CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment oftherequirementsfordegreeMaster ofArts In partialfulfillment E XPLAINING THE I N B ETWEEN THE ETWEEN in andEuropeanStudies in InternationalRelations Supervisor: Annabelle Littoz-Monnet ProfessorAnnabelle Supervisor: Central European University Central European L I ACK OF MMIGRATION D Budapest, Hungary OMESTIC AND THE OMESTIC IRES Department IRES Words Submitted to Submitted Erisa Lame Erisa H 2007 By ARMONIZATION OF : 15, 616 P OLICY S UPRANATIONAL EU L ABOR CEU eTD Collection needed it. most I when mestrength gave who Nenad, to thanks enough never least, not but Last thiswith academic me throughout year. A special myappreciation to goes family, compassion whosehugesupport; and love were advice, valuable comments, patience and encouragement. FirstandI would foremost, like express my to sincere my gratitude to supervisor for her help of certain people whom it is my pleasure thank.to accomplished doingfactof scientific As amatter is a complex work research study and cannotbe by a single person. ThisA thesis would not have been completed without the CKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii CEU eTD Collection not agreed upon a commonagreed upon not policy. immensethe importanceimmigration labor EU member for poses as yet they states, have labordiversity on Given immigration process. integration states thegreat across policy and EU the driving actors main the are who states member EU is it that concludes thesis This employed. is analysis framework Intergovernmentalist Liberal a policy, immigration labor of process harmonization in the states member EU of role the disclose to aims thesis laborimmigration policy memberthe at domestic sphere level. states’ andatEU As the This of identifies national study executives. of aspects sovereignty anddiscusses important whether a policy willcould bring.The main hypothesismember is key are the that states players be in deciding this harmonized benefits the of inspite level EU at policy immigration economic atcommon a no theis there EU level or whether exist.it main the policy Therefore not does answerquestion this is thesis to why attempts will immigration remain labor common a and states member EU from under blockages many faced have theefforts these However, policy. this of harmonization at aiming institutions EU from coming importance the Given policy. immigration labor EU of harmonization of issue the addresses thesis ofThis the immigrationA issues for the EU as a whole there are many attempts BSTRACT iii CEU eTD Collection Chapter 1- Background Information Introduction Chapter 3-NationalPreference Formation Chapter 2-Theoretical Framework Conclusion Chapter 5 –Delegating Sovereignty toSupranational Institutions Chapter 4 –EULevel Bargaining Bibliography 2.3 Applying Liberal to Integration Union European to Intergovernmentalism Liberal Applying 2.3 5.1 Locking Each Other Into Credible Commitments Credible Into Other Each Locking 5.1 Issue Linkages4.2 and Side Payments Alternatives Coalitional and Unilateral 4.1 5.3 Preliminary Conclusion Preliminary 5.3 Conclusion Preliminary 4.3 Conclusion Preliminary 3.3 member Divergences3.1 across states Neo-Functionalism2.1 1.2 Role of EU institutions 2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Liberal 2.2 Revisions Treaty 1.1 5.2 “EscapingEurope” to 3.2 Political Salience and Public Opinion Public and Salience Political 3.2 2.3.1- National Preference Formation.2.3.1- Origins Intergovernmentalism- Liberal 2.2.1 3.1.2 High Skill or Low Skill Labor? 2.3.3 3.1.1 EU Member State’s Labour Immigration Policies Immigration Labour State’s Member EU 3.1.1 Distribution and Efficiency Explaining Bargaining: Interstate 2.3.2 2.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism – Main Assumptions Institutional choice: Pooling and Delegation of Sovereignty of Delegation and Pooling choice: Institutional ...... 53 ...... 1 ...... 57 ...... 8 ...... 15 ...... 49 ...... 11 ...... 52 ...... 45 ...... 38 ...... T ...... 40 ...... ABLE OF ...... 17 ...... 14 ...... 8 ...... 30 ...... 44 ...... 34 ...... 22 ...... 36 ...... 42 ...... iv C ...... 28 ...... ONTENTS ...... 17 ...... 47 ...... 30 ...... 19 ...... 46 ...... 25 ...... 23 ...... 22 ...... CEU eTD Collection immigration policy does not exist. It is highly appealing therefore, to examine the examine to therefore, appealing highly is It exist. not does policy immigration policy has faced many political blockages memberof the from and part the a common states faranycoming So attempt member the from EUaimingstates. the atharmonization of this recognized is importance sensitivity the andthe this issue sovereigntyfor the represents of equally time, same the At Union. the within labor of movement free of goal broad its achieve to is EU if the especially recognized, widely is level EU the at policy immigration labor harmonizing of importance The institutions. EU for also but states member T former being ones far so successful in retaining control. theexecutives between competence member of the institutions, and EU states with the immigration policy concerning nationals thirdcountry hasLabor been theobjectof a struggle of etc. opinion public requirements, professional different the in transformations in member have by been states prompted domestic such factors as (un)employmentlevels, liberal and tendencies restrictions depending changing on Policy domestic factors. changes beenby characterized extreme time, changes countriesand across across switching between governments. One of them is the labor immigration policy immigration labor the is them of One governments. policies havebeen successfully communitarized, remain others in handsthe of nationalthe agendathe of of Union. European hasthe top been on Even severalthough immigration 2 Geddes, Andrew 1 I Labor immigration isthe voluntary movement by people across state borders. See Geddes, (2005): 8 Immigration isdefined as movement by people across state borders thatlead to permanent settlement.See NTRODUCTION HE The issue of the harmonization of immigration policy is of a high importance for EU for importance high a of is policy immigration of harmonization the of issue The During the last decade, the question of question of Duringthe lastharmonizingthe decade, immigration states’ EU D EFINITION OF THE EFINITION The Politics of Migration and Immigration in . ( Europe. andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics P ROBLEM 1 2 . Labor immigration policy has policy immigration Labor . Sage Publications, 2005):7 1 policies CEU eTD Collection T making, the content of the labor immigrationpolicy and policy decision willof notbe evaluated.framework the be will point focal the as Thirdly, immigration. economic – intra upon touching without EU outside countries from coming immigration labor is which immigration, – extra on only be will focus the Secondly, policy. immigration labor the of harmonization of process the only analyze will study this Firstly, limitations. harmonizationthe policyof the place.taken has not levelEU is basedon unanimity and because they feeldon’t Europe, escape needthe to to that because member have differentstates argue labor immigration will policies,thesis bargaining the The game atthe institutions. supranational the to sovereignty delegate to decision preference domesticthe formation level, at bargaininginterstate level2) EU the at and 3) national executives. This stepanalysis: study pursue athree intends to 1) national of sovereignty the under remain will it whether or level EU the at harmonized be will policy integration more generally. understandinginfluence that factors of the decision EU the making and process European delegation couldbring. Answering such a question will help usgain anda better deeper competence such that benefits obvious the and area policy the of supranationalization the of favor in institutions EU from calls repeated despite level, EU the at policy immigration A behind reasons are the unwillingness the EU. the to delegate power of member to states thisbackstage of policy developmentinpolicy theEU making process identifyand to what HEORETICAL IM OF Taking into account the magnitudethe thisTakingthis account of thesis into topic, acknowledges threemain The main hypothesismember is key arethe that players states in deciding whether a The research question this thesis attempts to answer is to this question thesis research The attempts S TUDY AND F RAMEWORK R ESEARCH Q UESTION 2 why there is no a common labor CEU eTD Collection four main themes: immigration under the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the role of the of role the Affairs, Home and Justice of field the under immigration themes: main four approach to the issue, study specific to this of aspects issue. Even though each for of studiesthe is unique in its the purpose of this literature review they can be grouped into L achallengerepresents integration the process. to policy this why reasons the understand to help will policy immigration economic of process harmonization the to theory this Applying all. if at play, will institutions EU the that itis that argues the member whodecide modes states upon of decision making and role the Intergovernmentalism Liberal Also, environment. domestic the from coming influences as preferencesthese a resultpredeterminedare created of contrary preferences; onthe “blackMoravcsik,member arenot boxes” to according However, states with they decide whether they that interests these willon a pursue certain policy not. or isit based and interests have states Member process. integration EU in the maindrivers the with AndrewThe mainMoravcsik. underlying assumption of LI is memberthat are states the hypothesis of this thesis is that states are still the central actors. therolesupranational of andinterest focusnow on (governance Yet groups turn). actors integration EU of accounts theoretical most that given interesting, particularly be will This role. crucial a played states member immigration, labor of field the in that believe to ground this thesis However, willprocess. use Liberal Intergovernmentalism.There is indeed good them offers adifferentperspective and provides different when tools tryinganalyze to this 3 , Constructivism, Federalism, Multi-Level Governance etc. ITERATURE After the 1990s, given the high salience of labor immigration policy researchers started researchers policy immigration labor of salience high the given 1990s, the After Known often as a one author theory, Liberal theory, Intergovernmentalism author Known asaone often is best associated explain is wideThere thatseekto arange of theories EU integration. R EVIEWAND L ITERATURE G AP 3 3 Each one of CEU eTD Collection process of Europeanization of immigration policy, however differently from Givens and Givens from differently however policy, immigration of Europeanization of process immigration the taking though policy as a whole. Likewise,facing, Andrew is Geddesevaluates the harmonization of process the that constrains national explaining on focus They Adam Luedtke a very importantMoreover, study is theoneby topic. the of Terri Givensaspects and alsosomeare specific there general these approaches, atmore specific studies look that Thirdly, Apap Joana developments a certain and an development. active ittakes not favors whether it stand or policy immigration about informed well is opinion public that arguing opinion, public Lahav Gallya topic, same the On institutions. EU the is in animportantfactor explaining yield to reluctance Member of the the to power States opinion public that argues He policy. immigration over control EU towards opinion public Elgar, 2004), Elgar, Comparative Political Studies Political Comparative 7 (2005) 6, no.1 8 coordination of coordination of policies under JHA Justice andHome Affairs.He also challengesstudies the enlargementthe that on the poses of developments behindthe forces driving the explain findand to seeks He onwards. explain seeks to dynamics the of Justice and Home Affairs mostly after 1990sand the 6 http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c91_monar.pdf EU Instruments andStrategies.” 5 CommonStudies Journal of Market 4 umbrella of Justice andHome Affairs. Monar Jorg the under immigration discuss which studies many are there Firstly, policy. immigration on impact institutional and policy immigration of Europeanization opinion, public Gallya Lahav. “Public Opinion Toward Immigrationthe European in Union: Does it Matter? Joana Apap Ed., Adam Luedtke. “EuropeanIntegration, Public Opinion Immigrationand Policy” Jorg Monar. “EU Justice and Home Affairs inthe Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of Diversity and Jorg Monar. “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors andCosts” 9 , who seek to analyze the attempts of creating a coming immigration policy. immigration coming a creating of attempts the analyze to seek who , Justice and Home Affairs: Liberty and Security issues after Enlargement. issues after Liberty andSecurity and Home Affairs: Justice 8 , focuses on Europeanization of immigration policies. Apart from Apart policies. immigration of Europeanization on focuses , 37, no. 10, (December 10, 37,no. 2004) Center for Studies, forEuropeanIntegration Center 39, no. 4(2001) 39, no. 5 . Secondly, Adam Luedtke 4 4 is a prominent writer in this field who field this in writer prominent a is 7 takes asimilar takes analyzing approach 2001 6 , investigates effects, the of European UnionPolitics (Edward CEU eTD Collection University Press, 2001) in Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein, Wayne Sandholtz, TheInstitutionalization of Europe, (Oxford 11 Publications, 2005) far and at the same time tobe able tosuccessfully predict possible changes in the future. so happened have that developments the understand to important analysis is very thorough policiescontroversial which a challengeposes member EUandthe for the a states, most the of one is this that mind in Bearing policy. this of process harmonization intergovernmental lenses offer anexcellentframework for understandingin debate the the intergovernmental Aswill itperspective. be arguedfurther in this thesis, liberal aliberal from process this analyses that study no there Moreover policies. immigration specificallystudieslook assuch no that are There harmonizationthe at of labor researched. under considerably is policy immigration economic of harmonization of issue by providing of asetnorms policy, and principles which immigration guide their behavior. towards (states) actors of attitude the shaping in role important an play do institutions that is argument main Their policing. and immigration of field Penelope Turnbull and Wayne Sandholtdz Finally, eachother. on a different and importantperspective can be seen in study the of comparativeprovides aanalysisGeddes exist. onthedual influence of EU –member states 10 Salience Harmonization”and 9 Luedtke Terri Givens Terri andAdam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Andrew Geddes. Andrew Penelope Turnbull, Wayne Sandholtz, „Policing andImmigration: The Creationof New Policy Spaces“, However, despite undisputable the However, importance abovethe of mentioned studies, the 10 , he attempts to answer the question whether a common immigration policy can policy immigration common a whether question the answer to attempts he , The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, ( Europe, andImmigrationin ofMigration The Politics The Policy Studies Journal32, Studies The Policy 11 who explain the institutional landscape in the landscape institutional the explain who 5 no. 1, (2004) no. 1, Sage CEU eTD Collection their role inrole their shaping national the this policy.preferenceand