august 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 8

Contents A Fight for the Spoils:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 A Fight for the Spoils: The Future Role The Future Role of Syria’s of Syria’s Armed Groups By Stephen Starr Armed Groups Reports By Stephen Starr 4 Defining Cyberterrorism: Capturing a Broad Range of Activities in Cyberspace By Jonalan Brickey 6 Pakistani Taliban Renew Attacks on Punjabi Heartland By Arif Rafiq 9 The Strategic Limitations of Boko Haram in Southern Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 13 Yemen’s Huthi Movement in the Wake of the Arab Spring By Lucas Winter 18 Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth By Muhsin Hassan

21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts A Syrian rebel in the city of Aleppo on August 18, 2012. - Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images n august 6, 2012, President (FSA)—mostly operate independently Bashar al-Assad’s prime on tribal and geographic bases, and minister defected, dealing interaction between them, violent another blow to the Syrian or cooperative, is for the most part Oleader’s efforts to preserve his regime. 3 relatively rare. Jihadist groups, such as Since the start of the Syrian uprising Jabhat al-Nusra, have also definitively in March 2011, the strong central entered the fray. authority the al-Assad regime built and institutionalized during four decades has The role and future actions of the milieu About the CTC Sentinel been rapidly crumbling. Yet the factors of armed groups operating in Syria is The Combating Terrorism Center is an that made Libya’s uprising succeed—a sure to affect the shape of the country independent educational and research united and organized opposition, sparse following the seemingly inevitable fall of institution based in the Department of Social population patterns and a weak army— Sciences at the United States Military Academy, are absent in Syria. The country becomes West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses more militarized after each passing week, ries of armed groups operating independently across the the Center’s global network of scholars and with various, competing rebel groups country. Although in propaganda videos groups claim to practitioners to understand and confront gaining more leverage and territory— be part of the FSA, in reality their chain of command stops contemporary threats posed by terrorism and and even reportedly committing their at a local commander. other forms of political violence. own massacres.1 For now, the rebels— 3 In Aleppo this summer, rebels from all over northern habitually termed the Free Syrian Army2 Syria joined in the fight against government forces in one of the only examples of a large-scale coordinated military The views expressed in this report are those of campaign against the Syrian army. Rebel groups regular- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 “Rebels ‘Execute’ Regime Loyalists in Aleppo,” al-Jazira, ly bicker over funding and weapons. See Ghaith Abdul- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. August 1, 2012. Ahad, “Al-Qaida Turns Tide for Rebels in Battle for East- 2 The Free Syrian Army is less an army, and more a se- ern Syria,” Guardian, July 30, 2012.

1 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 al-Assad’s regime. Rebel units number member of the local community—not to security apparatus.10 The Muslim in the dozens. Some are secular, while a central command.6 In many respects, Brotherhood, an organization that others call for an Islamic state in Syria. this operational system has worked excites significant fear among Syria’s All are vying for weapons and territory. to their advantage in a guerrilla war minority groups, reportedly now has For now, what unites them is their against the Syrian army. fighters on the ground.11 shared goal of defeating the Syrian regime. This mutual interest will likely At its core, the rebel movement is not The capture and consequent release change if the regime falls. manifestly Islamist. Religious rhetoric of two Western photographers held has been a feature of war rebels by foreign fighters inside the Syrian- Conversely, the future role played seeking inspiration for centuries. Turkish border post of Bab al-Hawa by those who fill the ranks of the Against a far more powerful army, the government’s roving shabiha gangs rebels turn to God for inspiration and “Divisions between rebel is also troubling. Infamous for their to find meaning in continuing their brutality mostly upon civilians in fight under such testing conditions. leaders and the political dissenting areas, the largely Alawite As the regime upped the ferocity opposition—such as the shabiha have been successful in of its attacks on both civilians and sowing sectarian divisions among armed opposition elements, the rebels Syrian National Council— Syrians by attacking Sunni civilians.4 have turned more religious in their are likely to destabilize the As the central authority controlling rhetoric. the shabiha breaks down, the role political climate post-Assad these government militias play will be Limited public backing from Western as neither are united and significant in the future. states makes the rebel movement often appear a product of, or at least sponsored both feel it is their right to If the al-Assad regime falls, these by, Gulf states Saudi Arabia and Qatar, govern the country.” heavily armed, battle-hardened fighters two conservative and undemocratic will likely destabilize the country countries. Many secular Syrians, going forward. As a result, the post- particularly in the major cities, fear Gulf Assad authorities will face a number of influence in the country and believe confirms past suspicions about foreign challenges. This article will assess the these states are attempting to destabilize jihadists.12 Up to 100 fighters had evolution of the FSA and what role Syria and replace the al-Assad regime camped inside the Syrian border the group will serve in a post-Assad with an Islamist government. Indeed, in July, and evidence of al-Qa`ida Syria. It also addresses the challenges both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have activity in other parts of the country of the shabiha, determining whether openly committed financial support grows each week.13 the pro-Assad militias will return to and weapons to the rebels.7 This is their mountain villages or attempt a version of events that also worries Moreover, foreign fighters have to mount a counterinsurgency against Syria’s non-Sunni minorities, who recently been confirmed in Syria a new FSA-organized government in compose around a quarter of the fighting government forces. The Damascus. country’s population.8 Irish Times reported the presence of a number of Libyan fighters outside the The Evolution of the Free Syrian Army Violent Islamist elements, however, northwestern town of Idlib in July. An The FSA is largely a collection of have attempted to hijack the uprising, Irish-Libyan revolutionary, Mehdi al- defected Syrian army soldiers and local and jihadists are beginning to Harati, has been operating a militant civilians who have grouped together to puncture through the rebel movement.9 group in Syria since last spring and fight the Bashar al-Assad government Militant groups such as al-Qa`ida and has introduced an Islamic undertone in their immediate neighborhoods and Jabhat al-Nusra are confirmed to be to the Syrian revolt.14 A Syrian fighter towns. The FSA is not a unified entity, operating in Syria, once a country working with this Libyan-led brigade, and as a result there will be difficulties with an extraordinarily competent the Liwa al-Umma, said he wanted to restructuring or disbanding these 5 forces in a new political system. Many 10 Abdul-Ahad; Neil MacFarquhar and Hwaida Saad, FSA battalions are clan- and tribe- 6 Although the Syrian National Council signed a memo- “As Syrian War Drags On, Jihadists Take Bigger Role,” based, organized around a specific randum of understanding with the rebel leadership in New York Times, July 29, 2012. geographical area—such as a town, March 2012, in reality FSA rebels do not take combat 11 Ruth Sherlock and Richard Spencer, “Muslim Broth- village or city district. Fighters answer orders from the SNC. erhood Establishes Militia Inside Syria,” Daily Telegraph, to local commanders—often a respected 7 Justin Vela, “Arab States Arm Rebels as UN Talks of August 3, 2012. Syrian Civil War,” Independent, June 13, 2012. 12 Rod Norland, “Syrian Rebels Free 2 Journalists After 4 Christoph Reuter and Abd al-Kadher Adhun, “Search- 8 Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Up- Weeklong Ordeal With Islamic Extremists,” New York ing for the Truth Behind the Houla Massacre,” Der Spie- rising (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Times, July 27, 2012; Rania Abuzeid, “Meet the Islamist gel, July 23, 2012. Press, 2012). Militants Fighting Alongside Syria’s Rebels,” Time Maga- 5 As of August 4, 2012, 10 FSA military bureaus were op- 9 See the YouTube video apparently showing al-Qa`ida zine, July 26, 2012. erating inside Syria. See Rania Abouzeid, “Going Rogue: operatives after taking control of the Bab al-Hawa border 13 Ibid. Bandits and Criminal Gangs Threaten Syria’s Rebellion,” crossing in northwest Syria, available at www.youtube. 14 Mary Fitzgerald, “Syrian Minds Focused on Likely Time Magazine, July 30, 2012. com/watch?v=fYfsVOMyAms. Outcome at Aleppo,” Irish Times, July 28, 2012.

2 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 take part in their operations because regime over the course of the uprising.18 Controlling a Multifaceted Powder Keg they are “fighting for truth and justice The shabiha are mostly drawn from the The bloodshed and destruction that with an Islamic background.”15 Alawite sect to which President Bashar has engulfed Syria for the past 17 al-Assad belongs and have roamed months means that a successful As the violence surges and the town centers and surrounded mosques revolution will not bring the stability regime endures, the growth and at prayer time since the uprising’s seen in Egypt or Libya. As such, it spread in jihadist activity will likely beginning. They have been accused will require far more international expand. Islamists will begin to claim of atrocities in the towns of Houla, involvement in peacekeeping and post- responsibility for military gains against Tremseh and Qubeir in May, June and conflict reconstruction. A UN-backed the regime and consequently assert that July 2012. monitoring presence to oversee the they have a genuine stake in shaping internal workings and developments of Syria’s future. As of December 2011, one respected the nascent government will be crucial source claimed that shabiha members to maintain law and order. Furthermore, What constitutes today’s FSA were reportedly being paid 50,000 an international peacekeeping force leadership, where it exists, will likely Syrian pounds ($800) per month in that protects against the possibility become the central military figures cash that came from Iran via Hizb of reprisals and sectarian fighting in a new Syrian political system if for Allah in neighboring Lebanon.19 If true, in regions where tensions between no other reason than it is they who Iranian meddling in Syria illustrates yet Alawite and Sunni towns exist may be fought and died to oust the al-Assad another difficulty facing any post-Assad necessary. Few international actors regime (and not the traditional political government. The possible role played want Alawite militias roaming western opposition watching events from the by the shabiha gangs after the inevitable Syria and Lebanon, destabilizing an safety of other countries).16 Divisions demise of the al-Assad regime is difficult already volatile neighborhood. between rebel leaders and the political to quantify and chart. If regional opposition—such as the Syrian National supporters Hizb Allah and Iran provide For Syrians themselves, amnesties Council (SNC)—are likely to destabilize them with financial backing, however, and statements that assure the safety the political climate post-Assad as then they will be a destructive force of Alawite civilians will be essential neither are united and both feel it is during the reorganization of the Syrian in helping eliminate further inter- their right to govern the country. state. With outside backing, the shabiha religious strife. Dialogue between rebel could mount a counterinsurgency, leaders and the political opposition The perfunctory head of the FSA, Riad possibly resulting in a long-term civil that includes, among others, the SNC, al-Asaad, is unlikely to hold much sway conflict. over the makeup and formation of a in a post-Assad Syria since he has spent new Syrian army and government must much of the revolution in Turkey rather Until now, direct confrontations be fruitful. A nationwide arms dump than fighting regime troops inside the between rebel forces and pro-regime program that incentivizes rebels and country. He is a figurehead; few FSA militias have been rare. In the absence shabiha militias to hand in weapons members answer to him today, and they of a central authority (the Syrian armed will help Syria on the road to a more are unlikely to in the future. forces) controlling important cities, the peaceful future. Of course, none of these future may bring many such clashes. measures are guaranteed to take place. The Shabiha As the regime seeks to consolidate As more Syrians die, piecing the country The central kernel in the regime’s its control of urban centers such as back together becomes increasingly attempts at maintaining control of Damascus and Aleppo, Syria’s open difficult. As long as the al-Assad regime power centers is the deployment and countryside will be free for shabiha and remains in control of militias and key actions of the government’s militias, the rebels to operate and fight each other. army divisions—which looks likely for shabiha. Originally a small group of men— at least several more months—Syria’s some from the president’s extended The Syrian government’s stockpile future looks dark. family—who operated in trafficking and of chemical weapons and missiles smuggling in and around the coastal remains secure. Yet if al-Assad falls, Stephen Starr is a freelance journalist city of Latakia on Syria’s northwest an organized transfer of government and author who lived in Syria from 2007 coast during the 1980s and 1990s,17 the weapons and security installations to a to February 2012. His writings have shabiha today number in the thousands. new authority appears unlikely.20 The appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the possibility of these weapons falling Washington Post, ForeignPolicy.com, Many in the newly rejuvenated gangs into rebel, shabiha or Islamist hands is a USA Today, the Guardian and the London are career criminals whose loyalty was growing prospect. Times. His book, Revolt in Syria: Eye- bought through a series of “political Witness to the Uprising, was released in prisoner amnesties” enacted by the North America on August 14, 2012. 18 “1,180 Detainees Involved in Events in Syria Released,” 15 Ibid. Syrian Arab News Agency, November 15, 2011; Starr. 16 Joshua Landis, “Syria’s Next Leader: Will He Come 19 Personal interview, civilian familiar with their activi- from the SNC or the Militias?” SyriaComment, February ties, Damascus, Syria, December 2011. This information, 16, 2012. however, has not been corroborated by other sources. 17 Ahed al-Hendi, “The Structure of Syria’s Repression,” 20 John Reed, “What’s Up with Syria’s MANPADS?” Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2011. Foreign Policy, July 27, 2012.

