november 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 11-12

Contents The Challenges of Retaking

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali Northern Mali By Martin van Vliet By Martin van Vliet

Reports 5 An Algerian Press Review: Determining Algiers’ Position on an Intervention in Mali By Kal Ben Khalid 9 Serious Leadership Rifts Emerge in Afghan Taliban By Anand Gopal 12 Shabiha Militias and the Destruction of Syria By Stephen Starr 14 Hizb Allah’s Role in the Syrian Uprising By Chris Zambelis 17 Security Implications for Multinational Corporations Operating in Mexico By Charles Regini

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Military leaders from ECOWAS develop plans to regain control of northern Mali. - Habibou Kouyate/AFP/Getty Images nce considered africa’s Restoring state authority and legitimacy flagship of democracy, Mali to northern Mali will require a radical has turned into a shipwreck break with the governance and security of anarchy seemingly strategies adopted by Malian political Oovernight. A military coup ousted elites during previous decades. The Malian President Amadou Toumani Malian state has recurrently relied on Touré in March 2012, and within weeks local militias in response to security state authority completely withered in threats in the northern regions, thereby About the CTC Sentinel the northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu fueling rivalry between and within The Combating Terrorism Center is an and Kidal. Covering an area as large local communities. Falling back on independent educational and research as the state of Texas, these regions are such a “militiatary”1 strategy in institution based in the Department of Social currently controlled by three “hybrid the context of the current crisis will Sciences at the United States Military Academy, organizations” blending Islamic be counterproductive to the efforts West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses radicalism with transnational crime. undertaken to restore state authority the Center’s global network of scholars and Deeply concerned by the security threats and legitimacy and could provoke a civil practitioners to understand and confront posed by such a sizeable sanctuary for war. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and terrorists, the international community other forms of political violence. has pressured the Malian government and military to overcome internal wrangles as preparations for an international 1 By deploying a “militiatary” strategy, a state partly The views expressed in this report are those of outsources its primary mandate of security provision to the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, military intervention are underway. local militias. While often temporarily integrated into the the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. military chain of command, these armed non-state actors mostly operate outside formal state structures.

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This article will show why northern networks, multinational corporations Songhai7—communities. Frustrated by Mali is prone to rebellion. It will then and migrants all invested considerably the army’s poor response to the Tuareg explain how the state has supported in the area, the information and revolt, senior Songhai officers deserted militias to quell these frequent communication technology revolution from the army and created the Ganda uprisings, argue that the state might facilitated enhanced connections with Koy militia to defend the interests of reemploy that same strategy to unseat the outside world, and transnational the sedentary Songhai population.8 Islamist militants in the north, and smuggling further developed as a pivotal Particularly violent confrontations identify what results an international economic pillar in the region. took place between the Ganda Koy, the military intervention might bring. predominantly Arab Islamic Front of Rebellion and the “Militiatary” Azawad (FIAA) and the Tuareg Popular In the Margins of Development Just as the Malian state relied on non- Movement for the Liberation of Azawad Situated in one of the poorest countries state actors to deliver services and (FPLA). in the world, development prospects in invest in northern Mali, it has also Mali’s desolate and desert-like northern depended on others to perform its core Political elites in Bamako exploited regions are particularly restrained. Most function of security provision. Far from these intra- and inter-communal of Mali’s economic and agricultural obtaining a monopoly on violence, the tensions. The army actively cooperated resources are confined to its southern state repeatedly adopted a “militiatary” with the Ganda Koy to combat the regions. In the north, soil fertility is strategy to respond to the series of armed Tuareg and Arabic resistance groups. extremely poor, rains are sporadic and rebellions that occurred in northern By adopting a “militiatary” strategy, irregular, access to water is restricted Mali during the last half century.4 the Malian state deliberately ensconced and severe droughts occur frequently. rivalry and mistrust between local Agricultural GDP per capita is inferior to The first violent conflict erupted when communities in the north. It was any other region on the continent, while a small group of Tuareg leaders took mainly due to the conciliation efforts infant mortality rates are high. Covering up arms to rebel against their forced undertaken by local traditional and almost 70% of the national territory, inclusion in the Malian state shortly religious authorities, supported by the northern regions only host a mere after the country gained independence in the international community, that a 10% of the population. Government 1960.5 The Malian army brutally crushed fragile peace emerged by 1996. Almost investment and international aid have the revolt and kept the northeastern region 1,500 Tuareg rebels were subsequently therefore long been primarily oriented under strict military control for decades. integrated into the army which, to toward the south.2 Northern pastoralist the anger of other local communities, communities were particularly A second Tuareg rebellion emerged made former rebels responsible for marginalized by state policies adopted at the start of the 1990s. Tuareg maintaining security in the north.9 under the socialist regime of 1960-1968, society consists of multiple clans as well as under the military rulers (confederations) and is stratified Transnational Crime, the “Militiatary” and from 1968-1991 that strongly favored along strict hierarchical lines whereby State Collapse sedentary constituencies.3 “subordinate” groups have increasingly Situated on the margins of formal state contested “dominant” castes. The development opportunities, northern Development prospects in the region renewed rebellion soon fragmented Mali gradually took center stage within improved from the mid-1990s as a result along these tribal and caste lines, with various transnational smuggling of increased government spending different militant Tuareg groups fighting networks. Subsidized consumer goods (particularly in infrastructure) but also each other. The conflict gradually due to the resources made available by evolved into a small-scale civil war actors and transnational networks involving other—notably Arab6 and region). They formed the backbone of the militant Arab operating beyond the state. Tourism Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA). flourished, international non- 7 The Songhai, originally sedentary farmers, constitute governmental organizations, religious 4 Previous armed conflicts in northern Mali occurred in the majority population in the Gao and Timbuktu region. 1963, 1990-1996, 2006 and 2008. During the last decades, they have seen many Tuareg set- 5 The Tuareg are nomadic pastoralists, culturally and tling in these regions, especially following the devastat- 2 David Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali and the War linguistically related to North African Berbers, scattered ing droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. on Terror,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25:1 across various Sahelian states. They strongly opposed 8 The Ganda Koy also attracted support from former Tu- (2007): pp. 59-76. Comparative research conducted by becoming a minority within a predominantly “black” Af- areg and Fulani slaves, who joined out of frustration with the World Bank suggests that countries with a substan- rican country. In his book Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, the armed revolt of their former masters. Fulani (also tial level of socioeconomic inequality that is either region- Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern known as Fulbe or Peul) are nomadic pastoralists scat- ally or ethnically concentrated face a considerable, latent, Mali, historian Baz Lecocq depicted the racial stereotypes tered around the entire region. While the distinction be- security risk. See “Understanding Civil War. Evidence that underpinned relations between Mali’s independence tween nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers is still and Analysis: Africa,” World Bank, 2005. leaders and Tuareg representatives. See Baz Lecocq, Dis- often used, most livelihood strategies in northern Mali 3 Tor A. Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity puted Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and actually consist of combined forms of agro-pastoralism. Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali (Leiden, Netherlands: See Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Na- the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali,” Journal of Peace Brill, 2010). tionalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Research 45:6 (2008): pp. 819-836; Pierre Boilley, Les 6 The principal Arab (Moors) groups residing in north- 9 Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dépendances et Révoltes: du Soudan ern Mali are the Kunta and Telemsi (concentrated in the in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saha- Français au Mali contemporain (Paris: Karthala, 1999), pp. Gao region) and Berabiche (of which a majority reside ran Front,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25:1 285-286. in Timbuktu, but who are scattered around the entire (2007): pp. 141-166. 2 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 from both Libya and Algeria have in both Gao and Timbuktu.14 Malian confrontational attitude. AQIM had long been popular contraband sold in army representatives commanded these solidified ties with influential local northern Mali, while transnational militias on various occasions.15 Arabs in the Timbuktu region, people cigarette smuggling networks rose to on whom Touré heavily relied for his prominence in the 1980s. Demand for Touré’s balancing act in the north “militiatary” strategy to confront the small-arms in the wider region prone became increasingly complicated Tuareg threat.18 International diplomats to conflict particularly increased as the southern wing of al-Qa`ida increasingly complained that the Malian throughout the 1990s.10 During the in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)— regime colluded with (rather than course of the last decade, transnational which, until 2007, was known as merely tolerated) AQIM.19 Despite its drug networks started to benefit from this the Salafist Group for Preaching and international reputation as a flagship well developed “social infrastructure” Combat (GSPC)—gradually anchored of democracy, the Touré regime relied underpinning the smuggling economy on what the International Crisis in northern Mali.11 Conflicts between Group has referred to as “remote- competing smuggling networks “Diplomatic efforts to control governance through dubious proliferated concordantly, fueling both separate Ansar Eddine criminal and mafia intermediaries” intra- and inter-community tensions.12 in the northern regions.20 State Traffickers established private militias from both AQIM and representatives became deeply involved to protect their business interests. MUJAO have generated in the drug trade and kidnapping industry established by AQIM.21 As a By 2006, internal rivalries within initial results. A military result, the state lost much authority Tuareg society instigated yet another intervention is then likely and legitimacy in northern Mali. armed revolt. Leaders of the previous rebellions had witnessed what they to primarily target AQIM This delicate power balance altered considered their subordinates obtaining and MUJAO and focus on decisively when well-armed Tuareg leading positions within the Malian army. fighters from Libya returned to northern Fearing a significant loss of influence, liberating the cities of Gao Mali following the fall of Mu`ammar they decided to take up arms again.13 In and Timbuktu.” Qadhafi. Yet preparations for a renewed response to this security threat, Touré rebellion had been ongoing since October fell back on the “militiatary” strategy; he 2011 and various leaders actively sought proactively supported the mobilization support from their kinsmen in Libya.22 of “subordinate” Tuareg to fight the itself within the region. Despite While some returning Tuareg fighters rebels but also leaned on private Arab substantial international support, decided to join the Malian army or militias established by drug smugglers Touré frequently emphasized that refrained from fighting altogether, many the Malian army lacked the capacity joined the National Movement for the to confront this rather small group16 Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a recently 23 10 Kalilou Sidibe, “Criminal Networks and Conflict- and persistently called for a concerted formed Tuareg rebel movement. These 17 Resolution Mechanisms in Northern Mali,” IDS Bulletin regional response. Yet internal 43:4 (2012): pp. 74-88; Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime political motives also seemed to 18 Roland Marchal, “Is a Military Intervention in Mali and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region (Washington, D.C.: play a significant role for his non- Unavoidable?” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Cen- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012). tre, October 2012. 11 “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to 14 The short-term advantages of deploying local (Arab 19 “Mali: Avoiding Escalation”; “La colère en intégralité Stability and Development,” United Nations Office on and Tuareg) militias, well adapted to the inhospitable d’un ambassadeur atypique,” Le Républicain, December Drugs and Crime, 2007; Joelle Burbank, “Trans-Saharan northern terrain, enabled the Malian state to effectively 13, 2011. Trafficking,” Center for the Study of Threat Convergence, counter revived Tuareg rebellions. Yet it also legitimized 20 “Mali: Avoiding Escalation.” September 2010; Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s Interna- the drug smugglers behind these militias, raised con- 21 AQIM took more than 50 people hostage between tional Drug Trade,” African Affairs 108:431 (2009): pp. siderable frustration within the army, deliberately en- 2003 and 2011, which secured a flow of income in the 171-196; “Cocaine: A European Union Perspective in the sconced intra- and inter-community tensions and there- millions of dollars. See Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mo- Global Context,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs by undermined longer term stability. Also see Lacher; hamedou, “The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic and Drug Addiction & Europol, April 2010. ‘‘Mali: Avoiding Escalation,” International Crisis Group, Maghreb,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, May 2011; 12 A smuggling coalition between Kunta Arabs and If- July 18, 2012. Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Alge- oghas Tuareg clashed with Imghad Tuareg smugglers, 15 Ibid. rian Challenge or Global Threat? (Washington, D.C.: Carn- Arab (Berabiche) traders in Timbuktu and Sahrawi 16 Until 2010, most analysts estimated the number of egie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). smugglers. Furthermore, “subordinate” Arab castes AQIM members to range between 500 and 1,000. 22 Anouar Boukhars, The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and transferred drug money into campaign funds to increase 17 Since 2002, the United States has supported the Ma- the Conflict in Mali (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow- their influence in the 2009 local elections, which further lian government together with Niger, Mauritania and ment for International Peace, 2012); Andy Morgan, “The aggravated intra-community tensions. For details, see Chad to combat terrorism under the Pan-Sahel Initia- Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali,” ThinkAfrica- personal interviews, Malian members of parliament, Ba- tive (PSI). Three years later, the program was reformu- Press, February 6, 2012. mako, Mali, December 2009. These details also exist in lated as the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative 23 A diplomatic source indicated that at least 2,000 men the U.S. Embassy cables published by Wikileaks. (TSCTI) and expanded in volume as well as in partnering had returned by October 2011, but stated that the number 13 Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Na- countries. A joint military base was established by Alge- could well be above 4,000. See Martin van Vliet, “Mali,” tionalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali, pp. 391- ria, Mauritania, Niger and Mali, although mutual coop- in Africa Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society South of 394. eration remained limited in practice. the Sahara, vol 8 (Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill

3 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 well-armed rebels, joined by militants and Arab communities.28 A leader of interim government, and factionalism from Ansar Eddine, launched a new the Ganda Izo recently told a journalist, continues in the military.32 Also, while offensive by the end of January 2012, “We are not going to let the Arabs and the deployment of government-aligned which the Malian army was unable to Tuareg enslave us again.”29 A Ganda Tuareg and Arab militias, as well as repel. The military coup that overthrew Koy member indicated he was “ready to the Ganda Izo, Ganda Koy and smaller the highly unpopular Touré in March beat the ‘light-skins,’” referring to the northern militias, is probably useful removed the final remnants of state Tuareg.30 It is clearly within a context to achieving short-term military authority in the north.24 of revived ethnic and racial rivalry objectives, it would certainly inflame that a potential international military (intra)-ethnic tensions. Falling back Northern Mali is currently controlled intervention will operate in northern again on a “militiatary” strategy will by an uncertain and opaque alliance Mali. significantly frustrate future political established among AQIM, the Movement processes that remain at the very core of for Unity and Jihad in West Africa International Intervention any sustainable solution in northern Mali. (MUJAO)25 and Ansar Eddine26 who By the end of November 2012, the If the Salafists are indeed ousted from the have introduced and vigorously applied UN Security Council will consider principal urban areas, they are likely to Shari`a law. Private militias established specified plans for an international disperse within the vast desert to which by smugglers have either realigned military intervention in northern Mali they have become well acquainted over themselves to these new authorities or as recently adopted by the Economic the last decade. Profiting from support kept a certain distance, while former Community of West African States networks in Algeria, Mauritania and government-allied Tuareg and Arab (ECOWAS) and approved by the Niger, where AQIM has conducted militias moved across the border into African Union. These include the numerous attacks and abductions in Niger and Mauritania, respectively.27 training of Malian armed forces and recent years, neighboring countries the deployment of 3,300 soldiers, will be directly affected. It is difficult At the frontline between Mali’s northern mostly from ECOWAS members and to see an ECOWAS force, largely and southern regions, several local possibly other African countries. In unaccustomed to the terrain, defeat the militias eagerly await being deployed by the meantime, diplomatic efforts to militants in these circumstances. the Malian army. The Ganda Koy militia, separate Ansar Eddine from both AQIM a strategic government ally in the 1990s, and MUJAO have generated initial While increasing military pressure has revived itself, and the Ganda Izo, results.31 A military intervention is to counter the significant security which was established by other Songhai then likely to primarily target AQIM threats in northern Mali has become and Fulani in response to the renewed and MUJAO and focus on liberating the unavoidable, this should be done in full Tuareg rebellion in 2006, stand ready. cities of Gao and Timbuktu. recognition of the impact upon longer- Confrontations between the latter and a term stability objectives. This not only Tuareg militia have already taken place. Such an intervention would require means avoiding the recurrent pattern The two militias teamed up with smaller strong Malian leadership. Yet different of deploying local militias for short- northern self-defense groups under the power factions still compete with term gains at the expense of stability Patriotic Resistance Forces (PRF), which and obstruct each other within the in the longer run, but it also entails is primarily opposed to ethnic Tuareg recognizing the limited potential of 28 “Mali’s Self-Defense Militias Take the Reconquest of a regional military force and divided NV, 2012); Marchal. the North Into Their Own Hands,” Terrorism Monitor Malian regime to secure northern Mali. 24 The MNLA proved unable to maintain supply chains, 10:16 (2012). Efforts aimed at restoring stability and lacked resources as well as popular support among most 29 “Grand reportage: avec les miliciens qui veulent libér- state authority will therefore need to non-Tuareg communities and was driven out of the prin- er le Mali,” Le Parisien, November 2, 2012. Other mem- move beyond providing a predominantly cipal areas in northern Mali within weeks. bers have publicly expressed their desire to take revenge military response to Mali’s multifaceted 25 MUJAO’s Mauritanian leader originated from AQIM against Arabs in northern Mali. See, for example, “Mali: crises. and the organization currently controls Gao. Various le risque d’une guerre civile plane sur la ville d’Ansongo reports indicate their backbone consists of Arab smug- au nord du pays (habitants),” Autre Presse, October 30, Martin van Vliet is currently finalizing glers, while the organization also rapidly secured its mar- 2012. All militias have at their disposal a vast pool of dis- Ph.D. research on the nexus between ket share within the kidnapping industry. gruntled youth who are much less ideologically motivat- security, democracy and governance in Mali 26 Ansar Eddine was established by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a ed and primarily in search of income. Defections between at the African Studies Centre in Leiden, first-hour Tuareg rebel from the dominant Ifoghas clan. the various groups occur frequently. the Netherlands. He has previously worked He has been a key player in northern Malian politics dur- 30 Anne Look, “N. Mali Militias Train Youth to Fight,” as a Political Adviser Africa for a Dutch ing the last decade, involved in negotiations over the re- Voice of America, October 9, 2012; Peter Tinti, “Inter- political party. As a program officer for lease of various hostages, working as a Malian diplomat vening in Northern Mali: Don’t Forget the Ethnic Dimen- the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party in Saudi Arabia and being a convert of Tablighi Jama`at. sion,” ThinkAfricaPress, November 19, 2012. Democracy, he has been responsible for After being sidelined within the MNLA, he established 31 Ansar Eddine has formally distanced itself from the political party support programs in Mali Ansar Eddine and originally attracted support from If- other “terrorist” groups with “foreign” elements, while and Zambia between 2004 and 2011. oghas Tuareg and Kunta Arabs. Ousted from the urban it also restricted its objective to applying Shari`a law to areas, an unknown number of MNLA fighters are be- its own stronghold in Kidal. Until recently, leaders of the 32 Analysts have pointed to recurrent tensions among lieved to have defected to his organization. Kidal is Ansar various organizations were seen together in various ur- the interim president, prime minister and former coup Eddine’s stronghold. ban centers and many questions about the nature of cur- leaders, while continued factionalism within the army 27 Lacher. rent relations in practice still persist. and police led to open confrontations in recent months.

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An Algerian Press to many press accounts, while Algeria Algerian press accounts focused Review: Determining reportedly still favors a “political heavily (and sometimes exclusively) solution” to the crisis in Mali, it now on the security file, mostly neglecting Algiers’ Position on an appears that Algiers will participate agenda items in the energy sector and Intervention in Mali in an international intervention within U.S. support for Algeria’s World Trade specified parameters and discretion. Organization bid. While coverage in the By Kal Ben Khalid Algerian media reports remain divided, semi-official newspaper El Moudjahid was however, over whether military overwhelmingly positive and focused on october 29, 2012, U.S. Secretary of intervention is desirable, and several on the visit as “reflecting strong State Hillary Clinton visited Algiers to articles suggest that while Algiers has relations,” coverage in the private press discuss developments in northern Mali. identified political processes it favors was more diverse.6 Articles in El Khabar, One of the main purposes of her trip was with respect to Mali, it has yet to decide one of Algeria’s leading private Arabic- to determine the role Algeria might play on a desired end state from negotiations language newspapers, were dominated in a future military intervention. The or military action. by security issues between October 28- goal of any intervention is to unseat from 31, with headlines almost exclusively power three armed militant groups that This article will discuss the focus about Mali and terrorism. control northern Mali—Ansar Eddine,1 of Algerian press reports on Hillary the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Clinton’s visit to Algiers, and how these One story on October 29 described West Africa (MUJAO)2 and al-Qa`ida in reactions reflect Algerian perceptions Algeria “in the heart of a diplomatic the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).3 Algeria of international efforts to intervene in battle over sending its army to Mali.”7 is considered the main regional power northern Mali. The article described Algerian concerns in the Maghreb-Sahel region, with key of “turning into Pakistan”8 if it became economic and diplomatic influence in Algerian Press Perspectives on Intervention embroiled in a war in Mali with foreign northern Mali. Algeria’s cooperation in Mali is critical to the success of a potential Clinton’s visit received extensive military intervention. attention in mainstream Algerian “Algerian media coverage newspapers. Coverage in the main suggests that Algiers’ Algeria’s press coverage of the crisis private newspapers suggests that while in Mali and international efforts to the Algerian government has adopted widely reported public respond to it have relied heavily on a more flexible posture on military opposition to military official Algerian government sources intervention in Mali, significant and reflect elite perspectives on skepticism exists within Algeria’s intervention in northern northern Mali in one of North Africa’s elite over the merits and potential Mali is easing.” key power centers. In general, Algerian outcomes of an intervention. Algeria is media coverage suggests that Algiers’ often deeply skeptical of international widely reported public opposition to intervention schemes. As a former an international military intervention colony of France—born out of an eight- powers. In the article, a member of in northern Mali is easing.4 According year war for independence—Algeria parliament (MP) from Tamanrasset jealously guards its sovereignty. It called on Algerian President Abdelaziz 1 Ansar Eddine is an Islamist faction that was founded warned Western governments against Bouteflika to “maintain steadfastness” by veteran Tuareg rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly in 2011 and intervening in Libya’s civil war in 2011, in its “traditional position in rejecting is one of three main Islamist groups in control of north- predicting that internationalizing the any foreign military intervention in the ern Mali. Made up heavily of Tuareg fighters, it is close conflict would destabilize the region by region,” fearing anything else would to AQIM and MUJAO. It has been particularly active in strengthening terrorist groups such as “act as a gateway to a status quo of 9 Timbuktu, and the Kidal region. AQIM. Algeria also fears that intensified foreign military bases in the region.” 2 The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa conflict resulting from an intervention The MP warned that an intervention (MUJAO) is one of three Islamist groups in control of could spread into southern Algeria, in Mali “will create many problems,” northern Mali, especially the area around Gao. It emerged where Algeria’s own Tuareg minority stressing the need to continue dialogue. out of AQIM’s network in northern Mali, although the lives and thousands of refugees from He said, “We know from all previous specific circumstances around its origins are murky and northern Mali have fled. These concerns controversial among analysts. The group is strongly are evident in a warning from Algeria’s 6 “Algeria USA: Clinton Visit Reflects ‘Strong Rela- comprised of a mix of Malian Arabs, Songhai, Arabs and Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia on tions,’” El Moudjahid, November 20, 2012. others; it is rumored to have links to Gao-area merchant November 8, 2012, when he said that an 7 “Pressured by Paris and Washington, Algeria in the families and drug traffickers. It remains close to Ansar intervention would have “very serious” Heart of a Diplomatic Battle to Send its Army to Mali,” El Eddine and AQIM. consequences for “local populations” in Khabar, October 29, 2012. 5 3 The French posture is probably best summarized in the the region around Mali. 8 This is a common refrain heard among Algerian of- Agence France-Presse headline from October 28: “US, ficials concerned about or opposed to an intervention in France Pressure Algeria to Stop Fence-sitting on Mali.” Mali. See Anouar Boukhars, The Paranoid Neighbor: Al- 4 One headline of a story summarizing Clinton’s meet- geria and the Conflict in Mali (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie ing with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the 5 “Ould Kablia: une intervention militaire au Mali aura Endowment for International Peace, 2012). Arabic daily Ech-Chorouk described the visit as “The Last des conséquences ‘très graves’ dans la region,” Alge- 9 “Pressured by Paris and Washington, Algeria in the Meeting Before the Military Intervention in Mali.” rie360, November 8, 2012. Heart of a Diplomatic Battle to Send its Army to Mali.”

5 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 experiments beginning with foreign with it and turning it into a hotbed that quicksand of northern Mali, wanting intervention that we cannot know how it attracts extremist groups [from abroad] to understand and know where they ends and what happened in Libya is the under the pretext of resisting a foreign are setting their feet.”20 El Watan judged best proof of this…military intervention presence.”15 It then pointed to reports Clinton “much less committed to military in northern Mali will lead to a new that the AQIM-linked MUJAO is action ‘in a few weeks’ as suggested by colonization” spreading out of Mali and preparing for a foreign intervention in the [French] Defense Minister Jean- into Algeria.10 The MP also said that a Gao by bringing in jihadists of various Yves Le Drian.”21 group of Movement for the Liberation of nationalities including Sudanese and Azawad (MNLA)11 men had traveled to Pakistanis.16 The article stated that “if Paris and southern Algeria “for dialogue and then Algiers agree in principal on the use returned to Mali” recently as part of the The report opined that the French-led of force against terrorists in northern government’s efforts to find a political approach to Mali looks to “recreate the Mali, they differ significantly on the solution.12 A major report on October American NATO model of involvement identity of potential targets.”22 The 30 said that the United States and in Afghanistan” and argued that article then presented the intention Algeria would follow up the meeting an intervention by the Economic of Algerian officials to “recover much “within the context of bilateral military Community of West African States of the elements of Ansar Eddine talks,” while stating that “Washington (ECOWAS) and the West would be brought in through dialogue, in order persuaded Algeria to participate” at hampered by “armed groups well to isolate the radicals.”23 An El Watan the military planning level without the trained in guerrilla warfare, who enjoy piece from November 1 described participation of the National People’s freedom of movement in a vast desert Algeria as “embedded” in planning Army in a military intervention in area and their knowledge of the terrain for an intervention with West African Mali.13 The report said that Algerians gives superiority in combat, which will militaries and noted that despite would participate in planning sessions drain regular troops participating in the Algeria’s acceptance of a role in an with West African military officials on intervention.”17 intervention, “the nature of the group November 2 and November 4. Ansar Eddine…remains a point of Algiers: Between Washington and Paris? contention, especially with France.”24 Other El Khabar reports framed the visit Algeria’s leading private French- The article later quoted an anonymous as part of Washington’s efforts to wage a language daily, El Watan, also gave diplomat as saying “the north of Mali proxy war against AQIM and emphasized Clinton’s visit prominent coverage. Its is also the south of Algeria” before differences “revealed by Algerian early reporting was mostly based on suggesting that Algeria intended to officials” over their views of the MNLA wire service or Algérie Presse Service play a prominent role in a potential and Ansar Eddine (contrasting with reports. Longer, deeper articles from intervention.25 “Information services reports elsewhere arguing that Algiers October 29-31 focused on security and such as the Foreign Ministry and and Washington have similar views of Mali. These were somewhat consistent Presidency are stingy with information” the two groups).14 One article explained in their emphasis on describing shared on what role Algeria seeks or plans to how some in the West see Algerian U.S.-Algerian perceptions of the play in Mali, the article continued.26 views of northern Mali as relevant situation in Mali, while one article “because Algeria differentiates between described the visit as having “cooled A brief opinion piece by well-known the different armed groups in northern French ardor” by seeking to “cure” commentator Chawki Amari from the Mali, and this helps to understand the Algeria’s chronic allergy to military same day described Algeria as being social structure of the terrain inside intervention in Mali.18 Such reports pressured to allow its airspace to be used northern Mali, rather than colliding described Clinton having “a better for an intervention but “unofficially, grasp of the political and security it [Algeria] is playing the benefits of 27 10 Ibid. issues in Mali” than the French and as America against those of France.” 11 The MNLA is one of three armed groups that took having “given all attention to concerns The piece criticized the Algerian 19 control of northern Mali in 2012. A mostly Tuareg group raised by the Algerian authorities.” government for not being clearer with founded in October 2011, the MNLA’s fighters and lead- They argued that the United States its own citizens about its intentions in ers include many Tuaregs who served in the Libyan understood “the complexity of the Mali. military or fled from Libya during 2011. Self-described situation in Mali coldly, stepping away secularists, the MNLA, with Ansar Eddine, initiated the from the risky consequences which are 2012 rebellion against the Malian government. It was hardly imaginable,” for “the Americans eventually marginalized by AQIM and its Islamist allies do not want to commit blindly to the in Ansar Eddine and MUJAO after defeating the Malian 20 Ibid. army in the key northern cities; it currently controls a 15 “Washington and Paris: Proxy War Against al-Qa`ida 21 Ibid. few towns in northern Mali. in North Africa.” 22 Ibid. 12 “Pressured by Paris and Washington, Algeria in the 16 Ibid.; Andrew Lebovich, “What to Make of Foreign 23 Ibid. Heart of a Diplomatic Battle to Send its Army to Mali.” Fighters in Mali,” al-Wasat, October 30, 2012. 24 “La participation algerienne se precise,” El Watan, No- 13 “Clinton Persuades Algeria to Participate in the ‘Plan- 17 “Washington and Paris: Proxy War Against al-Qa`ida vember 1, 2012. ning’ Committee for a Military Intervention in Mali,” El in North Africa.” 25 Ibid. Khabar, October 30, 2012. 18 “Crise malienne: Mme Clinton partage la position al- 26 Ibid. 14 “Washington and Paris: Proxy War Against al-Qa`ida gerienne,” El Watan, October 30, 2012. 27 Chawki Amari, “Une blonde à Alger,” El Watan, Oc- in North Africa,” El Khabar, October 31, 2012. 19 Ibid. tober 30, 2012.