towards The actors domestic on focusing policy immigration labor towards formation preference thesis hypotheses andthe which arederived from it. The institutions competences. The institutions competences. EU and revisions Treaty on mainly focus will It policy. immigration labor concerning today chapter The first states at the EU level. EU the at The states member EU among policy, immigration labor concerning bargaining interstate the on focus not) to delegate power to the supranational institutions on the issue of labor immigration labor of issue the on institutions supranational the to power delegate to not) S developments in field.the chronological and problems policy actors, on information important provided articles online and journals in books, found literature secondary the finally and Thirdly policy. immigration insight harmonization the deeper member of of the role of the towards the economic states memberPermanentEU of inRepresentations , states which has helped acquire a to the from and Commission EU the highofficials from with conducted been have interviews the EU and official haveThe documents member been acquiredstates. mainly theofficial through the of web sites of and institutions EU the of positions official the and area policy this in websitesdevelopments of documentstheofficial communications, member treaties, and of form in the speeches documents primary Firstly, used. be ofstates. EU officials Secondly,will be used. They will a limitedhelp to reveal the numbermain of TRUCTURE OF THE This thesis is organized in five main chapters. isorganized thesis This In this a qualitative study methods will research be used.Diverse will of sources data R ESEARCH M will necessaryintroduce the background major of the developments until ETHODOLOGY T HESIS fifth chapter fifth secondchapter will analyze the reasons behind the decision (or decision the behind reasons willthe analyze 6 will present the theoretical framework of the thirdchapter will discuss national discuss will fourth chapter fourth will CEU eTD Collection debates on EU policydebates on integration. policy.The lastconcluding will chapter summarize findings the and them relate broader to 7 CEU eTD Collection coordinated cooperation (even discussed though the outside EU framework), cooperation coordinated was the achieve to effort institutional first The competencies. its exceeding was Commission UK, Germany, suchasthe countries France,and Denmark, whichthe that argued policy was a national monopoly. national a was policy The first stage, duringoccurred. 1957-1986can be identified as timethe when immigration 1.1 Treaty Revisions changes and EUinstitutions of the competences. treaty and institutional major the of overview an make will chapter This states. member integration policy. immigrant and immigration labor except issues immigration all to applies (QMV) Voting Majority Qualified and Treaty the of pillar first the to moved policies immigration Today, governments. national of remit the within solely was policy Immigration was alacksubstantial of there will member of the part the change on this.to states Moreover, polices. immigration concerning Rome of Treaty in the basis legal substantial supranationaleven The key considered.venue wasthe not absencefactor was of a EC in the issues immigration discussing of option mere the Actually, institutions. EC the of reach of out was policy immigration field, economic the in policies common establishing 13 University 116 Press, 2000), 12 C Andrew Geddes, Andrew Ibid,117 HAPTER Four main stages can be identified when important institutional changes have changes institutional important when identified be can main stages Four While during 1960s the and 1970s European the Community was far ahead in 1- B ACKGROUND Immigration and European Integration: TowardsImmigration andEuropean Integration: Fortress Europe? 12 Labor immigration policy still remains the sole competence of the of competence sole the remains still policy immigration Labor 13 I NFORMATION Commission proposals Commission 8 14 werewelcomed reluctantly by (Manchester CEU eTD Collection could decide to move to a QMV system. In this way, labor immigration policy was policy immigration labor way, this In system. QMV a to move to decide could leasta five at After transitional yearthe period. againperiod, by for unanimity, area Council the policy the of character intergovernmental the maintaining thus 2004, until Council in the making decision unanimity the keep to agreed states member issues, immigration Community pillar Community “an freedom,area of justice and security” andimmigration brought issues into the peak wasreached with thesigning of Amsterdamthe Treaty The institutions. supranational of empowerment the on and developments JHA the on grasp Justice werestill marginalized in process. the key the player,and Commission, the Parliament European the of Court and European the of Intergovernmentalism and unanimity voting. unanimity and Intergovernmentalism of principle the around built was JHA in accountability and authority of framework the result, whereby pillar thirdthe name under the of Justice and Home Affairs (1992) As was a created. Treaty Maastricht the of signing the is policies immigration of supranationalization immigration. become basiswould elementslater the for that shapingin field EUcooperation the of 18 17 continued to pursue their own national policies field.in this without frontiers, internal which did not influence the issue of economic immigration member and states 16 Schengenland. are UK Ireland) and 15 Policy1985) (CEC, onmigration 14 of five countries. pro-integration frontiers internal the down brought which 1985, in June agreement Schengen the of signing The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999 Towards Fortress Europe?”54 (2005) : Integration: European and Geddes, “Immigration A major event this during period is also the signing of the . Itcreated anarea France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. Since 1997, 13 EU member states (excluding EC’s first Social ActionProgramme of 1974 Commission and proposal guidelines fora Community Throughout the third stage,1993-1999, member thirdthe keep a continued stage,1993-1999, Throughout tight states to During second(1986-1993) the stage, 19 under the title IV. Although Amsterdam Treaty communitarized Treaty Amsterdam Although IV. title the under 15 The Schengen The agreementintroduced important 9 17 16 As the Council of Ministers emerged as emerged Ministers of Council the As , the main breakthrough towards the towards main breakthrough the , 18 , which committed to develop to committed which , CEU eTD Collection the debate among EU institutions, debateamongthe EU member and civil states “added the society value” about managing to EU approach and labor on immigration. GreenPaperaimed The fostering at commissionIn 2005the etc. controls Green the external Paper presented border standard up to three months, the migrationabolition on third-countryof internalalsoopportunities. It keepsrestrictedveto parliamentary rights for legal long-term nationals,border controls the freedom between to travel the memberfor third-country states, nationals for http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/work/doc/com_2004_811_en.pdf Brussels, 1.11.2005 24 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf Union. Brussels, 13December,European 2004 23 Public Service inBrussels. Interview by author 9May 2007 22 Brussels,200/99, (1999) 21 Green Paper. The HagueProgramme The Green Paper. 20 19 empowering on supranational states institutions. member the from reluctance with tied been always has it however, issues, immigration governmental level.has beenThere communitarizationa slow move towards of highest the for impetus political provided and policy immigration EU common a for called commonwhich a immigration cancreate Memberstates policy. The Tampere summit was done in theTampere Council in 1999 which clearly defined the This policy frameworkpolicy. in immigration EU common a about indication no was there pillar community the under policies immigration brought Amsterdam of treaty the While communitatization. remainedkey actors member the since unanimity states the votingthe rule prevailed. but pillar Community the under placed was it that sense the in communitarized, partially ,Green PaperEU on an approach to managing economic migration,811 final, European Commission,The Hague Programme: Strengthening security, freedom andjustice in the Peter Claes. First Secretary Coordination European Cooperation Justice and Home Affairs, Federal Council, Presidency European Conclusions ofCouncilof European ampere the 15-16 October1999, SN Geddes. Thefirst pillar where the Qualified Majority Voting applies Two importantdevelopmentsTwo Finally, during main the fourth the stage, 1999-2006 objective has been The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe andImmigrationin ofMigration The Politics 22 23 after 1999 are The HagueProgramme are after 1999 and the retains unanimousway, voting national and,that 10 . (SagePublications,2000): 98 20 24 21 CEU eTD Collection marginal. Before the Amsterdam Treaty the Commission had to share its right of initiative of right its share to had Commission the Treaty Amsterdam the Before marginal. been always has Commission the of role the immigration of field the in process, making 1.2 Role ofEU Institutions regarding the legal status of immigrant workers legally residing in the EU. hand,On the other Commission the plans presenta proposal to in September 2007 and transferees remuneratedworkers trainees (autumn(2009). andintra-corporate 2008), immigration andshould areplannedforward be put address to respectively seasonal competitiveness. aimwith the professionalscountries, the of sustainattracting EU's neededthe to third- from workers skilled highly of residence and entry of conditions the on directive CommissionMigration theEuropean plansinpresent September to a 2007 proposal for a secondhalf of 2007. AccordingClaes, to basisthe on of its 2005Policy Plan on Legal introduce any did first The not proposal. areonlyconcrete proposals duringexpected the Commission the because also position, formal a express to early too it considered states Foreign Office/ Germany Interview by author 14 May 2007 27 26 25 Claes, Action the Peter Plan,Accordingwas organized. coordination no to of publication the After 2006. December of migration legal on Plan Action Commission’s policy. immigration labor EU and employmentfor A new momentum purposes. was hence found nationals re-launch to debatethe on country third admitting for rules Community for form appropriate most the and of Sven Mossleer Dr.Desk Officer, Division E05 – EU Justice and Home Affairs, European Law, Federal Ibid. Peter Claes, Interview by author, Unlike in most other issues where the Commission was granted a role in the policy- in the role a granted was Commission the where issues other most in Unlike The green Book of Commissionthe of The green Book of April 2005 was followed by the 26 Three other proposals aimed at facilitating circular and temporary labor temporary and circular facilitating at aimed proposals other Three 11 27 25 member CEU eTD Collection constrained in three ways. Firstly preliminary rulings can only be required against decision against required be only can rulings preliminary Firstly ways. three in constrained of Qualified Majority Voting. Majority Qualified of application the and supranationalization for called has EP the policy, immigration economic legal framework onrelated issues. persons undertemporary protectionwill be moved to co-decisionprocedure afteradoption of Community of illegally resident persons, administrative cooperationareas in under title IV. Policy on asylum and 29 http://eioop.or.at/eiop.texte/2001-005.htm immigration is not one of them.Nice gaveparliament treaties inco-decision power certain issues; nonetheless, labor and Amsterdam procedure. making decision the influence to possibility the EP the to give will which Commission, European the with links closer created has It policy. immigration institutions. policy preferences of actuallymember theposition than that of rather matters states is the That charge. in one the are still states member policy immigration labor of field the In commission. of power –setting agenda informal and formal on constraints substantial are there time over powers Commission’s the of strengthening impressive the of spite Justice Homeand Affairs” 28 Commission. in DG youngest the is DG This activities. its structure and enhanced by of a DGdealing creation the with JHA in allowing1999 organize better itto further was asylum and immigration of area in the role Commissions’ summit. Tampere in policy asylum and immigration common a develop to Commission the for mandate a gave Council the when improved was policy immigration the in commission the of role with themember anditgained states, sole the rightof agenda setting only after 2004. The Theissues include: movement of TCN’s in possession of visa; illegal immigration the repatriation and Emek Ucarer, “From the Sidelines to Center Stage: Sidekick no More? The European Commission in Geddes Similarly the holds limited powers in the field of labor of field in the powers limited holds Parliament European the Similarly 30 argues that the ECJ’s right of jurisdiction over title IV issues is also is issues IV title over jurisdiction of right ECJ’s the that argues , European Integration online Paper online Integration , European 29 Considering the limited role it possesses in the issue of issue in the possesses it role limited the Considering 12 5. no 5, (2001) 5. no 28 However, in However, CEU eTD Collection 32 31 30 background and necessary the analyzeframework to empirical the findings. beanalyzed further in followingthe nextwill The chapter chapters. lay theoretical the will issues All these policy. immigration economic the as such importance high of issues their and role memberrestrict remain have managedto states main the least at in actors, EU policy, immigration labor including immigration of issues the all of communitarization MS. and Commission ECJ can rule on the interpretationby law policethe enforcement other conducted or agencies of a member states.” of title “theIV only oncourt a request ofhas maintainingthe to measures related over of of lawnational order fromsecurity. This means that nothe Council,jurisdiction thejudicialno are when there remedies undernational law. Secondly, ECJ the has no powers to review the validity and proportionality of operations Ibid,140 Ibid,. 139 Geddes. To sum To up, itcan bewhilst arguedthat institutions EU arepushing for full The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. ( Europe. andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics 32 13 2005): 138 31 Thirdly CEU eTD Collection harmonization of labor immigration policy. Finally, Liberal Intergovernmentalism will Intergovernmentalism Liberal Finally, policy. immigration labor of harmonization Liberal Intergovernmentalism analyze to theoretical tool appropriate is most the why argue will it and Intergovernmentalism Liberal analyzing and introducing on focus will explainmeans to harmonization the of labor immigration policy. chapter Therestof the necessary the providing not of grounds the will on be dismissed inturn which institutions, mainly concerningrelevant of role actors presented, the member and supranational states be will Neofunctionalism of assumptions main follows, As framework. theoretical best the is Intergovernmentalism Liberal policy immigration labor of harmonization concerning (which reasons strong willare there However, be explained asfollows)believe to that and provideIntergovernmentalism. different namely tendencies the process, the of Neofunctionalism and Liberal tools to main aretwo there best though, grasp theories integration that EU Concerning of topic explain the integration. EU the of what’s and who’s why’s, the on whyperspective different a offers and how doesby a singlebecomplex captured to framework. Indeed,each theoretical of theories the EU integrationalsopossiblepredictbuthelp BenRosamondones. EUis usto futurethe that states far too takeframeworks,which helpexplain to are taking or and place,occurred understand events that place. explain to have provide thistheories Theories uswith attempted and process. concepts Neofunctionalism Liberal and Intergovernmentalism will be considered. 