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Delivering Democracy Repercussions of the “Arab Spring” on Human Rights
Human Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2012
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Delivering Democracy Repercussions of the “Arab Spring” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies on Human Rights CIHRS Human Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2012
Reform Issues (32)
Publisher: Cairo Institute for Human Co-founder Rights Studies (CIHRS) Dr. Mohammed El-Sayed Said Address: 21 Abd El-Megid El-Remaly St, 7th Floor, Flat no. 71, Bab El Louk, Cairo.
P.O. Box: 117 Maglis El-Shaab, Cairo, President Egypt Kamal Jendoubi E-mail address: [email protected]
Website: www.cihrs.org Director Tel: (+202) 27951112- 27963757 Bahey eldin Hassan Fax: (+202) 27921913 Cover designer: Kirolos Nathan Deputy Director Cracked House Wall by MattTheSamurai Ziad Abdel Tawab There is hope by Bolognist The Window by UtopiaIsBanished Layout: Hesham El-Sayed Dep. No: 2013/ 15711
Index card
Delivering Democracy Human Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2012 Publisher: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) Reform Issues (29), 24cm, 256 Pages, (Cairo)
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (Author)
With support from The European Commission (2) The Open Society Foundation
Contents
Why This Report? 5 Introduction: 9 What Prospects for the “Arab Spring” in Light of an Early “Autumn” of Political Islam? Section One Behind the “Arab Spring” 27 Summary of the Report: Where is the “Arab Spring” Taking Us? 29 The League of Arab States in the Wake of the “Arab Spring” 49 Tyranny of the Majority: Islamists’ Ambivalence towards Human Rights 63 The Crisis of Transitional Justice Following the “Arab Spring”:Egypt as a Model 95
Section Two Challenges to Human Rights in the “Arab Spring” States 115 - Egypt 117 - Tunisia 147 - Libya 171 - Yemen 189 - Syria 205 - Bahrain 225 Section Three Human Rights in the Countries Less Affected by the “Arab Spring” 239 - Iraq 241 - Lebanon 257 - The Occupied Palestinian Territories 271 - Saudi Arabia 291 - Sudan 307 - Algeria 327 - Morocco 335
Acknowledgements 351
(3) Contributors to this Report
Head researcher Essam El-Din Mohamed Hassan
Researchers and authors of background papers Ismael Abdel Hamid Sarah Dorman Farida Maqar Salah Nasrawy Moataz al-Fegiery Khalil Abdel Mo’men Sherehan Osman Ziad Abdel Tawab Mervat Rishmawi
Head Editor Bahey eldin Hassan
English Version
Editing and revision by Translation by Sarah Dorman Mandy McClure and and Jeremie Smith Sarah Dorman Nadine Wahab Paola Salwan Daher
Special acknowledgement is deserved by several fellow human rights defenders and academics for their valuable contributions to the revision, editing, and review of this report or for their provision of additional information. Among them are the following: · Elghalia Djimi – Vice president of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State– Morocco · Dr. Radwan Bou Gomaa – Human rights activist and university professor – Algeria · Dr. Radwan Ziadeh–President of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies– Syria · Ali al-Dailami – President of the Yemeni Organization for Defending Rights and Democratic Freedoms - Yemen · Kamel Jendoubi – President of the Committee for Respect for Human Rights and Liberties in Tunisia - Tunisia · Magdy al-Naim – Rights expert - Sudan · Mohamed Masqati – President of the Bahraini Youth Center for Human Rights-Bahrain · Massaoud Ramdani – Vice president of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights – Tunisia · Walid Aboul Kheir–President of the Monitor for Human Rights in Saudi Arabia-Saudi Arabia · Walid Ahmed Salis– Researcher with the Adala Center for Human Rights (Saudi Arabia)
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Why this report?
The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies is pleased to present its fifth annual report, in which it monitors and analyzes the state of human rights in the Arab region throughout the year 2012. The publication of this report comes as we mark the passage of two years since the beginning of what has come to be known as the “Arab Spring,” during which the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were able to overthrow the symbols authoritarianism and tyranny in their countries through enormous popular uprisings whose effects were felt to varying degrees all across the region. Therefore, this report focuses special attention on the implications of the “Arab Spring” and the resulting opportunities for the promotion of human rights and democratic transition in the countries of the region. In order to better analyze these changes, several new chapters have been added to this year’s report. For example, one chapter has been dedicated to the specific challenges facing the transitional periods in Egypt and Tunisia, including the implications of the leading role which has been played by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and by its counterpart, the Ennahda movement, in Tunisia. Given that the countries undergoing transitional periods have largely failed to adopt holistic strategies for achieving transitional justice and preventing impunity for crimes committed by the former regimes, this report also dedicates a chapter to shedding light on the problems facing the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, focusing on Egypt as a case study. Another chapter of this year’s report focuses specifically on the effects of the “Arab Spring” on the institutions available for joint work among Arabs, specifically at the League of Arab States, and discusses the
(5) opportunities for engaging and developing mechanisms for the protection of human rights in these institutions. The previous annual reports provided overviews of the state of human rights in 12 Arab countries, namely Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, and the occupied Palestinian territories. In addition to these country chapters, a new chapter has been added to focus on Libya, given the developments seen in this country throughout 2011 which led to the ouster of the Qaddafi regime. These country chapters have been divided into two sections. The first section covers the countries which were most affected by the “Arab Spring,” highlighting the major challenges and complexities faced in many of these countries as they pursue transitions to democracy. The second follows the developments seen in the countries which have yet to be thus affected by the “Arab Spring.” As in the previous reports, this year’s report bases its evaluations on the general framework of civil and political rights, with a specific focus on a number of key issues. The key themes analyzed in this report include the following: · The political transitions in the countries which witnessed the overthrow of the leaders of the former regimes, focusing on the extent to which these transitions are contributing to the establishment of democracy, introducing mechanisms which allow for accountability and uncovering the truth regarding past violations, and ensuring a genuine break with the patterns of abuses which pervaded these countries during decades of dictatorship; · The most prominent developments seen in the countries under study in terms of constitutional and legislative reform; · The mechanisms in place for dealing with the spread of political and social protest movements; · The extent to which freedom of expression and media freedoms have been expanded or restricted; · Practices related to the promotion or repression of the right to freedom of association, whether in regards to political parties, civil society organizations, or unions; · The situation of human rights defenders and the nature of the restrictions and threats faced by these defenders and the organizations with which they work;
(6) · Restrictions imposed on freedom of religion and belief as well as the state of the rights of religious, ideological, and ethnic minorities; · Instances of violations to the right to a fair trial, including trials before politically motivated courts; · Grave violations to human rights, including arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killings; · Grave violations committed by non-state actors, which increased significantly in the countries undergoing unstable transitional periods, as such violations were exacerbated by a security vacuum, by some factions of political Islam seeking to impose their political control over their opponents and to impose their religious views on society, and by the tendency of some parties to use violence to confront government oppression or to respond to the violence exercised by some factions of political Islam. This report relies on background papers prepared by researchers in the Cairo Institute and by rights experts in some countries under study. The report has also relied heavily upon information documented by other Arab and international rights organizations, in addition to analysis, observations, and information provided by members of the advisory board of the Cairo Institute’s International Advocacy Program and by a number of Arab experts who were consulted by the Cairo Institute to give their opinions on the final drafts of this report.
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Introduction
What Prospects for the “Arab Spring” in Light of an Early “Autumn” of Political Islam?
Bahey eldin Hassan
The battle for the “Arab Spring” continues to be waged on three fronts1: between the revolutionaries and remaining members of the old regimes, between secularists and those who call for the establishment of a religious state, and between various actors of the international community. The context in which this struggle is taking place has become even more oppressive since 2011, as is clearly the case in both the Arab countries which saw the fall of old regimes and in those which still aspire to catch this wave of democratic change. One look at the Arab states which did not experience regime change in the wake of the “Arab Spring” is sufficient to understand the fate of this “spring,” for it is clear that the regimes in these states no longer feel drastically threatened by it. Rather, some of the governments in these states
1 See the introduction entitled “The Arab Spring: A Struggle on Three Fronts,” of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies’ 2011 Annual Report “Fractured Walls, New Horizons”.
(9) have increased counterattacks2, with Sudan and Algeria being two prominent examples. The Sudanese government has carried out a wave of arrests targeting political activists and shut down or frozen the activities of a number of rights and research organizations which had played a critical role in mobilizing Sudanese society. In Algeria, the authorities prevented civil society organizations from participating in the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2013, detaining those who were traveling to Tunisia by land and arresting a number of rights activists in an unprecedented move driven by fears of the spread of the “contagion” of the uprisings seen in Tunisia. In other states in the region as well, numerous political and rights activists have been subjected to trials lacking the basic guarantees of due process, leading in some cases to severe sentences. The situations in the countries most directly affected by the “Arab Spring” vary. In Libya, the nascent state faces armed militias which exert their authority over much of the country. The Syrians who continue to struggle to topple the regime in Damascus cannot be sure that the situation will improve or even that the violence will cease following regime change, as grave crimes are being committed not only by the state but also by armed opposition groups. In Yemen, the struggle continues against the institutions of the old regime, which remain a center of power more influential even than the new interim president. Egyptians, too, struggle against values, principles, practices, legislation, and even a constitution belonging to the “counter- revolution,” which has come to rule in the name of the revolution. Tunisians are likewise working to resist falling prey to the same problems faced by Egyptians. This state of affairs has facilitated the work of the rulers in the countries less affected by the “Arab Spring,” for it is not difficult to convince their peoples of the need to avoid the fate of the “Arab Spring states” and to opt instead to accept the status quo, with the hope of gradual improvements along the way. The Egyptian example has been prominently used to convince other Arab peoples that “contentment with what one has is a treasure that does not run out” and that “one bird in the hand is worth ten in the tree,” according to popular Arab proverbs which have aided rulers in subduing their citizens for centuries. In light of Egypt’s experience over the past two years, other Arab populations have been easily deterred from running the risk of attempting to replace their current rulers with new regimes which may not prove to be any less repressive.
2 For further details, see Section III of this report.
(10) Given Egypt’s size and the major influence it holds in the Arab region, the events that played out in Egypt and the ouster of Hosni Mubarak embodied a nightmare for other Arab rulers, who feared that their peoples would be inspired by and attempt to follow the example of their Egyptian counterparts. Now, however, the daily occurrences in Egypt have become a tool in the hands of these autocratic rulers, who hold up the Egyptian experience as a warning to their own citizens of the fate that awaits those who overthrow their leaders. Indeed, Egyptians have incurred severe losses in all areas – not only have they lost stability, security, and consistent access to electricity, fuel, and food, but they also find themselves on the verge of losing the very freedoms won by their revolution. It is impossible to compare what is happening in Egypt to merely a difficult delivery before the birth of democracy. Indications that Egypt is not moving towards democracy but rather away from it include: the regular use of violent repression against the political and social protest movements; the daily harassment of media professionals and institutions – whether through bringing legal cases against them or through targeted physical attacks; the battle against the independence of the judiciary in both the constitution and legislative framework as well as through political and institutional attacks; the preparation of draft legislation which would ‘nationalize’ civil society organizations and transform them into semi-governmental bodies; and the use of rape and sexual harassment as a political tool to eliminate the participation of women in the political sphere. Clearly, Egypt is transitioning from one authoritarian regime to another, albeit with different features on the surface. It is the counter-revolution that has come to power, and this at the expense of the revolution that called for “freedom, bread, and social justice.” Even as Egypt’s transition suffers from this multi-faceted repression, the Muslim Brotherhood was been careful to comply with the demands of the military establishment when drafting the country’s new constitution. As such, the military continues to enjoy all the privileges that it had under Mubarak, the only difference being that now these privileges are constitutionally protected. Moreover, these constitutional provisions have given the military the additional right to refer civilians to trial before military courts. This is particularly surprising, as members of the Muslim Brotherhood itself suffered greatly from being subjected to military trials before the revolution, despite the fact that such trials were not explicitly allowed for by the constitution at the time – rather, the law which allowed for military trials of civilians was appealed before the Supreme Constitutional Court for its unconstitutionality. With the passage of the new constitution, the grounds for this appeal have been annulled and military trials of civilians have gained explicit constitutional legitimacy. This has
(11) happened despite the fact that the prohibition of such trials had been one of the most important demands of the January 25 Revolution.3 Also astonishing is that while the Egyptian police carry out acts of repression on a daily basis, including arrests and even torture of political activists, the public prosecutor continues to summon political activists and media professionals for questioning. At the same time, some of the most prominent officials of the old regime have been released, and financial and other deals have been made with others affiliated with the old regime in the name of “reconciliation,” in order to prevent their prosecution by the judiciary. It is clear that before moving on to establishing a totalitarian theocracy, the political priority of the Muslim Brotherhood is to re-establish the pillars of autocracy. The reasons for this appear to range between the unanticipated political resistance they have met and the need to avoid provoking the institutions of the state, which are still unready to accept such drastic changes, despite the fact that many had moved towards Islamization even during the Mubarak era. Another factor is the competition that the Muslim Brotherhood faces from the Salafists in promoting its project of the “religious state” after these groups surprised Egyptian society - and even themselves - with their abilities to organize and gain ground politically. This competition is exacerbated by the increasing distance between the regional players which support the two groups – namely Qatar and Saudi Arabia – as these two countries have also begun competing for influence in Syria and Yemen, after they had been acting in coordination at the beginning of the Syrian uprising.
Why has Egypt’s transition differed from that of Tunisia? At the beginning of 2011, Egypt had appeared to be following right behind Tunisia when Egyptians rose up only eleven days after Ben Ali’s regime collapsed on January 14, 2011. The Mubarak regime tried desperately to convince Egyptians that Egypt is different from Tunisia, only to hear the response of Egyptians - determined to prove that they were no less worthy, determined, or willing to undertake the struggle for democracy than their Tunisian counterparts - echoing in the streets that Egypt was no different. There are many important similarities between Egypt and Tunisia, not least among them that of the Islamist Ennahda movement, which gained
3 See “No to constitution establishing political and theocratic tyranny; Egyptian rights groups reject draft constitution,” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 18 Nov 2012,
(12) prominence in the Tunisian political sphere following the revolution, and its older counterpart, the Egyptian branch of the international Muslim Brotherhood organization. However, other factors have led the post- revolutionary courses of the two countries to differ. First among them are the historically rooted political aspirations of the Egyptian military, dating back to July 1952, whereas the Tunisian army has not sought to play a direct political role. Rather, the Tunisian army announced4 its consent for democratic oversight of the army by Tunisian society in 2013, in the framework of its acceptance of the implementation of the relevant international standards for democratic states. In contrast, the military establishment in Egypt sought to immunize itself in the new constitution from any form of oversight from Egyptian society by brokering a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. The second important difference is the value of secularism which seeped into Tunisian society both before its independence and under Habib Burguiba, Tunisia’s first president, and which is reflected positively in Tunisian society to a greater degree than in Egypt. Furthermore, civil society organizations in Tunisia enjoy greater political dynamism and ability to influence political elites than those in Egypt. As a result, directly following the Tunisian revolution, a body was composed of political, union, and civil society actors – the only of its kind seen in the “Arab Spring” countries – known as the “High Commission for Achieving the Goals of the Revolution.” This Commission played a critical political and legislative role during the initial stage of the transition before general elections were held and the Ennahda movement came to power. It is also important to note the pivotal role played by the Tunisian General Union of Workers, a unique union organization unlike any group found in Egypt. The membership of the Union is not limited to trade workers, as it also includes professional syndicates, and as such the regional branches of this union bring together workers, teachers, and other professionals in regional committees. For this reason, the Union was able to play a critical political, civil, and union role in a number of the most important periods of Tunisian history since the country’s independence, particularly in the period immediately preceding the revolution and the subsequent period of transition. None of this is found in Egypt, where the General Union of Egyptian Workers has been nothing but an ambassador of the ruler to the workers and a representative of the government’s interests for the past six decades. Furthermore, the new rulers – which represent the Muslim
4 “Jeish tunis yutalib b-ikhda’aih li-riqaba demoqrateyya,” Al Jazeera, 31 Mar 2013,
(13) Brotherhood – are anxious to entrench this traditional role for the General Union in Egypt. Despite the fact that Egyptian rights organizations are some of the most dynamic in the Arab region, the political elites in Egypt have always been too ineffectual and uncomprehending to be able to benefit from their work, whether before the revolution or after it – with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood before it took power, as its members were defended by these organizations when they were victims of repression at the hands of the old regime. Egypt has also seen recurrent workers struggles, yet they have been fragmented and union workers often view politics as a disease to be avoided at all costs. Despite the increased number of independent unions following the revolution in Egypt, it is clear that the social protest movements of the past two years are much wider than could be contained within the framework of these unions, particularly given their fragmented state. In a further difference between Egypt and Tunisia, the Ennahda movement in Tunisia has historically been less hostile to the principles and values of human rights than other Islamist movements in the Arab region, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In the context of deliberations undertaken by the “October 18 Coalition”5 prior to the revolution, Ennahda (along with other political groups) had adopted a progressive position on women’s rights and other rights-related issues often seen as problematic by other Islamist groups. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood was moving in the opposite direction in Egypt, having announced its political program in the fall of 2007, under which it adopted a plan for establishing a totalitarian regime with religious features.6 For all of the above reasons, the results of the first general elections after the revolutions in Tunisia differed from those in Egypt. This difference, in and of itself, is another factor which has caused the transitions in the two countries to diverge. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists won a majority of the seats in the People’s Assembly (the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament) and an overwhelming majority in the Shura Assembly (the upper house of the Egyptian Parliament), followed by the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate. In Tunisia, Ennahda only obtained a plurality in Tunisia’s elections, which did not allow this group to single-handedly govern Tunisia. Rather, Ennahda formed a government in cooperation with two parties – one of them liberal and the other leftist.
5 “Hey’et 18 october li-l-huquq wa al-hureyat: I’alan mushtarak howl al-‘alaqa bayn ad-dawla wa ad-dein,” E-joussour, 17 Dec. 2009,
(14) Directly following these elections, a new party known as the “Nidaa Tunis” (Appeal for Tunisia) Party began forming from the ranks of the opposition, and it is now poised to become the second-most successful party in Tunisia’s next elections, if not the overall winner. The Nidaa Tunis party is another important indicator of the extent to which the dynamics of the political movements in Egypt and Tunisia differ. Nidaa Tunis brought together liberals and leftists – some of whom had been persecuted or exiled prior to the revolution – as well as businessmen and members and leaders of the former ruling party who had not been charged with crimes of corruption or human rights violations. As a result, Nidaa Tunis enjoys a broad social base. Furthermore, it is led by Beji Essebsi, a prominent figure in Tunisia’s recent history and a former colleague of Burguiba who successfully headed the government during an important initial phase of the transition. Essebsi is immensely popular in Tunisia, such that after his resignation he topped the list of most popular Tunisian figures in opinion polls following the revolution. In contrast, Egypt’s main opposition group – represented by the National Salvation Front (NSF) – has been incapable of distinguishing between members of the former regime who committed crimes of corruption and violations to human rights and the vast social base of the regime, which cannot be stigmatized or held responsible for the regime’s crimes. At the same time, this segment of society – as in Tunisia – is important to address, especially since some of its members adopted positions and demands for reform from within the former regime prior to the revolution. Instead, the NSF appears to be composed of “armchair generals without any foot soldiers”, for despite the fact that it is comprised of a number of the most prominent political, intellectual, economic, media, professional, and legal experts and figures in Egypt – enough to form a dozen different governments – it only engages a limited social stratum in Cairo and a few other cities along the Nile Delta and Suez Canal. Additionally, the nature of some of its slogans and statements have led both Egyptian and international public opinion to view the NSF more as a body that either rejects initiatives or stirs up unrest, rather than having anything to do with saving the country in reality. The National Salvation Front sees itself as the convergence of the myriad groups of revolutionary youth in Egypt, yet this is a difficult claim to make due to the significant political and organizational fragmentation among the revolutionary youth as well as to the large variance between these groups’ ever-changing – and sometimes contradicting - slogans and positions over the two years since the revolution. The ambiguity surrounding the position of the NSF on the escalating trend of violence and stirring up chaos among some groups of youth, which has come as a reaction to the violence of the
(15) current ruling party and its supporters, will surely have severe repercussions for the future of the NSF and its cohesion and will affect whether Egyptian society views the NSF as an institution which can be depended upon. In comparison to the lack of political agility on the part of the NSF, the Muslim Brotherhood has displayed a level of pragmatism not seen from any other political group before or after the revolution. It may confidently be stated that Egypt has never before seen a group with such a rigid ideological basis simultaneously exercise such practical political pragmatism. This is clearly demonstrated by the international relations cultivated by the Muslim Brotherhood, as the group went with surprising agility from “enemy of the West and Israel” to maintaining relations of close cooperation without officially denouncing their former position. According to statements made by Israeli officials, relations under the Muslim Brotherhood are even stronger than they were under former president Hosni Mubarak. The pragmatism displayed by the Muslim Brotherhood in domestic politics is no less astonishing, particularly due to the major deals it brokered with the military establishment. The Muslim Brotherhood has offered the military everything that the Brotherhood had originally rejected in the context of the “Selmy document” of supra-constitutional principles, such as special privileges and immunities for the military establishment as well as the right to try civilians before military courts – despite the fact that Brotherhood members had historically been among the most prominent victims of such courts. Moreover, this pragmatism is clear from the Muslim Brotherhood’s swift efforts to conduct “reconciliation” agreements with prominent figures associated with the former regime, to broker elections deals with some of these same figures who continue to carry political weight, and to create alliances with specific sectors of the security apparatus, which seek retribution at any cost against the forces which sparked the revolution. The success of such an alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian security apparatus, even if temporary, may go down in history as marking the beginning of an unprecedented regression in terms of human rights in the country. Notably, the negotiations leading to these deals occurred behind a smoke screen of accusations alleging that the opposition was seeking alliances with the remnants of the old regime. For its part, the NSF and a number of Egyptian and international rights activists continue to deal with the security apparatus just as they had in the immediate wake of the revolution – by repeating the legitimate demand of reforming the security sector and vetting from its ranks all corrupt officers and those responsible for human rights crimes committed before the revolution and for the killing of demonstrators during the revolution. However, such demands have remained unaddressed by both the Supreme
(16) Council of the Armed Forces and by the Muslim Brotherhood – as if time stood still on February 12, 2011, the day after Mubarak’s ouster. Hopes for such reform have further dimmed now that this demand would mean in practice that the Muslim Brotherhood – which is responsible for the killing of demonstrators in front of the Ittihadeyya Presidential Palace in December 20127 and thereafter – would be in charge of vetting the police responsible for the killing of demonstrators during the revolution in January 2011. It is possible that any “reform” at this time could contribute politically to one of the pressing goals of the new regime – “Islamization” of the police – as the removal of those responsible for the killing of protestors during the revolution would only be substituted by those responsible for the killing of protestors after the revolution. Such a scenario would merely be a repetition of the extralegal removal of the former public prosecutor by President Morsi and his replacement with a new public prosecutor who has done nothing to this day except turn a blind eye to the crimes committed by the police and members of the Muslim Brotherhood against peaceful protests, including all new cases of killings of protestors, while prosecuting political activists and media professionals who voice criticism of the current regime following complaints filed either officially by the Muslim Brotherhood or by its supporters. It is important to note the effects of the shock of the revolution on the police, which is no longer one unified body which blindly follows orders, as was the case before the revolution. Certainly, there were isolated voices of criticism which emerged from within the police from time to time, yet these were silenced through intimidation, dismissal, or forced early retirement. However, after the impact of the revolution was felt throughout the police establishment – and even despite the stubborn refusal to reform it – a new phenomenon emerged by which union-like bodies formed among different segments of the police forces, mass police strikes were staged, and demonstrations were held for various reasons, most importantly against the use of the police to confront political and social protests and against new draft legislation to govern demonstrations, which would lead to increased clashes between the police and protest movements. Demands for security reform must take the changes that have occurred both on the level of the state and within the police into consideration, and any plan for security reform must be reviewed according to these changes in order to prevent such a project from leading to further rights violations or obliterating chances for real security reform. Human rights organizations and
7 See: “Will the Ittihadeyya Clashes Become a Routine Model to Settle Political Disputes in Egypt?” Report issued by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 26 Dec. 2012,
(17) all other parties eager to see reform of the security establishment must review the plans and possible scenarios which were laid out after February 11, 2011 and which are suitable for countries transitioning to democracy, since Egypt can no longer be considered a country going through a period of transition to a better future. Rather, it is merely witnessing a transition from one repressive authoritarian regime to another. As such, the concepts and approaches of transitional justice are not applicable in the current Egyptian context, and ignoring this reality could have grave repercussions. Rather, calls for security reform in this new context should resemble those made under the Mubarak regime, i.e. calling for: an end to human rights violations committed by the police, rule of law, judicial oversight, respect for and implementation of judicial decisions, transparency and internal accountability, including human rights education in police curricula, promoting the role of human rights organizations in monitoring violations, etc.
The tyrant masked as the victim “The security apparatus is not in the business of art, but in confronting criminal acts.” Surprisingly, this quote did not come from a dispassionate observer but from the leader of a once-persecuted group whose members were subjected to torture and other abuses by security forces. The man who made this statement is none other than Rachid Ghannouchi, the historical leader and current president of Tunisia’s Ennahda movement. Despite the fact that Ghannouchi often spoke out against torture prior to the revolution, rejecting justifications used by the regimes in both Tunisia and Egypt that the police were confronting terrorism and thereby protecting millions of lives, there has been a consistent shift in his rhetoric following the revolution. Similarly, since the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power in Egypt, the human rights violations that sparked the revolution have continued and in some cases abuses even gotten worse. Protests have been violently suppressed on a nearly daily basis, and in the past few months more journalists and media personalities have been referred by the public prosecutor to investigation and trial on charges of insulting the president than during the entire 30 years under former president Mubarak. The independence of the judiciary has also been severely attacked, and a new constitution has been adopted that for the first time in Egyptian history allows for military trials of civilians. The draft legislation to govern civil society currently under consideration would effectively nationalize civil society and eliminate independent human rights organizations. Meanwhile,
(18) supporters and leaders of the ruling party have publicly assaulted protesters, besieged Media Production City, assaulted media professionals, and surrounded courthouses in an attempt to influence judicial rulings or impede their deliberations, even targeting Egypt’s highest court, the Supreme Constitutional Court, while the president and his cabinet sat in complicit silence. In contrast, the president did not remain silent when 40 people were killed in January in Port Said and Suez — instead, he expressed his appreciation for the police and urged them to act even more decisively. Perhaps most astonishing is the fact that before the supporters of the ruling party tortured protesters in front of the Ittihadeyya Presidential Palace last December, they first gathered at a nearby mosque to perform their prayers. Similarly, on 22 March, after completing Friday prayers, members and supporters of the ruling party again tortured protestors, this time in a mosque in Muqattam. The Quran says, “Then, when prayer is finished, scatter in the land and seek God’s bounty, and remember God frequently; happily you will prosper” (62:10). Does torture bring us closer to God? Do their “prayers” not forbid “indecency and evil” (29:45)? Or is it possible that the interpretation of the Quran has changed now that the victim has become the oppressor? The violent crimes committed at the Ittihadeyya palace and in Muqattam have not been investigated by the prosecutor-general. Instead, he diligently focuses on cases of insult and verbal defamation of the country’s new leaders and their interpretation of Islam. The acts of violence defame and insult Islam more than Bassem Youssef and others could ever do with mere words. In a speech given on 6 April in Sudan, the president said that he intends to launch “a second revolution” to achieve the objectives of the “renaissance project”. One might ask: A revolution against whom? And using what means? When security and legislative repression — the regime’s chosen tactics — fail, what kind of revolution could remove the perceived obstacles to the Muslim Brotherhood’s “project”? Although often a point of controversy, the rights of Islamists have long been defended by human rights defenders in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. This was done despite the possible authoritarian tendencies of many whose rights were defended and regardless of whether they belonged to “moderate” groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, or to terrorist groups – all were defended equally because all humans are equally entitled to their natural rights. This defense of Islamists was also a constant source of tension with the Egyptian regime and its security apparatus, sometimes leading to direct confrontation. Some organizations, including the oldest human rights
(19) organization in Egypt, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, were even prevented by the government from obtaining legal recognition due to their defense of Islamists. Despite this and other types of pressures exerted by the government to get Egyptian rights organizations – largely secular in nature – to cease their defense of Islamists, many organizations rejected this message, considering that defending the human rights of all – including Islamists – is not the same as granting political support to Islamist groups. At the same time, many of these human rights defenders expressed profound skepticism about the potential for a coherent, pro-human rights, democratic trend evolving within that generation of political Islamist movements in Egypt, in contrast to the positive developments within leftist and Nasserist currents at the time. Therefore, the community of rights activists in Egypt is perhaps not surprised by the authoritarian, anti-human rights, and anti-democratic trends seen in the Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamist groups. What is shocking, however, is how quickly the face of the oppressor has revealed itself. Franz Fanon and others have examined the process by which the victim becomes the oppressor, a process currently being witnessed in Egypt. What happened with these Islamist groups isn’t a transformation but rather a process of slipping off the mask of victimhood to reveal the true persecutor underneath. It is unfortunate that so quickly after coming to power, the former victims began publicly denouncing the human rights NGOs that had for years defended them, shamelessly reproducing the rhetoric of their own persecutors from the Mubarak regime in their attacks on civil society NGOs as “foreign hands” and the receivers of “foreign money.” Before the revolution, Islamist leaders had no objections when Egyptian human rights NGOs exposed human rights violations in international forums or western countries. Now that the victim has become the tyrant, the Muslim Brotherhood has reclassified such criticism as interference in its domestic affairs by external agents. Brotherhood leaders recently told international organizations that since the “success of the revolution” Egypt no longer needs NGOs to defend human rights. This shift in position makes perfect sense, since all oppressors do their best to avoid exposure of their crimes and prevent victims’ voices from being heard. Unfortunately, this has become the foundation of the new alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the security apparatus. The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to consolidate power at any price, even at the price of aligning themselves with an enemy that persecuted them for nearly a century.
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Can political Islam be democratic? After more than two years, it seems that the “Arab Spring” has thus far been unable to produce a single consolidated and stable democracy. Despite significant differences in terms of the challenges faced and the varied nature of the political and social contexts, conflict and non-democratic measures continue to affect Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. It is possible that a democratic state will be born out of the struggles of at least one of these states, yet this possibility remains fragile at best. Meanwhile, in Bahrain, the conflict has been settled for a time, which may prove to be at the expense of the democratic uprising. In the Syrian context, a statement issued in April 2013 by one of the armed opposition groups announcing its allegiance to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is a worrying sign, particularly in light of the continued inability of the Syrian National Coalition – headed by the Muslim Brotherhood – to formulate a political discourse and program or daily practices which address the demands of the ethnic and religious minorities in Syria. In Egypt, the situation has become clearer now that the country has moved from a continuous state of uprising into the grip of another authoritarian regime, yet this new regime’s religious features will further exacerbate the regime’s autocratic nature and indeed move it towards totalitarianism. According to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political program of the autumn of 2007 – prior to the revolution – the unannounced goal of the organization was the establishment of a totalitarian theocracy.8 However, the nature of the political opposition which has confronted the Brotherhood, as well as its inability to convince non-politicized citizens – including traditional Muslims – of its political, professional, or even religious merits, has prolonged the period over which the Brotherhood seeks to accomplish this goal. Regardless of whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood succeeds in realizing the intended goal of its political program, it will – in cooperation with other Islamist parties, including Salafists, Jihadists, and the Wasat Party – continue to impose its practices and policies at all levels. In this we find the unanticipated answer to the question of whether Islamist political parties could become democratic parties and pass the first real test by contributing to the process of democratic transition in the Arab region – in other words, whether Islamist parties could become the equivalent of the democratic Christian parties in Europe. It seems that, at least in Egypt, the answer is resoundingly ‘no’, as the Muslim Brotherhood has exerted all its efforts to thwart the chances for democratic transition since they surfaced in February
8 Bahey eddin Hassan, ibid.
(21) 2011. Furthermore, it must be recognized that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood organization in the Arab region. It should be noted that the idea that Islamist political parties can transform into democratic political parties has also been challenged by the experiences of both Iran and Sudan for more than three decades. Of course, this does not mean those whose religion is Islam cannot interpret Islam to be in conformity with modern forms of secular, pluralistic democratic governance and human rights standards. Instead, this is an observation about the political platforms and religious interpretations of Islam that are put forward by Islamic political parties in their current forms. Even as there is still room for forces within Ennahda to interact positively in the democratic process in Tunisia, it appears from the practices of the Muslim Brotherhood that any similar progress in Egypt may take at least a decade – and perhaps closer to a century – and that it will likely occur only after a new generation assumes positions of authority within the organization. Yet even this possibility remains remote, and no indications point to such a change anytime soon. Rather, any critical voices from within the Muslim Brotherhood – and they are limited indeed – have either left the organization or been forced out. In any case, we are not witnessing a mass movement of resignations from the organization nor wide internal criticism for it. The most prominent critical voice was without a doubt that of Dr. Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, who put himself forward as a candidate for the presidency and then formed the Strong Egypt Party. It had been predicted that this party would become a large umbrella party, bringing together those who had left the Brotherhood and other Islamists and presenting itself as the moral, democratic successor of the Muslim Brotherhood – the alternative from within the same camp. However, the party followed a different course, seeking to become an even broader umbrella under which former Brotherhood figures would come together with liberals and leftists. In doing so, the party lost the main quality which made it unique and failed to present a clear image either to the people of Egypt or to those in the outside world who had hoped that despite the fears about political Islam in Egypt, a political program could emerge from this camp based on the ideals of humanism, progress, and modernism. The ambiguous nature of the Strong Egypt Party was also clear through the positions it adopted, which completely lacked consistency and therefore, political appeal. In any case, it is clear that the Strong Egypt Party cannot be classified as an Islamist party or as an alternative to other Islamist parties. It had been anticipated by some observers in Egypt that another limited split would occur within the Muslim Brotherhood due to the Wasat Party, which had presented a political discourse differing significantly from that of the
(22) Brotherhood prior to the revolution. However, after the revolution and after this party became legally recognized, the positive discourse which had distinguished the Wasat Party became a thing of the past. The party turned into a mere appendage of the Muslim Brotherhood to be used against the Brotherhood’s real opposition, as had been done during the Mubarak era with certain “opposition” parties whose main purpose was to counter Mubarak’s opposition to the benefit of the ruling party. The historic failure of political Islam in Egypt – with all of its organizations and parties – to adopt a consistent democratic discourse, to respect basic human rights, and to follow democratic principles in practice is a major loss for all Egyptians and is in no way mitigated by the success of these parties in elections, which is achieved through any means. Furthermore, this failure is preventing Egypt from emerging successfully from its current crisis and from avoiding falling into the grip of another repressive regime. In light of the major influence of Egypt on the whole Arab region, and due to the fact that Egypt is the center of the international Muslim Brotherhood organization, the repercussions of this failure will indeed be of historical proportions, and its effects will be felt far beyond Egypt’s borders. At the same time, we see frequent indications that religiously based groups which advocate violence are increasing their activities in the “Arab Spring” countries. Perhaps what is happening in Syria was foreseeable – despite its catastrophic nature – yet the return of such violent Islamist groups to carry out their terrorist activities under Islamist governments in Egypt and Tunisia is another indicator of the historic proportions of this failure. Before the “Arab Spring,” many analysts, academics, and politicians predicted that armed Islamist groups would give up their violent activities once an Islamist government came to power. When others would argue that this was not the case under the Islamic Caliphate – whether under the Umayyads, the Abbasids, or others – nor has it been the case in modern-day Saudi Arabia, the response was that the case would be different under democratic governments. However, in Egypt and Tunisia, Islamist groups have come to power through democratic means (or so they claim) and opened up unprecedented space for other Islamist groups, including those which are not legally recognized or which carry out armed operations. Even so, resorting to violence and even acts of terrorism as a means to achieve political or religious ends has not declined; rather, such acts have increased in these two countries since the revolution as compared to the five years prior. In Yemen, the significant participation of the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the new government has similarly not led to a decline in armed operations carried out by the Al-Qaeda terrorist
(23) organization in the country; to the contrary, a new armed Islamist group has emerged. Among the paradoxes which merit examination is that under the non- Islamist, undemocratic regime in Egypt prior to the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jihadi and al-Jama’a al-Islameyya organizations rejected violence as a means to achieve political and religious ends, yet since the Islamists came to power Egypt has seen a series of physical attacks committed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups against media professionals and peaceful protestors. Moreover, it is strongly suspected that assassinations of political activists have been carried out purposefully, yet the judiciary has not been able to conduct serious investigations into these cases. It is in this context that we must ask ourselves: Are the Islamists capable of submitting to the results of the ballot box – by which they came to power – even if the result is not in their favor? Before the Muslim Brotherhood has even completed its first year in power9, it is already responsible for most of the same violations which took the previous regime several years to commit. The new regime has employed both new and old tools – including the constitution, legislation, administrative mechanisms, and the security apparatus – in both a legal and illegal fashion to repress protest movements and diversity of unions, to restrict the exercise of basic freedoms by opposition and civil society activists, and to stifle human rights organizations. It has further announced its intention to impose legal amendments which fundamentally contradict the democratic principles of media freedoms, civil society participation, and judicial independence. Once again, we raise the same question: Is it possible for a political group which exerts all of its efforts to restrict its opponents and to undermine the pillars of democratic transition - including an independent judiciary, free media sector, functioning civil society10, and independent unions – to accept
9 See: “Egypt: 8 Months after Dr. Mohamed Morsi Assumed the Presidency, the Rapid Deterioration of the State of Human Rights in Egypt Must be Halted,” a statement issued by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and 20 other rights organizations, 21 Feb. 2013,
(24) results which are not in its favor from the ballot box by which it came to power? The domination of political Islam on the course of the “Arab Spring” has become perhaps the most prominent feature of this historic development – to the point that the “Arab Spring” has now come to be known as the “Islamist Spring,” a term that describes the reality that the fruits of this spring have been overwhelmingly enjoyed by only one political group. In the end, the question remains: Is the suffering experienced by the Arab peoples over the course of the past two years really leading to the birth of democracy in the wake of the “Arab Spring”? Or have secular forms of autocracy merely been traded for religious forms of autocracy? I fear that, because of the inability of political Islam to accept and uphold human rights and democratic principles for which the uprisings occurred, Arab peoples will be forced to pay an even greater price in order to hasten the coming of autumn for political Islam before true democracy can be born out of the “Arab Spring.” April 15, 2013
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(26) Section One
Behind the “Arab Spring”
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Summary of the Report
Where is the “Arab Spring” Taking Us?
In 2011, the uprisings which became known as the “Arab Spring” led within a matter of months to the overthrow of the heads of the dictatorial regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. Now, two years later, the prospects for transition to democracy in these countries appear out of reach, and the major challenges which surround the chances for successful transitions threaten to leave these countries in an even more regressive state than they were in before the uprisings. In the best case scenarios, transition to democracy will come at the cost of even greater sacrifices made by the peoples of these countries and by those who cling to the dream of bringing about freedom, human dignity, and social justice. The state of human rights in most of the countries which were less affected by the “Arab Spring” continues to witness the same violations seen in previous years. The legislative frameworks of these countries remain hostile to human rights and public freedoms while ensuring impunity for grave violations; in Algeria and Iraq, new legislation was passed to further restrict freedoms. In practice, Saudi Arabia and Sudan demonstrated increasing propensities to repress peaceful protests and assemblies, to clamp down on the freedom of opinion and expression, and to eliminate human rights
(29) organizations and harass the activists working with them. Torture and ill- treatment of prisoners continue to be practiced widely and have led to a number of deaths of detainees in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the occupied Palestinian territories, as well as in Morocco and Lebanon, albeit to a lesser extent.
