency, falling forward and a window of opportunity. These three factors were found to have worked together in influencing the activities of the three examined actors. Additionally, the empirical material points towards a combination of both ideational and material factors that have played a role in the development of CSDP after Brexit.

Keywords

CSDP, European Union, Process-Tracing, Brexit, Defence, Window of Opportunity

II Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my supervisor Stephanie Winkler for her vital support during these last couple of months, especially in times of doubt on how to proceed best. Her advice played an important role in the successful completion of my master thesis. A distinct thanks must also go out to two of my fellow students who encouraged my work and provided insightful ideas for discussion. Besides their academic collaboration they have also made the more stressful periods easier through much needed fun and distraction. Furthermore, I would like to thank my family who enabled me to pursue a master’s degree abroad in Stockholm and supported me in countless ways over the last two years. Even though it turned out quite differently to what I had pictured beforehand due to a pandemic that flipped life upside down, the experience of studying in Sweden has nevertheless been life-changing and opened many new perspectives. Finally, thank you to my beloved sweetheart for always standing by my side and your unwavering belief in me.

III Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... V

LIST OF FIGURES ...... VI

LIST OF TABLES ...... VI

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3

3. THEORY ...... 8

3.1 NEOREALISM & INTERGOVERNMENTALISM ...... 8 3.2 NEOFUNCTIONALISM ...... 10 3.3 INSTITUTIONALISM ...... 11 3.4 TRANSNATIONALISM & TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM ...... 12 3.5 DISCUSSION ...... 14

4. METHODOLOGY ...... 15

4.1 PROCESS TRACING ...... 16 4.2 DATA AND MATERIAL OVERVIEW ...... 19 4.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ...... 21

5. HISTORIC BACKGROUND ...... 22

5.1 EMERGING EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II ...... 23 5.2 FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL TO ST. MALO ...... 24 5.3 THE LISBON TREATY, CSDP AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT ...... 25

6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ...... 27

6.1 FRANCE ...... 28 6.2 GERMANY ...... 32 6.3 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EU COMMISSION ...... 37 6.4 SUMMARY: THE OVERALL PROCESS ...... 43

7. DISCUSSION ...... 44

8. CONCLUSION ...... 49

REFERENCES ...... 51

IV List of Abbreviations

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy EDA European Defence Agency EDF European Defence Fund ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EUGS European Union Global Strategy IR International Relations NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation PSC Political Security Committee RQ Research Question SEDE Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament TEU Treaty on European Union TFEU Treaty on Functioning of the European Union WWII Second World War

V List of Figures

Figure 1: Location of thesis in current literature (author's own illustration) ...... 5 Figure 2: Main theoretical groups (author's own illustration) ...... 5 Figure 3: Process tracing (author's own illustration; based on Beach, 2017) ...... 16 Figure 4: Tracing the process in CSDP development (author's own illustration) ...... 18 Figure 5: Activities by France - Process Tracing (author’s own illustration) ...... 32 Figure 6: Activities by Germany - Process Tracing (author's own illustration) ...... 36 Figure 7: Activities by the EU - Process Tracing (author's own illustration) ...... 42 Figure 8: The combined process (author's own illustration) ...... 43

List of Tables

Table 1: Theories and their view on CSDP (author’s own table) ...... 15 Table 2: France - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table) ...... 32 Table 3: Germany - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table) ...... 36 Table 4: EU - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table) ...... 42

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1. Introduction

“In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the British referendum. […] None of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities of our time alone. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled.” (European Commission, 2016, p. 3)

In 2016, Federica Mogherini, then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, advocated for a stronger and more united European Union in the light of external but also internal threats, to start off the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). Publishing a common strategy during arguably one of the most fragile periods of the Union shows that shared visions for a common approach to foreign policy, security and defence issues were suspected to carry weight – weight needed to support the European project. This highlights the importance that integration in the policy area of defence and security could have for the European Union, and why understanding the inner workings of that policy area should be of central interest. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the main policy framework guiding the Union’s actions and activities in that area. Much of the scholarly research interested in European defence and security in the recent years has been centred on CSDP, a direction this paper will follow in. Since research surrounding this specific policy is situated between disciplines (Kurowska & Breuer, 2012; Howorth, 2014) scholars are faced with a field that is wide and complex in the questions, theories and explanations it offers, but at the same time it is also a highly intriguing field for research. For this master thesis the research question (RQ) is the following: “Why did CSDP efforts progress substantially after Brexit despite wide anticipation and fears of disintegrating effects following the referendum?” The inquiry is interested in how relevant actors in European security and defence interact with each other, what dynamics are at play and how certain decisions and actions can be understood. Overall, the RQ aims at an investigative understanding of the process of European integration in security and defence, specifically that of CSDP, in light of Brexit. Of interest is whether there are mechanisms present that have facilitated the shift from stagnation to action that has followed the British referendum. If there in fact should be such mechanisms, it will be highly valuable to understand under which conditions they can play out and on the other hand what constrains them. Through understanding this puzzle, a piece can be added to the studies of the European Union which brings additional, focused insights in security and defence with potential to widen the overall understanding of the European integration process.

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Focusing on the time of Brexit is specifically insightful since it marked a turning point in CSDP history. In the early 2010s there was a period marked by stagnation which changed shortly after the referendum when a variety of policy initiatives have been passed and approved by the member states (see section 5.3). Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to examine what and why has happened in the development of CSDP after the Brexit referendum in 2016. As has been stated recently by McArdle, among others, the decision of the British to leave the EU didn’t harm European Security and Defence, but rather it induced a push for substantial progress in the field (McArdle, 2020, p. 2). It appears puzzling given the anticipations and fears of damaging effects that have been present during the time surrounding the referendum. As Collins stated there have been several prominent IR scholars1 that pointed to the great risk Brexit would pose all while the political world was in turmoil, fearing contagion effects of Brexit across the continent (Collins, 2017, p. 311). Official political documents from member states and the EU also unveil that the fear of damaging effects to the Union was a key concern for national as well as EU executives in the time directly after Brexit. The contribution this thesis brings to the existing body of work on CSDP is that it investigates recent events through an explaining-outcome approach in contrast to theory-driven approaches that are mainly focused on realist/intergovernmentalist input or on the other hand institutional effects and influences. This allows for considering a variety of theoretic inputs to makes sense of the observations gained from empirical material. The focus of research lies on mechanisms which could have facilitated the move towards increased activity in the policy field. As scholars familiar with the history of European defence and security will know, any progress made over the last decades has been possible during times when all the countless pieces fitted together perfectly (Howorth, 2017) - any one disturbance and plans that appeared certain, vanished (see background section). The period after Brexit seems to represent such a point in time where all relevant actors were in fact in line with the objectives they wanted to achieve and made best use of the opportunity. Which is why an inquiry into that period, researching in a process- orientated, mechanism-based manner will lead to further insights into the nature of the European integration process. This thesis finds that there were three key factors that have been responsible for the move towards more integration in European defence and security in 2016/17. (1) Urgency, which refers to the way in which the situation after Brexit was portrayed by the EU institutions. (2) A factor that will be referred to as falling forward. It entails the notion of unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty that was relatively easy to activate. And ultimately, (3) a window of opportunity,

1 Collins mentions contributions by Ian Bremmer and Stephen Walt 2 Tobias Eichinger that created a strategic opening for key actors to move forward during that specific period. All three in combination can explain why the efforts in CSDP progressed substantially in 2016/17. Overall, they represent a certain set of circumstances that induced and influenced key actors to take action towards more integration after the Brexit referendum. Besides the academic interest for a deeper understanding of European integration and how it functions in this specific policy area, EU security and defence also is an important subject for the citizens of Europe. Eurobarometer reports from 2017 and 2018 provide an overview of public opinion. When asked how to best make sure that their countries’ interests are considered on the international stage, Europeans broadly prefer common action over individual action when addressing external factors. This also holds true as for how to address Brexit, for which on average 65% of respondents favour a joint EU approach (Schulmeister et al., 2018, pp. 24– 25). More specifically for defence issues, Special Eurobarometer 461 from April 2017 inquired about Europeans’ opinions on foreign policy and security and defence, and it shows clear and strong support for common action. A common foreign policy is supported by almost two thirds, a common security and defence policy by an even greater margin of 75%. Even the highly controversial topic of the creation of a European army found a slight majority (55%), although with four in ten being opposed to it (Directorate-General for Communication, 2017, p. 18,21). It becomes clear that the field of EU defence and security is an important topic for citizens, and one where a majority is supportive of a joint and common approach of the EU. In summary, studying how progress in European defence and security is made or hindered, means investigating an issue, that is academically interesting and at the same time also holds wider real-world relevance for the EU and its citizens.

2. Literature Review First, turning to a selection of recent contributions in the research area on CSDP, allows for an overview of issues that have been discussed in the academic community in the last couple of years. It can be noticed that contributions often fall into one of three categories that focus on: (1) intra-EU research on institutions and/or member states, (2) the EU and its external relationships e.g., with NATO or (3) on the military aspect of CSDP, dealing mostly with capacity building and operational issues. In the following, a brief selection of contributions for the three groups is presented before a more detailed look into the different theoretic approaches allows for a deeper understanding of the various angles of research. McArdle recently argued that Brexit hasn’t undermined the EU in security and defence, but rather induced a level of development that hasn’t been seen in years. Member states stepped up

3 Tobias Eichinger in face of a threat to the European project and the EU progressed a previously neglected policy field. This step is understood to be substantial and in connection with the EUGS is moving towards an “integrated and considered approach” in Security and Defence (McArdle, 2020, p. 17). Similarly, Svendsen (2019) observes institutional developments that have followed the Brexit referendum of 2016. Additionally, visions represented in debates point towards an EU that is willing to further integration in defence. He also addresses the impact of values, perceptions and political representations and how they function as justifications for the European integration project (Svendsen, 2019, p. 1003). Turning the attention to the EUGS, Barbé and Morillas found that it has played a significant role in the politicization of the EU. This also had an impact on the narrative of European foreign policy and in turn positive effects on the implementation of EUGS in security and defence (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, pp. 765– 766). Other scholars recently focused more closely on the relationship between the EU and NATO and how it is impacted by Brexit, the EUGS and progresses in CSDP. Cladi and Locatelli drafted different scenarios as to how that relationship could develop in the future, ranging from no change at all towards differentiated disintegration or on the other hand to an improved EU- NATO cooperation (Cladi & Locatelli, 2020, p. 11). Also investigating the EU-NATO relationship, Koppa looked into the effects of Brexit on CSDP and additionally discussed the prospects for a European Defence Union (Koppa, 2019). The issue of strategic autonomy of the union plays a part here as well which has also been taken up by Howorth in an earlier article from 2018. He found that to reach said autonomy Europe needs to address its lack in capacities as soon as possible, otherwise true autonomy is not possible. If the EU could become a serious security actor, as has been laid down as aspiration in its own EUGS, the NATO in its current form would not be needed anymore, being superseded by a new bilateral alliance between USA and EU (Howorth, 2018, p. 534). On the issue of lacking capacities, many scholars have engaged in research, e.g., Biscop who has recently discussed the military capacity building needs and pointed towards current shortcomings and how to potentially address them (Biscop, 2020). To summarize, most recent contributions circle around the future of CSDP either from a perspective of EU-internal developments or on the other hand how a changed, more ambitious EU security and defence approach could affect external relationships of the Union. To round it off, a third group of scholars is focused on military capacity and personnel issues which is often informed by security studies. This thesis will move mostly in the realm of the first group of scholars, investigating internal mechanism of the Union in defence and security, CSDP as well as the change that followed the British referendum. Subsequently, this thesis draws insights and

4 Tobias Eichinger is informed in large part by the literature belonging to the first group of scholarly work as it fits most closely with the research interest.

Figure 1: Location of thesis in current literature (author's own illustration) As briefly mentioned initially, the research surrounding CSDP is situated in an awkward place since it falls between three fields of studies: European integration, International Relations (IR) and security studies (Kurowska & Breuer, 2012, p. 2). Howorth also points towards the fact that research on CSDP is caught between disciplines, naming international relations and European integration theory as the two relevant ones (Howorth, 2014, p. 193). To unpack issues of interest in the field of European defence integration and cooperation it is therefore advisable to generally consider both IR and European integration theory and, if needed, input from security studies as well.