34 game. governance, Institutionalism, Rationalism, Constructivism, , Postmodernism Two-Level and approach, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, The policy network approach, the Fusion-Thesis, Multi-lateral ( Integration 33 C Since other EU theories do not focus specifically on the dynamics behind the integration process only Philippe C. Schmitter. “Neo-Functionalism” eds Antje Wiener Thomasand Diez HAPTER Since the beginning of European Integration in the early 1950’s, a number of number a 1950’s, early in the Integration European of beginning the Since Oxford University Press, 2005), 46- lists: regime International analysis, The regulatory 2 - T HEORETICAL 34 These two theories hold opposing views on issues of integration of issues on views opposing hold theories two These F RAMEWORK 14 Theories ofEuropean 33 CEU eTD Collection which in turn create their own self-maintaining norms. Neo-functionalism acknowledges Neo-functionalism norms. self-maintaining own their create turn in which searching for a common answer,decisions a common past and/or agree upon push nationalsolution. that to In actors national actors agree upon creating a set of would be set ininstitutions, place tocontinue the momentum.” “integration is that suggests alinear, progressive phenomenon; dynamics started; once that interconnected a deeper integration integration becomes adeeper interconnected necessary. fields, alsoother of logicintegration but the of deepening as policyonce areas are to lead will field one in integration that meaning expansion of logic the holds concept This forth. so and action additional necessitate will turn in which actions further taking of spill-over concept andgroups supranational institutions. interest states, member the of role the and assumptions main its outlining into narrowed wide regarding regionalaspects of range Presentingintegration. Neo-functionalism will be of foundationstrategies the of EU; howeverdeveloped it a genuine into theory covering a theorize the explaining attempting to asanapproach Unionstarted integration.It European 37 36 Fora fullaccount Neo-functionalism on (1963)) see(2005), Lindberg (Haas, E.B (1976), Schmitter 35 2.1Neo-Functionalism following of this chapters thesis. necessary the provideframeworkwhich will serve for three as thebackground the Ben Rosamond. by introduced First 1958 Haas in Neo-functionalism is build upon the basic assumptions of functionalism, whichwas furtherelaborated. Neo-functionalism that argues According to Neo-Functionalism the engine of integration is best described by the described is best integration of engine the Neo-Functionalism to According Neo-functionalism Theories of European Integration Theories ofEuropean 36 , whereby the integration of one sector will be complete only by only complete be will sector one of integration the whereby , 35 has been considered as one of hasbeen considered most of one the theories important as in it is the threats coming from the global environment global the from coming threats the is it 15 . (London: Macmillan, 2000), 61-63 2000), . (London: Macmillan, 38 37 The hypothesis of spillover of hypothesis The CEU eTD Collection national policy goals in the field immigration. of of pattern EU the Furthermore, Virginie Guiraudon member have1970s been mainstates the in actors deciding every of integration.step As isconsiderably a new phenomenon. Since early the in of this andstages 1960s cooperation, sensitivethe of member asone sovereignty areasof instates state and cooperation this field EU by considered is policy Immigration policy. this of integration the behind dynamics the explain to framework the lacks Neofunctionalism it, of aspects various explain certainly can theory above the from ideas individual while that argued be can it policy, immigration EU integration at the supranational level, focusing mostly on the role of EU institutions. 41 further integration. promote to forces national and international manipulate to position unique a in is Commission integration. EU Neo-functionalistsfoster to believe mainthe actor the that non-state direction. right from the member states had beto created, which would give a push theto integration in the spillforin place,understand order that came take a to over to high authority – autonomous Haas Yet, integration. further for pushing governments their lobby will they result a as willgroups interest that Rosamond argues become benefitsthe awareof of integration and 40 39 38 regionalof the “secretariatthe organization” calls Schmitter Philippe what and movements social or groups interest the as such actors, influencecannot integration.of On it contrary, degree is andthe direction the the non state member duringEU original of the role the states agreement; itthey however that argues Rosamond, Rosamond, Schmitter, “Neo-Functionalism” (2005): 46 Ibid,63 Nonetheless, bearing in mind the topic of this thesis, the integration of labor EU of integration the thesis, this of topic in mind the bearing Nonetheless, Theories of European Integration Theories ofEuropean Theories of European Integration, (2000): Integration, Theories ofEuropean 40 He considers EU supranational institutions, especially EU Commission as Commission EU especially institutions, supranational EU considers He 42 puts it, state actors strategically actors state it,use EUlevel puts organizations pursue to 41 Therefore, it can be argued that Neofunctionalismcan beit arguedthat Therefore, analyzed , (2000): 67 , (2000): 16 39 that provide spurfor further the integration. that 59 CEU eTD Collection main mainthe objective that drivingargues latter andthe is force pursuitthe security for main is thefor power quest the differenceis formerthe that that argues two the between cooperate with each other. cooperate minimala influence behavior state overthe andthey becomecannot aparty when states ImmigrationPolicy”, 42 gains can vary,itwill always than zero. be greater relative the on perception their though even and gains byrelative driven are actions Their in key the internationalactors the are states arena and inthat policythe making process. Moravcsik basesitself theRealiston and Intergovernmentalistassumptions.Realists argue Liberal2.2.1 Intergovernmentalism- Origins 2.2 LiberalIntergovernmentalism inof thispresented restchapter. the be thus will Intergovernmentalism Liberal of predictions and assumptions main The policy. immigration labor of lack) (or harmonization the explains best which Intergovernmentalism instead Also, that of itpredicts preferences Neofunctionalism, andinterests. itis Liberal state member to down still is policy immigration labor of shaping and making the policy. immigration the for applied be maximize to their and competences initiate supranationalization the of a policy area cannot able been have institutions EU that argument the So, Ministers. of Council in the procedure making decision in the applies unanimity and intergovernmental largely is cooperation VirginieGuiraudon, “Seeking New Venues: Europeanizationof Migration-Related Policies, Debate on Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which is almost always identified with Andrew with identified always almost is which Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Swiss Review 44 Neo-realism is a revised follow-up version of realism. The realism. of version follow-up revised a is Neo-realism 17 7, no. 3(2004) 7,no. 43 On the other hand, institutions possess Therefore, this thesis hypothesizesTherefore, that CEU eTD Collection 48 Intergovernmentalist Approach”, 47 46 www.epsnet.org/EPISTEME/Unit2/neorelism.htm retrieved 5.5.2007 45 44 Routledge,Williams.( New Londonand 40 York, 2000): Power, Integration: andCommunity ofEuropean Politics Security as ablackwith predetermined box, preferences; the Liberalcontrary on Realism/Intergovernmentalism isLiberal that state the Intergovernmentalism treat not does interdependence. international of theories liberal the on isbased which formation, preference bargaininginterstate andinstitutional compliance andby of adding atheory of national theory its refining by institutionalism intergovernmental upon theory his builds he that argues Moravcsik Institutionalism. Intergovernmental of theory and Relations International of theory Liberal theories: broad two of combination a is Intergovernmentalism Liberal states. among process bargaining the in explaining stop not does theory than simply an application of Intergovernmentalism. Indeed, the scope of this theory supported by Moravcsik who states that: end resultof bargainingthe between procedure nation This – states. view is strongly 43 institutions. within and makes EU actors the central the little are rolefor of the room EU the and welfare. Ibid., 473 A Liberal Community: European the in Power and “Preferences Moravcsik, Andrew Initially proposed by Stanley Hoffmann, but also developed by , JohnMearsheimer etc EU E-learning units“Neo-Realism: EU as an International Actor” Ibid,.40 Steve Smith. “International Theory and European Integration” in However, Liberal However, Intergovernmentalism hasbe developedafar to more complex bargains. facing integration explainis task of European a theoretical to account these agendafor aninterveningthe set consolidation. of period The most fundamental aseriousdevelopedcelebrated of though intergovernmental bargains, each of which From the signing of the to the making of Maastricht the EC has 46 45 According toIntergovernmentalism, the scope of European Integration is the Intergovernmentalism departs from these assumptions, and argues that states that assumptions,and argues from Intergovernmentalismthese departs 47 48 The main distinction between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and (Neo) and Intergovernmentalism Liberal between distinction main The Journal of CommonStudies Journal of Market 18 eds. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. International Relations theory andthe theory Relations International 31, no. 4(1993) 31, no. CEU eTD Collection economic arefar interests than geopolitical moreimportant ones. geopolitical behindinterests are policy decisions He undertake. argues that states preferenceformation and key the question asked by Moravcsik is whether economic or national explains step first The 1. in Table summarized been have analysis of steps namely,national bargainingpreference formation, interstate and institutional choice. These interests of the member states and in the power they bring toBrussels. (1998):7 bargaining”. as EU a “seriousthe of portray celebrated intergovernmental to He hassought Integration. supranational and ininstitutions role theirthe of the European pressures which the stresses Liberal 2.2.2 Intergovernmentalism Assumptions – Main Intergovernmentalism will be presented. Liberal of assumptions general the section, following the in Meanwhile, Integration. discussed in length when analyzing application the ofLiberal Intergovernmentalism EU to 52 51 50 Taiwan, March2002 Integration: WhatandWhy? at the Graduate Institute of European Studies, TamkangUniversity, Taipeoi, 49 Intergovernmentalism study the preference of state itupto formation.opens Moravcsik. Ibid. 46 (2000):46 Integration”, Theory European and “International Smith. “European on lecture for paper Background Integration” ofEuropean “Theories Laursen Fin When developingMoravcsikLI, introduced athreestepanalysis of integration Moravcsik has specifically framed his theory as a critique to Neo-functionalism, to critique a as theory his framed specifically has Moravcsik The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht” to 50 His main assumption is that the driving forces of EU integration lie in the lie integration EU of forces driving the that is assumption main His concerns and the ideological visions of politicians and public opinion. When opinion. public and one factor had giveto politicians way,of it tended tobe . visions ideological the and concerns generallygroups imposed tighter constrains on policy than did security economicYet remained interests primary. from Pressures economic interest 19 52 51 49 This will be , CEU eTD Collection negotiation Stages of sovereigntypool in certain policy in areas andnot or others. delegate to chose states do why is, puzzle main the step this in Thus rule. unanimity the by governed still are decisions areas, sensitive few a in Yet, applies. now Voting Majority supranationalmajority the In a great theories. to of delegated policy Qualifiedthe sectors, international institutions. In some areasof policy making extensive have powers been outcomes. interdependence among policy influencespreferences that bargaining interstate the it andis concludes the asymmetrical nationstates relative that the the of power entrepreneurshipconcerningexplanatory Moravcsik hasmore power theoutcomes. preference intensity. This term is firstly coined by and . Joseph and by Keohane Robert coined firstly is term This intensity. preference relative value that itplaces onagreement an compared to the outcome of its best alternative policy – its 53 stage underlying each variables independent Alternative The key question here is whether asymmetrical interdependence more than the country others. another favor or one that outcomes are negotiations there distributional the divergent Theissue isdue to stake outcomes. interests, at that during Asymetrical Interdependence is best defined as “… the power of each government proportional to the to proportional government of each power the “… as defined best is Interdependence Asymetrical The third step seeks to explain the issue of delegating or pooling decision making in making decision pooling or delegating of issue the explain to seeks step third The The second step analyzes step bargaining,The second interstate focusing on efficiency and Formation Preference National preferences? national underlying of Whatis source the 20 Bargaining Interstate bargaining? interstate outcomes of distributional efficiency and the explains preferences what Given national Bargaining Institutional Institutions? international of sovereignty to explains transfer the agreement, what substantive Given 53 or supranational or CEU eTD Collection Intergovernmentalism it is important to evaluate how this theory applies to EU integration. EU to applies theory this how evaluate to important is it Intergovernmentalism compliance want Afterhaving picture states of broad states. bythe Liberal presented other when but institutions, common need they that agree governments the when nor converge credible commitments.Hence,pooling anddelegation happen not does when ideologies factor, third by the explained isbest organizations international to sovereignty of pooling governments to constrain and to control each other). each control to and constrain to governments efficientmore are decentralizedthan governments) and credible commitment of (efforts the centralizedpreferences), management idea technocratic (the international that institutions institutional in shaping ideas of role independent (the ideology federalist explanations: 55 Maastricht” 54 at eachstage Observed outcomes Ibid. 8 Moravcsik. possible three contrasting andbycomparing answer the seeks Moravcsik Table. 