Overview of Human Rights Developments in 2012 1 – Repression of Political and Social Protests Political protests and social movements continued to be met with excessively repressive measures, even in the countries where the uprisings of the “Arab Spring” led to the overthrow of the heads of the former authoritarian regimes. The brutal repression unleashed against the popular uprising in Syria drove the country to a state of armed conflict after several groups of the opposition resorted to armed resistance. In an attempt to crush the uprising, the army of the Syrian regime committed gross violations against its own people in cold blood as if it were the army of an occupying power dealing with the people of another foreign nation. This repression included the use of heavy weaponry and the bombing of residential areas and even hospitals – some of which were used to illegally detain individuals and even execute detainees without trial – as well as the plundering and arson of property, random killings, and summary executions, even in towns and villages which had maintained the peaceful nature of their protests. Between the beginning of the popular uprising in March 2011 and the end of 2012, at least 60,000 people were killed, while the number of civilians killed during 2012 alone is estimated at 36,000 people. In Egypt, dozens of protestors lost their lives due to the excessive use of force used to repress demonstrations, both at the hands of the police and at the hands of the armed forces during the first half of the year. Killings of protestors did not end following the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in July 2012; rather, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood exacerbated this crisis through the repression of anti-government protestors, including by torturing demonstrators in front of the presidential palace. Such acts resulted in the outbreak of street battles by the end of the year which led to the deaths of 11 individuals. In response to strikes organized in the country, the government formed by the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to the use of police repression and harassment of the groups of union members which had organized the labor strikes and sit-ins.
(30) In Tunisia, police responses were used to repress peaceful and protests and sit-ins more often in 2012 than during the previous year. Intense use of tear gas and even of bullets to confront protestors was increasingly reported, and these tactics not only contributed to growing numbers of injuries but also led to increased numbers of protestors. In Yemen, excessive force – including the use of live ammunition – continued to be used to repress peaceful protests, particularly in the south of the country. Dozens were killed as a result. In Bahrain, security forces used tear gas canisters, birdshot pellets, and rubber bullets, leading to a number of deaths during demonstrations, particularly in areas populated by citizens belonging to the Shiite population. Furthermore, the authorities targeted dozens of political activists through harassment and preventative detention and even subjected some to torture and other ill-treatment. In Saudi Arabia, at least 15 people were killed due to the excessive use of force against peaceful protests between March 2011 and the end of 2012. Hundreds more were arrested, and the authorities took retributive measures against demonstrators, including dismissing them from their jobs and decreasing their wages. In Iraq, lists were issued containing the names of political activists wanted for arrest. Union activists were also arbitrarily arrested, transferred to live or work in other places of the country, fined, or banned from traveling. In Sudan, excessive force was also used against peaceful protests, and some 20 individuals were killed due to the use of live ammunition, being run over by police vehicles, or torture. Following the fall of Qadhafi, Libyan citizens experienced a tangible improvement in their ability to exercise their right to assembly and peaceful protest. However, the transitional authorities proved unable to put an end to the presence of armed militias in the country, and this resulted in a number of armed attacks on demonstrations. Moreover, during the second half of the year, the authorities undertook initiatives to impose legal restrictions on the freedom of peaceful assembly and to punish participants of such gatherings. In Algeria, the authorities dealt severely with peaceful protests, and dozens of activists who work for the defense of the rights of the unemployed and other marginalized groups were arrested along with hundreds of workers. In addition, the police used batons and water hoses to break up unprecedented social protests held by members of the Republican Guard.
(31) In Morocco, excessive force was frequently employed to break up social protests, and collective punishment was used against the population. Detainees were subjected to severe insults and verbal abuse, torture, ill- treatment, and extralegal imprisonment. Even though the Moroccan authorities displayed a relative measure of tolerance for acts of political protest, this did not prevent violent police interventions at times, nor did it spare some of those who participated in demonstrations from being referred to trial. In the occupied Palestinian territories, a number of citizens were killed when Israeli forces dispersed several protests held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the occupation. The security apparatus of the government of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and the police of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip also used force to disperse a number of demonstrations and to ban several public meetings and marches, including the forcible prohibition of attempts in Gaza to commemorate the anniversary of the death of deceased president Yassar Arafat.
2 – Increasing Attacks on Freedom of Expression Freedom of expression continued to face repression in many countries in the region. Even in Egypt and Tunisia, contrary to expectations following the ouster of the heads of the police states in these two countries, freedom of expression underwent a significant relapse. Although the restrictions on freedom of expression diminished to some extent in Yemen after the removal of President Ali Abdullah Salah, the press, media professionals, academics, and members of the political opposition remained targets for repression, particularly in southern Yemen. In Libya, the transitional authorities did not yet make progress in terms of establishing legal protections for such freedoms, yet the country did experience a significant opening in terms of freedom of expression and of the media in practice, which was supported by the fact that the authorities refrained in most cases from implementing repressive legislation which remains from the Qadhafi regime. Moreover, the Libyan Constitutional Court succeeded in upholding this freedom by striking down a new law which would have restricted expression. In Tunisia, media professionals, academics, and artists were subjected to severe violations by both the state authorities and Salafist groups, which displayed increasing animosity toward media freedoms, artistic expression, and the freedom of thought and opinion. Of the more than 130 violations to these freedoms which were recorded, some of them included prosecution, yet most consisted of acts of violence, including physical assaults. The
(32) government voided several decrees related to protections for journalists and dealing with restructuring the field of audiovisual communications. The government further extended its control over the state-owned media institutions, and the same penal provisions which had been used under the Ben Ali regime were drawn from in order to refer media professionals and academics to court and to sentence them to prison. In Egypt, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in the second half of the year was followed by widespread attacks on freedom of expression and of the media. National newspapers were brought further under the control of the government through the restructuring of their boards of directors and the appointment of new editors, and articles critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the president were banned from publication in these papers. Prosecutions of critics of the president also increased. Independent satellite channels were subjected to increased administrative restrictions and security harassment, and legal provisions about defamation of religion were increasingly employed to impose severe prison sentences against a number of bloggers and to prosecute other writers and media professionals. Media institutions were intimidated and even physically surrounded, and newspapers and individual journalists and artists were attacked, both by the Muslim Brotherhood and by Salafist groups. In Yemen, violations targeted the activities of the political movement of the South and its affiliated press institutions and journalists, trials of journalists before the special press and publications court continued, and publications by the press in the south of the country continued to be confiscated. A number of journalists faced intimidation, death threats, physical attacks, and assassination attempts, and media campaigns accusing writers, journalists, and rights activists of heresy intensified. Despite the significant improvement in terms of freedom of expression seen in Libya following the ouster of the Qadhafi regime, journalists continued to face abduction and detention at the hands of local militias. Syria witnessed the gravest violations against freedom of expression and opinion, with some 150 press and media workers arrested during the beginning of the uprising, around forty of whom remained in detention until the end of 2012. Some 60 journalists and media professionals lost their lives, and a number of others were subjected to physical assaults and torture. Even as killings of journalists decreased in Iraq, three media professionals were killed by unknown assailants. The authorities threatened to shut down media outlets, and the government referred a bill on “information crimes” to the parliament. This bill aims to restrict freedom of expression and opinion as well as civic and rights activism, imposing penalties of up to life in prison
(33) on critics of the economic and social policies of the state or on those who shed light on the situation of human rights in the country. Journalists in the Kurdish region were also subjected to security harassment and prosecution. In Bahrain, a number of journalists and political opposition activists were arrested, prosecuted, or physically attacked, and one journalist was killed. The authorities imposed additional restrictions on the entry of foreign correspondents to the country, and some of them were detained. In Saudi Arabia, exceptional anti-terrorism courts were employed to try critics, internet activists, and rights defenders, and internet websites continued to be blocked in the country. The Sudanese authorities increasingly controlled newspapers in the country by confiscating their publications, thus causing them to incur massive financial losses. As a result, papers were forced to prevent journalists critical of the government from writing and to comply with security directives regarding banning information on certain issues from being published. A number of press institutions were also shut down. Journalists continued to be subjected to unfair trials which lacked the minimum guarantees of due process, and dozens of journalists, opposition members, and political activists were arrested. Furthermore, critical websites were increasingly blocked or hacked. In Algeria, journalists and internet activists continued to face prosecution and prison sentences. Despite the fact that the authorities hailed a new law adopted at the beginning of the year as a significant step to develop press freedoms, this law in fact allows for the restriction of freedom of expression based on allegations of defaming religion or opposing the national identity or the cultural values of society, or under the pretext of protecting state security, public order, or the economic interests or foreign policy needs of the country. Freedom of expression remained threatened in Morocco, given the continuation of prison sentences imposed for press and publication crimes. Moreover, the authorities continued to deal severely with criticism of the monarchy and opinions considered to contradict the religion of Islam. In Lebanon, the increased role of the military in administering political and civil life was accompanied by an increase in the number of civilians referred to military courts, including journalists, political activists, and rights defenders. Political and sectarian divisions, exacerbated by the repercussions of the Syrian uprising, led to increased attacks on journalists and correspondents as they were covering various acts of sectarian violence or protests supporting or opposing the Assad regime. In addition, a Lebanese
(34) photographer was killed by Syrian forces at the border between the two countries. Freedoms of expression and of the media remained targeted by all sorts of attacks at the hands of both the authorities of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the two parties to the Palestinian National Authority. Journalists, bloggers, and media teams were attacked while covering protests and subjected to detention, interrogation, prosecution, house arrest, and travels bans. The offices of media establishments were raided, websites were blocked, and media institutions were pressured to end programs critical of Hamas in Gaza.
3 – Increased Political and Sectarian Violence and the Spread of Violations by Non-State Parties Iraq continued to witness acts of violence between the Iraqi army and police and the armed militias loyal to rival political and ideological factions, in addition to acts of violence committed by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization in Iraq. Throughout the year, over 4,400 people were killed by suicide bombs, attacks using mortar bombs and firearms, and assassinations. A number of these attacks were sectarian in nature, targeting Shiite gatherings, holy shrines, and religious celebrations. Al-Qaeda, which is a Sunni organization, did not conceal its responsibility for a number of these attacks. Religious, ideological, and racial minorities – including the Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, and Turkmen minorities – continued to face attacks which appeared to be aimed at changing the demographic make-up of certain areas as part of attempts by the dominant ideological and ethnic groups, including Shiite and Sunni Arabs as well as Kurds, to consolidate their hold on political power, land, and natural resources. The transitional authorities in Libya were unable to control or to restructure the security apparatus, thus allowing armed militias to maintain control of large segments of the population and certain regions of the country. These militias refused to disarm or to surrender the thousands of detainees that they hold to the Libyan authorities. As such, acts of violence continued to target those suspected of having been loyal to Qadhafi, particularly dark-skinned Africans who are often suspected of having worked as foreign mercenaries. In addition, the armed forces, in conjunction with aligned militias, attacked the town of Bani Walid, which was considered a bastion of Qadhafi supporters. Dozens were killed and thousands displaced as a result. The transitional government in Yemen was also unable to extend its authority over the country, to restore security, and to resolve the divisions
(35) within the army, even as the traditional political, tribal, and military elites in the country continued to fight to fill the power vacuum left by the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Salah. The country’s principal security forces, the Central Security brigades, and the Republican Guard remained under the control of the family of the ousted president, while the First Armed Brigade remained under the command of a general who had defected from the Salah regime. Meanwhile, tribal militias supported different parties in the conflict. The political and security situation was exacerbated by increased terrorist activities by Al-Qaeda and affiliated Ansar al-Shari’a groups. Groups of Huthis in northern Yemen took advantage of these circumstances to reinforce their influence in the Sa’ada governorate, including through military operations targeting Salafist groups. In response to increasing acts of repression against the peaceful political movement in the south, some groups from the south moved towards armed campaigns, attacking security forces and government institutions. The Ansar al-Shari’a groups sought to impose their control and their beliefs about Islam (including applying penalties of flogging and amputation) on regions in the south of the country. The deaths of dozens of civilians due to random bombings by the military or to the shelling of Ansar al-Shari’a and al-Qaeda bases by American planes were recorded. Terrorist activities in the Yemeni capital, including attacks targeting the military, also resulted in large numbers of casualties. Syria witnessed a serious qualitative transformation from the brutal repression of the peaceful uprising which started in March 2011 to internal armed conflict between the security forces, the army, and affiliated militias known as “shabiha” (thugs) on one side and what is known as the Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition groups on the other. Some of the regiments of the Free Syrian Army and other armed groups opposed to the regime also committed grave violations, including extrajudicial killings, summary executions, and torture of detainees. Opposition groups also abducted civilians belonging to towns supportive of the Syrian regime, considering them a legitimate target for attacks. A number of bombings and suicide attacks occurred, leading to dozens of civilian deaths throughout the course of the year. The identities of the perpetrators of many of these acts were never uncovered. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascent to power in the second half of the year was accompanied by the use of its supporters and other political Islamist groups to intimidate media professionals, journalists, rights defenders, and judges and to surround the Supreme Constitutional Court to prevent it from reviewing cases related to the plans of the Brotherhood to dominate political life in the country. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood publicly incited their supporters to attack protests which were held against
(36) the group and against the president. The resulting attacks led to the deaths of 11 people and the detention, questioning, and torture of opposition protestors in front of the walls of the Presidential Palace before they were handed over to the police. In response, attempts were made to raid and set fire to dozens of offices belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party. In Tunisia, extremist Salafist groups threatened public and personal freedoms, even as the government led by the Islamist Ennahda party neglected to protect Tunisian citizens. These pressures were accompanied by a ban on certain cultural activities and the confiscation of a number of works of art based on allegations that they offended Islam, and leaders affiliated with the Ennahda party called for the implementation of penalties against workers who conducted strikes. Journalists, writers, media professionals, artists, and civil society activists all came under attack. Groups known as “Committees for the Protection of the Revolution,” which are closely affiliated with the Ennahda party, were accused on several occasions of violence against individuals and property; some political groups considered these committees responsible for the first political assassination in the country following the ouster of Ben Ali. In Lebanon, the situation of human rights was affected by repercussions of the conflict in Syria, particularly due to the conflicting positions of different groups in society towards the Syrian regime, which led to the worst outbreak of sectarian clashes since Hezbollah occupied Beirut in 2008. These clashes left dozens killed and hundreds wounded. Dozens of Syrians were also abducted as a form of retaliation for the abduction or disappearance of Lebanese in Syria. Political parties supportive of the Syrian regime were accused of backing attacks on the homes of Syrians opposed to the regime. Journalists and media institutions were subjected to attacks due to the positions they adopted on the conflict in Syria or to their coverage of the clashes which broke out in Lebanon. In Sudan, the intentional failure of Bashir’s regime to resolve issues related to ethnic and religious diversity led to the continuation of armed conflicts. The regime was adept at taking advantage of these conflicts and using tribal loyalties to confront political opponents. For example, tribal militias loyal to the regime were employed to commit armed attacks on citizens in Darfur as well as on international peace-keeping forces. These policies were accompanied by a growing trend on the part of the opposition in the regions of Kordofan and Blue Nile to resort to armed tactics under the banner of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-North). Some 170,000 people have been displaced as a result.
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4 – Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Crimes of arbitrary arrest continued to be committed, as did cases of enforced disappearance and of torture, ill-treatment, and deprivation of medical care in detention centers. Syria boasted the worst record in terms of arbitrary arrest, as some 32,000 people were arrested between the beginning of the uprising in March 2011 and October 2012. Entire families were arrested in order to pressure relatives to turn themselves in, and the families of members of the security forces or the army who defected to the opposition were also targeted. A large number of detainees – among them activists, rights defenders, and journalists – became forcibly disappeared, due to their detention in isolation from the outside world and the refusal of the authorities to reveal their places of detention. Hundreds lost their lives due to the widespread, systematic use of torture. In Yemen, the inability of the transitional authorities to rein in and reform the security establishment and to bring the army under a unified leadership left detention centers outside of the control of the state and without judicial review. The former centers of power (the national security and political security apparatuses, the Central Security forces, and the Republican Guard, which are directed by relatives of former president Salah; and the defected armed brigades and the tribal militias which support the Islamist-leaning Reform Party) maintained prisons and detention centers under their control, outside the supervision of the state and of the judiciary. As such, the government proved incapable of presenting any official clarification about these prisoners or about the nearly 200 disappeared persons who are suspected to be held in secret prisons and are likely subjected to torture. In Egypt, practices of torture and ill-treatment of detainees did not cease under the country’s first elected president. While eight people died in detention centers – likely as the result of torture – during the period when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was in control of the country, eleven deaths of detainees occurred after Mohammed Morsi assumed the presidency. Torture was also carried out by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood against opposition protestors in front of the Presidential Palace. In Tunisia, the year 2012 witnessed a significant increase in the use of torture against detainees as compared to 2011, with at least one detainee being killed as a result. Cases of sexual assault in detention centers increased as well. Meanwhile, the leader of the Ennahda Party – whose members were subjected to torture under the unjust rule of former president Ben Ali –
(38) sought to excuse the security establishment through statements that the security apparatus “does not concern itself with fine art and literature, but rather with confronting criminal acts.” In Libya, thousands of people remained illegally detained under the transitional authorities, and some 8,000 people continued to be held in detention centers run by armed militias. In Iraq, some 12,000 prisoners are held without charge or trial in prisons run by the Ministry of Justice, in addition to an unknown number of people detained in centers run by the police and military establishments. Reports continued to surface regarding detainees who lost their lives due to the torture which continues to be practiced in prisons, as detention facilities remain outside of judicial surveillance and lawyers are unable to contact those held inside. In Bahrain as well, torture led to a number of deaths in detention centers. Moreover, the judiciary refrained from investigating cases in which confessions were extracted through torture, instead using these confessions as evidence against the defendants. In Sudan, torture was used against the students who were detained in the context of demonstrations calling for democracy. Also recorded were a number of cases in which individuals were abducted, detained in unknown locations, and subjected to torture and intimidation. In Lebanon, reports of detainees being subjected to physical assaults upon arrest increased. Prison conditions in the country also deteriorated, particularly in Roumieh Prison. Notably, over 100 detainees from the Fatah al-Islam organization have been held for nearly 5 years without trial. In Saudi Arabia, prisoners continued to be subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture with the aim of extracting confessions from them. Corporal and inhumane punishments remained legal, and political activists were frequently subjected to punishments in detention, including forbidding them from receiving visitors for extended periods of time. In Morocco, reports continued to be heard of physical and psychological torture in detention, particularly against Sahrawi activists who took part in social protests. Morocco did not ensure surveillance or inspections of detention centers or penal facilities. In the occupied Palestinian territories, torture and ill-treatment were accompanied by deaths in detention centers both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The government of the Hamas movement in Gaza was
(39) responsible for the extrajudicial killings of a number of individuals who were arbitrarily sentenced to death based on accusations of “cooperation with the enemy.” Nearly 4,000 Palestinian detainees held in prisons run by the authorities of the Israeli occupation were subjected to violations, including solitary confinement and deprivation of visits. Administrative detention was employed to retain a number of these prisoners in long-term arbitrary detention.
5 – The Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Organizations Human rights defenders, union activists, and civil society activists in general continued to face arbitrary forms of legal and security harassment in many of the countries under study. A number of these activists were subjected to arbitrary arrest and prosecution. While there was a clear decline in violations against such activists and their organizations in Tunisia and Yemen, the “Arab Spring” did not positively affect the situation of human rights organizations and civil society activists in Egypt. Rather, smear campaigns and incitement against human rights organizations in the media culminated in the raids of 17 offices belonging to a number of Egyptian and international rights organizations, while draft legislation was proposed which aims to “nationalize” civic work and to do away with human rights organizations. Dozens of the leaders of independent unions were also arbitrarily arrested, tried, and summarily dismissed from their jobs. The National Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya drafted legislation to support the freedom to form non-governmental organizations and to carry out their activities independently from governmental oversight, yet this law was not officially adopted. Even so, Libya witnessed an explosion in the number of non-governmental organizations in the country, including the establishment of dozens of groups working in the fields of human rights and humanitarian relief. In Bahrain, dozens of human rights defenders and those who called for democratic reform remained targeted by escalating harassment and intimidation following the pro-democratic uprising which started in February 2011. An exceptional military court upheld sentences of life in prison against Abdelhadi al-Khawaja, the founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), and six others who had called for reform and greater democracy. Nabil Rajab, the president of the BCHR, was subjected to physical assaults by members of the security forces only a short time before a number of cases were opened against him and led to his imprisonment due to his rights-
(40) related activities. A number of other activists and rights advocates from the BCHR, as well as the president of the Bahraini Youth Society for Human Rights, were also arrested. The Bahraini authorities continued their practice of defaming rights activists, including those who cooperated with the United Nations mechanisms to expose the situation of human rights in Bahrain. In Syria, numerous of human rights defenders were subjected to arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, and torture. The office of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression was raided, and its director, Mazen Darwish, was arrested, along with fifteen others. Darwish’s fate, as well as that of a number of his colleagues, remained unknown until the end of the year. Seven other employees of the Center were referred to a military court based on the charge of “possessing material banned from publication.” The rights activist Adnan Wahba was killed by unknown, armed assailants, and Khalil Ma’touq, the executive director of the Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research, was arbitrarily arrested. In Saudi Arabia, the authorities maintained their policy regarding legal recognition of independent rights organizations, refusing to allow the Adala Center for Human Rights and the Monitor for Human Rights in Saudi Arabia to obtain licenses to work. The authorities particularly targeted the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association, and a number of its leaders were referred to court on various charges, including working with an unauthorized association, tarnishing the reputation of the country, and inciting international organizations against the Kingdom. Several activists were also banned from traveling to participate in the proceedings of the international rights mechanisms. In Sudan, arbitrary arrest and torture were used against numerous human rights defenders, and a rights defender was referred to court following her role in providing humanitarian assistance to those living in Kordofan and in uncovering violations occurring in the region. The authorities also expelled a number of foreign humanitarian organizations working in Darfur and in the east of the country. The Arry Organization for Human Rights and Development was banned from carrying out its activities, and six of its employees were arrested. Similarly, the registration of the al-Khatim Center for Enlightenment and Human Development was canceled, it was removed from the general registry of licensed voluntary organizations, and its assets were confiscated. The activities of the Sudanese Studies Center were suspended for a period of one year based on allegations that the organization constituted a threat to national security. In Algeria, the authorities adopted new legislation which imposed further restrictions on associations and non-governmental organizations. Security
(41) harassment and the threat of being tried before a judiciary which lacks independence continued to be used to intimidate and persecute activists, rights defenders, and union leaders. Indeed, several prominent members of the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights, a number of union activists, and members of committees working to defend the rights of the unemployed were sentenced to prison. In the occupied Palestinian territories, rights activists continued to be arbitrarily targeted by the Israeli authorities as well as by the governments in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Severe restrictions were imposed on the freedom of movement and the ability of prominent rights advocates to travel. A researcher with the Dameer Association for Human Rights was subjected to torture while under arrest, and the offices of the Dameer Association for Human Rights, the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network, and of the Union of Palestinian Women Committees were raided and their equipment and files confiscated. The offices of the Palestinian Human Rights Foundation (Monitor) in the West Bank were also closed, and rights activists were subjected to harassment, threats, and assaults while carrying out field monitoring. In Gaza, a researcher with the Al Mizan Center for Human Rights was physically attacked after receiving death threats. In Lebanon, rights activists were referred to military courts based on charges of tarnishing the reputation of the country and of the military after they published information regarding the conditions in a number of prisons and criticized practices of the army. Even though Morocco is one of the few Arab countries in which human rights organizations are allowed a margin of freedom and independence in which to carry out their work, the authorities continued to be hostile to rights organizations working in the Western Sahara, including by refusing to allow such organizations to legally register. Rights activists working on the region continued to face arbitrary arrest, physical attacks, and unfair trials.
6 – Minorities, Refugees, and Displaced Persons In Egypt, sectarian violence continued and was accompanied by attacks on both places of worship and private property belonging to Coptic Christians. Such incidents were fed by an escalation of the extremist rhetoric inciting to intolerance and religious hatred. Both the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and later the authorities affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood perpetuated Mubarak-style policies in dealing with issues of sectarian violence, which led to a worsening atmosphere of impunity. As a result, entire Coptic families were forcibly displaced from their homes due to the
(42) failure of the security apparatus to protect Copts from attacks by extremist Muslims. Moreover, the authorities continued to deny citizens belonging to the Shiite sect their right to practice their religious rites, and a number of Shiites were prosecuted based on charges of spreading Shiite ideas and performing prayer rituals in a way that violates the Sunni tradition. In Saudi Arabia, members of the Shiite Isma’ileyya minority were subjected to arbitrary restrictions on their right to freedom of religion, including on their religious celebrations and funeral processions. Discrimination against them also led to their clear exclusion from appointments to government positions. The Saudi authorities prosecuted religious leaders and political activists from this minority based on charges of undermining state security, and a number of them were sentenced to prison or banned from travel or from preaching. In Bahrain, the authorities did not undertake serious measures to put an end to the systematic discrimination against citizens belonging to the Shiite sect, which makes up a majority of the population in Bahrain. Even though the authorities reinstated most of those who had been dismissed from their jobs as part of an attempt to repress the popular uprising of February 2011, a number of these workers were forced to sign pledges stating that they would refrain from participating in any future demonstrations. In Syria, systematic discriminatory practices against the Kurdish minority declined, as the Assad regime focused instead on the all-out war against the Syrian people in a desperate attempt to suppress their calls for change. In fact, the Assad regime sought to keep the Kurdish population and other minorities removed from this conflict. The brutal repression which took place in the context of this conflict led to the displacement of nearly a million people, only some 350,000 of whom were able to obtain refugee status after fleeing to neighboring countries. In Iraq, religious, ideological, and racial minorities faced various forms of discrimination and armed attacks, as the dominant ideological and ethnic groups – such as Shiite and Sunni Arabs and Kurds – sought to extend their monopoly on power and wealth. Christians in particular were targeted by the government in an attempt to forcibly displace them and thus change the demographic makeup of the areas in which they live. The Yazidi minority in the region of Kurdistan was also subjected to repressive measures, with their activists restricted and their places of worship targeted. The Shabak and Turkmen minorities in Nineveh and Kirkuk were targeted by terrorist operations which were likely carried out in order to force these minorities to flee the areas in which they live.
(43) The situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon saw no improvement in 2012. The severely restricted access to Palestinian refugee camps, and in particular the Nahr al-Barid camp, remained a source of tensions and even violent confrontations with the armed forces. Restrictions also continued to affect new non-Palestinian refugees, with attacks by security forces and the army affecting Egyptian and Syrian workers as well as Sudanese refugees. In Sudan, those living in Darfur continued to suffer from armed attacks at the hands of state forces and tribal militias loyal to the government, which led to some 100 deaths, the destruction of a number of towns, and the displacement of some 25,000 people. Armed confrontations in the Kordofan and Blue Nile regions also caused some 170,000 people to flee their homes to refugee camps in South Sudan, yet even these camps were exposed to bombings by Sudanese planes. The Sudanese government further imposed a ban on all forms of trade with border areas, which exacerbated the problem of providing humanitarian assistance to refugees. In Morocco, positive steps were taken to address the discrimination and marginalization experienced by the Amazigh minority through the recognition of the Amazigh language as a national language in the constitution. This was followed by the launch of a television channel in the Amazigh language. Nevertheless, the education system continued to include content which reinforces discriminatory views of the Amazigh people and their culture, and the Amazigh language was not adopted in public administration or state institutions.
7 – Chronic Failures to Prevent Impunity For the most part, perpetrators of grave crimes against human rights continued to enjoy immunity from accountability and punishment. Even in the countries which succeeded in toppling their authoritarian rulers, the transitional authorities failed to adopt the holistic strategies for transitional justice necessary for successful transitions to democracy. In Egypt, the security apparatus refused to cooperate with the authorities investigating crimes related to the killing of protestors, whether committed during the last days of Mubarak’s rule, while the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was administering the country, or after the elected president assumed power in June 2012. As a result, these investigations were not sufficiently thorough and lacked important evidence, thereby allowing for the acquittal of high-ranking officials and members of the security apparatus. The two exceptions were the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak, and his Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly, both of whom received initial sentences of
(44) life in prison. Even in these two cases, however, the considerations of the court constituted a strong basis for appealing the ruling and holding a retrial, as the court reached its decision after finding that it did not have sufficient evidence to convict Mubarak and al-Adly, except based on their failure to stop the killing of protestors. The elected president also failed to uphold his promises to achieve justice for those killed during the revolution, despite the fact that he issued exceptional legislation under the name of “protecting the revolution,” which opened the door – in the case of more evidence being presented – to reopen investigations and hold retrials in the cases related to the killing of protestors. However, the provisions of this law could be interpreted to allow for impunity for the crimes that occurred after Mubarak was ousted, both under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is particularly worrisome given that the new public prosecutor was selected and appointed singlehandedly by the president in violation of the law and the constitution, and his independence is in severe doubt. As such, it is highly unlikely that investigations will be conducted into the killing of protestors and acts of torture attributed to the police and to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood after the elected president took power. In Libya, the transitional authorities do not appear prepared to adopt a uniform approach to ensure accountability and prevent impunity for the grave crimes and violations which occurred since the beginning of the uprising and the military operations which led to the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. Despite commitments by the National Transitional Council to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, the authorities opposed handing officials from the former regime for whom the Court had issued arrest warrants over to the Court. This is but one example of the widespread trend towards seeking revenge rather than ensuring justice in the country, as it would be difficult to claim that the Libyan judiciary is currently capable of establishing justice. Instead, the Libyan authorities reinforced the atmosphere of impunity for crimes committed by the revolutionaries and armed militias by adopting Law 38/2012, the provisions of which guarantee protection from accountability and punishment for all acts committed to ensure the success of and to protect the revolution. Indeed, it is not clear that the law exempts grave crimes such as forced displacement, arbitrary arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killing from this protection. The application of this law further entrenched the culture of impunity for similar crimes which continued to be committed even after the Qadhafi regime was overthrown.
(45) In Yemen, the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council provided for the despot Ali Abdullah Salah to step down in return for guarantees of immunity from prosecution for Salah, his supporters, and his family for crimes committed by his regime against the Yemeni people. Even though the presidency issued a decree to establish an independent, impartial committee to investigate the violations and massacres which had accompanied attempts to quell the popular uprising throughout 2011, the Yemeni parliament passed a law on “transitional justice and national reconciliation” which reinforced the impunity included in the Gulf Initiative, without prescribing criminal accountability for any of the parties involved in the human rights crimes which were committed since the outbreak of civil war in the 1990s. In Bahrain, the authorities failed to implement the recommendations of the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry related to the grave violations committed to repress of the popular uprising which began in February, 2011. Instead, the authorities sufficed with referring a limited number of low- ranking officers and soldiers to court; only three of them were condemned and sentenced to prison. In Sudan, the Bashir regime continued to commit crimes against the Sudanese people, especially in Darfur and the Kordofan and Blue Nile regions. International and regional pressures on the Sudanese regime to comply with the rulings of the International Criminal Court, to cooperate with it, and to surrender those responsible for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in the context of the armed conflict in Darfur diminished. In Lebanon, prospects dimmed for uncovering the truth about and achieving accountability for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the most prominent Sunni political figure in the country, as well as for a series of bombings and assassinations that targeted other Sunni leaders and those aligned with al-Hariri. Hezbollah continued to defy the rulings of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – the international tribunal set up to prosecute those responsible for the al-Hariri assassination – and refused to hand over those among its members who were indicted by the Tribunal. Hezbollah further threatened to ignite civil war if the opposing camp supported the International Criminal Court. Attempts to uncover the truth of what happened to of thousands of individuals who disappeared during the years of Syrian military invasion of Lebanon remained similarly ineffective. Finally, Israel announced that it would cease to cooperate with the United Nations Human Rights Council in response to a resolution by the Council condemning the continued proliferation of settlements in the occupied
(46) Palestinian territories and calling for an international fact-finding mission to be sent to investigate the issue of settlement policies. Similarly, the recommendations of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict – established to investigate the grave crimes committed during the war on Gaza in late 2008, which left some 1400 people dead – were not implemented, nor were those who refused to implement the recommendations held to account.
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The League of Arab States in the Wake of the “Arab Spring”
*Mervat Rishmawi
In 2011 and 2012, the League of Arab States (the League) took limited steps in relation to what has become known as the “Arab Spring” which may have important implications on human rights issues, as will be discussed below. While these developments may have broken with some of the practices of the past, they do not reflect a fundamental change in the work of the mechanisms of the League inspired by a set of coherent policy decisions, nor have they led to a new systematic approach within the League with regards to human rights. Arguably, some of the positions taken by the League in 2011 and 2012 - when cries for freedom and democracy rocked the Middle East and North Africa - illustrate that respect for human rights principles and international law is slowly but increasingly featuring in the work of the League. Despite this, the League has missed countless opportunities to play a constructive
* Mervat Rishmawi is a Palestinian human rights activist who currently works as an independent rights consultant. Previously, she worked for nearly ten years as the Middle East and North Africa legal advisor to the International Council of Amnesty International.
(49) and decisive role in systematically ensuring that its member states respect and protect human rights at all times. It is believed that some new factors may increase the potential for the Arab League to play a more decisive role in relation to respect of human rights and international law. These include the recent appointment in July 2011 of a prominent jurist as its Secretary General,2 the changing balance of power in the region as dictated by the emergence of new political leadership in some Arab countries, and the functioning of the treaty body which oversees implementation of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, as well as the reform process that is said to be taking place within the League itself. However, some observers fear that the developments of the “Arab Spring” do not portend well for human rights in the region nor, therefore, in the context of the Arab League, at least for the foreseeable future. It should be highlighted that most of the League’s major decisions related to reform initiatives in Arab countries have been made by the political bodies of the League. As such, balances of power and political interests and considerations continue to be the main impetus behind these decisions. At the same time, the significance of the positions adopted should not be underestimated.
The Process of Reforming the Arab League One issue that has long been on the agenda of the League is the reform of its Charter, including in order to include reference to the promotion and protection of human rights as one of the aims of the organization. However, decisions on this have been repeatedly delayed. In March 2011, the Council of the League (the League’s highest decision-making body) endorsed the report and recommendations made by the Standing Commission on Human Rights in its January 2011 session.3 In this report, the Commission noted the resolution issued by the Council in its earlier session in September 2010 to postpone adopting a decision on including a reference to human rights in the Charter of the League. This was said to be pending proposals on more general reform of the Arab League (see below for further information).
2 Nabil al-Arabi was appointed as Secretary General of the League in July 2011. He is a seasoned Egyptian jurist and diplomat and holds a doctoral degree in law. His extensive career includes many positions at the international level. He has served as a member of the International Court of Justice and previously as a member of the International Law Commission. 3 Council Resolution 7343, Regular Session 135, 2 March 2011.
(50) Therefore, no concrete decision about putting human rights at the heart of the organization has been adopted. The Standing Arab Commission on Human Rights, as a political body formed of political representatives of each of the 22 member states, has a narrow mandate and methods of work which are believed to significantly hinder its ability to actively engage on human rights concerns in the region. The Commission does not have special mechanisms (such as country or thematic special rapporteurs or working groups) to allow for direct engagement with victims of human rights violations. In March 2011, the Council of the League endorsed the decision of the Commission to ask the Secretariat to consult with member states and present a report on ways to activate the role of the Commission. The Commission also asked for an evaluation of the role of the Committee of Experts, which was initially created as a sub-Commission in 2007 and whose mandate was expanded to include the preparation of studies upon the request of the Commission or the Secretariat.4 However, in 2012, the Council of the League approved the recommendation of the Commission to end the work of the Committee of Experts as an independent body and to maintain an expert committee only for the purpose of overseeing the human rights education plan.5 The Standing Commission had also asked its Committee of Experts to propose ways to develop the criteria for giving observer status to NGOs, as the current criteria are very restrictive and have been widely criticized. Of particular concern is that the Commission only allows for NGOs to obtain observer - rather than consultative - status. Thus, NGOs are not allowed to intervene in deliberations or to make presentations, and until very recently they did not have access to documents or even the agenda prior to the League’s sessions. All of these issues are now being considered by a special commission on reform established by the Secretary General following his first speech upon being appointed. This commission, headed by Lakhdar Ibrahimi, will present its report to the Secretary General, who will transfer the matter to the Council. The mandate of the commission is supposedly to suggest ways to reform the Arab League in general, rather than specifically in relation to human rights mechanisms and standards or to the structure of the Secretar iat. In its development of the report, the commission has only met with a very limited number of NGOs, and it failed to establish mechanisms for holding
4 See agenda item 5 of the Report of the Commission for Human Rights, 26-30 January 2010, approved by Council Resolution 7202, Regular Session 133, 2-3 March 2010. 5 Council Resolution 7488, Regular Session 137, 10 March 2012, approving recommendations of Session 32 of the Arab Commission on Human Rights.
(51) public hearings, for calling for and receiving submissions, or for any formal avenues for civil society engagement. Nonetheless, several informal meetings did take place. Based on their own initiative, human rights NGOs also sent two main letters to the Commission at early stages in order to present specific observations and proposals.6 However, as it is not clear whether the report will be made public or if the League will establish avenues for debating the report with NGOs before its adoption, another joint letter was sent in 2012 calling for these two steps to be taken.
International Law and Setting Standards The Arab Human Rights Charter and Committee The Arab Charter on Human Rights was revised and entered into force on March 15, 2008. Currently, it has been ratified by 11 states, which represent half of the member states of the League. According to Article 48, initial reports are to be submitted one year after the Charter enters into force in a given state party, and periodic reports are to be submitted every three years thereafter. However, by June 2012, only Algeria and Jordan had submitted their initial reports, despite the fact that initial reports were due for all 11 state parties. Jordan’s report was considered by the Arab Human Rights Committee in April 2012 and Algeria’s report in October 2012, and the concluding observations and recommendations concerning both countries were made public several months after the review sessions. Bahrain also submitted its report in August 2012, but it was not discussed until the end of the year. The Arab Charter on Human Rights is the first and only existing treaty in the League to have an independent supervisory mechanism established according the treaty itself. The consideration of Jordan’s report was particularly important, as it was the first time that the Committee issued concluding observations. A review of these concluding observations reveals that the work of the Committee has been serious and vigorous – taking into consideration that this was the first report to be reviewed by the Committee – and that the Committee even referred to international law and standards in its consideration. Some of the most important points included in the Committees concluding observations are as follows. The Committee welcomed many positive aspects but initially criticized on principle the fact
6 For details of the letter signed by 37 NGOs in various Arab countries, see http://www.cihrs.org/?p=1889&lang=en.
(52) that no non-governmental organizations - nor even the National Human Rights Institute7 – were included in the process. The Committee referred specifically to CEDAW in criticizing that the Jordanian Constitution still does not expressly provide for equality between men and women, despite having been amended. Among the other issues criticized by the Committee were the light punishments imposed by the law for the commission of torture, highlighting that they are disproportionate to the seriousness of crime; the lack of clear legal provisions for reparation for torture; the contradiction between the law regarding protection of government secrets and the right to access to information; and the widespread practice of administrative detention and the legal grounds which provide for it. The Committee also noted that the state’s report does not clarify how the state deals with problems arising from the inability of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians to pass Jordanian nationality on to their children, pointing out that this is a form of discrimination against Jordanian women and recommending that the law be amended to enable Jordanian women to pass their nationality on to their children. The Committee also noted that labor legislation does not adequately deal with issues of trade union rights, child labor, and social security. The Committee provided a number of recommendations, including on combating torture, compensating victims of torture and arbitrary detention, and the need for an absolute prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the family and schools. The Committee further called for the amendment of a number of other laws and policies.8 Despite these important observations and recommendations, it should be noted that the Committee overlooked a number of critical observations and recommendations made by the mechanisms of the United Nations, which should have been addressed by the Committee as well. In October 2012, the Committee considered Algeria’s report. Among the issues of concern referred to by the Committee in its concluding observations were the lack of wide participation from civil society organizations in the preparation of the report, the fact that Algerian law does not explicitly prohibit the use of confessions extracted through torture, the authority of the executive branch exerted over the Supreme Judicial Council, the lack of clear standards for appointing, promoting, or dismissing judges, the lack of standards for making reparations to individuals following wrongful detention or unfair court decisions, the increased use of preventive detention, and the lack of surprise visits to detention centers. The Committee
7 The National Human Rights Institute is a state institution working in the field of human rights in Jordan. 8 Full text of the Observations and Recommendations of the Arab Human Rights Committee, issued in April 2012, is available on the website of the Arab League at www.lasportal.org.
(53) welcomed the issuance of a new law on associations in 2012 while noting that it remains unclear whether organizations will be able to carry out their activities in cases where the authorities do not respond with either approval or rejection within sixty days of when an organization’s application for registration is submitted. The Committee also welcomed the removal of some crimes from the list of those punishable by the death sentence under Algerian law, yet it criticized the lack of available information regarding a number of cases which were pardoned or in which a lighter penalties were issued in place of death sentences.