Figure 2: Main theoretical groups (author's own illustration)

One long-standing assumption of European integration studies is that areas of “low politics” are more easily integrated than areas of “high politics”. Security and defence are situated in the policy area of high politics and are understood to represent one of the central raisons d’être of a nation state. As a result, those areas are less likely to be integrated, because integrating in high politics would ultimately, step by step, turn the EU from a political community into a federation ((Börzel, 2005, p. 229). This theoretical divide between high and low politics already hints at the central questions and assumptions around which many of the EU integration theories circle: What power and importance the nation-states (EU members) have, where their interests

5 Tobias Eichinger lie, how much responsibility, and most importantly, decision-making power they are willing to transfer to the EU and its institutions and how the general process of integrating or not- integrating can be explained. (Liberal) intergovernmentalism is situated in the realm of Liberalism and belongs to the group of rational-choice theories. Most basically speaking it evolves around the notion that states bargain with each other for advancing their own respective national interests. (Howorth, 2014, p. 200). Closely related is the theory of neo-liberalism which focuses on interdependencies in economy and trade which are argued to be responsible for positive sum outcomes for the nation states. Due to these interdependencies, war is absent, and cooperation is likely (Ibid., 2014, p.201). Notice how both theories see the main centre of power and decision-making with the nation states and try to explain cooperation rather than integration. Neo-functionalism introduced the idea of “spillover” effects, which assumes that successful integration in one area leads to other areas being more likely to integrate as well. Importantly, spillover is only theorized to work in areas of low politics, so security and defence are not seen as subject to spillover (Ibid., 2014, p. 201). Transgovernmentalism is a theory that assumes cooperation between departments of different national governments, but without close guidance by their respective governments. It basically entails the notion that networks of bureaucrats of different states are formed over time which then can shape and influence policy (Hofmann, 2012). Assuming even deeper effects of integration, theories of institutionalism argue that socialisation processes and institutional rules play an important role in European politics. The bureaucracy and institutions of the EU lead to socialisation among the people they affect which in turn creates European thinking and perspectives on various policy areas. A transfer of competence from national capitals to Brussels is the result (Breuer, 2012). Each theoretical framework represents a different understanding of the EU with specific underlying assumptions. Ranging from a mere forum for nation states to bargain for their own interest all the way to being an entity able to shape and create identity as well as new ways of thinking. This broad variety of theories about the inner workings of the EU hints towards the many ways in which previous scholar’s work on the EU has tried to understand and classify the activities of important actors. This also means that a grand variety of motivations and reasons have been identified in the past as being influential for the direction of European politics. Because of this broad range of theoretical understandings of EU integration, this thesis starts from a point of working inductively with the empirical material. Connecting the findings to theory only later again, in turn allows for a wide consideration of potential reasons.

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Moving on to the second important group of theory we now turn to international relations. Realism is linked to other theories of rational choice – meaning that states are assumed to act like rational actors, trying to maximise their own goals and objectives. Realism also deals with the importance of power relations in the international system as well as assuming systemic forces to be at the centre of change to which nation states need to respond. Structural realism or neo-realism has been the predominant school of thought in the last couple of decades which focuses mainly on structures and has little space for other notions. Considering these attributes, neo-realism can’t provide an explanation for the phenomena accompanying CSDP development. Because nation states giving up parts of their sovereignty to pool it with other states is not understood as behaviour that sovereign nations states would engage in. Furthermore, all forms of realism agree that the EU will never be able to create a strategic culture of its own (Howorth, 2014, pp. 193–199). This means that CSDP and its potential is understood to be highly limited by realist approaches. Rejecting core assumptions of realist and liberal approaches Constructivism on the other hand is mostly interested in the influence of ideas, languages, norms, and identity, which are understood to be the basis for the Europeans’ own approach to security and defence. The realist notion of rational choice is rejected, and it is instead argued that political decisions are the result of constructing normative outcomes. CSDP is then understood by constructivists as generating new norms and identities which cumulate in a European normative approach for security and defence (Howorth, 2014, p. 209). Overall, the theoretical landscape that should be considered when studying European defence integration and cooperation is vast and offers many different directions for scholars to embark on. The two main pillars are the bodies of work of international relations and European integration theory. Each coming in realist or constructivist couleur, with respective implications for theoretical assumptions and phenomena to be investigated. The question then is what each type of theoretic framework can explain and what it cannot explain in the context of CSDP. Some scholars see a “problematic division of labour” between realist and constructivist approaches towards CSDP (Meyer & Strickmann, 2011, p. 62) which influences the issues that are investigated but also confines some inquiries to the respective borders of a chosen approach. Besides these constraints that must be kept in mind, every theoretic framework has strengths and weaknesses. Or to put it another way: Due to the focus on specific phenomena and specific underlying assumptions there is no one theory that didn’t have to trade in a blind spot on some aspects in exchange for a clear view on other aspects.

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3. Theory Following the literature review, this part will take a more detailed look at the different prominent theories in the field of research on CSDP, or European defence and security more broadly. Theories are assessed and their respective advantages and disadvantages are presented. This allows for a more thorough understanding of the different angles that CSDP can be investigated in. This section will also touch upon the issue that CSDP is very hard to grasp under one academic theory alone. CSDP is a “unique” policy in the sense that it represents a phenomenon of sovereign nation states combining resources and sovereignty to work together in security and defence. The long- standing assumption has always been that European integration will not include the area of security and defence – hence the mere existence of CSDP is already puzzling under many theoretical perspectives (Howorth, 2014, p. 191).

3.1 Neorealism & Intergovernmentalism Neorealism: The dominant school of thought in IR over the last decades In international relations studies the last decades saw mainly one strong school of thought: Neorealism (also called structural realism). It focuses on one core variable: the relative distribution of power capabilities. There are also a couple of central assumptions underpinning the theoretic framework of neorealism. First international systems are understood to be anarchic, secondly states are perceived as the primary actors on the world stage, thirdly all states are functionally similar and finally states are rational unitary actors (Hyde-Price, 2012, pp. 18–20). With its focus on the structural distribution of power, neorealism asks how states react to these structural pressures. Given that the international system is assumed to be of an anarchic nature, states have a limited choice of actions they can take. Depending on their relative power position, available choices differ, with very powerful states having more possibilities. As for how EU member states will approach CSDP, there are three commonly mentioned options. Balancing refers to the idea that member states might use the EU to balance against other great powers. Buckpassing entails the notion that the member states might leave the responsibility to deal with security issues to the US while focusing on other fields of interest. Finally, Bandwagoning refers to the idea that EU member states could align with the strongest power in the system to increase their influence (Ibid., 2012, p. 22-23). What can be taken away from this brief introduction is that neorealism is first and foremost dealing with nation-states and how their behaviour can be explained. Structural forces and influences are assumed to shape nation states’ decision-making and behaviour. It can therefore offer possible explanations for states’ actions

8 Tobias Eichinger according to the concepts it provides (e.g., Balancing). Nevertheless, due to its assumptions, neorealism is also limited in the way it can understand and classify CSDP. Since neorealism overwhelmingly focuses on poles of power, it has little to offer with regards to the EU, since the Union is not a pole of power itself. This leads to a situation where neorealism largely neglects change in the EU and sees it as a place where “nothing much happens” (Rynning, 2011, p. 24). Additionally, scholars arguing within a neorealist framework will inevitably come to the conclusion that the EU will not manage to develop into a serious security actor. Moreover, realist approaches in general agree that a Union of member states with distinct strategic cultures will never be able to create a joint strategic culture of its own (Howorth, 2014, p. 196,199). Intergovernmentalism: The state at the centre of decision-making A connected theory from the group of rational choice theories is intergovernmentalism. It shares similar fundamental ideas and evolves around the idea of states bargaining with each other in order to advance their respective self-interest (Howorth, 2014, pp. 199–200). The main underlying assumption in intergovernmentalism is that states are unitary and sovereign actors, hence decision that are taken on an international level between states are implemented on the national level swiftly and smoothly. On the role of international organisations intergovernmentalist theory manly sees them as forum to support cooperation. If the states do not see them as useful, the organisations will not be needed anymore. The driver for cooperation and integration is the intergovernmental bargaining taking place. So according to the theory, only if the national preferences of states point towards cooperation, it will in fact happen (Hofmann, 2012, p. 45). A common analysis following this approach would be e.g., the contribution by Simón who analysed CSDP through a realist/intergovernmental lens and argued that the most powerful nation-states use the union and its institutions to force their own aspirations on smaller and weaker states. Only ideas that serve the national interest are promoted, so CSDP is understood to be driven and determined by the most powerful members of the EU (Simón, 2013, pp. 5,6,13). This logic of intergovernmentalism is sound, but it nevertheless neglects a couple of other influences on CSDP. With the strict focus on nation-states other forms of agency tend to be overseen. Specifically on the case of liberal intergovernmentalism, Schimmelfennig overserved that it does not have a “dynamic theory of integration” which has become apparent during the last couple of EU crises (Euro, Schengen, Brexit) for which intergovernmentalism reached the limits of its explanatory power. Since it is a static theory, it does not consider influences of path-dependencies or politicization. Which is why he suggested a harmonization of liberal

9 Tobias Eichinger intergovernmentalism with neofunctionalism or postfunctionalism in order to explain especially puzzling cases of integration (Schimmelfennig, 2018). As Hofmann argued, if intergovernmentalism were indeed the only form of cooperation in CSDP one should not be able to observe any other forms of cooperation then one strictly based between national executives. The nation states governments provide the broad direction of CSDP but executing the policies is a daily business that happens between various actors on lower levels and within the institutions of the EU (Hofmann, 2012, pp. 49–50). Due to the shortcomings of intergovernmentalism, further theoretical approaches have turned their attention onto various other actors besides the member states to investigate their influence. To sum up, whether intergovernmentalism and the focus on interstate bargaining is enough on its own to explain what happens in CSDP is questionable since the institutional framework that accompanies the policy is rather extensive, but it rarely is considered of importance in research projects informed by intergovernmentalism. 3.2 Neofunctionalism The school of neofunctionalism is a prominent member of European integration studies. Its main argument is the idea of “spillover”, which basically comes down to the notion that integration in one area induces connected areas to also follow on the integration path (Howorth, 2014, p. 201). Since modern societies are commonly understood to experience ever increasing interdependence, integration in one area triggers a sort of “domino effect” leading to more integration in various political areas (Borg, 2015, p. 48). But as an important aspect, this spillover is only theorized to work in areas of “low politics” and not in “high politics”. This means that defence and security, traditionally seen as part of the high politics, sovereignty defining policy areas, is not subject to the spillover effect. The existence of CSDP itself is therefore already puzzling under this theoretic framework (Howorth, 2014, p. 201). Neofunctionalism focuses on the agency of interest groups that aim for maximising utility. It can be understood as a utilitarian and rationalist theory in the sense that it assumes agents to behave in a utility-maximising manner. This also means that neofunctionalism builds on the concept of the homo economicus. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that the theory holds an overall positive view of European integration and could also be seen as a form of peace research for a continent that has come out of another world war at the time the theory had initially been built (Borg, 2015, pp. 49,51). Considering all this, one can easily grasp the advantages and disadvantages of neofunctionalism. It is not without reason a, if not the, central theory of European integration studies. But due to the element of a distinction between high and low politics, the framework is unable to clearly

10 Tobias Eichinger explain integration processes in defence and security without an alteration of the parameters of the theory itself. This could either happen through showing that defence and security has moved down from high to low politics, therefore making the spillover effect possible for that area. Or, as Hanna Ojanen has argued earlier, by simply getting rid of the distinction between the policy areas altogether, since a policy like CSDP could then be explained within the neofunctionalist framework (Ojanen, 2006). If abandoning the distinction between high and low politics is not desired, then it would still be possible to theoretically argue that security and defence is not a part of high politics anymore. Employing the help of a concept like the Habermasian “post national federation” could support such a theoretical argument. As Kucera has argued in this regard, defence policy might have left the area of high politics, since the threat of invasion between European countries has greatly diminished, therefore lowering the importance of defence for national identity (Kucera, 2019, pp. 330–331). But it will be difficult to find sufficient real-world evidence to support the elements of the Habermasian concept, or any other highly theoretical concept for that matter. So, for most researchers this route might not be the best to embark on – only if they are interested in a highly theoretical discussion. In the end, what neofunctionalism can provide for researchers interested in European defence and security and CSDP depends on what exact phenomena are studied and if they fit more into the space of high politics or low politics. There is some room for manoeuvring this dilemma, but it will in turn require an especially solid argumentative basis as for why neofunctionalism has been chosen as a guiding framework on issues of security and defence.

3.3 Institutionalism As with many other theoretical frameworks, institutionalism comes in different shapes and forms. Since the previously discussed theoretic approaches could all be grouped under rationalist approaches, this section on institutionalism will focus on the opposite of the spectrum to offer an alternative and show how constructivist perspectives understand CSDP from a different angle. In a contribution on sociological institutionalism Breuer showed how a constructivist approach differs substantially from its realist counterpart. Central to this approach is that it evolves around the importance of rules and norms, which are understood to influence actor’s decisions and interactions and might ultimately lead to socialisation of the actors (Breuer, 2012, pp. 114–115). He argued that CSDP is influenced by institutional rules and that socialisation processes are taking place. Especially in the daily execution of the policy, institutions based in Brussels can influence national policymaking, hence leading to CSDP’s intergovernmental set up to be ever more “Brusselised”. The socialisation processes present in

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CSDP are understood to cumulate in a European thinking in security and defence issues. In sum, for Breuer that means that CSDP has developed from an intergovernmental policy area into one that has turned into a more institutionalised governance system. Decisions are increasingly taken in Brussels and a shift of competence takes place, away from national capitals towards Brussels. Breuer also stresses that even though bargaining still takes place, preferences of member states are not fixed but instead can change – which is driven by a desire for consensual decision making (Ibid., 2012, pp. 120, 125,127). What can be taken away from an account on CSDP like this is that there are two distinct ways of approaching and understanding the policy. Sociological Institutionalism as discussed here represents a constructivist take on European security and defence, where the influence of norms, rules and socialisation processes take centre-stage. This can help in addressing some of the shortcomings of strictly intergovernmentalist approaches as it opens for considering different influences besides a decision-making process that is purely driven by power considerations. Still, it should be considered that CSDP is built in a mostly intergovernmental way (see TEU Section 2 for the legal text) so one should not overestimate the influences of the European institutions on this specific policy. Menon has described this double-edged situation eloquently when he assessed that: “In several respects, institutionalism provides more compelling explanations of the nature and workings of CSDP than realist approaches which underestimate the impact of institutions and consequently exaggerate the aggregation capacity of the EU. Yet institutionalists, conversely, can exaggerate the degree to which institutions dampen power and underestimate the role of power in shaping their development and workings” (Menon, 2011, p. 96).