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Defining Cyberterrorism: The purpose of this article is to propose a comprehensive definition of Capturing a Broad Range cyberterrorism that captures the full of Activities in Cyberspace range of how terrorists have used the internet in the past and how they will By Jonalan Brickey likely use more robust cyber capabilities in the future. This article will first look a 1999 study prepared for the Defense at clusters of cyberterrorism graphed Intelligence Agency and produced at according to methods and targets; it the Naval Postgraduate School began will then describe the clusters in more with a disclaimer stating, “cyberterror detail and provide examples. Finally, is not a threat. At least not yet, and not the article will offer a new definition for a while.”1 Nevertheless, the authors of cyberterrorism incorporating these Figure 1. Clusters of cyberterrorism. warned, “cyberterror is indeed coming.”2 clusters. Around the same time, Richard Clarke, This includes individual and who at that time was the White House Three Clusters of Cyberterrorism organizational websites, which allow special adviser for cyberspace security, Figure 1 depicts the activities associated virtual interactions. Finally, the preferred use of the term “infowarfare” with the various cyberterrorism terms as physical domain consists of what instead of cyberterrorism. More than a described in the literature: online jihad, exists in the natural, physical world decade later, he still rejected the word virtual jihad, electronic jihad, and pure (as opposed to the man-made, virtual cyberterrorism on the basis that it is a cyberterrorism. While the chart is not a world). red herring that “conjure[s] up images quantitative plotting of the activities, it of Bin Ladin waging war from his cave”; is a qualitative approximation based on The y-axis in Figure 1 represents the he did, however, caution that there may an understanding of the concepts along methods of cyber activity: enabling, be such a term as cyberterrorism in the the x (targets) and y (methods) axes. disruptive, and destructive. The range future.3 Also, since terrorists are motivated of the methods variable is similarly by the pursuit of political goals, this described by General Keith Alexander, Barry Collin first introduced the term two-dimensional graph intersects a National Security Agency director and cyberterrorism in the 1980s, although “motivation” plane characterized by the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, just as experts have not formed a pursuit of political goals. Some of these who remarked that cyber attacks consensus definition of terrorism, same activities may be carried out by against U.S. information networks there is still no unifying definition of other actors with different motivations, started as exploitative before becoming cyberterrorism.4 Cyberterrorism is an but they would appear in a different disruptive, but now such attacks are even more opaque term than terrorism, plane.7 moving into the realm of destructive.9 adding another layer to an already contentious concept. Cyber5 events in The x-axis represents the targets of The activities in Figure 1 form three general are often misunderstood by cyberspace8 operations, spanning the clusters that represent different types the public and erroneously reported by cognitive, virtual, and physical domains. of cyber militancy at the intersection of the media. People tend to use the terms Cognitive targets are human minds—the cyberspace and terrorism. cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cybercrime, cognitive faculties that enable thinking, and hacktivism interchangeably, reasoning, and judgment. Virtual targets Enabling Cyber Militancy although there are important, sometimes are cyber manifestations of physical The bottom-left grouping represents subtle, differences.6 objects, such as organizations or people. activities that are not directly associated with operational acts 1 Bill Nelson, Rodney Choi, Michael Iacobucci, Mark of traditional terrorism; however, Mitchell, and Greg Gagnon, Cyberterror: Prospects and Im- type of target and attack techniques. For example, cy- they play a key supporting role in plications (Monterey, CA: Center for Study of Terrorism berwar is warfare conducted in the cyberspace domain facilitating attacks in the cognitive and Irregular Warfare, 1999). between nation-states; cybercrime is crime committed by and virtual domains. Enabling cyber 2 Ibid. individuals or organizations via cyber tools; and hacktiv- militancy (ECM) activities include 3 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next ism is the use of cyber by activists to voice dissent and recruiting, inciting, radicalizing, Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New support for a cause. financing, training, planning, and York: HarperCollins, 2010). 7 For example, cybercriminals may communicate with communicating. Research on terrorist 4 Barry Collin, “The Future of CyberTerrorism,” Pro- each other and plan operations, but that activity would use of the internet, often described ceedings of the 11th Annual International Symposium appear along another plane represented by the motiva- as online jihad or virtual jihad, has on Criminal Justice Issues, The University of Illinois at tion to pursue financial gain. revealed the many (similar) benefits Chicago, 1996. 8 Cyberspace is defined in a draft U.S. military document that al-Qa`ida and other terrorists seek 5 The term cyber is commonly used as a synonym for (Joint Publication 3-12) as a global domain within the in- to achieve through the virtual world, computer, but it could also include other information formation environment consisting of the interdependent including recruiting, radicalizing, communication technologies, people, and anything with network of information technology infrastructures and the ability to interpret and act upon code. associated data, including the internet, telecommunica- 9 John T. Bennett, “NSA General on Cyberattacks: ‘Prob- 6 The specific types of cyber attacks vary based on the tions networks, computer systems, and embedded pro- ability for a Crisis Is Mounting,’” U.S. News and World motivation and affiliation of that attacker, as well as the cessors and controllers. Report, July 9, 2012.

4 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 financing, targeting, operational means, although they are not disruptive systems. In the worst case, DeCM may planning, and communicating.10 or destructive acts themselves that cause catastrophic effects on critical leverage the full potential of the infrastructure, possibly resulting in There are several definitions in the cyberspace domain. death and destruction. DeCM activities literature that broadly include these are often described in the literature as activities as acts of cyberterrorism, Disruptive Cyber Militancy pure cyberterrorism, which is the direct and some courts agree with this The center cluster includes exposing, use of cyber hardware, software, and characterization. A key operative defacing, and denying. Disruptive networks to create kinetic effects on associated with al-Qa`ida in the cyber militancy (DiCM) is similar to par with traditional acts of terrorism, Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted electronic jihad, a cyberterrorism term as opposed to merely using information ECM-like activities in France in 2008 described as jihadist hacking designed communication technology in support and 2009, leading to his conviction to take down websites and disrupt the of organizational communication and normal (cyber-dependent) lifestyle of traditional terrorism.14 Most experts in Westerners, which relies on critical the field narrowly define cyberterrorism “The goal of terrorists infrastructure supporting medical, to include only the direct use of cyber using destructive cyber utility, transportation, and especially capabilities, as opposed to ECM-like financial systems. Like ECM, electronic activities in support of terrorism. militancy is to manipulate jihad also includes less nefarious, more computer code and corrupt nuisance-minded activities such as web Although there have been no defacement, denial of service attacks,12 destructive cyberterrorism attacks to information system and unauthorized access and disclosure date, terrorists may engage in DeCM functions to damage of confidential (and oftentimes to cause massive physical damage embarrassing) information. and economic disruption to critical or destroy virtual and infrastructure such as the power grid, physical assets.” At the outbreak of Syrian unrest in fuel distribution and storage systems, early 2012, Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, a senior writer for jihadist websites and “One example of a possible supporter of al-Qa`ida and mujahidin in 2012. Court documents described everywhere, proposed DiCM acts against DeCM event would be how Adlene Hicheur provided the Syrian regime. In a detailed article the destruction of a key intellectual and logistical support posted online in February, al-Sunni to AQIM through the internet. His enumerated several ways the mujahidin natural gas pipeline, the support included uploading pro- could attack the Bashar al-Assad flow of which is regulated jihadist materials online, distributing regime.13 He called on “skilled hackers encryption software to facilitate covert like Red Virus, Omar OX, and other by electronic industrial electronic communications, moderating jihadi hackers” to conduct electronic control systems.” a pro-jihadist website, and establishing jihad against the Syrian regime. These virtual payment processes to finance hackers have also been active in cyber AQIM operations.11 attacks between Palestinian and Israeli supporters that have disrupted public water sanitation systems, air Actors committing ECM do not have financial, transportation, and other traffic control systems, and financial to be motivated by religious ideals, business websites. systems (especially ATM networks). although to fit in this category they must Many of these critical systems are seek political change. ECM activities Destructive Cyber Militancy either directly connected to the internet may enable terrorists to achieve their The goal of terrorists using destructive or indirectly accessible via removable goals via traditional means—knives, cyber militancy (DeCM) is to media and out-of-band channels.15 A guns, and bombs—or through cyber manipulate computer code and corrupt 2011 al-Qa`ida video called upon cyber- information system functions to savvy mujahidin to attack U.S. critical 10 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Are- damage or destroy virtual and physical information systems by conducting na, the New Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of assets. Manipulating or corrupting Peace Press, 2006); Bruce Hoffman, “Using the Web as a information may, at a minimum, provide 14 Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, “Cyberterrorism?” Weapon: The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicaliza- misinformation and induce confusion Computers and Security 21:7 (2002): pp. 636-647. tion and Homegrown Terrorism,” testimony before the and loss of confidence in critical 15 Removable media, such as flash drives, enable au- U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland tomatic transfer of computer code from one network to Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 12 A denial of service (DoS) attack prevents the exchange another as users plug devices into computers physically Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, November of legitimate network data by overwhelming target com- connected to those networks, oftentimes inadvertently 6, 2007; Sajjan M. Gohel, “The Internet and its Role in puters with messages; a DoS attack may cause users to creating an electronic link between otherwise discon- Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning,” CTC experience loss of connectivity to the internet and other nected systems. An out-of-band channel is a network Sentinel 2:12 (2009). network services. connection that is not typically used for routine commu- 11 “Judgment of 4 May 2012, Case No. 0926639036 of the 13 Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, “The Electronic Arm of nications; for example, system administrators may estab- Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (14th Chamber/2),” al-Qa’ida Should Work to Topple Bashar,” Shumukh al- lish an out-of-band channel by using a dial-up telephone Paris, France, 2012. Islam Network, February 16, 2012. connection to conduct off-site maintenance.

5 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 an “information raid in the manner of Conclusion Pakistani Taliban Renew the raids of September 11.”16 The video Current definitions for cyberterrorism included translated interviews of cyber range from narrow to broad, although Attacks on Punjabi experts in the United States discussing most experts subscribe to the narrow Heartland how DeCM-like attacks may cause definition of pure cyberterrorism. The extensive damage to life-sustaining definition proposed here includes three By Arif Rafiq critical infrastructure. One example shades of cyberterrorism to capture the full range of cyber activities terrorists after an extended pause, Tehrik-i- use or wish to employ in the pursuit of Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resumed attacks “Although there have political goals. Such a definition in the in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populated, been no destructive hands of practitioners and academics prosperous, and centrally-located may engender more granular research, province. The boldest attack was a cyberterrorism attacks debate, and potentially strategies complex operation on August 16, 2012, to date, terrorists may to counter the threat stemming on Pakistan Air Force Base Minhas from the three different shades of (PAF Minhas), located in the northern engage in DeCM to cause cyberterrorism. Punjab city of Kamra.1 Two additional massive physical damage attacks occurred in July, one of which More work is needed to understand was a drive-by shooting that killed and economic disruption to and assess the risk associated with seven Pakistani soldiers in the central critical infrastructure.” cyberterrorism—threats, vulnerabilities, Punjab city of Wazirabad.2 and consequences. Computer security experts routinely expose vulnerabilities Pakistani counterterrorism intelligence in cyberspace; however, there is a and policing have improved in recent of a possible DeCM event would be paucity of research on cyberterrorism years at the federal level as well as in the destruction of a key natural gas threats and potential consequences. The most provinces, including in Punjab. pipeline, the flow of which is regulated cyberterrorism definition proposed here Nevertheless, a number of factors by electronic industrial control systems is broad enough to give researchers a hinder the province’s fight against (ICS). These systems are vulnerable to wider lens to study the cyber capabilities terrorism, including a justice system hacking exploits, which could allow the of terrorists across the full spectrum of ill-equipped to handle terrorism cases, manipulation of ICS functions such as cyberspace. poor prison security, aid to militants a sudden increase in pipeline pressure, from a powerful Deobandi religious resulting in a large kinetic explosion. Lieutenant Colonel Jonalan Brickey is an network, public antipathy toward Information Systems Officer and the Army military operations, and the absence of A New Definition of Cyberterrorism Cyber Command Fellow at the Combating a clear-cut anti-jihadist strategy. Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as “the Terrorism Center, West Point. He holds a deliberate creation and exploitation B.S. in American Political Studies from the The Federally Administered Tribal of fear through violence or the threat United States Military Academy, an M.S. Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of violence in the pursuit of political in Information Technology Management Province remain the primary targets change.”17 If one assumes for a moment from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a of domestic terrorists in Pakistan. Yet that this was the accepted definition of Ph.D. in Computer Science and Information attacks in Punjab could increase during terrorism, then the addition of cyber Systems from the University of Colorado the next few months due to TTP fear of to this term results in a simple, though Denver. He has held leadership positions impending military operations against circular definition: cyberterrorism is in cyber-related programs at the National it in North Waziristan Agency and as the use of cyber to commit terrorism. Security Agency, U.S. Northern Command, Islamabad proceeds in partnering with Given the range of cyberterrorism and U.S. Army Central Command. Washington on Afghanistan.3 Attacks activities described in the literature in Punjab are one of the most effective and depicted in the clusters shown in ways for the TTP to retaliate, sending a Figure 1, this simple definition can direct message to Pakistan’s leadership be expanded to: cyberterrorism is the and citizens. use of cyber capabilities to conduct enabling, disruptive, and destructive militant operations in cyberspace to create and exploit fear through violence 1 “Taliban Carry Out Brazen Attack on Pakistan Base,” or the threat of violence in the pursuit Associated Press, August 16, 2012. of political change. 2 “Gunmen Kill Seven in Attack on Pakistan Military Camp,” Reuters, July 9, 2012. 3 U.S.-Pakistan relations have improved since early July 16 “Electronic Jihad Video,” al-Shabab, 2011, available at following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s apology for www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=483eca14-3c0e- the accidental killing of two dozen Pakistani soldiers in 4a30-9038-f4bf4a1fad60. a U.S. raid on November 26, 2011. The Pakistan-based 17 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Colum- NATO supply route has reopened and high-level meet- bia University Press, 2006), p. 40. ings between U.S. and Pakistani officials have resumed.