The Rights of the Child The last few years have also witnessed a discussion on whether there is a need for elaborating a revised Arab Convention on the Rights of the Child. In its session in January 2011, the Standing Commission took note of the position of the Arab Childhood Committee, which found that there is no need for updating the 1983 Charter on the Rights of the Arab Child. This position argued that since most Arab states (with the exception of Somalia) have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), there is no need to create an Arab instrument parallel to every international instrument. In its 2012 summit, the League adopted the Marrakech Declaration, which affirmed commitment to the CRC and its protocols and adopted tools for advancing children’s rights accordingly. According to the Charter of the Rights of the Arab Child, states submit reports to the General Secretariat (rather than to a treaty body of independent experts) on measures they have taken to give effect to the Charter. However, there is no clear timeframe or format for this.
The International Criminal Court and Impunity In May 2011, a conference was hosted by Qatar between the ICC and the Arab League, shedding light once again on the earlier position of the League which had strongly opposed the ICC following the indictment of Sudanese President Bashir. The conference saw the presentation of many statements on the importance of combating impunity and of cooperating with the ICC. However, the Arab League did not change its formal position concerning the
(54) indictment of Bashir.9 Furthermore, the League did not officially discuss the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against former Tunisian President Ben Ali and against former Libyan President Qadhafi and members of his family. It should be noted that Jordan, Djibouti, and Comoros were the first members of the Arab League to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. Following its revolution, Tunisia also acceded to the Rome Statute on 24 June 2011. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen are also signatories.
The “Arab Spring” The demands for democracy, reform, and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa, described by some as the “Arab Spring” or the “Arab revolutions”, have great ramifications for the relationship between the League and its member states on the one hand, as well as for the relationship between the League and international human rights law and standards on the other. While the situation in several Arab countries has been alarming and human rights were gravely violated for decades prior to the revolutions, the Arab League never took firm, serious steps in these situations to ensure respect for and protection of human rights. In fact, the position of the League on human rights violations leading up to and during the “Arab Spring” continued to be driven not by a coherent and systematic human rights policy but by political considerations. This is evidenced by the way in which the Arab League dealt with the situations in the various countries which experienced uprisings. While the Arab League discussed the situations in Libya and Syria through regular and extraordinary sessions of many of its bodies, the situations in Yemen and Bahrain did not attract similar attention, despite the seriousness of the violations being committed in these two countries. From the start of the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab countries, the Arab League reacted initially through statements issued by the previous Secretary General, calling on states to respect freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, to resort to dialogue, and to refrain from the use of excessive and lethal force. However, this did not trigger a noticeable reaction beyond such general statements. For example, in a statement made by the Secretary General on February 3, 2011, the Arab League called for an inquiry into the violent events which had taken place in Tahrir Square in
9 Following the decision of the ICC prosecutor to issue the arrest warrant against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan on 9 December 2009, several bodies of LAS, including the Summit, issued resolutions rejecting the decision, stressing the integrity of Sudan. See for example Summit Decision 465, Regular Session 21, 30 March 2009. See also Prosecutor v Al Bashir [Warrant of Arrest] ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 2009.
(55) Cairo, Egypt when demonstrators were violently attacked. However, the matter did not come before any of the political or human rights bodies of the League, and no decision or position beyond this statement was taken on this particular event. Surprisingly, another statement welcomed the announcement of President Mubarak not to run for another term in office. The response to the situation in Libya was different. It may be argued that the position of the League concerning Libya was not surprising, given that at the time of the revolution in 2011, the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi had made an enemy out of almost every Arab regime. For this reason, the route that the Arab League took in the case of Libya was different from that adopted in relation to Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, which all have their own political allies both within the League and in the international community. In February 2011, the Council suspended Libya’s right to participate in all of the League’s bodies and meetings out of protest at the violence being used against civilians.10 This was followed by a resolution of the Council on Libya in its regular session in March 2011 condemning the violence and attacks unleashed by the Libyan authorities against civilians; at the same time, the resolution rejected what was called “any attempts at foreign intervention in Libya”.11 In an extraordinary session held ten days later, the Council, while still rejecting foreign intervention, asked the UN Security Council to “take necessary measures to impose a ‘no fly zone’” over Libya.12 The subsequent UN Security Council Resolution no. 1973,13 which refers to the resolutions of the Arab League, authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya while excluding a foreign occupation of any form on any part of Libyan territory. A coalition of NATO allies and other Arab partners began an operation whose purpose was said to be “to enforce an arms embargo, maintain a no-fly zone, and protect civilians and civilian- populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya.”14 In the case of Bahrain, the League did not condemn the use of force against demonstrators or the mass arrests of reformists and demonstrators. The Council approved the initiative of the King of Bahrain to resolve conflict
10 See Statement of the Council no. 136 in its extraordinary session on 22 February 2011. Full membership status was restored on 27 August 2011 when the Libyan Transitional Council was considered the representative of the Libyan people in the League. See Council Resolution 7370, Extraordinary Session 27 August 2011. 11 Council Resolution 7298, Regular Session 135, 2 March 2011. 12 Council Resolution 7360, Extraordinary Session, 12 March 2011. 13 See: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution. 14 See NATO and Libya on NATO’s website, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm.
(56) through dialogue and rejected any foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs yet justified the entry of the Gulf Shield Forces into Bahrain on the basis of the joint security and defense agreement between GCC members. The League welcomed the establishment of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry but did not comment on the outcome of the Commission’s investigation, conclusions, or report, which blamed the government for the use of lethal force and pointed to the shared responsibility of the government and the opposition for the escalation of events.15 Further, the League did not call on Bahrain to implement the recommendations of the Commission. The position of the Arab League on Yemen has been weak, calling for a peaceful transition of power, condemning “crimes against civilians”, and requesting concerted efforts to safeguard national unity and the right to freedom of expression. In April 2012, the League announced its support for the initiative of the GCC to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis in Yemen. This marked a setback for international justice, as the GCC initiative provided for impunity for President Ali Abdullah Saleh through an agreement under which he was allowed to leave the country and given guarantees that he would not be brought to justice in exchange for a transfer of power.16 The position of the League towards Syria was clearer and marked a shift towards a more proactive role. In addition to condemning of the use of lethal force and calling for respect for freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, the League initially approved a four-step agreement with Russia based on calling on all parties to cease violence, the acceptance of an independent monitoring mechanism, the rejection of international intervention, and enabling access to humanitarian assistance.17
15 The Independent Commission of Inquiry concluded that ”there is no doubt that what occurred in February/March [2011], and subsequently, was the result of an escalating process in which both the Government and the opposition have their share of responsibility in allowing events to unfold as they did.” The Commission adds that “[t]he forceful confrontation of demonstrators involving the use of lethal force and resort to a heavy deployment of Public Security Forces led to the death of civilians. This caused a marked increase in the number of persons participating in protests and led to a palpable escalation in their demands.” See Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, presented in Manama, Bahrain on 23 November 2011, para. 1690-1691, available at http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf. 16 See Summit Decision 555, Regular Session 23, 29 March 2012. 17 Council Resolution 7460, Regular Session 137, 10 March 2012.
(57) In October 2011, the League agreed with the Syrian president on a plan which called for the cessation of violence by all parties, the release of all detainees arrested in the context of the crisis, the removal of all arms from residential areas, and allowing the organizations of the League and all media outlets to access Syria freely. In the light of Syria’s lack of cooperation with this plan, the Council of the League voted in November 2011 to suspend Syria’s right to participate in meetings of all bodies of the League. This resolution also provided for the imposition of economic and political sanctions.18 Gradually, the position of the League became more decisive. On September 5, 2012, the Council of the League condemned attacks against civilians by government forces and Shabiha and decided to provide all required forms of support for the Syrian people to defend themselves. The Council further called on the UN Security Council to ensure the cessation of attacks against civilians by the Syrian regime in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.19 In an earlier resolution of an extraordinary session of the Council, the League had decided to call on the Syrian president to leave power but also stated that the League would assist him and his family in achieving a “safe exit”.20 In this resolution, as in many previous resolutions, both Algeria and Iraq registered their reservation against the call for the Syrian leader to step down and the reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Lebanon distanced itself altogether from this resolution as with similar resolutions previously passed. It should be noted that the League met at several occasions with representatives of the Syrian opposition. On July 3, 2012, the Arab League sponsored a conference for the Syrian opposition which concluded with the participants, who represented various opposition groups, adopting a common political vision. Previously, the League had made a decision in November 2011 to send an observer mission to Syria.21 This was widely criticized by NGOs and some bodies of the League, including the Arab Parliament and the Arab Human Rights Committee, for lacking clear guidance, training, and equipment. The mission was withdrawn in February 2012. On February 23, 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League to Syria and mandated to provide good offices with the aim of ending all violence and human rights violations and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.22 In an annex to Security Council Resolution
18 Council Resolution 7438, Extraordinary Session, 12 November 2011. 19 Council Resolution 7523, Regular Session 138, 5 September 2012. 20 Council Resolution 7510, Extraordinary Session 22 July 2012. 21 Pursuant to Council Resolution 7438, Extraordinary Session, 12 November 2011. 22 In accordance with the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253, 16 February 2011.
(58) 2042 of 14 April 2012, the Security Council adopted the six-point plan proposed by the Joint Envoy.23 On April 21, 2012, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2043, which set up the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), initially established for a period of 90 days and made up of a deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers and a civilian component. The UNSMIS mandate has been renewed regularly since its establishment.24 This and many other subsequent resolutions, which also refer to the positions and role of the Arab League, demanded that the Syrian Government ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance, increase the pace and scale of releasing arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists throughout the country, and respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully. Mr. Lakhdar Ibrahimi was appointed as Joint Envoy a few days after the resignation of Mr. Annan on August 2, 2012, when Annan acknowledged that his mission had failed.
The Arab Parliament The Baghdad Summit in March 201225 adopted the Statute of the Arab Parliament, which was previously endorsed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.26 The Arab Parliament is a new addition to the structure of the League established through an article added to the League Charter which provides that “[an] Arab Parliament shall be established in the framework of the League, and its rules of procedure, composition, functions and areas of competence shall be defined”.27 The Parliament is composed of four members from each state who are to be chosen, appointed, or directly elected by their own national parliaments or similar national assemblies. According to the Statute, considerations are to be taken to ensure female representation. The primary responsibility of the Parliament is to ensure economic, social, and developmental cooperation towards achieving Arab unity. Particularly, the Parliament has a primary responsibility to foster Arab relations, cooperation, and joint mechanisms and to guarantee national security and
23 See: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10609.doc.htm. 24 See: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10618.doc.htm. 25 Arab League Summits are held annually in March. The March 2011 Summit was delayed repeatedly until it was finally held at the end of March 2012 in Baghdad; the various and sometimes conflicting positions of Arab states concerning the situation in the region were said to be reasons for the delay, along with security concerns over holding the summit in Iraq. 26 See Summit Decision 559, Regular Session 23, 29 March 2012. 27 ‘Development of the Joint Arab Collaboration System: Amendments to Some Articles of the Charter of the League of Arab States’, the League Summit Decision 290, Regular Session 17, 23 March 2005, and ‘Development of the Joint Arab Collaboration System: Establishment of an Interim Arab Parliament’, the League Summit Resolution 292, Regular Session 17, 23 March 2005.
(59) promote human rights. The Parliament is not given the power to draft agreements, but it can endorse agreements referred to it before they are ratified by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The decisions of the Parliament are not binding but rather are considered recommendations which must be ratified by a Ministerial Council or a Summit if they are to take effect. The body can question ministerial councils, the Secretary General, senior staff of the Secretariat, or the specialized agencies of the Arab League. The Parliament also plays a primary role in leading efforts to unify Arab legislation and to provide guidance in this area. The seat of the Parliament is Syria, and its sessions are public unless the Parliament decides otherwise.28 It is clear that the Parliament is a relatively weak body which will not be able to ensure through its decisions that, for example, Arab legislation is consistent with international law. However, it is possible that the Parliament will be able to ensure that debate on such matters is constantly prioritized on the agenda, especially in its efforts to review treaties or unify Arab legislation. Obviously, this will depend on the members and their own commitment to human rights.
An Arab Court Although Article 19 of the original version of the League Charter (Article 20 of the amended Charter) provides for the creation of an Arab Court of Justice by the agreement of two-thirds of the Council, this provision has not yet been realized. Discussions regarding the creation of such a court have taken place in the past, but a decision on this has been repeatedly delayed. In 1996, the Arab Summit agreed to establish the Arab Court of Justice in principle and charged the Arab ministers of foreign affairs with the task of completing a final draft of its Statute.29 Proposals for the statute of the court were made by the Secretariat in 2005, but discussion on this was again delayed. In March 2012, a new proposal to create a court was presented by the Kingdom of Bahrain. However, this time the proposal was specifically to create an Arab Court for Human Rights. The Council of the League took note of the proposal and welcomed Bahrain’s suggestion to convene a conference in 2012 to discuss the issue. The Council also asked the
28 Until June 2012, sessions of the Parliament have met outside Syria due to the situation in Syria. The creation of the Parliament was preceded by a Preparatory Parliament, which also met in Syria. 29 Summit Decision 196, “Arab Court of Justice, Honour Charter for Security and Cooperation, League of Arab States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Arab Union Proposal”, 23 June 1996.
(60) Secretariat of the League to develop a study on the issue, taking into account the comparative experiences of regional courts and drawing on studies done by Arab experts. The Council decided to review the outcome of the conference, the study, and the opinions of Arab states at a later session.30 No documentation of this proposal was made public, which makes it virtually impossible for NGOs to comment on the details of the proposal.
30 Council Resolution 7489 “Establishment of an Arab Court on Human Rights”, Regular Session 137, 10 March 2012.
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Tyranny of the Majority: Islamists’ Ambivalence towards Human Rights
Moataz El Fegiery *
The Arab revolutions have not yet led to the emergence of democracies founded upon respect for human rights and individual freedoms. Islamists took power through the ballot boxes in Tunisia and Egypt, but their ambivalent approach to human rights has subverted or delayed these rights. This paper evaluates the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the Salafist Nour Party in Egypt, and the Ennahda Party in Tunisia by analyzing the positions, programs, and practices of these Islamist parties in light of international human rights standards.1
* Moataz El Fegiery is a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London and member of the board of directors of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. This chapter is adapted from a book published in October 2012 by FRIDE, a think tank based in Spain. 1 For the purpose of this study, I will identify theoretical and practical positions using official platforms, pamphlets, statements, parliamentary records and intellectual contributions of the main ideologues and scholars of the three parties: the Freedom and Justice Party, the Ennahda Party, and the Nour Party. In talking about Ennahda, I will make use of the writings of Rached Al-Ghannouchi, who was recently re-elected president of the movement and whose book on public liberties is acknowledged by Ennahda as one of its official documents.
(63) Since the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, Islamists have engaged actively in the transitional processes in Egypt and Tunisia, succeeding in coming to power in these two countries. The FJP and Ennahda are currently the largest political parties in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively, and the Nour Party became the second-largest political bloc following the first parliamentary elections held in Egypt after the revolution. These Islamist parties, which are under study in this paper, have led the processes of drafting the new constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia. In their programs, statements, and literature, Islamists have been keen to show that their beliefs are not incompatible with international human rights standards. However, the evidence shows that, in fact, universal human rights will be endangered under the rule of these parties due to their ambivalent conception of rights. Islamists vary in their opinions on specific rights, ranging from hardline positions to reformist attitudes, and thus they have failed to develop a coherent and consistent approach to human rights. Islamists have not abandoned the objective of establishing Islamic states based on adopting Shari‘ah (Islamic law) as the legal framework for the state. They reject the ‘civil’ or secular state that is neutral towards all religions and based on citizenship and equality before the law. Limiting democracy to the holding of elections - without safeguards for individual human rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers - will not prevent the emergence of new majoritarian tyrannies and their rise to power through the ballot box, at the expense of the rights of minorities. This is certainly not what the Arab revolutionaries aspired to.
A number of key questions are relevant in assessing the human rights record of Islamist parties. What is the status of human rights in Islamic law in general? What commitments did Islamist parties make regarding fundamental human rights before the elections? To what degree are their visions of fundamental human rights in line with international human rights standards? How have Islamist parties in government performed in terms of respect for human rights? And finally, what does the ambivalence of Islamist parties towards human rights mean for the future of Arab societies and for their relations with their international partners?
(64) Islamists in Power: A Distorted View of Democracy Islamism, or political Islam, refers to ‘the reassertion of the role of Islam in both public and private life’.2 The Islamist movements and parties considered here are those political organisations that ‘mobilise and agitate in the political sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic traditions’.3 Islamist movements are diverse in their strategies and interpretations of Islamic legal traditions. These differences can be attributed to the historical and organisational evolution of these movements, as well as to the changing socio-political contexts in which they operate.4 Bassam Tibi differentiates between jihadist Islamists, who use violence to achieve their political objectives, and institutional Islamists, who pursue their goals through non-violent means and engage in formal political processes and institutions.5 Institutional Islamists are influential political actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) today, having gained the largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in 2011 and 2012. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is also a key player in the Syrian opposition. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, recently became the country’s first civilian elected president. In Libya, Islamists have failed to achieve the same electoral success as their peers in Tunisia and Egypt, yet they remain influential.
The increasing political clout of Islamist parties across the region has stirred up serious domestic and external concerns over the depth of their practical commitment to international human rights standards. Long before the Arab revolutions, many observers were suspicious of Islamists’ commitment to human rights and liberal democracy.6 These concerns were bolstered by previous experiences of Islamic governance and the application of Shari‘ah law in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Northern Nigeria and
2M. Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.2. 3 S. Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (New York: I.B Tauris, 2006), p.2. 4 M. Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 14-17. 5 B. Tibi, Islam and Islamism (New York: Yale University Press, 2010), p.10. 6See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 2002), pp.192-198; B. Lewis, ‘Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, 36(2002), pp. 48-50; B. Tibi, ‘Why They Can’t Be Democratic’, Journal of Democracy, 19(3) (2008), pp. 43-48.
(65) Afghanistan.7 Given the popularity of Islamist parties in many Muslim states, other analysts advocated for the integration of peaceful Islamists into political processes as a tool of de-radicalization and moderation.8
Before the revolutions, Islamist parties were outlawed in Egypt and Tunisia. However, they remained active in the political opposition to varying degrees. In Egypt after 1984, the Mubarak regime intermittently tolerated the political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and MB members were represented in the parliaments of 1984 and 1987 as independents; they also dominated professional syndicates and student unions. The group was subjected to a security crackdown during the 1990s, yet in 2000 and 2005, the MB emerged once again as a powerful oppositional bloc in the parliament. In Tunisia, Ennahda, known before 1989 as al-Itijah al-Islami, was a major political player during 1980s, yet it was systematically banned and repressed in Tunisia after 1989. Many of the top leaders of Ennahda lived in exile. After the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali, the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda have flourished in the political scenes of their respective countries.
Other Islamist actors have emerged as well. In Egypt, Salafists, as well as former violent jihadist movements such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, have formed political parties. After decades of staying away from formal politics, Salafists decided to make use of the free political space in the post-Mubarak era and to participate in politics. The main social base of the Nour Party is the Salafist Call Association in Alexandria, a major organisational umbrella group for Salafists in Egypt.9 Tunisian Salafists have also become visible in public life, but unlike their Egyptian counterparts, they have not yet participated in post-revolution elections. On March 30, 2012, the first
7See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004) Fourth edition, pp. 36-46; P. Marshall, ‘Introduction: The Rise of Extreme Shari’a’, in P. Marshall (ed.) Radical Islam’s Rules: the Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari’a Law (Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 1-17. 8 K. Kausch, ‘Plus Ca Change: Europe’s Engagement with Moderate Islamists’, FRIDE’s Working Paper 75, 2009, available at: www.fride.org/publications/563/europe’s-engagement- with-moderate-islamists (Accessed 15 February 2012); K. Roth, ‘Time to Abandon the Autocrats and Embrace Rights: the International Response to the Arab Spring’, in Human Rights Watch World Report 2012 (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2012), pp. 1-21. In the introduction of the 2012 world report of the Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of the organisation, states that ‘Islamic movements are hardly monolithic or implacably opposed to rights. Yet rather than engage with them to demand respect for rights, Western governments have often treated them as untouchable.’ 9 U. Abdul Latif, ‘Salafists and Politics in Egypt’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, available at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/508a64a4-3f6e-4958-8e1b- e0c9d6288d67, p. 11.
(66) Tunisian Salafist party was established, with a view to competing in the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2013.10 Th experience of Islamists in power so far demonstrates that their conception of democracy is limited to competition at the ballot box, with less appreciation for ensuring the rights of minorities, individual liberties, the separation of powers, and the independence of public institutions, including the judiciary. If this trend continues, Islamist-led regimes in the wake of the revolutions will entrench a tyranny of the majority rather than true democracies, as envisaged by the revolutions. After coming to power, Egyptian Islamists have been far more concerned with securing a dominant position in the emerging regime than with working with other political forces to consolidate the transition to democracy. Many of their actions have raised doubts about the genuineness of their commitment to democracy and the rule of law. Although Ennahda showed a liberal and consensus-driven mindset at times throughout the transition in Tunisia, its recent political behaviour and its stance on certain human rights are cause for concern. Having obtained the majority of seats in the parliament in Egypt, Islamists dominated the Constituent Assembly as well,11 and they refused to develop a set of supra-constitutional principles regarding human rights, citizenship, and democratic governance. The FJP and the Nour Party firmly maintain that the elected parliament should have exclusive authority to oversee the drafting process of the new constitution. They have refused to give universal human rights a privileged status in the constitution, arguing that these rights reflect ‘western values’.12 President Morsi has succeeded in asserting his power over the military,13 but no reforms have yet been undertaken to prevent the politicization of the army. The Muslim Brotherhood has dominated state-owned media and used Mubarak’s press law to silence journalists. President Morsi has also broken his electoral promise to restructure the membership of the Constituent Assembly to reflect Egypt’s political
10 The Reform Front Party was officially established on 30 March 2012. See S. Ajmi, ‘Reform Front Party: Tunisia’s First Salafist Party’, Tunisia Live, 11 May 2012, available at: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/05/11/reform-front-party-tunisias-first-salafist-party/ . 11 See M. Ottoway, ‘The Death of the Constituent Assembly’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/13/egypt- death-of-constituent-assembly/brzn. 12 See ‘A Statement by the Freedom and Justice Party’, 6 September 2011, available at: http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=2308. 13 See M. El Fegiery, ‘Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil-Military Relations’, FRIDE Policy Brief, 14 August 2012, available at: http://www.fride.org/publication/1054/crunch-time-for- egypt’s-civil-military-relations.
(67) diversity, and he failed to deliver on his promise of an inclusive cabinet. Islamists’ imprint on public institutions was obvious in the formation of the National Council for Human Rights, some members of which are known for their outright hostility to human rights.14 One member was previously involved in a flagrant incitement to hatred and violence against Shiite Muslims.15 President Morsi and his Islamist allies consider that their success at the ballot box allows them to infringe on the independence of the judiciary and to subordinate the judiciary to their political agenda. Indeed, the Egyptian judiciary has been subjected to flagrant attempts to control its supervisory role over the executive and the legislature. President Morsi has confronted the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and circumvented its judgment on the dissolution of the parliament. He unilaterally adopted a Constitutional Declaration on November 21, 2012 to immunize his actions from the judicial oversight. This declaration allowed him to dismiss the attorney general and to appoint a new one of his own choosing. When the SCC refused to submit to the president, Islamists besieged the headquarters of the SCC and prevented its judges from entering in an attempt to prevent potential judgments on the constitutionality of the upper house of parliament and of the law regulating the Constituent Assembly. One of the stated objectives of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood has been to stifle the powers of the SCC in the name of reforming the judiciary.16 The SCC does need reforms to ensure its full independence, but these reforms must not serve as a pretext to weaken the court. Islamists used the new constitution as an opportunity to achieve this goal. Article 233 reduced the number of judges in the court from 17 to 11. Accordingly, its newest six members were removed from the bench. Article 176 provides that both judicial and non-judicial organs can nominate judges to serve on the SCC and that their appointment takes place by presidential decree. Before the adoption of the constitution, the general assembly of the SCC was charged with appointing its members and president. The new appointment system will allow the government to restructure the membership of the court in the near future. Moreover, a new law being prepared to regulate the court is likely to limit its jurisdiction. This attack on the judiciary is not an attempt at judicial reform, as claimed by the
14 See ‘Political Groups, Figures Concerned over Politicised Human Rights Council’, Ahram Online, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/52100/Egypt/Politics- /Political-groups,-figures-concerned-over-politicis.aspx, accessed 6 May 2012. 15 See the statement of Safwat Hegazî, a leading Islamist who is a close ally of the Muslim Brotherhood, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_3m10LZ4mU, accessed 6 May 2012. 16 See the statement of the leftist al-Tagammuh Party on 8 August 2012, available at: http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/35934.
(68) president and his supporters. Rather, the president and his allies have taken these actions to enable their use of the judiciary in the future in order to serve their political goals. In the early months of Tunisia’s transition, Ennahda tended to seek political compromise with secular parties, even when the concessions involved came at the expense of important elements of the party's ideological underpinnings. It confirmed its willingness to share power with other Tunisian political forces and to draft an inclusive constitution. It also declared its respect for the rights of women as enshrined in family law. One major step was Ennahda’s agreement with other political forces to refer to Islam as the official religion of the state in the first section of the constitution, rather than citing Shari‘ah as the main source of legislation. This move did not signal an abandonment of Ennahda’s Islamist agenda. Rather, it reflected a new organisational and political reality that is different from the situation of Islamists in Egypt. Ennahda has chosen to defer controversial political issues likely to divide Tunisian society so as to successfully steer the country through the fragile political transition. Unlike their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisian Islamists face a strong secular opposition and feminist movement. These actors pressure the Islamist movement and its political leadership to emphasize their reformist understanding of Islamic law. Ennahda has not rejected the doctrine of supremacy of Shari‘ah and the traditional methods of Islamic law, yet this does not contradict with the development of its comparatively progressive views on human rights. Tensions remain between its Islamist agenda and international human rights standards, but in comparison to the thought and practice of Islamists in Egypt, Ennahda has thus far introduced a relatively soft version of Islamism. Even before the revolution, political leaders of Ennahda had engaged in dialogue with secular Tunisian political forces and reached agreements with them on many sensitive issues.17 Nevertheless, this consensus has recently been threatened amid accusations by its political partners that Ennahda is attempting to monopolize power and to restrict media freedoms and gender equality.18 Ennahda has been also
17 See L. Hajji, ‘The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia’, Arab Reform Initiative, February 2007, available at: http://www.arab-reform.net/18-october-coalition- rights-and-freedoms-tunisia. 18‘Tunisia President Launches Attack against Ruling Islamists’, AFP, available at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5icOQzez62kG3rLP2EptGS3vbTT- Q?docId=CNG.6ecabf95f500747be87b57255a70d2e9.7b1.
(69) criticised for being too lenient with hardline Salafists who have committed violence against intellectuals and against artistic activities.19 Recently, the Tunisian government arbitrarily dismissed 75 judges from their posts, claiming to be purging the judiciary. This action represents an inappropriate interference in the judiciary, as the government has not adopted a transparent and impartial mechanism to review the records of judges.20 Moreover, the independence of the judiciary and of constitutional monitoring bodies remains questionable under the current draft of the constitution,21 which provides for the establishment of a new Constitutional Court that would be charged with interpreting the constitution and overseeing the constitutionality of future laws. However, the parliament would be charged with selecting the judges of this Constitutional Court based on nominations from the president, the prime minister, the speaker of the parliament and the Supreme Judicial Council, thus subjecting the court to the dominant political groups in the parliament. The parliament would also be charged with appointing the members of the High Elections Commission, the National Human Rights Council, and other monitoring bodies. No criteria are suggested in the draft constitution to ensure that political considerations do not influence the selection process and, thus, the independence of these bodies.
Ideological Underpinnings and Political Practice Examining the ideological and programmatic deliberations of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nour Party, and Ennahda can provide insight into these groups’ posture towards human rights and their views regarding the relationship between religion and the state. This section also addresses the relevant constitutional, legal, and political positions taken by these parties after coming to power. Issues that are particularly important to discussions regarding Islamists’ commitment to human rights and democracy include the role and nature of the state, the definition of human rights, the relationship between Shari‘ah and pluralism, equality between men and women, limits of religious freedom, the rights of non-Muslim citizens, and restrictions on the freedom of expression.
19 N. Dalaa, ‘Is the Ennahda Government Soft on Salafists?’, Al-Monitor, 24 May 2012, available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/05/tunisian-media-and-political- ana.html. 20 Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: Mass Firings a Blow to Judicial Independence’, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/29/tunisia-mass-firings-blow-judicial-independence. 21 In this paper, I refer to the draft Tunisian constitution published on 14 December 2012.
(70) The Civil State with an Islamic Reference Islamists have argued that their conception of Shari‘ah as the legal framework of the state is compatible with that of a constitutional democratic state. Many have pointed out that they seek to establish not a theocracy but a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’. At the same time, the distinction made by many Islamists between a theocratic state and an Islamic civil state fails to address the fears expressed by non-Muslims, liberals, and the human rights community. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda consider themselves to be part of a centrist, ‘moderate’ Islamism. In its platform, Tunisia’s Ennahda underlines the movement’s enlightened understanding of Islam. It has expressed its readiness to let its doctrine benefit from modern human and civilizational achievements through ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning).22 The FJP and Ennahda say that very few rulings in Shari‘ah are fixed and unamenable to change, having been derived from provisions of the Qur’an or Sunna that are of indisputable meaning and authenticity. All other rulings are established through ijtihad, guided by the overarching legal principles of Islamic jurisprudence, the intent of Shari‘ah, and the principle of seeking the public interest.23 This approach to Shari‘ah leaves open a wide space for human reasoning, but it does not provide a sufficient basis for reforming religion. Many of the so-called fixed rulings in the Qur’an and Sunna are not compatible with fundamental human rights such as gender equality, the rights of non- Muslims, and the prohibition of cruel forms of punishment. Moreover, this approach leaves many loopholes open for the issuance of arbitrary rulings based on the positions and values of the bodies tasked with interpreting Shari‘ah as the legal framework of the state. Like the FJP and Ennahda, the Salafist Nour Party shares the view that Islam offers comprehensive guidance for the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, and as such it believes in the supremacy of Shari‘ah.24 Generally, Salafism refers to the Islamist trend that aims to purify Islamic belief and practices by returning to the origins of Islam as practiced by the Prophet and his companions. This definition can be applied to many
22 Parnāmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html, p.3. 23Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p.28. See also Al-Nahdah Movement, al-Rū’iyyah al-Fikriyyah wa al-Manhaj al-ūsūlî (2011), available at: .اﻟﻔﻜﺮﯾﺔ-اﻟﺮؤﯾﺔ/http://www.ennahdha.tn 24 See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
(71) Islamists, including Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood. However, today the term ‘Salafism’ is usually used to refer to Islamists influenced by Wahabism and Zahirism, which are characterized by their emphasis on strict and literal interpretations of Qur’an and Sunna.25 Since the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood has been exposed to increasing Salafist influence, and many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are also part of Salafist associations in Egypt.26 The MB states that it aims to establish a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’.27 The MB insists that this model differs fundamentally from the theocracies of medieval Europe, claiming that in an Islamic state, no special privileges would be given to clergy in the name of God, the source of authority would be the people, and democratic institutions would be entrusted with protecting the teachings of Islam.28 The constitution would be based on the principles of Shari‘ah, and the function of shura (consultation) would be performed through an elected parliament whose decisions are binding on the ruler. The parliament would legislate in accordance with the principles of Shari‘ah, and the Supreme Constitutional Court would oversee the compatibility of laws with these principles.29 The Nour Party generally agrees with the FJP on the structure and nature of the ‘Islamic version’ of democracy ruled by Shari‘ah, but it rejects the term ‘civil state’, fearing that this idea could undermine the application of Islamic law.30 Like the FJP, the Nour Party rejects both the theocratic and the secular state. It affirms its belief in an Islamic, modern, constitutional state where representative democracy is practiced in accordance with Shari‘ah. This state, according to the Nour Party, would be based on the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the respect of human rights and public liberties.31 The concept of a civil state with an Islamic reference poses many dangers for the future of human rights and constitutionalism. Fundamental human rights,
25 G. Denoeux, (2011) ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam’, in Volpi, F., (ed.) Political Islam: a Critical Reader. New York: Routledge.pp. 59-60. 26 See H. Tammām, Tassaluf al-Ikhwan (Alexandria: Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2010); J. Brown, ‘Salafists and Sufis in Egypt’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2011), available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/salafis_sufis.pdf, p.5. 27 ‘I Al-‘Iryān, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-‘ilām al-arabi, 2011). 28 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 29 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 30 Hizb al-Nour: Narfud al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah, available at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=567760. 31 Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
(72) such as freedom of religion, could be restricted in the name of Shari‘ah, unless clear safeguards are included in the constitution to protect citizens from arbitrary interpretations of Islamic law. Moreover, including a constitutional clause stating that Islamic law is a fundamental element of the political system limits the scope of other articles in the constitution. The legislative process under such a constitution would lack clarity and transparency, as interpreting Shari’ah would be left to the majority in parliament and to the judiciary and every political actor would seek to establish its understanding of Shari’ah as the truest representation of Islam. Article 81 of the new Egyptian constitution states: ‘Rights and freedoms shall be exercised in a manner not conflicting with the principles pertaining to the elements of the state and society in the Constitution’. This means that Islamic law (Article 2), other vague criteria pertaining to public morals (Articles 10 and 11), the cultural and civilizational foundations of society (Article 12), and national unity (Article 5) will determine the scope of constitutional rights. The state’s adherence to international human rights treaties will be also subject to these vague qualifications (Article 145). State interference in certain areas of public and private life in the name of public order and public morals can go far beyond the acceptable limits under international human rights law. For this reason, the UN Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comment No. 22: ‘The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]’. The Committee also stated that ‘the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical, and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition’. Islamists assert that in their model of an Islamic state, no one would be able to monopolize the interpretation of Shari‘ah and that ijtihad is open to all Muslims. In practice, however, it would appear that this would not be the case, as ijtihad is only considered permissible when based on human-made approaches and principles of jurisprudence and Islamists insist that there are fixed rulings in Shari‘ah that cannot be open to change. This view is supported by many institutions in Egypt, including the Supreme Constitutional Court and al-Azhar. While there is no definite list of these fixed rulings, a Muslim jurist who practices ijtihad in any of these areas can be declared an apostate, as he or she would be considered to be denying an Islamic fact. Thus, under the model of the Islamic state, one specific understanding of Islam would be institutionalized and adopted by the state as
(73) authentic. Consequently, any religious belief that differs from the mainstream understanding of ijtihad and Shari‘ah would be denounced as heresy. Islamists consolidated the status of Shari’ah in the new Egyptian constitution, which establishes a consultative role for religious scholars in the law-making process. Article 4 states: “Al-Azhar Association of Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law”. The platform of the Freedom and Justice Party affirms that the Supreme Constitutional Court is the competent body to interpret Islamic law, yet the draft political platform of the Muslim Brotherhood from 2007 mentions granting authority to Muslim scholars for the interpretation of Islamic law. Many scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood since Hassan al-Banna have also upheld this proposal. Moreover, the former presidential candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater, promised during his electoral campaign to form a committee of Muslim jurists to assist him in applying Islamic law.32 Further, the inclusion of Article 4 in the Constitution has been seen as a concession made by the Muslim Brotherhood to satisfy its Salafist allies. Nonetheless, Article 4 has provoked outrage from a wide range of liberals and human rights activists. They consider this move a bold step towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars intervene in the work of the elected bodies.33 Even though the opinions of the Association of Senior Scholars are not binding, the scholars represent a powerful moral and religious authority over elected parliamentarians. Furthermore, Article 219 of the Constitution provides an explanation of Islamic Shari‘ah which is now binding on all judicial and political bodies in Egypt. Even though this explanatory article refers to the traditional sources, methods, and principles of Sunni Islamic law, it remains very broad and vague and leaves the door open to the whole range of Sunni juristic choices, from moderate to hardline opinions. Article 219 is broader than the previous interpretation of the principles of Islamic Shari‘ah introduced by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in the1990s, when the SCC pointed out that the legislator should not override fixed rulings of Shari’ah derived from the Qur’an and certain texts in Sunna. This interpretation emphasized the role of ijtihad in all other cases in order to accommodate changing realities in ensuring the public interest. Article 219 of the new constitution provides the executive, legislature, and the Association of Senior Scholars with broad discretionary powers to determine the scope of Islamic law, which will result
32 See Al-Masry Al-Youm, 4 April 2012, available at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/751541. 33 See the statement by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights on 16 July 2012, available at: http://www.eipr.org/pressrelease/2012/07/16/1453.
(74) in a lack of legal certainty and transparency in the law-making process. Thus, the new constitution will likely lead to political struggles between different actors over how to interpret Shari’ah. Article 219 also establishes that the Sunni Islam is the only recognized Islamic doctrine in Egypt, thereby excluding Egyptian Muslims who belong to other non-Sunni doctrines. In contrast, Ennahda has avoided explicit reference to Shari‘ah as the legal framework for the state in its political platform, maintaining only that Islam is the official religion of the state. It considers Islam to be its supreme reference and says that its program is in its entirety committed to Islamic values. Contrary to its Islamist peers, Ennahda and its leaders have openly used the term ‘the secular state’, albeit with some refinement to make it fit their Islamist approach. Ennahda’s leader, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, has argued that Islam is reconcilable with ‘procedural secularism’, under which constitutional safeguards on religious freedoms and freedom of expression can be established to ensure the state’s neutrality towards different religions. Since the state refrains from intervening in the religious way of life of its citizens, the coercive apparatus of the state would not be used to impose religious habits or practices.34 In the sphere of politics, according to Ghannouchi, “the state is Islamic insofar that it assures its actions are in accordance with Islam’s values without being subjected to the tutelage of any religious institution,” and the parliament conducts peaceful management of diverse interpretations of Islam.35 However, Ghannouchi’s theory aims to maintain two irreconcilable ideas: the religious neutrality of the state and Islam as the supreme source of law for the state. In the words of An-Na‘im, “The rationale and purpose of public policy or legislation is based on the sort of reasoning that the generality of citizens can accept or reject, which cannot happen when such matters are demanded as categorical religious mandate”.36
34 R. Al-Ghannouchi, ‘Secularism and Relations between Religion and the State from the Perspective of al-Nahdah Party’, a lecture organised by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy, 2 March 2012. The video of the lecture is available at: http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20827717?utm_source=Transcript+of+Rached+Ghannouchi %27s+lecture+on+Secularism++March+2%2C+2012&utm_campaign=Tunisia+Democracy+ Rached+Ghannouchi+Transition+Center+for+the+Study+of+Islam+and+Democracy+%28CS ID%29&utm_medium=email. The full transcript is available in English at: http://blog.sami- aldeeb.com/2012/03/09/full-transcript-of-rached-ghannouchis-lecture-on-secularism-march-2- 2012/. 35 Ibid. 36 A. An-Na‘im, ‘The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, The Modern Law Review, 73 (1) (2010), p. 3.
(75) Ennahda has had different political priorities during the transitional period in Tunisia than those of its counterparts in Egypt. Ennahda’s official party platform does not call for the application of Shari‘ah, and al-Ghannouchi has stated that his party is not concerned at this stage with implementing Shari‘ah or including it in the constitution. Despite pressure from Tunisian Salafists and hardliners among Ennahda’s ranks, Ennahda agreed to liberal demands that Shari‘ah not be mentioned in the new constitution. Instead, it contented itself with keeping Islam in the constitution as the official religion of the state.37 This represented a significant move in reducing tensions between secularists and Islamists. Al-Ghannouchi says that his movement’s priority is to consolidate freedom and democratic transition in Tunisia, which he claims is in any case a central part of Shari‘ah.38 However, on different occasions, Ennahda leaders have stated that reference to Islam as the official religion of the state allows the party to adopt Islamic laws and nullifies any laws that are not consistent with Shari‘ah.39 Indeed, Ennahda’s longer-term aspiration to implement the rule of Shari‘ah has not been fully abandoned. The issue has been set aside to be addressed at a later stage, when the movement is better established socially and politically. The draft constitution in Tunisia would allow Islamist parties to gradually impose their agendas, as it includes several references which guarantee that the state favor Islam in its public policies. The preamble of the draft constitution refers to the centrality of the foundations and objectives of Islam in the society, although it does emphasize a moderate and flexible understanding of Islam. Article 4 establishes the role of the state in safeguarding religion and protecting sanctuaries, and the reference to Islam as the official religion of the state is considered to be a non-amendable constitutional provision.