3.4 Transnationalism & Transgovernmentalism Transnationalism: The hidden star of European integration studies? The concept of transnationalism was first built by Keohane and Nye at the beginning of the 1970s. Their aim was to take a deeper look into global interactions that are not purely “interstate” interactions. By including other nongovernmental actors, they widened the group of actors that could be considered when investigating global interactions. The defined a transnational interaction as one which “may involve governments, but it may not involve only governments: Nongovernmental actors must also play a significant role” (Keohane & Nye, 1971:332). The authors argue that these transnational relations lead to a heightened sensitivity between societies and in turn also influence the relationships between governments. Additionally, transnational organizations may play a role in creating new attitudes through creating novel symbols and norms (Ibid., 1971:336,338). The type of transnational relations that Keohane and Nye describe

12 Tobias Eichinger are frequent and common throughout the European Union, in fact they have been fostered and promoted by the European integration process through policies like the single market (Hurrelmann & DeBardeleben, 2011:9). Transnationalism touches on European policymaking in many ways and transnational relations are explicitly fostered by the European Commission. Transnational relations can be understood as bridging the divide between the intergovernmental and supranational forces that characterize the political system of the EU (Tömmel, 2011:58- 59). So, there is a strong transnational element in European politics that can be observed. What does that mean for CSDP? Since transnationalism needs to include non-state, non-governmental actors it is not best suited to analyse CSDP. But transnationalism preceded and laid important groundwork for a concept also introduced by Keohane and Nye: transgovernmentalism. Transgovernmentalism: The mode of cooperation in CSDP? As Hofmann has argued, governance of CSDP might be following a weak form of transgovernmentalism (Hofmann, 2012). This mode of cooperation is different from the previously introduced transnationalism but nevertheless shares some similar notions since Keohane and Nye sketched out the concept of transgovernmentalism after their initial thoughts on transnationalism. The focus of this approach lies on different governmental sub-units interacting with each other, without close supervision and guidance by their respective government (Keohane & Nye, 1974:43). International cooperation understood from a transgovernmental perspective rewards importance to the “sub-units” which can alter the formation of preferences of their own government while at the same time making sure that political mandates are implemented. To get the desired outcome, national officials based in Brussels often have to negotiate with their counterparts but at the same time also with their own governments at home. For CSDP this means that overarching policy is firmly in the hand of national governments, but the implementation is done by officials based in Brussels who are also influenced by the institutional dynamics in Brussels. Therefore, they themselves can influence CSDP through activities like brokerage, information sharing or peer pressure (Hofmann, 2012:47,55,56). Overall, both the concept of transnationalism as well as transgovernmentalism offer more for the general understanding of European politics than a specific explanatory approach for what happens in CSDP. This is in part due to the strong importance of national governments and executives in CSDP policymaking, so overarching policy decision in the field are unlikely to be best captured by these two frameworks. But other parts of the cooperation taking place in CSDP may very well be explained by the two related, though distinct, concepts. But the focus

13 Tobias Eichinger of inquiry is different then, more geared towards examining daily operations rather than the big political decisions.

3.5 Discussion This chapter on selected theories that can be used as an explanatory framework for issues of European Defence and security and CSDP more specifically has revealed a couple of things. First, it has become apparent that no single theory alone is able to capture CSDP perfectly, all the selected frameworks above rather unfold their explanatory power for different instances. Realist accounts and in connection intergovernmentalism are focused mostly on issues of power distribution and how it influences states’ decision-making. These analyses play an important role in IR studies and rightfully so. For CSDP especially, intergovernmentalism appears to be a perfect fit since the policy itself is designed in a way that aligns with intergovernmentalist ideas. It represents a solid starting point for inquiring about what and how happens in CSDP. But it also neglects the importance of the EU as well as the institutions and networks provided by it. Since the central unit of analysis is the nation state, intergovernmentalism cannot explain why states would surrender sovereignty to another entity. This leaves it open for criticisms since European politics is driven by a variety of influences besides member states bargaining with each other. This is when the other presented concepts come into play. Neofunctionalism, a theory designed to explain integration, helps with understanding the integration process and its drivers, although it is not applicable for areas of high politics to which CSDP belongs to. Sociological Institutionalism as discussed above includes the importance of institutions and shows how they can be central in producing and shaping a distinctly European thinking. This concept has likely also played a role in the development of CSDP in the time of Brexit since member states showed a united front during turbulent times. It is unlikely that this unity has only been driven by pure power considerations, rather it is an indicator that the fear of damage to the European project and the will to preserve it in light of adversity might have played a role as well in shaping the preferences and decisions of the actors during the time. Finally, the related but distinct concepts of transnationalism and transgovernmentalism describe different types of relationships between actors and how those relationships assert influence on political decisions. These concepts can be helpful in determining and classifying relational ties between actors and examine the influence they might have had on a phenomenon of interest. Overall, as stated briefly in the introduction to the theory section, CSDP is not captured by any one single theory alone, rather its existence is even puzzling to some of them or the potential they credit the policy with is very limited. I therefore suggest examining CSDP with its multi-faceted nature through

14 Tobias Eichinger enlisting the help of various frameworks later in the empirical part. Making this decision also implies certain consequences for the methodology which are discussed in the next chapter. In short it means that the role of theory in this research project is a heuristic one, as an explanatory tool to make sense of the observations made during empirical work. Table 1 summarize the discussed theories, lists their core characteristics and states brief observations on how each of them looks at CSDP from its own respective angle. It offers a brief, general comparison between the various theoretical approaches and sets the basis for later empirical work.

Table 1: Theories and their view on CSDP (author’s own table)

The wide variety of theoretic frameworks that can offer explanations for phenomena in European defence and security indicates that movements in the policy field are likely influenced by multiple factors, instead of one singular trigger. We can assume that a combination of factors exists, but we do not know through which underlying mechanism that occurs. In the methodology Process-Tracing and its components are presented and it is shown how the method can be used to better understand what has happened in CSDP in 2016/17. The advantage of focusing on mechanisms is that it allows to investigate in detail which factors appear in the empirical material and then later connect them to theory, therefore being able to consider various theoretical inputs presented in this chapter.

15 Tobias Eichinger

4. Methodology The research interest of this thesis is to investigate how the progress made in CSDP after Brexit can be explained and which underlying mechanisms caused the shift from stagnation in the early 2010s to increased speed in policy implementation and decision-making after 2016. Since the research interest for this project is geared towards a mechanism-based examination, process tracing subsequently represents the logical choice for the central research method. As described by Checkel, epistemologically process tracing is situated within a positivist understanding of the world, which encompasses the assumption of linear causation. The method itself consists of tracing causal mechanisms in a situation of interest. The material and data used for process tracing is mainly of qualitative nature, and can include materials such as historic accounts, documents and interviews (Checkel, 2008, p. 116). 4.1 Process Tracing The central research method for this thesis is process tracing. This method allows for tracing causal mechanisms, building on case centric empirical evidence. Researchers using this method are interested in examining the mechanisms that connect cause and outcome. The objective is to create a continuous explanation which does not leave any big logical gaps in the story of connecting cause and outcome. A possible way to illustrate this is through showing in detail how each step of the mechanism is made up of entities and activities (Beach, 2017).

Figure 3: Process tracing (author's own illustration; based on Beach, 2017)

Thinking about a mechanism in terms of entities that act in a certain way, helps to visualize who and what has been important in the development of CSDP after Brexit since it focuses one’s reflections on the topic. The argument brought forward in this thesis is that in connection to the Brexit referendum a window of opportunity opened which has led to more integration in European security and defence. The window of opportunity is therefore understood as the cause of the process, while increased integration in security and defence is seen as the outcome. The additional level of integration is reflected in the progress made in CSDP in 2016/17 when several initiatives have been passed and further structures were established, most notably the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017. The window of

16 Tobias Eichinger opportunity is assumed to stand in connection to Brexit since the increased activity in CSDP followed swiftly after the British referendum. Deciding which entities or actors are relevant during the period 2016-2017 should be determined with the historic development of European defence and security in mind. Member states play a central role in CSDP, which is also apparent in its legal basis in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Decisions in relation to CSDP are to be taken on a unanimous basis in the council (TEU Article 42/4) and the capacities for the task performed under CSDP are to be provided by the member states (TEU Article 42/1). This shows that the setup of CSDP follows an “intergovernmental” logic in large parts as the member states are in a very powerful position and an unanimity clause is making sure that no member state’s objections can be overruled. On the other hand, the EU likely has influence in proposing and shaping policy through its institutions and committees where nationals of the different member states work together. Today there are 27 member states in the EU, looking into every single one of them would be impossible given the time and space restraints of a master thesis. Therefore, a choice had to be made which member states’ activities warrant a deeper examination. There is a strong case for including France as one of the central member state actors. It is the militarily most powerful member state of the EU today. Furthermore, France has also played an essential role in all notable developments of the policy field in the last decades (Howorth, 2017). Other scholars have discussed and pointed out France’s substantial influence to shape European defence and security (e.g., Haroche, 2017). Subsequently it is very probable that France’s actions following Brexit carried a similar weight as in previous periods. Besides France the actions of other member states should also be acknowledged, so one additional member state has been chosen for closer examination to account for that. The choice here fell on the biggest member state of the EU: Germany. Although the country has been less active in defence and security issues, it is still the country with the biggest population and biggest economy of the EU, so it is naturally often perceived to hold a leadership role. Also, some scholars have argued that Germany is prepared to play a more active role in security and defence issues (Iso-Markku & Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2020) while others see a Franco- German axis as a central influence for future development of CSDP (Martill & Sus, 2018). With these characteristics in mind, it is justified to assume that Germany’s activities following Brexit have played a central role. Additionally, since a strictly intergovernmental understanding of CSDP is seen as insufficient, it is also necessary to include actors that are not member states. As Mérand et al. have shown, CSDP cannot be described by intergovernmentalism alone, since it is “too narrow” and doesn’t

17 Tobias Eichinger account for the multi-level governance present in CSDP (Mérand et al., 2011, p. 138). Therefore, European institutions and the influence they exercise through their practices should also be considered. A good visualization of possible influence of the institutions is the instance of the EUGS. As Tocci described, it represented a collaborative effort of different national and EU officials which in the end led to a joint declaration of what the future of European defence and security should look like. The timing of publishment of this common strategy was also highly delicate, with the final version having been sent out to member states shortly after the Brexit vote came in (Tocci, 2017, p. 490). With activities like these, the EU institutions arguably assert influence, which is why they have been deemed relevant actors for this inquiry. Selecting a specific institution represents another complex choice but the network study of Mérand et al. offers some indications. Ranking high in a gatekeeping function within their analysis were either the Political Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors or the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament (SEDE). While PSC ambassadors are still national representatives they are mainly based in Brussels as opposed to their national capitals and SEDE, as a subcommittee of the European parliament, represents a part of the European institutions (Mérand et al., 2011, pp. 131–132). Since a subcommittee of the EU parliament holds an important gatekeeping function, the parliament by extension, is in an important position within the realm of CSDP. Therefore, its position on the various initiatives will be examined. Furthermore, during analysing the French and German documents, it became apparent that both saw the work of the EU Commission as influential during the time of inquiry. Subsequently key strategic papers published by the Commission like the EUGS, or the White Paper on the Future of Europe have been included for the analysis of the EU’s activities as well. In summary, following the concept of understanding mechanisms through activities by entities, three entities are investigated: France and Germany, as well as a relevant EU institution, namely the parliament and the commission. Their respective actions are traced during the defined period to understand how the window of opportunity opened in connection to Brexit in 2016 (cause) is connected to the increased integration in European security and defence (outcome).

Figure 4: Tracing the process in CSDP development (author's own illustration)

18 Tobias Eichinger

After having established the basic structure and premise of the research approach, the method of process tracing is discussed in more detail and the exact type that has been used is categorized. As Beach and Petersen have argued, process tracing does not represent one singular method, but rather it can be classified into three distinct variations. This is important because the three variants have a different purpose which in turn also influences the way of working. The purpose of the Theory-Testing variant it to test whether a causal mechanism exists as predicted. Theory- Building approaches use evidence from a case to build a generalizable mechanism. Finally, Explaining-Outcome process tracing is geared towards explaining a specific outcome. So, in summary the theory centric approaches try to trace mechanisms that can be generalized, while the case centric approach traces a mechanism that can offer an explanation for the specific case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 11–13). Choosing the approach that fits most closely can therefore be reached through reflecting on the specific objective of one’s research project. Is it more of a theory driven inquiry that wants to test or build theory? Or is it rather an attempt at offering a sufficient explanation for a specific historic outcome? For this thesis the chosen approach is the case centric variant (Explaining-Outcome process tracing) that Beach and Petersen discussed. That also means that the role of theory will be more of a “heuristic” function, as a tool for the best possible explanation, rather than employing it in a strict testing or building function (Ibid., 2013, p.19). Deciding on this approach allows for a focused look into the historic development of CSDP at the time of Brexit in the years 2016 and 2017. Focusing on mechanisms will lead to building a detailed account of why the initiatives in connection to CSDP have been passed during that exact time and how the shift from stagnation to action can be explained.