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Certain press reports described Liberte took a different line, previewing Security Council resolutions calling for Clinton’s visit as a power play by either the visit on October 28 with a piece the African Union and regional bodies Paris or Algiers to use the United States stating that “there is every reason to to plan operations to remove the armed as a check on the other’s influence over believe that the United States will groups from the north. It briefly reflected international plans for an intervention continue to exert further pressure on on U.S. views of the humanitarian crisis in Mali. These reports tended to focus Algiers trying to sell it on certain points, in the region, focused mainly on the on differences in Algerian and French knowing that differences lay in the role overflow of refugees into neighboring views of the heavily Tuareg Islamist that Algeria should play according to countries. The article quoted U.S. group Ansar Eddine, with which Algeria the Western model.”29 Liberte reported statements urging Mali’s neighbors that “Algeria, according to Western (such as Algeria) to support an officials, has moderated its position [on intervention and to take responsibility “Algeria views those foreign intervention] and accepts an for resolving the country’s problems. elements of Ansar Eddine African intervention force. It refuses, however, to be directly involved in One strand of Algerian press accounts close to historical Tuareg this process which it considers highly presented the Clinton visit as an rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly risky.”30 It also reported that Algeria Algerian attempt to play Washington refused over-flight rights to France off of Paris as a means of conditioning as susceptible to a ‘political during an intervention. The report, international plans for an intervention solution’ and having the published on the eve of Clinton’s visit, in a way favorable to the Algerian also accused U.S. officials of “issuing position. One representative report on credibility among key contradictory statements,” complaining Tuareg demographics in that “it is as though some officials “Some Algerian outlets who have visited Algiers have spoken the Kidal region to help openly against foreign intervention presented Clinton’s counter AQIM.” in Mali, whereas others have rather visit as vindication of supported the French proposal.”31 The piece highlighted how both Washington the Algerian view that and Algiers are approaching Mali with more time for ‘dialogue’ has reportedly engaged in discussions “strategic aspects” in mind: “the United and negotiations during the last several States does not want to repeat the wars between Algerian officials months (another track of talks has been in Iraq or Afghanistan in the Sahel, as and elements of Ansar led by officials from Burkina Faso). Algeria does not want to have a fire on French officials have dismissed Algerian its southern border…The question now Eddine is needed before an efforts to splinter factions within Ansar remains as to why the Western countries invasion.” Eddine away from AQIM. Algeria views want Algeria to enlist in a transaction those elements of Ansar Eddine close that may be part of a vicious cycle.”32 to historical Tuareg rebel leader Iyad The article then described the economic Ag Ghaly as susceptible to a “political elements of the U.S.-Algeria Strategic the French-language news site Tout Sur solution” and having the credibility Dialogue framework, noting that “by the Algerie argued that Clinton’s visit was among key Tuareg demographics in the admission of American officials, Algeria intended to offset French pressure over Kidal region to help counter AQIM.28 offers unlimited opportunities.”33 a Mali intervention by using the United Algerian press accounts place this States to shape an outcome in Mali closer disagreement near the center of Algerian An October 29 Liberte report described to Algiers’ image—the visit would be “a objections to plans for an international “the American perspective on Mali.” boon for Algiers which has long sought intervention. Some Algerian outlets The United States, it said, views Mali an ally to counter French intransigence presented Clinton’s visit as vindication facing multiple challenges “of equal on several points, including dialogue of the Algerian view that more time for importance which must be solved with Ansar Eddine and the timing of “dialogue” between Algerian officials simultaneously.”34 Liberte described a military intervention.”35 Algerian and elements of Ansar Eddine is needed Washington and Algiers as being on concerns over an intervention are before an invasion. “the same wavelength” on the issue, thus not a question of ends but merely with Algiers supporting United Nations means. According to Tout Sur Algerie, 28 Jean-Felix Paganon, the French special envoy for the Algerian officials see the U.S. position Sahel, told Jeune Afrique in October: “The behavior of 29 Rubrique Radar, “Hillary Clinton ne compte pas rem- contrasting with the French one (and Ansar Eddine is that of a group totally linked to the ter- piler,” Liberte, October 28, 2012; Djilali Benyoub, “Hillary being similar to its own) in two ways: rorists of AQIM. They are in the same camp. But many Clinton chez Bouteflika pour parler du Mali,”Liberte , Oc- 1) Ansar Eddine “can be part of a countries in the region, such as Algeria, and many ana- tober 28, 2012. political solution within the framework lysts believe that negotiations are possible with Ansar 30 Ibid. of a credible dialogue with the Mali Eddine and that to understand the organization as sup- 31 Ibid. porting terrorism is a mistake. We shall see…” See “Jean- 32 Ibid. Félix Paganon: ‘Tout le monde est désormais engagé’ 33 Ibid. 35 Samir Allam, “Alger accueille Hillary Clinton avec dans la reconquête du Nord-Mali,” Jeune Afrique, October 34 Djamel Bouatta, “Hillary Clinton à Alger: Le point de l’espoir de renforcer sa position face a Paris,” Tout Sur 22, 2012. vue américain sur le Mali,” Liberte, October 29, 2012. Algerie, October 28, 2012.

7 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 authorities,”36 and 2) “an intervention post-colonial regimes antagonizing and have on Algerian efforts to divide must be well thought out, well prepared, repressing ethnic dissent. AQIM’s Malian Islamist supporters. well funded and well informed so as Press reactions to Clinton’s meetings to avoid collateral damage that would In opposition-oriented sources, similar in Algiers suggest positive responses to aggravate the situation in a region narratives emerged, although with the visit as recognition and validation of destabilized by many problems.”37 The a closer eye toward their domestic Algeria’s position as a regional power. It Tout Sur Algerie report noted that the implications. For example, the French- implies that Algeria will likely play a role Algerians were pleased to have Clinton language opposition paper Le Matin in an intervention but will probably seek visit without a stopover in Paris.38 The carried similar reports to those found to shape its scope according to its own article said that while Algeria opposes in the Tout Sur Algerie article.42 One such interests and concerns. Algerian elite foreign troops using its territory during report quoted an International Crisis opinion appears divided as to the merits an intervention, it “has not yet ruled on Group analyst as saying that it is likely and viability of an intervention in Mali. issues such as over-flights in its airspace Washington is more understanding during a military intervention and the of Algerian concerns over foreign While much of the reporting indicates exchange of information on terrorist intervention than Paris; it noted that perceptions of shared Algerian and groups.”39 The report concluded that with a French lead, Algiers would U.S. perspectives on northern Mali, “it is indeed easier for Algiers to grant be forced to “abandon the dialogue it it is not clear that this is a consensus concessions to the Americans than the initiated last June” with Ansar Eddine. view among Algeria’s elites. Press French.”40 Another story in Le Matin puzzled over reporting indicates that Algerian the Algerian view of Ansar Eddine: officials and local elites, notably in At the same time, a column by Mustapha southern Algeria, believe that a military Hammouche on October 28 noted that According to Paris and intervention internationalizing the “Algeria does not have a clear position Washington, Ansar Dine, MUJAO Mali crisis could spread into Algeria’s on the question of intervention in and AQIM are the same breed border regions, which currently host Mali.”41 Hammouche argued that of terrorism. In contrast, for thousands of refugees and are home Algeria is right to “maintain its Bouteflika, Ansar Eddine has to vulnerable communities. These decision not to take part” in plans nothing to do with MUJAO or sentiments have likely contributed to for a Mali intervention, arguing that AQIM. This is why Bouteflika Algeria’s preference for a “negotiated Algeria and France disagree over the wants to save the lost soldier Iyad solution” through elements of Ansar nature of armed groups in northern Ag Ghaly and his group Ansar Eddine while putting off a potential Mali (i.e., Ansar Eddine) and described Eddine…How many Islamist armed intervention. It does not appear, Mali as a weak state “plagued by battalions embedded with the however, that Algeria rejects military corruption and the unpopularity of an MNLA at the beginning of the intervention in general. Instead, Algeria unjust regime with tribes and ethnic year? What does Algiers see in prefers a longer timeline for a potential groups after squandering a good part of Iyad Ag Ghaly? Is he a mole of intervention and sees this outcome less the few democratic achievements of the the DRS [Algeria’s Department optimal than an alternative process. At country”—in line with the descriptions of Intelligence and Security], as the same time, media discussion shows Algerian officials often give of the suggested by some commentators that Algeria fears being drawn into an “root causes” of Mali’s numerous on the Sahel question?43 international military effort in Mali troubles. Hammouche attributed from which it cannot extract itself. Mali’s overall troubles to “unfinished Le Matin also published another decolonization” in which borders are piece criticizing Bouteflika for not Kal Ben Khalid is a Washington, D.C.- inconsistent with the demography, with communicating more often on foreign based North Africa analyst. He is the affairs, which the author claimed are author of the northwest Africa-focused 36 This view is especially strong in articles like this only made clear to the Algerian public weblog, The Moor Next Door. The views from November 3 in which Algerian sources intimate “during visits by foreign diplomats” expressed here are his alone. to El Watan that Ansar Eddine’s leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, which is also when they “are informed 44 would make an announcement splitting from AQIM in that their president is still alive.” the coming days. The Algerians will likely hold any such announcement as validation of their policy over the last Conclusion several months; it remains to be seen what process can be Algerian press reporting of U.S. fashioned out of such a development, although it would Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s give many actors greater freedom of movement and space Algiers trip suggests Algeria is strongly for creativity. See “Clinton-Bouteflika: The Last Meeting concerned about spillover effects of an Before Military Intervention in Mali,” Ech-Chorouk, Oc- intervention and the impact it might tober 29, 2012. 37 Allam. 42 “Crise au Mali: Alger entre la diplomatie de Washing- 38 Ibid. ton et les pressions de Paris,” Le Matin, October 29, 2012. 39 Ibid. 43 “Intervention militaire dans l’Azawad: Alger veut 40 Ibid. sauver Ansar Dine,” Le Matin, October 30, 2012. 41 Mustapha Hammouche, “Le syndrome malien,” Lib- 44 “Bouteflika: un président à distance,” Le Matin, Octo- erte, October 28, 2012. ber 30, 2012.

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disagreements. In the last two years, At the same time, the capture-kill U.S. Serious Leadership Rifts however, three developments opened military campaign between 2009 and Emerge in Afghan Taliban the way for a set of substantive, political 2011 killed a few thousand suspected disagreements within the organization: insurgents, according to ISAF press By Anand Gopal Taliban leader Mullah Baradar’s arrest, releases.8 A significant number were the U.S. military’s targeting of mid- field commanders, which amounts to the afghan taliban are perhaps level commanders, and the initiation of the wholesale removal of a layer of local the most cohesive political force in peace talks with Washington. insurgent leadership. Whereas many Afghanistan’s history. While nearly field commanders from the 2006-2008 every other faction across the spectrum In his decade in hiding, Taliban supreme period were likely to be associated has suffered splits and realignments, leader Mullah Omar has operated with the Taliban government of the the Taliban leadership has remained away from the rest of the insurgency, 1990s—and by extension the Quetta remarkably unified and consistent in presumably due to the protection (or, shura—by now many Taliban units are membership throughout the various according to some, quasi-imprisonment) under a fourth or fifth generation of iterations of war during the last two of Pakistani intelligence. Baradar, the local leadership.9 As a consequence, decades. day-to-day leader of the insurgency ties between the Quetta shura and the until 2010, was one of the few who In recent months, however, this enjoyed access to Mullah Omar, and in “Ties between the Quetta leadership has shown the first signs of this capacity came to wield enormous sustained internal divisions: certain influence within the movement.4 shura and the field corps commanders have been dismissed from Baradar’s strong links with Mullah appear to be at their the insurgents’ top brass, spats have Omar (the two hail from the same erupted between leading figures, and a district in Uruzgan and were childhood weakest point this decade, growing number of field commanders friends), his background as a frontline with Taliban figures and are contravening the orders of their commander, and his political acumen superiors. In the process, a political allowed him to bridge the Taliban’s tribal elders reporting that struggle between blocs favoring and traditional divide between military and cases of insubordination opposing talks with the United States political leadership. In the process, he has emerged. This article describes became a major binding factor in the are more common now these developments and attempts to insurgency. than ever before.” assess what impact, if any, they have on the prospects for a negotiated settlement When Pakistan arrested Baradar in to end the war.1 the winter of 2010, reportedly due to unauthorized contacts with the Karzai field corps appear to be at their weakest Causes of Leadership Division government, the leadership bifurcated point this decade, with Taliban figures Like any organization, the Taliban into two networks.5 Mullah Akhtar and tribal elders reporting that cases of has always contained factions and Muhammad Mansur, the former insubordination are more common now differing allegiances that stem from civil aviation minister in the Taliban than ever before.10 In Baghlan Province, non-homogenous conceptions of polity. government, heads the first, and the for example, a prominent commander During the Islamic emirate of the 1990s, second is under the command of Mullah refused to turn over a portion of taxes informal blocs formed around a variety Zakir, an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee.6 his unit collected to Peshawar, as per of disagreements, most strikingly Confusion over the chain of command, on Usama bin Ladin’s activities in absent during Baradar’s tenure, now Karachi, while its military command is in Quetta. Pesha- 2 Afghanistan. During the insurgency features frequently in dealings between war forms the third major Taliban center, overseeing af- period (post-2003), top Taliban figures the Karachi- and Quetta-based Taliban fairs in the east. All three cities are in Pakistan. have differed on the efficacy and leadership and the rank-and-file in 8 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, “A 3 7 morality of suicide bombings. These Afghanistan. Knock on the Door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases,” were mostly tactical and strategic Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 12, 2011. 4 Personal interviews, members of the Taliban politi- 9 This article uses the term “Quetta shura” as shorthand 1 Much of this article is based on interviews conducted cal shura, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2008. Also see Ron for the Taliban leadership. The actual shura is merely by the author with Taliban figures this summer in the Moreau, “America’s New Nightmare,” Newsweek, July 24, symbolic. The real loci of power in the leadership exist in United Arab Emirates and with members based in Paki- 2009. clusters of informal networks and on bodies such as the stan over phone or Skype. These members spoke on the 5 Dexter Filkins, “Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban Military Commission. condition of anonymity. The author also interviewed Leader’s Arrest,” New York Times, August 22, 2010. 10 Personal interviews, senior Western official involved three Western authorities—including one U.S. and one 6 Personal interview, Taliban member connected to the in appraising the security situation, 2011; personal UN official. Quetta shura’s political wing, Dubai, 2012; personal inter- interview, Western NGO security officer, 2010; personal 2 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy view, Taliban commanders and tribal elders, Kandahar, interview, member of the United Nations Assistance We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Af- Afghanistan, 2010; personal interview, Alex Strick van Mission for Afghanistan’s political team, 2010; personal ghanistan, 1970-2010 (London: Hurst, 2011). Linschoten, 2010; personal interview, U.S. State De- interviews, dozens of tribal elders in Baghlan, Kandahar, 3 Antonio Giustozzi ed., Decoding the New Taliban: In- partment official, 2011; personal interview, UN Security Loya Paktia and Kabul, Afghanistan, 2010-2011; sights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia Univer- Council official, New York, 2012. personal interview, Taliban member connected to the sity Press, 2009). 7 The Taliban’s political leadership is largely based in political shura, Dubai, 2012.