37 K. Fahim, ‘Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law’, New York Times, 28 March 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/africa/tunisia-says- constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html. 38 Al-Assad Ben Ahmad, ‘We Fought for Freedom, Not Sharia Law’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 5 April 2012, available at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1092/re4.htm. 39 See interview with al-Ghannouchi, ‘Mijalat Al-Mujtama‘, 7 April 2012, available at: http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137.
(76) The Concept of Human Rights All three parties under study acknowledge the value of human rights and international human rights treaties in theory. The protection of human rights as a basic function of the Islamic state has been repeatedly addressed in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda over the last three decades.40 The Nour Party has also shown openness towards human rights.41 The rights proposed and advocated by Islamists do intersect with many universal human rights, yet some important conceptual differences remain. These differences give rise to tensions, especially in the areas of gender equality, the rights of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, freedom of expression, political pluralism, religious freedoms, and the prohibition of inhumane and cruel punishment. The conception of human rights adopted by many Islamists establishes religious texts and Shari’ah as the foundation for human rights, with less appreciation for reason and the human experience in understanding these religious texts. This conception contradicts the rationale behind universal human rights. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirms that each individual – regardless of his or her religion – can claim human rights by appealing to human reason and conscience. Although religion can form a conceptual basis for human rights, religious interpretations exist which contradict international human rights norms. The FJP says that it is committed to universal human rights, provided that they are not inconsistent with Shari‘ah.42 The electoral platform of President Morsi mentioned the protection of human rights as stipulated in Shari‘ah and fundamental religious values.43 The Nour Party says that public liberties and
40 M. Al-Ghazzali, Huqūq al-Insan Bayn Ta‘ālym al-Islam wa ‘I’lān al-‘ūmm al-Mutahidah. 4th edn. (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2005); Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Bayān Li al-Nāss’, in ‘A Al- Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011) pp. 315-320; M.M. El-Hodaiby, The Principles of Politics in Islam (Cairo: Islamic INC, 1997); R. Al- Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 and 2 (2011). 41In an Amnesty International survey on the positions of Egyptian political parties on international human rights, ‘al Nour Party agreed to all pledges with the exception of the abolition of the death penalty and protection of women’s rights’. See Amnesty International, ‘Egypt: Survey of Political Parties’ Views Reveals ‘Disturbing’ Opposition to Women's Rights’, 2011, available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19911, accessed 23 August 2012. 42 Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 29. 43 Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-‘Adallah, al-Parnāmij al-Ri’āsî li Mohammad Morsi (2012), p.8.
(77) fundamental rights should be protected in accordance with Islamic Shari‘ah and the foundational values of the nation (thawabit al-ummah).44 In many Arab countries, vague references to Shari‘ah and the respect of religious values have often been misused by both secular governments and Islamists to erode the guarantees provided by international human rights law. Of the three parties under study, only Ennahda does not condition human rights based on the limitations of Shari‘ah. It states in its platform that “international human rights treaties are generally consistent with the objectives and values of Islam”.45 However, on other occasions, al- Ghannouchi and other party representatives have expressed their support for the reservations on the CEDAW46 previously expressed by the Tunisian state.47
Shari‘ah and Political Pluralism Before the 2011 uprisings, Islamist movements such the MB and Ennahda focused largely on political rights. Working in a repressive environment for decades, Islamists could only survive and engage in the political system by demanding their political rights. Islamists argue that political pluralism in modern democracies is similar to the pluralism between the various schools of Islamic law. The MB and the Nour Party state that political pluralism in the Islamic state exists within the supremacy of Shari‘ah.48 This means that any party or association that differs from their version of Islamic could be subjected to restrictions or dissolution, since Shari‘ah constitutes the public order of the Islamic state and neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can challenge it. Ennahda and its chief thinker, al-Ghannouchi, have asserted that all kinds of parties and associations can exist in an Islamic state, including those with secular or atheist orientations.49 In practice, however, this assertion seems dubious, since Ennahda aims to criminalise certain forms of expression in the name of protecting religious sanctities. This argument
44 See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers. 45 Parnāmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html, p.7. 46 The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. 47 See interview with al-Ghannouchi, Mijalat Al-Mujtama‘, 7 April 2012, available at: http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137. 48 ‘I. Al-‘Iryān, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-‘ilām al-arabi, 2011); Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers. 49 R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 2 (2011), pp. 147-150.
(78) could easily be turned into a tool to silence liberal Muslim and secular voices.
Gender Equality The most controversial area in the debate on Islamism and human rights is the rights of women. In general, none of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nour Party, or Ennahda believes in the concept of gender equality as stipulated in international human rights treaties. Members and leaders of the MB have usually been critical of the concept of gender equality as established in the CEDAW, arguing that the international approach to women’s rights corrupts Islamic social values and morals.50 Instead, Islamists advocate the concept of complementary roles for men and women.51 In reality, this means that not all the rights enjoyed by men are granted to women. This understanding is reflected in the discriminatory positions held by many Islamists on marriage, divorce, and the political rights of women. The three parties under study agree on some legal aspects of the relationship between men and women in Islamic law, including the responsibility of men to provide for their wives financially according to the doctrine of Qawammah, in exchange for advantages for men in the institution of marriage. They also agree that women should inherit half of the share of inheritance allocated to their male siblings, and they think that the marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men should be prohibited. These legal opinions are common among scholars of Islamic law, since they are directly derived from clear stipulations in the Qur’an and Sunna. Therefore, even reformist Islamists, such as al-Ghannouchi, have not departed from these views.
There are remarkable differences between the three parties in the understanding of many other aspects of women’s rights. Ennahda, for example, is much more progressive than Egyptian Islamists on many controversial areas of women’s rights. For instance, Ennahda does not oppose restricting the practice of polygamy, although it adopts the view that
50 See interview with Makarim al-Dirî, 11 August 2012, available at: http://ikhwanonline.com/ramadan/Pageview.aspx?ID=2333&SectionID=9. 51 Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun ‘Wathîqat al-Mar’ah wa al-Shūrah’, in ‘A Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011), p. 307. The same meaning is also clear in the program of FJP, Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), pp. 112-113 and p. 31; Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_social; and R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al- ‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), p. 90.
(79) polygamy should not be outright abolished.52 Most Egyptian Islamists, by contrast, maintain that polygamy is permissible in Islam and cannot be subjected to legal restrictions, as long as men are committed to just and fair treatment of their wives.53 Human rights activists in Egypt fear that the new constitution could lead to changes to the Personal Status Law.54 Female leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party have stated on many occasions that family law should be amended to be consistent with Shari‘ah. They have also said that international treaties on the rights of women have been destructive to the values of the Muslim family. Members of the Nour Party have proposed draft laws in the post-revolution parliament that are inconsistent with the rights of women. One of these proposals aimed to reduce the age of marriage for girls to 12 years old. During his electoral campaign, President Morsi said that early marriage should be legalised. The Nour Party has also proposed decriminalisation of the practice of female genital mutilation. This is consistent with the position of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes that this practice should be left to the discretion of families but that it must be performed by doctors.55 In 2008, the parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood opposed the criminalisation of female genital mutilation and resisted raising the age of marriage to 18 years old.56 Protections for gender equality and the rights of women are severely lacking in the new Egyptian constitution, which endorses the patriarchal view of gender relations in the society and reinforces a conservative interpretation of Islamic Shari‘ah on the matter. Women are mentioned in the constitution as mothers and sisters but not as citizens that enjoy full equality with men. Article 33 states: “All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination”. However, the reference to the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, religion, ethnicity and any other basis was omitted in the last version of the constitution, leaving the
52 R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Mar’ah bayn al-Qur’an wa Waq’ al-Muslimîn, 3rd edn. (London: Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), p.98 and p. 104. 53 The Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists have traditionally opposed the restriction of polygamy in the amendments to the family law in 1979. See S. Al-Bahnasāwî, Qawānîn al-’Ussrah Bayn ‘Ajz al-Nissa’ wa da‘f al-‘Ulamā’ (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1984) pp. 144-146; S. Al-Bahnasāwî, Hurriyyat al-Ra’i: al-Waqi’ wa al-thawabit (Al-Mansurah: Dār al-Wafa’, 2003) p. 115. 54 H. Badran, ‘The Arab Spring Represents a Leap Backward for Women’. The Daily Star. 27 August 2012, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Aug- 27/185770-the-arab-spring-represents-a-leap-backward-for-women.ashx#axzz24mOSmBKj. 55 Ibid. 56 See Al-Markaz al-I’lāmî Lil Ikwan al-Muslimun, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fî Parlamān 2005’, Al-Mawsü‘ah al-Tarikhiyyah al-Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan, 2008, available at: http://bit.ly/O99T9U, accessed 23 August 2012.
(80) constitution without any explicit provision on gender equality. Article 10 opens the door for discriminatory policies against women within the family and in workplaces. Using vague language, this article entrusts the state and society with maintaining the authentic character of the Egyptian family and ensuring its moral and religious values. According to the same article, the state guarantees that women can reconcile between their “duties towards their families” and their participation in public life. After the fall of Ben Ali, Ennahda was keen to assure Tunisian women that their rights under family law would not be repealed. The party accepted the electoral law that stipulated allocating an equal number of seats to men and women in the electoral lists of parties. However, Ennahda has come under attack as a result of its proposal to use the expression ‘complementarity of roles between men and women’ in the constitution. This proposal has triggered outrage particularly among secularists and human rights advocates, who fear that it could be used to justify a future retreat from the protection of women in Tunisian law.57 Tunisian Islamists withdrew this controversial proposal, and the Tunisian draft constitution recognizes the rights of women in many provisions. It refers to gender equality (Article 5) and the rights of women and the protection of any progress achieved previously in Tunisia in this area (Article7). It also protects equal opportunities for men and women and refers to the state’s responsibility to end all forms of violence against women (Article 37). However, it remains unclear how this progressive language will play out in light of other constitutional provisions establishing Islam as the official religion of the state (Article 1) and the vague reference to the state’s responsibility to protect the family and its cohesion (Article 8), as certain interpretations of these provisions could obstruct full equality between men and women. Tellingly, when the Tunisian government lifted its reservations on CEDAW in August 2011, it made an ambiguous declaration saying that the implementation of the treaty should not violate Islam as the official religion of the state.58 On the political rights of women, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained that Shari‘ah allows women to run in parliamentary elections and to occupy any public post except for the presidency of the state.59 Prior to 2011,
57H. Mcrobie, ‘Will the Tunisian Constitution Erode the gains of Women in the Arab Spring’ New Statesman, 15 August 2012, available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/will-tunisian-constitution-erode-gains- women-arab-spring. 58 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: Government Lifts Restrictions on Women’s Rights Treaty’, 7 September 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/06/tunisia- government-lifts-restrictions-women-s-rights-treaty. 59 Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Wathîqat al-Mar’ah wa al-Shūrah’, in ‘A Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011), p. 310.
(81) Egyptian Salafists were of the view that women should not be allowed to run for seats in parliament.60 Following the revolution, leading scholars of Salafism reviewed this position, yet it is clear from a legal opinion by leading Salafist Yasser al-Borhami that Salafists have been forced to retract their previous position in order to conform to the Egyptian electoral law requiring all parties to nominate at least one female candidate in their electoral lists. Al-Borhami says that the nomination of women in the parliamentary elections is in principle not permitted. However, he goes on to say that this position can be altered to prevent moral corruption, or the corruption that could be caused if secularists who refuse the rule of Shari‘ah were to dominate elected bodies.61 During the parliamentary elections of 2011, the Nour Party did not publish the photos of their female candidates in the electoral lists, instead replacing them with pictures of flowers or photos of the candidates’ husbands. Ennahda’s al-Ghannouchi, by contrast, stated in his book on public liberties in the Islamic state that Islam does not prohibit women from being nominated for all public posts, including positions in the judiciary and the presidency.62
Freedom of Religion The political platforms of all three Islamist parties under study state that freedom of religion is a key right in Islam. However, Islamists conceive of religious freedom differently than it is envisioned in international human rights law. The prevailing opinion in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party in Egypt is that conversion from Islam is prohibited and can be punishable by the death penalty.63 Converts from Islam can be deprived of their rights in marriage, inheritance, and custody of children. Some Egyptian jurists, such as Yousef al-Qaradawi and Salim al-‘Awa, have argued that the punishment of apostasy is a discretionary punishment and that it is not part of the fixed punishments in Islam. However, many Islamists think that apostasy is a serious crime that should be punished in the Islamic state. The
60 Y. Al-Borhami, ‘Fatwa Tarashuh al-Mara’h li Majlis al-Sha‘b’, 2010, available at: http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=4821. 61 Y. Al-Borhami, ‘Hukm Musharakat al-Mar’ah fî al-Majalis al-Niyabiyyah’, 2011, available at: http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=5710. 62 R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Mar’ah bayn al-Qur’an wa Waq’ al-Muslimîn. 3rd edn. (London: Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), pp. 115-128. 63 See the legal opinion (fatwa) published on the official web site of the Department of Da‘wa at the Muslim Brotherhood on 27 March 2012, available at: http://www.manaratweb.com/e- print.php?id=1608. Similar fatwas have previously been published and are available on the web site. See also the opinion of the leading Salafist scholar Yasser al-Borhamî on apostasy in Islam, 12 May 2012, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lL3AhugZ_5E.
(82) MB and the Salafists contend that Islam is the system of belief in the Islamic state and that apostasy represents a rebellion against this system.64 During his electoral campaign, President Mohamed Morsi was asked about his position on apostasy, to which he responded that people can change their religion in private but that they are not allowed to display their conversion from Islam in public.65
In contrast, Ennahda’s al-Ghannouchi says that freedom of religion, including apostasy, is absolutely protected in Islam.66 He, too, fails to address the consequences of apostasy on the civil status of apostates, however. Without ending the civil punishment of apostates, allowing conversion is a hollow concession.
The Rights of Non-Muslim Citizens The majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. Christians make up the largest religious minority, while other religious communities include Baha’is, Jews, Shi’ites, Ahmadiyas, Quranists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Religious minorities have lately become deeply concerned about their future rights under Islamist rule.67 Over the last two decades, the Muslim Brotherhood has on numerous occasions stressed its respect for the principle of citizenship and equality between all Egyptians, yet the status of the rights of religious minorities in the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood remains problematic. The MB’s Reform Initiative of 2004 stated that “religious freedom is guaranteed for the recognized heavenly religions” (in addition to Islam, these are Christianity and Judaism, whose followers are often referred to as ‘people of the book’).68 A similar restriction can be found in the FJP’s platform, which only refers to the state’s duty to protect the “heavenly” religions.69 MB leaders have stated that non-Muslim citizens who are not “people of the book” have the right to live in Egypt but are not allowed to
64 Ibid. 65 See the electoral debate ‘Maw‘id M’a al-Ra’îs’, al-Nahar TV 18 May 2012, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ReJFzuKONk. 66 R. Al-GhannouchiAl-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp. 72-77. 67 See O. Halawa, ‘Egyptian Religious Minorities Fear Rise of Islamists’, Egyptian Independent, 3 June 2011, available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/462243, accessed 20 March 2012. 68 Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Mubadarat al-Ikhwan Lil-Islā ’, in ‘A. Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak ‘Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. (Cairo: Iqra’, 2004) p. 324. 69 Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 154.
(83) publicly express their religious beliefs or to build their own places of worship.70 The platform of the Nour Party names Christianity as the only non-Muslim minority in Egypt whose religious freedom is protected.71 In contrast, Ennahda’s al-Ghannouchi has supported the opinion of many Muslim jurists that religions of those not belonging to “the people of the book” should also be protected in the Islamic state.72 The FJP and the Nour Party state in their platforms that non-Muslims should apply their own religious regulations in their family and religious affairs. They agree that in all other areas, however, state laws, i.e. Islamic law, should be applied equally to Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, Ennahda’s chief ideologue, al-Ghannouchi, also says that all Islamic regulations related to public order should be applicable to Muslims and non- Muslims alike.73 Non-Muslims in Egypt have expressed their refusal to be governed by Islamic law, particularly with reference to Islamic corporal penalties (hudud). On political rights for non-Muslims, the official documents published by the FJP and the MB after the revolution avoid discussing the right of non- Muslims to be nominated for the presidency. By contrast, in its draft political platform of 2007, the MB unequivocally excluded non-Muslims from running for the positions of president and prime minister. These positions of ‘grand leadership’ (willayah ‘uzmah), they said, must be occupied by male Muslims.74 Following the revolution, MB leaders stated that the group would not nominate non-Muslim or female candidates to the presidency but that they would not object if other parties did so.75 In the ideological literature of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is explicitly stipulated that non-Muslims and women are excluded from positions of ‘grand leadership’.76 In Tunisia, al- Ghannouchi states that the Muslim faith is a requirement for the presidency, although he goes on to say that in some exceptional cases, such as to
70 See R. Scott, The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State (California: Stanford University Press, 2010); M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012). 71 See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers. 72 R. Al-Ghannouchi, Huquq al-Muwatanah. 3rd edn. (Virginia: Al-Ma’had al-‘Alāmî li al- Fikr al-Islami, 1993) pp. 56-57. 73 Ibid., p. 105 74Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Parnāmij Hizb al-Ikhwan’, Al-Mawsü‘ah al-Tarikhiyyah al- Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan, 2007, available at: http://bit.ly/e2JXBE, accessed 15 May 2012. 75 M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012). 76 M. Ghuzlān, al-Islam Huwa al-Hal (Cairo: Dār al-Tawzî‘ wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyyah, 2006).
(84) preserve the national unity in multi-religious societies, this requirement may be lifted.77 Discrimination against non-Muslims in political rights is enshrined in Tunisia’s draft constitution, Article 67 of which stipulates that the president of the republic must be a Muslim citizen. This condition is inconsistent with another constitutional provision that guarantees equality and non- discrimination among Tunisian citizens (Article 5). This condition was copied from the former Tunisian Constitution despite opposition from Tunisian human rights defenders and other political forces. The leaders of the Nour Party have made it clear that non-Muslims are not allowed to occupy positions of “grand leadership” in the Islamic state. For them, this also includes the position of vice president.78 Undoubtedly, the rights of religious minorities under the new Egyptian constitution are in peril. The practice of religious freedom will only be guaranteed to the followers of the monotheistic “heavenly” religions (namely Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). This means that other religious minorities, such as Baha’is, will be deprived of their religious rights. Indeed, the parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood was outspoken against the recognition of the Baha’i religious minority in the parliament of 2005, considering Baha’ism a heretical belief that should not be protected in a Muslim society. The new constitution in Egypt recognises the rights of non-Muslims to apply their own religious regulations within their family and religious affairs. Some observers have viewed this article as a step forward for the rights of non-Muslims, since it represents the first time that a constitution has recognised the existence of other religions in Egypt. However, this article entrenches the sectarian regulation of family matters in Egypt, rather than having one civil law for all citizens regardless of their religion. Many Christians suffer from the strict regulations on divorce applied by the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, which have forced some Christians to convert to Islam.79 Applying sectarian religious family laws means that members of each religious community will be subject to discriminatory religious regulations that are not in line with human rights. The rights of the Christian minority in Egypt have not improved after the revolution. Rather, the intolerant religious climate aggravated by Islamists’
77 R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp. 235-241. 78 See statements of Yasser al-Borhamî, 4 July 2012, available at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=722750&. 79 See ‘Protesting for the Right to Divorce’, Ahram Weekly, 28 July 2011.
(85) political dominance has deepened the fears of Christians. Egypt has witnessed a series of sectarian clashes over the past year, yet these instances have been dealt with as a security issue rather than by tackling the root causes of the injustice felt by religious minorities. Rather than addressing the legitimate rights of Christians to equality and non-discrimination, the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi have repeated the mistakes of the former regime. One fundamental demand of Christians in Egypt has been to remove legal restrictions on building and maintaining churches. In June 2011, the transitional government headed by Essam Sharaf presented a draft law with unified procedures on building places of worship. Many Christians opposed the law, considering it restrictive and below their expectations. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party have been firm that any regulations must be proportional to the number of Christians and their exact needs. They therefore oppose having a unified law on places of worship.80 The appointment of non-Muslims and women to senior political positions is contentious for Islamists in Egypt. In his electoral campaign, President Morsi vowed to appoint a Christian and a woman as vice presidents. This proposal was opposed by Salafists, who considered that the position of vice president, who may assume the role of the president under certain conditions, should only be occupied by a Muslim male. President Morsi gave in to this pressure, appointing a woman and a Christian as presidential assistants and naming a prominent Muslim, male judge as his vice president.
Freedom of Expression The definition and scope of freedom of expression and its relation to religion and morality is problematic in Islamist agendas. The programs of the FJP and the Nour Party are full of vague, broad formulations that allow for limitations on freedom of expression. For example, the FJP says that it is committed to “freedom of expression provided that it respects the fundamental values of the society”.81 The FJP also establishes a direct connection between freedom of artistic creativity and respect for the morals, values, and traditions of society.82 The party platform includes a special section on media reform, where it says that “the press is free and it is not subject to any form of censorship except the censorship of the professional conscience, the values of the society, and the law”. It adds that “the freedom
-ﺑﺮﻟﻤﺎن/See al-Wafd Newspaper, 16 May 2012, available at: http://www.alwafd.org 80 -and al Masry al ,اﻟﻌﺒﺎدة-دور-ﻗﺎﻧﻮن-ﻋﻠﻰ-ﯾﻌﺘﺮﺿﻮن-واﻹﺧﻮان-اﻟﺴﻠﻔﯿﻮن-210983/اﻟﺸﻌﺐ-ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺎت-471/اﻟﺜﻮرة Youm, 21 March 2012, available at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/725126. 81 Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 31. 82 Ibid., p. 140.
(86) to publish newspapers, magazines, or any other printed or electronic outlets is guaranteed without any legal or administrative obstacles, as long as the outlet respects the constitution and the law as well as public morals”.83 Similarly, the party program ensures the right to establish private TV channels and radio stations, provided that they respect the values of the society and public morals, and emphasises that media must respect the “heavenly” religions.84 These references to the values of society and respect for religions leave the door wide open for arbitrary interference in the media on religious grounds. Moreover, the FJP fails to define what kinds of restrictions can be imposed by the law and on what grounds. The program does not include a commitment to amend the penal code to abolish the prison sentences for journalists, which has been a serious concern in Egypt for decades. In Egypt, where state-owned media were frequently used by the Mubarak regime for repressive purposes, the FJP’s platform vows to restructure the ownership of the state-owned print and broadcast media to ensure their independence, yet it again fails to establish how this will be carried out. Freedom of expression on the Internet also faces restrictions. The FJP aims to establish a specialised council for new media, tasked with drawing up guidelines for electronic media so that their work is guided by “the spirit of Islam and the values and morals of the Egyptian civilizational project”.85 While the exact tasks of this council are not clearly defined, the proposal raises concerns that restrictions might be imposed on the use of the Internet. The FJP also pledged to adopt a new law on Internet offenses related to intellectual property rights, piracy, and the protection of public morals. This kind of law is common in many other states, yet the vague reference to the protection of public morals could be used to restrict and block certain websites. The Nour Party has stated that freedom of expression and media freedoms should be consistent with Shari‘ah, the fundamental values of society, and the maintenance of public order. The party points out that the government and its institutions, including the ministry of information, should promote Islamic identity and culture. This position does not reflect the religious and cultural pluralism of Egyptian society, and it raises concerns that a Salafist- led government could systematically use the state media as a tool to boost Islamic religious education and promote Islamic values. In addition, the
83 Ibid., pp. 153-158. 84 Ibid., p. 154. 85 Ibid., p. 157.
(87) Salafist party’s program does not mention the freedom of artistic creativity at all.86 Egypt’s President Morsi has vowed to respect the right to artistic creativity and freedom of expression, yet Islamists’ bleak record in this area in practice casts doubt on the official positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Since the 1990s, Islamist activists have pressured the Mubarak regime to restrict certain types of expression that are protected under international human rights. Numerous parliamentary interrogations were presented by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including President Morsi himself, against publications released by the ministry of culture and the ministry of information that were deemed offensive to Islam. Prominent leaders of the MB recently supported positions taken by al-Azhar and the government against academic freedoms and freedom of expression and artistic creativity, stating that freedom of expression should respect the values and morals of the society.87 In response, a group of Egyptian intellectuals, actors, artists, and novelists have formed ‘Egypt’s Creativity Front’ to protect the right to artistic creativity and freedom of expression. These artists were alarmed by a series of cases filed against Egyptian artists by Islamist lawyers who accused them of offending Islam and its symbols. The Front has vowed to combat any attempts to impose censorship on cultural activities by Islamists.88 President Morsi has taken no legal measures to ensure that artists are protected from this kind of lawsuit. Rather, the new constitution includes an article that prohibits the defamation of all prophets and messengers of God. This article was presented by al-Azhar and backed by Islamists and other political forces;89 it could be used to prosecute Muslims deemed heretics under the dominant Sunni perspective, such as Shiites. It will have a far- reaching negative impact on freedom of expression and religious freedom in Egypt’s emerging political order. Trials of persons, including non-Muslims, charged with blasphemy against Islam increased over the last four months of
86 Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers. 87 See the statements of Abd al-Rahmman al-Barr to al-Hurrah TV on 13 January 2012, Taqrîr Khas, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXOG6c9WNkI. 88 A. Mohsen, ‘Dark Comedy: Is Adel Imam’s Sentence the Start of a Worrying Trend?’, Egypt Independent, 25 May 2012, available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/dark- comedy-adel-imam’s-prison-sentence-start-worrying-trend. 89 See Makhawif Ala Huriyyah al-Aqiddah Fî Misr, August 2012, available at: http://almarayanews.com/new/permalink/5501.html.
(88) 2012. Some of the defendants received prison sentences,90 and in one of the famous blasphemy cases, the defendants were sentenced to death in absentia.91 President Morsi and his government have also taken tough stances against media in recent months. An increasing number of lawsuits have been filed against journalists on charges of insulting the president. At the same time, President Morsi and his government have tolerated the discriminatory discourse of Salafist media and some Islamists. Instead of working to reconstruct the ownership of the state-owned media as promised in its platform, the Muslim Brotherhood has used its political power and laws of the former regime to appoint media professionals with close ties to them to positions of influence – including as editors and administrative officials – in state-owned newspapers.92 Ennahda states in its program that freedom of expression is guaranteed, without naming any explicit restrictions. It also asserts that “freedom of artistic creativity is protected and the state should issue laws to guarantee its practice”. On media, the program generally refers to “the development of media in order to enrich the cultural sphere”. However, it fails to explain exactly how public and private media are to be reformed.93 The prosecution of journalists in Tunisia over the last few months has given rise to doubts about the commitment of Ennahda to freedom of expression. Ennahda also proposed criminalising offenses against the sanctity of Islam in the future constitution. Secularists and human rights defenders resisted this proposal until it was withdrawn from the draft constitution. However, another sentence was added to Article 4 that maintains the same meaning, ambiguously stating that “the state protects sanctities”. Some observers argue that the movement did this as a concession to the demands of Salafists.94 In the meantime, it has failed to deter hardline Islamists who threaten public liberties and freedom of artistic creativity.
90 Amnesty International, ‘Egypt: Outrageous’ Guilty Verdict in Blasphemy Case an Assault on Free Expression’, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-outrageous-guilty- verdict-blasphemy-case-assault-free-expression-2012-12-12. 91 Ahram Online, ‘Six Expat Copts Receive Death Penalty Sentence for Anti-Islam Film’, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/59363/Egypt/Politics-/Six-expat- Copts-receive-death-penalty-sentence-for.aspx. 92 See the Joint Statement by Egyptian Rights Groups on 9 August 2012, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Following Mubarak’s Footsteps’, available at: http://www.cihrs.org/?p=3773&lang=en. 93 Parnāmij Harakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html. 94 See Amnesty International, ‘Tunisian Journalist Faces ‘Public Morals’ Charge after Criticizing Government’, 8 August 2012, available at:
(89) In summary, the theoretical and practical positions of all three groups on key human rights issues are extremely worrying. While Ennahda adopts more progressive positions in many instances, it remains ambiguous in others. The visions of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour Party on several fundamental universal human rights are flagrantly restrictive.
Islamism, Human Rights, and Islamic Reformation Any future introduction of Islamic law as interpreted by Islamists into the legal frameworks in Tunisia and Egypt will undermine international human rights standards. A recent comparative study of the incorporation of Islamic law in the legal systems of Muslim states revealed that “a number of violations are directly related to norms and practices based in Islamic legal traditions”.95 Liberal Muslims maintain that international human rights law and modern constitutionalism cannot be put into practice in the context of the Islamic state unless Muslim scholars engage in drastic reformation of traditional Islamic law. The Sudanese scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im argues that there is nothing divine in Islamic law, and as such its content and methods of implementation are a product of human interpretation of Islamic sacred sources. Thus, Muslims can review it at any time in light of their changing circumstances.96 Moreover, many Muslim scholars reject the idea of using Shari‘ah as the legal framework for the state. For instance, the Egyptian judge Muhammad Sa’îd Al-‘Ashmāwî argues that Shari‘ah in the Qur’an means the way of God or of Islam but that the term was changed by Muslim jurists in the second century of Islam to apply mostly to legal matters.97 An-Na’im contends that the secular state is necessary in Islam. He explains that Islamists overlook the significant differences between the modern nation state and the pre-modern Islamic community. Historically, Islamic law was by and large interpreted and applied by independent Muslim jurists and judges, rather than as part of the central authority. Early Muslims committed http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/tunisian-journalist-faces-public-morals-charge-after- criticizing-government-2012-08-07; A. Guellali, ‘Tunisia’s Setback in Freedom of Expression’. Human Rights Watch, 2012, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/24/tunisia-s-setback-freedom-expression. 95 J. Otto, ‘Towards Comparative Conclusions’, in J. Otto (ed.), Sharia Incorporated. A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), pp. 618. 96 See A. An-Na‘im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996). 97 E.W. Shepard, ‘Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi and the Application of Shari‘a in Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28 (1) (1996), p. 43.
(90) themselves voluntarily to Shari‘ah in accordance with their convictions, without any need for coercion. According to An-Na‘im, any law applied by the central authority will always be secular and cannot be described as Islamic, because Muslims will always disagree on the exact interpretations of Shari‘ah.98 Respect for international human rights norms through creating inclusive, equal citizenship will be essential to guarantee the peaceful co-existence of the multiple religious, ethnic, and cultural communities in Arab societies. It is mistaken to consider demands for universal human rights an imposition of alien values on Muslims. Muslims do not all hold one monolithic view on the place they assign to religion in the public domain, and many Muslim scholars and human rights actors increasingly support international human rights norms, Islamic reformation, and a secular state.99 A document produced by a coalition of Egyptian and Arab human rights NGOs in 2004 affirms that international human rights is a product of the interaction between cultures and civilizations throughout history. The document warns against invoking conservative interpretations of Islamic sources that undermine the universality of human rights.100
98 A. An-Na‘im, ‘The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law’, The Modern Law Review 73 (1) (2010). 99 See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004) Fourth edition; see also the analysis of the work of some liberal reformers in W. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī usūl Al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 207-254. 100The Second Independence: Towards an Initiative for Political Reform in the Arab World. This is a joint declaration adopted by the first civil society forum organized by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies in collaboration with the Association for Defending Rights and Freedoms, a Palestinian Human Rights Organization. The forum gathered 52 NGOs from 13 Arab States (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 2004). The same view has been expressed on many other occasions over the last two decades by Egyptian and Arab human rights NGOs.
(91) Moreover, the popular uprisings that swept the Arab region in 2011 have shown the popular impetus for democracy and human rights values. These developments challenge the assumptions that universal human rights have no basis in Arab societies and that conservative Islamist forces are the sole political alternative in the region. Although Islamists have consolidated their political influence as a result of the political transitions that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the political and intellectual diversity of these societies is obvious. In Egypt, new political parties emerged in 2011 which clearly advocate international human rights norms and embrace liberal and progressive understandings of Islamic sources.101
Conclusion Scrutinizing the human rights records of Islamists is very important at this critical stage of the political transitions in the Arab region. Islamists are not the only actors who are hostile to human rights, yet the Arab revolutions have shown that the political culture of Muslims is not monolithic and that support for universal human rights is on the rise. However, Islamists’ impact on religious discourse is immense. The political rise of Islamists in a country like Egypt since the 1970s prompted Sadat and Mubarak to adopt both repressive measure and religious policies to appease Islamists. Islamists’ ascendancy has influenced the society as a whole, and their ideology has infiltrated cultural, media, educational, and religious institutions, reinforcing cultural relativism and conservatism in society. There has been no expectation that Islamists will positively transform the human rights landscape in the region upon coming to power. Islamists have so far failed to offer a coherent and consistent theory and practices harmonizing their Islamist agenda with international human rights standards. The positions of Ennahda can be considered more progressive than those of Egyptian Islamists, yet there are deep-seated tensions between fundamental human rights and the positions and actions of all three of the Islamist parties under study. A promising factor in both Tunisia and Egypt is the increasing constituency backing universal human rights among liberals, young activists, and civil society. Without a doubt, liberals are potential competitors of Islamists. If they strengthened their organizational and communications capacities, they
101For instance, see the political platforms of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, available at: http://www.egysdp.com/docs/party_pro.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2011); the Platform of the Egyptian Liberals Party, available at: http://almasreyeenalahrrar.org/PartyProgram.aspx (Accessed: 10 April 2011); the Platform of Freedom Egypt Party, available at: http://www.masralhureyya.org/about-party/program (Accessed: 10 April 2012).
(92) could well achieve electoral success in future elections. Human rights defenders have also been outspoken about Islamists’ performance after coming to power, insisting that they must abide by international human rights standards. Yet human rights defenders and liberals should not leave religion to be distorted by Islamists. Islamic reform and rooting universal human rights in Islamic discourse should be a strategic objective. The international community should make sure that current governments in the region effectively respect the freedoms of expression and association. The ability to exercise human rights can ensure that a vibrant debate on the future of universal human rights and religion takes place in an environment free from intimidation. Beyond the domestic context, Islamists’ ambivalence about human rights can be expected also to have an impact in the regional and global contexts. Arab governments led by Islamists will likely attempt to trigger a debate on cultural specificities in international human rights institutions. Issues such as gender equality and defamation of religions can be expected to come to the fore both globally and regionally. Universal human rights in bilateral and multi-lateral cooperative frameworks between the EU and Southern- Mediterranean will be contested on cultural grounds. After a long history of suspicion of Islamists, the United States and Europe have recently become supportive of the inclusion of Islamists in political processes, but this policy shift should not come at the expense of the respect of international human rights norms in Arab states. It should also avoid overshadowing the long struggle of liberal Muslims and the human rights community to find common ground between Islamic traditions and universal human rights. The United States and Europe should prioritize political and moral support for liberal Muslims and human rights defenders who share common universal values. Universal human rights, and particularly gender equality, non- discrimination, and freedom of expression, must continue to be the frame of reference between the European Union and its Arab partners. The European Union can draw on the diverse experiences of Muslim states in establishing respect for human rights and refer to best practices to encourage Islamist parties to develop their legal positions on international human rights treaties.
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The Crisis of Transitional Justice Following the “Arab Spring”: Egypt as a Model
Ziad Abdel Tawab *
Introduction Since the ouster of ex-President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, human rights NGOs have been calling for a process of transitional justice which would ensure a clear break from the state’s repressive practices and government impunity for such acts. These calls have been almost entirely ignored by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the interim governments that served them, and now the government formed by elected President Mohamed Morsi. Yet before delving into why this is, let us take a step back and ask a seemingly obvious question: What is meant by the term “transitional justice,” which Egyptian rights NGOs have been calling for since February 12, 2011?1
* Deputy Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies; Farida Makar and Jeremie Smith also contributed to the preparation of this paper. 1 Only hours after President Mubarak stepped down, the Egyptian NGO Forum issued a draft roadmap towards establishing a state based on rule of law and respect for rights. Among the fundamental demands of this document was the following: “4 - An independent judicial body for truth and equity should be formed to investigate and receive complaints of corruption and
(95) By transitional justice, we mean a set of varied tools – both judicial and otherwise – which may include trials of individuals, reparations, fact-finding commissions, legislative and constitutional reforms, the vetting of public officials and security personnel, and other measures considered by the society to be necessary for dealing with the legacy of repression and human rights violations left by the previous regime. For instance, it may be required that changes be made to the penal code and other notorious laws which were used to ensure impunity for the former regime or to justify its criminal acts. Also important are reforms of the security sector, the judiciary, and other general institutional reforms, including changes to educational curricula. The establishment of memorials and museums or the setting aside of a national day of remembrance may serve as important steps towards national reconciliation. These components of transitional justice are laid out in a comprehensive study conducted by Egyptian legal expert Dr. Sharif Bassiouni which was adopted by the UN General Assembly as a set of basic guiding principles for UN member states regarding the steps that may be taken to achieve transitional justice. The study adopts a legal view of transitional justice and focuses on ensuring victims’ rights, elaborating their right to remedy in particular. Importantly, the study does not limit the definition of reparations to monetary compensation but also provides for other forms of redress such as the recovery of smuggled funds and assets, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence.2 Reparations should be proportional to the gravity of crimes and human rights violations committed, including to civil, political, social, and economic rights.3 Instead of adopting such an approach, the successive governments which were appointed following the Egyptian revolution flouted all proposals to address the crisis surrounding the implementation of transitional justice in Egypt. These governments also refused to present a clear roadmap for the transition to democracy, instead continuing to resort to repressive measures including arbitrary arrests, torture, intimidation, confiscation of newspapers, defaming the opposition, and harassing restricting the work of civil society. human rights abuses committed before and after 25 January. The authorities should guarantee and provide every facility to ensure the independence and impartiality of the body. The latter should give priority to the investigation of crimes committed since 25 January.” See also: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “The Forum of Independent Human Rights Organizations: Long Live the Egyptian Popular Revolution,” Feb. 12, 2011,
(96) A number of the patterns of human rights violations committed under the rule of Mubarak intensified over the two years following the revolution, contributing to a further destabilization of Egyptian politics and the spread of general mistrust regarding how the state conducts its affairs. In this context, the successive governments have demonstrated their disregard for ensuring genuine accountability for past abuses and establishing the rule of law. This has led to a significant increase in courtroom violence as well as both peaceful and violent protests organized by the families of those killed, tortured and/or illegally imprisoned both before and during the revolution. The tireless attempts by the current political regime to hijack calls for transitional justice and turn them into a form of revenge against its political opponents or to subjugate the institutions of the state to serve its narrow interests also contributed to the escalation of such protests. It is clear that the authoritarian practices of the former regime have merely been reproduced in the name of vetting state institutions of corrupt elements. Such practices were adopted both by the SCAF and later by President Morsi with the goal of restoring stability within the state’s institutions, leading instead to increased social and political discontent with the already difficult period of transition in Egypt. Mubarak’s conviction by an ordinary court on June 2, 2012 was hailed internationally as establishing justice and marking the end of an era of repression and impunity in Egypt’s history. Unfortunately, the case of Mubarak has been used to cover up the ongoing reluctance to hold almost any officials or members of the security forces responsible for past abuses, including the acquittal of military and security officials involved in performing the forced virginity tests on female protestors. Indeed, the condemnation of Mubarak continues to be used from time to time to divert public attention from discussions in the media and political circles regarding reform issues. With a deeply rooted system of police brutality and a long record of torture, Egypt has been considered a police state from the second half of the twentieth century onwards. The Egyptian government under President Mubarak left thousands of victims as the result of its commission of systematic and gross human rights violations, including enforced disappearances, torture and other cruel and degrading treatment, sexual assault against political and criminal inmates, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of thousands of political opponents. All such crimes went unpunished, as throughout the past 30 years public prosecutors were reluctant to open serious investigations into any of these
(97) crimes. Most alarming, however, is the fact that the existing frameworks of repression were not dismantled after the fall of former President Mubarak. On the contrary, the political forces in power are resorting to methods of repression and committing patterns of violations similar to those seen before the January 25 Revolution, thus resulting in the creation of additional victims following the revolution. The failure of the current president, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, to prioritize establishing mechanisms to ensure a successful transition to democracy has directly exacerbated the crisis of governance and justice in Egypt and threatens to push the country towards even greater instability. This was clearly visible through President Morsi’s constitutional declaration of November 21, 2012 which aimed to undermine the law on the judiciary and allowed the president to dismiss the public prosecutor. This decree resulted in a situation of political and legal instability whose repercussions may be felt for years to come. Even though removing the former public prosecutor had been and continues to be an essential demand of the public and of rights experts for achieving justice, this step should have been based on the adoption of a democratic law to govern the judiciary which would have separated the position of the public prosecutor from the Ministry of Justice, making it subordinate instead to the Supreme Council of Judges. This would prevent the public prosecutor from being influenced by the interests of the executive at the expense of the principles of rule of law and respect for citizens’ rights. However, this demand has been rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood since they won a plurality in the parliament in 2012. The constitutional declaration issued by Dr. Morsi reaffirms that the political group currently in power did, indeed, adopt the same authoritarian tools and tactics used by the Mubarak regime. Moreover, during the trials which have been held following the revolution, only Mubarak, his Minister of Interior, and ten low-ranking police officers were convicted of complicity in the murder of peaceful protestors. Meanwhile, six assistant ministers of interior and hundreds of police officers were acquitted on the grounds of insufficient evidence in the same case. Lengthy adjournments, the presentation by the public prosecutor of weak evidence that excluded important and obvious elements, intimidation by police of key witnesses, and the absence of a witness protection system have dramatically decreased public confidence in such trials and in the process of transitional justice in general. Often the state, including state-run media, has attributed the killing of protestors to “foreign hands.” Further, the public prosecutor abstained from opening investigations into serious allegations of torture committed before, during, and after the revolution.