4.2 Data and material overview The material for this inquiry is overwhelmingly of qualitative nature, owning to the fact that process tracing naturally calls for this type of material. To unpack the actions of the three entities of interest, parliamentary documents are consulted. The timespan for inquiry is set from 24.06.2016, the day after the Brexit referendum, until 31.12.2017, since by the end of 2017 all the notable policy initiatives that represent the increased integration in European security and defence have been passed on a European level. Regarding France and Germany, the focus of attention lies on identifying which actions the respective national governments undertook during the time of interest. For France the audiences of its defence minister at parliament have been chosen for closer examination. Focusing on these audiences has two central advantages: (1) It allows for capturing the actions, plans and

19 Tobias Eichinger overall political line of the government in matters of defence and subsequently shows the actions of the nation-state on a European stage. (2) At the same time the parliamentary questioning of initiatives shows whether support is high or if scepticism is ruling regarding certain decisions. An assumption about the unity of a nation state’s voice can therefore be made building on the information provided by these documents. The examined documents have been accessed through the document search function on the website of the Assemblée Nationale.2 All are in the form of parliamentary minutes3, capturing the spoken content during a parliamentary meeting, and indicating the respective speaker. During the defined period, there have been eight audiences of the French defence minister4 at commissions of the Assemblée Nationale. Since France held elections during the time of inquiry, the first speech of president Macron before both chambers of parliament on July 3rd, 2017, has also been included in the analysis. It outlines the new government’s central initiatives and priorities, which allows for examining the overall position of France on issues of European affairs during that time. Turning now to Germany a critical limitation must be mentioned right away. Unlike in France where the meeting minutes of the parliamentary “commission de la défense” are publicly available, in Germany the most closely comparable parliamentary sub-commission the “Verteidigungsausschuss” is working behind closed doors. Therefore, access to these meetings and documents was not possible for this research project. Since the goal is the same as with France, to examine the national government’s line and actions during 2016/17, a substitute needed to be found. The documentation and information system of the Bundestag (DIP) allows to search parliamentary documents via thematic, field and process related attributes. One of the common processes in the German parliament is the Regierungserklärung 5 given by the federal chancellor. In these speeches and following debate the general political agenda of the government is presented and discussed. Searching the DIP for the time of inquiry, it returns six such government statements, five of which deal with issues of Brexit, defence and/or European Council meetings and have therefore been selected for closer examination. Additionally, there are various questioning formats in the Bundestag that allow members of parliaments to address specific issues, weather that be in a written question or in open debate in the plenum. To complement the chancellor’s speeches one written question to the government specifically on

2 The Assemblée Nationale is the lower chamber of the French parliament 3 French: compte rendus 4 French defence minister in documents 1-6: Jean-Yves Le Drian; in documents 8-9: Florence Parly 5 English: government statement 20 Tobias Eichinger

CSDP and two debates on Brexit have been added to the inquiry6. In total eight documents have been examined. Since Germany held federal elections in September 2017 and the formation of a new government took time into 2018, there are no documents for the time from after the election until the end of 2017 in this inquiry. This additional time and therefore material limitations for Germany should be kept in mind. Lastly let’s turn to the EU and its actions. Here the focus will be on two European institutions: The Parliament and the Commission. In the examination of the French and German documents it became clear that the EU Commission as well as the Parliament were understood as playing an important role in the development of CSDP (see e.g., Assemblée Nationale, 2016a; Deutscher Bundestag 2017a). The commission asserted influence through publishing most notably the EUGS as well as whitepapers on the future of Europe. The parliament holds central function through needing to be consulted over CSDP’s budget (TEU, Article 41) and the EU treaty furthermore states that parliament’s opinion on CSDP must be taken into due consideration (TEU, article 36). As shown earlier the SEDE subcommittee also holds an important gatekeeping function within CSDP (Mérand et al., 2011), so the EU Parliament is by extension in an important position within the realm of CSDP. For the commission the examined documents were chosen based on the time frame but also with consideration to which publications have been deemed relevant by France and Germany. Included in the inquiry are three documents from the commission. For the EU Parliament the focus lies on texts adopted by the parliament in connection to CSDP. For the time of inquiry, the search function on the website of the Parliament returns 21 documents, with the keyword search being set to look for “CSDP” in the text of documents. Of these 21, eight resolutions have been chosen as directly related after a first general examination: four connected to annual reports on CSDP/CFSP and four resolutions dealing with the potential of treaty provisions and scenarios for the future of European defence and security. This allows for capturing the standpoint of the parliament on issues of CSDP during the time of inquiry and connect them to the observed activities of France and Germany.

4.3 Limitations of the research As every type of material, parliamentary minutes also have some disadvantages that limit their value as evidence for making claims. What is said during debates or audiences and subsequently

6 The DIP was searched with the following parameters: Election period: “18”, Time: “24.06.2016 – 31.12.2017”, Wordsearch in title/abstract/description “VERTEIDIGUNGSPOLITIK BREXIT”, Subject area: “Europapolitik und Europäische Union”. 22 results were returned, from which both returned debates and one written question which deals directly with CSDP have been added to the examination. 21 Tobias Eichinger what a defence minister or head of government is willing to disclose is likely influenced by political reasoning. Furthermore, especially in security and defence matters, many decisions tend to be taken behind closed doors. Subsequently, the true underlying reasons behind certain decisions might not be completely evident from only looking at publicly available parliamentary documents and misjudgements could be made. The publications of the EU commission are unsurprisingly prone to a pro-EU bias as are the resolutions of the EU parliament. Additionally, since the EU institutions don’t enjoy the same scope of action as nation states, the mechanistic claims that can be made from the documents are limited. Mostly the documents themselves represent the action taken by the respective entity as they either support existing ideas or give new impulses as e.g., the EUGS did. Nevertheless, looking into the meetings at national parliaments provides an account of political decisions and justifications that can be linked to the broader historic development and function as evidence for mechanistic claims about the process that led to more integration in European security and defence. Furthermore, their relatively easy accessibility made parliamentary minutes and documents a sound choice for a research project with comparatively high time restraints. Overall, this project faces a couple of general limitations. First, there is a set timeframe for the project, which is concentrated mostly on the time of Brexit, more specifically from 24.06.2016 – 31.12.2017, depending on the availability of material. This will of course, limit the scope of the inquiry and should be kept in mind. Secondly, the focus lies mainly on intra-EU actors (member states and the EU institutions), and their (inter)actions while external influences are studied to a lesser extent and given lower priority. Furthermore, due to the ongoing pandemic with its still challenging conditions during the time of writing this thesis, research has been almost completely desk-based, which might limit the quality of insights and findings. Finally, given the research design of a case study using explaining-outcome process tracing as the main method, the findings are first and foremost applicable for the studied historic case. But due to the focus on mechanisms, it might be able for similar projects to trace processes in other time periods which might lead to the discovery of mechanistic patterns in the history of European defence and security. With necessary considerations and limitations some results may be abstractable to a higher level and might hold more generalized value for other researchers beyond the boundaries of the studied case of this project.

5. Historic Background Before turning to the empirical analysis, a short dive into the history of the European security and defence policy field is taken. This section fulfils two main functions: (1) it introduces a

22 Tobias Eichinger short schematic picture of the developments on the European defence and security policy area after WWII, laying the basis to understand the starting point for later, more recent events. And (2) it provides a more in-depth account of the time after the St. Malo summit in the 1998 and especially after the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 and the following years leading up to Brexit. The second part also highlights the contrast between a relatively stagnant timespan starting in the 2010s and the significant uptick in activity and progress for CSDP shortly after Brexit. Additionally, a closer look into the actual treaty provisions in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is undertaken to highlight the difference between stagnation before Brexit and speed-up activity afterwards. As such this section functions as a historic basis for the empirical part to allow for placing the activities of the examined actors in the broader context of European security and defence history. It should be kept in mind, that this short historic account does not attempt to be exhaustive, instead it rather represents a selection and summarization of main events and turning points that have been deemed relevant for emphasis by the author.

5.1 Emerging Europe after World War II After the end of the Second World War, Europe had to agree on a new post-war order on the continent and how to best move forward. The issues of security and defence was one, if not the, central aspect that had to be sorted out. This might come as a surprise from today’s standpoint, but early ideas of how to organize this post-war order already envisioned a form of “European bloc”. This bloc was supposed to be led by France and Britain, put Europe into an independent position from the new superpowers while at the same time laying a vital foundation through cooperation in security and defence for an eventual bloc encompassing many policy areas. The idea of organising the defence of Europe collectively was also highly supported by the US. Washington recommended the formation of a purely European alliance which could then later discuss support needs with the US. Even though this idea was generally accepted and supported by many European countries they still pushed for the creation of a transatlantic alliance. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed but for the Americans it was still clear that Europe should first and foremost help itself, instead of relying on the US for protection. In fact, the US was confident about the potential of European political integration, which was started through the search for security and defence of a continent freshly out of war. Or simply put: “European integration began with defence” (Howorth, 2017, pp. 14–16). By the early 1950s it looked like Europe was moving towards an integrated European defence approach. But the French initiative of a European Defence Community (EDC) failed before it could even come properly to life due to disagreement between the two most important European countries at the time: France and

23 Tobias Eichinger the UK. When the UK refused to enter the framework, survival chances of the EDC plummeted but the final blow came when the French parliament, driven by sovereigntist tendencies, voted negatively on the proposal. As a consequence of the failed EDC initiative, European defence became detached from the broader European integration process and was basically handed off to NATO and subsequently to the US. Integration proceeded in all policy areas, but with the decision to rely on NATO, defence and security had been set up for an existence outside the wider integration process. A detached existence that should last for decades (Ibid., 2017, pp. 17-18).

5.2 Fall of the Berlin Wall to St. Malo 1989 marked a crucial point in time which was characterized by turning tides and substantial changes in and around Europe. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War European countries saw themselves faced with a number of new challenges that required new, updated considerations for foreign policy (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p. 19). In the 1990s there was also much discussion around the topic that NATO’s time might be over, given the fact that alliances tend to separate once the original reason for inception has vanished. But NATO survived, albite with constantly evolving strategic concepts (Howorth, 2017, p. 20). In 1993 the EU was created through the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which also established a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that was meant to coordinate joint action of the member states in international politics. But the wars in Yugoslavia highlighted how little the EU was prepared to react to crises in its direct neighbourhood, once its diplomatic toolkit had been exhausted. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was terminated through NATO coordinated airstrikes, as was the Kosovo war at the end of the 1990s. The EU’s lacking capacity to conduct combat operations was clear, which drew attention to the need for the EU to develop the necessary structures. At the St. Malo meeting in 1998 France and Britain, the two biggest military powers in Europe, agreed to develop a defence and security policy for the Union. As a result, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the predecessor of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), was launched in 1999. The significance of this agreement is, that it was able to bridge the divide between Europeanists and Atlanticists that had previously hindered developments towards a shared security and defence policy. Europeanists (France) have long advocated for a more autonomous European policy but Atlanticists (Britain) on the other hand did not want to create a competitor for NATO. The compromise reached at St. Malo therefore created a policy that did not challenge NATO directly, but would nevertheless be able to act autonomously. (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, pp. 20–21). It

24 Tobias Eichinger is fair to say that with the historic meeting at St. Malo, the foundation for the current structures for a common security and defence approach of the Union was laid.