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This article explains the significance 22, 2011, for example, the TTP launched retaliating against the Pakistani state of the August 16 attack on PAF Minhas a complex attack on the PAF Mehran for restoring cooperation with the as well as the difficulties in combating naval base in Karachi, destroying two United States and demonstrating that terrorism in Punjab Province. P3C Orion surveillance aircraft.8 Islamabad will have to pay high costs in its heartland if it expands operations in A Preemptive Strike by the TTP in Punjab? The TTP’s show of strength took place the North Waziristan tribal area where On August 16, 2012, nine militants— on the 27th of Ramadan, which is the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud is including six suicide attackers— date Muslims believe most likely is believed to be based.12 If Pakistan defers launched a complex attack on PAF Laylatul Qadr (The Night of Power), the Minhas, located along Punjab’s border holiest night in the month and the most “The TTP is possibly with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. probable night in which the Qur’an is The base, home to dozens of fighter jets believed to have been revealed to the retaliating against the and surveillance aircraft, was previously Prophet Muhammad. The importance Pakistani state for attacked by terrorists in 2009 when a of this date in the Islamic tradition suicide bomber blew himself up at the suggests that the TTP aimed to send a restoring cooperation gate, killing eight people.4 message to its members, sympathizers, with the United States and other Pakistanis that the execution The most recent attack lasted nearly of a spectacular attack on this day was and demonstrating that six hours, with both the Pakistani demonstration of its “righteousness.” Islamabad will have to pay military and the TTP stating that Additionally, the TTP likely saw the all nine terrorists were killed. An night as providing an opportunity to high costs in its heartland unnamed source told Pakistan’s Express exploit security weaknesses. The attacks if it expands operations in Tribune that the driver of the militants’ took place after midnight on a holy vehicle escaped, a point that clashes night when many Muslims stay awake for the North Waziristan tribal with the official government narrative.5 much or all of the night to perform extra area.” The militants were armed with hand prayers and supplication. As a result, base personnel were reportedly dispersed praying at the time of the attack.9 “If Pakistan defers anti- anti-TTP military operations in North TTP military operations The TTP stated that the attack was Waziristan until next year, it could allow conducted to exact revenge for the the TTP to conserve strength during the in North Waziristan until killings of former TTP leader Baitullah winter. Indeed, in August, as the NATO next year, it could allow the Mehsud and former al-Qa`ida chief supply route reopened, Hakimullah Usama bin Ladin.10 In another interview, Mehsud reportedly ordered an increase TTP to conserve strength spokesman Ihsanullah described the in terrorist attacks in Punjab, focusing during the winter.” attack on the airbase as revenge for the on its largest city, Lahore. Mehsud is aerial bombing of the tribal areas by the alleged to have disbursed over $260,000 Pakistani air force.11 for attacks on a Pakistan Air Force base and other government installations in and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), Beyond revenge and symbolism, Lahore, a considerable distance away mines, and automatic weapons.6 Local there could be broader strategic from Kamra.13 security personnel were aided by objectives behind the TTP’s attack. commandos from the Special Services The resumption of attacks against the Some observers point toward other Group (SSG) flown in from the Tarbela state in Punjab comes after Pakistan TTP-affiliated jihadists as having Ghazi airbase. Two Pakistani soldiers announced the restoration of the organized the attack. The most were killed, and RPG fire damaged a NATO supply route from Pakistan to notable suspect is Adnan Rashid, a Saab-2000 Airborne Early Warning Afghanistan in early July. Additionally, former technician at PAF Minhas and Control plane.7 This was the second the summer of 2012 is effectively the who was arrested in 2004 for alleged attack in a year-and-a-half that targeted last fighting season with the “surge” involvement in an assassination Pakistani aircraft, which are difficult troops present in Afghanistan—perhaps attempt on then-President Pervez for the government to replace without a final opportunity for the United States Musharraf.14 Rashid was freed from foreign financial assistance. On May and Pakistan to strike militants in prison in the city of Bannu in Khyber North Waziristan with a “hammer and Pakhtunkhwa Province in a large, anvil” approach. The TTP is possibly daring escape along with more than 4 “Taliban Claim Attack on Minhas Base; Nine Militants Killed,” Dawn, August 16, 2012. 5 Irfan Ghauri, “Lingering Questions: Is Something Be- 8 Faraz Khan, “PNS Mehran: Official Naval Complaint ing Hidden about the Militants’ Approach?” Express Tri- at Odds with Ministry,” Express Tribune, May 25, 2011. 12 “Targeting Punjab: TTP Chief Wants Increase in At- bune, August 17, 2012. 9 Ibid. tacks,” Express Tribune, August 1, 2012. 6 Shakeel Anjum, “Nine Militants Killed in Raid on Kam- 10 Shaheryar Popalzai and Nabil Ansari, “Tehreek-i- 13 Ibid. ra Airbase,” The News International, August 17, 2012. Taliban Claim ‘Revenge’ Attack on Kamra Airbase,” Ex- 14 “Taliban’s Attack on PAF Base Kamra: Pity the Na- 7 Hanif Khalid, “Damaged Awacs Aircraft Repairable,” press Tribune, August 16, 2012. tion Whose Security is in the Hands of Dangerous Duf- The News International, August 17, 2012. 11 Anjum. fers,” Let Us Build Pakistan, August 17, 2012.

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200 other inmates.15 The raid focused Prior to the killing of Qaiserani, the into the conservative tendencies of on Rashid, who reportedly used three cell TTP conducted two major attacks in the urban Punjab populace. In 2010, phones, got married, and fathered a child Punjab in the month of July. On July Shahbaz Sharif, the powerful chief while in one of Pakistan’s notoriously 9, it executed a drive-by shooting, minister of Punjab, asked the Taliban lax prisons.16 During his incarceration, brazenly killing seven Pakistani for mercy and to spare his province from Rashid was also reportedly in contact soldiers who were camped in the central violence.29 Sharif said, “If the Taliban with Dr. Aqeel, who is accused of plotting Punjab city of Wazirabad while on a are also fighting for the same cause the complex attack on the Pakistan search and rescue mission.22 Ironically, [i.e., opposing Musharraf’s policies Army’s General Headquarters in 2009.17 a rally of the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba-led and foreign interference in Pakistani Defense of Pakistan Council was close politics], then they should not carry out “A failing judicial and by.23 It is possible that the perpetrators acts of terror in Punjab.” of these killings hid among the other prison system emboldens militants and religious party activists. A failing judicial and prison system militants and either results Separately, on July 12, TTP terrorists emboldens militants and either results stormed a building housing Pakistani in their undeserved release from in their undeserved release police cadets and killed nine people.24 detention or allows them unwarranted from detention or allows access to the public. Malik Ishaq, a self- The Fight for Punjab confessed culprit behind the murder of them unwarranted access Pakistan’s Pashtun belt bordering to the public.” Afghanistan has borne the brunt of the “Militancy is bolstered post-9/11 insurgent and terrorist wave. Yet given the size of the province, the by religious, social, and fight in Punjab is almost as important as political networks in In a video released shortly after his the one in the Federally Administered escape, Rashid is shown in the North Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Punjab—most notably, the Waziristan cities of Mir Ali and Miran Province. spread of Deobandism and Shah, near where Hakimullah Mehsud is reportedly based.18 Punjab is home to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba conservative nationalist as well as the various Punjabi Taliban politics.” Pakistani intelligence reports suggested groups.25 The Punjab police have that attacks in the month of August made some important arrests in the were being planned, but the reports past year. In November 2011, the were conflicting and inconclusive. Punjab police arrested 17 suspected many Shi`a, was acquitted on 34 out of Reports preceding the PAF Minhas TTP commanders.26 Qari Azmat, the 44 murder counts and released on bail attack pointed to two different TTP mastermind of many attacks in Lahore, on the remaining 10.30 He once again cells based in Miran Shah, one led by was apprehended in July.27 In early openly calls for the murder of Shi`a Qari Aslam and the other led by Qari August, five alleged TTP members and rebellion against the government Yasin, and possibly even the Ilyas were arrested in the southern Punjab in public speeches. Much like Adnan Kashmiri Group.19 According to one city of Multan.28 Intelligence gathering Rashid, Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was report, the PAF Minhas attack as well and police training have improved, but allegedly involved in a number of plots, as two other smaller-scale attacks in Punjab-based politicians are reluctant including the murder of Wall Street Journal Punjab, including an August 1 attack on to muster public support for the war reporter Daniel Pearl, is said to have a fruit stall in Lahore, were in response and instead defer to and even feed had access to three mobile phones, six to the killing of militant leader Ghaffar batteries, and 18 SIM cards while in 20 31 Qaiserani by Punjab police. Qaiserani national, August 2, 2012. prison. In 2008, he managed to call was killed in an encounter with Multan 22 “Gunmen Attack Army Camp, Kill Seven,” Agence Pervez Musharraf’s personal cell phone 21 32 police on August 1, 2012. France-Presse, July 9, 2012. and threaten his life. 23 Arif Rafiq, The“ Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Is- 15 Fida Adeel et al., “Prison Break: Taliban Attack Ban- lamist Coalition,” CTC Sentinel 5:3 (2012). nu Jail, Nearly 400 Inmates Escape,” Express Tribune, 24 “Taliban Claim Lahore Attack Killing Nine Person- April 15, 2012. nel,” Dawn, July 12, 2012. 16 Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Pakistan’s New Most 25 The “Punjabi Taliban” is a generic term that refers Wanted: A Short Sketch of Adnan Rasheed,” Militant to Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab as well as splinter groups Leadership Monitor 3:5 (2012); “Reforming Pakistan’s emerging from the anti-Shi`a Lashkar-i-Jhangvi as well 29 Zeeshan Haider, “Punjab Minister Asks for Mercy Prison System,” International Crisis Group, October 12, as the once Kashmir-focused Jaysh-i-Muhammad and from Taliban, Earns Woman’s Scorn,” Reuters, March 2011. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. 17, 2010. 17 Ibid. 26 “Punjab Police Arrest 17 Suspected Militants from 30 Owais Raza, “Sectarian Clashes: LeJ Chief Malik 18 Ibid. Various Cities,” Express Tribune, November 17, 2011. Ishaq Placed Under House Arrest,” Express Tribune, Sep- 19 Asad Kharal, “Pre-Warned: Attack was Expected,” 27 “‘Mastermind’ of Several Bomb Attacks in Lahore Ar- tember 22, 2011. Express Tribune, August 17, 2012. rested,” Press Trust of India, July 8, 2012. 31 “Plot to Kill Musharraf Unearthed,” Geo TV, Decem- 20 Ibid. 28 “5 Alleged TTP Men Arrested in Multan,” Express Tri- ber 18, 2008. 21 “Alleged Terrorist Killed in DG Khan,” The News Inter- bune, August 4, 2012. 32 Ibid.

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Rather than directing their focus profile targets—a marked contrast to The Strategic Limitations on threats within, many Pakistanis the military’s failure to secure the PNS are pointing their fingers outward. Mehran naval base in May 2011. of Boko Haram in Hamid Mir, a popular television Southern Nigeria talk show host, singled out the New The TTP umbrella organization has York Times’ Pakistan bureau chief splintered into smaller factions that By Jacob Zenn Declan Walsh for allegedly following often rival one another.37 Funding for the CIA’s agenda after he suggested the organization has reportedly dried on july 30, 2009, Boko Haram founder that PAF Minhas stored some of up, possibly resulting in less spectacular Muhammad Yusuf was killed while in the country’s nuclear weapons.33 attacks. Still, the TTP has shown great custody of Nigerian security forces in resilience. It continues to operate in Maiduguri, Borno State, in northeastern Popular support for counterinsurgency both North and South Waziristan as Nigeria.1 On August 9, Boko Haram’s operations is also waning, dropping well as Dir, Chitral, and adjacent safe new leader announced in a written from 53% in 2009 to 32% in 2012.34 Only havens in Afghanistan—and it often statement that Yusuf’s ideas would “live 49% of those polled in Punjab Province reminds Punjab that it still exists on forever” and that Boko Haram would see the Taliban as a threat, compared to through violence. begin a series of bombings in the “evil 94% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.35 cities” of Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and The decline in attacks seems to have Pakistan faces a long-term challenge Port Harcourt, all in southern Nigeria. reversed public support for the war, from militancy and terrorism, which is He stated that Boko Haram’s “Islamic but rising anti-American sentiment, not restricted to the border regions with revolution” was not limited to the growing economic troubles, and overall Afghanistan. Militancy is bolstered by northern states and that the southern war fatigue could also be factors. religious, social, and political networks states, “especially the Yoruba, Igbo in Punjab—most notably, the spread and Ijaw infidels,” would become Boko Conclusion of Deobandism and conservative Haram’s immediate target.2 In September 2012, Pakistan could nationalist politics. Rather than looking launch military operations in North to face the threat within, the urban As Nigeria is split between a Waziristan to target the TTP before the Punjab populace is directing its support predominantly Muslim north, where end of the current fighting season this toward anti-war politicians like Imran Boko Haram originates and primarily winter.36 Direct operations against Khan, who call for a quick, negotiated operates, and a predominantly Christian the Haqqani network, based in the settlement with Pakistani jihadists. south, attacks against Christians same tribal area, appear unlikely. Based on polling data, Punjab’s urban in southern Nigeria would spread The Pakistani military has restricted middle class is largely averting their eyes instability to the south. Boko Haram counterinsurgency operations to from the threat, hoping that terrorism attacks on churches in the religiously militants that primarily attack the and radicalism in Pakistan were caused mixed Middle Belt in the first half of Pakistani state—with reasonable by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and 2012 have already led to retaliation effectiveness. In Malakand Division will end when U.S. forces depart the by Christians against Muslims in that and much of FATA, the TTP no longer region.38 region and heightened the prospects for serves as the de-facto government. a religious civil war in the country.3 In Moreover, the multiple intelligence Arif Rafiq is an adjunct scholar at the addition, the insecurity caused by Boko reports received about a potential Middle East Institute and president of Haram attacks in the south, including threat to PAF Minhas demonstrate Vizier Consulting, LLC. kidnappings or sabotage, would affect that Pakistani intelligence networks the country’s economy because all of are active and working. The inability Nigeria’s oil reserves, which account of the base attackers to penetrate deep for more than 90% of the country’s into the base, destroy, and kill large export earnings and 80% of government numbers of personnel point toward revenues, are in the southern zones.4 an improvement in security of high- 1 The moments before Yusuf’s death were recorded on a cellular phone and posted on YouTube. See “Boko 33 “Capital Talk,” Geo TV, August 16, 2012. Hamid Mir Haram Leader Muhammad Yusuf Interrogation Be- said, “Now if any Pakistani journalist expressed an opin- fore his Execution by Nigerian Security Agents,” ion that was according to the line of the ISI or the army, August 3, 2009, available at www.youtube.com/ they would say that he is an ISI agent. But if Declan watch?v=ePpUvfTXY7w. Walsh is following Leon Panetta’s line, then we cannot 2 “Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad,” Van- say that he is a CIA agent, because if we were to do so, guard, August 14, 2009. The Yorubas, Igbos and Ijaws it would infringe upon his journalistic freedom.” This are the three largest ethnicities in southern Nigeria. translation was made by the author. 3 “Nigeria Tightens Curfew on ‘Middle Belt’ Area,” al- 34 “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.,” Jazira, July 9, 2012. Pew Research Center, June 27, 2012. 4 Nigeria is unofficially divided into six geopolitical 35 Ibid. 37 Kathy Gannon, “Expert: Pakistan Taliban are ‘Weak zones, with all 36 of the country’s states and Abuja Fed- 36 “Pakistan Military Plans to Open New Front: Panet- and Divided,’” Associated Press, December 4, 2011. eral Capital Territory falling into one of these zones. The ta,” Associated Press, August 14, 2012. 38 “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.” geopolitical zones do not represent ethnic or religious ho-