(98) The rule of Mubarak, like that of other Arab rulers, was one of psychological domination just as much as it was imposed by force. Not only was the Mubarak era characterized by acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and other gross and severe violations of human rights; Mubarak and other Arab rulers undermined the institutions of the modern state that were set up all over the region in the wake of independence from foreign occupation and turned them into state machinery of propaganda and oppression. For example, the different Arab governments have extensively used the executive, legislative and judicial branches in their countries to dominate the minds of their citizens and to cause them to lose the value of rule of law. Constitutions and state institutions established to serve the interest of the people and entrench the rule of law became the main instruments used to exploit and dominate the people. This institutional fragmentation, cultural oppression, culture of impunity, and reign of fear are the main challenges facing the Arab post-revolutionary countries. The challenge was never to merely remove the individuals of Mubarak, Ben Ali, or Gaddafi; rather, the real challenge has deep socio- economic and cultural roots which were cultivated through police domination and using the bureaucratic machinery of post-independence institutions in an attempt to protect the regime from the very popular uprisings seen today. During the trials of Mubarak and 150 of his aids (including high- and low- ranking police officers) the Egyptian government has resorted to the same judicial structure that existed under Mubarak. Throughout the past 60 years, the judiciary in Egypt was heavily criticized for its bias and for lacking independence from the executive branch and national security apparatus. As such, the Egyptian judicial system has consistently proven unwilling or unable to prosecute state agents involved in crimes that would qualify as gross human rights violations. Calls for reforming the judicial system to ensure the independence of judges and ensure due process, including proposals submitted by judges themselves, have been summarily dismissed by the SCAF, the party which controls the parliament (namely, the Muslim Brotherhood), and the new president. The various calls to establish truth committees and other non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms have also been ignored or emptied of their meaning. The reality is that the SCAF, which managed the transitional period from February 2011 until the beginning of July 2012, adopted positions reminiscent of the Mubarak government – to whom the SCAF was once loyal – by banning protests and sit-ins, restricting the work of NGOs and media, inciting xenophobic campaigns, using excessive force against peaceful protests, killing tens of unarmed civilians, arbitrarily arresting
(99) citizens, exploiting state-owned media outlets to defame liberals, leftists, and revolutionary youth, and using some extremist Islamic groups as a tool to frighten both Egyptian society and the West. At the same time, Mubarak and other convicted members of the former regime are enjoying rights and privileges, even as prisoners, that other Egyptians are not afforded. To understand the position of the SCAF, it is important to note that during the past two decades the military played a crucial role in securing the regime’s interests and maintaining its position. For example, the military institution was pivotal in resolving the economic and food crisis, as it has served as a venue to diminish the unemployment crisis and contributed to several major economic projects (building and managing highways, hospitals, factories, etc.). Mubarak and other leaders of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have always enforced a vision of the positive role that the military could play as an engine for economic growth and development. As such, the military institutions and its affiliated civilian industries manufacture a wide variety of products, including washing machines, televisions, heaters, clothing, doors, office supplies, pharmaceuticals, and even microscopes. In addition, Mubarak seemed to increasingly rely on the military judicial system to defer and try his opponents. In the years immediately before the revolution, Mubarak ordered cosmetic amendments to the military judicial system to make it more acceptable to the West and to increase its responsibilities to become, according to his plan, one of the pillars of the Egyptian judicial system. However, even as the military establishment was an active social, political, and economic actor under Mubarak, its role was less visible than that of the NDP and the emerging class of businessmen who were actively visible to the public. This deal, or at least this de facto check- and-balance, seemed to be acceptable to the NDP as well as to the military, as it allowed each of them to exert their influence on the system. Even after the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, the use of the same state machinery of repression utilized by Mubarak to silence his opponents continued. During the first 100 days of Morsi’s presidency, human rights groups documented the recurrence of the same trends and patterns of violations, and calls for transitional justice continued to be dismissed. The majority of Islamists in the now dissolved parliament refused to revoke laws that were passed by Mubarak and his predecessors to restrict public freedoms and prevent accountability for crimes committed by the regime. According to human rights groups in Egypt, this is an indication that the Muslim Brotherhood haves chosen to adopt the same hostile approach to human rights developed by the Mubarak regime.
(100) There was a general perception that the trial of Mubarak and his closest aides would be one of the pillars of Egypt’s transition to democracy, putting an end to the culture of impunity that had prevailed in Egypt for over 150 years. For decades, Mubarak and his predecessors had sought to weaken all forms of institutional accountability and to undermine the rule of law. Nevertheless, opinion polls – even those conducted before January 25, 2011 – showed that the general public viewed the judiciary as the state institution that was able to retain the greatest autonomy.4 This general sentiment led the revolutionaries to trust in the ability of the existing system to prosecute the Mubarak regime for its crimes and even encouraged the liberal elite to advocate for the adoption of an exceptional treason law5 by which to prosecute the old regime, without considering that such exceptional laws can do more harm than good in the future. Egyptians believed in the so-called “wisdom of the judges,” a view which was maintained until the day when Egyptians woke up to courthouses surrounded by the families of the revolution’s victims, attacks on courtrooms, and attempts to assault defendants in the South Cairo Criminal Court. These developments took place in protest of the postponement of a trial of police officers accused of killing demonstrators. In March 2012, the political crisis again deteriorated beyond the abilities of the courts to offer a resolution when residents of Alexandria assembled at a city courthouse to protest the court's decision to release defendants accused of killing dozens of demonstrators.6
The Victims of Violations Among the challenges to implementing transitional justice in any country is defining the time period for which transitional justice mechanisms will be applied. This is necessary in order to determine who should be considered a victim of the regime for the purpose of reparations. The concept of transitional justice combines the two general concepts of transition and
4 Nathan J. Brown, “Reining in the Executive: What Can the Judiciary Do?” Paper presented at a conference hosted by CIHRS in Cairo in 2006. Available at: www.cihrs.org/Images/ArticleFiles/Original/121.pdf. 5 For more information about the draft treason act leaked by the ministerial council, see CIHRS position paper: “Toward Democratizing the System of Legal Accountability for Members of the Former Regime to Guarantee Victims’ Rights”, available at: http://www.cihrs.org/English/NewsSystem/Articles/2941.aspx. 6 For more information see CIHRS’ statement, “In Defense of Judicial Independence…Transparent Investigations and Trials and Avoiding Double Standards Protect the Courts and Guarantee Accountability,” available at: http://www.cihrs.org/English/NewsSystem/Articles/2903.aspx.
(101) justice. According to the United Nations, justice is defined as “an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs”.7 The meaning of the term “transition” in the context of transitional justice is understood to be confined to a period of political changes characterized by legal and rights-based measures to confront and correct the crimes committed by the former repressive regime.8 Thus, in the context of transitional justice, the transition is that from an oppressed society to a more democratic, free society. The starting point for implementing transitional justice is liberation from the repressive, authoritarian practices of the former regime, and it is these practices which justify recourse to the exceptional legal concept that is transitional justice. In political contexts such as that seen since February 11, 2011 in Egypt, where violence and systematic violations have continued to be committed against the political opposition, it is impossible to analyze exceptional measures taken by the new authorities within the framework of transitional justice. This is because the repressive practices seen on a daily basis demonstrate that the country remains hostage to an authoritarian political reality. Indeed, any attempt to dismantle the repressive institutions of the former regime carried out by any party which adopts the same authoritarian approach will be resisted by broad segments of society, as such moves will be seen merely as attempts to re-establish the old tools of repression, albeit under a different name. The Mubarak regime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and the current government appointed under President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have all been involved in various human rights violations. These violations can be classified as follows: 1) Excessive Use of Force in Confronting Peaceful Protestors: Under the SCAF, both the police forces and the army consistently resorted to the use of force in order to disperse protesters. Force was used in many incidents between February 2011 and the presidential elections, the most serious incidents being the Maspero events, during which the army’s armoured personnel carriers ran over Coptic protesters on October 9, 2011, the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in November 2011, the December clashes in front of the Cabinet in December 2011, and the massacre which took place at
7 Report of the UN Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” Aug. 23, 2004,
(102) a football match in Port Said in early February 2012 and the protests which followed it. In all of these cases, excessive force was used to disperse peaceful protestors. Live ammunition was often used, with snipers aiming at the torsos and heads of protestors. Such practices have claimed the lives of hundreds of peaceful protestors, as well as other individuals who were not participating in protests, and injured thousands more. It should also be noted that violence was used in June 2011 and in November 2011against the families of those killed and injured during the revolution, with police forces forcibly beating victims’ relatives who were demanding better treatment and state acknowledgement for their cases. Such practices have continued since President Mohamed Morsi assumed power, as excessive force has been used against striking workers in July and September 2012 and against students of Nile University in September 2012. One protestor was shot dead during clashes at the American embassy also in September, and several others were injured. The Ministry of Interior has refused to review its regulations regarding the use of firearms, which allow police to shoot at protestors at close range, often resulting in serious injuries or death. Human rights NGOs have proposed several regulations that comply with the relevant international standards, yet all suggestions have been ignored by the consecutive ministers. Police violence against protestors not only increased under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, but such violence began to be used also by members and supporters of the ruling party, who played an increasing role in confronting and suppressing the political opposition. The matter peaked on the night of December 6, 2012, when hundreds of supporters of the president surrounded a peaceful sit-in being held in front of the presidential palace; the supporters of the president then beat, dragged, insulted, and even killed a number of opposition protestors.9 2) Torture: Torture was and continues to be widely used as a method of investigation by the police. The Egyptian army is also reported to have engaged in torture, especially against those detained in military prisons.10 The military was also behind the infamous “virginity tests” which female protestors were forced to undergo after being arrested by the military police from Tahrir Square in March 2011, one month after the revolution. As of April 2011, human rights NGOs had revealed dozens of cases of deaths as a result of torture; all of these cases remain unpunished. Unfortunately, families of the victims have often resorted to violence against police stations
9 For more information regarding the clashes which took place at the Ittihadeyya Presidential Palace, see the report by the CIHRS at http://www.cihrs.org/?p=5361&lang=en. 10 For further information about those condemned by military courts, see the joint intervention presented by the 20th session of the UN Human Rights Council by CIHRS and the group No to Military Trials entitled, available at http://goo.gl/8wuKm.
(103) where their sons were tortured due to lack of accountability mechanisms. The authorities continued to neglect to pass new legislation to combat the prevalence of torture in accordance with Egypt’s international commitments. In this context, torture began to take on a new dimension when members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other supporters of the president abducted dozens of opposition protestors on December 5, 2012 during the clashes at the presidential palace, detaining and torturing them within sight and earshot of security forces and the Republican Guard, which even encouraged such acts in some cases. Furthermore, the president used information obtained through torture in an attempt to justify the repressive practices of the authorities during a televised speech on December 6. 3) Enforced Disappearance: Political activists continue to be targeted by enforced disappearance. As there has been no clear process to reform the security institutions in the country, such methods continue to be used widely. Recent incidents were reported in July 2012. 4) Arbitrary Arrest and Detention: Victims of arbitrary arrest mainly included protesters or others who are often taken randomly during mass arrests conducted by the police or the army. Political and union activists and other citizens continue to be subjected to arbitrary detention even after Egypt’s first democratic elections. Civilians also continue to be subjected to military trials; indeed, Article 198 of the new constitution explicitly provides – for the first time in Egyptian history – for the referral of civilians to military courts in cases of “crimes which harm the armed forces”.
Absence of Accountability, Justice, Trust, and Reconciliation Continued Lack of Accountability for Past Violations The acquittals in all the cases that were brought to the courts since February 2011 are indicative of the absence of political will to prosecute members of the old regime for systematic and gross human rights violations they committed both before and during the January uprising. This absence of accountability has encouraged the official security forces, including the military, to commit further violations against pro-democracy protesters following the revolution. Over the last two years, hundreds of pro- democracy protestors have been shot and killed, thousands wounded, female protestors subjected to forced virginity tests, and male protesters sexually molested and tortured in military prisons. All of these crimes have gone unpunished. In mid-October 2012, a civilian judge was mandated to
(104) investigate complaints filed by victims’ families and members of the public against former SCAF leaders Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and Lieutenant General Sami Anan regarding their roles in the infamous Maspero massacre of October 2011. This represented a major step forward, as it is the first time in Egypt’s history that military leaders are investigated by the civilian judiciary vis-à-vis alleged crimes committed by the military. However, the investigation had not begun as of the issuance of this report. Moreover, this step was taken on an ad hoc basis in the absence of an adequate framework to review and reveal alleged crimes committed by SCAF in 2011 which resulted in the killing of more than 100 peaceful protesters and the injury of thousands more. As such, the need to create an adequate and comprehensive framework to enforce the principle of accountability in cases of crimes committed by the SCAF or during its administration of the country - which requires real and clear political will first and foremost - still persists. In terms of documentation and acknowledgment of violations, the Egyptian state has failed to set a unified standard by which victims of violations from the Mubarak era should be recognized. Victims of the last 30 years of human rights violations have been denied justice and remedy; even those who participated in the protests in 2011 are accused of being thugs or foreign spies. There has been no official acknowledgment of state responsibility for the killings committed during the revolution or for the gross human rights violations committed in the previous decades. There has also been no acknowledgment of torture, nor have any measures for accountability been set in place to address victims’ demands. Moreover, Egyptian courts have avoided examining allegations of human rights violations committed during the 30 years of Mubarak’s rule, even as Egyptian citizens continue to be subjected to military trials. Those considered to be victims of the repression against the revolution by the state are officially entitled to monetary compensation, and a compensation fund was set up in this regard in June 2011. However, no official plan exists to establish any form of rehabilitation or commemoration for surviving victims or the families of those that were killed. In the overall absence of recognition and justice for violations, the compensation fund appears more designed to appease and silence dissent then to ensure accountability, justice, and reconciliation. The successive transitional governments have opted not to provide for psychological assistance, nursing care, and other vital needs to rehabilitate victims, nor has legal assistance been provided. Families of the victims also reported having been mistreated by the state officials in charge of issuing their monetary compensation and complained of increased bureaucratic procedures and difficulties when
(105) applying for their compensations. The fund has no clear vision or mechanism to maintain the scope of its work, especially in light of the continuation of the violence and the addition of new victims. Following the election of President Morsi, a committee was established by Presidential Decree no. 10/2012, issued in early July 2012, to review the cases of all victims from the revolution. All victims of the former regime were once again overlooked, and the role of the committee was limited to carrying out a fact-finding mission, with no indication of what its role might be following the completion of its investigations. Moreover, neither the findings of the committee’s investigations nor the committee’s hearings will be made public. In fact, the members of the committee are forbidden from making any comments to the press. In addition, the committee is only mandated to present recommendations to the president, and no clear indication was made authorizing the committee to review the findings of the investigations carried out by the public prosecution over the past 18 months. The committee submitted its confidential report to the presidency at the end of 2012. Civil society organizations have been working to document the number of victims and their social status so as to keep record of all those victimized by the state. Several volunteer initiatives, such as the initiative “Lan Nansahum” (We will not forget them), have emerged with the aim of collecting records and preserving the memory of the revolution’s victims. Following the uprising, several NGOs have also presented proposals to the consecutive Egyptian governments regarding the establishment of a comprehensive transitional justice mechanism to ensure remedies to victims of past human rights violations, including proposals for the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions and specialized tribunals. However, the policies adopted by the SCAF and the interim governments have resulted in the creation of additional victims as the state continues to use violent practices against its own citizens.
Distrust between State Institutions and Citizens No effective measures have been taken in order to genuinely reform the Egyptian Ministry of Interior and the State Security Apparatus, and prominent members of the former regime have remained in their posts. The police state, once introduced under Mubarak, was reintroduced again throughout the past year, with the same patterns of human rights violations that were committed under Mubarak.
(106) The laws issued in 2011 and 2012, whether by the SCAF, by the dissolved parliament, or later by the elected president, failed to seriously address the issue of victims of violations. In addition to the lack of accountability and the continuation of brutal police practices, no laws have been set in place in order to punish torture in prisons, for example, or to adequately protect victims’ rights. Ironically, the Ministry of Interior proposed six draft laws11 that further reinforce the grip of the police state over the public life in Egypt, directly threatening the rights to peaceful assembly, to association, and to freedom of opinion and expression. If these draft laws are adopted, they will guarantee an effective return to authoritarianism and likely lead to increased victims of violations in the future. Moreover, given its ongoing repression of citizens, it would appear that the Ministry of Interior has not undergone any reform or changed its policies of repression.
Genuine Reconciliation Currently Impossible In absence of clear measures for accountability, the term “reconciliation” has instead become associated with impunity, as the concept of reconciliation has been misused to ensure amnesties for those who committed human rights crimes or were involved in corruption during the Mubarak era. For example, the government introduced amnesty laws that would provide for “reconciliation” with businessmen who were involved in financial misconduct under Mubarak, yet the state has failed to establish reconciliation mechanisms that would enhance dialogue and ensure transparency with regards to such crimes. Until now, victims have yet to be recognized as victims, and no serious measures have been taken to prevent impunity. The lack of accountability for the Mubarak regime as well as for ongoing human rights violations forces us to ask if a process of transitional justice has in any way occurred. It would appear that perhaps a political transition has taken place without being accompanied by a transition toward rule of law, accountability, or social reconciliation. As a result, responses to repressive state policies have primarily come from civil society activists and NGOs. In addition, the burden of assisting the victims of the police state has also fallen to civil society activists rather than the government. However, civil society in Egypt
11 These bills were presented under the SCAF and again adopted by the Ministry of Interior following Dr. Mohamed Morsi’s assumption of the presidency. See CIHRS’ report “Criminalizing the Egyptian Revolution,” Oct. 2012, available at http://www.cihrs.org/?p=4623&lang=en.
(107) suffers under Law No. 84 of 2002, which restricts the role of civil society groups, imposes strict bureaucratic and government oversight on their work, and significantly limits funding opportunities. This situation was exacerbated when President Morsi’s government hastily attempted to pass a bill even more repressive than the current law.
Questioning Judicial Independence Immediately after the fall of Mubarak, public opinion and even political analysts surprisingly disregarded the perception - ironically also held by most judges - that the Egyptian judiciary lacks independence.12 As per the legislation regulating the work of the judiciary, the executive branch of the government exerts enormous influence over the judiciary, as evidenced by the powers enjoyed by the President, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of the Interior over the judicial branch.13 The public prosecutor himself, who is in charge of investigating complaints of violations and presenting evidence to the courts, is far from being independent. Public opinion also tends to forget that the Mubarak era witnessed widespread impunity for crimes committed by police and NDP officials, who were shielded from accountability and punishment. This is illustrated by the hundreds of complaints that were filed with the Public Prosecutor's office in previous decades and never investigated, many of which were ultimately closed without action. At the same time, however, Mubarak's regime did not hesitate to mobilize judges and investigative authorities to target critics and opponents or to reinforce the lack of accountability for its own actions. Independent judges have struggled since the 1990s to free the judiciary from the interference of the executive. Executive influence is exerted through the
12 After President Mohamed Morsi took office, the “Judicial Independence” movement ceased calling for the immediate amendment of the law governing the judiciary, which the movement had been advocating for under both Mubarak and the SCAF. The two judges who had prepared an alternative bill assumed senior positions in the new government – the head of the Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a new constitution and Minister of Justice. One of the most prominent figures of the movement became vice president, as well. As such, the “Judicial Independence” movement and its three main leaders stopped calling for judicial independence, and some judges became party to consultations with the president regarding how to subdue the judiciary altogether. 13 For more information on the independence of the Public Prosecutor’s office see: Abdalla Khalil “The Public Prosecutor, Representative of Society or Subject of the Executive?” Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2006; “The General Prosecutor between the Judicial and Executive Authorities” in Nabil Abdelfattah, “Judges and Political Reform in Egypt” pp. 119- 153, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2006.
(108) Judicial Inspection Department;14 administrative pressures on judges’ work, such as through the rules of transfer and internal and external lending; the supervisory role of the Minister of Justice and the broad sanctions that it can impose on courts; and the control that the Ministry of Justice has over the budget of the judiciary.15 The Egyptian judicial system is not in on the verge of collapse. Its institutions are functioning, and it boasts the oldest legal tradition in the region. Despite the critiques presented above, it should be clearly acknowledged that the degree of institutional and moral autonomy enjoyed by Egyptian judges is greater than that of their peers in other Arab states. Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the current system able to adequately investigate the massive crimes that were committed under Mubarak's rule and bring the perpetrators to justice?
Prosecuting a Friend According to lawyers and judges who attended the trials of Mubarak and other members of his regime, the evidence and investigations presented by the public prosecution are far from being serious, causing many to believe that the decision to sentence Mubarak will be easily appealed and that he will be acquitted on the grounds that his sentence was not supported by sound legal evidence. In contrast to many modern legal systems, the public prosecution in Egypt combines the investigative and prosecutorial powers, thus casting doubt on the impartiality of its investigations. Egyptian law stipulates that only the public prosecution can investigate criminal complaints against public officials and order their referral to a criminal court. Both victims and their relatives are prohibited from criminally suing perpetrators of violations directly.16 Rather, it is the prosecutor who must decide whether the allegation is serious enough to warrant an investigation, at which point he/she proceeds to investigate the incident. Based on the results of the investigation, the prosecutor writes a memorandum recommending whether the case merits continuation through a trial. Subsequently, the prosecutor’s supervisor should approve this decision. Complainants cannot appeal for a judicial review of the prosecutor’s
14 “A department… [that aims to]… inspect the work of judges and presidents of courts of first instances” Article 78 of the Egyptian judicial authority law. 15 For further information, see: Magistrate Mahmud al-Khdayri “How Law no. 4 of 1972 on the Judicial Authority Legitimizes Attacks on Judicial Independence” in “Judges and Political Reform in Egypt” pp 101-117. 16 Nevertheless, at the start of an investigation by the public prosecutor, victims can lodge a civil claim that gives them standing in the case.
(109) decision. The only possible method of appeal is through action of the public prosecutor himself.17 When making his/her decision, the prosecutor relies on reports prepared by technical experts like the Forensic Medical Authority, questions witnesses, and examines documented evidence. The technical experts themselves are also subjected to the interference of the executive branch and the public administration in their work. Technical experts are not guaranteed any immunity, and, like the Public Prosecutor, they are subject to the authority of the Ministry of Justice.18 In addition, Egyptian law does not provide for a witness protection program. In highly complicated cases involving current and former members of national security, as well as police and military officers, the absence of these protection programs usually leads to the failure of investigations to be conducted fairly and impartially. In July 2011, an Egyptian rights NGO filed a complaint with the Prosecutor’s office alleging that “police officers in the Marg Police Department are exerting pressure on victims of the January revolution to drop their complaints, and then threaten citizens who file complaints about this pressure”.19 This complaint, like many other complaints that were submitted by lawyers and NGOs, was closed with the knowledge of the office of the public prosecutor, as were the majority of complaints that his office received prior to, during, and after the January revolution. It is important to note that the investigations process for the crimes committed during the revolution has also been severely undermined by the continued abuse of power by the police. Intimidation of victims and destruction of evidence, including records of the Ministry of Interior, are but a few examples of the seriousness of this manipulation. Despite several cosmetic assurances that the Ministry of Interior has reformed its policies and practices (such as changing the slogan of Egyptian police, creating a new department to communicate information with human rights NGOs, arresting accused policemen, abolishing the notorious State Security Investigations apparatus and substituting it with National Security Services, etc.), the Ministry of Interior has failed to undergo a serious vetting process. A decision was made a year ago by the Interior Minister to dismiss some 669 high-ranking police officers; however, this decision has not been received
17 Infra note 4. 18 For more information about the independence of Forensic Medical Authority, see the notes of a roundtable discussion held at CIHRS in September 2011 with forensic experts, available at http://www.cihrs.org/Arabic/NewsSystem/Articles/2991.aspx. 19 See Press Release by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, available at http://www.eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2011/07/11/1197; see also http://www.eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2011/09/12/1249.
(110) positively,20 as the Ministry has failed to explain on what basis these officers were dismissed and whether these officers were incriminated in perpetrating the torture that was systematically practiced in Egyptian police stations. Thus far, lawyers and other observers of the trials of members of the Mubarak regime have expressed concern with the charges and evidence presented by the public prosecutor. In an interview last June, a judge clearly stated to the CIHRS that any independent judge would deem the evidence gathered and presented against Mubarak and his regime as insufficient to condemn them and would have to acquit them immediately. The system currently in place is not adequate or able – and perhaps unwilling – to deal with these trials. This is not an insult but rather the result of the long years of oppression which led to the January 25 uprising. Regardless of the question of the impartiality and independence of the judge looking into a particular case, there are significant loopholes in the investigations process and legislative context which need to be addressed. This view was explicitly expressed by the UN Committee Against Torture in Paragraph 20 of its Confidential Inquiry on Egypt in 1996, which recommended that the government "set up an independent investigative mechanism, including in its composition judges, lawyers, and medical doctors, that should effectively examine all allegations of torture, in order to bring them expeditiously before the courts."21 The system in place in 1996 is no different than the system which remains in place today. At the time, the system wasn’t adequate to investigate the horrendous acts of torture systematically practiced by the government; hence it is only logical to conclude that as the institution currently stands; justice would not be achieved.
Lack of Political Will Blocks Progress on Human Rights Until now, the prosecution of Mubarak and his regime members remains a political issue rather than a legal one. A review of the timeline of the arrests, detention orders, and prosecution of members of the former regime reveals that these arrests and court hearings always took place at key political moments, usually on the Wednesday or Thursday prior to a mass protest scheduled on a Friday. Protestors have named these measures the “Friday
20 CIHRS has discussed these changes with Human rights experts, security experts and representatives of the ministry of interior in a public debate in September 2011. For the minutes and conclusions of this debate see http://www.cihrs.org/Arabic/NewsSystem/Articles/2964.aspx 21 Committee Against Torture, Art. 20, Examinations Re: Systematic Torture, CAT A/51/44 (1996).
(111) gift.” Tellingly, the months that witnessed no large protests also failed to see any arrest or prosecution of any member of the former regime. The ruling regime has until now avoided examining allegations of human rights violations committed by its predecessor, focusing instead on charges of corruption and mishandling of public funds. Mubarak and his two sons, his Prime Minister, his Ministers of Interior and of Housing, and other secretaries and close advisors of Mubarak, such as his right-hand-men Hussein Salem and Ahmed Ezz, all face trial on charges of corruption for the illegal amassing of wealth. The former Minister of Interior has already been sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges of corruption, yet no of these were convicted for acts of killing, torture, or any other civil and political rights violations committed during or prior to the revolution. During the past two years, only ten low-ranking police officers have been convicted - some in absentia - of killing protesters during the January revolution. In other cases, trials have ended in acquittals, with one such recent decision setting off a riot in the courthouse. Mubarak has been accused and convicted of conspiring in the premeditated and attempted murder of protesters during the uprising, abusing power to amass wealth, and allowing gas to be sold to Israel below the market price. These charges are nearly impossible to prove, especially after the alleged destruction of all evidence, records, and documents that could lead to this conclusion. In fact, Mubarak’s lawyer has argued tirelessly during the past few months that Mubarak himself did not sanction the killing of protestors. Testimonies by Field Marshal Tantawi and other high-level officials even deny his very knowledge of the killings. As such, his conviction surprised most observers and was criticized as politically motivated to avoid public outrage, and it was said that Mubarak was used as a scapegoat to cover up crimes committed by the state. It is also obvious that the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood have so far adopted stances against investigating crimes of the past. With the exception of corruption charges, the criminal trials of the Mubarak regime have reduced the crimes committed under Mubarak’s rule to those crimes committed in the eight days between January 25 and February 2, 2011. Thus, it appears that the military rulers and the public prosecutor want to limit the goals of the Egyptian revolution to a mere struggle against corruption. Once more, the ruling authorities are using the same strategy as the old regime, which reduced the demands of the Egyptian people to the mere provision of bread.
(112) The trials of the former regime were surrounded by consecutive delays, acquittals, and the refusal to investigate crimes of the past. The right of senior security officials and members of the former regime to due process and a fair trial before the civilian judge of relevant jurisdiction was fiercely guarded, while a completely different standard of justice was applied in cases of accused civilians, including bloggers, political activists, and suspected thugs. Such civilian defendants have been referred to military trials lacking due-process guarantees, including the right to appear before the civilian judge of relevant jurisdiction. The situation remained largely the same following the transfer of power to President Mohamed Morsi, as the trials remained politicized due to the lack of independence and impartiality within the state’s institutions. At the same time, trying Mubarak cannot wait until comprehensive institutional reforms take place. However, the experiences of other regions of the world have demonstrated that the establishment of independent and impartial transitional justice mechanisms can guarantee that the achievement of justice go hand in hand with the process of political transition to democracy. Unfortunately, the current lack of political will in Egypt threatens to thwart both processes. The pivotal question is how to achieve transitional justice in a society where the institutions of the state were undermined or eliminated by years of political repression. In Egypt, this dilemma is made all the more difficult by the lack of internal security, the divisions within and between the various social and political segments of society, and the depletion of the country’s resources. Moreover, achieving transitional justice also faces the challenges of the lack of institutional independence within the justice sector itself, the absence of local technical expertise, the prevailing sense of shock and betrayal in society, and the lack of confidence on the part of citizens in the state’s institutions. There is a lack of respect for human rights and rule of law within the government, and the political forces which have come to power lack crucial legal and political experience and have consistently attempted to undermine the institutions of the state or to utilize them to serve their own political goals. Achieving transitional justice and establishing rule of law are not mere technical frameworks to be established; rather, they are fundamentally related to the political context Indeed, the first requirement of transitional justice is that the state in question be undergoing a genuine transition to a new democratic order. Justice will only be achieved if there is sufficient political will to make a clean break with the past, hold those responsible for violating Egyptians’ rights to account, and compensate the victims of these abuses. This can be realized in numerous ways, but disreputable exceptional laws should not be one of them. Certainly, a far-reaching program of transitional justice
(113) involving trials, fact-finding commissions, and reparations and rehabilitation will be a costly process in the short term. In the long term, however, failing to address these issues wisely and in a democratic comprehensive manner will prove to be much more costly for the state and its citizens.
(114) Section Two
Challenges to Human Rights in the “Arab Spring” States
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Egypt
Throughout the year 2012, Egypt witnessed several major political developments, including a struggle to fill the power vacuum created by the ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak. Many opposition parties struggled to respond effectively, having become accustomed over the previous six decades to sham political participation by which the ruling party enjoyed complete control in practice. Similarly, the youth movements and political forces which had been at the forefront of the popular uprising also proved unprepared to compete for influence due to their organizational inexperience and political fragmentation. In comparison, Islamists successfully mobilized their broad social base, took advantage of their significant organizational capabilities and financial resources, and successfully employed religion to garner votes, thus launching the Muslim Brotherhood to win the presidency, despite its having been banned and its members harassed for 60 years. However, it should be recognized that this success was only made possible by the ardent resistance of revolutionary youth to military rule and their insistence on setting a timeframe for transferring power to elected institutions. Only six weeks after being elected president, Dr. Mohamed Morsi was able with surprising ease to put an end to the official political role of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and to return the armed forces to their barracks. This was achieved through the Constitutional Declaration issued
(117) on August 12, which also granted the president both executive and legislative powers.1 Despite having delayed setting a clear timetable for transferring power to a civilian government, the SCAF had not display signs of aspiring to permanently fill the power vacuum in Egypt throughout the 17 months during which it held power in the country. It is more likely that during this time the leaders of the military were looking for a way to leave the political spotlight without facing accountability for the crimes which occurred on their watch, while at the same time guaranteeing the continuation of the privileges which have enjoyed by the armed forces since 1952 and ensuring that the military establishment would not be subjected to civilian oversight. In order to achieve these objectives, the SCAF preceded the announcement of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate with a constitutional declaration on June 172 in which it reclaimed legislative powers. This move came based on a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court which ordered that the People’s Assembly be dissolved after finding the elections law by which it was formed unconstitutional. The constitutional declaration also granted the SCAF the authority to oversee all matters related to the armed forces, including the power to appoint military leaders and their terms of service. This move echoed a strategy pursued by the SCAF in 2011 that became known as the “supra-constitutional principles,” which would have granted the military establishment additional privileges as well as constitutional supremacy over all other state institutions.3 The constitutional declaration further gave the SCAF the authority to object to any provisions of the new constitution drafted by the constituent assembly, in order to allow the SCAF to intervene if necessary to ensure that the military’s privileges would not be derogated under the new constitutional order. The lack of resistance displayed by the military in response to the elected president’s move to sideline the SCAF from the political scene points to the existence of understandings between the military establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood. This became further evident when the new constitution included protections for the military’s privileges, despite the fact
1 See the constitutional declaration issued by the president on August 12, 2012, State Information Service,
(118) that the Muslim Brotherhood, which had dominated the drafting process, had previously rejected the “supra-constitutional principles” due to their objection to allowing the military to enjoy such privileges. The year 2012 saw limited gains in terms of establishing the democratic governance and respect for human rights which Egyptians had hoped to enjoy following the ouster of Mubarak. Among these gains were the first parliamentary elections in Egypt to be hailed as largely free and unaltered by security or administrative interference. Even so, these elections lacked a number of important guarantees for fairness and equal opportunities between candidates.4 Egypt’s first competitive presidential elections were also held, yet they were beset with a number of challenges. The decisions of the High Committee for the Presidential Elections, however, were immunized from appeal, despite the fact that a number of these decisions were controversial and played a decisive role in determining the final list of candidates and settling a number of challenges regarding voter lists and other complaints that certain Coptic- majority towns had been prevented from voting. Moreover, the committee declared that the electoral process had been free and fair, despite a significant number of cases in which ballots had been filled in inside government printing facilities prior to the runoff elections.5
4For more details regarding violations surrounding the parliamentary elections, see: - Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Al takreer al-marhaly al-awel al-mostaqil li- moraqabet al-intekhabat,” Nov. 21, 2011,
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On May 31, the state of emergency was lifted. This period also saw a decrease in the number of civilians referred to military trial, although such trials did not cease to be used even after the elected president took power. President Morsi issued a number of decrees to release hundreds of those who had been imprisoned since the January 2011 uprising as well as an amnesty to pardon hundreds of those charged or condemned – whether by civilian or military courts - of crimes committed “in support of the revolution.” However, this did not bring justice to the more than 1,000 people who had been tried by exceptional military trials for crimes unrelated to the revolution. The country continued to be held hostage to a situation of increasing political polarization, which was further exacerbated by a series of failures to positively administer the transitional period - first by the SCAF and then by the Muslim Brotherhood. Most prominently was the failure to put an end to impunity for grave violations committed both under Mubarak’s rule and during the popular uprising which began in January 2011, as well as for further violations and massacres perpetrated over the 17 months during which the SCAF held power in Egypt.6 The year 2012 saw the continued use of excessive force by the army and the police, resulting in the deaths of dozens of people. The largest massacre occurred at the stadium in Port Said, where 74 people were killed. Torture likewise continued to be practiced, and religious freedoms were severely threatened amid a climate of increasing religious intolerance and campaigns inciting to religious hatred sponsored by leaders of Islamist political parties and religious satellite television channels. Indeed, acts of sectarian violence led to the forced displacement of an increasing number of Coptic Christian families. Freedom of expression also faced growing repression, particularly after the elected president assumed power. Legal charges were increasingly filed against journalists and other media professionals with the apparent aim of intimidating them from criticizing the presidency or the Muslim
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Fi mo’atamar sahafi l-al-i’telaf li-moraqabet al- intekhabat: Al-intekhabat al-ri’aseyya ghair horra we ghair shafafa we nazeeha ‘ila had ma,” June 25, 2012,
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Brotherhood. Issues of a number of newspapers were confiscated, and some satellite television channels faced threats from the administrative authorities and even prosecution. Moreover, a number of laws from the previous regime were employed to impose the control of the Muslim Brotherhood over the state-owned newspapers and media institutions and to prohibit a number of writers from publishing their articles. Journalists and artists were physically assaulted by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and of some Salafist groups, Media Production City was surrounded for several weeks, and an attempt was made to set fire to the offices of the newspaper of the Wafd Party. One journalist was killed after being shot with live ammunition, and live fire was opened on another journalist who had left the Muslim Brotherhood in what is thought to have been an act of intimidation or an assassination attempt. Civil society organizations and human rights groups faced continued smear campaigns, which had been started following the January uprising by the SCAF with the support of various Islamist groups. These campaigns employed judicial mechanisms to intimidate civil society activists and human rights defenders and to mar their reputations. Moreover, numerous bills were drafted which aimed to severely restrict human rights organizations in particular and to “nationalize” civil society organizations in general by turning them into semi-governmental bodies. The biggest failure of the SCAF was its inability to establish a national consensus around a trajectory for the transitional period and to build constitutional institutions. Yet it was the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies who deepened the already tense political divisions and polarization in the country, particularly through their monopolization of the process of drafting the constitution. This polarization led to violent clashes, which in turn resulted in a number of deaths. Thus, it became poignantly clear that the Muslim Brotherhood and the presidency were determined to impose their vision for the country through intimidation and repression and with total disregard for the rule of law or democratic principles. This aim was also clearly seen in the way in which the president issued a constitutional declaration which immunized all of his decisions and decrees from judicial review immediately ahead of a judicial ruling expected to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council, dealing a severe blow to judicial independence. The president further utilized this constitutional declaration to dismiss the public prosecutor, who was associated with the former regime, and to singlehandedly appoint another to replace him. The last months of 2012 witnessed an increase of what became known as the “militia” activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions. At
(121) the same time, the work of the judiciary faced increased interference and campaigns questioning its integrity, even as the average citizen’s confidence in the judiciary’s ability to achieve justice – particularly for the killing of protestors – and to prevent impunity receded. This threatened to obliterate the chances for setting up the foundations of a modern democratic state in which all persons and institutions are subject to the rule of law and to judicial rulings. Along with the blockage of channels for political dialogue between the new ruling elites and the opposition, this undermining of the judiciary prepared the way for the country to slide towards civil war. Indeed, peaceful protests gradually turned more violent, as was the case when offices of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party were raided and set on fire and when the presidential palace was attacked after opposition protestors were harassed and tortured outside of its walls by supporters of the president, who were never held accountable.