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Taliban rules. Ignoring punitive efforts threatened to kill entire groups of tribal running through the province to by the leadership, he simply established elders in certain villages.16 When elders extort NATO supply convoys, earning his own freelance armed group.11 appealed to the Taliban leadership, they millions in revenue.20 In the wake of were told that “it was out of their hands,” Baradar’s arrest, Ismael became one of Finally, news of contacts between according to one interlocutor, and that the most important commanders in the the United States and Mullah Omar’s Khadem was ignoring orders.17 Some country and was selected to head the representative Tayeb Agha, along with months later, he produced literature Quetta shura’s all-important Military an agreement to open a political office extolling the virtues of Wahhabism, Commission. in Qatar, have throttled the Taliban contrary to the mainstream Taliban community. There is now, according theological line of Deobandism. For His fall came as quickly as his rise. It to Taliban insiders, a community these and other transgressions, he was began when he attempted to clamp of hardliners in the leadership who stripped of his position on the leadership down on field commanders raising oppose negotiations or are mistrustful shura and shunted to the relatively funds independently of command of Washington’s intentions, and those unimportant shadow governorship and control chains—in particular, the more open to a settlement.12 In general, of Uruzgan Province. When he was case of Baz Muhammad, a prominent the hawks are clustered in the military eventually relieved of this post as well, Taliban member from Farah Province. command and the doves on the political he relocated to a Pakistani border town Muhammad employed his cross- side, but this does not tell the whole and, according to Taliban figures, border Noorzai tribal networks to raise story. established a quasi-independent group funds that he refused to share with that opposed negotiations.18 Since then, the Quetta leadership. When Ismael Divisions his name has been linked to a number arrested one of Muhammad’s principle Three cases highlight the nature of of actions that have fallen outside of the fundraisers in an effort to force him these divisions. The first relates to a Taliban’s official sanction, such as the to hand over the money, Muhammad senior Taliban figure named Mullah assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani retaliated by beating and kidnapping Abdul Raouf Khadem, an Alizai from and the activities of the so-called Ismael.21 This response—Ismael held Kajaki, Helmand Province, who was a Mullah Dadullah Front, which claimed the most important military position in prominent military commander during the murder of High Peace Council the country—is unprecedented in the the Taliban regime. In 2001, he quit member and ex-Taliban minister Arsala organization’s history.22 the Taliban and surrendered to the Rahmani. It remains unclear, however, Northern Alliance, who promptly whether he is indeed involved in these The Taliban top command eventually betrayed him by turning him over to U.S. activities or if his name presents a stepped in to free the two parties and custody.13 He ended up in Guantanamo convenient false flag for others inside resolve the issue. Not long after, in April Bay, which, according to other inmates, the movement.19 2012, Ismael found himself embroiled in further radicalized him.14 Upon his another fight with commanders in Zabul release in 2007, he quickly rejoined The second major incident concerns a Province over money, and some reports the Taliban and climbed to a senior powerful Taliban commander named claimed that one of the commanders position on the Quetta shura’s Military Mawlawi Ismael, an Andar from ended up dead.23 Around the same time, Commission, which oversees fighting Ghazni, who was appointed by Baradar the Quetta shura arrested Ismael after countrywide, and became an officially in 2009 as shadow governor of Zabul he had unauthorized contact with the designated deputy to Mullah Omar.15 Province. In that capacity, Ismael took United Nations, possibly as an opening advantage of a key stretch of highway for talks, in which money allegedly Khadem emerged as a hardliner, often changed hands.24 He thus became acting against the party line. In 2010, a 16 The author received and read copies of these night let- one of the highest-ranking members series of “night letters” bearing his name ters. Also see personal interviews, tribal elders in Pan- of the Taliban ever to be detained by appeared in southern Afghanistan that jwayi, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2010. 17 Personal interview, Agha Lalai Dastagiri, head of the 20 Personal interviews, Afghan government officials and 11 Personal interviews, tribal elders, mullahs, police of- Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Kandahar Prov- tribal elders, Zabul, Afghanistan, 2010. ficials, Baghlan Province, Afghanistan, 2011. ince, Afghanistan, 2010; personal interviews, tribal el- 21 Personal interview, Taliban member connected to the 12 Personal interview, Taliban member connected to the ders, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2010. Quetta shura’s political wing, Dubai, 2012; personal in- Quetta shura’s political wing, Dubai, 2012; personal in- 18 Personal interview, Taliban member connected to the terview, second Taliban member connected to the Quetta terview, second Taliban member connected to the Quetta Quetta shura’s political wing, Dubai, 2012; personal in- shura’s political wing, 2012; personal interview, Michael shura’s political wing, 2012; personal interview, a former terview, second Taliban member connected to the Quetta Semple, 2012; Ron Moreau, “Feud Splits the Taliban,” high-ranking government official during the Taliban re- shura’s political wing, 2012; personal interview, UN Se- Newsweek, August 17, 2012. gime, 2012; personal interview, Michael Semple, 2012. curity Council official, New York, 2012; personal inter- 22 Ibid. 13 Anand Gopal, “Qayum Zakir: The Afghanistan Tali- view, Michael Semple, 2012. 23 Nasim Hotak, “Senior Taliban Leader Shot Dead in ban’s Rising Mastermind,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 The Mullah Dadullah Front is an ad-hoc faction within Quetta,” Pajhwok Afghan News, April 17, 2012. April 30, 2010. the Afghan Taliban that emerged following the expulsion 24 Personal interview, UN Security Council official, New 14 Personal interviews, government officials, tribal el- of Mullah Bakht (also known as Mullah Mansur Dadul- York, 2012; personal interview, second Taliban member ders and Taliban commanders, Helmand and Kandahar lah) from the Taliban in 2008 for insubordination. It is connected to the Quetta shura’s political wing, 2012. In provinces, Afghanistan, March and June 2010. unclear if the name is used by hardliners in the organiza- some interviews, Taliban and Western officials deny this 15 “Afghan Taliban Chief Appoints Two Deputies,” The tion as a false flag or if a coherent group with the name claim. Either way, it is likely that the Zabul struggle is di- News International, March 29, 2010. actually exists. rectly related to Ismael’s arrest in some way.

10 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 the Taliban itself. He is now under The three incidents are a marked of Taliban tactics. In recent months, house arrest and has been removed departure from the Taliban’s past insurgents have increasingly targeted from any official positions within the cohesion. Although spats are common civilians—even when there is no movement.25 In the process, his wide and in any organization, there is little discernible military target nearby— influential network within Afghanistan record of leadership-level disputes such as an August attack on a market in has been thrown awry. Mullah Ghulam descending into violence or open breaks Nimroz Province.32 These assaults may Hassan, one of his allies, released a with the Taliban’s doctrine at that level. be a reflection of the growing cadre of video proclaiming Ismael’s innocence Taliban interviewees could not state younger Taliban leaders who are less and threatening to kill members of the similar examples from the post-2003 tied to their communities than previous Quetta shura. Others have allegedly insurgency period.29 generations, although it is too early to broken with his network and with the say with certainty. Taliban proper, now instead operating Prospects for the Future as independent armed factions. Each of these three cases intersect, in Regardless, even some considered some way, with the question of peace hardliners (who tend to be on the While Ismael and Khadem were relative negotiations. When news of Tayeb military side) have made overtures or newcomers in the Taliban’s upper Agha’s meetings with the United States sent feelers to the Afghan government echelons, infighting has also reached leaked, it created a mini-crisis for and Western officials.33 In a way, there the leadership’s innermost circles. Agha the Taliban leadership, who faced the appears to be a deeper logic at work, Jan Mutasim, a longstanding member problem of convincing their rank-and- where every member of the leadership who served in a number of important file to support their peace initiatives is attempting to situate himself for the while simultaneously asking them to coming post-2014 world. The danger risk their lives on the battlefield.30 inherent in the hardline position is that “The danger inherent in Many second-order effects ensued; by opposing a settlement, that member the hardline position is that fundraising, for instance, became more might lose out if such an agreement of a challenge, to the point that the is indeed reached. This is, in effect, by opposing a settlement, shura’s Financial Commission issued the delicate balance those across that member might lose a rare public appeal for donations Afghanistan’s political spectrum have directly on the Taliban’s website.31 In had to master during the past 30 years out if such an agreement is this regard, the Quetta shura’s messaging of war, where fortunes can change at a indeed reached.” and positioning vis-à-vis negotiations moment’s notice. should be seen as directed as much to their own members and supporters as to These dynamics indicate that the outside world. leadership-level divisions are not political roles for the Quetta shura, was irrevocable. In interviews, Taliban gunned down by unknown assailants in Disagreement abounds within Taliban who support negotiations complain Karachi in 2011.26 He survived and fled circles as to whether Washington is a that they have nothing to show their the country, subsequently suggesting trustworthy negotiating partner and more skeptical comrades from their that hardliners opposing his advocacy whether it is more politically astute engagement with Washington, which of negotiations were responsible.27 to simply wait the Americans out suggests that if the talks achieve Others claim the shooting stemmed until the 2014 withdrawal deadline— substantive confidence building from suspicions that he embezzled in other words, there is an ongoing measures—such as the exchange of Taliban funds a few years before, or political struggle between pro-war and prisoners—they might have a uniting that he fell victim to feuding between pro-negotiations blocs. At the same effect that will aid in an eventual the Muttahida Quami Movement and time, and perhaps overlaid with this, settlement. Pashtuns in Karachi, or even that there appears a growing divergence Mullah Omar himself ordered his Anand Gopal is a writer and Bernard 28 assassination. Whatever the reason, 29 The sole exception might be the feud between Mul- L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Mutasim now stands as the most senior lah Dadullah and Mullah Akhtar Osmani, which ended Foundation, where he studies South Asian Taliban member ever forced out of the when both were separately killed by coalition airstrikes and Middle Eastern political movements. movement. in 2006 and 2007. In Taliban circles, the rumor persists that one or both of these leaders (or their relatives) used coalition forces to eliminate the other, but evidence is scant and there is reporting indicating otherwise. Per- 25 Some press reports mistakenly stated that the Taliban sonal interviews, Taliban members connected to the executed Ismael. Quetta shura’s political wing, 2012. 26 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Afghanistan: A 30 Personal interview, Taliban member connected to the Moderate Defies the Taliban,” The Daily Beast, April 25, Quetta shura’s political wing, Dubai, 2012; personal in- 2012. terview, second Taliban member connected to the Quetta 27 Ibid. shura’s political wing, 2012; personal interview, a former 28 See, for instance, “Exclusive Interviews with Top high-ranking government official during the Taliban re- 32 “Afghan Civilians Targeted in Wave of Attacks,” al- Taliban Leaders,” Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, gime, 2012; personal interview, Michael Semple, 2012. Jazira, August 15, 2012. September 11, 2012. 31 This statement is available on Taliban websites. 33 The author has evidence of a number of such cases.

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Mafia Beginnings Although hard evidence is difficult Shabiha Militias and the A word rarely heard before March to acquire, a leading Damascus-based Destruction of Syria 2011, the original term shabiha, meaning journalist claimed in 2011 that the “ghosts,” referred to the darkened- shabiha’s numbers swelled with the By Stephen Starr windowed Mercedes-Benz cars used release of hundreds of criminals from in the 1970s and 1980s by Alawite prison during a number of government since the revolt in Syria descended smugglers from the Syrian coast.6 amnesties.10 As such, the established into civil war, attention has largely Among the original bootlegging leaders shabiha—those with close familial ties focused on the growing effectiveness included Malik and Jamil al-Assad, a to the al-Assads—were positioned to and influence of jihadist groups fighting half-brother and brother respectively of command newly released criminals in the country.1 Members of Jabhat al- former Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. whose loyalty had been bought by the Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham have featured These men and others made huge profits regime. prominently fighting alongside secular smuggling cigarettes and luxury items rebels from street skirmishes with from Lebanon. They terrorized local As in the cases of Houla,11 Dariya,12 regime troops in Aleppo to battling populations, openly carried weapons and other cities, one tactic employed for control of state military bases, and considered themselves beyond the by the regime to quell dissent in particularly in the country’s north, reach of the law in part because of their towns and villages close to sensitive to partaking in suicide missions ties to the ruling family.7 As president, areas13 appears to involve sending against government targets in Aleppo, Hafiz al-Assad and later his sons in paramilitary shabiha to carry out Damascus and other cities.2 Yet while Mahir and Basil arrested many of these summary executions of civilians and both foreign and Syrian jihadists smugglers and for the most part brought to then disfigure the bodies on a mass, probably number a couple thousand their criminal enterprises under control indiscriminate scale.14 The tactic in fighters,3 the regime-backed shabiha after they began to undermine the these cases, it appears, is to drive militiamen—pro-Bashar al-Assad state’s authority. Yet since March 2011, fear into the local populations so that gangs and security enforcers—may they have been recast by the regime as they discontinue their dissidence. number close to 10,000.4 They have an indispensable force of intimidation Whether such massacres are conducted the backing of and share a common and repression against dissenting with the aim of forcefully moving identity with both the country’s Alawite populations. Sunni communities away from areas civilian population—which comprise deemed vital to the regime’s interests about 12% of the country—and the At a time when peaceful protests were and survival and can therefore be crumbling Ba`athist state itself.5 Shabiha more widespread across Syria than understood as ethnic cleansing is militias also feel they have a genuine they are today, militias including those unclear, but it is not to be discounted historical and political claim to the land, with ties to the “original” Alawite given the religious makeup and where non-indigenous fighters among shabiha gangsters, vigilante gangs and sectarian nature of the shabiha’s leading the rebels have none. pro-regime civilians were deployed to figures. intimidate, beat and detain protestors.8 This article reviews the background, As it quickly became clear, earlier actions and potential future role that methods failed to coerce protestors, shabiha militias may play beyond the and sticks and batons were quickly estingly, as the revolt became more widespread, many increasingly inevitable fall of the substituted with guns, knives and new regime vehicles appeared in towns and cities around 9 al-Assad regime and the ongoing brutal forms of torture and repression. Syria. They were expensive, modern models that had not breakdown of Syria’s social fabric. been seen before, and they drew the attention of civilians 6 Richard Engel, “Rebels Fear Syria’s ‘Ghost Fighters,’ unfamiliar with their “comings and goings” through resi- 1 “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamental Opposition,” the Regime’s Hidden Militia,” NBC, July 26, 2012. dential neighborhoods. International Crisis Group, October 12, 2012; Aaron Y. 7 “The Original Shabiha by Mohammad D.,” SyriaCom- 10 Personal interview, Damascus-based journalist, 2011. Zelin, “Jihadists in Syria Can be Found on The Internet,” ment, August 17, 2012. This interview is expanded in Stephen Starr, Revolt in al-Monitor, October 18, 2012. 8 Yassin al-Haj Salih, “The Syrian Shabiha and Their Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising (London/New York: 2 Aron Lund, “Holy Warriors,” Foreign Policy, October State,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, April 2012; “Shabiha Mili- Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2012). Also see Zeina 15, 2012. For a more detailed examination, see Aron Lund tiamen, Tools of the Syria Regime”; Peter Kellier, “Ghosts Karam, “Syria Frees 70 Political Prisoners, Arrest 200 “Syrian Jihadism,” Swedish Institute of International Af- of Syria: Diehard Militias who Kill in the Name of Assad,” Protestors,” Arab News, March 26, 2011; “Syria Releases fairs, September 14, 2012. Guardian, May 31, 2012. Hundreds of Prisoners But Violence Continues,” Voice 3 Martin Chulov, “Syria’s Rebels Fear Foreign Jihadis in 9 At the start of the revolt, these militia men had yet to be of America, November 4, 2011. Their Midst,” Guardian, November 1, 2012. titled, but began appearing at demonstrations whereby 11 Christoph Reuter and Abd al-Kadher Adhun, “Search- 4 Joe Sterling, “Regime-Backed Militia Does Syria’s ‘Dirty through the use of force attempted to quell dissent to the ing for The Truth Behind The Houla Massacre,” Der Spie- Work,’ Analysts Say,” CNN, June 8, 2012; “Shabiha Mi- regime. Shabiha are not readily identifiable. They do not gel, July 23, 2012. litiamen, Tools of the Syria Regime,” Agence France- move with the military but can seamlessly move past 12 Phil Sands, “Daraya, a Town Haunted by The Price of Presse, June 10, 2012. checkpoints and into dissenting areas because of the ef- Defiance,”The National, October 18, 2012. 5 In the early years of his rule, President Hafiz al-Assad figies on their car windows and the accents with which 13 Be they military in the case of Dariya, or adjacent to filled government ministries (as well as the security they speak. They dress in military fatigues, tracksuits (as Alawite-populated towns and villages in the cases of forces) with hundreds of thousands of his co-religionist is common among men from Syria’s coastal region), or a Houla and Tremseh. Alawite civilians to solidify his strategic base but also to mixture of both. Most travel in civilian cars with pictures 14 Richard Beeston, “Mutilated Bodies Mark a Rout, but reduce the possibility of defections. of President Bashar al-Assad adorned upon them. Inter- Defiance Lives On,”Times of London, February 2, 2012.