5.3 The Lisbon Treaty, CSDP and the implications of Brexit Turning now to the developments after the turn of the millennium, the Treaty of Lisbon will be examined more closely and the provisions it lays down for CSDP are shown. Afterwards the contrast between stagnation leading up to 2016 and the comparatively fast implementation of policy programmes after Brexit is highlighted. Also, the differences between Britain and France will feature again as a consequential piece of the more recent history of European defence. The current version of the TEU is the Treaty of Lisbon from 2007. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) in combination with the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) build the basis for the European Union, its nature, rights, and functions. In the TEU, there is a separate section laying down how CSDP is to be understood and the different elements it contains. Section 2 of the TEU encompasses this main information. CSDP is intended to be an integral part of the CFSP and act as the foundation on which the EU can rest to conduct missions outside the Union in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Capacities for operations are to be supplied by the member states (TEU, Article 42/1). Importantly, CSDP is also supposed to include the framing of a common defence union which might ultimately lead to a common defence if the European Council agrees to that (TEU, Article 42/2). Remembering the 1950s project of the EDC, this sounds familiar and leaves the door open to the deepest form of defence integration possible. It must be acknowledged though that with the unanimity requirement laid down in that same article it is very unlikely that we will see a push into that direction anytime soon. Furthermore, CSDP should also not impede on member states other engagements, especially in the NATO and respect the obligations made under that framework (TEU, Article 42/2). Additionally, the responsibilities of the European Defence Agency (EDA) are described and the basis for PESCO is laid in this section of the treaty (TEU, Articles 42/3, 45 & 42/6, 46 respectively). The main takeaway from this brief look into the legal text is that CSDP is adorned with ambitious wording and visions for the future as to what the ultimate objective for European defence should look like – namely a true “Defence Union”. But at the same time, it is apparent that CSDP is limited by and depended on the member states’ will to equip it with capacity and give it political weight. Also, the subordination of CSDP requirements to NATO requirements limits the potential of the policy. The development of CSDP (and its predecessor ESDP) so far has not been without obstacles, which should not come as a surprise considering the difficult past the policy field of European

25 Tobias Eichinger security and defence. An old but central clash of interest between the two most powerful states continued to leave its marks. France and Britain very publicly fell out over the Iraq crisis, which cast a shadow on the overall project itself. Additionally, initiatives by France (and others) like a European Operations Headquarters were swiftly shut down by the UK, a central factor being British fears over too much integration. Even though the United Kingdom initially committed a lot after the St. Malo summit its dedication became increasingly ambivalent. Especially since the elections of 2010 the UK showed less and less interest for CSDP, openly preventing it from reaching its full potential (Howorth, 2017, p. 24). The 2010s can be seen as a time when the goals of St. Malo began to unravel – much like in the 1950s when the early ideas for a European approach of the 1940s failed (Ibid., 2017, p.25). After Brexit, increased drive could be observed in European security and defence, with several changes that have been realised shortly after the British referendum. In 2017 the EU Military Headquarters was established and PESCO initiated. Later the European Defence Fund was launched as well as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. Even with all these changes that happened in a rather short span of time, nothing had changed in the basic principles of CSDP. These recent changes don’t represent a challenge to NATO and they also don’t change the fact that control over militaries remains firmly in the hands of the nation states (Martill & Sus, 2018, pp. 851–852). To summarise this brief dive into decades of European defence and security one can notice a couple of things. First, ideas for a common defence and security approach existed basically right from the beginning and resurfaced again after the Cold War. But then as now they were hampered by differences between the member states who have not been ready to surrender enough of their sovereignty to make the common European approach work and neither to equip it with enough weight to make a difference. Second, Brexit has indeed induced momentum in the story of CSDP since various initiatives have been launched in the wake of the referendum that previously found themselves in a deadlock situation. Probably the best example here is PESCO, which had already been set out in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, but only came to live in 2017. Third, even though developments have been made since 2016, the basic principles underlying CSDP have not changed and the legal basis of TEU limits the potential for future deeper integrative developments. Finally, the movement that has been induced not only but to a significant extend by Brexit, shows that swift progress is possible once member states act together. Nevertheless, history also reveals that the next stop sign could very well be just around the corner. It is this exact instable existence between progress and stagnation that makes CSDP such a thought-provoking policy to investigate, since it offers the chance to understand the

26 Tobias Eichinger mechanisms inside one of the central policy fields that will substantially affect the Union’s future.

6. Empirical Analysis Turning now to the empirical analysis the most important points of departure developed up until now are briefly summarized. The research question is: Why did CSDP efforts progress substantially after Brexit despite wide anticipation and fears of disintegrating effects following the referendum? To reach an answer for that question the following has been shown and argued for so far: (1) The literature is mainly divided into three groups that all focus on different issues in the realm of CSDP. This paper belongs to group 1, examining intra-EU dynamics. (2) The theoretical landscape is wide and diverse when inquiring about CSDP and none of the frameworks alone can capture the policy perfectly. Intergovernmentalism fits most closely with the legal foundation of CSDP and the decision-making process of big policy guidelines which are mainly of interest here. But to account for all dynamics the help of alternative concepts should be employed so that institutional and relational dynamics of the EU are included as well. (3) The methodology follows a case-centric process tracing approach as outlined by Beach and Petersen. This means that the goal is to build a sufficient explanation for the historical outcome of increased integration in European security and defence, apparent in the various policy steps that have been taken in CSDP after Brexit. Therefore, the inquiry will be mostly inductive with theory being employed to make sense of observed mechanisms. (4) The historic development of European defence and security has been characterized by member states’ negotiation over the right path and a long-standing rift between Europeanists and Atlanticists. Defence and Security as a policy field has been detached from the overall integration process in other areas. Recent history saw the establishment of CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty but also directly afterwards a stagnant timespan in which nothing much happened and initiatives that have been part of the treaty were not realized. In the year following the Brexit referendum movement came into CSDP and a couple of bigger initiatives have been passed and new structures established leading to a more integrated EU approach to defence and security matters. The empirical analysis will examine the actions of France and Germany during the period 24/06/2016 – 31/12/2017 via studying parliamentary documents. Additionally, texts adopted by the European parliament are examined to understand the activities of the parliament, what initiatives the actively supported. Also, key policy papers of the EU Commission are included as well, most notably the EUGS and two White Papers. Overall, the objective is to identify the

27 Tobias Eichinger mechanism which underlies the process leading from a stagnant time in the 2010s before Brexit, towards a push of policy decisions taken shortly after the referendum.

6.1 France The eight compte rendus of the audiences of the French defence minister as well as the compte rendu of president Macron’s first speech have been searched for keywords to direct the path through the documents and quickly identify sections of interest. The first examined document for France is dated 05.07.2016, about two weeks after the Brexit referendum, and the last document is dated 03.10.2017. The following section will analyse the documents in a chronological order, so that steps that built on each other become apparent through time. Additionally, the mechanism as seen through the French documents and its main elements will be sketched out at the end of the section. What has generally become apparent over the course of examining the compte rendus is that France saw itself in a leadership role with a responsibility to move the European project forward, especially after the British referendum (Congrès du Parlement, 2017). Consequently, the statements of the French defence minister but also questions of the parliament members are often phrased in a way that indicates a French Republic waiting on or inducing their partners to take the actions deemed necessary by France. But besides France there are two other actors specifically, that are mentioned in almost every compte rendu: Germany as the most important European partner and the EU for coordinating and proposing initiatives. Taking the first document to define the starting point for France’s actions, the field of tension in which European nation-state actors are caught can immediately be seen. The defence minister Mr. Le Drian pointed out that national sovereignty is of utmost importance since Brexit showed that no alliance is irrevocable (Assemblée Nationale, 2016a, p. 3). But in the same breath he argues that the EU has reached a higher awareness of the importance of strategic autonomy of the Union which is reflected in the EUGS presented by High Representative of the Union Ms. Mogherini shortly before this parliamentary meeting, which is seen as favourable overall (Ibid., 2016a, p.4). So, the starting point for France’s actions is one that is driven by considerations about its own national interest under the new circumstances, while also encouraging and seeing potential for fast moves in European defence and security. Two elements appear to be crucial for the further actions that France has taken later: First, Germany is understood as politically moving in the same direction as France, which points towards a higher likelihood for swift progress from a French point of view. And secondly the EU seems prepared and ready to move on initiatives that have been on the table for long, like PESCO or the EDF (Ibid., 2016a). In

28 Tobias Eichinger these circumstances France undertook certain activities that have played a role in the outcome of more integration in European defence. The next document from end of July, does not hold any specific evidence in connection to CSDP as it was mainly concerned with a meeting in Washington D.C. for a coalition against Isis (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b). Often referred to as l’Europe de la défense 7 by the French, they took several steps to move the project of a more integrated European defence approach along. Building on the France-German relationship as the “pillar of the Europe of defence” the French and Germans together tabled a proposal for future steps to take in September of 2016, jumpstarting a serious discussion among their European partners and receiving support by a couple of other countries and the EU quickly (Assemblée Nationale, 2016d, pp. 6–7) Additionally, Minister Le Drian also underscored that France would make use of the Treaty provisions on the structured cooperation mechanism in case that any blockages of the proposal should come up during the next EU Council meeting (Ibid., 2016d, p. 8). This basically means that France was prepared to push forward even without including all member states on certain initiatives, as is possible under the provisions in TEU article 46, and furthermore indicates that pressure would indirectly be put on indecisive countries to follow the proposal at the next Council meeting. At said Council meeting the progress aimed for by the French has been achieved, notably because the UK did not vote against any of the proposals and the joint action together with the Germans was seen very impactful. When asked whether the exit of the UK was advantageous for this development8 the minister replied with a simple “Incontestablement” – “Unquestionably” (Assemblée Nationale, 2016c, p. 15). 2016 ended with several EU Council decisions taken in the December meeting of the year that were mostly in line with the French-German proposal. Moving into 2017 the positive effect of the December 2016 council decision was still felt and understood by the French as a good basis for further developments. The effects of Brexit are seen as the most apparent in the field of European defence. Minister Le Drian calls it a “rupture fondamentale”9 for European defence since it separates the EU from one of its biggest powers but at the same time also a country that wasn’t particularly involved in the European project in the defence area

7 English: The Europe of Defence

8« Pensez-vous que cette évolution a été favorisée par la sortie du Royaume-Uni ? » - « Incontestablement. Lorsqu’ils se sont rencontrés après le Brexit, la Chancelière allemande et le président de la République nous ont demandé explicitement, à mon homologue allemande et à moi-même, de préparer un dispositif destiné à accélérer l’Europe de la défense. C’est ce que nous avons fait, et nous en voyons les résultats aujourd’hui. Et, encore une fois, le Royaume-Uni n’a pas voté́ contre. » (Assemblée Nationale, 2016c, p. 15)

9 English: fundamental break 29 Tobias Eichinger and didn’t support it. The impact of the joint French-German initiative of September is pointed out again, an initiative that was not opposed by the UK (Assemblée Nationale, 2017d, pp. 5– 6). In the last audience of defence minister Mr. Le Drian in February 2017, it is indicated by a question of a member of parliament that there is a wide support for l’Europe de la défense in the parliament and the importance of the joint move of France and Germany is highlighted again for ensuring future swift progress (Assemblée Nationale, 2017c) The newly elected French president Emmanuel Macron underscored his commitment to the European project in his first speech before the Congrès du Parlement and made clear that France is ready to proceed with ambitious initiatives in the future (Congrès du Parlement, 2017, pp. 11–12). With this he sent a strong message to the other European members that one of the key countries of the Union is prepared to act. The new French defence minister Ms. Florence Parly shortly after reinforced the plan to think about defence in a European way, calling the situation back then an “extraordinary window of opportunity” 10 for continued progress in the defence policy field. Explicitly the EDF and PESCO are mentioned by her during this audience as projects that are on the way, with the EDF having been equipped with money already at this point by the EU Commission. The vital importance of the France-Germany duo is underscored; only if initiatives are brought to the table, other countries will follow (Assemblée Nationale, 2017a, pp. 5,6,12,20). The last audience during the period of inquiry was on October 3rd. Since it was a budgetary meeting concerning the French budget, European defence is only mentioned insofar as to how financial cost are distributed among members for new initiatives (Assemblée Nationale, 2017b). After having established the French take on European defence after the Brexit referendum the steps that France took can be sketched out, while also some actions of Germany and the EU institutions are hinted at. The following list of steps focuses on France’s actions, while the later schematic illustration of the process also includes the influence of EU and Germany. According to the examined material the following actions by France are identified:

• Step 1: Contact Germany swiftly after the Brexit vote to get its support for the ambition of a l’Europe de la défense

10 « Notre défense doit vraiment s’inscrire dans un cadre européen. À cet égard, nous bénéficions d’une fenêtre d’opportunité assez extraordinaire […] » (Assemblée Nationale, 2017a, p. 6)

30 Tobias Eichinger

• Step 2: Table a joint FR/DE initiative to spark discussion among EU partners and get EU institutions’ support • Step 3: Make clear that movement on specific initiatives would happen even if not all member states are on bord i.e., apply pressure • Step 4: Newly elected president reinforces France’s ambitions, equipping them with more weight • Step 5: Continuously communicate internally and externally the united front of France and Germany on policy proposals to get other members to follow on initiatives.

As we will see in the other case studies, these actions sparked reactions by other member states as well as the EU institutions which often reinforced them beyond their initial impact. Abstracting the actions of France to a general level, shows how its actions follow rather straightforward steps of using its political weight to gather support for its own initiatives, or on the other hand give support to ideas that came out of the European institutions. Through doing this France created a situation where it made best use of the disruptions that Brexit caused in a manner that used the uncertainty of the time to induce its European partners to move on initiatives France has long advocated for. This was achieved mostly through doubling up with Germany, putting additional weight behind the initiatives while also creating an atmosphere of urgency through stressing the importance of the moment in time for the future of Europe. The analysis of the French parliamentary documents points towards one central element that was important for triggering the process towards more integration: the window of opportunity that opened in 2016. Defence minister Parly called the situation exactly that in mid 2017, owning to the fact that progress had already been made by that point and future developments were still in the cards until the end of 2017. For a policy field which has been locked in stagnant periods repeatedly (see background section), a dynamic time like in 2016/17 was rather unusual. From the documents one can tell that the French government realized these special circumstances and acted upon them. With the opening of the window of opportunity France took various actions/steps that contributed to a more integrated European security and defence policy field by the end of 2017. In this analysis the window of opportunity has been identified as the likely cause that triggered the process towards more integration. The following figure visualizes the process according to the steps France undertook.