The Process of Drafting the Constitution Egyptians have paid a high price during the blundering transitional period, which prioritized holding parliamentary and presidential elections under a constitutional declaration of 63 articles issued singlehandedly by the SCAF in late March, 2011 without the slightest consultation with the various segments of Egyptian society.7 As such, political divisions were deepened from the very beginning of the transitional period, and chances for building consensus between liberals, secularists, leftists, and Coptic Christians on one side and Islamist factions on the other grew increasingly bleak.8 Throughout 2012, these divisions widened due to the insistence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies on dominating the process of drafting the constitution and crafting it to reflect their ideological and political views. The constitution was adopted through a referendum held on December 15 with only about 20% participation of the electorate and the approval of only 63% of those who voted.9 Thus, it is clear that the constitution did not enjoy consensus, particularly in light of the fact that a
7Concerning constitutional amendments and declarations, see: - Egypt State Information Service, “Amendments of the Constitution 2011,”
(122) significant number of challenges were raised against the process of casting and tallying votes. In fact, the voting had taken place in the absence of sufficient judicial oversight, as a large number of judges had announced their refusal to take part in overseeing the referendum out of protest against attempts to undermine judicial independence.10 The process of adopting the constitution was accompanied by an unprecedented attack on the judiciary and against the Supreme Constitutional Court and the judges of the State Council in particular. This attack was led by the president himself and was carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions due to judicial rulings which had dissolved the People’s Assembly and declared the first Constituent Assembly invalid.11 Despite these court rulings, the second constituent assembly failed to address the most prominent problems regarding the make-up of the first assembly. For instance, the second constituent assembly did not include any constitutional experts, which resulted in 43 legal challenges being brought against it. In addition, a number of the representatives of non-Islamist political groups announced their resignations from the assembly after exhausting all possibilities for dialogue. The president further called the dissolved People’s Assembly to convene and signed into law the bill on requisites for members of the constituent assembly which had not been approved by the SCAF.12 On October 23, the administrative court referred
10For further information regarding violations surrounding the referendum on the constitution, see: - Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Civil Society Organizations Warn of Potential Rigging of Constitutional Referendum, Demand that NCHR Be Excluded from Referendum Monitoring and Oversight of Civil Society,” Dec. 13, 2012,
(123) this law to the Supreme Constitutional Court to rule regarding its constitutionality.13 Due to judicial rulings expected to invalidate the Constituent Assembly and dissolve the Shura Council based on the same reasoning that had been used by the Supreme Constitutional Court in its decision to dissolve the People’s Assembly,14 the president issued a constitutional declaration on November 21 which essentially undermined the principles of judicial independence and rule of law, which are among the bases for the modern state.15 The declaration prohibited any judicial body from dissolving the Shura Council or the Constituent Assembly. It also provided immunity from any form of judicial review for all constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees previously issued by the president or which would be issued until the passage of the constitution and the election of a new People’s Assembly.16 These measures were accompanied by official incitement by the president and leaders of the Freedom and Justice Party against the Supreme Constitutional Court, including by accusing the court of plotting against the institutions of the state and seeking to undermine them. This occurred despite the fact that the 2012 ruling that declared the law by which the People’s Assembly was formed unconstitutional was based on the same rationale used by the same court to invalidate the configurations of the People’s Assembly and of the Shura Council, as well as municipal and local councils, on several occasions during the Mubarak era. Following this incitement, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood surrounded the Supreme Constitutional Court, anticipating the possibility that the court could challenge the constitutional declaration by taking up any of the cases brought before it regarding the constitutionality of the Shura Council or the Constituent Assembly. Amid the collusion of the other state institutions –
13For the merits of the administrative court ruling concerning challenges to the second Constituent Assembly, see: - Al-Mashhad Newspaper, “Nonshor haytheyat hokm ‘ihalet ta’oun hal a-ta’seeseyya a- dostoureyya… Al-mahkama: Qanoun ikhteyar ‘ada’ a-ta’seeseyya ghal yad al-qadaa’ al- idary,” Oct. 28, 2012,
(124) including the Presidency and the Ministries of Interior and of Justice – the court was forced to suspend its work for nearly six weeks. During this siege of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Constituent Assembly rushed to finish what became known as “the crime of the constitution” by November 30, at which point the president immediately issued a decree to hold a referendum on the constitution only two weeks later – despite the fact that his constitutional declaration had allowed the constituent assembly two additional months to finish its work in order to ensure that a “consensus” could be reached over the constitution.17 These measures led to violent clashes in the streets in front of the presidential palace from December 5-6 after supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood attacked opponents of the president who had been holding a sit-in in front of the palace.18 On December 8, the president issued another constitutional declaration which provided that all developments which had resulted from the November declaration would be maintained.19 The constitution paves the way for the establishment of political and religious authoritarianism and for theocracy along the lines of the velayat-e faqih system in Iran, albeit with Sunni terminology, as it provides for the “Sunni faqih” – as represented in what is known as the Council of Senior Scholars of al-Azhar – to give their opinion on all legislation to be passed. The constitution further asserts that “rights and liberties shall be exercised in a way that does not conflict with the provisions included in the section entitled ‘State and Society’” – provisions closely related to the concept of theocracy – thus effectively emptying any positive provisions related to human rights of their meaning. This is particularly dangerous due to the fact that the constitution makes no reference to international human rights treaties and mechanisms. The constitution further rejects the principle of trade union pluralism, and it is the first constitution in Egypt to grant constitutional legitimacy to military trials of civilians, to child labor, and to forced labor. The constitution does not limit the sweeping powers which were enjoyed by the president under the previous Egyptian constitutions. Rather, the constitution adds to the powers of the presidency the authority to appoint the heads of the independent oversight bodies which are supposedly intended to
17Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “The Supreme Constitutional Court: Defending Human Rights or the Mubarak Regime?” Jan. 14, 2013,
(125) monitor the executive branch - including overseeing the presidency itself. The constitution further maintains the privileges of the military and prevents matters pertaining to the armed forces from being subjected to civilian oversight.20
Legislative Developments The country witnessed a number of positive legislative developments, although they were of limited effect in terms of realizing Egyptians’ aspirations for democracy after the fall of the Mubarak regime. Among the most prominent of these developments was the official lifting of the state of emergency on May 3 after the SCAF refrained from presenting a request for its extension. In addition, the People’s Assembly amended the law governing presidential elections to eliminate opportunities to manipulate the outcome during the process of vote-counting and announcing the final results.21 However, the People’s Assembly failed to annul the immunity from all forms of legal challenges enjoyed by the decisions of the High Commission for Presidential Elections. The security apparatus did not welcome the ending of the state of emergency; rather, the Interior Ministry called several times for it to be reinstated in one form or another after the elected president took office, justifying such measures under the pretext of needing them to address the lack of security and stop acts of “thuggery”. The Minister of Justice issued a
20For the full provisions of the constitution see: - Official website of the High Elections Commission (Arabic):
(126) decree on June 13 – two weeks after the state of emergency was lifted – granting judicial powers of search and seizure to military intelligence officers and military police for crimes committed by civilians. Rights organizations considered this decision to be worse even than emergency law, as it provided legal cover to additional crimes committed under the rule of the SCAF.22 Even though the administrative courts moved swiftly to issue a ruling annulling this decree based on a legal challenge filed by rights organizations, the effects of the decree were revived again as part of another decree issued by the president to mandate the armed forces to secure the process of the constitutional referendum on December 15. Following the presidential elections, the government circulated a number of bills which had been presented previously by the Interior Ministry to the People’s Assembly to replace the state of emergency when the SCAF was in power; the People’s Assembly had been dissolved before any of these bills could be passed. These bills aimed to impose restrictions on the right to peaceful protest and to organize strikes, and they would have allowed for exceptional measures similar to preventive detention under emergency law based on the pretext of protecting society from the lack of security and “thuggery.”23 On November 21, a new exceptional law was passed under the guise of “protecting the revolution” which allowed for the harassment of critics of the authorities, journalists, and civil society activists by establishing specialized delegations with the authority to hold individuals in preventive detention for up to six months. The president did take some limited positive measures pursuant to his assumption of legislative powers, the most prominent of which was the annulment of preventive detention for journalists charged of insulting the president. A committee was also formed to review the situation of detainees and those who were tried by military courts, leading to the release of some 700 people who had been imprisoned after January 25, 2011. The president further issued an amnesty pardoning all those charged of having committed crimes with the aim of supporting the revolution between January 25, 2011
22 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Administrative Court Rules in Favor of Appeal Presented by Human Rights NGOs, Revokes Decree Enabling Military Intelligence and Military Police to Arrest Civilians,” June 26, 2012,
(127) and June 30, 2012, when he took office. This amnesty included all those who had been tried or whose cases were still being reviewed, whether by military or civilian courts.24 However, this amnesty did not represent an end to military trials for civilians. To the contrary, dozens of people were referred to military courts throughout 2012 following protests in Port Said and Suez and in front of the Ministry of Defense in Cairo; fishermen were even tried before military courts based on charges of fishing in restricted military zones.25 In addition, 25 residents of the island of Qursaya were arrested in November and tried before a military court after clashes broke out between Qursaya residents and the military police, which had been attempting to remove them by force from land that the army considers to be its own. 26
Repression of Peaceful Protests Egyptians continued to insist on exercising their right to hold peaceful protests and sit-ins, despite the fact that acts of repression against such gatherings did not cease. Dozens were killed throughout the course of 2012 as the result of the use of excessive force by the police, the military police, and the armed forces. The killing of 74 fans of the Ahly football club at the beginning of February, in what became known as the Port Said massacre, sparked a wave of large protests in Cairo and Suez that lasted nearly five days. In response, Central Security forces used excessive force, including firearms, and 16 additional people were killed as a result.27
24 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “After President Morsi’s First 100 Days: Worrying Indications for the Future of Human Rights; Major Crises Remain Unresolved,” Oct. 15, 2012,
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In the period between April 28 and May 4, demonstrators held a sit-in at the Ministry of Defense to protest the disqualification of the Salafist presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail by the High Commission for the Presidential Elections. The demonstrators were attacked by unidentified assailants armed with shotguns and knives, yet neither the security forces nor the military intervened to protect the demonstrators. Twelve people were killed, and some 300 were arrested and referred to the military prosecution.28 On June 2, a group of feminist activists organized a demonstration in Cairo to demand an end to the sexual harassment of female demonstrators. However, they, too, were subjected to sexual harassment and physical assaults by groups of men, some of whom attempted to strip the female activists of their clothes and to grope them.29 After the elected president took office, violations to the right to assembly and peaceful protest became even more severe, as supporters of the president and of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies took part in attacks against demonstrations held to protest the direction in which the president and the Muslim Brotherhood were taking the country. On October 12, the Muslim Brotherhood incited its followers to go to Tahrir Square to confront the mass demonstration dubbed “Friday of Accountability,” which had been called in order to protest the president’s performance during the first 100 days of his term. This incitement led to the outbreak of clashes between supporters and opponents of the president, and some 160 people were injured as a result.30 At the beginning of December, prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and of its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party incited their followers to head towards the Ittihadeyya Presidential Palace in order to “protect [the president’s] legitimacy” from his opponents, who had set up tents and begun a peaceful sit-in in the area around the palace. This attack by supporters of the president led to the outbreak of violent clashes from December 5-6 during which eleven people were killed. Neither the
28 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Brutality Unpunished and Unchecked: Egypt’s Military Kill and Torture Protesters with Impunity,” Oct. 2, 2012,
(129) presidency nor the security apparatus took any measures to prevent the outbreak of violence or to stop supporters of the president from detaining, interrogating, and even torturing a number of opposition protestors in front of the palace walls. 139 people were handed over to the police after being interrogated by supporters of the president, among them 20 minors. Before the results of any investigations into the incident were announced, the president condemned the protestors who had been holding the sit-in, accusing them of being paid thugs who had received money and weapons in order to attack the presidential palace. However, the public prosecution of East Cairo ordered the immediate release of these protestors, as he found no evidence against them,31 nor did the presidency present any such evidence. It is important to note that attacks by militias made up of Muslim Brotherhood supporters had previously taken place against a number of lawyers, rights defenders, and political activists at the time when the State Council was considering the legal challenges which had been filed against decrees made by the president and against the membership of the Constituent Assembly.32 From November 19-28, peaceful protests were held to commemorate the anniversary of the clashes which had occurred at Mohamed Mahmoud Street one year before and to denounce the president’s constitutional declaration. These protests, too, were met with excessive force by security forces; three protestors were killed and hundreds injured by birdshot pellets and tear gas. In response to this repression, counter-violence began to appear, and attempts were made to raid 28 offices belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party; some of these offices were set on fire. In the context of these attacks, one supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood was also killed.33 After the elected president took office, social protests also came under increasing attack. For instance, a sit-in held on July 17 by workers of the Ceramica Cleopatra factories was dispersed, and on September 16 security
31For further information regarding the events of the Presidential Palace, see: - Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Al-Ittihyadiyya – ‘Presidential Palace’ Clashes in Cairo 5 and 6 December 2012,” December 2012,
(130) forces surrounded workers with the Public Transport Authority who were holding a strike in a number of the authority’s garages and arrested the official spokesperson of the Independent Union of Public Transport Workers based on charges of inciting to strike.34
Increasing Repression of Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms Egyptians continued to cling to the space that they had claimed during the last years of Mubarak’s rule to freely express their views, despite the arsenal of laws hostile to freedom of expression, media freedoms, and access to information which saw no notable change following Mubarak’s ouster. The most prominent attacks on journalists and media professionals under the SCAF’s rule occurred in May while journalists were covering clashes which occurred during a sit-in in front of the Ministry of Defense. A number of journalists choked on the tear gas that was used against the demonstrators, and 18 journalists were detained.35 The SCAF further pressured a number of private satellite television channels to stop criticizing its policies. As a result, on February 11 the administration of the channel Al-Tahrir discontinued the daily program presented by Dina Abdelrahman after it featured a report by the Liars (Kazeboon) campaign revealing violations which had taken place under the SCAF’s rule.36 On February 21, the channel Modern Hureyya cut off the transmission of the voice of Moataz Matar during the live broadcast of his program “Mohatet
34 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “After President Morsy’s First 100 Days: Worrying Indications for the Future of Human Rights; Major Crises Remain Unresolved.” 35 Concerning the violations suffered by journalists during the sit-in see: - IFEX/Committee to Protect Journalists, “At Least 18 Journalists Assaulted, Arrested in Clashes,” May 7, 2012,
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Misr” as he was describing the interference of the security apparatus in the various Modern channels.37 Attacks on freedom of expression and media freedoms increased significantly during the second half of the year. Only two weeks after the elected president took office, he began to threaten critics and members of the opposition,38 and the leadership of both the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party escalated their accusations against media workers. The Minister of Investment threatened to impose sanctions on satellite television channels, ranging from notices and warnings to halting their broadcasts and withdrawing their licenses.39 In December, al-Husseini Abu Dheif, an opposition journalist with the newspaper Al-Fagr, was killed after he was shot in the head while taking pictures of the violent clashes between supporters and opponents of the president at the Ittihadeyya Presidential Palace.40 On November 5, fire was opened on the car of writer Abdel Jalil al-Sharnoubi, former editor-in-chief of the website Ikhwan Online and coordinator of the Egyptian Front for Innovation, as he was driving in the governorate of Qaliubeyya. Al- Sharnoubi had previously received threats on his phone urging him to stop criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood, which he had left in mid-2011.41 Media Production City was surrounded by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies on a number of occasions with the aim of intimidating those who work there, and media workers and artists, intellectuals, and rights activists who were hosted on satellite television channels were attacked. In August, media professionals Khaled Salah, Amr Adib, and Yusef al-Husseini were assaulted,42 as was well-known cinema
37 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights Studies, “EOHR Supports Mahatat Misr,” Feb. 22, 2012,
(132) producer Khaled Yusef in December. The broadcast of the channel Al- Fara’in was shut down and its president, Tawfiq Akasha, targeted by several lawsuits based on charges of insulting the president and inciting to his assassination.43 On December 15 – the first day of the referendum on the new constitution – a group of the president’s supporters attacked the offices of the Wafd Party and its newspaper, firing projectiles and fireworks at the offices and destroying the cars of journalists parked outside.44 On November 16, the administration of the Dream channels announced that it would be impossible to broadcast its programs live, as the private company Nile Sat had cut off the cable used for its broadcasts, citing breaches of the law to do so.45 However, an administrative court later ruled against this decision and ordered that Dream be allowed to broadcast its programs.46 Following claims filed by over 1,000 judges, investigations were opened with numerous media professionals from the channels Al-Hayat, ONTV, Annahar, Dream, CBC, and Egyptian Rotana based on charges of insulting judges and the judicial institutions through their views or commentary.47 On August 26, an episode of the program “Al-Dhameer” on the government- owned television channel Al-Qanaa Al-Thaneyya was banned from being broadcast, as it dealt with the ‘Brotherhoodization’ of the media. Similarly, the production team for the program “Naharak Sa’id” on the channel Nile Live was referred for investigation due to the criticisms expressed by a guest
(133) on the program against the ruling Freedom and Justice Party and of the “renaissance project” which had been part of the president’s electoral platform.48 An increasing number of complaints were filed against journalists, media professionals, and even the individuals hosted on television shows, based on charges of insulting the president. Judicial investigations were opened in a number of these cases before the end of the year, including in the cases of prominent talk-show host Mahmoud Saad and professor of psychology Dr. Manal Omar, who presented a psychological analysis of the president on Saad’s show.49 Similarly, Khaled Salah, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Youm As-Sabaa, and journalist Alaa al-Shafa’i were also investigated.50 Islam Afifi, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Ad-Dostoor, was referred to a criminal court,51 and the August 11 issue of the paper was confiscated from newspaper stands.52 On August 22, the weekly issue of the newspaper Al-Shaab Al-Jideed was also confiscated from the Al-Ahram printing facilities.53 In the name of reforming the media, the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party were able to utilize their majority in the Shura Council to appoint new editors and boards of directors loyal to them to most of the state-owned newspapers as well as to dominate the Supreme Press Commission. This led to the prevention of a number of articles written by critics of the Brotherhood and of the president from being published, including articles by Abla Ruwaini, Alcinarsit Medhat al-Adl, Ghada Nabil, novelist Yusuf Qaeed, and former Brotherhood leader Tharwat Kherbawi, among others. Abdel Jalil al-Sharnoubi, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was banned from writing on the political page of the journal Al-Itha’a wa Al-Television, and the journal Al-Musawwer discontinued publishing segments of the book A’idoun min Jennet al-Ikhwan (Returning from the Heaven of the Brotherhood), written by author Sameh Fayez, after the first five segments had been published. The Al-Ahram paper canceled a
48 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “After President Morsy’s first 100 Days: Worrying Indications for the Future of Human Rights; Major Crises remain unresolved.” 49 Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, “Freedom of Expression under Accusation.” 50Ibid. 51Ibid. 52 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “After President Morsy’s first 100 Days: Worrying Indications for the Future of Human Rights; Major Crises remain unresolved”; The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, “Another Setback for Freedom of Expression,” Aug. 11, 2012,
(134) section entitled “100 Days of Presidential Promises” which had monitored the president’s fulfillment - or lack thereof - of his promises during his first 100 days in office.54 While the president of the Shura Council was also serving as the president of the Supreme Press Council – in breach of the law – he issued a decision to dismiss the editor of the newspaper Al-Jamhoreyya on October 17, following the paper’s publication of information regarding the Illicit Gains Authority decision to investigate Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, the former minister of defense, and Sami Anan, the former chief of staff of the armed forces.55 Despite a court ruling which overturned this decision in favor of the editor, the Shura Council failed to implement the order to reinstate him. The last six months of 2012 saw a notable escalation in the number of charges related to defamation of Islam or defamation of religion used to suppress freedom of expression. On September 18, for instance, the Sohaig Criminal Court found Bishawi Kameel Kamel guilty of defaming Islam and insulting the president through his postings on Facebook and sentenced him to six years in prison.56 In December, the Al-Marg Criminal Court sentenced Alber Saber Ayyad to three years in prison after finding him guilty of defamation of religion. Ayyad had been detained in September after a number of his neighbors had gathered in front of his house and filed complaints accusing Ayyad of defamation of religion via his accounts on social media websites. Ayyad’s mother had called the police for help, as she feared that the neighbors would break into the house, yet the police arrested Ayyad and confiscated his computer instead. Ayyad was physically assaulted inside the police station, and his mother was received death threats and threats that her house would be set on fire if she did not leave, which she was then forced to do.57
54Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “After President Morsy’s first 100 Days: Worrying Indications for the Future of Human Rights; Major Crises remain unresolved”; Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, “Freedom of Expression under Accusation.” 55 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, “Dismissal of Abd-El-Rahim from Being the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Gomhuria Newspaper,” Oct. 18, 2012,< http://en.eohr.org/2012/10/18/dismissal-of-abd-el-rahim-from-being-the-editor-in-chief-of-al- gomhuria-newspaper/>; Al Watan News, “Al-Edary Yalghey Karar Al-Shura Be-Ekalet Abd Al-Raheem Men Rea’set Tahrir Al-Gomhouriyya,” Nov. 6, 2012,
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Also in December, lawyers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood filed a complaint with the public prosecutor against journalistic writer Ibrahim Eisa, who also hosts the “Hunna al-Qahera” program on the satellite television channel Al-Qahera wa An-Ness, accusing him of defamation of Islam and mockery of Qur’anic verses. Dua’a al-Adl, a cartoonist with the newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, was summoned for investigation on December 27 after a complaint was filed against her accusing her of defamation of religion following a cartoon which ridiculed calls to vote “yes” for religious reasons in the constitutional referendum.58
Increasing Restrictions on Religious Freedoms and Continued Sectarian Violence The year 2012 saw the spread of religious intolerance along with continued acts of sectarian violence. The authorities continued to follow the Mubarak- era method of responding to such acts by calling for customary “reconciliation meetings” rather than holding those responsible to account according to the law. Furthermore, adequate protection was not provided to Coptic Christians or to their churches and property. As a result, cases of forced displacement of Coptic families from their villages increased. In the few cases in which acts of sectarian violence were referred to the courts, the authorities resorted to the use of “emergency” state security courts, as had been done in similar cases under Mubarak’s rule. Many of the rulings issued by these courts are questionable, and defendants are not allowed to appeal these decisions before a higher court. On May 21, one of these emergency courts sentenced twelve Christians to life in prison while acquitting eight Muslims in a case regarding the sectarian clashes which took place in the city of Abu Qurqas in the governorate of Minya in 2011; two Muslims had been killed in the clashes and a number of Coptic shops and homes burned. Another trial heard by an emergency court was related to even more serious acts of violence which occurred in Imbaba in May 2011, when two churches were attacked, 13 people killed, and hundreds injured. In April 2012, the court ordered that the 48 defendants in the case be released
(136) on bail pending a ruling on the constitutionality of one of the provisions of emergency law.59 At the beginning of the year, a Coptic family was evicted from one of the towns in the governorate of Assiut. This occurred after sectarian violence had broken out in four towns following rumors that a Coptic student had circulated an insulting picture of the Prophet Mohammed. Upon hearing this, many Muslims had gathered and attacked Coptic homes, attempting to break into some of them, and the home of the Coptic student who allegedly circulated the picture was set on fire. In response, authorities in the governorate and religious and tribal leaders agreed to displace the family of the Coptic student from their town.60 On January 27, Coptic Christians from the town of Shurbat in the governorate of Alexandria were subjected to sectarian attacks, including arson and looting of their homes and shops. These acts took place after a rumor spread that a Coptic youth had circulated pictures of himself with a Muslim woman from the town. Despite the fact that the youth turned himself in to the police and the prosecutor decided to hold him in custody pending investigations, a “reconciliation meeting” was called for on January 30 by the executive and security authorities in the governorate; the meeting ended in a decision to forcibly evict eight Christian families from the town.61 After the elected president assumed office, the town of Dahshour in the south of the governorate of Giza witnessed an outbreak of sectarian violence on July 26 after a dispute between a Muslim and a Christian turned violent and led to the arson of five homes and shops owned by Copts and the death of one Muslim after he was severely burned. The police did not intervene or allow emergency response vehicles to enter to put out the fires. Fearing for their lives, a large number of Coptic families were forced to flee the town
59Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: End Mubarak-Era Impunity for Sectarian Violence,” July 16, 2012,
(137) after the police asked them to leave their homes until the wave of anger subsided.62 As the activities and influence of Salafist jihadist groups in Sinai spread, Coptic property was attacked by unknown assailants on a number of occasions in Rafah in September; prior to these attacks, a masked man had circulated notices demanding that Copts leave the area. Nine Christian families were forced to leave Rafah and to sell their homes after the authorities in North Sinai made it clear that they could do nothing but reassign Coptic employees from Rafah to positions in Ariyash. Despite this, the prime minister denied that Copts in Rafah had been forcibly evicted, claiming that they had freely decided to move to another area.63 On October 28, Christians were attacked by dozens of Muslims wielding sticks, rocks, and chains as they were leaving the Mary Girgis Church in the manor of Marco Tilla in the governorate of Beni Suweif; the attackers claimed that some of the Copts had come to pray from other villages. The security authorities called for a “reconciliation meeting,” during which it was agreed that the church would refuse to allow Christians from the surrounding towns and villages - which do not have their own churches - to come and pray in the church. The Muslim attackers were made to repair two cars that had been damaged in the attack, while the Christians were forced to withdraw the charges that they had prepared to be filed against the attackers.64 On November 5, a number of Muslims carrying firearms gathered in front of a plot of land owned by the diocese of Shubra al-Khaimah in order to prevent a building for workers of the diocese from being completed. The Muslims threatened to turn the building into a mosque and performed the prayer on the land set aside for the building. The security apparatus refrained
62The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, “Ba’ad wafat shab b-al-qarya mota’theran bi- essabateh: ’ala al-shorta a-tadakhol fawran li-hamayet al-arwah wa al-momtalakat tahassoban li-tajadod al-eshtebakat a-ta’efeyya fe dahshour,” July 31, 2012,
(138) for nearly two days from arresting the Muslims who had incited to the incident and those who had been participated in the attack.65 During 2012, restrictions on Shiites and on the practice of their religious rites increased. For instance, Mohamed Fahmi Abdel Sayyed was sentenced to imprisonment for one year after being charged of spreading Shiite ideas and of committing acts that contradict the Sunni tradition while performing the prayer in a mosque, as these acts were considered to amount to “desecration of places of worship.”66 It is important to note that on a number of occasions, Al-Azhar, a Sunni religious institution, has announced its rejection of the establishment of mosques with sectarian leanings, particularly Shiite “Husseineyyat”, as it considers them to serve to spread a culture of hatred against the companions of the Prophet and his family.67
Restrictions on Civil Society Civil society organizations continued to be held hostage to administrative, bureaucratic, and security restrictions, which reflected the growing trend of the government towards tightening its control on civic work, whether through the use of the provisions of Law 84 of 2002 or in violation of them. Indeed, since the ouster of Mubarak, the authorities have sought to impose increased arbitrary restrictions on the work of civil society. At the same time, the attack which was initiated in the media by the security authorities against human rights organizations in 2011 continued even after the Muslim Brotherhood came to power. In terms of legislation, an attempt was made in April to circulate a new bill which embodied the intent of the government to bring NGOs under state control, as it would have considered NGO funds to be public funds and board members of associations, NGO staff, and members of their affiliated unions to be public employees. This bill sought to grant the government the right to interfere in the minutest of NGOs’ affairs, to prohibit such groups
65 The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, “’Ala ra’ees al-jomhoureyya al-bade’ fawran fe hewar mogtama’y men agl isdar qanoun ’adel li-dor al-e’badda,” Nov. 8, 2012,
(139) from conducting field research and opinion polls, and to prevent them from defending specific rights or workers belonging to specific professions. The bill further sought to grant judicial powers of search and seizure to employees of the Social Affairs Directorates when conducting inspections of associations.68 It is important to note that the Human Rights Committee in the People’s Assembly had conducted consultations with human rights organizations – including the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies – and decided to reject the government’s bill and to adopt a bill proposed by human rights organizations and presented by the Cairo Institute. After the Freedom and Justice Party, the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, presented a new draft of the law, negotiations regarding the bill took place between the party and the Cairo Institute which led to several relative improvements to the draft. However, the People’s Assembly was dissolved before the law was passed.69 After the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate was elected and the Muslim Brotherhood thereby obtained both the executive and legislative powers in Egypt, however, it became increasingly clear that the Brotherhood and it’s party were moving towards adopting legislation with the same content as that of the government’s repressive bill, which they had previously rejected when it was discussed in the Human Rights Committee of the People’s Assembly. The government appointed by the Freedom and Justice Party contributed to the smear campaign against civil society organizations that had been started by the government under the SCAF in 2011. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs held a press conference on October 14, 2012 at which it claimed that it had “refused to allow some civil society organizations to receive money from foreign sources linked to Israel,” without giving the names of the donating bodies or of the organizations which were going to receive these funds. The apparent aim of this was to generalize these charges to all civil society organizations.70 It is important to note that prominent figures in the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions had previously taken part in this smear campaign
68 For more details, see: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Draft Law for the Nationalization of Civil Society and Transforming it into a Government Institution,” Apr. 11, 2012,
(140) against rights organizations in 2011, charging them with receiving foreign funds in order to implement Western agendas with the aim of preventing parliamentary or presidential elections from being held.71 In the context of this campaign, 43 people who worked for foreign organizations (four offices of American organizations and five offices of German organizations) were referred to a criminal court in February 2012 on charges of directing unlicensed organizations and of receiving funds from abroad in violation of the law. Diplomatic pressure led the Egyptian authorities to drop the travel ban imposed against the foreign defendants and to allow them to leave the country. Also in the context of this smear campaign, the Ministry of Justice circulated unfounded charges against dozens of organizations in the media. An impartial investigation was supposed to be conducted by the judiciary into these allegations, yet the investigation was delegated to two judges handpicked by the Ministry of Justice. Throughout the investigation period, incorrect information and information that had been taken out of context regarding the case were intentionally and continuously leaked to the press to fuel the smear campaign against rights organizations, despite the fact that information related to ongoing investigations should be kept confidential. This campaign peaked when the investigating judges – in a new precedent violating both the law and judicial norms – convened a press conference to provide additional accusations. Later, when the travel ban against the defendants was lifted, the judges made an official announcement that the charges did not amount to more than a breach of administrative procedure and therefore did not warrant preventive detention or a travel ban.72
71 For information concerning these campaigns, content, and parties, see: - Essam Al-Deen Mohamed Hassan, “Hamlat a-tashheer a a-tamweel al-ajnaby, kera’a fe al- hajma ’ala al-jama’eyyat al-ahleyya wa monathamat al-mojtama’ al-madany,” Working paper presented at a talk on “Ehanat Al-Qanoun wa Hamlet Al-Karaheyya,” Sep. 19, 2011. 72 For more information on the attacks on human rights organizations and civil society, see: - Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “The Case Against Foreign NGOs Must be Closed and Responsible Ministers Held Accountable,” Mar. 11, 2012,
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Since the elected president assumed office, he sought to exclude rights organizations from participating in consultations on issues related to human rights. For instance, on November 11 the president convened a meeting with civil society organizations without including any human rights groups. Similarly, rights organizations had been invited to participate in a meeting of the European-Egyptian Working Group on November 13; these invitations were cancelled based on a request from the Egyptian government. Tellingly, the invitations extended to American and European organizations and to Egyptian organizations working in fields other than human rights were not cancelled. On November 7, the Egyptian government interrupted the opening session of a conference organized by the United Nations in Cairo regarding problems related to the implementation of transitional justice – despite the fact that the schedule of the conference included a time for the government to speak during the opening session. The following day, a representative of the Foreign Ministry in attendance fiercely attacked the conference, calling it an extension of an international conspiracy against Egypt.73
Continued Restrictions to Union Rights and Freedoms The authorities took no serious steps to improve union freedoms limited by Law 35 of 1976 on workers’ unions, despite the fact that an alternative bill had been prepared in 2011 upon the initiative of the former Minister of Manpower, Ahmed Bora’i. At that time, an agreement had been reached by all parties of the union movement, business owners, representatives of the government, and rights organizations. Instead, the president signed a limited amendment to the existing law which paved the way for individuals close to the Muslim Brotherhood to control the Egypt Workers Union, the official union organization.74 The continued application of Law 35 of 1976, which entrenches a role for only one union organization, created obstacles for independent syndicates.
- Amnesty International, “Egypt: Stop Holding NGOs Hostage,” Feb. 7, 2012,
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At the same time, union leaders were harassed, punished by being dismissed from their jobs or transferred arbitrarily, detained, and investigated and referred to trial. On September 23, the Alexandria Criminal Court issued a harsh sentence against five leaders of the independent union of the Tadawwol al-Haweyyat Company in absentia based on charges of inciting workers to strike and misusing public funds.75 During the first 100 days of the elected president’s term, 39 leaders of independent syndicates were dismissed from their jobs, 32 unionists were referred to the prosecutor general on charges of inciting to strikes, and dozens of unionists were subjected to administrative investigations by the institutions in which they work.76 Prominent rights advocate and unionist Kamal Abbas, the general coordinator of the Center for Union and Workers’ Services, was sentenced on February 26 to imprisonment for six months on charges of insulting the acting president of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Egypt during meetings of the International Labor Organization in Geneva. On November 25, he was acquitted by the Helwan Court.77
Continued Torture and Police Violations Practices of torture and other forms of ill treatment continued to be carried out against detainees and prisoners by the police and military police, excessive use of force – at times lethal – continued to be used to confront peaceful protests, and extrajudicial killings continued to be committed. The continuation of such practices was encouraged by the atmosphere of impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights violations and by the lack of measures taken to reform the security sector. The severity of the massacre at the Port Said stadium in early February 2012, when at least 74 fans of the Ahly Club were killed within sight and earshot of security forces, was not sufficiently reflected by the charges of police
75Center for Trade Union & Workers’ Services, “Entahakat al-horreyyat al-neqabeyya khilal al-ma’a youm al-oula men hokm al-ra’ees mohamed morsi,”
(143) neglect to protect citizens which were raised following the incident.78 Indeed, the report of the fact-finding commission formed by the People’s Assembly pointed to the role that the security authorities and the police played in facilitating the massacre.79 Rights reports considered the massacre to represent an indicator of the intentional entrenchment of an atmosphere of chaos in the country in order to prepare the way to impose increasingly repressive laws and to allow the police to use force freely against citizens and to commit the same violations seen in the Mubarak era.80 During 2012, 17 deaths occurred in detention facilities that were thought to have resulted from torture, ill treatment, and deprivation of medical attention. Twelve additional cases were recorded in which women were held hostage as a form of coercion against their relatives.81 The military police was also responsible for torture, including against those arrested during the clashes which took place on May 4 at the Ministry of Defense; practices used against them included severe beatings with clubs, electric batons, rifle butts, and water hoses.82 Following the election of the president, police violations escalated: Whereas rights organizations recorded two deaths due to torture between January and June 2012, they recorded ten deaths in police stations or prisons thought to have resulted from torture during the first four months of the elected president’s term. Similarly, while eight cases of extrajudicial killings were recorded during the first half of 2012, eleven cases were recorded between July and November.83 On July 2, the town of Abu Salim in the governorate of Beni Suweif was attacked by officers and soldiers stationed in the town, who opened fire in the town and killed four people. The attack took place after some of the
78Al-Dostour Newspaper, “Nas morafa’et al-neyaba fe qadeyyet mathbahet bor said,” Aug. 26, 2012,
(144) soldiers had been exposed to fraud. On December 24, members of the security directorate in Minya attacked one of the neighborhoods of the city, assaulting passersby, destroying shops, and opening fire randomly; the attack took place after a police officer was killed during a fight.84
84 Ibid. For more details on police violations, see: - Al-Nadeem Center, “100 Days of Morsi Rule,” Nov. 13, 2012,
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Tunisia
The success of the Tunisian revolution in overthrowing the regime of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January, 2011, was accompanied by high hopes regarding the prospects for transition to democracy in the country. These hopes were buoyed by the return of prominent rights activists and members of the political opposition to the country, the end of the siege which had effectively been imposed by the police on human rights and civil society organizations, and the release of hundreds of prisoners of conscience, including union and rights activists. In addition, a number of organizations which had been banned during the Ben Ali era were legally recognized. The most important development, however, was the progress made by the most prominent civil society and political actors to fill the power vacuum by setting up a “High Commission for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution” (HC), which played a significant role in enacting a number of important laws to reinforce the course of the transition to democracy, including a law to govern the election of the National Constituent Assembly. The HC also formed an independent elections committee headed by a prominent rights figure. It further passed a new law regulating the work of civil society associations which complies with international standards and represents the most commendable of such laws in the entire Arab region. Similarly, the HC passed other legislation related to eliminating torture, to guaranteeing press and publication freedoms, and to regulating the field of audiovisual communications, as well as establishing an independent high commission to set the regulations for these fields. Moreover, the election of the Constituent Assembly set an example unique in the Arab world for free
(147) and fair elections and for the peaceful transfer of power to a civilian elected authority, after which the Ennahda Party formed a government.1 However, the year 2012 witnessed a waning of the hopes that had been held regarding the transition to democracy in the country, especially following the dissolution of the HC and the transfer of legislative powers to the National Constituent Assembly. The implementation of laws previously passed by the HC to protect press and media freedoms was obstructed, and the government arbitrarily interfered in the appointment of directors of state-owned press and media institutions. Journalists, media professionals, and artists became increasingly pressured by the government, while attacks and pressures from Salafist groups on freedoms of expression and creativity as well as personal and academic freedoms increased. Simultaneously, the Ennahda Party introduced a draft law making crimes against “the sacred” punishable by prison, and it is clear that pressures exerted by Salafist groups converged with similar tendencies within the Ennahda movement. This is visible in the first draft of the constitution, which included restrictions on freedom of expression, failed to guarantee full equality between women and men, and neglected to explicitly establish the status of international human rights treaties in Tunisian law, which could allow lawmakers and judges to disregard the obligations that are placed on the state by such treaties. In light of the continued renewal of the state of emergency – which was imposed on January 14, 2011 and renewed most recently in October 2012 – practices of the security forces have increased fears that police forces will continue to enjoy impunity for gross violations, particularly those related to excessive use of force to break up peaceful gatherings and practices of physical and psychological abuse and torture exercised against detainees. Moreover, serious efforts to adopt a holistic process of transitional justice have been greatly lacking.
Constitutional and Legislative Developments The process of drafting a new constitution for the country continues in the National Constituent Assembly, whose members were chosen through the first free and fair elections ever held in Tunisia. A first draft was prepared and presented for public review in August 2012, yet the failure of the Assembly to complete a final draft of the constitution within one year from
1For details regarding the accomplishments of the first year following the revolution, see the chapter dedicated to Tunisia in “Fractured Walls, New Horizons: Human Rights in the Arab Region,” Annual Report 2011, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies,
(148) its formation on October 23, 2011 has resulted in the deadline being extended until February 2013.2 The text of the first draft reveals that the Assembly has yet to settle on a final version for several of the provisions related to the system of governance and the relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.3 Despite the fact that the text of the draft tended in general to affirm respect and guarantees for rights and public freedoms, including the right to form political parties, unions, and associations and the right to peaceful gatherings, protests, and strikes, the wording used is basic and does not define the specific obligations of the state to protect these rights. Positively, the draft also recognized the right to human dignity and completely banned any form of assault on the physical or psychological integrity of any person, including all forms of torture, considering it a crime not subject to a statute of limitations. The most significant causes for concern over the status of human rights in the new constitution relate to the freedoms of expression and creativity, religious freedoms, and women’s rights. There are also fears related to the status of international human rights treaties in the constitution, as Chapter 20 of Part 5 grants the Constitutional Court the power to examine the extent of the constitutionality of international treaties prior to signature. Chapter 17 affirms that international treaties shall be respected as long as no contradiction with the Constitution exists. This approach would limit the effective value of the Constitutional texts which guarantee human rights and public freedoms, as it would allow the legislative authorities and the courts to disregard the provisions of international human rights treaties under the pretext that they contradict the Constitution. The wording of provisions regarding women’s rights is ambiguous, as it fails to clearly recognize full equality between men and women. The only reference to equality comes in Chapter 21 of Part 2, which discusses the care for and stability of the family as well as enabling the family to play its role in “supporting equality between the two spouses.” The protections for women’s rights in Chapter 28 of Part 2 also appear to be applicable only in the framework of the woman’s role as wife complementing the man in family life.