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An attack in southern Nigeria would in his native South-West zone and also render a psychological victory for confessed to planning attacks at Boko Haram because it would show strategic targets in Lagos, including a that the group could strike anywhere five-star hotel, Tafawa Balewa Square, in the country and that Lagos, Nigeria’s churches and markets, and a bank. economic hub and Africa’s most He revealed that Boko Haram does populous city, is in Boko Haram’s not want to limit itself to an “ethnic targeting range. agenda” and be perceived as working for the interests of the Hausas, who are Following Boko Haram’s August 9 threat the majority ethnic group in northern on the south, the group did not carry Nigeria, or any other ethnic group.9 out any successful attacks in southern Nigeria. In fact, all of the approximately This came less than four months after 500 Boko Haram attacks recorded since Abu Qaqa, a Boko Haram spokesman 2009 were carried out in the country’s and Shura Council member, was northern zones.5 During this period, captured in January 2012. Abu Qaqa Boko Haram expanded its operations A map of Nigeria. revealed that ethnic Kanuris, who are from its original bases in Yobe and the majority ethnic group only in Borno Borno states in the far northeast to As this article will detail, there is still State, have been selling out members North-Central zone’s commercial only speculation about Boko Haram’s of other ethnicities, including Abu capital of Kano and North-West zone’s ability to strike southern Nigeria. Qaqa, an ethnic Ebira from Kogi State.10 traditional capital of Sokoto, and to the There is, however, growing certainty Among the reasons why northern elites, Middle Belt states of Plateau, Kaduna about Boko Haram’s infiltration of who are mostly Hausas and Fulanis, and Kogi, but the threats to attack the North-Central zone’s Kogi State, have rejected Boko Haram is that they south were never realized.6 which could serve as a “staging point” perceive Kanuris as the dominant for operations deeper into southern ethnic group within Boko Haram.11 7 mogeneity and are broadly accepted in political discourse Nigeria. Interrogations of captured An attack on southern Nigeria, by almost all Nigerians. The six geopolitical zones are: Boko Haram leaders in 2012 have also according to Suleiman Mohammed, North-Central (Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, shed light on internal divisions in Boko would show that Boko Haram is a Plateau and Abuja Federal Capital Territory); North- Haram that explain some of the group’s “national movement” with an “Islamic East (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and practical motivations for attacking the consciousness” and unite the various Yobe); North-West (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Ke- south beyond the rhetoric of public Muslim ethnic groups in the country. bbi, Sokoto and Zamfara); South-East (Abia, Anambra, statements. He also stated that attacks in the Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo); South-South (Akwa Ibom, south would divert the attention of the Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers); South- Internal Tensions security forces in the north and relieve West (Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo). For the Suleiman Mohammed, an ethnic Yoruba, pressure on Boko Haram members purposes of this article, “northern Nigeria” will refer to was arrested in Kano on May 11, 2012, there, while also helping Boko Haram 12 the country’s three northern zones and “southern Nige- with 10 IEDs and thousands of rounds prove its worth to southern sponsors. 8 ria” will refer to the country’s three southern zones. of ammunition in his home. He was a 5 See “Terrorist Incidents Attributed to Boko Haram, commander for Boko Haram operations Another Boko Haram leader from the 2009-2011,” Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, north, Kabiru Sokoto, masterminded 2011. This study records 271 attacks during those three on June 17, 2012, Boko Haram suicide vehicle bombers the vehicle bombing of Saint Theresa years. Since attacks have escalated in 2011 and 2012, attacked three churches in Zaria, Kaduna State, killing Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, 500 attacks is an appropriate estimate at present. Most 19 people and sparking reprisals by Christians against on Christmas Day 2011, which killed 13 attacks have targeted police stations, banks, poker and Muslims. According to one report, “After the bombings, more than 35 people. He had been on beer halls, universities and schools, and political leaders Christian youths blocked the highway leading south out the police intelligence’s list of Boko and, more recently, media houses and churches. Approx- of Kaduna to the capital Abuja, pulling Muslims out of Haram suspects before the attack and imately 1,500 people have been killed in these attacks. cars and killing them.” On June 10, 2012, Boko Haram at- was monitored by the police while 6 Muhammad Bello et al., “Four Killed in First Boko tacked one church in Jos, Plateau State, and one church scouting targets on Snake Island, Haram Attack on Sokoto,” ThisDayLive, July 31, 2012; in Biu, Borno State. These church attacks were all carried Isaac Abrak, “Nigeria Church Bombings Kill 19, Spark out on Sunday when services were being held. 9 Ibid. Reprisals,” Reuters, June 17, 2012. Sokoto, the seat of 7 Kogi is in the North-Central zone and is the only state 10 Ike Abonyi and Ibrahim Shuaibu, “Nigeria: Qaqa - the traditional caliphate in Nigeria, had enjoyed relative in the country that borders on three geopolitical zones as Boko Haram is Under Duress, Divided,” AllAfrica.com, peace despite a threat by Boko Haram to attack the state well as Abuja: South-South, South-East and South-West. February 7, 2012. in 2011. On July 30, 2012, Boko Haram fighters set off Okene is only 20 miles to the border of South-South zone 11 James J.F. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko twin bomb blasts in the capital city of Sokoto, including and 30 miles to the border of South-West zone. Haram in Nigeria,” JSOU Reports 12-5, May 2012, p. 84. a suicide vehicle bombing at the zonal police headquar- 8 Ibrahim Garba, “Nigeria Soldiers Arrest Boko Haram 12 Garba; “Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin ters, and engaged policemen in a gunfight in which two Commander,” Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 2012; Says ‘We Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Boko Haram members were killed. On January 23, 2012, “Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin Says ‘We Enugu and Warri Too’; Says ‘Terrorists Feeling The Im- Boko Haram shattered any sense of peace in Kano when Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and pact Of The Security Crackdown.” it killed more than 200 people in a day-long series of at- Warri Too’; Says ‘Terrorists Feeling The Impact Of The 13 “Terror: 40 Killed in Christmas Bombings,” Vanguard, tacks. Among other attacks in the Middle Belt region, Security Crackdown,’” Beegeagle’s Blog, May 17, 2012. December 26, 2011.

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Lagos, on December 13, 2011. He about their plans to bomb a church In South-East zone, two men from then disappeared from surveillance symbolically timed for New Year’s Eve. northwestern Nigeria’s Zamfara monitoring—perhaps due to police The State Security Service director for State were arrested in a motor park ineptitude or collaboration with Boko Edo State, however, later said that the in Ebonyi State on May 4, 2012, with Haram—until three days before he suspects’ Boko Haram connections were guns and machetes. They were accused was captured on January 14, 2012, in “not yet established.”17 The earliest of belonging to Boko Haram, although Abuja.14 A source from Nigeria’s State reported Boko Haram operation in there was no clear evidence of their Security Service said that Sokoto’s the South-West zone was in August membership.21 In a much larger incident presence in Lagos was no “coincidence” 2011 when a suspected member was in February 2012, 25 suspected Boko and that Boko Haram was planning to Haram members, also from Zamfara attack the southern cities of Lagos, “While Boko Haram State, were arrested while traveling Ibadan, Enugu, Onitsha and Warri.15 on a bus in Enugu State. They were activity in the three reportedly planning to bomb the Failed Operations and False Attributions southern zones is hard to University of Nigeria campus in Nsukka The Nigerian media often assumes that during its 41st convocation ceremony and any militant or criminal activity in the corroborate, Boko Haram were traveling with 27 guns wrapped south that may be the work of Boko has a more verifiable in fertilizer bags, axes, daggers, and Haram is the work of Boko Haram acid. After four weeks of interrogation, regardless of the evidence, which presence in North-Central however, they were released.22 Like in inflates the actual threat that the group zone’s Kogi State.” the South-South and South-West zones, poses in the region. Nevertheless, the there was no conclusive evidence that several attempted attacks on churches the suspects in South-East zone were in the South-West zone, which is the Boko Haram members. most religiously-mixed of the southern conducting surveillance of churches in zones, and other symbolically-timed Ibadan disguised as a beggar. When he Kogi State Exception attempted attacks in the region show began talking in Hausa, the common While Boko Haram activity in the three that either Boko Haram or violent language of northern Nigeria, on his southern zones is hard to corroborate, sympathizers are operational in the smart-phone near a church, locals reported Boko Haram has a more verifiable south. Boko Haram’s intent to expand him to police.18 Like the other incidents in presence in North-Central zone’s Kogi operations in the south, however, the zone, however, the suspect was not State, which borders Abuja and all has been met with poor results. Boko conclusively a Boko Haram operative. three southern zones. Boko Haram’s Haram fighters appear to have failed first operation in the state was in in all of their attempts to carry out In South-South zone, there has only been February 2012 when it raided the Koton attacks in southern Nigeria or been one reported Boko Haram operation, Karfe Prison and freed 119 inmates, captured before initiating attacks. which was in December 2011 when including seven Boko Haram members. military intelligence officers arrested Unlike the attacks attributed to Boko In South-West zone, all suspected three northerners, one Yoruba Muslim Haram in the southern zones, Boko Boko Haram operatives have targeted and one Muslim convert from Rivers Haram claimed the attack, with its churches. In Ikorodu, Lagos, on April State in Nigeria’s top oil-producing city spokesperson saying, “We staged the 24, 2012, a man from Taraba State who of Port Harcourt, Rivers State. The Boko operation in Kogi to rescue seven of our locals suspected was a member of Boko Haram cell was reportedly on a mission members incarcerated there and Allah Haram placed a bomb in an amulet to carry out a bomb attack on Christmas made it possible for the operation to be outside of a Methodist church before Eve at the Nigerian Army’s 2nd Brigade successful.”23 security officers detected his behavior Command, a mid-size hotel, and the and seized him.16 Three months earlier, Shell Oil facility timed to coincide in January 2012, members of a Boko with Kabiru Sokoto’s church bombing 19 Haram cell were arrested in Benin City, in Madalla. Hotels and oil facilities, BBC, May 17, 2012. That article stated, “Boko Haram has Edo State, after police were tipped off however, have never been the targets of staged numerous attacks across northern Nigeria but has Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria not targeted the country’s oil industry, based in the south. 14 Kabiru Sokoto was arrested on January 14, 2012, but or the Middle Belt, and a closer look at Other militant groups used to carry out frequent attacks escaped from police custody within 24 hours with the the operation shows that the operatives on the oil industry in Port Harcourt and the surrounding help of Zakaria Biu, the police commissioner in charge were more likely Niger Delta militants region but many have now joined a government amnesty 20 of criminal investigations, and local youths organized by or simply oil “robbers.” and the area has been relatively calm recently.” Biu. Sokoto was rearrested on February 10 in Mutum- 21 Nnamdi Akpa, “Ebonyi Police Arrest 2 Suspected Ter- Biu Village in Taraba State by a joint team of State Se- 17 Mike Osarogiagbon, “SSS Confirms Arrests of Boko rorists,” Daily Times, May 4, 2012. curity Service and army operatives. See Mitaire Ikpen, Haram Suspects,” Nigerian Observer, January 3, 2012. 22 Tony Edike, “25 Boko Haram Members Nabbed in “Kabiru Sokoto’s Escape – Zakaria Biu Dismissed,” Van- 18 Ola Ajayi, “Suspected Boko Haram Member Nabbed Enugu,” Vanguard, January 28, 2012; Abdulkadir Badsha guard, February 22, 2012. in Ibadan,” Vanguard, August 1, 2011. Mukhtar, “Nigeria: Boko Haram - Police Free 25 Hunters 15 “Security Agencies Uncover Boko Haram Plot to At- 19 Fidelis Soriwei and Chukwudi Akasike, “Five Boko in Enugu,” Daily Trust, February 22, 2012. tack South,” Punch, March 10, 2012. Haram Bombers Arrested in Port Harcourt - Army Puts 23 Hamza Idris and Aliyu M. Hamagam, “Boko Haram: 16 Steve Ogwu-Chinuwa, “Attempt to Bomb Lagos Formations on the Red Alert,” Punch, January 22, 2012. Why We Attacked Kogi Prison…Niger Police Arrest 9 Church Fails,” The Moment, April 25, 2012. 20 “Port Harcourt Blasts: Nigerian ‘Robbers’ Killed,” Escapees,” Weekly Trust, February 18, 2012.

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Following the prison break, the State on the worshippers with AK-47 assault false.34 In March 2012, in response Security Service uncovered a series of rifles, killing 20 people.29 The following to reports from the anti-terror Rapid hideouts and bomb factories in Kogi day, a bomb was detected at a church Response Squad (RRS) that Boko Haram State, several of which were suspected in Kogi’s capital, Lokoja, before it might use religious sanctuaries as cover of belonging to Boko Haram. A bomb- detonated.30 As evidence of the toll that for attacks, the state government of making factory was uncovered on these attacks are having on Nigerians’ Lagos demolished mosques in “strategic March 26 in Kabba; then, on April 1, faith in the government and the ability locations,” such as commercial hubs the State Security Service raided a for the country to remain united, the and areas near government offices.35 cell’s hideout in Okene, killing nine reverend of the church publicly blamed suspected Boko Haram fighters.24 On the government for not carrying out its These fatalistic predictions about April 9, another bomb factory was responsibility to protect its citizens, Boko Haram overlook two important while also calling for Boko Haram and reasons why the group is unable to gain “Since most of Boko those who want Islamic laws to form a foothold in the south. First, since their own country.31 most of Boko Haram’s rank-and-file Haram’s rank-and-file fighters come from the poorly educated fighters come from the There is now talk of a “Kogi Boko Qur’anic schools of northern Nigeria, Haram” faction, which may be distinct they would struggle to blend in with the poorly educated Qur’anic from “Kanuri” and “Hausa” Boko population in southern Nigeria, such schools of northern Haram factions in the north, but whose as in the oil-producing states, where operational capabilities may be derived northern languages are not spoken Nigeria, they would from interacting with Boko Haram and Christianity is the religion of more struggle to blend in with operatives, weapons traffickers and than 95% of the population.36 In fact, criminal networks in the north.32 It the dozens, or even hundreds, of Boko the population in southern remains to be seen whether Kogi State Haram fighters who have traveled Nigeria.” becomes Boko Haram’s “staging point” northwards to Gao, Mali, to join the for launching attacks further south, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West but Boko Haram cells and weapons hideouts in the state would facilitate “As in any insurgency, uncovered in Ogaminana.25 On April Boko Haram’s southward expansion. 23, the Nigerian Air Force attacked Boko Haram depends on a suspected bomb-making factory Misperceptions vs. Reality some level of local support in a forest in Usomi.26 On July 16, The rhetoric about Boko Haram in the 2012, the day after a vehicle bomb south continues to mislead southerners and collaboration to carry attributed to Boko Haram exploded about the threat that the group actually out attacks.” outside of a church in Okene, the poses in the region. In a few examples state police uncovered another bomb- of overreaction, the Southeast chapter making factory in Okehi.27 On August of the Christian Association of Nigeria 22, 2012, Nigerian police uncovered announced in June 2012 that more than Africa and other insurgent groups in two more bomb factories, one in Okene 6,000 Boko Haram members have the newly proclaimed State of Azawad and one in Okehi, and a car loaded with infiltrated the three southern zones, have integrated more smoothly into ammunition, two rocket launchers and even though most estimates place the human terrain there than northern explosives, and arrested five suspected Boko Haram’s total cadre between Nigerian Boko Haram fighters would in Boko Haram fighters.28 1,000 and 4,000 people.33 In the same southern Nigeria.37 month, the Yoruba ethno-nationalist The level of violence in Kogi State youth group Apapo Oodua Koya stated As in any insurgency, Boko Haram escalated to new levels on August 6, publicly that it is “almost inevitable” depends on some level of local support 2012, when suspected Boko Haram that Boko Haram will conduct suicide and collaboration to carry out attacks. fighters chanting Islamic slogans bombing attacks in Lagos and Ibadan In the Middle Belt, for example, some surrounded a church in Okene during by July 2012, a prediction that proved Muslim Fulani communities embroiled the middle of a service and opened fire in land conflicts with Christian ethnic