31 Tobias Eichinger

Figure 5: Activities by France - Process Tracing (author’s own illustration)

During the analysis a couple of main themes have become apparent that can be linked to broader theoretical discussions. All of them have in common that they feature as a central element in several documents and shaped the French actions and the evaluation of the situation in 2016/17.

Key Theme Appears in document(s) French leadership role and initiatives 2 out of 9 EU prepared to move along and presenting supporting initiatives 2 out of 9 Friendship with Germany and closer political alignment 5 out of 9 Exit of UK from the Union affects France’s scope for action. The window of 4 out of 9 opportunity

Table 2: France - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table) Overall, the material points towards the fact that France saw the exit of the UK as a window of opportunity to improve its own position within the EU and as a chance to progress initiatives that were in its own interest. The arguments brought forward during the French debates align mostly but not completely with intergovernmental and realist assumptions. Central themes of systemic pressure and interstate bargaining are frequently part of the debates and argumentations. Nevertheless, the material also shows that other consideration like the close bond with Germany or the initiative input out of the EU were important for France’s assessment of the situation. To sum up, France’s activities were driven by a recognition of exceptional circumstances in European politics overall and in defence and security specifically. It saw the chance to realize some of its own policy ambitions in a swift and fast manner, so the steps it took were all geared towards making best use of the window of opportunity that opened in mid 2016.

6.2 Germany The Regierungserklärungen (government statements) by chancellor Merkel are examined in chronological order to assess the federal government’s overall political line during the time of inquiry. Additionally, they are complemented by one written question on CSDP and two debates that were held during that time. The first document is dated 28.06.2016, shortly after

32 Tobias Eichinger the British referendum and the last is dated 29.06.2017, due to federal elections that took place in September 2017. The first Regierungserklärung by chancellor Merkel is held only a couple of days after the Brexit referendum. This document allows to define a starting point for the German actions. Given that the referendum took place only a couple of days before this parliamentary session it was naturally of central concern. Starting off her statement, Merkel called the June 23rd referendum a “turning point” 11 for Europe as well as the European integration process. It is argued that there are various foreign policy and security challenges for which Europe needs to take responsibility and CSDP needs to be further developed. She stresses a “historical responsibility” especially for France and Germany, to safeguard the achievements of the European integration and states that Germany is ready to step up to that responsibility (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016a, pp. 17881,17883,17884). The starting point for the German actions is therefore one that is aware of the importance of the Brexit referendum for future political movements in Europe while also stating right away the relationship with France as a crucial element. Furthermore, the need to work for Europe in the coming months/years is portrayed as a kind of duty for Germany and the importance of a functioning EU for Germany is highlighted. Shortly after in the next government statement that focused on a NATO summit meeting in 2016, it becomes clear that Germany was prepared to step up its commitment on defence issues e.g., increasing spending on defence and moving closer to the NATO’s two percent goal. Both NATO and CSDP are understood as the “framework” for German foreign and security policy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016b, p. 17983). This indicates two things: (1) That Germany is firmly rooted in NATO and CSDP and (2) that it was stepping up its commitment in defence overall, which validates the earlier mentioned French assessment that Germany is ready to take on more responsibility in this policy field. A written question to the government by a group of members of parliament inquired about the future development of CSDP and the government’s position on this issue. In the federal government’s answer, it becomes clear that making CSDP more capable and effective is a main objective. At this point, specific initiatives haven’t been set yet,

11 „Ich wiederhole, was ich bereits am Freitag gesagt habe: Die Bedeutung der Entscheidung des britischen Volkes kann gar nicht hoch genug ermessen werden, für das Vereinigte Königreich wie auch für die Europäische Union nicht. Der vergangene Donnerstag war ein Einschnitt für Europa. Er war ein Einschnitt für den europäischen Einigungsprozess.“ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016a:17881)

33 Tobias Eichinger but the overall ambition to further develop CSDP is clear. This is justified as necessary by the assessment that the security environment for Germany and Europe had changed (e.g., instability in the neighbourhood, international terror organisations) so that the member states are equipped to tackle these threats. Importantly a complementary capacity development between EU and NATO is strived for by the German government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016c, pp. 2,3,6,8). Moving on into March 2017 the need for Europe to take on more responsibility in security and defence policy is a central element in chancellor Merkel’s Regierungserklärung once again. Regarding a change in the transatlantic relations (start of Trump presidency) but also crises looming closer to home she states that Europe will need an ambitious security agenda that can act complementary to the NATO framework. As one of the main initiatives, PESCO is mentioned in this speech, which is seen as a crucial next step within European defence and security. Merkel also points out that it must be possible for willing countries to move forward, even if that means that other member states will only join in on certain initiatives later. Keeping Europe together will require continued great effort, and Brexit has been a “wake-up call” in that regard (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017e, pp. 22067–22068). What can be seen here is that the German government shared the same conception as France, that progress had to be made, even if that meant not taking every member state along right from the start. It again indicates that Germany and France were overall on the same page as to what the next steps should look like. At the end of March that year, a debate on Brexit was held in parliament in which the minister of Foreign Affairs was speaking on behalf of the government. The main element in his speech was the focus on unity of the European Union in the future negotiations with the UK. He underscored that the German government is fully committed to supporting a common EU negotiating line, that in fact a common approach is seen as vital for safeguarding German as well as European interests (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017b, pp. 22890–22892). With this the minister of Foreign Affairs already touched upon a theme that the chancellor herself would address often in her next speeches: unity among the EU member states in the face of the UK’s exit. In April, Merkel’s next speech in front of parliament didn’t specifically touch upon defence issues or CSDP. But what it can provide is a look into the situation in Europe at large. Especially the great unity among all 27 member states considering Brexit is highlighted by the chancellor, and she expresses that it had by no ways been certain that this unity among member states could be achieved. It was a joint effort by all member states as well as the EU commission and parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017a, pp. 23181–23182).

34 Tobias Eichinger

In a debate format called Aktuelle Stunde12 the federal government’s approach towards Brexit and European politics was discussed, specifically regarding an EU Council meeting taking place at the time. Speakers of the two governing parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) underlined the government’s commitment to building and maintaining unity among EU member states for future developments. One speaker also mentioned that there was “momentum” in certain policy fields that should be put to best use, singling out CSDP as a prime example (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017c, pp. 24539,24541). This again points towards the fact that the period of 2016/17 was indeed special in its dynamic nature and that the German government intended to use this circumstance for getting things done on the European level. In her final Regierungserklärung before the federal elections in September 2017, Merkel underscored the crucial importance of the French-German collaboration for a successful future of Europe as well as the progress that had been made up until that point. The commitment to further develop CSDP is reiterated and the unity among member states of the union is highlighted again (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017d, pp. 24879–24880). The main takeaway from Merkel’s last two speeches is that the France-Germany relationship was given equal weight and importance by both sides and understood as crucial for any meaningful progress by both governments. Additionally, the “window of opportunity” that French defence minister Parly mentioned in July 2017 also becomes apparent in Merkel’s speeches although it is not mentioned explicitly. But the fact that the unity among members has been especially high after Brexit was frequently singled out by the chancellor as an important circumstance for the progress that had been made on European projects. A similar judgement of the situation was therefore again present for both France and Germany, even though phrased slightly differently. Now let’s turn to the process according to the steps that Germany undertook. Since these speeches were orientated more broadly, they naturally cannot provide the same detailed information as the elaborations of the French defence minister regarding specifics on CSDP. But nevertheless, the overall line of the German government can be seen and the reasoning and actions it took become apparent. The following steps have been identified from the examined documents:

• Step 1: Communicate internally and externally the historic responsibility for Germany to act and protect the European project in light of Brexit • Step 2: Team up with France for joint initiatives on the European level

12 Translates literally to „current hour “. It is a format that is often used in the German parliament to discuss current events, in this case an EU Council meeting in June 2017 35 Tobias Eichinger

• Step 3: Support the option to move ahead on initiatives even without all member states following right away • Step 4: Continuously stress and support the need for unity among the EU member states regarding Brexit and the overall future of the Union

The process for Germany was identified with one less step than the process of France. Since France held elections earlier in 2017 than Germany, it already had a new government up and running that could additionally leave its mark during the time of inquiry. The steps undertaken by Germany follow a largely similar pattern as those of France, building on the close relationship between the two countries, but also on a continuous emphasis on key themes that are communicated internally and externally. Pressure was also applied in the sense that the option for progress on certain initiatives without having all member states on board was supported by the German government. The trigger for the process was the window of opportunity that France recognized as well. France saw the situation more through a lens of losing an important partner but at the same time also an adversary that has long stood in the way of a more integrated European security and defence approach. Germany on the other hand also saw the exceptional circumstances of the time but characterized them mostly through the newfound unity among member states following the Brexit referendum. The window of opportunity is the same, but the assessment of the situation is slightly different which also impacted Germany’s activities. The following figure visualizes the process according to the activities by Germany.

Figure 6: Activities by Germany - Process Tracing (author's own illustration) Same as with France, a couple of central themes have been identified during the empirical analysis that can later be linked to theoretic considerations. The main themes are listed in the following table. Key Theme Appears in document(s) Historic responsibility and national interest to protect the European project 5 out of 8 Changed security environment for Germany and EU 4 out of 8 Brexit as a turning point for EU integration 4 out of 8 Friendship with France as central element 3 out of 8

Table 3: Germany - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table)

36 Tobias Eichinger

What can be seen from the documents is that Germany approached the situation after Brexit from a different angle than France. For the German government, protecting the European project was not only about the often proclaimed “historical responsibility”, but more importantly about Germany’s prosperity and stability being directly tied to a functioning and stable European Union. The pursuit to protect the Union is therefore also influenced by an element of national interest, so letting the EU drift apart after Brexit was never really an option for Germany as can be told from the examined documents. All the subsequent activities that the country undertook are in some way linked to this starting point: protect the Union to protect Germany. The field of security and defence and subsequently CSDP warranted more effort during 2016/17 due to turmoil and fears of further divisions inside the Union after the Brexit referendum and various other external instability risks. An element of urgency is often present in the Regierungserklärungen, as the danger for the Union was seen as high. In sum, Germany’s activities are driven by a national interest element that is connected to protecting Germany’s prosperity but also by a normative one, that evolves around the EU as first and foremost a peace project that cannot be allowed to fail.

6.3 European Parliament and EU Commission Finally, let’s turn to the EU and its activities during the time of inquiry. To start eight resolutions of the European parliament are examined. Later, the strategic documents published by the EU Commission complement the picture of what the EU process and its steps look like. The first document is dated 28.06.2016, on this day the EUGS was published, and the last is dated 13.12.2017. The first parliament resolution is from 22.11.2016 and discusses the prospects of a full European Defence Union. This is interesting because it means that during a time when there was movement coming into the policy field of defence, the parliament actively adopted a resolution that discusses and supports the highest form of integration possible, likely aiming to create additional momentum. This resolution recognizes the effects of a changing security environment for the Union as well as implications of Brexit. It is pointed out that many treaty provisions, although ready, have not been realized yet and that movement needs to happen as soon as possible. It is highlighted that the state of CSDP as of that point in time hinders the EU of addressing pressing issues effectively and member states are reminded to make best use of the potential the Lisbon Treaty provides. As first steps the initiation of PESCO is advised as well as implementing the action plan for the EUGS (European Parliament, 2016a, pp. 2-5,11).