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Other events suggest some shabiha The regime has predicted and warned it is from these projects that shabiha groups may no longer be acting under of a situation in Syria similar to militiamen live with their families the regime’s direct command and Afghanistan.17 The spread of civil and from where campaigns against control. Armed by the state security disorder, petty crime and kidnappings— dissenting populations are planned and forces and possibly by Hizb Allah15 the majority of which may be attributed launched. since the early days of the uprising, some to the actions of shabiha gangs—supports now portray contempt for the national the regime’s own rhetoric that the As such, more and more Alawite men, military forces because of their inability uprising means an increasingly unstable particularly those in and around to effectively quell the uprising.16 climate. Damascus and in districts shared with Syrians of other religions, will, out of Once fighting for a cause—the Syrian The Elephant in a Bloody Room fear, likely flood the ranks of the shabiha state with Bashar al-Assad at its head— Alawites, from whom the vast majority as the al-Assad regime nears its end. shabiha militias today are fighting for of shabiha members and leadership are As a result, the shabiha’s activities may the al-Assad family and the network drawn, comprise about 12% of Syria’s become more violent and widespread as of contacts surrounding it, which, population. Areas such as Mezzah rebels gain more ground on their way to importantly, they see as being the 86 in southwest Damascus, a sea of confronting Assad-held Damascus. best guarantees of securing their own poorly-constructed houses set upon a hill overlooking the city and located The Syrian regime is running out of “Little is known of the several hundred meters from the main funds20 and is losing territory to rebel presidential palace, are virtually forces.21 Although the full extent of shabiha leadership, inaccessible to outsiders. This area, the government’s losses in the north where it exists today, built to house the many thousands of and east of the country have not yet Alawites who moved to the capital to been fully realized and accepted by the but prominent figures take up government jobs during Hafiz al- regime and its shabiha enforcers, their are likely to be trusted Assad’s presidency, is today surrounded reaction to the news that rebel forces on all sides by shabiha and checkpoints. are at the gates of Damascus—whenever relatives of powerful For the Alawite residents here, the that happens—will likely see them turn Alawite groups such as government has provided electricity increasingly violent against local Sunni and water for decades without charge— populations. Areas within their reach the Shalish, Makhlouf and inextricably intertwining the fate of this and previously known for resistance to Deeb families.” population to that of the state. the regime are likely to suffer most, and Dariya-like massacres may well become These civilians clearly feel that the commonplace in the time until rebel revolt—which they view through a forces finally overthrow the al-Assad future interests. Although both shabiha sectarian lens—is an existential threat. regime. and regular government forces have Incendiary government propaganda and been defeated in most of the north, a recent bombing in Mezzah 86 believed The quickening rate of violence now paramilitary groups are still carrying to have been carried out by a rebel group coloring the revolt-turned-war means out widespread detention and torture add to this fear as well as entrenching groups like the shabiha will play an operations in areas further south, the feeling among shabiha members that increasingly central role in conducting particularly in and around Damascus, they must kill or be killed.18 violence as law and order breaks down Homs and Deraa. Damascus is viewed in the major cities. If and when rebels as key to deciding the eventual outcome Another key feature binding the fate of reach Damascus after having taken of the revolt. Syria’s Alawites and pro-government control of much of the rest of the militias with the regime is the state- country, the shabiha, making a last stand, imposed segregation of Alawites in will likely unleash ferocious reprisals areas across the country. In the 1970s on Sunni-dominated neighborhoods and 1980s, the state erected hundreds and regions. of enclosed military housing complexes to provide free housing to thousands 15 This assertion is based on uncorroborated comments of military officers—almost entirely 19 from a Syrian civilian familiar with shabiha commanders Alawites—and their families. Today, in Damascus in December 2011. Also see Nicholas Blan- ford and Tom Coughlan, “‘1,500 Hezbollah in Syria’: As- 17 Andrew Gilligan, “Assad: Challenge Syria at Your powerful and the indigenous, powerless communities. sad Bolstered by Military Assistance,” The Times, Octo- Peril,” Daily Telegraph, October 29, 2011. 20 The 2013 state budget deficit is expected to be 745bn ber 6, 2012. 18 “Damascus Bomb Kills at Least 11,” Reuters, Novem- SYP. See “People’s Assembly Listens to Government’s 16 In the words of one shabiha member quoted by Reu- ber 5, 2012. Financial Statement on General State Budget Bill for ters, “Bashar will stay in power as long as I have breath 19 To this end, Alawite families were distributed in every 2013 Fiscal Year,” Syrian Arab News Agency, November in my body, but his army leaders are rats. My guys and I corner of the country but because they lived in enclosed 4, 2012. work for ourselves, without orders from anybody.” See housing complexes, they rarely interacted with the local, 21 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syrian Rebels Take Airbase “Syria’s Paramilitary Gangs a Law Unto Themselves,” often Sunni, population. Over decades, this absence of in- in Slow Progress Toward Damascus,” Reuters, Novem- Reuters, July 2, 2012. teraction bred suspicion and often contempt between the ber 25, 2012.

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The psychology that Syria is “Assad’s Along with the intensification of Syria,” a country ruled by Alawites, is Hizb Allah’s Role in the violence across Syria has come a rise in so prevalent that pro-Assad militias Syrian Uprising reporting that points to an operational are unlikely to be easily brought to role for Hizb Allah. According to an a negotiating table. This is further By Chris Zambelis October 2 videotaped statement issued complicated by the fact that there are by the rebel al-Farouq Battalions, Ali no immediately obvious shabiha leaders as the civil war in Syria rages on, Hussein Nassif, a purported Hizb Allah who could bring the roving militias there is ample evidence pointing to the commander, along with two other Hizb under control. Little is known of the activities of foreign interests—nation Allah operatives, was killed in a series shabiha leadership, where it exists today, states and non-state actors—opposed of operations launched by the al-Farouq but prominent figures are likely to be to the Ba`athist regime in Damascus.1 Battalions and allied insurgent groups trusted relatives of powerful Alawite In contrast, recent reports implicating near the Syrian city of Qusair, located groups such as the Shalish, Makhlouf Lebanese Hizb Allah, an avowed adjacent to the Syrian-Lebanese border.4 and Deeb families.22 Syrian ally, remain murky. Hizb Allah The details surrounding the death of continues to refute charges that it is Nassif and his companions are vague. Once it becomes clear there is no participating as an active belligerent Some reports claimed that they were future for the al-Assad regime, pro- in the civil war, even as it continues killed when the militants detonated a government paramilitaries will likely to lend political and moral support to roadside Improvised Explosive Device flee Damascus and other mixed- the Syrian government. The deaths of (IED) near a vehicle they were driving religion areas around the country Hizb Allah members in Syria in October on a road in Qusair.5 Other reports for the rural villages and towns 2012 coupled with reports of Hizb Allah suggested that they were killed in an of Qardaha, Shaykh Badr, Ain al- activities in border regions along the ensuing firefight with insurgents after Tina and others in Syria’s coastal Syrian-Lebanese frontier, however, the IED detonated.6 Another report mountains—the Alawites’ ancestral have raised a new set of questions about claimed that Nassif and his colleagues home. Without what they perceive Hizb Allah’s role in the conflict.2 were killed after a rocket attack struck as protection, thousands of Alawite a building in which they were staying.7 civilians may also migrate to these safe This article evaluates the growing The announcement of Nassif’s death areas because of fear of retribution number of reports of Hizb Allah’s was circulated on social media websites from rebels and Sunni civilians. Yet for involvement in Syria and the operated by the al-Farouq Battalions and shabiha gangs cut off from safe zones and geopolitical stakes involved for the other Syrian insurgent groups. Nassif’s unable to get to the mountains along the group amid the ongoing turmoil. It death occurred after earlier reports of coast, bloody “last stand” scenarios may also addresses Hizb Allah’s likely the death of Musa Ali Shahimi, another occur. preparations for a post-Ba`athist alleged Hizb Allah operative, who was Syria should the regime fall. The article reported to have perished in Syria under The arguments outlined in this article finds that Hizb Allah’s involvement unclear circumstances in August.8 The paint a grim future for Syrians and their in Syria encompasses political, alleged death of Hussein Abdel Ghani country. Given the growing acceleration humanitarian, intelligence, and al-Nimr, another reported Hizb Allah of violence23 and the international operational dimensions. member, was said to have occurred in community’s reluctance to get more the context of the crisis in Syria shortly directly involved in solution seeking, Rumors and Headlines following Nassif’s death, but under even less bloody outcomes for Syria’s Since the start of the Syrian uprising, murkier circumstances.9 immediate future are scant. The violence the political and militant components will continue and likely worsen before of the Syrian opposition have accused Syrian opposition sources also report the al-Assad regime leaves or is forced Hizb Allah of being actively involved having inflicted major casualties on Hizb from power. in the Ba`athist regime’s violent Allah in Syria and of identifying Hizb crackdown against both peaceful and militant dissidents. A longtime ally of Stephen Starr is the author of Revolt in cluding numerous Shi`a militias, are operating in Syria Syria, Hizb Allah has remained resolute Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising. He on behalf of the Ba`athist regime are appearing with in- in its support for Syrian President lived in Syria for five years until February creasing frequency. See Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Bashar al-Assad throughout the crisis. 2012. Militias Fight for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, October 16, The prevailing geopolitical conditions 2012. dictate that Hizb Allah and Iran will 4 “Al Farouk Battalions: The Assassination of Hezbollah work to ensure the al-Assad regime’s Representatives in Syria Ali Hussein Nassif,” available at survival.3 www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHXCiniwzVc. 5 “Hezbollah Military Commander ‘Killed in Syria,’” 1 Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly, “Syrian Rebels Get Influx BBC, October 2, 2012. of Arms with Gulf Neighbors’ Money, U.S. Coordina- 6 Ibid. 22 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Valued tion,” Washington Post, May 15, 2012. 7 Ibid. Relative and 2 Strong Loyalists Die in Damascus Attack,” 2 Nicholas Blanford, “Accusations Mount of Hezbollah 8 Tulin Daloglu, “Turkey Held Hostage in Syria,” al- New York Times, July 18, 2012; Salih. Fighting in Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, October 15, Monitor, October 23, 2012. 23 David Kenner, “Syria is More Violent Than Iraq at its 2012. 9 “Hezbollah Buries Fighter Killed in Syria ‘Border Worst,” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2012. 3 Reports that pro-Ba`athist factions based in Iraq, in- Area,’” Daily Star [Beirut], October 8, 2012.