1 (1998):24 The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina to 54 EU Cooperation: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework Intergovernmentalist Liberal A Cooperation: EU Interests? Geopolitical or Economic Interests preferences Underlying national 21 entrepreneurship? Supranational or Interdependence Asymmetrical substance Agreements on 55 He concludes that the delegating or commitment? credible More or management technocratic Centralized or ideology Federalist institutions international in making or pool decision- delegate Choice to CEU eTD Collection in national positions are more likely to happen after major changes in economic situations in economic changes major after happen to likely more are positions national in preferences. Onthe seconddimension,autonomous timing,shiftsMoravcsik that predicts their protect to them allow will that policies upon agree to tend will states member harmonization, Concerning incentives. economic and by will issue vary states member EU of positions national that predicts Intergovernmentalism Liberal dimension first the actors/cleavages andactors/cleavages negotiating demands/ salient inconcerns domestic policy. domestic demands, consistency/negotiating policy timing, countries, across The economicmakes approach five predictions across dimensions: systemic variation geopolitical than role will latter the a greater Thus ones. be considered not in the analysis. 57 PurposePower Europe: Social andState fromMessina Maastricht,(1998): to security vis-à-vis a particular or threat, to realize some ideational goals, Moravcsik, national objectives independent of any particular integrationinternational to expand exports to enhance 56 Preference National 2.3.1- introduced. be will thesis this of hypothesis bargaining,preference formation,interstate institutional end,choice.In the main the national above; introduced division the to corresponding parts, in three divided be will integration EU of analysis theoretical The theory. this testing for avenue excellent an general whichone, can be appliedany to kind of regional caseisintegration; EU however, 2.3 Applying Liberal Intergovernmentalism to European Union Integration Ibid,.50 By preference Moravcsik means not simply a particular set of policy goals but aset of underlying When analyzingeconomic that preference formation,reasons playMoravscik states Moravcsik states that Liberal that IntergovernmentalistMoravcsik states framework theoretical is a 56 Formation. 22 20 The Choice for The Choice 57 Basedon CEU eTD Collection governments canand willwould leave agreementsreject that them off worse than unilateral analyzed in turn. be will which assumptions, three on based is approach This policies. specific on not influencerole andthe in bargaining the states of butalso process, its willingness or agree to preferences. main The assumption isasymmetrical that interdependence determines the state of intensity and nature the on and involved actors the of power bargaining the intergovernmentalthe principle.The intergovernmental bargaining theory 2.3.2 Interstate Bargaining: Explaining Efficiency andDistribution economic objectives. domestic their achieving for allow will which policy, a formulate to attempting discourses negotiatingdemands and officials salientstate that predicts concerns, will engage in 60 59 50 policy.” a in formulating lead the take will executives “the andeconomic economicgroups officials interest alongthat with ruling is and parties chief assumption the cleavages, and actors domestic dimension, fourth the On policies. own their with consistent is which policy regional EU an pursue will states member negotiating demands,Liberal Intergovernmentalism governments foresees that of the 58 policies. domestic in or Ibid,60 Ibid,50 Moravcsik. Firstly, negotiations take place “within a non coercive system …in which …in system coercive non a “within place take negotiations Firstly, Liberalexplain Intergovernmentalism to bargaining the attempts based process on The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht” to 58 Concerning the third dimension, on policy consistency and consistency policy on dimension, third the Concerning 23 59 Finally, the fifth dimension, fifth the Finally, 60 focuses on the on focuses (1998) CEU eTD Collection coalitional makeagreements areless concessions. predisposed to hand,and governments when necessary. other withOn the high satisfactory unilateral or reach an governments desire avery with the agreement to strong will make compromises if the outcome of of its bestalternativeoutcome policythe – its preference intensity” is inversely proportionalrelations governments.bythe between As put each of Moravscik,“thegovernment power to the relative value that it places on an agreementreach an agreement. in to compromisesorder not) (or compared to governments whereby proposals, canundertake disclosing their preferences and making and mediate possible issues agreements on of their In interest. a non-coercive, the options. institutional information governments preferencesagreements, of potential other the the and about Moravscik assumesnational from that cooperation. governments have necessary the benefits aparticularthe on membercountries issue to arelow compared that gain states leave everyone place. off;take worse thisagreements mere do the that for can factaccount becomewhen aparty consideringeven agreeto possibility the failingthat will agree to resulting from outcome the unilateralthan agreements. agovernmentbetter Moreover, can be will outcome future the that considering when only off, worse position its make which will policy a upon agree can It governments. other with coalitions form or disagree, out, 63 (199):61 62 61 policies.” Ibid,62 Moravcsik. Ibid,60 Thirdly, the distribution of benefits reflects the bargaining power and the power the and power bargaining the reflects benefits of distribution the Thirdly, for gathering information costs the assumesSecondly, theory the that on other 61 In anon-coercive environment In a government such asthe EU, can opt- agree, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht” to 62 This gives governments memberthe of a chance initiate to to states 24 63 . Asaconsequence, CEU eTD Collection linkages and compromises upon issues where non-complianceestablish isto tempting.” seek they when “particularly uncertainty, of conditions under commitment when governments pool) delegate they decide (or Moreover, to are seeking credible institutions. supranational common create to willing more be to tend outvoted being Governments havemember of EU “extreme that preferences”of with states thethreat happen. to sovereignty of delegation and pooling the for conditions right the create that situations arecertain there issues. and across However, countries pooling varies across lock each other into credible intolock eachother commitments. governments willother make agreements, that the meaning sure respect they want to that pooling and delegating is to be found supranationalized. in the hypothesisinstitutionsEU have andmore andmore policy powers exceededtheir own areas are that EU member statesthe Parliamentdirectly (the elected assembly) of Justice (aconstitutional court). andthe Court powers), setting wantagenda with secretariat to(the Commission the body), intergovernmental (an Ministers of Council the EU: of umbrella the under bodies institutional main four considering EU, the rich institutional the relevantto settingshas it developed. Thereare Market Studies Market 67 (1998):73 66 Commission enjoys such autonomy in some matters, See Moravcsik (1998): 67 65 Moravcsik enjoys some sort of pooling sovereignty when the political parties caninfluence the legislative process. See 64 2.3.3 Andrew Moravcsik. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism integration: and A rejoinder” Moravcsik. Sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors areallowed to take autonomous decisions. The Sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide by voting otherunanimity. than TheParliament Institutional choice: Pooling According to Moravcsik, the framework which bests explains the phenomena of phenomena the explains bests which framework the Moravcsik, to According The question of why governmentsinstitutions delegate to power is particularly The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht,(1998): to 67 The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht” to 33, no. 4 (1995): 612 4(1995): 33, no. 64 andDelegation 66 25 He argues that the support for delegating He argues support the that and 65 of Sovereignty Journal of CommonJournal of 67 CEU eTD Collection harmonization of economic immigration policy. The three hypotheses are as follows: as are hypotheses three The policy. immigration economic of harmonization The followingeach step. will chapters hypotheses these test regarding issue the of supranational level. From this analysis, main three hypothesis can be derived, from one concludes acollective with decision on pooling delegating or sovereignty the at formulate their preferences, which is followed by a collective bargaining and it process main decision the stages making in National through. process theEUgoes governments integration. EU of demandpolicy for ideas, supranationalthe and not supply of them, which is real the force it Thus, itrisks member is seeing vetoed. or intergovernmental proposals the these states the of preferences the in mind keeping proposals policy its tailor should Commission the meansthat Commission the upon states member by the held power appointment play a marginal role inand decision the making and the veto of EU.The the process powers limited have they Intergovernmentalism, Liberal to according institutions, up 69 75 outvoted in specificoutvoted issues. 68 pressures. provide asafemember andso EU environmentstates for them escapenational to in differentspecifically, ways.More institutionsEU legitimize actions the of headsthe of themember institutionsthese of Hearguesthat can stance weaken the be states. beneficial than rather strengthen institutions these that arguing institutions EC/EU the to importance againstLiberal Intergovernmentalism. Moravcsika significant attaches However, i.e when Qualified Majority Voting applies Moravcsik, To conclude, the tripartite framework that was analyzed framework tripartite that the conclude, thethree above represents To The extended powers of European institutionsEuropean of The extended are powers often as presented an argument 68 However, the decision to delegate brings with it a known risk of being The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht, to 69 Despite the recognition of the benefits deriving from setting from deriving benefits the of recognition the Despite 26 (1998): CEU eTD Collection weakens thenational government. than rather strengthens institutions supranational the to authority Delegating 3: Hypothesis it. upon agree states member EU ifall only reached be will policy immigration labor common a Ministers of Council the in applies voting unanimity as long As 2: Hypothesis across EU states, the positions of the states will be different. acommon laborimmigration preference towards policy. Becausedomestic politics differ national influence that level national the at politics domestic the is It 1: Hypothesis 27 CEU eTD Collection this policy area isas developed not as needthe would suggest. In tryingstimulate to a been highly recognized byin governments the cooperation of member the the Yet, states. engage intheir policy interests. protect seekingcreation to will states member high, is issue an of salience political the when Intergovernmentalism, national positions concerning aspecific issue.Liberal Also, according to different to lead will incentives economic different that suggests Intergovernmentalism formation: divergences and countries political the across salience issue. of the Liberal be main the them to of issuesshould bethat considered when analyzing national preference of this two thesis, thesis this considers purpose dimensions the for by discussed Moravcsik, five the of out Intergovernmentalism, Liberal on Based policy. immigration labor of field the in preferences national explain which politics domestic and conditions economic the is it that argue will it and politics domestic states’ member analyze will It hypothesis. first the on focus will chapter first This Intergovernmentalism. Liberal of examination thorough empirical findings.mainThree will chapters threehypothesesthe derivedtest from the across EU states, the positions of thediffer states will bepolitics different domestic Because policy. immigration labor common concerning preference Formation Preference 3 -National Chapter The previous chapter provided the theoretical analyze theoretical frameworkThe previousneeded provided the chapter to the Hypothesis 1 In the last decade, the need for coordination in coordination needfor the decade, economic lastthe In the immigration policy has : It is the domestic politics at the national level that influence national influence that level national the at politics domestic the is It : 28 CEU eTD Collection “black box” of the state for analysis, for “black state the box” of it of laboris and markets thestructure political the the opening when Thus, inpublic debates. issues by other is bypassed immigration labor states in other opinion, public the influencing indirectly or directly agenda, political the of top on is immigration labor of issue the countries some in whilst addition, In not. some andtheircitizens immigrants, have different towards attitudes some being more liberal and structures political in their differ states member Also, workers. agricultural of need in be while Moreover, member one may IT professionals,state of have might others ashortage supply. labor the boost unjustifiably can it others some in countries, some in ageing population with dealing in mean useful a be can immigration while that argues Pasqueti differentdifferentdemographic trends, unemployment politicalrates, choices, etc. several such for reasons as different markets, labortheir needs, labormarkets access to value (in this prefer retain policyfullMember to States area), incompetence regulating field. this in sovereignty their relinquish to refuse labor needforacknowledgethe aEuropean immigration member do EU states policy, they of governments though Even enthusiasm. of signs little showed states member However, member between can coordination an effective states policy be created. approach close only through states, Mossler As Sven governance. EU binding, not yet common, advance their to countries levels encourage of nationalwas to policy under coordination Commission. Interview Commission. Interview by 16 May author 2007 72 Foreign Office/ Germany Interview by author 14 May 2007 71 11July.387 final, method of co-ordinationfor the Community immigrationpolicy’, COM (2001) 70 Commission proposed the “Open Method of Cooperation.” dynamicmore change andbring of agenda issuethe the member for ontop the the states, Stefania Pasquetti. Unit JLS B2: Immigration Asylum, and DG Justice Freedom andSecurity, European Sven Mossleer Dr.Desk Officer, Division E05 – EU Justice and Home Affairs, European Law, Federal Commission of the (2001b) ‘Communication on an open Commissiononan (2001b)ofCommunities ‘Communication European the unlessis there aclearcommon EU that argues StefaniaPasquetti general terms, In 29 70 The purpose of this proposal 72 71 CEU eTD Collection 73 today, Germany has been pursuingUntil a