37 Tobias Eichinger

The next document touches upon similar themes, starting from a point of criticizing lacking effectiveness of the member states responses to current crises as well as showing that support for closer integration is high in the European population. PESCO and the creation of a European operations headquarters for CSDP missions are supported as next important initiatives (European Parliament, 2016b, pp. 2–6). A reoccurring theme also for document three are the internal and external crises that the EU faced during that time and that only a harmonized, common approach is understood as effective and able to address the risks. Also, the need to utilise potential provided by the Lisbon Treaty is underscored again. It is argued that the EU can only become a truly global power if soft and hard power are combined. The parliament furthermore acknowledged that the crises also represent an opportunity for the Union if it leads to better functioning and cooperation13 (European Parliament, 2016c, pp. 2,3,6-8). Here we can see that the window of opportunity was also recognized by the European Parliament, so all three, France, Germany and the EU Parliament saw the time of 2016/17 as having potential to be used for progress on European-level projects and initiatives. Moving into 2017, the next examined resolution represents a form of thought-experiment about potential evolutions of the current institutional set-up of the Union. Main element is the need to create more unity and closer cooperation through evolving the design of the institutions, which also touches upon CSDP (European Parliament, 2017b). The issue of not using the potential of the Lisbon treaty to its fullest, resurfaces again in the next document. The parliament urges that steps towards a common defence must be taken, and that a first step would be the establishment of PESCO through a qualifying majority vote to give willing member states the chance for closer cooperation (European Parliament, 2017a, pp. 7, 20). This instance points towards the same dynamic that France and Germany were advocating for as well: move forward on initiatives without the need to include every member state from the start. It shows that the European parliament too was in favour of making progress where progress is possible to make best use of the circumstances and the window of opportunity. Through supporting this in principle, the parliament validated the approach that France and Germany both already favoured. Further dealing with the possibilities that the legal basis of the Lisbon treaty provided,

13 “Considers that the current internal and external crisis also represents an opportunity for the EU if it is used to make the EU work and cooperate better; […] recalls that European citizens see an effective common foreign and security policy as a priority area of action for the EU and that this is one of the areas where European cooperation can yield most value added; emphasises, therefore, that Member States must change their mentality since nowadays thinking about foreign policy and security in a narrow minded national perspective is obsolete; […]” (European Parliament, 2016c:3)

38 Tobias Eichinger document six once more highlights the changing “geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances” and the need to move forward on treaty provisions that are already in place to make CSDP more effective. Additionally, successful integration is connected to the very core principles of the Union that goes back to the founding fathers: to establish collective defence that would safeguard peace on the continent (European Parliament, 2017c, pp. 3,6). This normative argument introduced here by the parliament, has also featured in some of the Regierungserklärungen of German chancellor Merkel. The final two resolutions from December 2017, reiterate many key themes that are present throughout the period for the European Parliament. Document seven credits the EUGS as important step towards framing a common defence approach. It also points out that Brexit gave “new momentum”14 to initiatives that have been gridlocked previously. As the establishment of PESCO later in the month could be foreseen at this point, the parliament welcomed this development it had strongly advocated for over the last one and a half years. (European Parliament, 2017e, pp. 5,6,8). In the final document key themes are underscored again, stressing the need for unity, close cooperation, a common defence approach and the need to unlock the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (European Parliament, 2017d). Overall, the European Parliament provided impulses through passing these resolutions. This was cleverly timed in some instances, like the resolution about a true European Defence Union at the end of 2016, that came right at a time when first movements in the policy field could already be observed. Additionally, there was a continuous emphasis on already existing provision of the Lisbon Treaty that would just need to be activated by the member states, highlighting the simplicity with which progress could be achieved. With this the parliament introduced an important factor that will be referred to as falling forward. The parliament actively pointed towards unused potentials in the TEU, therefore showing that achieving progress must not be a difficult task but could instead be done rather easily and quickly. This is also validated by the initiation of PESCO, which was one of the main unused treaty provisions that was ultimately activated by member states at the end of 2017. Through actively pointing out that certain initiatives can and should be passed by qualified majority vote instead of relying on unanimity, parliament supported the same approach that France put forward more aggressively and Germany was also open for. The pressure on member states to join in on initiatives was therefore applied from the two biggest members but also by the EU itself through

14 „ […] through Brexit the EU will lose part of its military capability and will possibly no longer be able to benefit from the UK’s expertise, and vice versa; notes that Brexit gives new momentum to initiatives that have long been blocked, and could open the door to new proposals; […]” (European Parliament, 2017e:4,5). 39 Tobias Eichinger its parliament. Furthermore, changing geopolitical circumstances as well as internal and external crises were used as incentives to deepen integration to become more effective in defence and security. Also, the window of opportunity that opened in connection to Brexit is acknowledged and seen as useful for achieving fast progress. Ultimately, there is a normative argument too, that goes back to the founding fathers of Europe, connecting peace and prosperity on the continent with a deepened, more effective common defence and security approach. The EU commission was mostly credited with advancing the framing of a common defence, mostly through the publishment of the EUGS and the White Paper on the Future of Europe. Therefore, these documents will be examined briefly here as well, since they represent an activity by an EU institution that has been deemed relevant by both other actors examined so far. The EUGS was published only a couple of days after the Brexit referendum was held and as Tocci described some small alterations were made to have the document reflect this new circumstance as well (Tocci, 2017). The document contains many central themes that the EU parliament also dealt with in 2016/17. There is an emphasis on changed global circumstances, new threats, that must be addressed together through a joint approach. The EUGS starts off with the assessment that the EU faces “existential crises” internally and externally and that the European project itself is in danger. Improving security and defence is highlighted as a crucial next step and that defence cooperation must be the new norm. Also, the dormant potential of the Lisbon treaty should be put to full use (European Commission, 2016, pp. 3,7,10,11). The EUGS therefore already introduced key themes in June 2016 that would later be taken up by the EU Parliament and were also welcomed by France and Germany as an important basis, possibly also justification, for their own activities. In 2017 the EU commission published the White Book on the future of Europe which contained five potential scenarios for the future development of the Union. They were all reflections on options rather than strict policy prescriptions. The scenarios provoke discussion, as they show potential ways forward. Keeping in mind that 2017 was a dynamic time in European politics in general, this White Paper arguably further induced thought-provoking options. It is striking that scenario three (“those who want do more”) basically evolves around the option for willing countries to move ahead on certain policies (European Commission, 2017a). This matches the activities by France, Germany and the EU Parliament which all saw this approach as a solid option to induce progress in the policy area of security and defence. In connection to the White Paper a series of Reflection Papers on specific policy areas were published as well. For the future of European Defence this came in June 2017. Three scenarios are developed, differing in the level of integration they would encompass in security and defence. It is underlined that improving European security and

40 Tobias Eichinger defence is crucial and that initiatives underway at that time show that member states and the EU want to move into that direction. Safeguarding the EU as a peace project for future generations is connected to a successful security and defence union (European Commission, 2017b) The process for the EU is naturally different to that of France or Germany. While the two nation state entities have the full scope of activity a nation state enjoys, the EU is more restricted in that way. Many of its activities are the publications of strategic and policy papers itself or the resolutions taken in parliament to support certain initiatives or point out shortcomings. The following steps have been identified for the EU (commission and parliament together):

• Step 1: Publish EUGS with ambitious goals for a closer integrated approach to foreign policy as well as in defence and security • Step 2: Frame internal and external threats and show the need to work together to effectively address them • Step 3: Continuously support promising initiatives like PESCO and point out the “ready-to-use” treaty provisions of the TEU that just need to be activated • Step 4: Publish White Paper on Future of Europe and support the option for “some do more” approaches on certain policy initiatives • Step 5: Tie successful integration in defence with preserving peace in Europe, therefore introducing a normative element

The steps taken by both the Commission and the Parliament walk more along the line of creating impulses through showing ambitious ways forward. They supported initiatives that moved into the same direction and criticized slow movement or lack of progress continuously. By pointing out that much could be achieved with little work since the Lisbon Treaty had much unused potential, the progress the EU institutions aimed for was presented as an easy to achieve way forward and the falling forward factor was introduced. Ultimately by tying the successful integration in security and defence with lasting peace on the continent an argument that goes to the very core of the history of the Union, a normative element but also pressure was introduced. Through this normative argument, a situation of urgency was created. Failing to commit to deeper integration in defence and security as a sign of unity during times of distress, was portrayed as potentially fatal for the Union overall. So, the EU institutions urged member states to take the responsibility of protecting the European project seriously. The urgency factor also surfaced in the German documents, that also frequently pointed out the need to work for

41 Tobias Eichinger member states to be united in face of the Brexit crisis. In sum, the EU actively proposed ambitious plans willing member states could refer to, while simultaneously pushing for progress on initiatives that already existed in the TEU and just needed to be initiated. The figure below illustrates the joint process steps of the EU Commission and the Parliament:

Figure 7: Activities by the EU - Process Tracing (author's own illustration)

Some key themes that have come up repeatedly in the documents of the Commission as well as the Parliament are listed below. These will later be connected to overarching theoretical discussions together with the themes that surfaced during the analysis of France and Germany.

Key Theme Appears in document(s) Lisbon Treaty must be used to full potential, ease of establishment for next steps 3 out of 11 Changed geopolitical and geostrategic environment 5 out of 11 Closer, harmonized action as the only way to address threats effectively: Unity All is needed Normative argument: EU is essentially about preserving peace on the continent All

Table 4: EU - Key themes from the empirical analysis (author’s own table) Overall, the window of opportunity that has been recognized by Germany and France was also recognized by the EU parliament as it also pointed towards the new momentum that was possible due to the exit of the UK. The material points towards the EU as being aware of the exceptional circumstances of 2016/2017. Changing global security environments played a role but also the effects of Brexit and the danger the British referendum could have potentially put on the European project itself. The Union therefore acted along its possibilities in showing a route forward that could protect the European project and lead to a closer instead of more fragmented future. This was mainly achieved through publishing strategic documents that widened potential scope for activity while supporting member states that were willing to move forward quickly. Additionally, the relative ease with which next steps could be taken was communicated frequently to underscore that progress was not only deemed necessary but also rather easy to achieve for member states. Ultimately all these impulses were connected to the history of the Union to create a normative argument, that the EU as a peace project needs to be protected, and that it is member states’ historic duty to do so.

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6.4 Summary: The overall process In this section all three observed processes are harmonized and connected to understand the overall picture of what happened in European defence and security in 2016/2017. Being guided by central underlying national interest considerations, France started from a point of seeing a potential to strengthen its leadership role and Germany saw keeping the European project intact as crucial for safeguarding national prosperity. They both realized that working closely together will lead to a higher likelihood of speedy success, which is why the French-German tandem has been at the centre of their activities. Additionally, they both understood the tumultuous political circumstances after Brexit as a window of opportunity to advance projects on a European scale that had previously been blocked by the UK. The EU institutions examined for this study, the Commission as well as the Parliament, played their role in introducing new impulses through the EUGS or parliamentary resolutions on a European Defence Union and stated their support for certain initiatives like the establishment of PESCO. Moreover, a continuous framing of the seriousness of the point in time for the future of Europe painted the picture of a Union only inches away from disaster and introduced a factor of urgency. Showing that a contagion effect of Brexit could be averted rather easily through activating ready-to-go treaty provisions that cumulate in closer cooperation and integration, an easy route forwards was shown which represents the falling forward factor. Ultimately all the activities by France, Germany and the EU likely reinforced each other, as each actor adopted their next step to the activities of the others, which could be seen in instances like France and Germany building on the EUGS to justify their own activities. The figure below sketches out the process of all three examined entities to allow for a summarized, condensed view of their activities and steps that led from the window of opportunity to the increase in integration in European defence and security.

Figure 8: The combined process (author's own illustration)

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7. Discussion After identifying the process steps according to the activities of France, Germany as well as the EU the attention now turns back to theory and how it can help to explain the observed process. The activities of France and Germany can be explained to a certain extend by frameworks that concentrate on nation states as their main unit of analysis. Hence, neorealism and intergovernmentalism offer solid explanations for parts of their activities. Both countries acted from a point of considering national interest. For France that starting point was the opportunity to further strengthen its leadership role while for Germany it was the objective to safeguard national prosperity through working towards protecting the EU from any potentially disintegrating effects. Both also engaged in intergovernmental bargaining behaviour, on the one hand with each other where they found common ground seemingly quickly and on the other hand, with other member states whose support was needed as well to advance initiatives. Both France and Germany also applied pressure over the course of 2016/17 by actively considering moving ahead on certain initiatives without unanimity across the member states, which was also supported by the EU institutions. Remembering the key themes that came up during the analysis of the documents, many fit realist theoretical assumptions rather well. Identifying a changing geopolitical context as one main reason to move forward and better equip the EU to address the changed circumstances as e.g., Germany but also the EU Parliament and Commission often did, connects directly to neorealist assumptions of anarchy and systemic pressures that influence actors’ behaviour. So, on a lower, inter-state-level, many of the activities taken by France and Germany can be explained well by intergovernmentalism. Considering that the legal foundation of CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty follows and intergovernmental logic in large parts, this finding should not come as a surprise. Furthermore, key themes in the documents can frequently be connected to neorealist assumptions of national interest, systemic pressure, and geopolitical power considerations. There is however, one crucial problem to this explanatory approach. For many theoretical frameworks, and for realist ones especially, nation states giving up elements of their sovereignty does not represent a logical choice, even more so in the policy field of security and defence. Why then would big, powerful countries within the EU, like France and Germany, actively work to harmonize the European approach towards defence? Since every step towards closer integration results in a loss of control and/or limits a nation state’s available scope for action, such a move does not make sense under these frameworks. So, while neorealism and intergovernmentalism can explain many aspects of the activities that have been observed in the

44 Tobias Eichinger empirical analysis, they cannot provide an answer for why countries decided to move into the direction of giving up parts of their sovereignty at that specific point in time. Now it must be mentioned at this that the four notable initiatives that have been passed between mid 2016 and the end of 2017 did not challenge the very core elements of national sovereignty in defence. As Martill and Sus described the control over militaries to this day remains firmly in the hands of member states (Martill & Sus, 2018, pp. 851–852), so the undoubtably most crucial part of defence sovereignty was not opened to influence from the EU by the member states. However, this does not mean that a transfer of control did not happen. PESCO for example requires members to coordinate closely on matters of material and capabilities. Commitments are legally binding, and decisions are taken through qualified majority voting. There are no known sanctions for failing to meet commitments, but instead an element of peer pressure is applied through annual reports on participating members’ performance (Engberg, 2021, pp. 13–14). This means that participating states can be outvoted on decisions regarding PESCO while being pressured to follow through on their commitments, hence limiting their scope of action. Also established in 2017, the European Defence Fund (EDF) as a new funding tool for defence investments is funded in large parts by the member states, but the direction of investment is mostly at the discretion of the EU Commission (Regulation (EU) 2021/691). So, while the very core of national sovereignty has not been touched by these new initiatives, member states nevertheless willingly set up structures that restrict some of their scope for action, while at the same time manifesting a route towards more integrated instead of independent actions in defence. As has frequently been noted by other scholars, from mid 2016 on the area of European defence and security experienced a dynamic time towards more integration as hardly ever seen before (Herranz-Surrallés, 2019; Koppa, 2019; McArdle, 2020). The empirical analysis points towards three factors that were central for the activities of the examined entities in 2016/17 and ultimately cumulated in the move towards more integration in European defence and security. As has been assumed earlier, the EU likely played a role in the process and the empirical work has validated this assumption. The Parliament together with the EU Commission introduced one of the three critical factors for progress in 2016/17: urgency. This refers to the way in which the situation after the British referendum was portrayed by these two European institutions. Starting directly with the EUGS, the situation was defined as one of urgency, with various forces threatening to break apart the EU. Threats to the Union, internal and external ones, featured in many other examined documents too, as the main reason why closer integration in defence is needed. Additionally, these institutions also connected the success of the European project overall and that of a more capable and closer integrated defence