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Allah members in combat.10 The Free Hassan Salim al-Miqdad, a member of of these accounts appear crafted to Syrian Army (FSA) claims to have killed the prominent al-Miqdad clan centered achieve broader political goals aimed 60 Hizb Allah fighters in heavy clashes in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, in Syria at undermining Hizb Allah’s reputation in Qusair in October that prompted in August adds another layer of intrigue and further weakening Syria. This tone Hizb Allah to request a truce to retrieve to the Hizb Allah dynamic in Syria. Al- of reporting also tends to misrepresent the bodies of their fallen comrades.11 Miqdad’s captors described him as a Hizb the true nature of Hizb Allah’s role in Members of the Syrian security forces Allah member. This incident provoked the Syrian crisis. and irregular paramilitary units known a wave of retaliatory abductions of 20 as the shabiha (ghosts) captured by FSA Syrians and one Turk by al-Miqdad clan The Resistance Responds militants have issued statements while members in the southern outskirts of Hizb Allah has responded to the in captivity claiming that they had Beirut.16 numerous allegations regarding its received training or direct orders by Hizb activities in Syria. While scoffing at Allah and Iran.12 The FSA also claimed A sober assessment of the claims claims that it is fighting alongside Syrian to have detained 13 Hizb Allah members repeated by the Syrian opposition forces, Hizb Allah officials have issued around the opposition stronghold regarding Hizb Allah’s activities public statements during the funeral city of Homs, in western Syria.13 FSA in Syria finds that many tend to be ceremonies held for Nassif and other detachments also frequently showcase outlandish and exaggerated. Many Hizb Allah members in their native what they allege is evidence of some of Lebanon. Lauding their contributions the measures undertaken by Hizb Allah to the organization, Hizb Allah officials member of the FSA told the Independent that “thousands” to navigate the battlefield, including its described Nassif and others as having of Hizb Allah fighters had entered Syria and were fight- supposed reliance on using ambulances perished while “performing their ing as part of the Syrian security forces. He also added and other civilian vehicles.14 The FSA jihadist duties.”17 that he was able to distinguish between members of Hizb claims that Hizb Allah’s presence in Allah and other Syrian soldiers due to the former’s “com- Syria numbers well in the thousands, an Hizb Allah Secretary General bat skills” and use of “M16 assault rifles.” See Loveday estimate that overstates the group’s true Hassan Nasrallah elaborated on the Morris, “Hezbollah Crosses Syrian Border with Bloody membership.15 The FSA’s abduction of circumstances surrounding Nassif’s Assault on Assad’s Enemies,” Independent, October 26, death and the growing reports of Hizb 2012. While precise estimates of Hizb Allah’s regular Allah activity in the vicinity of Qusair 10 A Syrian army officer who defected relayed the fol- membership vary widely, its core paramilitary wing— during a televised statement broadcast lowing account: “With my own eyes I saw snipers on excluding its numerous reserve and auxiliary units that by al-Manar television on October 11. the top floors of buildings, Iranian snipers, Hezbollah are usually mobilized during conflict scenarios—is not Nasrallah labeled the accusations that people shooting at the people.” See “More than 8,500 likely to number more than a few thousand members. In Hizb Allah has deployed thousands of Syrian Refugees in Turkey,” Agence France-Presse, June this context, reports of Hizb Allah forces mobilizing in operatives in Syria and that it is suffering 14, 2011. Similarly, the commander of an FSA-affiliated the hundreds or thousands in Syria as is often repeated major losses as lies. Underscoring the detachment offered another firsthand testimony from by Syrian opposition sources should not be taken seri- group’s transparency in dealing with the front: “They [Hizb Allah] were very professional ously. The FSA has an incentive to overestimate Hizb the crisis, he stressed that Hizb Allah and tough fighters. You can tell they are superior fight- Allah’s presence in Syria. has recognized its losses, as evidenced ers from the way they move in battle and how they fight.” 16 Hizb Allah has strongly denied any association with by the publicly held funerals for its See Nicholas Blanford, “Hezbollah Role in Syria Grows Hassan Salim al-Miqdad and the retaliatory abductions fallen members.18 Nasrallah also More Evident,” Daily Star, October 12, 2012. conducted in Dahiye by members of the al-Miqdad clan. rejected reports that Hizb Allah was 11 Paula Astatih, “Syria: FSA Kill 60 Hezbollah Fighters, Hizb Allah’s political rivals in Lebanon accuse Hizb participating in combat alongside the Retake Town,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 12, 2012. Allah of executing the abductions in concert with the Ba`athist regime on account that its 12 See “The Free Syrian Army Captured 13 of al-Assad’s al-Miqdad clan. It is widely accepted that Hizb Allah ally in Damascus did not request its Thugs in Idlib Province in Syria 15.12.2011,” available at maintains friendly relations with many of the most influ- assistance.19 www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnGpA5md6O8. ential tribes and clans in Lebanon, particularly the con- 13 “FSA Threatens to Take Fight to Hezbollah Strong- stellation of predominantly Shi`a families residing in the Regarding the circumstances hold in Beirut,” Daily Star, October 10, 2012. Bekaa Valley such as the al-Miqdads. The extent of Hizb surrounding Nassif’s death in Syria, 14 “Free Syrian Army Captures Hezbollah Terror Allah’s relations with the al-Miqdads and other power- Nasrallah offered an explanation that Ambulance Loaded with Weapons 11-13-11 Homs,” ful clans whose influence in Lebanese society precedes provides insight into Hizb Allah’s November 23, 2011, available at www.youtube.com/ Hizb Allah by generations does not, however, translate broader approach to the Syrian crisis. watch?v=M6u3P80VrNU. into a formal alliance, even though Hizb Allah’s rise and He emphasized that members of Hizb 15 An al-Arabiya report claimed that 1,500 members of influence could not have been realized without their sup- Allah were present in 23 villages and 12 Hizb Allah are operating in Syria. This report was sup- port. Just as important, the interests of the al-Miqdads farms in the vicinity of Qusair, but only posedly based on figures that were described as “leaked” and Hizb Allah have been known to clash on many is- to protect the approximately 30,000 Syrian security files. See “Over a Thousand Hezbollah sues. For more details about the circumstances behind residents of Lebanese origin—Shi`a, Agents in Syria,” al-Arabiya, October 7, 2012. Syrian op- the wave of abductions in Syria and Lebanon described position factions have similarly accused Iran of deploy- above and the complexities underlying Hizb Allah’s in- ing members of its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard teraction with the al-Miqdads and other important Leba- 17 “Lebanon’s Hizballah Buries Fighters Killed in Syria,” Corps (IRGC) to suppress the protests. It is important nese clans, see Mona Harb and Lara Deeb, “Fissures in al-Jazira, October 3, 2012. to note that the veracity of these leaked documents has Hizballah’s Edifice of Control,” Middle East Research 18 “Transcript of Televised Speech by Hizballah Secre- come under scrutiny, prompting al-Arabiya to issue a and Information Project, October 30, 2012. Also see tary General Hassan Nasrallah,” al-Manar, October 11, formal response. See Faisal J. Abbas, “An Apology on Nour Samaha, “Meeting the Clans of Lebanon,” al-Jazira, 2012. Behalf of Al Arabiya,” al-Arabiya, October 13, 2012. A August 18, 2012. 19 Ibid.

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Sunni, Christian, and Alawite—who Axis, an alliance that includes Syria depth Syrian territory has provided reside there and have come under and Iran, Hizb Allah is party to a larger Hizb Allah over the years would, in repeated attacks by the FSA. Nasrallah regional competition between rival theory, hamper its ability to operate. added that many of the region’s alliance blocs. The United States, Saudi The geographic continuity between residents have remained in Syria despite Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council Lebanon and Syria affords Hizb Allah the conflict to protect their property. (GCC) allies, and Israel, are positioned with a safety zone to operate outside of While located in Syrian territory, the on one side against Iran, Syria, and Hizb its Lebanese home. Syria also serves as residents of these villages identify Allah on the other. Saudi Arabia and a logistical land bridge for supplying as Lebanese, according to Nasrallah, Qatar, for example, have spearheaded Hizb Allah with arms and materiel and with many maintaining familial links efforts to organize the Syrian opposition to communities in Lebanon’s northern to diminish Iran’s regional influence “The potential fall of the city of Hermel in the Bekaa Valley and by weakening its alliance network. In surrounding areas. He stressed that Lebanon, the Hizb Allah-led March Ba`athist regime would while this patchwork of communities 8 coalition, which includes the Amal have a profound effect is diverse in its politics, many support Movement24 and other political parties or are involved in some capacity with aligned with Syria, stands against on Hizb Allah on many Hizb Allah, including its military the March 14 coalition, a U.S.- and levels.” wing.20 Nasrallah also refuted claims Saudi-backed network of political that Nassif served as a commander for parties that includes former Lebanese Hizb Allah’s Syria operations. Nassif’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Future death, Nasrallah declared, stemmed Movement and Lebanon’s Salafist enabling training and other operational from his activities supporting the current. In an attempt to strengthen activities. Syria’s alliance with Hizb besieged Lebanese communities inside its position in Lebanon and weaken its Allah emboldens the latter’s deterrence Syria around Qusair.21 rival Hizb Allah, the March 14 coalition posture relative to Israel and its has thrown its support behind the enemies in Lebanon. Syria’s continued In light of its continued support for the Syrian opposition, inflaming political support for Hizb Allah also serves as a al-Assad regime, Hizb Allah is mindful and sectarian tensions in Lebanon.25 form of assurance for its allies—Muslim of its sensitive political position in and Christian—in Lebanon’s inherently Lebanon and reputation across the In this context, Nasrallah’s admission turbulent body politic.26 Middle East. As a result, Nasrallah’s of a limited Hizb Allah presence in Syria retort to the allegations surrounding seems to correspond with the group’s With the persistent turmoil that Hizb Allah’s activities in Syria was traditional thinking and approach. Hizb continues to shake Syria—raising couched in a broader narrative of Allah has a strong interest in ensuring the possibility of the replacement of resistance—in this case, its defense of a that the al-Assad regime remains in the Ba`athist regime with one whose besieged Lebanese population in Syria— power. The potential fall of the Ba`athist interests would be inimical to Hizb it has honed over the years.22 Despite regime would have a profound effect on Allah—the prospects of a peaceful Nasrallah’s claims, there is more to Hizb Allah on many levels. In military transition are remote. The al-Assad Hizb Allah’s presence in Syria. terms, the possible loss of the strategic regime continues to enjoy support among a cross-section of Syrian society Evaluating the Evidence valuable intelligence on the activities of insurgents on the irrespective of religious confession and Hizb Allah’s stake in Syria cannot be Lebanese side of the Syrian-Lebanese border and con- ethnicity and among millions who fear understood without considering its ducting other activities to bolster the Ba`athist regime. what a complete breakdown in order place in Lebanese politics and wider 24 The Amal movement also commands a wide follow- would entail. This reality foreshadows geopolitical paradigms in the Middle ing in the Lebanese Shi`a community. enduring violence and chaos, in 23 East. As a member of the Resistance 25 The crisis in Syria is inflaming sectarian tensions in essence a protracted civil war, should Lebanon to such a degree that Lebanese Sunnis opposed the Ba`athist regime collapse. In this 20 Ibid. to Hizb Allah and Syria, including hardline Salafists, are regard, any post-Assad scenario will 21 Ibid. openly expressing a desire to organize professional and provide Hizb Allah and its allies inside 22 Relatedly, Hizb Allah has also organized aid and relief highly-capable militias based on the example of Hizb Syria and around the region with the efforts serving Syrian refugees and other affected popu- Allah. See Radwan Mortada, “Exclusive: The Man Be- opportunity to countervail attempts lations, regardless of their political or religious identifi- hind Hariri’s Secret Army,” al-Akhbar [Beirut], October by emergent forces to draw Syria away cation, throughout Lebanon. See “Hizbullah’s Mobile 25, 2012. Also see Mohammed Zaatari, “Assir Says Sus- from its previous stance. Health Clinics Help Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” Cres- pends Plans for Military Wing,” Daily Star, November 17, cent International [Toronto], October 1, 2012. 2012. Members of the Future Movement are also ratchet- 23 Most of the attention regarding the nature of Hizb Al- ing up political pressure against Hizb Allah by calling for lah’s involvement in Syria in support of the Ba`athist a formal investigation into its activities relating to Syria. regime tends to focus on developments in Syria proper. See “Judiciary to Probe Hezbollah’s ‘Involvement’ in Syr- 26 The predominantly Christian Free Patriotic Move- Considering Lebanon’s role in facilitating the insur- ian Crisis,” Lebanese National News Agency, October ment (FPM) represents a key ally of Hizb Allah within gency in operational, logistical, financial, and personnel 9, 2012. Even the Free Syrian Army has threatened to the March 8 coalition. Hizb Allah has also been able to terms, it is likely that Hizb Allah is playing a larger than target Hizb Allah in Beirut. See “FSA Threatens to Take attract support among a broader segment of the Lebanese acknowledged role inside Lebanon on behalf of Syria. Fight to Hezbollah Stronghold in Beirut,” Daily Star, Oc- Christian community that views the group as a necessary Hizb Allah and its allies are almost certainly gathering tober 10, 2012. bulwark against Israel.

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The fall of the Ba`athist regime Security Implications for Government Control and Attacks on would certainly take Syria out of the Authorities Resistance Axis. This does not mean Multinational Corporations Despite historical denials from the that Hizb Allah and its allies will stand Operating in Mexico Mexican federal government, current idle. It is conceivable that Nasrallah’s media reporting and public opinion explanations for Hizb Allah’s By Charles Regini consistently discuss “fallen cities” or activities in Syria reflect this reality. A “ungoverned” communities in various deployment of Hizb Allah operatives in mexico is a significant economic and areas of Mexico. These communities strategically important areas along the political player in Latin America. are characterized by a general lack of Syrian-Lebanese border, especially in With the world’s 13th largest economy, governmental authority. They arise and around villages that are home to sharing a large common border with due to pressure from direct attacks, communities sympathetic to Hizb Allah the United States and benefiting from assassinations, intimidation, and or possibly the Ba`athist regime (or extensive free trade agreements, public corruption perpetrated by apolitical communities opposed to the Mexico has developed privileged access all of the various organized criminal FSA), ensures the group an operational to U.S. markets and integration into groups. These groups seek to retaliate foothold in Syria in any post-Assad U.S. supply chains. Iconic American against Mexican security forces and scenario. A Hizb Allah presence in these manufacturers have moved factories support the continued expansion and areas also emboldens the Ba`athist by the dozens to Mexico, particularly activity of major DTOs in Mexican regime, thereby allowing it to devote to Mexico-U.S. border towns. Mexican communities. In February 2012, in what valuable military resources to other factories are exporting record numbers was widely reported as a break from theaters. At the same time, Hizb Allah is of televisions, cars, computers, and standard government media policy on also a relatively small organization that appliances. Mexico continues to be this subject, Mexican Defense Secretary has worked hard over the years to foster viewed as a prime location for U.S. Guillermo Galvan Galva acknowledged its reputation as a Lebanese entity that companies seeking to establish value- that some areas of Mexico are no longer exists to defend Lebanon against Israel. based, cost-effective, high return on under government control. “Clearly, Hizb Allah, therefore, must be careful investment business operations. in some sectors of the country public not to overextend itself in operational security has been completely overrun,” as well as political terms, especially as Drug wars and street battles, extreme he admitted.1 Galva said that organized the Ba`athist regime continues to draw violence, kidnapping, extortion, endemic crime has penetrated not only the the international community’s scorn. public corruption, and the looming country’s public institutions, but specter of spreading pockets of outright Mexican society as well.2 Some predict that the potential collapse criminal organizational takeover of of its patron in Damascus will leave municipal governments are consistent While there is no general consensus Hizb Allah irreparably weakened and headlines highlighting the ongoing of what constitutes an ungoverned or vulnerable in the face of its numerous challenges for business operations. fallen city, several conditions should be Lebanese and regional foes, especially Mexican federal authorities, however, considered when assessing security risks Israel. Subscribers of this view, however, point to continued successes in arresting for business purposes. In fallen cities, would be advised to revisit Hizb Allah’s or killing key criminal leaders and the any or all of the following conditions evolution over the years, specifically the break-up of transnational criminal may be present: lacks a mayor, city period of tensions surrounding the “war organizations and Drug Trafficking council, or police department; cartel of the camps” (1984-89) characterized Organizations (DTOs), as well as recent convoys travel openly in the city; by the years of open warfare between decreases in drug-related homicides. It cartels regularly operate roadblocks; Hizb Allah and its present-day allies is also a common belief that most of the street battles occur several times per the Amal Movement and Syria during violence in Mexico is due to drug gangs month; large numbers of drug-related Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990).27 Hizb killing each other, or “bad on bad” homicides, or businesses or citizens Allah has long established itself as an murders. Multinational corporations routinely pay extortion fees; and organic Lebanese organization that continue to consider future investment, retaliatory attacks related to extortion is able to wield tremendous social, but have developed reservations and attempts are common. political, economic, and military reluctance due to these concerns. functions in Lebanon. Hizb Allah will In the most extreme instances, these remain relevant in Lebanon and beyond This article assesses the current communities have no governmental should the Ba`athist regime fall. security realities in Mexico, authorities at all; they do not have addressing the country’s overall mayors, city councils, judges, police Chris Zambelis is an analyst and security environment and identifying departments, or other government researcher specializing in Middle East specific primary security risks likely officials. Residents and businesses in affairs with Helios Global, Inc., a to be encountered by multinational these communities have no protection risk management group based in the corporations operating in Mexico, from organized criminal groups who Washington, D.C., area. The opinions including extortion and kidnap-for- operate in the area, and criminals have expressed here are the author’s alone. ransom schemes. 1 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Mexico Official Admits Some Areas 27 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History Out of Govt Control,” InSight Crime, February 10, 2012. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 2 Ibid.