24 Shola Oyeyipo, Ibrahim Shuaibu, and Sherrif Bologu, 29 Shola Oyeyipo, Yemi Akinsuyi and Chiemelie Ezeobi, 34 “Boko Haram ‘Likely’ To Attack Lagos and Ibadan “Victorious Weekend for Military, Police, as they Bomb “Kogi Death Toll Rises to 20,” This Day, August 8, 2012. in Next Few Weeks, Pan Yoruba Group Warns,” Sahara Boko Haram Hideout,” ThisDayLive, April 23, 2012. 30 “Bomb Found in Kogi,” Business Day, August 8, 2012. Reporters, June 18, 2012. 25 Ibid. 31 “Kogi Church Attack: Primate Condemns Kill- 35 Emmanuel Mayah, “Boko Haram Scare Forces Lagos 26 Ibid. ings,” August 7, 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ to Demolish Five Mosques,” Africa Review, March 23, 27 Boluwaji Obahopo, “Car Bomb Explodes in Kogi, Sus- watch?feature=player_embedded&v=eaHyVd1R2wo. 2012. pect Arrested,” Vanguard, July 16, 2012; Usman A. Bello, 32 Forest, p. 3. 36 Abimbola Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko “Nigeria: Another Bomb Factory Uncovered in Kogi,” 33 Tony Edike, “Boko Haram Plans Jihad on Christians, Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of Daily Trust, July 18, 2012. S-East CAN Alleges,” Vanguard, June 19, 2012; David the Nigerian State,” Africa Today 57:4 (2011): pp. 99-119. 28 “Police Raid Bomb Factories in Central Nigeria State,” Cook, “Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in 37 “Dozens of Boko Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao,” Reuters, August 23, 2012. Northern Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 5:4 (2012). Vanguard, April 9, 2012.

12 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 groups have overlapping objectives recognize that they would suffer from Yemen’s Huthi Movement with Boko Haram to drive out the inter-religious conflict more than any Christians, so the Fulani communities other ethnic group in the country since in the Wake of the Arab may have formed a temporary alliance they are religiously mixed, while two Spring with Boko Haram.38 Nigeria is plagued other large ethnic groups, the Igbos by a tradition in which local community and the Hausas, are almost uniformly By Lucas Winter leaders support local gangs to attack Christian and Muslim. If the country rival communities. In the case of the were to fissure along religious lines, since february 2011, the Huthi movement the Yorubas would become a minority has played an important though largely in a Hausa-dominated north and Igbo- overlooked role in Yemen’s political “As long as the Muslim dominated south and face the prospect transition. The group has responded ethnic groups of southern of internal fratricide if Yoruba Muslims to the “Arab Spring” and in particular and Christians fought each other. to the slow, negotiated toppling of Ali Nigeria, especially the Abdullah Salih in Yemen. Since protests Yorubas, continue to deny Conclusion began in Yemen, the Huthi positions have As long as the Muslim ethnic groups aligned with those of the “revolutionary Boko Haram a foothold in of southern Nigeria, especially the youth,” calling for the downfall of the the southern zones, Boko Yorubas, continue to deny Boko Haram regime and justice for its victims.1 As a foothold in the southern zones, Boko the central government’s focus turned Haram’s attempts to strike Haram’s attempts to strike the south toward the capital, state authority in the south will likely remain will likely remain isolated, infrequent Sa`da Province crumbled, allowing the and ineffectual. Nonetheless, just Huthis to consolidate control over the isolated, infrequent and as Boko Haram struck the UN administration of a province they had ineffectual.” Headquarters in Abuja on August 26, been contesting for over a decade. At 2011, in a suicide vehicle bombing the same time, the group has attempted after having never targeted an to seize administrative control in areas international institution before, Boko where it only had a foothold, with mixed Middle Belt, a group like “Kogi Boko Haram could succeed in carrying out results. Haram” may be a local gang which is a powerful attack in Lagos or another funded by Fulanis to strike fear in the major city in the south. This would add This article provides a brief background Christian population, while in other credibility to the alarmist predictions of the Huthi movement, and then looks parts of the country, even in Christian that already exist about Boko Haram’s at the activities of the Huthis since the majority areas, militias like the Yoruba capabilities in the south. Unless the start of the Arab Spring in early 2011 Oodua Peoples Congress, the Igbo attack originates from Kogi State, on three different levels: local, national Bakassi Boys, the Ijaw Egbesu Boys, where Boko Haram has demonstrated and regional. It highlights significant and the Movement for the Actualization that it has bases and weapons caches, developments in the Huthi stronghold of the Sovereign State of Biafra pursue and from where it is capable of of Sa`da Province and its environs agendas targeting their rival ethnic carrying out a series of attacks, any during the past year. In addition, groups. All of these militias would single operation in the south would it looks at the Huthi stance toward be out of place anywhere except their likely be an anomaly rather than part Yemen’s Gulf Cooperation Council indigenous lands, and the same is true of a sustained offensive. (GCC)-backed transitional process as of Boko Haram in the southern zones. well as how regional developments may Jacob Zenn is a legal adviser and begin to play a stronger role in driving Second, the Yorubas, who form more international security analyst based in the conflict. The future of the movement than 20% of Nigeria’s population and Washington D.C. He writes regularly will depend on the complex interaction are indigenous to the South-West for The Jamestown Foundation, Asia of political dynamics at all three levels. zone, have stood united against Boko Times and SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Haram. Leading Yoruba Muslims, Analyst. He researches the socio-economic Brief Background of the Huthi Movement for example, “disowned” commander and political factors behind militancy in The Huthis (who officially refer to Suleiman Mohammed after his arrest Nigeria, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and themselves as “Ansar Allah”) are and have stated publicly that “nobody South America. named after their former leader, can fight for God.”39 The Yorubas Husayn al-Huthi, who was killed by Yemeni government forces in 2004 38 Yinka Ibukun, “Sect Attack Claim Complicates Nige- after refusing to turn himself in for 2 ria Crisis,” Associated Press, July 13, 2012. questioning. Basing himself in the 39 Garba; “Captive Ethnic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin mountainous west of Sa`da Province Says ‘We Planned To Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and Warri Too’; Says ‘Terrorists Feeling The 1 The fact that the positions align does not imply shared Impact Of The Security Crackdown.” A Muslim commu- motivations or coordination. nity leader in Lagos said, “The southern Muslims have 2 For details on this incident, see Iris Glosemeyer, “Local value for human lives; they know that nobody can fight ship in the south are putting their members on the alert; Conflict, Global Spin: An Uprising in the Yemeni High- for God. They are not inconsiderate. The Muslim leader- imams are already doing that.” lands,” Middle East Report 232 (2004).

13 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 in Yemen’s northwest corner, Husayn al-Jawf to the east of Sa`da and Hajjah to al-Huthi combined Zaydi revivalism its southwest. Political power, however, with sharp political criticism of both is particularly opaque and regularly local and international actors, crafting contested in Yemen’s tribal areas. The a historically rooted discourse of justice country itself is a patchwork of influence and empowerment that resonated over which the central government throughout the region.3 Zaydism is exerts varying degrees of authority a branch of Shi`a Islam that arose and through a variety of methods. This around the figure of Zayd ibn Ali,4 who context needs to be taken into account was killed in battle in 740 AD in an when speaking of Huthi “control” over attempted uprising against the ruling certain areas. In Sa`da Province, the Umayyad dynasty. Departing from Huthis are believed to have replaced the what would become the dominant Shi`a government as the main power-brokers narrative (as followed in contemporary in several parts of the province, most Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and parts of the importantly the provincial capital.9 The Arabian Peninsula), Zayd’s followers important question is not whether they held that the rightful imam must A map of Yemen. will play a role in Yemen’s future, but fulfill certain conditions, including rather what that role will be. descent from the Prophet Muhammad leadership of Husayn’s younger half- through his grandsons Hassan and brother, Abdul Malik.6 By the sixth Local Level Husayn, possession of superior skills war in 2009, an aura of invincibility In January 2011, heavy fighting broke both as a warrior and a scholar, and a surrounded Huthi fighters as they out on the outskirts of Sa`da city willingness to rise up against injustice pushed the fighting beyond Yemen’s between the Huthis and the al-Abdin and oppression. borders. In November 2009, the Saudi tribe, whose leader, Othman Mujalli, Arabian military intervened to support was a vocal Huthi critic.10 He was also Husayn al-Huthi was able to create a the Yemeni government in its fight with a parliamentary representative from strong network of devoted followers the Huthis.7 Three months later, the Sa`da Province for the ruling General in Yemen’s north, where Zaydism Huthis accepted a Qatari-negotiated People’s Congress (GPC) party. A few remained strong despite the overthrow cease-fire that teetered along during the weeks after the clashes started, the of Yemen’s Zaydi Imamate in 1962, in following year.8 student protest movement that began part due to the political liberalization in the capital Sana`a spread to other that accompanied the unification of In the wake of the Arab Spring, the parts of the country, including Sa`da. Yemen in 1990 as well as the crisis within Huthis have managed to seize control Meanwhile, the Huthis began laying Zaydism precipitated by the growth of parts of Sa`da Province. The Huthis’ siege to Mujalli and his followers. of Salafist influence in the region. Al- increasingly authoritarian conduct, As protests grew, Sa`da’s provincial Huthi’s growing influence in the late however, may have dented their government came under increasing 1990s was accompanied by increasingly discourse of justice and resistance. As pressure. On March 18, government contentious behavior on the part of his they go from being victim to aggressor, snipers fired on a mass protest in the followers, which in turn prompted the the Huthis may find their “self-defense” Yemeni capital Sana`a (the “Karama government, acting partly in response justifications ringing hollow to many in Massacre”) prompting national outrage to shifting international dynamics, to Yemen. This may not matter: the Huthis and a flood of defections from the regime. overreact.5 The manhunt that eventually have seized power in Sa`da Province and Protests flared throughout the country, killed al-Huthi unleashed a spiral of appear to be extending their influence and over the following days Sa`da’s violence beginning in 2004 that became outward, specifically in the provinces of provincial governor fled to the capital known as the six “Sa`da Wars.” The Sana`a in the face of popular outrage 11 group transformed from a grassroots 6 The group was initially known as the “Shabab al- at the regime. Bereft of government Zaydi revivalist network under Husayn Mumin” (Believing Youth). support, Othman Mujalli and his al-Huthi’s leadership to a strong 7 Kristen Chick, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Get Iran As- followers were chased out of town and insurgent fighting force under the surance, Ask Saudis to Stop Strikes,” Christian Science the Huthis seized or destroyed most Monitor, November 11, 2009. 8 Good overviews of the conflict include: “Yemen: De- 9 The opacity of political power has increased since the 3 For a useful exposition of Husayn al-Huthi’s thought, fusing the Saada Time Bomb,” International Crisis forced resignation of Ali Abdullah Salih. Sa`da Province see Abdullah Lux, “Yemen’s Last Zaydi Imam: The Group, 2009; Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple is nominally controlled by governor Faris Mana`a. Re- Shabab al-Mu’min, the Malazim, and Hizb Allah in the People, Complicated Circumstances,” Middle East Policy ports, however, indicate that Huthi commander Abu Ali Thought of Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi,” Contemporary 18 (2011). A recent analysis of the conflict weaving poli- al-Hakim is the provincial capital’s ultimate power-bro- Arab Affairs 2:3 (2009). tics and sectarianism is Sami Dorlian, “The Sa’da War ker. This, of course, does not mean that Huthi power is 4 Zayd was the grandson of Husayn ibn Ali, himself the in Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism,” Muslim uncontested. See: “What is Happening in Sa`da’s ‘Houthi grandson of the Prophet Muhammad through his daugh- World 101:2 (2011). The most comprehensive account is Kingdom’?” al-Masdar, November 30, 2011. ter Fatima. the excellent Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt and Mad- 10 “Violent Clashes Between Tribes and Houthi Fighters 5 Ayman Hamidi, “Inscriptions of Violence in Northern eleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The in Sa`da,” al-Masdar, January 17, 2011. Yemen: Haunting Histories, Unstable Moral Spaces,” Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpora- 11 “Houthi Group Appoints Arms Dealer as Governor of Middle Eastern Studies 45:2 (2009). tion, 2010). Sa’ada Province,” Yemen Post, March 27, 2011.