2Amnesty International, “Tunisia: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? One Year Since Tunisia’s Landmark Elections,” Oct. 23, 2012,
(149) Even though the draft constitution does establish that citizens are equal before the law in terms of rights and obligations without discrimination, it at the same time reserves the right to run for the office of president to Muslims only. The restrictions that the draft constitution imposes on freedom of expression are closely related to religious pressures in the country. In more than one article, the draft bans and criminalizes any infringement on “the religious sanctities,” and it is feared that expression of diverse opinions and ideas, literary and artistic works, and academic studies may fall under this provision if they are considered to compromise religion or offend religious figures. The draft constitution has also been criticized by constitutional law experts and human rights defenders for leaving the door open to the establishment of authoritarian rule in the name of religion and for upholding elements of a theocratic state, even as it was expected to establish the values of a civil state.4 In this context, the Ennahda Party presented a draft law to the Constituent Assembly which would have criminalized “desecration of sacred values,” whether through speech, images, or actions and made such acts punishable by prison sentences of up to two years.5 A second draft of the constitution was presented by the Constituent Assembly on December 14 which avoided some of the same problems regarding lack of protection for women’s rights that had been criticized in the first draft. Chapter 5 affirms that all citizens, male and female, are equal before the law without discrimination and hold equal rights and duties. However, Chapter 7 includes extremely broad language where it states that the state shall guarantee protection of the rights of women and support women’s gains without providing any definition for these rights or the basis for them. Chapter 37 also establishes that the state shall guarantee equal
4Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Fix Serious Flaws in Draft Constitution,” Sep. 13, 2012,
(150) opportunities for men and women, yet this provision is limited to matters related to “bearing responsibilities,” whereas it should provide for equal enjoyment of rights as well. Even though the second draft does not include final versions of the sections regarding the structure of governance and the relationships between the state authorities, some of the provisions agreed upon within the committees of the Constituent Assembly are cause for concern, For instance, Chapter 95 would potentially allow for the establishment of armed organizations or militias that do not belong to the state’s armed forces or the security establishment, as it provides for the possibility that such armed groups might be formed under another law. Civil society organizations and political activists have expressed fears that this article could allow for the party which currently holds a plurality, the Ennahda party, to replicate what was done in Iran through the establishment of militias - mimicking the Iranian Revolutionary Guard - which would serve to deter those who reject the establishment of a theocratic system of government in Tunisia.6 Furthermore, Chapter 68 of the second draft of the constitution provides for immunity from prosecution for the president while in office and extends this immunity beyond his/her term for acts committed while serving in the post of president. Such a provision could preclude accountability for misuse of the powers constitutionally granted to the president. The year 2012 did not see any progress towards reform to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Rather, the work of the High Judiciary Council was suspended and replaced with a temporary judicial commission, even though the adoption of the law to establish this commission faced strong opposition due to several political parties - including the Ennahda Party, which held a plurality in the Constituent Assembly - objecting to granting the commission financial and administrative independence. This legislative and institutional vacuum allowed for the executive branch, represented by the minister of justice, to interfere in the administration of justice. On May 28 the minister issued arbitrary decrees to dismiss 82 judges under the pretext of stopping the spread of corruption; nine of the judges were subsequently returned to their posts. Furthermore, the minister restored the High Judiciary Council with the same members that had been present before the fall of the Ben Ali regime.7
6 Middle East Online, “Dostor ennahda yuteeh tashkeel haras ‘al-basdaran’ fe tunis,” Jan. 7, 2013, (151) The Congress for the Republic Party presented a draft law on political isolation, yet at the time of the writing of this report this law had remained under discussion. This draft law called for the removal of high-ranking members of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party and ministers from the successive governments which served under Ben Ali from the political scene and banned them from joining any other political parties for five years. This would have prohibited a number of citizens from exercising some of their political rights simply for having adopted specific views. Deterioration of Freedoms of Expression and the Media During the first year following the revolution, prior censorship of newspapers was ended and the use of provisions of the penal code to criminalize expression of opinion and to punish those who work in journalism and the media greatly decreased. Legislative steps were also taken to protect the rights of journalists and to govern the field of audiovisual media in a way that ensures its independence.8 However, throughout the year 2012, those who expressed their opinions, including artists and those who work in the fields of journalism and media, were subjected to severe violations by the government as well as to growing pressures from Salafist groups, which have promoted an environment of religious extremism hostile to press freedoms and the freedoms of thought and creativity.9 In this context, at least 130 cases of violations to press freedoms have been documented, and while some cases include prosecution before the judiciary, most of these violations have come in the form of acts of violence and physical attacks on journalists and other media professionals.10 It is important to note that some of the leaders of the Ennahda movement have displayed their annoyance with and have perpetuated restrictions on press freedoms, even inciting attacks on media professionals. For example, independence>; Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Revise Judiciary Bill,” Aug. 6, 2012, (152) Habib Ellouz, one of the leaders of the Ennahda movement and a member of the Constituent Assembly, made a statement on September 7 in which he described media professionals as being enemies of the revolution and called for them to be “hit”.11 The government obstructed decrees 115 and 116 of 2011, which had been issued by the High Commission for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution; Decree 115 related to protecting the rights of journalists and their sources as well as to prohibiting the blocking of access to information, while Decree 116 had dealt with restructuring the field of audiovisual media and to creating an Independent High Body for Audiovisual Communication which would be responsible for issuing radio and television broadcasting licenses and for appointing the directors of state-owned media institutions.12 Furthermore, the government imposed its control on the state-owned media sector by appointing new officials to the official media outlets and revived the use of provisions of the Penal Code – as had been done under the Ben Ali regime – to curb the freedoms of expression and opinion and media freedoms as well as to refer media professionals to trial for charges such as undermining public order, “defaming sacred values,” and “compromising public morality.” At the same time, the silence of the government regarding pressures exerted by Salafist groups allowed artists and media professionals to be blatantly targeted and attacked by religious fanatics. On October 17, Tunisia witnessed an unprecedented general strike by various media outlets which was called for by the National Union of Tunisian Journalists13 with the demands of establishing constitutional protections for freedom of expression, reviewing the government appointments of directors of media outlets, and effectively implementing Decrees 115 and 116. The government was forced to promise to enforce the two decrees, although it included the condition that Decree 116 would be implemented only temporarily until a new independent body to regulate the media could be established under the new constitution.14 11National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, “Bayan an-naqaba al-wataneyya l-as-sahafeyyen at-tuniseyyen b-tarekh 08 sebtember 2012,” Sep. 8, 2012, (153) The call for the general strike was met with criminal procedures taken against a number of journalists and other media professionals. On September 25, the authorities summoned six journalists from Dar al-Saba7 for questioning based on allegations that they had “disrupted the functioning of the workplace.” Similarly, cartoonist Hamdi al-Mazhoudi was arbitrarily dismissed from his post as punishment for his role in the strike.15 This deterioration led the National Committee for Reforming the Media and Communication to announce its resignation and to dissolve itself out of protest of actions taken by the government to hinder the Committee’s activities. On July 4, the president of the Committee, Kamel Labidi, who is also a prominent rights defender, explained that the committee saw no purpose in continuing its work under such circumstances.16 With regards to the various prosecutions of media professionals, on March 28 one of the courts issued a sentence of seven years in prison against two internet activists - Ghazi al-Baji and Jaber al-Majry – on charges of publishing defamatory depictions of the prophet Mohammed and other writings which the court considered insulting to Islam, Muslims, and religious morality.17 On April 11, a court in Medenine in southern Tunisia issued a sentence of four years in prison against Ramzi Abasha on charges of “attacking mosques” and “insulting religious rites” after he was accused of desecrating the Qur’an in a number of mosques in the city of Ben Guedrane.18 On March 8, Nasreddine Ben Sa’ida, the director of the newspaper “Attuniseyya,” was convicted of “publishing information liable to disturb public order” and sentenced to a fine of one thousand Tunisian dinars. The paper had published a picture of the German soccer star of Tunisian ancestry, Samy Khedira, embracing his semi-naked girlfriend.19 On May 3, Nabil Karoui, director of the “Nessma” television channel, was sentenced to pay a fine of 2,400 Tunisian dinars for charges of “violating sacred values and undermining public order and religious morality” for 15 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “IFEX-TMG Calls on Tunisia to Guarantee Media Independence,” Oct. 17, 2012, (154) having aired the cartoon film Persepolis, which includes a scene depicting God.20 On August 25, the Investigations Department of the Court of Appeals in Tunis issued an arrest warrant for Sami al-Fahri, the director of the television channel “Attuniseyya,” based on charges of financial irregularities in a production company of which he shared ownership with the son-in-law of former president Ben Ali. The warrant was issued only two days after the government informed him of its displeasure at his satirical program “al- Mantiq as-Siyasi,” in which he criticized the government and leaders of the Ennahda movement, including Rached al-Ghannoushi. Before the issuance of the warrant, Al-Fahri announced that Lotfi Zitoun, the media advisor to the prime minister, had called him and requested that he stop broadcasting the program. If convicted, al-Fahri could face up to ten years in prison.21 On September 21, a military tribunal issued a suspended sentence of four months imprisonment against Ayoub Massoudi, the former advisor to President Moncef Marzouki, on charges of “disparaging the reputation of the army” and “defaming a government employee.” This followed a statement he had made to “Attuniseyya” channel on July 15 in which he criticized of the role of the army in handing over the former Libyan prime minister, al- Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, to Libya, claiming that the Chief of Staff of the armed forces and the minister of defense did not consult with the Tunisian president in advance.22 On November 22, the Court of First Instance ordered that the channel Attuniseyya not broadcast a conversation with one of the in-laws of the ousted president. The judiciary justified this ban because the controversial content was liable to undermine public security and instigate unrest among citizens.23 20International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “Spring into Winter? Fragile Achievements and Exceptional Challenges for Tunisian Free Expression Defenders,” Report issued July 2012, (155) In December, a number of journalists were referred to court following their publication of articles dealing with issues of corruption. Among them was Ramzi al-Jabari, the director of the newspaper al-Safir, who was brought before the Court of First Instance based on charges of defamation after he published articles about suspected corruption in the Collective for School and University Events. Journalists Mohamed al-Hamrouni and Nadia al-Zair, from the weekly paper al-Dameer, were also referred to trial on charges of defamation and slander, after the former head of the Federation of Industry and Commerce accused the two of defaming him in an article published in al-Dameer dealing with suspected corruption. The court refused to hear the case against the journalists due to procedural problems. Yasmin al-Nabli, a journalist with the weekly paper Sawt a-Sha’b, was also brought before the Court on charges of defamation after the general director of an agricultural company filed a complaint following al-Nabli’s publication of a journalistic report which included issues of suspected corruption in land investments.24 On January 17, unknown men, some wearing shirts of the Ennahda movement, attacked Sofiène Ben Hamida, a reporter with the channel “Nessma,” beating and insulting him and accusing him of being an unbeliever, as he was covering a protest organized by government supporters in downtown Tunis.25 Similarly, a number of other Tunisian and foreign journalists were subjected to physical and verbal attacks by the police, both in the capital and in other cities, during the celebration of Martyrs’ Day on April 9. Their equipment was confiscated; some of it was destroyed. The National Union of Tunisian Journalists stated that 14 reporters had been attacked during this demonstration.26 On August 6, journalist Siham al-Mohamadi and photographer Abdel Hamid al-‘Amri of the television channel “al-Hiwar at-Tunissey,” reporter Na’ima al-Chermiti of the television channel “Arabesque,” and reporter Saif Eddine al-A’miri of the news site “Akher Khabar” were beaten by police while covering the violent dispersal of protestors during an anti-government demonstration in Bourguiba Street. The previous day, on August 5, Tunisian 24 Tunis Center for Press Freedom, “Report: Violations against Tunisian Media during December 2012,” Jan. 3, 2013, (156) blogger Lina Ben Mhenni had also been beaten by the police.27 On September 14, journalists were against subjected to beatings during their coverage of a protest which took place in the area surrounding the American embassy because of the film which insulted the Prophet Mohammed. Among the reporters who were attacked were Mohamed Ali al-Suwaissi and Hashem Lamari, correspondents with Radio Mosaique FM; Na’ima al-Chermiti, a correspondent with Arabesque TV; Ramzi Hafiz, a correspondent and photographer with Dubai Channel and correspondent with the French newspaper Libération. In addition, a vehicle belonging to the national television was destroyed.28 Reporters were also intimidated for their work. On July 6, Nadia al-Hadawi, a reporter with national radio, was prevented from entering the building where she works, as she was scheduled to host writer Naziha Rajiba, who is known for her criticism of the government, on her morning program. On August 21, Bathina Qawiya’a, who hosts the program “al-Akhbar wa al- Sha’i’at” on National Radio, was informed that she was being transferred from her position in the news department following an episode during which representatives of the National Union for Tunisian Journalists discussed the government’s appointments of editors-in-chief of some of the government- owned newspapers and the director of national television and criticized the manner in which the government was dealing with the media.29 On August 22, the government dismissed reporter Kamal Samari, Director of Dar al-Sabah, and appointed in his stead Latfi al-Towati, a former security officer. This step was severely denounced by reporters and public figures, who protested in front of the building for several days. In addition, the front pages of the newspapers “al-Sabah” and “Le Temps” were left blank as a further form of protest.30 Several days after al-Towati assumed his position, he banned the publication of an article criticizing his appointment, dismissed one of the editors, and issued a list of people allowed to write editorials in the paper.31 Reporters with Dar al-Sabah continued their protests and 27 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “Old-Style Repression Threatens Free Expression in New Tunisia, Says IFEX-TMG.” 28 Kalima Tunis, “Al-I’atida’ ‘ala ‘adid min as-sahafiyyen athna’ al-ihtijajat,” Sep. 14, 2012, (157) periodic hunger strikes until Latfi al-Towati was dismissed and the judiciary appointed a replacement to head the newspaper.32 On May 27, unknown persons broke into the headquarters of the privately owned channel “Al-Hiwar at-Tunissey” and destroyed or stole an estimated 200,000-dinars’ worth of equipment. This came in the wake of a series of threats to reporters and other workers at the channel from groups affiliated with extremists and other individuals claiming to support the government.33 On November 28, security forces used excessive force in dealing with journalists who had been covering the general strike in the city of Siliana, southwest of Tunis. Abdelsalam al-Samrani, the director of the office of Dar al-Anwar in Siliana, sustained bruises and a fractured bone, and a team from the channels Hannibal and Attuniseyya was also attacked with clubs and flaming projectiles as the sit-in was being dispersed. Members of the security forces also attempted to prevent nine other journalists from covering the events and threatened and insulted them. David Thompson, a correspondent with the channel France 24, was shot by a firearm in his leg. On November 30, security forces used tear gas to prevent a group of journalists from filming a march in the same city, causing them to choke.34 Threats to Public and Personal Freedoms Salafist groups were successful in applying increasing pressure on public freedoms as well as personal freedoms, particularly in light of the failure of the authorities to carry out their responsibility to protect citizens and their apparent inclination to allow for such pressures to be exerted on various occasions. Indeed, in some cases, supporters of the ruling Ennahda Party – which enjoys a plurality in the Constituent Assembly – appeared to be implicated in attacks on their political opponents as well as in providing legal backing for the suppression of public freedoms. On June 12, the Ministry of Culture closed the exhibition “Spring of the Arts” and confiscated six paintings following protests by Salafist groups in a number of cities which claimed that some of the works of art were – according to the Minister of Culture Mohdi Mabruk – provocative and violated “the principles of Islam and the sanctities of the Tunisian people.” 32 Ibid; As-sabah, “Ta’een mutasarif qada’y ‘ala ra’s ‘dar as-sabah’,” Nov. 7, 2012, (158) On June 14, ministers from the Ennahda movement announced their intention to prosecute the artists whose works had been exhibited. On August 28, visual artists Nadia al-Jelassi and Mohamed Ben Salama were interrogated based on charges of “exhibiting what is liable to disturb public order” and “insults Islam.”35 Statements made before the Constituent Assembly by al-Sadiq Shuru, one of the leaders of the Ennahda movement, called for putting an end to the efforts of protestors and strikers, whom he considered to be breaking the law and damaging the national economy, citing a Quranic verse to support these claims.36 On August 5, reporter Sofiene al-Chourabi was arrested along with two of his friends based on claims that they had been drinking alcohol on a beach while camping in Kelibia in northeastern Tunisia. They were charged with “intoxication in a public place” and “assaulting public ethics.” One day before his arrest, al-Chourabi had called for the organization of a demonstration in front of the Interior Ministry to protest the imposition of increased restrictions by the Ennahda movement on public freedoms.37 On January 23, three journalists were attacked while coming out of the trial of the director of Nessma TV by a group of extremists who cursed them, spat in their faces, and kicked them. The police did not intervene to stop the assault or to apprehend the attackers.38 On March 24, Lotfi al-Hajji, the director of the al-Jazeera channel’s office and member of the executive board of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, was attacked while covering a political meeting in the city of Monastir. The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights condemned this attack, considering it “one of the recurring episodes in which press freedoms and protections of journalists have come under attack.”39 35 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “IFEX-TMG Alarmed by Recent Attacks on Artistic Expression,” June 25, 2012, (159) On April 8, a group of extremists verbally and physically attacked Ayman Ma’touq, Amin al-Ayashi, and Fathi al-Amiri, reporters with the Nessma satellite channel, while they were covering a demonstration organized by the Tunisian Nationalist Party in front of the Municipal Theater in the city of Sfax.40 On April 22, activists with the “Our Constitution” network were subjected to a violent attack in the city of Douz in the governorate of Medenine when extremist groups attacked the venue of their meeting, wielding clubs, glass bottles, and knives. In particular, the attackers targeted the president of the network, Johar Ben Mubarak. In a statement issued on the same day, the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights expressed its shock at the lack of a security response during the incident, which contributed to “the spread of the influence of extremist groups through violence and intimidation.”41 On May 24, extremist groups attacked the playwright Ragab al-Mokri in the city of Le Kaf, beating him severely on his head and chest. After the incident, he was taken to the hospital in critical condition.42 On May 27, Tatiana Massad, a reporter with the channel France 24, was attacked by extremists while covering a fire in one of the markets in the capital.43 On August 14, comedian Lotfi al-Abdli was assaulted by an extremist group, which prevented him from performing in the town of Menzel Bourguiba, close to Binzerte, after they claimed that he had insulted Islam. On August 15, Salafists prevented an Iranian band from performing at the International Festival of Sufi and Spiritual Music in the governorate of Kairouan, claiming that the band was “Shiite.” On August 16, 200 extremists armed with swords, clubs, and rocks attacked the “Nasrat al-Aqsa” festival (160) in the city of Binzerte, protesting the participation of Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese man who had been previously held prisoner in Israel and whom they claimed supported the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.44 The president of the Freedom and Equity Organization’s branch in Binzerte, Khaled Boujemaa, was also attacked and sustained injuries in this mouth and leg as well as a broken nose. The attack also included a group of rights activists, among them Manji al-Tayashi, Shukri al-Gharbi, and Emad al- Sfaxi.45 On November 17, a team from the channel al-Hiwar at-Tuniseyya was attacked during their coverage of the funeral of a Salafist youth in the town of Grado in the state of Zaghwan in north eastern Tunisia by a group affiliated with the Salafist movement. The team was beaten, kicked, and called “the media of shame,” “atheists,” “infidels,” and “secularists.”46 On December 31, two journalists from the same channel were attacked and threatened with death by another group affiliated with the Salafist movement while they were reporting in the Heshar area in the state of Manouba; they were similarly called “infidels” and “atheists.”47 Such attacks also targeted a number of Islamic thinkers. On April 22, extremists prevented thinker Yussef al-Sadiq, an expert in anthropology of the Qur’an, and writer Olfa Yussef from presenting a lecture on intellectual intolerance in the city of Kelibia in the governorate of Nabeul. The extremists threatened them with beatings if they approached the cultural center, then lowered the Tunisian flag and replaced it with a black flag symbolizing the Islamic caliphate.48 On August 5, Sheikh Abdel Fattah Muru was attacked during a religious seminar in the city of Kairouan; one of the extremists beat him with a glass on his head, resulting in him needing to be taken to the hospital.49 On August 23, a group of extremists physically attacked the well-known poet Saghir Awlad Ahmed after he had criticized the Ennahda movement on 44Al-mashhad at-tunissey, “Wazaret a-thaqafa at-tuniseyya tudin i’ateda’ salafeyen ‘ala a- sha’ir awlad ahmed,” Aug. 28, 2012, (161) a television program on “Attuniseyya.” On August 24, the poet Mohamed al- Hadi al-Waslati was also assaulted by a group of extremists in the capital, resulting in him being taken to the hospital in critical condition.50 Some cities saw attacks on hotels and bars by extremist groups wielding swords and sticks because they sell alcohol.51 Some fundamentalists belonging to the Salafist trend attempted to force the Faculty of Arts at the University of Manouba, close to the capital, to allow the entrance of female students wearing the niqab to exam rooms without revealing their faces for identification. They then held a sit-in inside the university for several days before they were dispersed by security.52 Habib Kazdaghli, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, was referred to trial on charges of slapping a female student wearing a niqab, the penalty for which may reach up to five years in prison.53 The Higher Education Syndicates decided to strike for a period of two hours in solidarity with Kazdaghli, and the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights – represented by its president – participated in the defense team of the dean. On October 18, Lotfi Naqd was killed and nine others wounded following a raid carried out by demonstrators belonging to the “People’s Association for the Protection of the Revolution” – which is closely linked to the Ennahda movement – on the headquarters of the Regional Farmers’ Federation in the city of Tataouine. It is important to note that Naqd was the coordinator of the l’Appel Tunisie Party, headed by the former prime minister Beji Kaid Essebsi, who accused the Ennahda movement of being responsible for Naqd’s assassination and called it the first political assassination after the revolution, saying that the planning for the assassination had taken place under the cover of the so-called committees for the protection of the revolution.54 The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights also 50 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “Old-Style Repression Threatens Free Expression in New Tunisia, Says IFEX-TMG.” 51Menara, “Salafiyun mutashadidun yuhajimun funduqan seyaheyan bi-madinat sidi bou zaid,” Sep. 3, 2012, (162) accused the committees for the protection of the revolution of having “called for violence against persons and property and practiced violence in a number of cases, thus threatening the peace and harmony of society” in a statement issued on October 18. Repression of Peaceful Assemblies Acts of violence against peaceful protest movements increased throughout the year 2012. On January 14, the police used tear gas canisters and rubber bullets to disperse a demonstration of unemployed youth who were demanding a “new revolution” in the city of Tozeur in southern Tunisia, as their demands had not been met, including employment and an end to corruption.55 On April 3, the police broke up a demonstration that was being held in solidarity with those injured during the revolution and which took place in front of the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Tunis. This dispersal led to injuries of varying severity among the protestors and their families, requiring a number of them to be taken to the hospital. In addition, three members of the Tunisian Party who had been arrested were subjected to insults and threats while being interrogated at the police station in Bardot.56 On April 9, Tunis saw acts of police repression against thousands of protestors who had gathered to commemorate Martyrs’ Day, considered a national holiday, and to denounce a previous decision by the Interior Minister to ban demonstrations in Habib Bourguiba Street. Police forces used clubs and large quantities of tear gas in a small area to disperse the protestors, and a large number was arrested. “Thugs” armed with clubs and tear gas also aided police in dispersing the crowds.57 Labor Union, “Al-maktab at-tanfizhy yunadid bahdath al-‘onf bi-tataween wa yutalib bi-fatah tahqiq jady,” Oct. 19, 2012, (163) On April 14, the police dispersed a sit-in held by a group of unemployed youth in the poor district of al-Malahi in Rades, situated 10 kilometers from the capital. The protestors were demonstrating against the results of a competition to obtain employment organized by the Tunisian Shipping and Wharfage Company. Police scoured the area violently, including by launching tear gas canisters into homes - which led women, children, and the elderly persons to choke – and by raiding homes after breaking down their doors, destroying furniture and attacking and beating residents inside, especially women. 22 individuals were arrested of whom five were released, and their bodies bore the marks of torture and other ill-treatment.58 On July 18, the police attacked a demonstration of workers at the University Hospital Hadi Shaker in Sfax; they were protesting the appointment of a new director who belonged to the Ennahda movement. The police response resulted in the injury of several people, who were taken to the hospital for treatment. The police also arrested two unionists. The hospital was again stormed on the night of July 20 in order to enforce the appointment of the director and to arrest five additional employees.59 On August 9, the police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse a peaceful demonstration which had been called for by several political parties, unions, and civil society activists in the city of Sidi Bouzid, demanding the resignation of the government and the dismissal of the mayor of the city and denouncing that social problems were being dealt with through security responses. Among those who were injured were two reporters, and a number of others were detained. That same afternoon, the police dispersed another protest denouncing the repressive policies used to deal with demonstrators. More demonstrators were thus injured and arrested. The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights condemned this repression of demonstrators and said that the security responses resembled those followed by the Ben Ali regime in dealing with protests in the Mining Basin in 2008.60 58International Federation for Human Rights, “Tu’adid intihakat haq at-tagamu’ as-silmy”; Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, “‘Itilaf al-mujtema’ al-madani: bayan mushtarak,” Apr. 16, 2012, (164) On August 22-23, events in the delegation of al-Hanasha in the governorate of Sfax (southeast of the capital) turned bloody following a protest by residents against the domination of the Ennahda movement of the local development association – which provides short-term loans – and calling for citizen representation in the administration of the local institutions of governance instead allowing such roles be monopolized by members of one political party. The police chased citizens through the streets with clubs and tear gas, broke into a number of homes, where they harassed the residents, and arrested a number of protestors. The International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners expressed solidarity with those who were detained and stated that it was “deeply concerned at the return of the use of the old security and judicial mechanisms to resolve political differences and to put a stop to peaceful social movements.”61 On the evening of September 10, a group of residents from the city of Jerish in the governorate of Le Kef gathered for the funeral of Abdel Ra’uf al- Khamasi, who had died as the result of a concussion sustained while being detained in a security center in Tunis.62 Those gathered carried signs against torture and protested practices of the Interior Ministry. The police attacked the protestors, injuring some of them and indiscriminately arresting others. Police forces also fired tear gas in several residential areas, including the Hached al-Ganubi and Ali Ben Khalifa neighborhoods, leading to several cases of choking among women and children.63 From November 27-29, the city of Siliana witnessed violent confrontations between the police and protestors after protests were held calling for the mayor of the city to be dismissed, for real economic development to be undertaken in the city, and for the release of 13 protestors who remained in detention awaiting trial since their arrest during demonstrations in April 2011. The police used excessive force, including pellet guns and other 2012, (165) firearms, to disperse the protestors, leading to the injury of over 300 people; over 20 of those injured had to be transported to the capital for medical treatment. Some sustained injuries to their eyes, leading to blindness in some cases, while others sustained broken bones.64 Torture and Ill-Treatment Despite the revolution, the practice of torture continued, even resulting in death in some cases. The Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice stated, “The former regime fell, yet torture remains ongoing; practices of torture continue even after the revolution.” According to the spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, “Despite our confidence in the efforts of the ministry towards ending practices of torture, we do not deny that some violations have occurred,” justifying the situation by saying, “We are going through a period of transition from one reality to another.” However, the Federation of Security Unions attributed the continuation of such violations to the absence of political direction to reform the security apparatus, holding the National Constituent Assembly responsible for such violations due to its marginalization of the security apparatus and its failure to undertake any initiatives for security reform.65 The Tunisian President, Moncef Marzouqi, asserted, “Torture remains ongoing” under the tripartite coalition government led by the Islamist Ennahda movement and of which his party, the “Conference for the Republic” party, takes part. He continued, “I have information regarding the occurrence of violations to human rights in prisons and police stations, including the torture of citizens who took part in the demonstrations which swept the country in protest of the government’s failure to meet Tunisians’ demands for employment and a life of dignity.” In contrast, the leader of the Ennahda movement, Rached al-Ghanouchi, downplayed the issue of physical violations to which Tunisian citizens have been subjected at the hands of security officers, stating that the security 64 Amnesty International, “Tunisia: End Excessive Force against Protesters in Siliana, Open Immediate Investigation,” Nov. 20, 2012, (166) apparatus “does not pursue art and literature; it confronts numerous criminal acts!”66 On September 8, Abdel Ra’uf al-Khamasi died in the Charles Nicole Hospital after being subjected to torture in the headquarters of the judicial police; he had been arrested on August 28 after being accused of stealing.67 His lawyer states that al-Khamasi died due to severe torture, including with a sharp device on his head during his interrogation.68 The forensic report also reveals that al-Khamasi was subjected to severe torture leading to his death. However, the Ministry of Interior claims that al-Khamasi was hospitalized after he had fainted, at which time his concussion caused him to enter a coma which resembled clinical death and lasted eight days until he finally passed away.69 The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights expressed its “strong condemnation” of the continuation of acts of torture in police stations and denounced the slowness of the public prosecutor in arresting the security officers responsible and in opening a serious investigation into the crime.70 On September 3, a young woman was raped by two policemen, while a third financially extorted her fiancé, who was with her at the time. After the two policemen were arrested and charged with rape and extortion, they claimed that they had found the woman and the man in an “unethical situation” in a car; these claims were repeated in the statement issued by the Ministry of Interior, despite the fact that the woman and her fiancé denied the truth of the claims.71 Rights sources pointed to evidence available in the forensic report to prove that the crime of rape had indeed been committed as well as to a video recorded by the camera of an ATM at the site of the incident which clearly 66 African Manager, “Rashid al-ghanoushi yuqallil min sha’n al-intihakat al-haquqeyya fe tunis,” Sep. 13, 2012, (167) showed one of the accused police officers accompanying the woman’s fiancé to obtain a bribe to keep the policemen from fabricating an ethics case against him and his fiancée.72 The woman and her fiancé were charged with “intentional public indecency,” punishable by up to six months in prison.73 The Presidency of the Republic officially acknowledged the incident on October 4, and President Marzouqi offered a state apology to the woman who had been raped and affirmed that “there is no place in Tunisia whatsoever for tolerating rapists, nor for those who protect them.”74 The unionists who were detained during the events at the Hadi Shaker Hospital in Sfax were also subjected to torture. According to Ahmed Ben Ayad and Essam al-Mashi, they remained handcuffed for a period of 48 hours, which kept them from eating or relieving themselves during that whole period. Additionally, while being interrogated, the two were bound “with their hands behind their backs, then they were attacked: kicked, punched, slapped and cursed with the most offensive of insults.” The lawyer of Ben Ayad states that he witnessed the marks of torture on Ben Ayad’s body.75 Zabir al-Wahishi, a member of the Sfax branch of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, visited the detained unionists and documented their testimonies regarding what they had been subjected to in terms of humiliation and torture. The same day, he submitted a written request to the judiciary to have the detainees undergo a medical examination; the court did not reply.76 On August 13, rights activist Zubair al-Gharbi was subjected to torture and attempted rape by security agents; he had been arrested while participating in a peaceful protest in the city of Sfax.77 Two youth from the region of al- Hanasha, who had been suspected of participating in a popular protest against the Ennahda movement, were also subjected to similar treatment, as 72A-shabaka ad-dowleyya l-al-haquq wa at-tanmeyya, “Al-intihakat al-akhera fe tunis mu’ashir khater nahu al-inzilaq li-siyasset al-mady,” Oct. 2, 2012, (168) well as curses and obscene insults. Those detained in what became known as the “al-Hanasha events”78 were also subjected to physical and psychological torture by the police within sight and earshot of Tunisia’s deputy public prosecutor in Sfax, who did nothing to intervene to stop the violations taking place or to protect 20 citizens who were “rebuked” in his presence, despite the fact that the violence deteriorated into “threats of rape and death,” according to victims and Zubair al-Gharbi.79 78Babnet Tunisie, “Ahdath ‘onf bi-madenat al-hansha wa tadakhul qowat al-amn l-as-saytara ‘ala al-wada’,”Aug. 24, 2012, (169) (170) Libya* Since 1969, Libya was ruled by an autocratic regime under which power was completely consolidated in the hands of Moammar al-Qadhafi. During this time, institutional frameworks became essentially non-existent and any components of the state supporting the rule of law were eliminated. Similarly, all forms of activity by political parties and independent civil society were criminalized and all political opposition figures were targeted with killings, enforced disappearance, or torture in prison. After 42 years of this autocratic rule, the winds of popular change first seen in Tunisia and Egypt spread to Libya on February 17, 2011, when a popular uprising calling for the downfall of the Qadhafi regime began. Only weeks after this popular uprising was initiated, the brutal repression with which the Qadhafi regime confronted the uprising pulled the country into a fierce armed conflict between Qadhafi loyalist forces and rebel fighters backed by NATO which lasted for the following eight months. After the rebels took control of the city of Benghazi at the end of February 2011, they announced the formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC) in * As previous annual reports published by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies did not deal with the state of human rights in Libya, this year’s report covers the most important developments and challenges seen in the country since the fall of the Qadhafi regime in October 2011. (171) order to coordinate the efforts of the rebels towards bringing down the regime.1 On August 3, 2011, the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration to govern the country’s transitional period. Shortly thereafter, the NTC received broad international recognition as the sole legitimate authority in Libya, taking over Libya’s seat at the United Nations in September 2011. 2 Just a few weeks later, Qadhafi was captured and killed in Sirte on October 20, and Libya was declared liberated after the rebels took Tripoli three days later. Following the fall of the Qadhafi regime, the transitional authorities in Libya faced a series of grave challenges. Not only was the country reeling from the armed conflict during which crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed by both sides,3 but deep-rooted issues such as regionalism, religious extremism, and the tribal loyalties which had been pitted against each other during the war threatened to prevent the NTC from asserting its authority across the country.4 The NTC further suffered from a lack of consensus over its legitimacy to govern in the wake of the revolution. Moreover, Qadhafi’s four-decade grip on power had left the country devoid of the institutions and infrastructure which are supporting the transitional periods in other countries in the region, such as Egypt and Tunisia. Libya’s lack of even basic institutions such as security forces to preserve order led the NTC to support the presence of forces working in parallel to the police and armed forces, including the Supreme Security Committee and the Libyan Shield forces, both of which are composed of groups which had fought during the revolution.5 The transitional period in Libya has been marred by a great number of human rights violations. Over the last year and a half, the country has seen discrimination and violence against both suspected Qadhafi loyalists as well as individuals of sub-Saharan African descent, who are often suspected of having supported Qadhafi or worked for him as foreign mercenaries. Heavily 1National Transitional Council of Libya, “Announcement of the Establishment of the Interim Transitional National Council” (Arabic), Mar. 2, 2011, (172) armed militias have continued to exert de facto control over large swaths of the population and territory of the country, and their refusal to disarm and to turn over thousands of detainees held without due process poses a major challenge to the NTC’s authority. Violations by such non-state parties to the rights to freedom of religion and belief, freedom of expression, and due process have gone largely unaddressed by the state in practice, thus leading to the entrenchment of a culture of impunity in the country. The Libyan authorities have also been party to a number of serious crimes, including holding detainees for extended periods of time without trial and disproportionate use of force, as in the case of the recent military operations in Bani Walid. Legislatively, although the Libyan authorities have refrained from implementing abusive laws from the Qadhafi era, they have failed to repeal many of these restrictive laws, with the notable exception of the annulment of Law 71/1972, which had criminalized political parties under Qadhafi. There is an urgent need for the swift development of legislation to uphold basic rights and freedoms and to organize the exercise thereof according to international standards. It is also critical that these rights be established in the new Libyan constitution, in order to preclude continued abuses. It is important to note that the NTC upheld the freedom to establish political parties through the law which governed the election of the members of the General National Committee (GNC). In addition, the NTC drafted a bill to govern the establishment and activities of non-governmental organizations which largely meets international standards on the right to freedom of association; unfortunately, this bill has not yet been passed. At the same time, the NTC passed a law granting the authorities broad powers to arbitrarily arrest individuals and to restrict their freedom of movement without bringing specific charges against them. For its part, the GNC passed legislation to govern the right to peaceful protest, some of the provisions of which clearly contradict international standards. Despite the challenges which face Libya’s transition to democracy, the clear increase in tolerance for free expression and the significant growth in the number of independent media outlets in the country should not be overlooked. Similarly, the number and diversity of civil society organizations – including human rights organizations – working in Libya have also seen major progress. (173) The Transfer of Power to an Elected Body The process of electing the members of the General National Congress represented an important milestone for the Libyan transition to democracy and marked the end of the role of the National Transitional Council. According to the constitutional declaration issued by the NTC,6 the GNC was granted legislative powers and tasked with appointing a prime minister and approving his/her proposed government, setting up the regulations and mechanisms by which a new constitution would be drafted for the country, and passing legislation according to the new constitution to govern the general elections which would be held following the adoption of the new constitution.7 The legislation passed by the NTC in February 2012 to govern the process of electing the GNC specified that the GNC would be made up of 200 members, 120 of whom would be elected according to a system of direct election of individuals and the remaining 80 according to a system of proportional representation based on closed lists submitted by political parties for particular electoral districts. The law further created the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) to supervise the elections. It also allowed for Libyans who hold dual citizenships to run for office and put in place a quota for women by requiring party lists to alternate between men and women.8 On July 7, 2012, over 3,000 Libyans competed in the elections for the General National Congress. While the elections process went smoothly overall and was considered to have taken place with a large degree of transparency, the HNEC came under mild criticism for a number of issues, including its implementation of last-minute measures affecting polling times and locations in a number of areas of the country, as this may have resulted in voter confusion.9 In addition, several incidents of violent attacks on polling centers occurred in towns in eastern Libya,10 where protests had 6 National Transitional Council – Libya, “Constitutional Declaration” (Arabic), (174) taken place in the weeks leading up to elections calling for Libyans to boycott the elections and demanding greater autonomy for the region. On the day of the polls, one man was shot and killed by a local security guard in the eastern city of Ajdabiya after he and two other men attempted to disrupt the voting process and to steal a ballot box.11 Despite the fact that these elections were largely hailed as a success for the country’s transition, the GNC faced significant challenges later in the year in appointing an acceptable government. The first prime minister elected by the GNC, Mostafa Abu Shaqur, failed to form a government and was replaced in October by Ali Zeidan. Later the same month, however, Zeidan’s proposed government led to large protests around the parliament building,12 delaying the GNC’s vote of confidence in the government.13 The protestors considered the proposed government to include ministers who had enjoyed strong relations with the former dictator, Moammar al-Qadhafi. In response to the GNC’s acceptance of Zeidan’s government, dozens of armed men occupied the parliament building for one day in early November.14 Such developments reveal that despite the relative success of the elections process in mid-2012, Libya’s transitional period remains troubled by a number of factors, chief among them instability, a heavily armed and divided population, and the inability of the central government to bring rival factions under the control of the central government. Freedom of Assembly The transitional period has seen a marked improvement in terms of citizens’ ability to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, as evidenced by the many gatherings and demonstrations which have taken place over the past year. In a worrying step taken to impose restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly, however, the Ministry of Interior issued a statement on July 13, 2012, banning citizens and organizations from planning for or participating (175) in demonstrations without obtaining prior permission from the Ministry. The statement also asserted that those who held such unauthorized gatherings would be held responsible for any disorder that may occur as a result.15 Both requiring prior authorization for assemblies and imposing undue burdens on the organizers of gatherings are condemned by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.16 In practice, the exercise of the right to freely assemble in Libya has been limited as a result of the country’s general lack of security. The exercise of this right has been marred not only by violent attacks on such gatherings by third parties, but also by the devolvement of such gatherings themselves into disorder and violence. On January 21, 2012, the headquarters of the NTC was stormed by angry protestors demanding greater transparency from the NTC; they used hand grenades to enter the premises and looted the building of furniture and electronics.17 Ahead of the elections in July, demonstrators similarly stormed the HNEC headquarters in Benghazi,18 and attempts were made to disrupt the elections process.19 Following the election of the General National Congress, the parliament building was temporarily occupied in November by demonstrators protesting the Congress’s proposed formation for the government.20 On March 16, 2012, clashes broke out during a demonstration in Freedom Square in Benghazi calling for the establishment of a semi-autonomous region of Cyrenaica. The demonstration was attacked by men armed with firearms and knives, and the ensuing clashes resulted in at least one death and multiple injuries.21 It was also reported that the local television station Libya al-Ahrar was also targeted by the attackers in order to keep the 15 IFEX, Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “Interior Ministry Urged to Reserve Decision Resticting Right to Peaceful Demonstrations,” July 16, 2012, (176) demonstration from being covered.22 The matter ended when militia fighters from Benghazi, who have been responsible for security in the city, arrived at the square and chased the attackers out. On August 26, 2012, an imam was kidnapped23 while participating in a peaceful protest condemning attacks on Sufi shrines.24 On September 11, 2012, armed individuals attacked the US consulate in Benghazi during a protest, leaving four US citizens, including US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens, and 10 Libyan personnel dead.25 This incident further reveals the urgent need for disarmament and implementation of rule of law in the country. In this context, the GNC issued Law 65/201226 on November 6 to govern the right to peaceful protest.27 Despite the fact that the law upholds that Libyan citizens have a right to peaceful assembly and protest, it does not comply with international standards on a number of issues. For example, the law grants the authorities broad powers to restrict or prohibit the practice of this right; it also allows for the imposition of prison sentences on those who do not fully comply with the law’s provisions. Finally, the law does not exempt spontaneous gatherings from its arbitrary restrictions.28 22 USA Today, “Libya: Protesters Supporting Self-Rule Attacked,” Mar. 16, 2012, (177) Freedom of Expression and of the Press Prior to the February 17 Revolution, Libya had been among the worst- ranked countries in the world in terms of freedom of the press,29 with independent media either non-existent or severely circumscribed. In the wake of the Libyan uprising, however, freedom of expression improved markedly in terms of press and media independence. This improvement is evidenced through the establishment of a plethora of new television stations, radio stations, and newspapers and journals following the fall of the Qadhafi regime,30 including in the English and Amazigh languages, which had been banned under Qadhafi.31 In addition, it was reported that the state-owned media institutions which had controlled the press and broadcasting under Qadhafi were dissolved upon the rebels’ seizure of Tripoli in August, 2011.32 The state-owned paper Sabah al-Youm was prevented from publishing in one instance, while another, al-Balad, was banned in April 2012 over a dispute involving revenue from advertisements. According to the editor of al-Balad, it was ordered that the paper be renamed and that all former staff be replaced.33 The journalists union in Tripoli sharply criticized this move as “a blatant violation of freedom of opinion and expression.” In a worrying step for freedom of expression in Libya, on May 2, 2012 the NTC passed Law 37/2012, which imposed severe restrictions on free speech. Article 1 of the law imposed sentences reaching up to life in prison for anyone who “spreads untrue or biased news, statements, or rumors” or incites calls which could incur damage to the war efforts to defend the country, spread fear among the population, or weaken the morale of citizens.34 The law goes on to specify that such acts include any praise of Moammar al-Qadhafi, his regime, his thoughts, or his children or “twisting the truth and misguiding the people about the acts perpetrated by them against the nation and its people.” 