17 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 full run of the community and typically improving the security conditions in control. The number of police officers control access to it (e.g., roadblocks and what were once considered lawless and killed during ambushes jumped from surveillance). uncontrolled cities. approximately 625 in 2010 to 817 in 2011, a 130% increase.5 The number In less extreme cases, municipalities Overall, however, evidence suggests of assassinations dropped 8% in 2011, may lack some elements of local that organized crime has increased although that number remains quite government, but retain others. For its control over Mexican cities in the high at approximately 125 for the year.6 example, they may lack mayors, city past decade. Research completed by In most instances, the victims were councils, chiefs of police, or even the Institute of Citizens’ Action for municipal level government officials, police departments, but they may have Justice and Democracy (IAC) shows followed by state level officials.7 other governmental departments that that organized crime’s control over function, such as public utilities, health Since January 2010, there has been a services and schools. They are still able “Overall, evidence suggests steady increase in not only the numbers to provide basic municipal services, of attacks on government authorities, but in a limited form and one that is that organized crime has but also a spread in the geographic essentially controlled by organized increased its control over pattern of attacks. In 2010, there criminal groups. were an average of 15 Mexican states Mexican cities in the past per month experiencing attacks on A third condition is also present decade.” government authorities.8 In 2011, the where communities may have some or average increased to 18.9 For most all elements of government, but they of 2012, the number of states with are largely ineffective in protecting attacks on government authorities was residents from criminal activity due Mexican municipalities has gone from 20.10 States most recently hit hardest to corruption, collusion, intimidation, 34% in 2001, to 53% in 2006, to 71.5% by attacks on authorities have been incompetence, or some combination in 2011.3 The president of IAC stated Chihuahua, Coahuila, Guerrero, and thereof. that the infrastructure of organized Michoacan. crime in Mexico is “apparent, open, and Due to variations in the level and type notorious,” and that in many cases there There has been a steady increase in of criminal control over communities, is complicity between political leaders the number of monthly attacks since and the fact that these levels are in and these groups.4 January 2010.11 Attacks on Mexican flux over time, it is difficult to derive security forces occur on a daily basis a definitive and current list of fallen Contributing to the deterioration of throughout most of the country. The cities in Mexico. Conditions change government control for security of families of elected officials are also rapidly and a fairly stable community business operations are the daily attacks routinely targeted. Data from 2010- can quickly become ungoverned (often on government authorities that plague 2012 reveals an increase in ambushes in a matter of weeks). In contrast, more than half of the Mexican states. since January 2010.12 Although the there have been instances where the Government officials are the target of pattern of political assassinations from conditions in ungoverned communities daily attacks perpetrated by organized January 2010 to July 2012 suggests they improved almost as quickly with the criminal groups in many areas of the are decreasing, political leaders and introduction of federal forces, such as country. The attacks include ambushes government officials remain routine the police or military. Several cities of police or military patrols, attacks targets of Mexican organized crime and that exhibit a continuing pattern of on government buildings such as drug trafficking groups, with an average security deterioration and indicators police stations, courts and municipal of five to 10 assassinations of elected of fallen or ungoverned would be buildings, assassinations of political officials in the first seven months Apatzingan (Michoacan State); figures, and executions or kidnap- of 2012.13 These statistics suggest Ciudad Altamirano (Guerrero State); executions of police officers. These continued challenges by Mexican Coyuca de Benitez (Guerrero State); attacks are in contrast to street battles authorities to maintain control of many Meoqui (Chihuahua State); and Piedras between government forces and sicarios areas of the country. Negras (Coahuila State). (cartel gunmen).

Several municipalities that have had The frequency and character of armed conditions improve with continued attacks directed against Mexican 5 “Mexico Annual Security Review 2011,” Harary Secu- deployment and use of military forces authorities provide insight on the rity Consulting, 2012. against organized crime elements are ability of the Mexican government to 6 Ibid. Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo on combat organized crime and maintain 7 Ibid. the northern border. Although neither 8 “Mexico Monthly Security Summaries in 2010, 2011, city can be considered “safe” and 3 The IAC did not define how they measure “control.” and 2012,” Harary Security Consulting, 2012. under complete control of legitimate See “Mexico: Situation of Organized Crime; Police and 9 Ibid. Mexican authorities not influenced State Response Including Effectiveness; Availability of 10 Ibid. or intimidated by criminal elements, Witness Protection,” Immigration and Refugee Board of 11 “Mexico Annual Security Review 2011.” there have been clear indications of Canada, September 11, 2012. 12 Ibid. authorities regaining control and 4 Ibid. 13 Ibid.

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Another useful variable in assessing continuing decline in the effectiveness tourist cities of Cancun and Playa del government control and the level of of law enforcement agencies in many Carmen, has now started to experience security risk to business operations in areas of the country due to direct business extortions. A local newspaper Mexico is the number of street battles or attacks, assassinations, intimidation, reported in 2011 that the Los Zetas firefights between Mexican authorities corruption, poor training, lack of drug cartel was gradually infiltrating and cartel gunmen.14 There has been equipment, and weak leadership businesses throughout the region, a continuing increase in the number contribute to the increase and spread of including businesses that work with these crimes. As a result, opportunistic, the tourism industry. Quintana Roo “States most recently small-scale criminals take advantage trade associations have reported that of the disorder in local communities an increasing number of businesses hit hardest by attacks as well. Burglary and theft, armed are simply closing down, in large part on authorities have been robberies, kidnapping, and extortion due to the ongoing threat of extortion all tend to increase as law enforcement and other organized criminal activity. Chihuahua, Coahuila, personnel direct their attention to more The trade groups claimed that 70 Guerrero, and Michoacan.” significant matters, including their very businesses closed in 2009, 120 in own survival. 2010, and 300 in 2011.21 A government official in the city of Playa del Carmen Extortion told the local newspaper Por Esto that of such battles during the first seven Since 2008, extortion in Mexico has reported extortion threats against local months of 2012. In January 2012, there increased and spread across the country. businesses jumped 150% in 2011.22 He were approximately 25 street battles, The National Citizens’ Observatory, an further said about 99% of the businesses with the number rising to 67 in April.15 organization that compiles statistics on along one main commercial street in In July, the number of street battles crime, calculated that Mexico extortion the city were paying protection fees to reached 71.16 cases of both nationals and foreign cartels.23 nationals have increased more than There has also been a slight increase 180% since 2006.18 A 2011 study by the The cities along the dangerous U.S.- in the geographic dispersion of these Bank of Mexico found that more than Mexico border are also major business battles; they appear to be taking place 60% of Mexican businesses reported extortion areas. Most extortion attempts across a larger number of cities and that they were victims of crimes such as here, as well as elsewhere in Mexico, states. This pattern, which might not extortion.19 One of the deadliest attacks seem largely directed at small, more yet reflect a fixed trend, may still on a private sector business during the vulnerable local Mexican companies indicate a geographic expansion of recent drug violence came as a result that cannot afford to invest in adequate threats to public safety and business of extortion. In August 2011, gunmen risk and security mitigation and operations. reportedly working for the Los Zetas management measures. cartel set fire to a casino in Monterrey In addition to the number and because its owners refused to pay them While most extortion attempts are geographic pattern of ungoverned protection money.20 The fire killed directed at local companies, there cities, attacks on authorities and 52 innocent civilian customers and have been increasing incidents street battles, other variables provide employees, most of whom were middle- targeting large multinational insight into the current security risks aged and elderly women who came to corporations. One of the most well- to business facilities, personnel, and the casino to play bingo. known potential extortion cases operations. These include violent affecting a multinational business criminal activities such as extortion, Extortion has spread to businesses occurred in late May 2012 against the kidnapping, and cargo theft. Reliable in areas of the country previously Mexican subsidiary of Pepsico snack statistics do not exist on any of these considered largely untouched and beverage company, Sabritas. The crimes, but media reports and releases by crime. The state of Quintana attack was viewed as the worst attack by various human rights organizations Roo, which is home to the popular on a multinational company in Mexico and think-tanks suggest an increase and in recent years. Members of the Knights 17 spread in each of them. Certainly, the Blanco, The Impact of Reform on the Criminal Justice Templar, an offshoot of the La Familia System in Mexico (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corpora- cartel, set fire to warehouses and more 14 The majority of these conflicts are running street tion, 2012); Gary J. Hale, A ‘Failed State’ in Mexico: than 30 trucks belonging to the firm 24 battles during which bullets are fired indiscriminately Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable (Houston: in Guanajuato and Michoacan states. in mostly urban settings often resulting in the injury or James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2011); In total, the attacks and fires at five death of innocent bystanders. Fragmentation grenades “Security and Criminal Justice in the States: 25 Indicators were also used in a significant number of these battles of our Institutional Weakness,” Mexico Evalua, 2012. 21 Edward V. Byrne, “300 Businesses Close in Cancún, resulting in injuries to innocent bystanders and property 18 Tracey Wilkenson, “In Mexico, Extortion is a Boom- Riviera Maya Due to 2011 Narco Extortion, Threats,” damage. ing Offshoot of Drug War,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, Mexico and Gulf Region Reporter, December 24, 2011. 15 “Mexico Annual Security Review 2011.” 2012. 22 “El crimen organizado expande su radio de acción,” 16 Ibid. 19 Ibid. Por Esto, October 24, 2011. 17 “Mexico’s 2012 National Survey on Victimization 20 Daniel Hernandez, “Who is Responsible for the Ca- 23 Ibid. and Perception of Public Security,” Mexican Nation- sino Tragedy in Mexico?” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 24 “Sabritas Target of a String of Attacks in Mexico,” al Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2012; Luisa 2011. CNN, June 2, 2012.

19 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 distribution centers across the two Separately, in August 2011, two miners and the manipulation of statistical states significantly damaged company of a multinational mining company data by local governments. The think- infrastructure, trucks and goods. were intercepted on a road near their tank’s 2010 figure was twice its 2009 In most media reports, the criminal mining facility in a remote area of numbers. Meanwhile, between October organization claimed the attack was Chihuahua State by a group of 12-14 men 2010 and September 2011 there were due to the company’s cooperation with in bulletproof vests, carrying automatic 1,016 incidents of kidnap-for-ransom, authorities, however the circumstances weapons, with bandanas over their as noted in a report by the National point to indications of attempted faces. The two miners were blindfolded, Public Security System.32 According to extortion.25 The attacks required handcuffed, and transported to the a 2011 Mexican congressional report, significant coordination to hit multiple group’s operating “base.” They were kidnapping in Mexico has risen 317% in locations and inflict a tremendous taken on a short tour of the location and amount of damage without causing any shown a roomful of automatic weapons, “Drug cartels commonly loss of life. Arson is a common method grenade launchers, and explosives. of intimidation and retaliation in A laptop with the company’s website pressure multinational attempted extortions.26 loaded on the internet browser was mining companies to pay also shown to the men. The assailants The mining industry in particular told the miners how the company’s from $11,000 to $37,000 has become a popular target for website bragged about the successes of a month in ‘taxes’ for the extortionists, mostly because the the Chihuahua gold mining operation industry is highly profitable and the and that to continue the operation the right to operate in the work sites are remote. According to company would be required to pay a cartel’s territory.” Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office, monthly “tax” to the group. 29 drug cartels commonly pressure multinational mining companies to pay Kidnap-for-Ransom from $11,000 to $37,000 a month in Mexico is among the top five countries the last five years.33 The report estimated “taxes” for the right to operate in the at risk for kidnap-for-ransom schemes. an average of 3.72 kidnap cases are cartel’s territory.27 If the “security tax” The Mexican government’s statistical reported every day. Although kidnap- is not paid, the company’s directors, information about kidnap-for-ransom is for-ransom incidents occur throughout family members, and the miners highly inaccurate and likely manipulated the country, high numbers of incidents themselves are attacked or kidnapped. for perception purposes. The reality is are concentrated in eight states: Mexico, The Attorney General’s Office has that the exact numbers of incidents, types the Federal District, Guanajuato, opened 12 investigations into extortion of victims, or average ransom demands Michoacan, Guerrero, Chihuahua, threats faced by some 300 mines are nearly impossible to accurately Baja California and Tamaulipas. Other across the country and has created an determine because only a fraction of primary trouble spots include Nuevo inter-agency investigative team aimed incidents are reported to authorities or Leon, Tabasco, and Veracruz states. The at protecting the mining industry in other organizations. This is mostly due municipalities in the Yucatan Peninsula response to the rise in extortion. to fear that corrupt local and state police seem relatively less prone to kidnap officers collude with kidnappers. incidents.34 In one example, a multinational mining company in Reynosa reported in A Mexican human rights group, the Kidnap groups in Mexico range from August 2012 that it had received several Council for Law and Human Rights, well-organized and professional threats from unknown individuals who claimed that 17,889 kidnappings kidnapping rings and drug cartels to demanded that they be permitted to occurred in 2011, up approximately opportunistic street criminals. Both steal copper from a warehouse owned 32% from the 13,505 abductions in types of groups generally operate in by the company.28 2010.30 The figures did not include urban areas or along rural highways. kidnappings where the victim was These groups often kidnap employees released within 24 hours, known as commuting to and from work, or in an “express kidnapping.” In 2011, a transit from city to city. Mexican separate Mexican think-tank reported nationals are believed to make up the that 1,847 kidnappings were recorded vast majority of victims, but foreigners in the country in 2010. Some 209 of are also targeted. Although all business 25 “Arson Attacks Against U.S. Multinational Subsid- these incidents resulted in the death sectors are victimized, energy and 31 iary,” U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2012. of the hostage. The think-tank, mining sector workers are particularly 26 The criminal organization claiming responsibility for however, admitted these figures were at risk due to their isolated and rural the arson attack was the Knights Templar, a relatively likely only a fragment of the real work sites and transportation routes. small splinter criminal group of the La Familia cartel that kidnapping rate due to underreporting routinely relies on extortion revenues, unlike the larger 32 Ioan Grillo, “No Reduction in Mexico Kidnappings,” cartels that primarily rely on drug trafficking revenues. 29 Ibid. Global Post, November 20, 2011. 27 Edward Fox, “Mexico Mining Ops Pay Hefty Extor- 30 “49 Kidnappings Per Day Occurred in Mexico in 33 Damien Cave, “In Mexico, a Kidnapping Ignored as tion Fees to Cartels,” Insight Crime, May 8, 2012. 2011,” Borderland Beat, January 2, 2012. Crime Worsens,” New York Times, March 17, 2012. 28 Charles Regini, “Kroll Critical Incident Case Studies 31 Elyssa Pachico, “Study: 2010 Record Year for Kid- 34 There is not one definitive reason why the Yucatan and Statistics,” Kroll Associates, 2012. nappings in Mexico,” InSight Crime, February 7, 2011. Peninsula is less prone to kidnap incidents.