14 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 of his properties. Not long after this a Huthi and Islah adherents for control of and as many as 200 armed followers group of Sa`da notables, with Huthi government installations, particularly began aggressively proselytizing and backing, appointed Faris Mana`a as the military and security facilities, broke setting up checkpoints in the area. region’s unofficial governor, a post he out immediately and continued for The Huthis claim that al-Madani and continues to hold.12 several months until they negotiated his followers were harassed from the a truce. In August 2011, the groups moment they arrived and that their use The neighboring province of al-Jawf agreed to appoint a new provincial of violence was in “self-defense.” The proved less amenable to Huthi control. governor affiliated with Islah.16 It is Hajoor tribe of Kushar district, likely When protests broke out in February unclear, though, whether a balance with support from Sunni sympathizers, 2011, Huthi influence in the province— has been reached in the province, has been engaged in fierce battles with as compared to that of Islah, the main particularly given al-Qa`ida in the the Huthis for months. The violence in opposition party—was limited.13 After Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) increased 17 failed government efforts to contain the targeting of Huthis in the area. “With the government Most recently, Huthi focus has turned largely absent from the “In the wake of the Arab to the impoverished province of Hajjah, Spring, the Huthis have southwest of Sa`da.18 In Hajjah, the area, a common refrain has Huthis initially used “soft power” been that the Huthis aim managed to seize control of methods to enter the area and establish parts of Sa`da Province.” alliances in the province’s northern to reach Hajjah’s small Red districts. Their use of “hard power” Sea port of Midi.” began in the spring of 2011, when Yusuf al-Madani, a key Huthi field protests (promising more resources, commander who is married to one of replacing the governor, firing on Husayn al-Huthi’s daughters, moved Hajjah has become severe, with nearly protesters), locals overran provincial into a family property in the Abu 50,000 residents displaced from the government installations, including Dawar area. This settlement is along three most heavily affected districts the base of the Yemeni Army’s 115th the border of Kushar and Mustabah (Washhah, Kushar and Mustabah).19 Division.14 Control of the province districts and overlooks the market The Huthis have been held responsible fell to members of the al-Islah Party, town of Ahim, famous in Yemen for its for the outbreak and the escalation, Yemen’s main opposition party which weapons and all other types of goods and are accused of laying landmines draws its support largely from the from and for Saudi Arabian markets. in several parts of Kushar district.20 Hashid tribal confederation and various According to local accounts, al-Madani Control of this province is at present Sunni organizations (most prominent highly fragmented and uncertain, as among them, groups affiliated with neither side is willing to yield even found in Shelagh Weir, “A Clash of Fundamentalisms: noted cleric Abdul Majid al-Zindani). though violence has increased. Wahhabism in Yemen,” Middle East Report 204 (1997). Although the Huthis and Islah both Among other elements, Huthi proselytism revolves opposed the Salih administration, this With the government largely absent around disseminating the thoughts of Husayn al-Huthi shared objective did not extend to the from the area, a common refrain has been as well as the regular chanting of the Huthi slogan (“Al- local level in al-Jawf, where Sunni that the Huthis aim to reach Hajjah’s lahu Akbar! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the tribesmen have historically resisted small Red Sea port of Midi. Their critics Jews! Victory for Islam!”). Huthi influence.15 Fighting between accuse the Huthis of expansionist 16 “Sunni-Shiites War in Al-Jawf,” Yemen Times, Octo- designs, specifically the creation of a ber 3, 2011. “Zaydi State” or “Huthi Imamate” in 12 Mana`a, who is from the region, is a notorious arms 17 The most notable AQAP attack was in November Yemen’s northern provinces (Sa`da, dealer who fell out of favor with the regime after being 2010. On November 24, a suicide bombing in al-Jawf Hajjah, ‘Amran, al-Jawf and Marib), accused of helping arm the Huthis. He appears to be a killed Husayn al-Huthi’s elderly father Badr al-Din which the Huthis themselves deny.21 respected consensus figure and has thus far been able to al-Huthi. An attack on the funeral procession in Sa`da help stabilize Sa`da Province. He has been involved in Province two days later took the lives of several more. mediation efforts between the Huthis and other groups. Other attacks against the Huthis claimed by AQAP in- 19 An illustrated map and factsheet are available at 13 On Huthi presence in al-Jawf and its impact on al- clude a suicide attack against a meeting of Huthi leaders www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ Qa`ida, see Gabriel Koehler-Derrick ed., A False Foun- in al-Jawf Province on August 15, 2011, and a bomb at New_idps_accessHajjah_2703122.pdf. dation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen another gathering of Huthis in al-Jawf’s capital on May 20 On the landmines, see for instance: “Yemen: Rising (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2011), 25, 2012. Landmine Death Toll in Hajjah Governorate,” IRIN, pp. 59-62. 18 The description given here of events in Hajjah Prov- April 18, 2012. 14 “115th Infantry Division in al-Jawf without a Com- ince is based on a comprehensive account written by a 21 A report by a Yemeni think-tank (Abaad Studies and mander, Revolutionary Youth Guard Government In- member of the Yemeni media and human rights delega- Research Center), for instance, sees the aim of Huthi mili- stallations,” al-Masdar, March 21, 2011. tion that visited the area, and which was simultaneously tarism as the creation of a state-within-a-state composed 15 Part of this was due to aggressive Huthi proselytism, published in two of Yemen’s main opposition publica- of the five provinces mentioned above plus parts of three which like other aspects of Huthi doctrine and practice tions (al-Ahale and Marib Press). See “Hajjah’s Deathmill… other ones. See “Houthis Look to Establish Shiite State may be viewed as a response to the incursion of Wah- Where the Houthis’ Route to Midi Begins,” al-Ahale, along Saudi Border,” Yemen Times, February 11, 2011. habism and Salafism into Yemen’s northwest provinces. March 21, 2012. By most, if not all, neutral accounts, the For a summary of the Abaad Center report, see “Abaad The best account of the origins of this dynamic can be Huthis are seen as the aggressor in Hajjah. Report: Houthi Military Movements Driven by Emotion

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Assuming that the Huthis are acting finally signed on November 23, 2011. and what their expectations are, at the with expansionist purposes, the limits The Huthis, along with revolutionary national level the Huthis appear to be and goals of this behavior might also be youth groups and the Southern showing a willingness to take part in more modest. National politics provide Movement (Hiraak), boycotted the one- the transitional process.27 Whether and some insight. man elections for Abd Rabbuh Mansur how their gains on the ground translate al-Hadi. The Huthis’ rejection of the into a stake in national politics remains National Level GCC initiative has opened them up to a major question looming over Yemen’s Although the exact start date of direct criticism from the main political transition. Yemen’s Arab Spring is disputed, mass opposition front (the Islah-dominated nationwide protests began in February Joint Meeting Parties, JMP). As the Regional Level 2012 and eventually toppled longtime transitional process begins creating its The GCC, and Saudi Arabia in president Ali Abdullah Salih. The own legitimacy, the Huthis are accused particular, has played an important role Huthis, unlike the opposition al-Islah of acting opportunistically and lacking in Yemen’s transition away from Ali Party, were quick to publicly support a constructive vision.24 Regardless of Abdullah Salih. The Huthis could be the protest movement and openly call the purity of their motives, the Huthis’ of concern to Saudi Arabia for reasons for the downfall of the regime.22 Large alignment with both the revolutionary that include fears of Iranian influence, anti-regime protests sprouted early in youth and the Southern Movement enmity from Huthi cross-border raids areas of Huthi influence, and the group’s creates a strong informal opposition bloc youth delegation set up a presence that helps legitimize Huthi reluctance to in the tent city of Sana`a’s Sahat al- fully endorse the transitional process. “The Huthis themselves suffer from accusations In fact, despite their public rejection “Yet it is likely that of the transitional process, the Huthis from Saudi Arabian and instability, rather than appear to have some interest in playing Yemeni opposition media politics. Several prominent Zaydi Huthi control over Sa`da figures, including defectors from the of ideological and material Province, is Saudi Arabia’s main Zaydi political party (Hizb al- support from Iran.” Haqq), recently formed a political principal security concern party (Hizb al-Umma) which, despite in this area.” denials of formal links by Huthi leaders in Sa`da, looks like a Huthi party.25 and Saudi Arabia’s military response in Whatever form the Huthis’ entry into 2009, and general concern with having a politics takes, it will be cautious and religiously motivated non-state actor in Tagheer (“Change Square”), under laden with preconditions. control of areas across the border from the banner of Shabab al-Sumud (The a province that has not fit comfortably Steadfast Movement). In a testament to The GCC agreement calls for a national in the Saudi Kingdom.28 Yet it is likely the importance of the group’s political dialogue that includes all political that instability, rather than Huthi stance, the Huthi protesters were, forces and actors, explicitly mentioning control over Sa`da Province, is Saudi for the most part, young, educated the Huthis. They have been ambivalent Arabia’s principal security concern in sympathizers from urban areas like about participating, although this is this area.29 Taiz and Sana`a who found in the Huthi a change given their initial rejection 26 ideology “one among many new outlets of the agreement itself. While it is 27 On May 31, 2012, the Huthis officially expressed their to express disenchantment with the unclear whether they will participate willingness to participate in the national dialogue. It is, 23 regime’s repressive apparatus.” however, difficult to predict whether or not this position 24 For instance, accusations of Huthi collusion with the will be maintained. The Huthi movement has taken beleaguered head of the Republican Guard and erstwhile 28 The Saudi Arabian border province of Najran is a positions that largely mirror those of inheritor of the presidency Ahmad Ali Abdullah Salih historical component of Yemen that was annexed by the the revolutionary youth. When the GCC (the former president’s son). It should be emphasized Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1934. It has a large Ismaili unveiled its plan to transition from that the charge of opportunism is also made against most (Shi`a) population whose relations with the Sunni rulers the rule of Ali Abdullah Salih, both other opposition groups in Yemen and is not unique to in Riyadh have at times been contentious. the Huthis and the youth rejected its the Huthis. 29 Sarah Phillips contends that when it comes to Saudi legitimacy. Furthermore, they refused 25 For more on Hizb al-Umma see: “A New Political Arabia’s policy toward Yemen, the “overriding objec- to recognize the agreement that Salih Party ‘Deranged by the Foreign Devil’: The Birth of al- tive is to contain Yemen’s problems within Yemen and Ummah Party,” al-Masdar, January 5, 2012. to prevent them from spilling over the border,” or as one and Based on a Misreading of Changing Conditions,” al- 26 In May 2012, the Huthis said they did not in principle diplomat put it, “We don’t care what they do, as long as Masdar, February 21, 2011. reject the talks but were undecided on participation, set- it’s stable.” Sarah Phillips, “Yemen and the Politics of 22 See Laurent Bonnefoy, “Yemen’s Islamists and the ting as a preliminary condition that the national dialogue Permanent Crisis, Chapter Five: The Regime,” Adelphi Revolution,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, be held under United Nations auspices, rather than those Series 51:420 (2011): p. 76. Saudi Arabia has previously February 9, 2012. of a particular country (specifically, the United States noted its view of the Huthis as “a mild threat to regional 23 Madeleine Wells, “Yemen’s Houthi Movement and and Saudi Arabia). See: “Houthis: Final Position on Na- security – unless they are seen as part of a three-way al- the Revolution,” Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, tional Dialogue not yet Determined,” National Yemen, liance with Al-Qaeda and Iran.” See Zuhair al-Harithi, February 27, 2012. May 11, 2012. “Understanding Yemen’s Troubles: A Saudi Perspec-

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The Huthis accuse Saudi Arabia of 1990s, which paved the way for the rise that sectarianism will continue and meddling, although these attacks are of the Huthis, was largely a reaction to perhaps increase, with the consequence often to justify actions driven by events the influx of Wahhabism into Yemen’s that broader regional phenomena are on the ground. In early May 2012, Zaydi heartland. Because arguments likely to exert even greater influence on for instance, Abdul Malik al-Huthi of tradition and indigeneity were this part of Yemen. explained the fortification of positions central to Husayn al-Huthi’s critique of in Hajjah as a defensive measure to Wahhabism, the charge that the roots The Huthis continue fighting to confront a looming attack by Saudi of Huthi doctrine are deeper in Tehran establish control over areas they Arabian mercenaries.30 Huthi ire is than in Sa`da is an attempt to undermine see as in their natural sphere of the very foundation of this critique. influence. At the same time, they continue to send mixed signals about “The Huthis appear to be The growing sectarian discourse, their willingness to participate in a position of relative in particular between Salafists and in national politics. Whether a Huthis, has created the potential for nationally negotiated solution can strength and are unlikely regional or international events to play halt the continued fighting depends to give up their gains a greater role in shaping the conflict. on how well the local dynamics of Sectarian tensions based on domestic Yemen’s north can be mapped onto easily; they may find factors have already escalated. In the national political negotiations in themselves in a situation of late 2011 and early 2012, the Huthi a way that satisfies both the Huthis blockade of a Salafist religious school and the other parties (primarily stability in an increasingly (Dar al-Hadith) located near Sa`da Islah). Assuming the Huthis have no chaotic Yemen.” city, part of the group’s steps to secessionist aspirations, what do they consolidate control over the province, consider their sphere of influence? Do threatened to explode into sectarian they hope to seize control of Marib war. Similar spikes in violence have Province and its oil facilities as part not limited to Saudi Arabia, and the occurred against the backdrop of an of the future “Huthi Imamate”? Or are group has been consistent in keeping ongoing “soft war” for influence in the they simply taking precautions against its slogan (which includes “Death to region, pitting the militant egalitarian renewed attacks by a new Saudi- America, Death to Israel”) relevant by puritanism of Salafism against Husayn sponsored, Sunni-dominated Yemeni constantly referring to U.S. and Israeli al-Huthi’s message of nationalism, state? Clear answers to these questions plots in Yemen.31 political justice and divine rights.33 will be crucial in determining the role More recently, the AQAP-aligned Ansar of the Huthi movement in post-Salih The Huthis themselves suffer from al-Shari`a appears to be taking their Yemen. accusations from Saudi Arabian and sectarian fight to areas of Huthi control, Yemeni opposition media of ideological threatening to engulf those provinces in Lucas Winter is a Middle East Analyst for and material support from Iran. These sectarian conflict.34 the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) charges are ongoing since at least the at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Winter early 2000s. The charge of ideological Conclusion holds an M.A. in International Relations links to the Iranian Shi`a is sensitive, The Huthis appear to be in a position of from Johns Hopkins SAIS and an M.P.S. in as it undermines a basic tenet of the relative strength and are unlikely to give Arabic from the University of Maryland. Huthis’ ideological project, namely the up their gains easily. They may find idea that they represent an indigenous themselves in a situation of stability form of Islam.32 The Zaydi revival of the in an increasingly chaotic Yemen. Developments in northern Yemen tive,” Arab Insight 2:7 (2010): p. 80. will continue to be mostly driven 30 “Houthi Says Saudi Arabia Prepares to Attack Yemen by events on the ground, with shifts Area,” Yemen Post, May 6, 2012. The reference is to local in the national political landscape tribes that are seen as receiving Saudi backing. exercising an important pull. It is likely 31 See any of a number of articles (in Arabic) on the Huthi website at www.ansaruallah.net. 33 On the origins of this clash, see Bernard Haykel, “A 32 The spread of Huthi Zaydi revivalism, which they Zaydi Revival?” Yemen Update 36 (1995); Shelagh Weir, call “spreading Qur’anic culture,” has in part succeeded “A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen,” through its appeals to Yemeni tradition. Zaydism is en- Middle East Report 204 (1997). As Weir notes, Salafism demic to Yemen and the charge that the Huthis are ac- found willing adherents in the 1990s among Yemeni tually spreading a foreign ideology deeply undermines tribesmen partly due to its language of egalitarianism, their religious and nationalist credentials. Their detrac- which contrasted sharply with the exceptionalism of tors point to several Huthi practices—not to mention sayyids (descendants of Hassan and Husayn) in Zaydi the wording of their slogan—as proof of the influence doctrine. of Twelver Shi’ism on “Huthism.” For more on this, see 34 For more on this, see Koehler-Derrick. The most re- Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Com- cent attack was a suicide vehicle bomb in al-Jawf: “Sui- plicated Circumstances,” Middle East Policy 18 (2011): pp. cide Bombing Kills 14 Houthis in al-Jawf,” Yemen Times, 107-109. May 28, 2012.