45 Tobias Eichinger approach specifically, with a normative argument. The lasting peace on the continent after WWII is connected to the European project and the EU. Therefore, a direct relation between peace and a stable, successful EU is drawn. An implication is made that it is member states’ duty to not endanger this historic period of peace but instead safeguard it for future generations through making the right choices at that crucial point in time. This normative argument of the EU representing a peace project first and foremost, often surfaced in the German and to a lesser extend in the French documents, which shows that it is also present in the decision-making processes of the biggest member states of the Union. The second crucial factor for progress in 2016/17 that was identified in the empirical work is what will be referred to as falling forward. It entails the notion that the Lisbon Treaty had much dormant potential during the time which just needed to be activated by the member states. The EU parliament specifically pointed out this fact in almost every document that has been examined for this project. This simply means that the barrier to pass and implement next policy steps was comparatively low, since most of the legal groundwork was already done and ready to be activated. As we will see in the next paragraph falling forward also directly connects to the window of opportunity, since both have an influence in which policy initiatives progress. Finally, the third and probably most important factor for progress in 2016/17 was the window of opportunity. As already touched upon in the introduction it appears that most central actors were indeed aligned on their preferences after the British referendum, which was vital for the progress that could be observed. This window of opportunity was recognized by all three examined entities. France and Germany as well as the EU through its parliament acknowledged that momentum was present in European defence and security. But why did the window open at that exact point in time? Kingdon dealt with this question when he described policy windows and how they open and close. He defined a policy window as an opening in policy systems that allows for action on initiatives and proposals. It is pointed out that these policy windows do not stay open for long and appear infrequently. Yet, many bigger political changes are tied to these specific moments of opportunity. A policy window is either opened by problems that require immediate attention and solution or by political changes like a government change. Additionally, he described that an open window influences the political agenda in the way that it gives initiatives priority according to their likelihood of enactment. Ultimately, a policy window closes again for a variety of reasons, which include the passing of the crisis that opened the window, or that politicians feel the problem has been adequately addressed (Kingdon, 2013, pp. 166–170). Connecting Kingdon’s insights to the empirical research, we can see that the pieces fit very close together. The window observed during empirical work was a problem-

46 Tobias Eichinger induced one as it was connected to the Brexit referendum and the subsequent crisis in European politics. It caused the examined actors to consider moving forward on policy initiatives that would balance the disruption of the Brexit vote to the European integration process through actively working for more integration in the defence and security field. Also, the choice of initiatives to move forward follows Kingdon’s claims about an open window influencing the political agenda. That PESCO was among the initiatives that was pushed forward is therefore no surprise. It was ready from a legal standpoint in the TEU and the French as well as the EU wanted to initiate that policy for quite some time. When the right moment arrived, i.e., the window opened, it was pushed high up on the priority list since its likelihood of success was comparatively high during that time. Kingdon argued that the three streams of problems, policies and politics come together during an open window, which makes significant movement much more likely (Ibid., 2013, p.20). This could be observed in the empirical material as well. The problem of Brexit and perceived danger to the Union was addressed by policy proposals that worked towards closer integration while the overall political environment was favourable for change to happen since key actors were aligned on which steps to take next. To sum up, the research question “Why did CSDP efforts progress substantially after Brexit despite wide anticipation and fears of disintegrating effects following the referendum?” can be answered through a combination of various elements. Common theories like neorealism and intergovernmentalism offer solid explanatory value for many of the observed specific activities of France and Germany. Furthermore, they could also often be connected to key themes that surfaced in the empirical material of all three examined entities. But they nevertheless ran into a central limitation for explaining the specific historic case of this research project: That giving up national sovereignty and handing over control to the EU does not make sense within their frameworks, especially not in matters of defence and security. The empirical analysis has shown that there were mainly three elements responsible for the progress made in European defence and security in 2016/17. Those three elements are partly normative, partly practical, and partly moment-in-time driven. All three combined, can explain why the move towards more integration happened the way it did. 1. Urgency: An atmosphere of urgency was created through connecting the fallout of the Brexit referendum with an existential crisis for the European Union. Additional external crises and security threats were connected as well, to further reinforce the argument of danger to the Union. A normative argument of the EU as a peace project was introduced by the EU institutions, which put pressure on member states to make sure that the historic project would not fail. Germany and France both included this normative

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argument in their own national justifications for their actions. The element of urgency led to key actors actively behaving in a way that showed unity to contrast the Brexit referendum that threatened to put the European project itself into question. 2. Falling Forward: The unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty represents the practical ease with which new initiatives could be implemented, therefore lowering the barrier for initiating the policy proposals. This factor connects to the window of opportunity, since as Kingdon (2013) described, policy proposals are selected according to their likelihood of enactment. Given the fact that legal foundations for some of the proposals were already in place, the EU institutions as well as the member states decided on them as the probability of successful enaction was comparatively high. 3. Window of opportunity: This element was found to have had the biggest impact since it started the process in the first place while influencing all activities of all actors along the whole process. With the exit of the UK a strategic opening occurred. The country that had often blocked progress in the 2010s in defence and security was about to leave while its decision to leave induced a sense of unity and political alignment across the remaining member states. France and Germany recognized the extraordinary circumstances of the time, as did the EU Parliament and the EU Commission. All worked towards making use of the window of opportunity that had presented itself by introducing ambitious policy initiatives in connection to CSDP.

Additionally, the empirical analysis points towards both normative/ideational factors as well as material/strategic factors that have played a role in actors’ activities. This can be connected to earlier theorization by Meyer and Strickmann who argued that EU member states are connected through ideational factors like high mutual trust but also material factors like economic interdependence. Additionally, depending on the material capabilities some actors may be able to make more credible arguments and proposals than others (Meyer & Strickmann, 2011, p. 72). When we connect their findings to the empirical work, we can see it helps us to understand the observed actors’ behaviour even better. France as the militarily most powerful member state was therefore very credible in its propositions and initiatives to advance CSDP, when Germany as the biggest country of the bloc supported this move the argument gained even more weight. Other member states followed, and the EU institutions further supported the steps towards deeper integration in defence while providing the process with an additional ideational/normative argument of preserving peace on the continent for future generations.

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All the many elements touched upon in this chapter ultimately played together in facilitating the move towards more integration in security and defence. (1) A window of opportunity opened in mid 2016 that enabled a newfound unity among member states. (2) Political movement with the objective to counteract any fallout from the Brexit referendum to the European project was initiated (3) Policies that would be comparatively easy to enact and activate were supported by France, Germany, and the EU. (4) Element of urgency and normative peace argument plus material arguments of geopolitical changes and external threats further moved along the process and influenced actors’ activities. (5) A legal framework of the TEU that provided chances to reach success fast and in a comparatively easy manner, a circumstance member states made use of.

8. Conclusion In this thesis European defence and security and the policy movements in connection to CSDP in 2016/17 were investigated through an Explaining-Outcome process tracing approach. This allowed for a detailed account of the activities of France, Germany, and the EU from mid 2016 to the end of 2017. It was shown that the three factors of urgency, falling forward and a window of opportunity led to increased integration in European defence and security. This thesis contributes to the existing body of work on CSDP through providing a focused, mechanism- based case study of key actors’ activities after the Brexit referendum. It was shown that common, dominant theories like neorealism or intergovernmentalism struggle to explain the whole observed process within their respective frameworks and that the additional factors identified during the research need to be considered as well. The insights from the empirical research point towards certain circumstantial needs that are required for integrative movements in European defence: Alignment of key actors was crucial to facilitate the intergovernmental bargaining process baked into CSDP. Additionally, the window of opportunity that presented itself after the Brexit referendum was required to kick off the process in the first place. It created a strategic opening to introduce policy initiatives that were previously blocked while simultaneously inducing a newfound unity among member states through the threat the British decision represented to the European project overall. Including the relative ease with which existing treaty provisions of the TEU could be activated lead to a situation where European countries could show the desired unity and progress in light of the threats facing their Union, in a comparatively simple and fast manner. An interplay of ideational and material factors became apparent as an important driving forces as well, with member states and the EU having reached into both spheres to justify and decide on moves to take. The phase of 2016/17

49 Tobias Eichinger represents an especially active period in the history of European defence and security with the described specific underlying characteristics that made the observed progress possible. While this thesis has focused on intra-EU activities between member states and the EU institutions, it must be acknowledged that there were other external influences during that period as well. All three examined entities recognized a combination of internal and external crises facing the Union in 2016/17, so it is likely that actors’ activities have been influenced by further factors besides the ones identified in this thesis. Future research could try to identify whether the combination of urgency, falling forward and a window of opportunity, is a reoccurring pattern of factors for increased integration in the history of European defence. This would allow to compare the findings of this study on relative recent history with other periods and could lead to the discovery of mechanistic patterns that have overall validity. Also, researching if the same of similar factors were tied to increased integration in other policy areas as well, could lead to a better understanding of the overall European integration process.

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Official Documents

Assemblée Nationale. (2016a). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mardi 5 juillet 2016, Séance de 18 heures 30, Compte rendu n° 64. https://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/15-16/c1516064.asp

Assemblée Nationale. (2016b). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mardi 26 juillet 2016, Séance de 14 heures 30, Compte rendu n° 65. https://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/15-16/c1516065.asp

Assemblée Nationale. (2016c). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mercredi 16 novembre 2016, Séance de 16 heures 30, Compte rendu n° 17. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/16-17/c1617017.asp

Assemblée Nationale. (2016d). Commission des affaires étrangères, Mardi 11 octobre 2016, Séance de 17 heures, Compte rendu n°004. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cafe/16- 17/c1617004.asp

Assemblée Nationale. (2017a). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Jeudi 6 juillet 2017, Séance de 11 heures 15, Compte rendu n° 2. https://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/dyn/15/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l15cion_def1617002_compte-rendu

Assemblée Nationale. (2017b). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mardi 3 octobre 2017, Séance de 17 heures, Compte rendu n° 01. https://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/dyn/15/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l15cion_def1718001_compte-rendu

Assemblée Nationale. (2017c). Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mercredi 22 février 2017, Séance de 16 heures 15, Compte rendu n° 31. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/16-17/c1617031.asp

Assemblée Nationale. (2017d). Mission d’information sur les suites du référendum britannique et le suivi des négociations, Jeudi 19 janvier 2017, Séance de 11 h 45, Compte rendu n° 8. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-mibrexit/16-17/c1617008.asp

Congrès du Parlement. (2017). CONGRÈS DU PARLEMENT, Lundi 3 juillet 2017, Compte rendu intégral. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/cri/congres/20174001.asp#P980776

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, (2007). http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/oj

Deutscher Bundestag. (2016a). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht 181. Sitzung, Berlin, Dienstag, den 28. Juni 2016. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18181.pdf#P.17881

Deutscher Bundestag. (2016b). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht 183. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 7. Juli 2016. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18183.pdf#P.17979

Deutscher Bundestag. (2016c). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/9643 18. Wahlperiode, 14.09.2016, Antwort der Bundesregierung. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/096/1809643.pdf

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Deutscher Bundestag. (2017a). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht 231. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 27. April 2017. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18231.pdf#P.23179

Deutscher Bundestag. (2017b). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 228. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 30. März 2017. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18228.pdf#P.22889

Deutscher Bundestag. (2017c). Deutscher Bundestag Stenografischer Bericht 240. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 22. Juni 2017. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18240.pdf#P.24537

Deutscher Bundestag. (2017d). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht 243. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 29. Juni 2017. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18243.pdf#P.24878

Deutscher Bundestag. (2017e). Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht 221. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 9. März 2017. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18221.pdf#P.22063

European Commission. (2016). A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

European Commission. (2017a). White Paper on the Future of Europe—Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf

European Commission. (2017b). Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf

European Parliament. (2016a). European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union (2016/2052(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0435_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2016b). European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (2016/2067(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0440_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2016c). European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2016 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2016/2036(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0503_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2017a). European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017- 0049_EN.pdf

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European Parliament. (2017b). European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017- 0048_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2017c). European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2017 on constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: Possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty (2015/2343(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0092_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2017d). European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2017/2121(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0493_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2017e). European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (2017/2123(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0492_EN.pdf

Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, (2021). http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj

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