very economy. liberalglobal approach the towards with labor immigration.compete to order in immigration need markets German policy. immigration regulated first its Germany give would that bill a proposed Schilly Otto Minister have asystem for regulation the of immigration until 1998 and only in 2001, the Interior EUMember Labor 3.1.1 State’s Immigration Policies skills they can inaccommodate their markets. laborimmigrants) when and2) needthe for foreignfor labor isnot acknowledged, what kind of need/or their on based is (which policy immigration labor restrictive or liberal a domestic politics will be analyzed thebasismain on of two 1)whether factors; they pursue enlargements,member of two result asthe in states 2004 and 2007.Member states’ new 12 the and states European Southern the states European Northern individually,the considered be will states member big the categories; four into set be will States similarities. certain sharing countries of groups several distinguish to possible is it policy, immigration 3.1 Divergences AcrossMember States turn. in considered be will issues These policy. immigration economic of harmonization salienceplay issue the of that a crucial role in position the EU member have states towards Andrew Geddes. Andrew One of the countries closely identified with high immigration is Germany. It did not did It Germany. is immigration high with identified closely countries the of One When analyzing member domestic the sphereof EU concerningstates labor The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics 73 Schilly declared that Germany is an immigration country and country immigration an is Germany that declared Schilly 30 Sage Publications, (2005): 78 CEU eTD Collection labor immigration policy and applies some specific, but limited forms of legal migration legal of forms limited but specific, some applies and policy immigration labor abandoned has Belgium France, to Similarly labor. foreign concerning policy specific a havemade not specificlabor references immigration. to everyyear 2000, National Action Plan forEmployment France has EU, that to presented MinistryLabor may residenceauthorize ifis andthere labor vice shortage versa. Since the the annually, enter should that immigrations of number the about quotas predetermined employment situation within the profession and the in the quest. in the region the and profession the within situation employment request for entry in purposes for work France’s territory is weighted against the 79 ategyKretzschmar.pdf http://www.migpolgroup.com/multiattachments/2551/DocumentName/FranceImmigrationLabourMarketStr 78 77 10.gov.uk/output/Page5708.asp 76 75 crisis in 1975 74 which is what labor, foreign for also need the Prime acknowledges UK Ministerpolicy. immigration UK for Tony prerequisite Blair states: However, it also promotes strict controls on who enters the UK’s soil. UKis,of the andalwaysandinto out has been,absolutely essential economy.” our to meetUK’s economic needs. to inorder immigration labor manage to commitment a as described be can immigration labor concerning developments policy power) to coming Blair’s Tony Minister from from an unplanned policy aselective to one. Ibid,12 Cyric Kretzschmar“Immigration as alabour market strategy: France” ImmigrationPolicy Group 2006 Ibid,78 PM speechto the Confederationof BritishIndustry onmigration, 27April 2004 http://www.number- Ibid,42 Ibid On the other hand, France, as of hashand,France, 1975 as of acquired On the other arestrictive policy after oil the United Kingdom’s immigration policies have fluctuated from open to closed doors and doors closed to open from fluctuated have policies immigration Kingdom’s United , 32 77 . Immigration since then has been limited to the family unification. Every unification. family the to limited been has then since Immigration . 75 Therefore limiting and restricting labor immigration is not a not is immigration labor restricting and limiting Therefore 31 74 In the last 10 years (mainly after Prime “ the movement of people and labor 79 Therefore, France does not have notFrance does Therefore, 78 Because there are Becausethere 76 CEU eTD Collection jobs. low called so the do to willing not is population indigenous the rates, unemployment high despite Italy, in Southern example, For jobs. certain do to refuses population native the where situation a created have inwhich turn living standards, better to led developments economic that is countries these for characteristic is What Spain). and Portugal would be allowed toenter the country would beimmigrants only ifthat way they only had a jobthe waiting that for them. stated Frederiksen Employment of Minister Denmark’s welfare. Danish on burden huge a as considered is it and welcomed not is immigration 84 http://www.parapundit.com/archives/cat_immigration_policy.html 83 http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=406 MigrationInternational Relations Ethnic and Stockholm University (2006) 82 superficial. remain issue this with deal to how on debates and strict considerably remains policy its immigration, labor for need the acknowledges labor immigrants.towards its moment, attitude Atthe reversed Sweden even though after aneconomicHowever, peak in 1969-1970. recession in 1972, the governmentits reached immigration labor Sweden, In policy. immigration labor strict a apply countries laborshortages. domestic their considering immigrants working of influx the control countries both that government policy the open doors stopped for foreign the labor in 1973. 81 Public Service Foreign Affairs inBrussels. Interview by author 9May 2007 80 reunification. family or asylum as such Geddes. 2006 CutsBack onImmigration” “Denmark Parker, Randall Charles Westin. “Sweden: Restrictive ImmigrationPolicy Multiculturalism”and Centre forResearch in Geddes. Peter Claes. First Secretary Coordination European Cooperation Justice and Home Affairs, Federal Greece, (Italy, countries European in observed different Southern can be A picture Concerning the Northern European countries, the argument goes that in general that argumentgoes these the countries, European Concerning Northern the 84 Hence, foreign workers haveforeign Hence, been fill workers welcomed to in the unwanted vacancies. The The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, Sage Publications Europe, andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, (2005): Europe, andImmigrationin ofMigration The Politics 80 Thesame appliesNetherlands. Dutch The to 32 82 Likewise, in Denmark, labor 189 (2005): 81 It can be said It 191 83 CEU eTD Collection policy.“PilotIn 2001a Project” (which was revised again in 2005), wasintroduced aiming Poland. on pressures immigration of absence current the of because primarily priority policy low immigration policy are not welcomed by the political elite. political the by welcomed not are policy immigration labor a formulate to Efforts workers. foreign of integration the includes that policy have not Poland a does standards, clearlegislative EU’s the immigration to adaptation illustrativemember Two examples states. come from Poland andCzech Republic. Despite still are countries highlythese of not they EU serveasother the gateways attractive, to markets labor the though Even immigration. labor regulate to need the felt have countries seen asreliable markets labor outsiders. for the member old they EU the are not states) to (compared areweak when it, states Geddes puts As immigration. labor incoming of pressure the felt not have and countries emigration been mostly have they time, long a for in transition countries been Having different. is countries these in situation the However, grouping. policy immigration liberal the to belong policies. immigration labor liberal pursued have countries European Southern jobs, in the fill to willing is which economy the of andfaced sectors withforeign for certain withlabor shortages labor force Albania and Northern , which countries with shareborders countries areeconomically underdeveloped, such as whose populations influx great the are of foreign immigrants is theirin geographical position. Southern European search for jobs in the EU. Being 580 http://www.developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&page=WebPage&DocumentID= 87 86 85 same canbe situation in observed SpainGreece, and Portugal. Justyna Dimerska, ‘’Poland’s ImmigrationPolicy: Instatunascendi’’ Ibid,192 Ibid,190 also new-comers, known asthe Finally, Europe, of Central countries and Eastern the 88 Similarly, only in 2001 did Czech Republic consider a proper labor immigration labor proper a consider Republic Czech did in2001 only Similarly, 33 86 It is only after EU accession that these 87 In general imigration remains a remains imigration general In Migration and Minorities 2 Migration andMinorities 85 What mostly counts for (2005) CEU eTD Collection Challenge: Liberty and Security Liberty Challenge: 91 90 Studies. International the UK, or Germany present shortages of high skilled immigrants in certain fields such as such fields certain in immigrants skilled high of shortages present Germany or UK, the construction workers andnursing workers construction for the care elderly. Spain,are inGreece, needPortugal of low –skilled immigrants such as housekeepers, completely differentmanner, thebasis on of nationalFor instance, labor Italy, shortages. in a is immigrant economic profitable a what defines state member Each background. HighSkill3.1.2 or Low Skill Labor? follows. as developed be will point This immigrants. of selection the concerning policies in the also but policies, liberal vs. strict the andGermany. ones this differenceHowever, European Southern can be seen only not in labor, countries northern the and UK are pursuing amorepolicy strict compared the to newmemberthe for acknowledge (except need the countries forof the states foreignmost immigrants; they havefelttherefore, real emergency not the immigrationcreate to policies. haveexperienced countries far,these not so ahighHowever, pressurefrom economic population, educational system and aboveall their (Slavic). language hasthesame roots countries are similarof these Most ones. are welcomedmore the other in than their immigrants whose countries, of list a compiled has project this that is note to interesting 89 88 select skilledto foreign and annualworkers wereestablished. quotas Sergio Carreras. “Legal Migration Law and Policy Trends in aSelection of EU Member States” Ibid., Milos Calda. “Demographic Slumps vs Immigration Policy: TheCase of the Czech Republic” Ibid,. immigrants’differenthaveconcerning the memberneeds states professionalEU though Even immigration. for need their in widely differ states member up, sum To Working Paper 127 (2005) PaperWorking , 2006 34 91 On the other hand, countries like countries hand, other the On 89 What is very Institute of Institute 90 CEU eTD Collection the analysis will focus on the role of public opinion and the salience of the issue. kindthe labor of they inaccommodate will their part The second labor markets. focus on policies.whichThey differto they extent the allowon liberal economic migration and on different due to that labor and markets economic needs, EUmember pursuedifferent states that he will bring tothe economy of the country he will work. knowledge professional or competences for immigrant the bybut the worker, actual profit to Geddes to member reallythe what states mean when referringhighly to skilled immigrants. According 97 96 95 and Security Liberty goal. this facilitating rules specific no are there prioritized, are workers skilled highly while Spain, national scale. The human capital method is little in known France and is certainlyapplied not on a qualifications is currently withindebate under governmentthe butopinions are divided. The ideaFrance.of favoring of immigrants certain depending others over on their can be country aburdenone is Interesting one. for for another thecase consideredan asset Germany. 94 93 92 immigrants. skilled SinceNetherlands 2004, has introduced adifferent selection prioritizing procedure high- Information medicalTechnology (IT), etc. occupation Geddes. Ibid. Ibid,. Carreras. “Legal Migration Law and Policy Trends in aSelection of EU Member States” Kretzschmar“Immigration as a labormarket strategy: France” Ibid,. 96 What adds to the complexitythe to adds What of issue the is isthere thefactalack that of clarity on To sum up, the analysisthe sum up, To of domesticthe characteristics of memberthe argued states, Therefore, a selective predominates Therefore, in approach amajority of EU member states. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, Sage Publications,(2005): Europe, andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics 95 97 Yet, not all of the EU states apply such policies. In the case of Poland and the status of of “highly status the skilled thelevelon isdependent not worker” of 93 , 2006 94 The same procedure is by practiced same The procedure Austria, Belgium, France, and 35 92 Thus, an immigrant which can be can which immigrant an Thus, Challenge: 186 CEU eTD Collection but also that it takes a stance. In France, the negativeIn France,the stance. image a takes it also of that butimmigrants is higher than in is well informed opinion public EU only the not that show facts process, driven elite an is the literature. the governmentbeis successful to and stay in power. if anational important very is turn in opinion public and opinion public with connected closely is very salience political that is reason main The harmonization. supranational by blocking sovereignty national will protect executives national is high, salience when pits various parts of and of sate society the pitsagainst various parts another.” one that mode political conflict – high a by replaced is politics of mode -conflict low “the EU in residing legally are if they even workers, country third to comes it when So, significantly. inmuch domesticthe attention arenaand when involvementthe of publicthe increases policy Most changes during times happen not) (or when particularthe issue is receiving can mobilize large number incitizens of react againstfavor new or developments to in it. 101 100 99 Salience Harmonization”and 98 surveys” references ranking inthe newspapers given or theimportance of issuethe in public opinion immigration awareness of, the paid to, attention issue, which can be operationalized as of level “the as defined is issues policy immigration of salience Political change). of lack Opinion 3.2 PoliticalSalienceandPublic Ibid,149 Givens Terri andAdam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, See, Carey (2002), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Marks and Hooghe and Marks Trechsel(2004) (2002), (2003), Lahav and See, Carey (2002), Christin Ibid,150 The linkage between public opinion andintegration European is well documented in The political salience an issue of is very importantwhen analyzing policy change (or 98 Givenspolitical that argue and Luedtke salience can politicize an issue and it 101 Even though it is believed that the harmonization of immigration policies immigration of harmonization the that believed is it though Even The Policy Studies Journal32, Studies The Policy 36 no. 1, (2004) pp150 no. 1, 100 The argument goes that goes argument The 99 CEU eTD Collection 108 terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing the foreign affairs etc. importance theEUranked of from across immigration general,respondents higher than control. under immigration keep not did governments their believed people the inFrance,Germany, UK, the conducted Italy and Spainmore than that found50 %of out 107 , 2006 106 Political Social and Research. Arbor,Research MI:Inter-University forConsortium (producer); GroupOpinion EEIG Ann European that only immigrants with special skills should be admitted. be should skills special with immigrants only that policystricter pursue a economictowards immigrants, and 40%of populationthe believed legally country immigrantsthe enter They to (79%). also believe theirshould that country for easy too is it that and liberal too is immigration towards policy country’s their country. 