November 2020 Europe’s Untapped Sway in Syria Rime Allaf 1 Half a Century of Regression November 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the military coup which brought Hafez Assad to power in Syria. Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by his regime1, the coup allowed Assad to consolidate the control of the Baath Party, itself in power since 1963, guiding it to gradually encroach control over every aspect of Syrians’ lives through an indoctrination system beginning in primary school. With socialist and pan-Arab slogans, Assad appropriated Damascus as his “beating heart of Arabism” and made this the leitmotiv of his rule. The trajectory of the regime’s gradual descent into absolute authoritarianism is well documented, as is its notorious meddling in the region, foremost in Lebanon, and around the world (including in the notorious attempt to bomb an El Al flight in 1986, known as the Hindawi affair2). Following an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood and a massacre in Hama (said to have killed up to 40,000 people under the orders of the dictator’s brother, Rifat Assad3), the worst was yet to come for Syrians; they lived in total isolation, cut off from the Arab world because of the regime’s support for Iran in its war with Iraq (the only Arab country to do so, despite the self-proclaimed Arabism), and denied most human rights and basic necessities like regular access to water or electricity. 1 See, “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party”, BBC, July 9, 2012. 2 See Francis X. Clines, “Britain Breaks Syrian Ties; Cites Proof of Terror Role; El Al Suspect is Convicted; US Recalls Envoy”, New York Times, October 25, 1986. 3 See Deborah Amos, “30 Years Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria”, NPR, February 2, 2012. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. November 2020 2 Europe’s untapped Sway in Syria It was only a US wish for a pan-Arab participation in the liberation of Kuwait in 19914, and the subsequent launch of the unprecedented Madrid Peace Process, that finally brought Assad back into the respectable international fold; this paved the way for his son Bashar to take power smoothly in 2000, turning Syria into the region’s first hereditary republic. For the first time since 1970, many Syrians thought that they were turning a corner, and that the apple would fall far from the tree. The next decade would quickly show them it hadn’t, and in the years that followed, they realized the son would even exceed his father’s brutality. 1.1 Bashar’s Tumultuous First Decade Relative to the perceived maturity of Assad senior’s policies, Assad junior’s first decade in power showed the limitations of inexperience, with his predilection for rash judgements paired with unmeasured conceit. On the domestic front, the buzz about increased freedoms, marketed by core Assad loyalists, was quickly smashed by Assad’s intolerance for dissent and his heavy-handed response to calls for reform. Numerous civil society activists, writers and intellectuals were silenced and jailed, accused of threatening national security when they dared to speak of human rights and freedom of expression.5 With the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration began to depict Assad as a low-hanging fruit6 following his open defiance of the US and his open support for armed resistance to foreign troops in Iraq. While military action was never really considered, the US nevertheless promptly passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, pulling the rope a little tighter on Assad in the hope this would change his behavior.7 Bashar Assad also instigated a sequence of events with the other uneasy neighbor, forcing Lebanese politicians to unconstitutionally extend the presidential term of the incumbent, Emile Lahoud. This was an ill-advised diktat, as Assad could have ensured the loyalty of numerous candidates rather than impose Lahoud.8 This triggered international condemnation and the adoption of the Franco-American sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of 20059, calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The humiliating retreat of Syrian troops followed, weeks after the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri which was immediately blamed on Syria and its ally, Hezbollah. The Lebanon debacle was accompanied domestically by a renewed campaign against critics of the regime, particularly those who dared to voice solidarity with Lebanese peers.10 Isolated from most of the Arab world once again, the Assad regime found unexpected relief in the aftermath of the Israeli war on Hezbollah in 2006; with Israel unable to crush the Iranian-backed militia, the latter successfully paralyzed Lebanon, turning its arms on fellow Lebanese in a drastic and bloody reversal of stated positions,11 and becoming the kingmaker in a Qatar-hosted agreement in 200812. Against all odds, Bashar Assad was once again rehabilitated through his partnership with Hezbollah, taking his place among world leaders in Paris at the invitation of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the July 14 parade. Less than three years later, before a popular uprising erupted in southern Syria and spread like wildfire over the country, Bashar Assad assumed he was invincible. 4 See Andrew Glass, “George H.W. Bush Creates Coalition to Liberate Kuwait”, Politico, August 7, 1990. 5 See “A wasted decade; Human rights in Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s first ten years in power”, Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2010. 6 See Alex Shone, “A low hanging fruit: Engagement with Syria and its role in the Middle East”, Defence Viewpoints, 25 November, 2010. 7 See “Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003”, The White House Press Release, May 11, 2004. 8 See Brian Whitaker, “By unpopular demand; Syria increased its international alienation by pushing Lebanon into extending Emile Lahoud's presidential term”, The Guardian, September 6, 2004. 9 See “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There”, United Nations, September 9, 2004. 10 See Robert G. Rabil, “Syria’s Regime Writes its Future in the Sand”, The Daily Star, May 24, 2006. 11 See, “Hezbollah Takes Over West Beirut”, BBC, May 9, 2008. 12 See Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger”, New York Times, May 22, 2008. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. November 2020 3 Europe’s untapped Sway in Syria Having repeatedly survived numerous upheavals unscathed, he boasted in February 2011 to the Wall Street Journal about his country’s stability while the Arab Spring moved around the region.13 A few weeks later, the fuse had been lit in Daraa with the imprisonment and torture of young boys who had written on their school wall: It’s your turn, Doctor.14 1.2 Bashar’s Ruthless Second Decade When Syrian civilians turned into revolutionaries, braving the regime despite knowing its formidable power and its proven willingness to violently crush any dissent, they assumed that the international community would not allow another Hama, nor remain idle as it watched civilians be slaughtered. Syrians expected that the regime which had been designated as a sponsor of terrorism for decades would be warned and stopped dead in its tracks, following years of rhetoric on the need to reform. They quickly realized no help was coming their way; nevertheless, they persisted. The astounding death toll and destruction at the hands of Assad and his allies have created a new reality in the region and beyond, with absolutely no evidence that it is possible to turn back the clock and regain a semblance of normalcy. Actual figures are estimates at best, undercounts at worst. Even though the United Nations declared it would stop counting the number of victims early in the war, claiming accurate figures were difficult to get, the then-special envoy Stefan De Mistura stated in April 2016 that the number of deaths had already reached at least 400,000. This conservative estimate was given before the bulk of Russia’s bombing campaign and the regime’s violent assaults on Aleppo later that year, on Ghouta in 2018, and on Idlib as of 2019.15 Syrian civil society organizations and international human rights organizations, however, have been keeping close count and according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, this war has already killed at least 586,000 Syrians.16 Moreover, the regime and its allies’ atrocities have been thoroughly documented by numerous independent observers, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, which estimates the death toll to top 560,000.17 If the last twenty years of Bashar Assad’s reign have shown anything, it is that the country’s stability thus far had only been ensured by drastic repression and by international wavering on Syria. The economy was adapted to benefit only Assad cronies, while basic infrastructure, education and health were deteriorating at an alarming speed, accompanied by a high population growth rate, rampant unemployment, and a new generation coming of age with absolutely no prospects for even the simple life their parents had. With or without the Arab Spring, Syria had long been on the slippery path to implosion. 1.3 Flawed Conclusions In spite of these shocking developments, at the 50th anniversary of the Assad regime’s power grab in Syria, and coming up to 10 years after the popular uprising of March 2011 and ensuing war, a chorus of European voices is countering Syrians in the opposition and civil society by playing devil’s advocate in a literal way, arguing for an acceptance of what is called “facts on the ground.” 13 See “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.