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The article will look at two driving Although personal poverty is not a Understanding Drivers of factors for recruitment, examining both reason for joining violent extremism, Violent Extremism: The “push” and “pull.”2 Push factors are the the cases of these youth show that the Case of al-Shabab and negative social, cultural, and political effects of poverty, such as idleness and features of one’s societal environment low self-esteem, cannot be ignored in Somali Youth that aid in “pushing” vulnerable this discussion. The fact that many individuals onto the path of violent Somali youth are unemployed and rely By Muhsin Hassan extremism. Push factors are what are commonly known as “underlying/root on june 20, 2012, U.S. Representative causes” such as poverty, unemployment, “Those who joined al- Peter King convened a fifth hearing on illiteracy, discrimination, and political/ Shabab, especially in towns the radicalization of Muslim Americans. economical marginalization. Pull Although the hearings covered factors, on the other hand, are the where the group had a radicalization of Muslim Americans in positive characteristics and benefits large presence, were seen general, special emphasis was placed on of an extremist organization that al-Shabab’s recruitment of more than “pull” vulnerable individuals to join. as heroes for defending the 40 young Americans. These include the group’s ideology country and the religion.” (e.g., emphasis on changing one’s This article provides clarity on the condition through violence rather than driving factors that attract youth to “apathetic” and “passive” democratic al-Shabab. It argues that identity as means), strong bonds of brotherhood on relatives for sustenance, either in manipulated by ideology in the trappings and sense of belonging, reputation Somalia or in the diaspora, dampens of religion, as well as the perceptions building, prospect of fame or glory, and their self-worth such that when an of neglect, combine to drive youth to other socialization benefits. opportunity to fend for oneself arises, join the Somali group. This conclusion they are quick to take advantage. is based on an extensive review of The participants unanimously stated literature on al-Shabab, including that it was a confluence of factors Fear of Victimization U.S. government documents, and field that led them to join al-Shabab, as Some of those interviewed feared being research in Nairobi, Kenya. The latter the group presented a “package” deal victimized for not joining al-Shabab. included focus group discussions in its recruitment propaganda. The They also worried about being seen as with 15 former al-Shabab members following provides brief explanations weak by family and society at large and between the ages of 19 and 27 living of the factors listed, as understood and thus had to “man up” and join. This was in Eastleigh—a predominantly Somali explained by the participants. especially the case for those youth who suburb of Nairobi.1 Their membership lived in al-Shabab controlled areas. in al-Shabab ranged from six months to Push Factors If an able-bodied youth did not join, two years. Unemployment one could be suspected of supporting Five of the 15 youth said that al-Shabab the Transitional Federal Government Due to the small sample size, the was a form of employment. According (TFG). Since some of them would move argument presented cannot be to them, joining al-Shabab paid well, between al-Shabab and TFG controlled generalized to all al-Shabab members. from $50-$150 monthly, depending areas regularly, they had to pick a side. The findings, however, offer valuable on the work, yet required little As one youth put it, “You have to make insight into the reasoning of an effort. “All one had to do was carry a choice. You are either on one side or important subset of Somali youth in around a gun and patrol the streets,” the other.” joining violent extremism. Given the explained a participant. “It was an porous border between Somalia and easy job compared to other jobs such AMISOM Bombardment Kenya, the large presence of Somali as construction work.” Therefore, Some explained that the bombing of refugee youth in Eastleigh facing dire for some of these youth, a significant Somali towns by the mostly Ugandan conditions (almost identical to those in reason for joining al-Shabab was and Burundian UN peacekeeping force, Somalia with the exception of war), and because it enabled them to provide for AMISOM, built intense hatred toward the growth of al-Shabab recruitment in themselves and their families. this group. The destruction of property Eastleigh, the voices of the interviewed and life was a great cause of distress. youth are relevant to this debate. They stated that they joined al-Shabab to seek revenge as well as to “protect 2 Although the author offers expanded definitions, this themselves and their families.” 1 As part of his undergraduate thesis, the author con- dichotomization of factors into push and pull was drawn ducted these interviews as focus group discussions in from Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, “Guide to the Revenge Kenya on January 5, 2012. The dataset included 15 Somali Drivers of Extremism,” Management Systems Interna- Some participants mentioned they youth, aged from 19 to 27. They came from different areas tional, publication produced for USAID review. This ter- sought revenge against TFG soldiers. in Somalia, such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo, minology appears to have been borrowed from migration Their urge for revenge was due to while others came from Dadaab and Ifo refugee camps in literature. They are used to categorize the various push harassment, particularly of female Kenya. All of the quotes and data in this article are drawn and pull factors that either “push” one to move out of a relatives at checkpoints. The youth from these interviews. bad neighborhood and “pull” them to a better one. who listed “revenge” described TFG

18 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 soldiers as “animals” who “would clan politics has brought nothing but is one of the surest paths that guarantee touch our women inappropriately at chaos and destruction. That is why meeting God. The disagreements arise the checkpoints. Imagine when you when asked whether they were Somali as to what exactly constitutes valid see this being done to your mother or Muslim first, a great majority of jihad. Thus, to convince a Muslim that or your sister…it is humiliating and the respondents answered they were paradise is waiting, al-Shabab must infuriating.” Muslim first. This does not necessarily justify that one’s struggle is indeed indicate religious zealousness, but valid jihad. In the case of these youth, Lack of Education rather the intertwined nature of who admitted to not being well versed Only two participants mentioned lack religion and nationality in their sense in religion, the task was not particularly of education. When asked to clarify, of identity. More importantly, though, challenging. they stated that this entailed a lack of it echoes Seth Schwartz’s argument that education in general and not religious terrorism represents a confluence of Recruitment Processes education. According to them, they were cultural, social, and personal identity.3 The following explanations were given not able to pursue different avenues It particularly underlines the role of in response to how they found out about in life and they did not see a bright a cultural identity strongly rooted in joining. future ahead. As a result, it was easier collectivism—prioritizing the group to join al-Shabab rather than languish over oneself—in accepting terrorism. Encouraged by Family Members and Peers in poverty with no chance to “pursue In this case, collectivism is evinced by In the words of one respondent: “My something greater.” the youth’s willingness to sacrifice their father bought me a gun and brought ambitions, relationships, and lives (what it home. He said that if he were me, Pull Factors generally constitute a personal identity) young and healthy, he would be at the Reputation (hero for defending country and for the sake of religion or country. front line of the battle and not at home.” religion) While al-Shabab targets marginalized The participants mentioned that al- Mental Manipulation and Fighting Islam’s youth and orphans, even those who Shabab uses reputation to attract youth. Enemies do not fit in those categories are not An al-Shabab recruiter would first When asked to define what they meant immune from recruitment. The fact that identify a group of youth who seemed by “mental manipulation,” the two close relatives encourage youth to join to consistently socialize in or frequent respondents who chose these words demonstrates that some in society see a specific location. He would then explained: “Mental manipulation al-Shabab’s fight as “their fight.” It is approach one of the youth and offer to through religion. They convince you not because society is radicalized and make him an “amir” of his own “men” that joining al-Shabab is your religious has fully embraced jihadist ideology if he could get three or more of his duty and that is what Islam requires and certainly not due to the debilitating friends to also join. This was the most of someone in your position.” Framing poverty that has riddled Somalia for popular reason cited. In the words of it as manipulation indicates that these decades; rather, it is a fight to maintain one respondent, “Walking the city with youth may never have fully believed their culture, language, religion and way a gun as a member of al-Shabab ensured that it was a religious duty to join al- of life—it is a fight to safeguard their everybody feared and respected you. Shabab. The firm opposition by those identity and its important features from Girls also liked you.” Those who joined who chose to use “manipulation” also foreign “invaders” such as Ethiopia and al-Shabab, especially in towns where hints at the power of disillusionment AMISOM. the group had a large presence, were and betrayal, since they have come to seen as heroes for defending the country see it as manipulation after the fact. Encouraged by Religious Leaders and the religion. Religious leaders would deliver fiery It is especially distinct from the six who sermons about jihad and urge the In the case of most youth, the reputation opted to use “fighting Islam’s enemies.” populace to join al-Shabab. that one earns by joining al-Shabab is These six, albeit not al-Shabab attractive for two main reasons. First, supporters anymore, still think that Encouraged by Businessmen Seeking Protection it delivers them from irrelevance to Ethiopian and AMISOM forces are anti- Businessmen in Somalia benefit from prominence. In a society that places Muslim—a testament to the power of al- security and order. Thus, they often great emphasis on age, the economically Shabab’s ideological indoctrination. support al-Shabab in areas where the dependent youth command little group is dominant (and other groups respect and are seen as powerless. By Obtain Paradise elsewhere).4 These businessmen becoming a member of al-Shabab, youth Obtaining paradise as a reason for encourage youth to join al-Shabab to are able to gain immediate respect and joining al-Shabab stems from the belief ensure ranks are well filled. This also access to power, thereby strengthening that al-Shabab was conducting valid functions as an alternative career for their sense of self-worth. Second, it jihad in defense of God’s religion. All idle youth who would otherwise turn to strengthens a particular identity: in schools within orthodox Islam, both petty crime and hooliganism. this case, “defender of country and Shi`a and Sunni, accept that paradise is religion.” This is important for two a reward for those who die as martyrs. It reasons. It highlights the centrality of 4 This can be seen in the history of the Islamic courts. Islam in Somalis’ sense of identity. The 3 Seth J. Schwartz et al., “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Each side of the conflict had a benefactor, and even today role of religion is especially magnified Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:6 (2009): al-Shabab receives its funds from major businessmen in the identity of youth for whom pp. 552-553. with interests in Somalia.

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Offered Guns and Money as Gifts Going Abroad rather factors that revolve around their Some youth were enticed by money, This was the second most cited response. sense of identity and perceptions of especially those who were more As was explained, this entails getting a neglect that stem from their frustration impoverished than others in society. chance to pursue a life free from violence with clan politics, lack of opportunities Others were attracted to the power and and war outside Somalia. Many youth to improve the quality of their lives, influence that al-Shabab affords to its expressed frustration with the situation and other difficulties that come with members, as recruiters offered them and claimed that when their parents or war. A testament to this is the fact that guns for joining. close relatives found a way for them to most of them gave up violent extremism go to either South Africa or the West, when given the chance of a better life, Reasons for Disengagement with Al-Shabab they chose to leave Somalia. especially when trusted relatives were There were multiple reasons why those the ones presenting such opportunities. interviewed decided to quit al-Shabab. Al-Shabab Became Powerless One respondent mentioned this as a Although the youth interviewed are Seeking Peace reason. According to him, the benefits currently in Kenya, their motivation to The three youth who listed this as that came with being an al-Shabab both join and leave al-Shabab developed one of the main reasons they left al- member disappeared with their defeat in in Somalia. Their desire for “peace” or Shabab expressed that they had grown his town, thus rendering it pointless to “education” had nothing to do with tired of fighting. They stated that the continue aligning with the group. This being in Kenya; these goals were merely deteriorating environment in Somalia attests to the point that in many cases suppressed or put on hold while fighting had become unbearable and that is why people switch sides due to convenience for al-Shabab. As their frustration with they fled to Kenya. Once again, the in Somalia. Experts have noted that in the situation in Somalia increased, it quality of life is germane to the decision Somalia, Islamists have historically became harder to justify why they had making process of these youth. been flexible and have switched sides delayed their ambitions for al-Shabab, several times5—which points to the lack and they finally put themselves first. In Seeking Education of an ideological core in many Somalis other words, the personal identity—and Four youth provided this response. who join al-Shabab. not the social and cultural—came to the They explained that there were no forefront in their decision-making. opportunities to go to school in Injustice and Inequality Somalia, and they wanted to further Injustice was mentioned once while In the case of such youth, typical their education so as to be able to earn inequality came up twice. The youth programs that merely address some a good living for themselves and their explained that they came to realize of the push and pull factors will not families. that al-Shabab was oppressive. One suffice. The challenge is to develop participant explained that al-Shabab programs centered on bolstering the Medical Attention did not live by its professed belief of personal identities of vulnerable youth Only one youth mentioned this. Due to a transcending clan politics. He saw that while also addressing the relevant severe injury, he left Somalia to receive most youth from minority clans were push and pull factors driving them into treatment in Kenya. given the most dangerous jobs and used militancy. as pawns while those from powerful Family/Clan Ties clans were given leadership positions. Muhsin Hassan is a graduate of the These were listed by various youth. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and One youth phrased it as looking for Implications International Affairs at Princeton “group identity” but explained that The argument presented—identity, as University. He is a SINSI (Scholars in his relatives, who had fled to Kenya, manipulated by ideology in the trappings the Nation’s Service Initiative) fellow persuaded him to join them and leave of religion, coupled with perceptions of currently pursuing a Masters in Public Somalia. Another respondent cited “clan neglect plays a central role in driving Affairs at Princeton. coalitions” and explained that his clan Somali youth to al-Shabab—aims to had severed ties with al-Shabab, which give nuance to the understanding of forced him to quit the group. He also radicalization that leads to violent fled to Kenya where he could live among extremism. In this case, this applies to close relatives. Other respondents cited Somali youth who have fled al-Shabab “advice from parents.” This was the in Somalia. This argument should most cited reason (6 out of 15). They neither be mistaken for a version of explained that this had to do with either “poverty causes terrorism” theory clan politics or prospects for a better nor others that undermine the role of life. Some also explained that their religious ideology. The main reasons parents would try to get them to leave these youth cite for joining al-Shabab al-Shabab for Kenya, as they wanted are not deeply held religious beliefs, but their children out of danger. 5 Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia,” Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.