105 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1400573 104 103 102 Europe. even or education economy, the than issue important more a is immigration opinion, public British the for that out found Britain in survey A immigration. concerning opinion immigration. on policy unusualitisTherefore French that not public opinion see woulda strictEuropean wantto criminality. high and fundamentalism religious benefits, social of scarcity unemployment; most importantly countries. EU other most a threat to French employment. They are identified with causes of Ibid, Eurobarometer60 (2004) Jimmy Burns and George Parker “Britons oppose open door to EU member states Immigration” The Eurobarometer60 (2004) Multiply”,Concerns retrieved BBC 2May (2001)“Immigration 2007 Ibid, Kretzschmar“Immigration as a labormarket strategy: France” France is not an isolated case when it comes to negative feelings amongst the public the amongst feelings negative to comes it when case isolated an not is France 104 105 Also, 76 per cent of British people said there were too many immigrants in their immigrants many too were there said people British of cent per 76 Also, Compared with other EU countries, the British are the most likely to believe to likely most the are British the countries, EU other with Compared Public Opinion in the European Union, European inthe Public Opinion Public Opinion in the European Union, European inthe Public Opinion 102 They see them as being poorly qualified often delinquents and 37 Autumn 2003. Autumn Autumn 2003. Brussels, Belgium:Autumn 106 Furthermore, polls Furthermore, 108 107 In 103 CEU eTD Collection workers. and big the memberones European competing Northern and the states for high – skilledlabor skill low needing ones European Southern the like states some with need, they labor of kind in the differ states member Moreover, policies. immigration labor proper have member states have not Thenew theirenter whois borders. over to control a strict for they argue however labor, yet felt the pressuremember such as Germany,Big states France andUK do acknowledge their need for foreignofStates. laborEuropean Southern the to immigration, compared policy immigration labor strict most as a result they havedon’t differentneeds concerning labor immigration. pursue a states European Northern immigration policy.The analysis memberindeed of the concluded that member states states politics influence national apolicy, preferencesin towards thecaseof this thesis the labor 3.3 Preliminary Conclusion opinion becameimmigration even to more reluctant public in sense. a broader context this In states. EU in immigrants of influx the towards fears existing to added had enlargement Thus, policy. immigration of issue whole the towards hostile turned certainlyhave East fueled to appear public opinion.Consequently, public sentiment the has from coming immigrants of millions about facts than rather Hysteria debate. political EU accession of 10 EasternEuropean countries, agreat number of immigrants would go to search for ajob 109 Plummer” “Polish public opinion of isrounds enlargement, thetwo in 2004and 2007. The discourse of the Polish Plummer isidentified with the fear coming from EU member states (15), believing after that the The firsthypothesis derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalismdomestic that states A very important event which certainly influenced and maybe manipulated the maybemanipulated and influenced certainly which event important A very 109 invaded headlines the of everynews TV/Radio newspaper, and 38 CEU eTD Collection in the the oldin memberstates. in theCouncil of Ministers. hypothesis will chapter willThe fourth be tested. focus on the decision making procedure policy. harmonization strict a favor harmonization against is opinion public iswhere there high salienceUK regarding issueslike the oflabor immigration policy and where the Countries interests. their protect to seeking making policy in engage will states Having tested and proved the first hypothesis in the following chapter the second the chapter following in the hypothesis first the proved and tested Having when politicalLI, the to according salience Moreover, of an issue is high, member 39 CEU eTD Collection like ministerialthe UK, the wasacceptable, yielding cooperation any to of power EU the countries for while And institutions. European of role the considerably limited it that was The main governments upon. the could agree advantage intergovernmentalthe of pillar out of of question. out was immigration labor the of and general) (in policies immigration of supranationalization structuremember identify states and discuss potential agreements where in end isthe one selected. of Denmark, terms of gamesthe mutually upon beneficial cooperation”. thestate. UK,agreementcan be reacheditwill of interests every the accommodate havemember EU to Greece an when even that means This immigration. labor with dealing when strategies different economic andpolitical great the peculiaritiesand in thedomestic realm, member pursue states Ireland, analysis the Yet, agree. of nationalto due to preference that showed formation 3) (chapter remainsif that be fact the developeda common has all response to the member have states which is with cope howeverit. there much Thecountries; main disagreement how to on problem left it. theupon agree states member EU ifall only reached be will policy immigration labor issueHypothesis 2: of Maastricht. 110 C Andrew Andrew Moravcsik, HAPTER During the negotiations of During itMaastricht, preferencewas the the for intergovernmental amendingtreaty that Moravcsik’s negotiations argues can be seen as bargaining their in immigration labor of importance the acknowledge do states Member ( (Cornell Press 1998): 51 4 As long as unanimity voting applies in the Council of Ministers a common a Ministers of Council the in applies voting unanimity as long As – 111 EU Thus, the intergovernmental pillar was the only option upon which all The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Power Europe:Social andState for The Choice From Messina to L EVEL B ARGAINING 40 110 During these negotiations, these During CEU eTD Collection as “cooperative decision making mode.” the form of form the bargainingof demands and compromise proposals. Council of Ministers is, member have incentive astrong reveal states their to preferences in discussedreachingwithout (asarticle suggests), TEC any 67.2 agreement.concrete December2006 22, in JHA the of meeting Council the survived veto national the Moreover, unanimity. hasperiod expired, decision-makingthe in procedure this field remains to hostage transitional the after years three Yet, voting. majority qualified to unanimity from move afiveon agreed Council yearthe transitional couldafter decide that, period, whetherto was it Council, Tampere the During hesitant. especially been has policy immigration labor Germany and the UK, did support the idea of empowering EU institutions. itseven preferencesFrance, though in immigrationthe policy lie somewhere in between any supranationalization. opposing strongly again were borders their over control strong http://www.teameurope.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=130 115 http://www.teameurope.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=130 114 113 Institutions” 112 111 to the EU institutions. because of its big share of EU immigrants, waspushing for delegating more competences Amsterdam Germany,the of negotiations the Treaty. whicha country is quite vulnerable during beobserved can A similar outcome debate. of question a even not was institutions 116 (1998): Moravcsik, Klaus Heeger “”Is there a European Solution for Immigration” Ibid. Andrew Moravcsik, andKalypso Nicolaidies “Explainig theTreaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Geddes. Andrew Heeger “”Is there a European Solution for Immigration” 51 Based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in a non-coercive environment as the as environment non-coercive in a Intergovernmentalism, Liberal on Based Up to now EU member states’ attitude towards the question of harmonization of Journal of common Market Journal of The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Power Europe:Social andState for The Choice From Messina toMaastricht: The politics of migration and Immigration in Europe, ( andImmigration inEurope, ofmigration The politics 114 where only the necessity for improving the decision making was decision the improving for necessity the only where 112 However, the UK and Ireland and Denmark countries with a with countries Denmark and Ireland and UK the However, vol. 37 no 1 (1999) 116 41 It means participatingthe can It that actors EUWatch EUWatch . 115 Bargaining has been defined been has Bargaining Sage Publications, 2005):145 . 113 CEU eTD Collection of of coalitions can socalledthe lead to “multi-speed” Europe. disagree andpursue a differentjust policy. or agreement, the on will their impose to easier it find alternatives unilateral strong considerably they makehave so to concessions.weak, governments with By contrast, is power bargaining their that find alternatives unilateral poor with governments unilateral crediblehave must orcoalitional other states alternatives. Moravcsik arguesthat be most the powerful consideredin to tool a bargaining process. exit an to policyagreementof an agreement.A threat is proposed they the out can step policyprefer the mirroralternatives. if their best on agree to However, not governments do Alternatives 4.1 UnilateralandCoalitional and side payments. will factors of Each these be considered in turn. alternative which underlies opportunities 2) the for issue veto, credible linkages to coalitional threats or unilateral a of value the 1) factors: specific two reflect to likely is outcomes agreements whereunanimity voting applies. Moravcsik negotiated arguesthatthe strengthens the bargaining the strengthens memberthese of powers states. coalition a form to possibility a of existence The involved. is government one than more 118 117 ifa negotiation of becomewould arenogainsthere part expected actor no Moreover, negotiations. prior to comparison in situation their improve http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/multispeed_europe_en.htm being implied thattheothers will follow later.See whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of Member States both able and willing to advance, it 121 120 119 Moravcsik, Ibid, Multi-speed" Europe is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration Ibid,64 Ibid,64 It iswhen rational upon assumeda policy,governments agree It that seek to they all The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Power Europe:Social andState for The Choice From Messina toMaastricht. 119 This becomes process even more powerful when 42 120 121 117 In the EU context this threat this context EU the In and this is especially true in true especially is this and 118 Yet, for the threatbe to 64 CEU eTD Collection states did not please them. didThisnot isstates obvious from reaction of the some of memberthe states discussedpowerfulof states issuesgroup have do that an impact 21member other the on small a that fact sheer The matters. immigration in say their have and role indisputable meetingequally wasnot retain welcomedtheir to by wanted member who other the states, schemes. immigration legal others, amongst tackle to measures for calling policy', migration ajointNicolaspresented his Sarkozy plan Frenchcounterpart for a'new European legal immigration were widely discussed. German Minister Interior Wolfgang Schäuble and 2006 underGerman chairmanship. (Germany, EU the of France,Italy,Memberlargest Poland,States Spain and UK) in March interests converge. whose countries with coalitions create to is Thisoption other the is theIntergovernemtnalism case Liberal of to the According G-6 options. meeting the of one of is the policies ministers unilateral the bargaining processes, they willPursuing preferpursue to their own policies.of the interiormember states. As far as these countries are notsatisfied of with the proposalsthe discussed in six UK and Ireland are known for their strict policies, stricter than many of the other EU http://www.teameurope.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=130 123 law, set out inaProtocol to the , which took effect 1May 1999. 122 frontiers. internal of lifting of policy the from isolated geographical position ittheir is easier for them Considering control to their borders. immigration. as such issues with deal to government national the leastinat caseof UK that the the and Irelandof geographical the strength andthe factors 124 Geddes. TheUK, Ireland andDenmark have opt-outs from EU immigration,asylum and civil Heeger”Is there a EuropeanSolution for Immigration” Even though the G-6 was an informal meeting and no decisions could be taken, this be taken, could decisions no and meeting informal an was G-6 the though Even During Amsterdam the Treaty UK, Ireland and Denmark negotiated an opt-out 125 The politics of migration andImmigration inEurope, ofmigration The politics 124 In this meeting matters of immigration, including immigration, of matters meeting this In 43 122 This can be partly explained by the fact EUWatch (2005): 43 . 123 Moreover CEU eTD Collection interests is limited. someEven countriesthe of though need number a greater of foreign asymmetrical highly for potential the policy immigration labor of field the in Yet, interests. issue linkagesargues that when aremore advantageous havecountries highly asymmetrical of the EU. However as yet, member states have notcome toan agreement. policycompletion people, of wouldfreedoms four services addto the (goods, and capital)immigration labor the of harmonization the that true is It concessions. give to parties Affairs, Directorate – General European Cooperation and Federal Public Service Foreign affairs, Brussels. 