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Drug trafficking gangs, such as Los impunity have left businesses and Businesses considering future Zetas, La Familia, and the Knights their employees, managers, and operations or maintaining current Templar, engage in retaliation and executives vulnerable. This has operations in Mexico must acknowledge intimidation kidnappings against resulted in significant economic and and take steps to actively manage these rivals, government authorities, social damage, as well as scaring away security risks to be successful and public officials and private sector some businesses looking to invest in profitable. Regardless of the severity, companies. They also kidnap-for- Mexico. business security risks can be managed ransom employees and managers of using a continuous and systematic risk successful high profile businesses and A 2011-2012 survey by the U.S. assessment and mitigation process. multinational corporations to boost Chamber of Commerce in Mexico found Access to and use of current continuous their finances. While the vast majority that 87% of the surveyed companies intelligence reporting on the evolving of ransoms are relatively small, high had increased security measures or threat environment and how a Mexico- profile senior managers and executives contacted authorities due to incidents of based business’ employees, facilities, of multinational firms and local Mexican extortion or kidnapping, and more than operations, and supply chain may be citizen business owners can fetch half of the companies increased their vulnerable to security risks is the first ransoms in the millions of dollars. A investments in security during 2011.36 step to developing and implementing U.S. businessman abducted in Tijuana A June 2012 article in the Financial Times, effective security practices and drew $5 million in 2011.35 however, reported a more optimistic policies. scenario; foreign direct investment In most cases, after the ransom is totaled $18 billion in 2011 and was Although Mexico will remain paid, the victim is safely set free. expected to reach similar levels in dangerous for the foreseeable future, Kidnappings in Mexico are rarely 2012. While extortion and kidnapping multinational companies operating investigated or prosecuted due to a affects multinational corporations, in there can limit the frequency and lack of adequate resources, as well as most cases criminals rarely know which severity of security related incidents corruption and competence issues. key leaders to kidnap due to the sheer through implementing a successful In addition to traditional kidnap-for- size of many companies operating in operational risk management program. ransom operations, there are a number Mexico. In fact, in many incidents of other kidnapping methods used in involving employees or managers of Charles Regini is Managing Director of Crisis Mexico, including: multinational corporations, the threat Response and Planning for Kroll Associates Inc. and demand are directed toward Mr. Regini oversees the day-to-day activities of Express Kidnapping: Abduction based the families and not the companies, Kroll’s crisis management planning and response on a 24-hour time limit with emphasis although most multinational services, particularly the Kidnap for Ransom placed on forcing victims to withdraw corporations do accept varying levels and Extortion response program and associated funds from a number of ATMs, as well of ownership of the incident and risk assessments, prevention, preparation, and as handover cash, valuables, and other associated support and assistance to planning services. Mr. Regini joined Kroll in 2011 possessions. In other cases, the victims the victim’s family. The prospects for after working as an independent consultant and are quickly released after paying a small smaller, local companies may be darker. program/project manager in the U.S. Intelligence ransom. Many small Mexican businesses close Community. He retired from the Federal Bureau rather than face the continued threat of of Investigation in 2009 after spending more Virtual Kidnapping: Criminals call violence, kidnapping, or ever-increasing than 21 years of distinguished service in a variety their victims from unregistered mobile extortion payments to gangs or cartels. of investigative, intelligence, and management phones and claim to have kidnapped positions. Mr. Regini was one of the hand-picked a family member or friend. These Conclusion full-time hostage negotiators in the FBI’s Critical criminals may use sound effects or The security environment for Incident Response Group, where he led the FBI’s information gathered on the internet to businesses in Mexico will see no international hostage/kidnap program, and convince a victim that a kidnapping has significant overall change for many became recognized as a subject matter expert in occurred. The criminal then demands years to come. Crime, corruption, and crisis-hostage negotiation. a ransom. Criminals often claim to be the resulting insecurity for business members of one of the large drug cartels operations, employees, and executives when making such calls, knowing will remain a consistent risk for these groups’ reputation for brutality business. Real change will require the will scare victims. These incidents are Mexican government to radically reduce actually elaborate extortion attempts the corruption within law enforcement since no one is actually kidnapped. and significantly restructure the criminal justice system. Since extortion and kidnapping are closely linked to the drug trade and the ungoverned municipalities and unsecured areas of the country, the cartels’ ability to operate with 36 “The Impact of Security in Mexico on the Private Sec- tor (Fourth Edition),” American Chamber of Commerce 35 Regini. of Mexico, 2011.

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of having links to al-Qa`ida. The man October 12, 2012 (ALGERIA): Algerian Recent Highlights in was carrying two U.S. passports as well troops reportedly killed Boualem Bekai, Terrorist Activity as a German passport. – AP, October 13 also known as Khaled al-Mig, near Tizi Ouzou. Bekai was considered the October 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A October 9, 2012 (UNITED STATES): number two in al-Qa`ida in the Islamic suicide bomber attacked a joint NATO- Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Islamic cleric Maghreb. – BBC, October 15 Afghan patrol in Khost, killing at least charged with aiding al-Qa`ida, was 14 people. Three of the dead were arraigned in a U.S. court after eight October 13, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida U.S. soldiers. The Taliban claimed years of fighting extradition from the chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new responsibility. – Voice of America, October 1 United Kingdom. – Bloomberg, October 9 audiotape urging Muslims to wage holy war against the United States and Israel October 1, 2012 (IRAQ): The Iraqi October 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Taliban due to the film Innocence of Muslims that government announced that 365 militants shot a 14-year-old female portrays the Prophet Muhammad in a people were killed in militant attacks student activist in the head while she highly negative light. – AFP, October 13 in September, the highest number of was on her way home from school in monthly deaths in more than two years. Mingora, located in the Swat Valley. October 13, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A According to the figures, 182 civilians, A spokesman for Tehrik-i-Taliban suicide bomber on a motorbike targeted 95 soldiers and 88 policemen were killed Pakistan claimed responsibility, and a local intelligence office in Maruf during the month. – Reuters, October 1 said that the girl, Malala Yousafzai, “has district of Kandahar Province, killing become a symbol of Western culture in at least nine people. Two of the dead October 1, 2012 (KENYA): Suspected al- the area.” Yousafzai survived the attack, were Americans. The Taliban claimed Shabab militants hurled a grenade at a but is in critical condition. According responsibility. It was later revealed that Kenyan police post in Garissa, close to to many press reports, Pakistanis were the bomber was an Afghan intelligence the Kenya-Somalia border. There were shocked over the incident. – New York agent who had worked at the agency for no casualties. – Reuters, October 1 Times, October 10; Voice of America, October 10 eight years. The bomber had moved his wife and children to Pakistan a week October 4, 2012 (YEMEN): The U.S. October 10, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. before he attacked the facility. – AP, State Department officially identified drone killed five suspected insurgents October 13; AFP, October 16 Ansar al-Shari`a in Yemen as an alias at a compound in North Waziristan of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Agency of the Federally Administered October 13, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide (AQAP). According to the statement, Tribal Areas. – AAP, October 12 bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle Ansar al-Shari`a “is simply AQAP’s killed at least 14 people near an arms effort to rebrand itself, with the aim October 11, 2012 (YEMEN): Masked bazaar in Darra Adam Khel in Khyber of manipulating people to join AQAP’s gunmen shot to death a Yemeni security Pakhtunkhwa Province. – Reuters, October terrorist cause.” – Wall Street Journal, official who worked at the U.S. Embassy 13; New York Times, October 13 October 4; U.S. State Department, October 4 in Sana`a. The official, Qassim Aklan, had “worked for the U.S. Embassy for October 13, 2012 (ISRAEL): Israel killed October 4, 2012 (YEMEN): Three U.S. almost 20 years and had been involved Hisham Saidani, an influential Salafi- drone strikes killed five suspected in investigating the storming of the jihadi, in an airstrike in the Gaza Strip. members of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian U.S. Embassy compound by protestors Saidani was killed along with one other Peninsula in Shabwa Province. – CNN, last month,” said a report from USA top militant. As stated by the Associated October 4 Today. He was killed when two men on a Press, “In recent years, a number of motorcycle opened fire on his vehicle. – shadowy groups that claim inspiration October 8, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A New York Times, October 11; USA Today, October from al-Qaida have been on the rise in suicide bomber in an explosives-laden 11 Gaza. While they are not believed to vehicle attacked an Afghan police have direct links with the global terror station in Lashkar Gah, Helmand October 11, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. network [al-Qa`ida], they share the Province. The explosion killed at least drone killed 18 suspected insurgents at same belief that they can impose their two Afghan intelligence agents. – AFP, a militant compound in Orakzai Agency fundamentalist version of Islam by force October 8 of the Federally Administered Tribal and frequently borrow its tactics. They Areas. Most of the dead were reportedly have also clashed with Gaza’s ruling October 8, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide Afghans. – AAP, October 12 Islamic militant Hamas movement.” bomber detonated a car bomb near – AP, October 14 Syria’s Air Force Intelligence compound October 12, 2012 (SYRIA): Rebel fighters on the outskirts of Damascus. Jabhat al- seized a government missile defense October 14, 2012 (NORTH AFRICA): Nusra claimed responsibility, and said base near Aleppo in northern Syria. Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of that the attack involved two car bombs. Among the rebels included members of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb – AP, October 8; BBC, October 9 Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi group. (AQIM), reportedly appointed Yahya – CBS News, October 12 Abou El Hamame as amir of the Sahel. El October 8, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemeni Hamame, whose real name is reportedly authorities arrested a U.S. citizen at a Djamal Okacha, will replace Nabil hotel in Shabwa Province on suspicions Makhloufi, who is believed to have died

22 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12 in a car accident in September 2012. were wounded. The Taliban claimed October 21, 2012 (YEMEN): Said al- – AFP, October 15 responsibility. – Reuters, October 17 Shihri, second-in-command of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, released a October 15, 2012 (IRAQ): Gunmen October 18, 2012 (NIGERIA): According new audiotape rejecting reports of his attacked a checkpoint in the town to Reuters, “A senior member of the death. – Reuters, October 22 center of Tuz Khurmatu, killing two Islamist sect Boko Haram has been policemen. – AFP, October 15 arrested at the home of a senator in October 22, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): the group’s stronghold in northeastern Taliban militants killed 10 Afghan October 16, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Nigeria…adding to evidence that the troops in an ambush in Herat Province. A U.S. appeals court overturned the group has ties to government officials.” – AP, October 23 conviction of Salim Hamdan, Usama bin – Reuters, October 20 Ladin’s former driver and bodyguard, October 23, 2012 (IRAQ): A series of concluding that “providing support October 18, 2012 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone attacks targeted Shi`a neighborhoods for terrorism was not a war crime at killed at least nine suspected militants in Baghdad, killing nine people. – AP, the time of Hamdan’s alleged conduct who were preparing to attack Yemeni October 23 from 1996 to 2001 and therefore could troops in Abyan Province. – New York not support a conviction,” according to Times, October 18 October 23, 2012 (RUSSIA): A suicide Reuters. Hamdan, who was convicted bomber in a vehicle attacked a police in 2008 while at Guantanamo Bay, was October 19, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A checkpoint in Russia’s North Caucasus returned to Yemen in November 2008. roadside bomb killed at least 19 people region, killing a policeman. The incident Yemen freed him in January 2009 to on their way to a wedding in Balkh occurred between the province of North live with his family in Sana`a. – Reuters, Province. Most of the dead were women Ossetia and Ingushetia. – Reuters, October October 16 and children. – Reuters, October 19 23

October 16, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide October 19, 2012 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in October 24, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomber and other militants killed six the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants group of Taliban militants reportedly Yemeni militiamen during an attack on killed 16 Yemeni soldiers during an attacked a village bazaar in Faryab a checkpoint in Abyan Province. – AFP, attack on an army base in Shuqra, Abyan Province. Afghan forces, however, October 16 Province. According to Reuters, “Two managed to kill 24 of the militants, militants disguised in army uniforms as well as their commander, who has October 17, 2012 (UNITED STATES): drove an explosives-laden car into the been identified as the Taliban shadow The Federal Bureau of Investigation military base…moments later, other governor for Faryab Province. Five arrested a Bangladeshi national living militants assaulted the base from the policemen were killed. – AFP, October 25 in Jamaica, Queens, for plotting to blow sea and a fierce battle ensued.” – Reuters, up the Federal Reserve Bank in Lower October 19 October 25, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Manhattan. The suspect, identified as A man wearing an Afghan National 21-year-old Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul October 19, 2012 (IRAN): A suicide Police uniform killed two U.S. Special Ahsan Nafis, tried to detonate by cell bomber targeted a Shi`a mosque in Operations troops in Uruzgan Province. phone an inert 1,000-pound bomb that Sistan-Baluchistan Province, killing – Voice of America, October 25 he parked next to the Federal Reserve two Basij militiamen. – AFP, October 19 on Liberty Street. An undercover FBI October 26, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida agent had provided him with the non- October 20, 2012 (NORTH AFRICA): leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released functioning bomb. Nafis described A leader of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic a new video message criticizing U.S. Usama bin Ladin as “our beloved Maghreb warned France against President Barack Obama, demanding sheikh.” – New York Daily News, October 17 attempting to rescue six French that he admit defeat in Iraq, Afghanistan hostages. – Reuters, October 20 and North Africa. Al-Zawahiri also October 17, 2012 (UNITED STATES): called on Muslims to kidnap Westerners. The U.S. Treasury Department October 21, 2012 (JORDAN): Jordanian – AFP, October 26 announced that it froze the assets of authorities announced that they three Pakistan-based individuals arrested 11 suspected al-Qa`ida-linked October 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): accused of supporting the Taliban and militants who were allegedly plotting A suicide bomber killed at least 40 other militant groups in Pakistan and to attack shopping malls and Western people in a mosque in Faryab Province. Afghanistan. The three were identified diplomatic missions in the country. – Reuters, October 26 as Maulawi Adam Khan Achekzai, – CBS News, October 21 Aamir Ali Chaudhry and Qari Ayyub October 28, 2012 (KENYA): Kenyan Bashir. – Reuters, October 17 October 21, 2012 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone police shot to death a Muslim cleric killed four suspected militants from accused of having ties to al-Shabab. October 17, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in The cleric, Omar Faraj, was killed after suicide bomber drove an explosives- Marib Province. – Voice of America, October police burst into his home in Mombasa’s laden vehicle into a joint U.S.-Afghan 21 Majengo district. Authorities did base in Zurmat district of Paktia not provide further details about the Province. At least 45 Afghan soldiers incident. – Reuters, October 28

23 november 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 11-12

October 28, 2012 (SOMALIA): Al- CTC Sentinel Staff Shabab militants killed General Mohamed Ibrahim Farah, a top Somali Editor-in-Chief military commander. The general was Erich Marquardt ambushed near the strategic town of Senior Editor, CTC Merka. – BBC, October 29

Editorial Board October 28, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. bomber detonated an explosives-laden Department Head vehicle at a Catholic church in Kaduna, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) killing at least seven people. – BBC, October 28 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Deputy Department Head October 28, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected Department of Social Sciences (West Point) U.S. drone killed four al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula militants in Sa`da MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Province. – Reuters, October 28 Director, CTC October 30, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A man in an Afghan police uniform killed two NATO service members in southern Afghanistan. – AP, October 30

Contact Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/

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support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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