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Recent Highlights in July 3, 2012 (YEMEN): Two suspected July 6, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber U.S. airstrikes killed at least four detonated an explosives-laden vehicle Terrorist Activity alleged al-Qa`ida in the Arabian near the home of an anti-al-Qa`ida Peninsula (AQAP) militants in Shabwa militiaman in Ramadi, killing six July 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An Province. Yemen’s Defense Ministry people. – AFP, July 6 Afghan policeman shot and killed three identified two of the dead as senior British soldiers in Helmand Province. AQAP figures Fahd Salah al-Anjaf July 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. The Taliban claimed responsibility. al-Harithi and Hassan Ali al-Ishaqi. drone killed at least 15 suspected According to the Los Angeles Times, – Reuters, July 3 Taliban militants in Zoi Narai village “Afghan officials identified the in North Waziristan Agency of shooter as a member of the Afghan July 3, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Islamabad the Federally Administered Tribal National Civil Order Police, a special agreed to reopen NATO’s supply Areas. According to the New York unit set up under U.S. auspices to help routes in Pakistan, which have been Times, “A drone fired four missiles keep insurgents at bay and enforce the closed since NATO troops mistakenly at a compound owned by a Taliban law in towns and villages. Its members killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in commander named Rahimullah, said undergo a more selective recruitment November 2011. According to CNN, a local resident who was reached process and more rigorous training “The Pakistani routes offer a shorter by telephone. The commander, who than regular Afghan police, adding to and more direct route than the one apparently was not present at the the disquiet surrounding the attack.” NATO has been using since November time of the strike, is thought to be a – Los Angeles Times, July 2 that went through Russia and other close aide of a local warlord, Hafiz Gul nations, avoiding Pakistan altogether. Bahadur, who controls a vast part of July 1, 2012 (KENYA): Masked It has cost the U.S. $100 million more a North Waziristan…” – New York Times, assailants launched a coordinated gun month to use the alternative northern July 6 and grenade attack on two churches routes.” – CNN, July 24 in Garissa, a northern Kenyan town. July 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen At least 17 people were killed. It was July 5, 2012 (UNITED STATES): The on motorcycles killed 18 people at a the most deadly attack in Kenya since U.S. Treasury Department imposed roadside restaurant in Baluchistan it deployed troops into neighboring sanctions on two Eritrean government Province. A government official Somalia to fight al-Shabab eight officials on charges of assisting told the New York Times that Pakistanis months ago. There was no claim of Islamist militants, including al- attempting to travel to Europe with responsibility. – Reuters, July 2 Shabab, in Somalia. – Reuters, July 5 smugglers were the targets of the attack. – New York Times, July 6 July 2, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 5, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber suicide bomber in an explosives-laden detonated explosives in a barber’s July 7, 2012 (MAURITANIA): Abu vehicle killed seven people near the shop frequented by police in Mosul, Hafs al-Mauritani, who previously gates of a university in Kandahar Ninawa Province, killing at least three served as an adviser to Usama bin city. The bomber reportedly targeted people. – Reuters, July 5 Ladin, was released from a prison in a vehicle carrying workers from a Mauritania. Reports suggested that nearby U.S. military base. – Reuters, July July 5, 2012 (SYRIA): Iraqi Foreign his freedom came after he renounced 2; RTTNews, July 2 Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that his ties to al-Qa`ida and condemned the Iraqi government has “solid the 9/11 attacks. As stated by the July 2, 2012 (SOMALIA): A joint information and intelligence that Associated Press, “He spent years in operation by Kenyan and Somali members of al-Qa`ida terrorist custody in Iran before being extradited military forces inside Somalia resulted networks have gone in the other to Mauritania in April.” – AP, July 9 in the rescue of four international aid direction, to Syria, to help, to liaise, to workers, who had been kidnapped carry out terrorist attacks.” Zebari said July 8, 2012 (UNITED KINGDOM): three days earlier in Kenya. – Voice of that al-Qa`ida “operational officers” British authorities arrested an al- America, July 2 were moving into Syria through old Qa`ida suspect after he traveled near smuggling routes. – Reuters, July 5 the venue for the upcoming London July 2, 2012 (NIGERIA): Suspected Olympics five times in one day. Boko Haram group militants killed July 5, 2012 (NIGERIA): A Nigerian The suspect, who is originally from nine construction workers in court charged two men—Olaniyi Lawal Somalia, has only been identified as Maiduguri, Borno State. – AllAfrica.com, and Lukman Babatunde—with having “CF.” – al-Arabiya, July 8 July 3 links to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The two Nigerians July 8, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 3, 2012 (FRANCE): French are accused of receiving more than roadside bomb killed six U.S. soldiers authorities arrested the alleged $6,000 from AQAP to recruit new in Wardak Province. – Fox News, July 8; administrator of an extremist website—a members and send them to Yemen. CBS/AP, July 9 Tunisian national—accused of helping – Voice of America, July 5; Reuters, July 6 al-Qa`ida and related terrorist groups recruit new members and finance operations. – Voice of America, July 3

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July 8, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A the province’s national security July 18, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide roadside bomb killed five Afghan director, was also killed in the blast. bomber attacked a national security police officers in Bamyan Province. The Taliban denied responsibility. building in Damascus, killing Syrian – New York Times, July 9 – Reuters, July 14; Voice of America, July 14 Defense Minister Daoud Rajha and Deputy Defense Minister Assef July 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Militants July 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Shawkat. There were a number of attacked a Pakistani army camp in Afghan and coalition forces killed other casualties. – AFP, July 18 Gujrat, Punjab Province, killing seven two Taliban militants in Wardak soldiers and police. – Voice of America, Province. According to ISAF, “both July 18, 2012 (BULGARIA): A suicide July 12 Qari Ziauddin, a senior Taliban leader, bomber attacked an Israeli tourist bus and Tor Gul, a weapons smuggler, at Burgas airport in eastern Bulgaria, July 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): were killed along with several other killing at least six people. The bomber According to NATO, “An Afghan and insurgents during the operation... carried a fake driver’s license from the coalition security force conducted an Qari Ziauddin, also known as Ikram state of Michigan in the United States. operation to detain the leader of a Jan, was the senior Taliban leader Israel blamed Lebanese Hizb Allah for Taliban attack cell in Chimtal district, for Maidan Shahr district. He armed the operation. – BBC, July 19; CNN, July 19 Balkh Province, today. During the insurgent fighters, transported operation a group of insurgents suicide bombers, coordinated the July 19, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): attacked the combined force. The emplacement of improvised explosive Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed force returned fire killing all of the devices, and personally led numerous to resume regular discussions on attackers. As the force continued their attacks throughout the district.” Afghanistan’s peace process. – Reuters, mission, another armed individual – ISAF, July 16 July 19 approached and threatened them with his weapon. He was consequently July 14, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide July 19, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemeni engaged and killed by the security bomber detonated an explosives-laden Colonel Abdullah al-Maouzaei was force. The operation resulted in the vehicle in the town of Muhrada, killing killed by a car bomb outside his home detention of one suspected insurgent four people. The bomber apparently in Aden. Al-Maouzaei, who survived and the seizure of multiple weapons.” targeted the local military security three previous assassination attempts, – ISAF, July 10 headquarters. – CBS/AP, July 14 was tasked with finding members of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. July 10, 2012 (SUDAN): The U.S. July 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani – AP, July 19 government released Ibrahim al-Qosi Taliban militants attacked a police from Guantanamo Bay and repatriated station in Bannu District of Khyber July 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide him to Sudan. – Miami Herald, July 10 Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing one bomber attacked the home of a militant officer. Two of the militants were commander in Orakzai Agency of the July 11, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide disguised in burqas. – CNN, July 16 Federally Administered Tribal Areas, bomber suspected of belonging to killing nine people. The commander, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula July 16, 2012 (NIGER): The European Mullah Nabi, is apparently part of a killed at least 10 Yemeni police cadets Union approved a new mission to rival, pro-government militant group. as they were leaving an academy in send experts to Niger to train its Nabi was not injured. Some reports Sana`a. Some reports placed the death security forces to fight al-Qa`ida. placed the location of Nabi’s home in toll at 22. – AP, July 11; Telegraph, July 11 “Increased terrorist activity and Kurram Agency. – CNN, July 21; BBC, July the consequences of the conflict in 21; New York Times, July 21 July 12, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Taliban Libya have dramatically heightened militants opened fire on a police insecurity in the Sahel,” explained EU July 22, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): compound in Lahore, Punjab foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton. Afghan authorities said that six Province, killing nine officers. The According to Reuters, “About 50 Afghans returning home from work at militants escaped on motorbikes and international staff and 30 staff hired a NATO base in Wardak Province were in a vehicle. – New York Daily News, July 12; locally will be based in the mission’s captured by Taliban militants. The Voice of America, July 12 headquarters in Niamey, with liaison Taliban then executed five of the men officers in Bamako, the capital of and booby-trapped their bodies with July 13, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide neighboring Mali, and Nouakchott, explosives. The sixth man managed to bomber killed five people at the capital of Mauritania.” – Reuters, July 16 escape. – AFP, July 22 central mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State. – Reuters, July 13 July 18, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 22, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An bomb destroyed 22 NATO supply Afghan police commander and 12 July 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A trucks that were parked in Aibak, the junior officers defected to the Taliban suicide bomber attacked a wedding capital of Samangan Province. Afghan in Farah Province. The commander, reception in Samangan Province, authorities blamed the Taliban. identified as Mirwais, was in charge killing prominent lawmaker Ahmad – Reuters, July 18 of a 20-man checkpoint. Seven other Khan Samangani and 22 other officers who refused to defect were guests. General Mohammed Khan, poisoned. According to reports, the

22 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8 men took with them heavy weapons, July 24, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): radios and at least one U.S.-made fired on a convoy of NATO supply Afghan and coalition forces arrested armored Humvee. – BBC, July 24; Reuters, trucks in Khyber Agency of the an explosives expert belonging to July 24 Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan killing two people. It was the first in Kunduz Province. According July 22, 2012 (IRAQ): Two car attack on NATO supply trucks since to ISAF, “The arrested explosives bombs exploded minutes apart in the Pakistan supply routes were expert managed the construction and Mahmudiyya, 18 miles south of reopened earlier in July. – CNN, July 24 placement of explosive devices and Baghdad. The blasts killed at least 10 directed improvised explosive device people. – AFP, July 21 July 25, 2012 (NIGERIA): Suspected attacks in northern Kunduz.” – ISAF, Boko Haram group gunmen stormed a July 31 July 22, 2012 (IRAQ): Abu Bakr al- factory and killed two Indian nationals Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic in Maiduguri, Borno State. – Reuters, July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): State of Iraq (ISI), purportedly July 26 Afghan and coalition security forces released a new audio message killed Taliban financier Maulawi saying that the militant group was July 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO Abdul Rahman in Chimtal district, “starting a new stage.” He said, “The forces uncovered a large cache of Balkh Province. Rahman facilitated first priority in this is releasing drugs in Deh Rawud district, Uruzgan the transfer of money, weapons and Muslim prisoners everywhere, and Province. According to ISAF, “During explosives to other insurgents. - ISAF, chasing and eliminating judges and the operation, the security force seized July 28 investigators and their guards.” Al- 40,000 kilograms (18,181 pounds) of Baghdadi became head of the ISI in hashish seed and 425 kilograms (193 July 28, 2012 (PHILIPPINES): 2010. – AFP, July 21 pounds) of processed hashish. The Philippine authorities arrested Ustadz security force destroyed the seeds and Ahmadsali Asmad Badron, a founding July 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): drugs.” – ISAF, July 27 member of the Abu Sayyaf Group. According to ISAF, “An Afghan He was apprehended in the remote National Army soldier turned his July 26, 2012 (NORTH AFRICA): Tawi-Tawi islands in the southern weapon against International Security U.S. General Carter Ham, the head Philippines. – AFP, July 30 Assistance Force service members of Africa Command (AFRICOM), in northern Afghanistan today. said that al-Qa`ida in the Islamic July 28, 2012 (THAILAND): Thirteen ISAF troops returned fire killing the Maghreb (AQIM) is likely “al Qaeda’s armed militants attacked an army shooter. There were no ISAF fatalities. best funded, wealthiest affiliate.” patrol in Pattani Province in southern Afghan and coalition officials are According to Ham, “AQIM gained Thailand, killing four soldiers. investigating the incident.” – ISAF, July strength, they gained a lot of money – Bangkok Post, July 30 23 through kidnapping for ransoms and they became a stronger and stronger July 29, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): July 23, 2012 (IRAQ): A series of organization.” – Reuters, July 26 Afghan security forces arrested coordinated bombings and shootings several suspected Haqqani network occurred in more than a dozen Iraqi July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): members in Sabari district, Khost cities, killing more than 100 people. Militants killed two NATO service Province. – ISAF, July 29 The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) later members in eastern Afghanistan. claimed responsibility. The violence The exact location of the attack, or July 29, 2012 (IRAQ): A car bomb marked the deadliest day in Iraq in the nationalities of the dead, was not exploded in Karma, near Falluja. more than two years. The attacks immediately disclosed. – Los Angeles Fifteen minutes later, a group of occurred one day after the ISI warned Times, July 28 gunmen opened fire on the Karma of a “new stage” of operations. As police station, killing four people. described by the Associated Press, July 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO – AP, July 29 “Many of Monday’s attacks were forces killed the Haqqani network stunning in their scope and boldness. militant Abdullah, also known as July 30, 2012 (SYRIA): A new report They bore the hallmarks of al-Qaida, Tufan, in Paktia Province. According in the Guardian newspaper said that happening within a few hours of each to ISAF, Tufan “was directly involved “scores of foreign jihadists have other and striking mainly at security in the planning and execution of the crossed into Syria from Turkey in the forces, government officials and June 20 suicide attack in the Khost past two weeks.” The report quoted a Shiite neighborhoods. In one brazen capital that killed more than a dozen smuggler who said, “There have been assault, three carloads of gunmen Afghan civilians.” – ISAF, July 31 Tunisians, men from Uzbekistan too pulled up at an Iraqi army base near and from Pakistan.” – Guardian, July 30 the northeastern town of Udaim and opened fire, killing 13 soldiers before escaping...” – AP, July 23; Voice of America, July 25

23 august 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 8

July 30, 2012 (UNITED STATES): CTC Sentinel Staff Shaker Masri, a 28-year-old U.S.- born citizen of Syrian descent, Editor-in-Chief pleaded guilty to planning to travel Erich Marquardt to Somalia to fight with al-Shabab. Senior Editor, CTC Masri was arrested in August 2010 while preparing to leave for Somalia. Editorial Board The Chicago man faces nearly 10 years COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. in prison. – Chicago Tribune, July 30 Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West Point) July 30, 2012 (NIGERIA): Two suicide bombers attacked police posts in COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Sokoto, killing two people. The Boko Deputy Department Head Haram group claimed responsibility. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) – ANP/AFP, August 1

LTC Liam Collins July 31, 2012 (IRAQ): Twin car bombs Director, CTC exploded minutes apart in central Baghdad, killing at least 19 people. Once first responders rushed to the scene, at least two suicide bombers disguised as police officers entered a nearby police station and tried to free two al-Qa`ida prisoners. The suicide bombers were killed by police. Contact – Reuters, July 31 Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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