11.05.2007 affairs, Foreign Service Public Federal and Cooperation European General – Directorate Affairs, 126 125 others.” some than to to important preference intensities different across issues, marginal with gains in some issues areas more linkageEU agreements. that Moravcsik argues happens “when governments have varying findstates themselves inof a majorinterconnectedness anet dueto number of previous isolated issues. Yet the EU environment is far more complicated4.2 Issue LinkagesandSide Payments than this. EU member unilateralhave not better member coalitionaldo whoor strong so policies. states not and small for especially problematic, is This outside. remain that countries the for limited are policy this in developments the influce to possibilities the area policy any in place takes is made within closed doors. The main reason for retain this unanimitythe to wantMember States welcomeand not they anydo initiativeis which that once a multi – speed Europe initiative themanagementthe on apaper when of G-6 it of the migration.proposed meeting. G-6 the Claes Belgiumtowards argues that marked its skepticism with to regard Interview with Peter Claes, First Secretary coordination Europeans Cooperation Justice and Home Ibid Moreover, based on the logic the basedissue of on linkagesMoreover, and side payments, Moravcsik The above analysis was based on the assumption that bargaining happens on happens bargaining that assumption the on based analysis was above The 127 In this case it may be then advantageous for the 44 126 CEU eTD Collection 127 This issue will be further analyzed inposition. followingthe chapter. marginalized a only hold Justice of Court European the and Parliament European the Commission, the and unanimity on based is making decision why is which institutions, deals. Alsobetter member have the remainedgivesupranational state moreto to reluctant have to them allow would which alternatives other seek they table the on put proposals the achieve memberto gains. in these other If member order states can upon agree not states preferencesalready are nationalthe formedlevel at and in the Council they bargain with Their policy. immigration labor common a of creation the concerning opinions different all it. From upon above the analysismember agree states itis clearmember have that if states only being into come would policy common a that was hypothesis derived the bargaining, 4.3 Preliminary Conclusion also agree that this kind of immigration should be controlled otherwise it can fire back. laborimmigration their caneconomieshelp theirboost and they labor regenerate force, to whilst that agree, all they scale large a At impacts. negative and positive its both policy, immigration labor the of influence the of aware are states member The policy. immigration labor EU concerning EU the within interests asymmetrical highly no are there skills, workers than another one and even though countries differ in their need for professional Moracvsik, When analyzing the second step in Liberal Intergovernmentalism, namely interstate Intergovernmentalism, in Liberal step second the analyzing When The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Power Europe:Social andState for The Choice from Messina Amsterdam to 45 . 65 CEU eTD Collection firstly by locking each other into credible commitments and secondly by finding safe setting safe byfinding secondly and commitments credible into other each locking by firstly main ways; in two happens government national the of empowering The it. weakening of instead executive national the and state the strengthens policy immigration labor regarding EUlevelat the Thiswill memberand the cooperation chapter the states. that argue institutions EU between relationship the analyze to important very is it policy, immigration establish to linkages and compromises upon issues where non-compliance is tempting.” seekingcredible commitmentunder conditions of uncertainty, “particularly when they seek common supranational institutions. when pool) they They delegate (or are decide to be more willing to tend of being“extreme preferences” with the threat outvoted create to level. Moravcsik’sBased on argument “governments member of the havethat states their policypursue venues objectives to other whichwelcomed domesticthe are not at want to lock each other into crediblelock eachother commitmentsto want isanswer member EUlevel whether EU create to policies states legislation or because they institutional Intergovernmentalist approach: choices. The main question this seeks chapter bargaining,this will chapter thethirdandfocus final on analytical instage the Liberal weakens thenational government. Hypothesis 3: ( 128 C Cornell University Cornell Press 1998): Andrew Andrew Moravcsik, HAPTER Considering the strong supranational institutional net the EU represents in the labor in the represents EU the net institutional supranational strong the Considering Having already analyzed of national stage the preference formation and interstate 5 Delegating authority to the supranational institutions strengthens rather than rather strengthens institutions supranational the to authority Delegating – D ELEGATING The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose Europe:Social & for PowerThe Choice State fromMessina Maastricht, to 75 S OVEREIGNTY TO 46 1 or is it because they find in the EU S UPRANATIONAL I NSTITUTIONS 128 CEU eTD Collection competitive Europe incompetitive thisglobalization ageof Europe coming wherethreats from all the over economically and strong a foresee all They concerns. similar share do and vision white scale. At the bottom line it can be argued that all member states do envisage a similar achievepolicies issue the goals.to However, their cannotbe seen in order in a black and that member states have different interestsbe lockedthey inalso to agreementsagree these aswell. and as a result they credible into memberlockthe of eachother interests They commitmentswant to states. and ought to pursue in the was move this that be would approach different Intergovernmentalist Liberal a on based arises: why did membereventually decide to states make this move? A simple answer stated question The states. member the with right this sharing was Commission the then Until initiative. of right exclusive the have, would Commission the which after period, transitional Only during Tampere the agreement, indid 1999, member the decide states a five year initiators. sole the remained states member pillar, first the in policy immigration labor of issue the brought Treaty Amsterdam the though Even Commission. the to right this giving of unwilling quite been have states member policy, immigration labor of field the in that takes place when the Commission is given the sole right of initiating. of right sole the given is Commission the when place takes decisions. formsimportant mostOne of the of member withering states’ of sovereignty autonomous take to possibility the institutions supranational to give states member 5.1 Locking Each Other Into Credible Commitments analyzed asfollows. be will issues These level. domestic the at restrictions face which policies pursue to When analyzing labor immigration policies across member states, it was concluded was it states, member across policies immigration labor analyzing When According to Moravcsik, the most important way of delegating sovereignty is when 47 129 It has been shown been has It CEU eTD Collection argues that the levelthe that delegationof argues reflects benefit a cost- analysis. immigration policy is few amongstthe 129 member prefer to states knowing whatimpactNot future developmentsthe population. will have for certain states, native the from empty left gaps fill inthe to immigration labor for need the and population everywhere.Alsopresent are they world all share concernof the an aging European 133 132 131 130 of mostsub policies under immigration the and asylum policies are under QMV Although policy. immigration labor the in making decision during norm the as unanimity states decided togrant the Commission to the sole right of initiative they agreed keepto the agreement. of level certain a ensure which circumstances institutional under done is this governments, norms. and principles of set common a to institutions and governments pre-commit but plans detailed initiatives among“relational serveas member contracts” whichspecify states not do Commission Majone, Giandomenico to According Commission. European the to powers certain of delegating the explain partially can which factor important an is This over’. ‘spill- of term the under scholars Neo-functionalist by captured well been has phenomenon member can memberhave aswell. other consequences states for the states This in any immigration economic of field the in measure policy any instance, for sphere, social conditions the agreements. for future create Moravcsik. Moravcsik. Integration Immigrant Policy is one of them Ie. Visa Policy Giandomenico Majone, Europe, (Routledge, Regulating 1996) However this argument can explain only part of the developments. Whilst member Whilst developments. the of part only explain can argument this However and economic inthe integration of high level arguably the considering Moreover, 130 The Choice for Europe: Social PurposePower Europe:Social andstate for The Choice fromMessina Maastricht to The Choice for Europe: Social PurposePower Europe:Social andstate for The Choice fromMessina Maastricht. to Afterwards, even though bargaining takes place among national among place takes bargaining though even Afterwards, ante prima agree upon a broad institutional framework which will which framework institutional broad a upon agree 132 where the unanimity rule still applies. Moravcsik applies. still rule unanimity the where 48 133 Therefore, preserving Therefore, 131 , 70 , labor 75 CEU eTD Collection bring to the EU level a national policy, (in this case labor immigration policy), is to be able be is to policy), immigration labor case this (in policy, national a level EU the to bring same concerning economic the immigration policy. haveMemberresistance. different states experiences all asnot domesticthe realms are the provide to Europe”new willvenues be discussed.intocredible commitments tothe extent ‘needed’.themselves lock In this to second part, the idea Thisof States “escaping Member for for way rational ideaa was rule) unanimity iswith combined thebased initiative (Commission on delegation’ the‘partial member how analyzed assumption part first The it. strengthens it conditions thatin certain instead, EU states government; institutionsnational a weaken not does institutions to pursue politics5.2 “Escaping toEurope” which findin turn. will analyzed be domestic supranational the institutions for to reasons this The than power others. more delegate to notall the member states perceive the issueSurprisingly, in guide. sucha as a way.only Some countries act will are more willing initiator an as role its with Commission, the case this In states. other the hurt might that anything do will not and norms and rules certain with This institutions.the already them allreassures that memberthe will states havecomply to issue memberhave seem been to satisfied states giving of withthestep initiative to power each member voice into isstate’s consideration. taken Considering high the salience of the each memberwillany possesses power possible The take state veto risks. make that sure to want not do they and states member for important extremely is policy immigration labor that argue to is outcome this explain to way credible most The veto. their maintaining unanimity, members of can be political outcome desire seenasthe reduce states’ to risks by According to Monar a potential a potential benefit Monar Accordingto for anational governmentattempting to As itwas introduced earlier in thisdelegating supranational chapter, to power 49 CEU eTD Collection domestic constrains. Actuallydomestic constrains. of a convergence between interests executivesthe and the political and judicial limited only faces UK the that argues Geddes policy. immigration Germany and France. allaccommodate memberthe in this analysisthe states section, to will be focused on UK,impossibility the of Because all. at institutions such are if there level, EU the at policies member face differentstates domestic constrains concerning issue the of harmonizingthat surprise a not is It level. EU the at policy immigration of harmonization against or the institutions which protect nationalthe surpass institutional level. at constraints Thus capacitythey the that argue of immigrant rights to governments determines national allow and sovereignty national enhance to designed was well) as whetherimmigration labor to applies a same statethe that willderived be can (it general in be policy in immigration favor actors. domestic many of will the against go might which objectives their pursue to opportunities political new find governments national case in this actors, political that supranationalized,itbecomes hierarchical and itoverrides national laws. is policy a once that points also Geddes states. member the upon binding is it level; EU in the accommodated is policy a once that know to important is it this hide behind weighty screen the of collective not)” EUaction (or issue has been successfully agenda, European governmentsthe can try to upto brought 136 135 of Journal Common4 (2001)747 Studies39,no Market 134 hostile certain policyescape domestic to groups to reforms. Salience Harmonization”and 137 Geddes. Ibid,748 Jorg Monar, “The dynamics of Justice and Home Affaires: Laboratories, Driving Factors andCosts” Terri Givens Terri andAdam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, British governments in turn have opposed the supranationalization of economic of supranationalization the opposed have inturn governments British Givens and Luedtke The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. andImmigrationin of Migration The Politics The Policy Studies Journal Studies The Policy 137 conclude that the harmonization which has occurred in the occurred has which harmonization the that conclude 50 32, no. 1 2004, pp 151 12004, 32, no. (2005):129 134 He argues that “once an 135 To better understand better To 136 This means CEU eTD Collection 141 140 139 in Germany strong. are quite rights immigrant protect that institutions Britain, from Differently approach. different a immigranthuge the flux member EU it presents has other receivedthe states, compared to and it prefersapply to its proposals sovereignty in thisharmonization issue. block to tendency the shows it Consequently policies. immigration legitimize to Europe its escape to strict economic facedrights needto hasnot the immigrant protect to institutions strong no with UK, like country a that is line bottom the frontiers. external its protecting of models policy its on insist to continues and one troubled itwill most has as the beencharacterized remain so aslong as Britain ingeneral) policies (immigration policy immigration labor regarding EU the with relations economic immigration policy. By doing this, Germany can more easily pursue its pursue easily more can Germany this, doing By policy. immigration economic restrictive of pursuit the in constrains political and legal domestic overcome ministers national the where Europe to escape is an this for that means This making. policy in the powers strong have would Commission the that means which Voting Majority Qualified of policy,Germany ofthisfavorsintegration further policy level. EU the at favors theuse It immigration labor harmonizing of case the In oriented. pro-integration been always have 138 policy. immigration labor British of effectiveness the undermine might this and apply counterparts its one’s the than organized better is policy immigration UK’s that belief is the there Moreover, home. at restriction any facing without policies, immigration can It pursue its Europe. economic escape to need to not UKdoes the Therefore, observed. be can policy immigration restrictive a pursuing for institutions domestic Ibid,130 Ibid,125 Ibid,125 Geddes, On the other hand, Germany which actually finds itself in a different situation due situation different ina itself finds actually which Germany hand, other the On The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe.(2005) andImmigrationin : of Migration The Politics 141 Germany is one of the founding countries and its policies 51 48 140 Nonetheless, 139 UK;s 138 CEU eTD Collection credible commitments and secondly by pursuing policies which are not welcomed at home. at welcomed not are which policies pursuing by secondly and commitments credible into governments other by locking firstly, ways; in two government the strengthens level weakens than Pursuing it. andit rather capacity strengthens policies state of the the EU at control of reassertion a is immigration labor of field the in level EU the at Cooperation truth. the being from far is this policy, immigration economic of case the in Especially isvanishing. process decision-making the control to ability their that mean not does this 5.3 Preliminary Conclusion necessary for their sovereignty. in order to pursue theirFrom here, it can begoals. argued that indeed member states delegateEU as to much as they Theyneed governments. national the of do, remit the under remain should howeverstates) their entering workers they retain foreign of number the (on quotas national that any argue both they QMV for advocating other power which is policy. immigration labor venues inpursue itsseek other obliged policy to to order objectives, particularly regarding Germany. they exist factthat Nonetheless, the and they are active meansFrance is that institutionsthese can be aremoreit said powerful that than in UK the lessbut so than in policy, it is supporting QMV in the Council. As for the institutions that protect immigrants , instance a pro-integration hada significant numberRegarding laborsectors. immigration of pressures coming from domestic groups. escaping and action EU of umbrella the under hiding policies immigration controlled It is a fact now that member that isnow sharefact with certain aEUinstitutions the powers It states but are though even France, and Germany both that note, to interesting is it However, speaking generally has is It Germany. with similarities some demonstrates France 52 CEU eTD Collection powers the EU to institutions, because it is sure it can pursue its politics independently. governmentdoes facenot such constrains, as in the case of UK, it is less willing to delegate as this will enable its policies.pursue executive the in to cases However, when the institutions EU the to power limited a delegate to willing more is constrains domestic faces analysis threemember Franceand of Germany states, when a member that showed state goals and policy objectives, especially when they face political home.constrains at The member state will happen within a set of norms and rules which they all are aware of. specificupon policy arrangements.This assures them every that future developmentin any commona specific objectives, future upon at however agree moment they agree cannot Finally, EU institutions give to national governments the possibility to pursue their pursue to possibility the governments national to give institutions EU Finally, credible intolock eachother commitments to tend Member states when they all 53 CEU eTD Collection and the public opinion has a firm stand towards it, it was shown that national governments national that shown was it it, towards a firm stand has opinion public the and salient highly is policy immigration labor of topic the where states In issues. immigration of politicization of level the by influenced are policies domestic Moreover policy. qualifications,EU member have different states preferences concerning labor immigration instance existence the anddifferentlabor of shortages demands concerning professionalfor as such conditions, economic different to due Indeed, policy. immigration labor of field in the policies national influence which politics domestic and conditions economic the not. or institutions supranational the and thirdly they basedstages previous onthe all two to delegatedecide power whether to bargain withseeking each wouldother deal leave a that them off better than quo status the member define laborstates immigration their towards interests policy; secondly,Firstly, they stages. three during shaped and influenced is policy immigration labor harmonize to analysispartite supranational institutions. three Afterthe it decisionwas concludedthe that bargaininginterstate level EU the at decisiondelegateand sovereignty 3) the to to Intergovernmental nationalscholars: 1) domesticpreferencethe formation at level, 2) analysis,step a three pursued based on theoretical the framework laid down by Liberal study this hypothesis, this test to order In executives. national of sovereignty the under remain will it whether or level EU the at harmonized be will policy a whether deciding behind reasons the understand lack the of harmonization of this policylevel. EU the at C ONCLUSION Regardingnational preference formation, Liberal Intergovernmentalism itis that argues The main hypothesis of the thesis was that member states are the key players in The aim of this thesis was to examine EU labor immigration policy and to and policy immigration labor EU examine to was thesis this of aim The 54 CEU eTD Collection who decide whether labor immigration policy is to be harmonized or not. From this thesis this From not. or harmonized be to is policy immigration labor whether decide who actors main the are states member that is conclusion main The . bring. could delegation supranationalization of policythe obviousarea andthe benefitssuch that competence the of in favor institutions EU from calls repeated despite level, EU the at policy domestic constraints were willing to escape to Europe. to escape to willing were constraints domestic policies,autonomous more pursue while faced to domestic that constrains tended states by Thisevidence pointwas supported memberstates. thatwhich facenot do states member willno state that apolicyundertake which disadvantages could create other for the the willingnessshows of thepillar member first states lockto the in each other now into is commitments, policy thus makingimmigration sure labor that fact The constraints. domestic credible into states commitmentsall andby creating avenue where member locking can by escape states positions states’ member strengthens institutions EU to power Delegating decisionLiberal making However, Intergovernmentalism process. the argues contrary. memberof the alossof control delegationcompetence the itover would create states assumption widely-spread the with associated often is This institutions. supranational to alternatives, eitherother unilaterally coalitions. through or indeed that when membera certainagree upon could they proposal, not states would seek showed policy immigration labor of case The policies. unilateral than off worse them leave will that off,make they them however better can and will wouldrejectagreements that that within a non coercive system such as thepolicies. EU, governments will preferences the of publicaccommodate the do opinion when formulating their national agree upon policies The aim of this thesis analyze was to The final of harmonizationstep comes with decisionthe delegate power of whether to argues Intergovernmentalism Liberal level EU the at bargaining interstate Concerning why 55 there is no a common labor immigration labor common a no is there CEU eTD Collection the member states that are in memberthe that drivingthe is states in seat it journey Integration. the of European institutions, EU the of role enormous the undermining not While society. international and members EU other to inrelation position their will strengthen this that know they when Integration on governments agree European memberMemberthe of states states. which integration placeEven every takes hastheconsent towards of the step national are sensitive inleastthat member areas at to sovereignty. states’ that shows, here presented is built and one of the sovereignty which remains upon state the isolated.Yet, international cornerstone the arena main goals of any state beinginterconnectedness,of age givesunitedand than results acting better being together is to preserve thishelp national theirown them to pursue policies. in order created is thatin It states true this sovereignty. The caseconclusion a broader can Unionbe is derived.European apolitical unitwhich its member 56 CEU eTD Collection www.epsnet.org/EPISTEME/Unit2/neorelism.htm retrieved 5.5.2007 E-learningEU units “Neo-Realism: asan EU International Actor” abourMarketStrategyKretzschmar.pdf http://www.migpolgroup.com/multiattachments/2551/DocumentName/FranceImmigrationL 2006 Group Cyric Kretzschmar “Immigration France”Immigrationas alaborstrategy: market Policy of method open an on ‘Communication co-ordination for Community the immigration(2001b) policy’, COM (2001) 387final,Communities 11July. European the of Commission in Opinion Public Explaining EU? Switzerland”the “Joining Trechsel Alexander and Thomas Christin, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=406for (2006) University Centre Stockholm Relations Ethnic and Multiculturalism” Migration and in International Policy Research Immigration Restrictive “Sweden: Westin. Charles andSecurity Challenge: Liberty Carreras. “Legal Migration Law and Policy Trends in a Selection of EU Member States” Integration? Carey, Sean. “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle toEuropean 2006 Times, Financial The Immigration” Burns Jimmy and George Parker “Britons oppose open EUmemberdoor to states ARENA Governance, EU and Market Working Papers,WP 97/251997 Single the Institutionalism, “New Simon. Bulmer, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1400573 BBC (2001) “Immigration Concerns Multiply”, retrieved 2May 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1400573 BBC (2001) “Immigration Concerns Multiply”, retrieved 2May 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1400573 BBC (2001) “Immigration Concerns Multiply”, retrieved 2May 2007 Edward Elgar, 2004 Apap Joana, Ed. European Politics” inWorld Journal Constructivism of International Relations,Ground: Middle vol. 3,no.the 3,pp. 319 – 363 “Seizing Emanuel. Adler, European UnionPolitics 3 European UnionPolitics ,3 Justice and Home Affairs: LibertyandSecurityJustice issuesand HomeAffairs: afterEnlargement. , 2006 B IBLIOGRAPHY , no. 4, (2002) , no. no. 4, (2002) no. 4, 57 CEU eTD Collection http://www.teameurope.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=130 Solution forKlaus Immigration”“”Is aEuropean Heeger there Kelstrup Morten and Michael C. Williams.( Routledge, London and , 2000): 40 &DocumentID=580 http://www.developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&page=WebPage nascendi’’ statu In Minorities 2 Policy: Immigration ‘’Poland’s Dimerska, Justyna Institutionalization (Oxford of UniversityEurope 2001) Press, NewYork, Organization 1976 30, 173-212, International Integration” Regional of Theory the and Fields “Turbulent Erns.B. Haas, Standford University Press, 1958 Haas, Ernst. B“The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957” Scientific for Center National Research: TheBrookings Institution, January France” 1, 2002 in Policy “Immigration Virginie. Guiraudon, ImmigrationDebate on Policy”, Guiraudon Virginie, “Seeking of NewVenues:Europeanization Migration-Related Policies, 150 Givens, Terri and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Immigration Union European SalienceInstitutions, of and Harmonization” Politics “The Luedtke, Adam and Terri Givens, (Manchester University 116 Press, 2000), Geddes Andrew, Publications, 2005 Geddes, Andrew. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf justice in Union. European the Brussels, 13December, 2004 Commission,European HagueProgramme: The Strengthening security, freedom and http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf justice in Union. European the Brussels, 13December, 2004 Commission,European HagueProgramme: The Strengthening security, freedom and http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/work/doc/com_2004_811_en.pdf 811 final, Brussels, 1.11.2005 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU approach managingto economic migration, Research. Social and Political for Consortium Inter-University Brussels, Belgium: Opinion European Ann Research (producer); EEIG MI: Arbor,Group Eurobarometer 60(2004) Eurobarometer (2005) The Politics Migration andImmigrationinEurope, of Immigration andEuropeanIntegration:Towards Fortress Europe? Public OpinionintheEuropeanUnion, Swiss Political ScienceReview The Policy Studies Journal 32, 58 7, no. 3 (2004): 101 3 (2004): 7,no. EUWatch Autumn 2003. Migration and . Sage no. 1, (2004) pp no. 1, CEU eTD Collection Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29issue 21996 integration: anHistoricalEuropean Paul. InstitutionalistPierson, “Thepath to Approach”, Macmillan London: Union, Press LTD.1999 in European making – Decision E. Bomber, & J. Peterson, Institutionalization Oxford of UniversityEurope, Press, 2001 New of Creation The Immigration: Policy and Spaces“, in Neil Alec Sweet, Fligstein, Stone „Policing Wayne Sandholtz, The Sandholtz, Wayne Turnbull, Penelope Law, Federal Foreign Office/ Germany Interview by author 14May 2007 Mossleer, Sven. Dr. Desk Officer, Division E05 – EU Justice and Home Affairs, European ” vol. 6,no. 4.1999 Moravcsik,Andrew. “Constructivism andIntegration” Journal European of European intergovernmentalist Approach” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No.4.1993 in“PreferencesMoravcsik,Community:Andrew. the and European Power A liberal rejoinder” A integration: and Common MarketStudies of Intergovernmentalism “Liberal . Andrew Moravcsik 2001 http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c91_monar.pdf Diversity and EU Instruments and Strategies.” Center for European Integration Studies, Monar Jorg. “EU Justice and Home Affairs in the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of Journaland Costs” of Common Market Studies 39,no4 (2001)747 Monar Jorg, “The dynamics of Justice and Home Affaires: Laboratories, Driving Factors European of Politics the and Security Integration: Power, and Community”Theory Routledge, Londonand 2000 NewYork. Relations “International Williams C. Michael International Policy Analysis Unit. and Democratic Competition” Integration Gary Marks, and “European LiesbetHooghe. Policy” Immigration and Opinion Public Union Politics Integration, “European Adam. Luedtke, university Press 1963 Lindberg, N.“ThePoliticalLeon Dynamics Economic Stanford European of Integration. Tamkang University, Taipeoi, Taiwan, March 2002 “European Integration: Whatand Why? Instituteof Studies, Graduate the European at Laursen, Fin “Theories paperforlecture Background on Integration” of European Lahav, Gallya. “Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union: Does it Does Union: European the Matter? in Immigration Toward Opinion “Public Gallya. Lahav, Comparative Political Studies 6, no.1 (2005): 83 (2005): 6, no.1 33, no. 4 (1995): 612 4 (1995): 33, no. (2003) 37, no. 10, December 37,no. 2004.1151 59 European Journal CEU eTD Collection Commission in Justice and Home Affairs” Home and Justice in Commission Emek. “From Sidelinesthe SidekickUcarer, The More? European no Stage: Center to Security, Commission. European Interview by 16May author 2007 Stefania Pasquetti. Unit JLS B2: Immigration and Asylum, DG Justice Freedom and theory andthe European Integration:Power,Politics of Security andCommunity Smith in Integration” “International Steve. Theory and European Diez Thomas and Wiener European Integration( Antje of eds “Neo-Functionalism” C. Philippe Schmitter, Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration, London: Macmillan Press LTD. 2000 Theory”Integration Oxford University Press, 2005 Risse, Thomas. “Social constructivism” in eds. Antje Weiner andThomas Diez “European http://www.parapundit.com/archives/cat_immigration_policy.html Randall “DenmarkParker, Back onImmigration” Cuts 2006 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page5708.asp PM speech Confederationthe to of British Industry on migration, 27April 2004 Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Brussels 9May 2007 Justice and Home Affairs, Cooperation Claes.European Coordination FirstSecretary Peter 5, http://eioop.or.at/eiop.texte/2001-005.htm accessed 05.5.2007 5, http://eioop.or.at/eiop.texte/2001-005.htm Oxford University 46 Press, 2005), , European Integration onlinePapers,, European 60 International Relations Theories Vol. 5 no 5 Vol. eds.