29 Reporters Without Borders, “Europe Falls From its Pedestal, No Respite in the Dictatorships,” Oct. 10, 2012, (178) Similarly, Article 2 of the same law imposes prison sentences for any speech or other form of expression critical of the February 17 Revolution. It imposes the same penalties for insulting the religion of Islam, the reputation of the state and its institutions, or the people, emblem, or flag of Libya.35 Positively, this law was later ruled unconstitutional by the Libyan Supreme Court,36 which considered it to violate the Constitutional Declaration,37 which included protections for several basic rights, including freedom of expression. However, the passage of this law by the NTC sends a serious warning about the direction which the country could take if legislation is not passed to protect the rights to freedom of opinion and expression as well as media independence, particularly as a number of repressive laws which violate freedom of expression and impose restrictions on media remain in place. Although they have not been implemented by the NTC or GNC, nothing prevents the authorities from resorting to these laws as long as they remain in effect. In May, 2012, three decrees were issued by the NTC38 announcing the creation of a supreme media authority,39 national press institute,40 and radio and television broadcasting institute.41 Although these institutions were not effective in carrying out their mandates, their establishment was protested by a number of Libyan journalists who feared that these institutions would re- impose state control over their work and were angered by the fact that they had not been consulted in the drafting process of the decrees.42 35 Ibid. 36 The Tripoli Post, “Democracy Wins in Libya: Law Restricting Speech Rules Unconstitutional,” June 6, 2012, (179) On November 25, the GNC replaced these institutions with a Ministry of Information to administer and fund the field of media.43 This step was also met with harsh criticism from legal experts and media professionals, who feared that the powers of such a ministry could be abused to restrict media outlets and to bring them under the control of the government, as had occurred in the Qadhafi era.44 Since the beginning of the uprising, reporting in Libya has indisputably placed journalists at great risk; it was reported that at least 5 journalists were killed during the fighting in 2011,45 while dozens more were detained and several subjected to mistreatment before being released.46 However, since the official liberation of the country on October 23, 2011, journalists continued to be at risk for abduction and detention at the hands of local militias, particularly in light of the inability of the transitional authorities to assert their authority over these groups and to guarantee the safety of journalists while carrying out their work. For example, in February 2012 two British journalists working for the Iranian Press TV were detained by the militia in Misrata while driving and taking photographs late at night.47 Their arrest followed a report they produced on the militia’s attacks on black Libyans, particularly in Tawergha.48 The journalists were eventually turned over to the Libyan authorities and released.49 On July 7, 2012, two Libyan cameramen with the Misrata-based TV station Tobacts were taken hostage and held in Bani Walid, where they had gone to 43 General National Congress – Libya, “Enshaa’ Wezaret E’alam,” Nov. 25, 2012, (180) cover the elections process. 50 The situation escalated while the cameramen were being held in detention, with at least one of the militias from Misrata threatening to attack the town if the two were not released. Their release on July 16 followed intense negotiations in which the NTC played a key role.51 On July 19, British documentary filmmaker Sharron Ward was arrested by the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) – forces operating in cooperation with the Interior Ministry due to the ineffectiveness of the official police forces – and held for several hours while filming at a camp for internally displaced persons in Janzour, west of Tripoli. After being briefly released, she was again detained by the SSC from July 21-23 and then deported from the country.52 Similarly, on August 25, 2012, three journalists were detained53 while covering the destruction of Sufi religious sites,54 including director of al- Assema TV, Nabil Shebani, who was summoned for questioning by the SSC regarding the channel’s coverage of the destruction of the Sufi al-Sha’ab mosque in Tripoli.55 Freedom of Association For nearly four decades under Moammar al-Qadhafi’s rule, exercising the right to freedom of association in Libya through establishing non- governmental organizations or participating in civil society was all but impossible. Independent NGOs able to voice dissenting views or criticize state policies and practices were essentially non-existent in the country, as were trade unions and political parties. Indeed, the law itself was worded in 50 IFEX, Reporters Without Journalists, “Two TV Cameramen abducted and Held and Bani Walid,” July 10, 2012, (181) order to guarantee that any independent civil society groups would be considered illegal and that establishing or participating in such groups would be punishable under law, including by the death penalty.56 Positively, the NTC immediately abolished Law 71/1972, which had long outlawed political parties. A number of political parties have in fact been formed since the revolution and took part in the recent elections for the GNC.57 However, several related laws which could be used to criminalize such activities remain in place in the Penal Code, although they have not been implemented since the fall of Qadhafi. Additionally, the NTC proposed a bill to govern the work of civil society associations which was considered to be one of the most progressive pieces of legislation in the entire region of North Africa. If passed, it would uphold the right of Libyans to establish and participate in organizations and comply with international standards in most areas, including by providing for a system of notification for establishing organizations rather than a system of prior authorization by the state; leaving fields of work open to organizations; avoiding the imposition of criminal sanctions for breaches of the provisions of the law; allowing for civil society organizations to seek and receive funding for their activities; permitting the formation of networks between organizations; and requiring a judicial ruling for the dissolution of an organization, rather than an administrative decision.58 The failure to pass this bill is worrying, however, particularly as the former law on associations, Law 19/2002, had not yet been repealed, although this law’s repressive measures had not been implemented by the Libyan authorities following the revolution. The lack of a clear law to govern registration and other aspects of civil society work has left new groups in Libya without a clear framework for how to legally establish and run their organizations. Despite this, civil society groups have been allowed to register officially, and the number of civil society groups in Libya has grown exponentially since the fall of Qadhafi. Just a month after the official liberation of Libya in October 2012, some 360 organizations had been 56 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, “Freedom of Association in the Euro- Mediterranean Region: Monitoring Report 2009,” (182) registered in Benghazi, along with some 500 in Tripoli.59 Indeed, the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society reportedly estimated that between 2,000-2,400 organizations had been established since the revolution,60 among them dozens of human rights and humanitarian groups, including organizations working to establish a culture of human rights through education, to raise civic awareness among Libyan citizens, to document ongoing violations of human rights, and to advocate for legislative reform, national reconciliation, and transitional justice.61 Moreover, the NTC cooperated with various human rights organizations, including international rights groups, on various occasions, allowing them to conduct studies, meet with diverse groups within Libya, and even visit detention facilities. Cases in which civil society activists have been targeted by armed groups due to their work related to the defense of human rights raise new concerns about the future of civil society in Libya. In April 2012, Eisa Doudou, a Libyan rights advocate who works with the Arab Organization for Human Rights, was abducted while participating in meetings in Tripoli;62 the militia in Zintan released him days later.63 On September 26, Dr. Ahmed Abu Raqba, head of the Libyana Foundation for Mother and Child, was arrested by the SSC and held in the Ryowami prison in Tripoli after he intervened to defend detainees held by the SCC in the same prison and to assist their relatives in filing complaints with the attorney general.64 On November 18, a group of civil society activists were abducted in Bani Walid65 while documenting the violations which were taking place in the city.66 59 Foundation for the Future, “Assessing Needs of Civil Society in Libya,” November 2011, (183) Arbitrary Arrest, Torture, and Extrajudicial Killings Perhaps the most worrying development in post-Qadhafi Libya has been the proliferation of abuses such as arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial killings, forced displacement, torture, and mistreatment in detention, whether committed at the hands of the transitional authorities or by the armed militias that continue to exert control over vast areas of the country. Despite the issuance of a decree by the NTC on November 29, 2011 prohibiting arrests by militias and pro-revolutionary fighters, this has gone largely ignored in reality, and militias across the country continue to hold detainees who are suspected of having supported Qadhafi. Migrant workers have also been caught up in the waves of arrests, 67 particularly because their dark skin and background as sub-Saharan Africans leads many in Libya to believe that they supported Qadhafi or worked for him as foreign mercenaries. In a worrying development, on May 2 the NTC passed Law 38/2012, which legalized arbitrary arrest without judicial review. Articles 6 and 10 of this law authorized the Ministers of Interior and Defense to detain any person considered to be a “threat to public security and stability during the interim period” for up to two months or to impose restrictions on his/her movement. The law states that such measures may be taken based on the person’s “previous acts, affiliation, or cooperation with any of the apparatuses or mechanisms of the former regime, whether in an official or unofficial capacity.”68 Even though Law 38/2012 required the Ministries of Interior and Defense to ensure that all detainees were brought before the competent judicial authorities by July 12, this deadline passed with many detainees still being held illegally by both militias and the official authorities; as of November the number of arbitrarily held detainees was estimated to be 8,000, with half of them being held by armed militias. In this context, extrajudicial killings and deaths due to torture continued to be reported. On April 13, 2012, three individuals died while being held in a detention center in Misrata. The United Nations expressed concern that the deaths may have resulted from torture, as the UN mission in Libya had received information of seven other cases of torture in the same facility as 67 Amnesty International, “We are Foreigners, We Have No Rights,” Nov. 2012, (184) well.69 In response, the Supreme Security Committee in Misrata issued a statement condemning acts of torture. Despite the continued allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment heard from detainees held by armed militias in various detention centers, including in Tripoli, Zawiya, Zintan, and Misrata,70 the authorities have yet to take serious steps to confront such practices and refer those responsible to trial. Those thought to be connected to the former regime are at particular risk of torture.71 For example, the former Libyan ambassador to France, Omar al-Barbish, died one day after he was detained and tortured by a Zintan militia in late January 2012. Foreign detainees are also at heightened risk of torture, as in the case of a number of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa. 72 Secret detention facilities run by these militias have also been reported, and it is likely that detainees at such centers would be at even greater risk of torture. Further concerning is that confessions have been extracted from such detainees under duress.73 Impunity It seems that the Libyan authorities are not prepared to adopt a consistent approach to ensuring accountability for the grave crimes and violations committed since the beginning of the revolution, whether perpetrated by the Qadhafi regime or by the armed militias which fought to overthrow it. First, even though the NTC had promised to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) following Security Council Resolution 1970, which authorized the ICC to investigate violations being committed in Libya, the Libyan authorities have been reluctant to hand over officials from the former regime, despite arrest warrants issued for them by the ICC. The Libyan authorities have further challenged the jurisdiction of the ICC to review the charges brought against these officials. 69 United Nations Support Mission in Libya, “UNSMIL Calls on Libyan Government to Hold to Account those Behind Deaths, Torture of Detainees,” May 1, 2012, (185) The ICC had issued arrest warrants for Moammar al-Qadhafi, his son Seif al- Islam al-Qadhafi, and head of military intelligence Abdullah al-Senoussi, after they were charged of having committed crimes against humanity. However, attempts to internationally try Moammar al-Qadhafi were thwarted when he was arrested and killed by armed militia fighters in Zintan in southern Libya in November 2011. Further, Libya has challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction to rule in the case of Seif al-Islam, as government officials are determined to try him in Libyan courts. The Libyan authorities have also been reluctant to surrender al-Senoussi, who is detained in Tripoli, as they hope to try him in Libya as well.74 The arbitrary nature of detention and access to justice in Libya was highlighted by the detention of four International Criminal Court staff for nearly four weeks in June, 2012 by the militia in control of the town of Zintan, where they gone to meet with Seif al-Islam. Although the trip by these ICC representatives had been authorized by ICC judges and agreed to by the Libyan authorities, their detention by the Zintan militia was not condemned by the NTC. Rather, the NTC declared it would seek an end to the court staff’s immunity in order to initiate investigations against them, and Libyan officials justified this by stating that they suspected some of the ICC representatives of having submitted documents to Seif al-Islam which threatened Libya’s national security.75 The killing of Moammar al-Qadhafi and his son Muatassim after they were detained further reveals the inability of the Libyan judiciary to ensure that ex-regime members are guaranteed their right to a prompt and fair trial. These fears are reinforced by the fact that thousands of other detainees suspected of having committed crimes on behalf of the Qadhafi regime have been denied their right to a fair trial, despite having been held in detention for extended periods of time; nor are these detainees guaranteed protection from physical assaults and torture inside detention centers. Recently, the daughter of Abdullah al-Senoussi was also arrested on October 6 and held in incommunicado detention as of October 20.76 In contrast, Law 38/2012 enshrines a culture of impunity for anti-Qadhafi forces in Libya, as its provisions provide immunity from accountability and 74 Human Rights Watch, “UN Security Council: Press Libya on ICC Cooperation, Impunity,” Nov. 6, 2012, (186) punishment for all acts committed by the revolutionaries in order to protect or bring about the success of the revolution. Such broad language has left ample room to protect supporters of the revolution from accountability, even for grave crimes under international law such as extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence and rape, and forced displacement.77 Under the protection of this law, a number of attacks and violations committed against minorities by anti-Qadhafi militias have been overlooked. For instance, in August 2011 militias from Misrata attacked and forcibly expelled an estimated 35,000 people from the town of Tawergha,78 whose residents they accuse of having participated with Qadhafi’s forces in committing atrocities in Misrata during the uprising of early 2011. Subsequently, IDP camps of Tawerghans in western Libya have been repeatedly targeted for attacks by militias, leading to several additional deaths.79 The militias are responsible for acts of forced displacement, arbitrary arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killings committed against the population of Tawergha, as documented by the Commission of Inquiry on Libya mandated by the UN Human Rights Council.80 This pattern of impunity was again clearly demonstrated in late August 2012, when various religious sites belonging to the Sufi minority were destroyed81 and those responsible faced no consequences. In fact, the Libyan authorities did not even seek to stop the demolitions as they were ongoing, let alone ensure justice for the perpetrators of these violations against the right to the freedoms of religion and belief. Moreover, security forces 77 National Transitional Council – Libya, “Law No.38 of 2012 on Transitional Period Procedures” (Arabic). 78 The United Nations Refugee Agency, “Q&A: Fresh Challenges in Libya for an Expanded UNHCR Team,” Mar. 16, 2012, (187) behaved aggressively towards journalists and protestors who tried to approach the sites that were being demolished.82 In late September 2011, the GNC issued decree 7/2012, which authorized the Ministries of Defense and Interior to use “all necessary powers,” including the use of force,83 to apprehend all criminal suspects in Bani Walid, a town southwest of Tripoli which is known as a stronghold of Qadhafi supporters and has a history of animosity with the city of Misrata. This decree came after the government failed to arrest those responsible for the killing of Omran Shaaban - who was credited with having found al-Qadhafi in late October 2011 - after he was detained in Bani Walid in mid-2012. Following this decree, the Libyan armed forces and aligned militias – particularly militias from Misrata - placed Bani Walid under siege. The ensuing disproportionate use of force, including indiscriminate bombings84 on civilian-populated areas, led to dozens of deaths and prompted thousands to flee.85 Although the GNC later called for an investigation of the situation,86 it is feared that such calls merely reflect a growing pattern in Libya of rhetoric reflecting rights ideals without being followed by concrete action. Indeed, the Libyan government’s issuance of such a decree allowing for an entire town to be attacked in response to criminal acts committed by individual citizens clearly reflects the absence of rule of law in Libya as well as the lack of state institutions able to confront the severity of the challenges faced by the country during this transitional period. 82 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “United Nations Reacts to Attacks on Religious Sites in Libya,” Sept. 20, 2012, (188) Yemen For 33 years, Yemen was ruled by the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who cemented his absolute rule through alliances with the military elite and, to varying degrees, Islamists, as well as by exploiting tribal loyalties and conflicts. To retain his hold on power, Saleh pursued draconian policies against his opponents and critics, often resorting to repressive security measures and fostering internal conflicts, despite the fact that these conflicts threaten to divide the country. Such policies have led to strong discontent not only among the Houthis in the north but also among the population in the south, which has been long subjected to discrimination and to political, economic, and social marginalization and whose wealth and resources have been looted by the regime. The last years of the Saleh regime saw widespread violations of public rights and liberties and a growing hostility on the part of the government towards human rights defenders. Despite the brutal suppression it faced, the popular uprising of 2011 did succeed in forcing President Saleh to step down. However, the political solution, based on the Gulf Initiative, linked Saleh’s forfeit of power to immunity for himself and his aides from prosecution for their crimes against the Yemeni people. Although the initiative temporarily defused the imminent possibility of civil war, the specter of war still looms, as the initiative disregarded the interests and aspirations of broad segments of those involved in the uprising, particularly southern factions and Houthis in the (189) north. As a result, 2012 saw an escalation in southern political action accompanied by calls for secession, while Houthis in the north resumed military operations, which took on a sectarian character against Salafist groups. The interim president and his government face serious challenges to asserting the authority of the state over the country’s territory, restoring security and stability, and ending factionalism within the army, even as the traditional political, military, and tribal elites vie to fill the power vacuum. The main security services and Central Security remain under the control of the family of the former president, who is still the head of the General People’s Congress (GPC), which holds half the ministerial positions in the transitional government. The army is divided between divisions under the command of the defense minister and the Republican Guard, led by the former president’s son, and the First Armored Division, under the command of Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who split with the Saleh regime last year. Tribal militias deployed in the capital and Taiz are divided in terms of their support for these parties. Finally, the security vacuum is greatly exacerbated by the spread of terrorist acts in the country, which have begun to affect the capital after devolving into violent battles in the south. All of these developments have had an extremely detrimental effect on human rights in Yemen. Dozens of people have been killed during crackdowns on peaceful protests in the south; activists with the southern movement have also been targeted by extrajudicial killings. Ansar al-Sharia groups have taken up positions in the southern province of Abyan and attempted to impose their version of Islam by force. Dozens of civilians have been killed in terrorist acts or in raids on potential terrorist locations by Yemeni forces or American airstrikes. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture in detention facilities remain widespread. Most detention facilities are not subject to judicial oversight and are run by the political and national security services controlled by the Saleh family. Freedom of expression, particularly freedom of the press, is under assault, and in the south in particular journalists face arrest and physical assault, while press offices are raided and newspapers confiscated. There is little sign that those responsible for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will be held to account. The Yemeni parliament responded to the Gulf Initiative by adopting a law that immunizes the former president and his aides from criminal prosecution, while the transitional justice bill drafted by the government leans toward the model of conciliatory justice, which does not entail prosecution for grave abuses. (190) Furthermore, the ability of the transitional authorities to restructure the security apparatus and the army on professional bases is limited by the various centers of power that compete for political control in Yemen. The Transitional Period and Legislative Developments With the signing of the Gulf Initiative and the agreement for its implementation on November 23, 2011, Yemen entered a multi-stage transition. In the first phase, Ali Abdullah Saleh turned his presidential powers over to then vice-president Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi. A national unity government was formed with ministerial posts split equally between the GPC, headed by Saleh, and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), comprised of five parties, the most influential being the Islamist Reform Party. A military affairs committee was also created to bring security and stability, including by ending divisions in the army and sending it back to the barracks, ending armed conflicts, ensuring the withdrawal of militias and other irregular forces from the capital and other cities, and restructuring the security forces. The ultimate goal of this plan was to foster a political and security climate amenable to early presidential elections. The greatest failure of the transitional authority in this phase has been in its inability to restore security and stability and assert the control of the state over Yemeni territory. The military affairs committee made tangible progress in removing checkpoints and ending armed clashes in Sana’a and Taiz, but the various centers of power – both within and outside of the government - have impeded an end to militarization, the unification and professionalization of the army, and the restructuring and development of the security services. This is partly due to the face that the former president has held on to his position as head of the GPC, which holds half of the ministerial posts, and that Saleh’s relatives, supported by tribal militias, have resisted giving up their influence and leadership positions within the security services and the management of Central Security. In addition, Saleh’s son has maintained his position as commander of the Republican Guard, while Gen. Al-Ahmar, who rebelled against Saleh during the uprising, has refused to end his rebellion as long as Saleh and his relatives maintain their influence. As a result, Sana’a and Taiz in particular continue to suffer from the presence of tribal militias and military deployments. For instance, tribal militias continue to operate in the capital which support the opposition Reform Party and possess all manner of light and medium weapons, artillery, and missiles. (191) The security situation has deteriorated further due to increased terrorist activity in the southern provinces and its spread to the capital, even as the calls for secession and independence have been renewed in the south and debates have been stirred up regarding the conditions that must be met for the south to remain part of the nation. Some southern movement groups have moved toward militarization when faced with increased suppression after the signing of the Gulf Initiative, which southerners believe disregarded their demands. In the north, where Houthis waged a seven-year war against the Saleh regime, residents are wary of the Gulf Initiative because it failed to address their issues of concern. Houthis now control the province of Saada in its entirety and some areas of neighboring provinces. Houthi military operations have also acquired an increasingly Shiite character, targeting Salafist mosques and religious academies. These operations have also entailed a blockade on some areas and imposed restrictions on freedom of movement in the controlled areas.1 Yemen entered the second phase of the Gulf Initiative when presidential elections were held on February 21. The elections were essentially a popular referendum on the consensual presidential candidate specified by the terms of the initiative—former vice-president al-Hadi—as parties to the agreement agreed not to slate another candidate to oppose him. The elections were accompanied by some violence, especially in the south, where calls for a boycott were heard most prominently. Militants also opened fire on some 1 This analysis of the political and security situation relies on several studies, including: International Crisis Group (ICG), “Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition,” July 3, 2012, (192) polling stations, killing seven people, including three soldiers,2 and the authorities were forced to close seven polling stations in the south.3 It was prescribed that the country’s security challenges should have been adequately addressed by the end of the second phase, which also involves the initiation of a national dialogue as a prelude to reforms to the constitution and the electoral process, according to which parliamentary and presidential elections should be held in February 2014.4 However, many fear that the national dialogue will fail in light of the complicated political and security situation, which may drive the country to the civil war that the Gulf Initiative aimed to defuse. As required by the Gulf Initiative, the Yemeni parliament passed a law on January 21, 2012 granting the former president full immunity from prosecution. The law also gives immunity to the president’s aides for “politically motivated” acts, which effectively strips the victims of crimes committed over 33 years of Saleh’s rule of any means to obtain justice.5 Although the transitional government announced its commitment to establish a mechanism to prevent the repetition of the grave violations of international law that characterized the Saleh era and proposed a law on transitional justice and national reconciliation, this bill contains no provisions that require criminal accountability for such crimes and abuses. In practice, the bill will not prevent impunity for past crimes but rather immunize the perpetrators. Similarly, it will not deter the commission of similar violations in the future. The bill provides for the creation of a justice and reconciliation agency to investigate human rights violations committed in Yemen since 1990 and to achieve “conciliatory justice,” under which victims and their families are to be compensated, the truth exposed, and the national memory preserved. The bill views these mechanisms as sufficient to prevent gross violations in the future.6 2 Southern Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), “al-Taqrir al-dawri li-shahr Fabrayir 2012,” Feb. 20, 2012, (193) On September 22, the interim president issued a decree establishing an independent commission to investigate abuses committed during the suppression of the popular uprising. Notably, the decree did not exempt any persons from accountability, investigation, or prosecution, which some observers believe may allow for the prosecution of the former president and his aides, despite the immunity given to them under the Gulf Initiative and the new law. The commission’s scope is limited to 2011 and it was given six months to carry out its work, after which it will submit a detailed report with its conclusions to the judiciary and to the House of Representatives for debate.7 This step is important because previous investigations into the killing of demonstrators were severely flawed, as if they aimed to protect government officials from criminal prosecution. A good illustration of this is the trial which began in late September 2012 regarding the Friday of Dignity massacre of March 18, 2011, when masked men opened fire from rooftops, treetops, and the street on demonstrators in al-Taghyir Square in the capital, killing more than 45 people. Of the 78 people named as defendants in the case, 30 of them remained at large, and only two of the defendants were charged with premeditated murder. High-level officials were not even questioned, as the public prosecutor was dismissed by order of President Saleh after he summoned government officials for investigation. Senior security personnel were similarly not questioned, although evidence indicates that they failed to protect demonstrators from attack, as Central Security Forces withdrew from al-Taghyir Square on the night preceding the onslaught and only reappeared 30 minutes after the attack began.8 Suppression of Peaceful Assemblies Peaceful assemblies and protests continued to be suppressed through the use of excessive force. On January 13, four people were killed and twenty injured when security forces used live ammunition and tear gas to disperse a peaceful protest in al-Hurriya Square in the Khur Maksar district of the Aden (194) province.9 On February 9, the use of live ammunition by security forces killed two people and injured others during the dispersion of a peaceful march in al-Dalia held to commemorate Southern Prisoner Day.10 The second week of February saw the suppression of a peaceful protest against the elections with live ammunition, which led to the death of two demonstrators and the injury of 13 others.11 On June 15, security forces backed by armored units stormed Martyrs Square in the Mansoura district of Aden province, where locals typically organize peaceful assemblies and sit-ins. Security forces then took over the square for 32 days, during which they vandalized and looted property and torched the square’s media center and an exhibit of photos of southern martyrs; 13 citizens were killed, among them women and children, due to the use of live ammunition.12 On July 7, Central Security Forces and snipers opened fire to disperse a peaceful demonstration in Aden, organized annually to commemorate the end of the civil war in 1994, when the southern forces were defeated and the Saleh regime’s control over the south reinstated. The suppression of the demonstration led to the deaths of three people, while security forces also attempted to enter a hospital to arrest wounded demonstrators.13 The most violent clashes took place in the capital during the protest against the film produced in the United States called “Innocence of Islam,” which was deemed insulting to the prophet. The US embassy was stormed, looted, and vandalized, and four citizens were killed and 38 wounded.14 Yemeni rights organizations accused security forces of using excessive force against unarmed civilian protesters, stating that some were injured as far as 500 meters from the embassy. A woman was also injured by sniper fire while in 9 Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), “Balagh bi-irtikab quwwat al- sulta al-Yamaniya i’tida’ musallahan bi-haqq al-muwatinin al-janubiyin,” Jan. 14, 2012, (195) her home. The organizations also accused the authorities of denying medical care to wounded persons that were detained.15 Freedoms of Expression and the Media Freedom of expression and media freedoms were repeatedly violated, with repressive measures particularly targeting the southern movement, its press institutions, its journalists, and its newspapers, which were confiscated several times. Prosecutions before the Specialized Press and Publications Court also continued, and several journalists were intimidated and received death threats. Writers, journalists, and rights activists were increasingly the target of smear campaigns labeling them unbelievers. Two journalists, Ahmed al-Shalaqi and Hamdi al-Bukari, both working as correspondents for al-Jazeera, were summoned to appear before the Press and Publications Court on May 21 in connection with a case filed by the former Saleh government in June 2011. The suit alleged that they had violated the law because the government had revoked the credentials of al- Jazeera reporters and closed its office in Sana’a to punish the channel for its supportive coverage of the uprising. Rights organizations believed that the renewed pursuit of the case indicated that nothing had changed for the press following Saleh’s removal.16 Meanwhile, journalist and counterterrorism researcher Abdul Elah Haidar Shaya remains in prison, serving a five-year sentence issued on January 18, 2011, due to his alleged links with al-Qaeda, although rights sources say that the charges were related to his investigative work on terrorism issues and that he was targeted after finding evidence of the US role in the cluster bomb assault on alleged al-Qaeda positions in southern Yemen that killed dozens of local residents, including women and children. Although the former president ordered Shaya’s release in February 2011, the order was not implemented due to the displeasure of the US administration.17 15 YODRDF, “Munazzamat Yaman tutalib bi-l-ifraj al-fawri ‘an al-muhtajazin ‘ala khalifiyat ahdath al-safara al-Amrikiya,” Sep. 30, 2012, (196) On June 4, journalist Majid Karout, a correspondent for Masdar Online, was sentenced to one year in prison and fined 750 Euros after his conviction on charges of spreading false news. Karout accused an official with the telecommunications agency in al-Bayda province of involvement in corruption. The trial entailed an egregious infringement of his right to defense, as the journalist was not informed of his summons to court or notified of the trial dates.18 As part of the crackdown on the southern movement, several journalists were detained and questioned, including Faris al-Jalal, the editor of the online al-Tajdid News,19 journalists Abd al-Alim al-Hamidi and Majid al- Shuaybi,20 and Fathi Bin al-Azraq, the editor of Aden al-Ghad. Adnan al- Ajam, the editor of al-Umana, was detained on July 18, only a few weeks after he survived an attempt to assassinate or intimidate him when assailants opened fire on his home.21 In January, Seif al-Hadiri, the general director of al-Mashmua for Press and Media in Aden, received death threats, while on February 28 militants set fire to the institution’s offices while Akhbar al-Yom was being printed there. The previous day, armed men had also burned copies of the paper, an incident that was repeated on May 26.22 The offices of Akhbar al-Yom in al-Dalia were torched 15 times.23 On May 16, two attempts were made to assassinate Hissam Ashour, a correspondent with the weekly al-Nida and the News Yemen website. Ashour was investigating corruption linked with officials in the Fund for Reconstruction in the Hadramawt province, which led to his criminal prosecution. Following one hearing of the trial, a car followed him and attempted to run him down in two different locations; Ashour said that the driver was an attorney for the Fund for Reconstruction.24 Journalists covering the southern movement also received death threats, among them Saleh Abu Awdhal, a journalist and 18 Reporters Without Borders, “Provincial Reporter Given One-Year Jail Sentence over Facebook Post,” June 7, 2012, (197) leading figure in the movement, who found death threats written on the walls of his home.25 Dozens of journalists were repeatedly harassed and physically assaulted while carrying out their professional duties. These include Nabil Haidar, the editor of al-Thawra, who was attacked by armed thugs after they surrounded the newspaper’s offices in February.26 In April, journalist Mohammed al-Maqalih was assaulted by militants belonging to the First Armored Division, which is commanded by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and controls parts of Sana’a with the support of the al- Ahmar tribe, one of the most influential tribal groups. Maqalih, who has published numerous articles on the role of tribal groups in conflicts, was visiting the home of the defense minister to discuss the armed groups present in his neighborhood. Al-Maqalih was beaten with rifle butts and his car windshield smashed in the presence of the minister, who did not stop the assailants, claiming he had no authority over them.27 Soldiers with the First Armored Division also attacked journalist Khaled Mohi al-Din in the capital, and armed men opened fire on the offices of Yamanat in the capital.28 Journalist Anwar al-Bahari, a correspondent with Saba News, was beaten in front of his wife and children in early May after unknown men raided his home. Journalist Wael al-Abasi, who works with the Socialist news website, which is closely related to the Yemeni Socialist Party, was attacked by unknown assailants while filming a demonstration in Taiz on April 24; he was injured in the head and eye. The weekly al-Ahali was publicly threatened by the son of the former president, who promised to bring newspaper officials to military trials, claiming that they were spying on army divisions and cooperating with al-Qaeda. The paper was also threatened by the head of the National Security Agency, Ammar Mohammed Abdullah Saleh. Al-Ahali is linked with the opposition Reform Party and regularly criticizes the government and the army.29 On July 1, Faid Dahhan, a correspondent with the Yemen Youth channel, was assaulted by soldiers of the Republican Guard in the province of Sana’a. 25 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-tafsili li-l-marsad al-janubi li-huquq al-insan li Yunya, Yulya, Aghustus.” 26 ANHRI, “Awqafu istihdaf al-sahafiyin.” 27 CPJ, “Musallahun yuhajimun sahafiyan Yamaniyan fi San’a’,” Apr. 12, 2012, (198) The soldiers beat him with the butts of their rifles, detained him at his home, and confiscated a video camera, two cellphones, credit cards, and a sum of cash.30 Several journalists and correspondents were assaulted on various occasions by the Republican Guard, among them Abed-Rabou al-Hachichi, a cameraman with al-Siniya channel, Ali Abdallah Khaled and Abdelrahmane Khaled, both photographers with the Arab Media Agency, and Marwan Khaled.31 Central Security Forces arrested French correspondent Benjamin Wiacek and Mahmoud al-Zileeyi, a cameraman with al-Sahat al-Ahliya.32 In addition, several newspapers in the south were confiscated, including Aden al-Ghad, al-Umana, al-Janoubiya, and al-Qadiya.33 Writer and political activist Bashra al-Moqtari was declared an infidel after she wrote an article accusing Salafist and radical Islamic groups of attempting to hijack the revolution in the name of religion. Clerics close to the Islamist Reform Party issued fatwas calling for the application of the penalty for unbelief against her. The smear campaign spread among several mosques and religious academies, and a march surrounded al-Moqtari’s home in Taiz in an attempt to intimidate her. On Facebook, there were calls for her death and the revocation of her citizenship.34 Suppression of the Southern Political Movement The political movement in the south was the target of daily repression, especially after some factions of the movement took up arms and launched attacks on security forces and government facilities.35 In addition to systematic attacks on the southern press and journalists covering the situation in the south and the use of excessive force to suppress 30 Masdar Online, “Naqabat al-sahafiyin tudin i’tida’ junud ‘ala murasil sahafi ya’mal fi qanat Yaman shabab,” July 6, 2012, (199) peaceful protests,36 southern political activists faced harassment, detention, and physical assaults; some were assassinated. These include Saleh Qaid, who was killed in his home on January 20,37 and activist Amal Qamari, a member of the local council in the Lahij province.38 Activist Ahmed Jamal Haidara was killed by sniper fire from a police station in the al-Mansoura district. During his funeral procession on June 22, security forces opened fire on mourners, killing two and injuring more.39 On July 11, security forces raided the home of political activist Sharaf Mahfouz and shot and killed him in front of his family.40 Shalal Shaya, the head of the peaceful protest council in al-Dalia, was targeted by an assassination attempt on January 29, which injured journalist Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib, who was with Shaya at the time.41 Lawyer Ghalib al-Shuaybi was arrested in the Aden airport, as he was included on the list of persons wanted by the National Security Agency.42 On August 15, southern political dissident Ambassador Ahmed Abdullah al- Hosni was detained upon his return to Aden from the UK, where he resides.43 Numerous political activists were arrested in February in the run- up to presidential elections due to their opposition to the elections.44 On several occasions, hospitals were raided to arrest people injured in protests or to intimidate nurses and doctors. On July 7, the Naqib Hospital was stormed following a demonstration in the Mansoura district. On June 18, police stormed a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, which forced the hospital administration to suspend operation for three days due to the intimidation that ensued.45 In October, some hospitals in Yemen were subjected to security raids, which were conducted on the pretext of locating armed elements undergoing treatment. In another attack on the Naqib Hospital, Central Security Forces, run by the nephew of the former president, removed a seriously injured patient from intensive care. Hospitals 36 See the sections in this chapter on violations of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. 37 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-dawri li-shahr Yanayir 2012,” Feb. 15, 2012. 38 Ibid. 39 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-tafsili li-l-marsad al-janubi li-huquq al-insan li Yunya, Yulya, Aghustus.” 40 Ibid. 41 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-dawri li-shahr Yanayir 2012.” 42 Ibid. 43 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-tafsili li-l-marsad al-janubi li-huquq al-insan li Yunya, Yulya, Aghustus.” 44 SOHR, “al-Taqrir al-dawri li-shahr Fabrayir.” 45 Ibid. (200) in Aden later began refusing to admit injured or sick persons suspected of political activity. Increased Terrorist Crimes and Counterterrorism Violations As the central authorities proved increasingly incapable of asserting their control over the country, terrorist activity - linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia - became more frequent. These groups exploited the security vacuum in the south and the central authority’s preoccupation with political struggles in the capital to take control of large swathes of the Abyan province. The interim government, with support from the US and in coordination with tribal fighters in the region, launched a counteroffensive to reclaim control of the region. The government successfully regained the provincial capital of Zanjibar, nearby Jaar, and several neighboring towns in the Shabwa province. Government military operations and US drone raids were conducted amid a great deal of secrecy.46 Eleven civilians, including two children and two women, were killed in a US raid on the Radia area south of Sana’a.47 Multiple cases were recorded in which unarmed civilians were killed by air attacks and arbitrary shelling that sought to clear Abyan of Ansar al-Sharia. While the Yemeni army was pursuing the latter group, al-Qaeda bombed a funeral on June 12, killing 46 people and injuring another 48.48 Ansar al-Sharia imposed its version of Islam and Islamic law in the areas under its control, including by applying lashes and amputations as criminal sanctions. The group also threatened to execute 73 soldiers in its custody in Zanjibar if Islamist militants were not released.49 On June 18, Gen. Salem Ali Qatan, who led battles against Ansar al-Sharia, was assassinated,50 while in May a suicide bomber killed more than 100 soldiers in the capital during a military exercise. Al-Qaeda claimed the attack as a response to military campaigns and US raids. 46 ICG, “Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition.” 47 Alkarama, “Yemen: Alkarama and HOOD Organise a Meeting with the Families of the Victims of the American Drone Attack of 2 December 2012,” Sep. 6, 2012, (201) It is thought that the National Security Agency and the Political Security Agency continue to detain terrorism suspects without charge. The latter agency continued to hold 28 people detained following the terrorist attack on the presidential palace in June 2011, which seriously injured the former president; they were only formally charged in February 2012. The detainees included four people held as hostages to compel fugitive family members to turn themselves in. They were released in January and March 2012.51 Persons arrested based on their suspected links to al-Qaeda included Amer Ghanem, who was arrested on May 14 merely for contacting a relative suspected of links to al-Qaeda; Ghanem was not charged.52 Two Belgians were also detained on April 13 while leaving the country via the Sana’a airport without an arrest warrant and held without charge for two months; they were later released and deported to Belgium.53 Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearance, and Torture Given the control of the former president’s family over the National Security Agency, the Political Security Agency, and the Republican Guard, security restructuring proved impossible, especially since these services maintain detention facilities not subject to state or judicial oversight. Some tribal militias also detain persons illegally. As a result, the central authorities do not provide adequate information about detainees, detention facilities, disappearances, or torture.54 Thus, despite the amnesties issued by the interim president, many people who participated in the uprising and peaceful protests in 2011 remain arbitrarily detained, especially those involved in the southern movement and in the conflict in Saada.55 Rights groups documented 163 cases of individuals detained without investigation or trial, most held by the political police,56 as well 190 disappeared persons thought to be held in secret prisons operated by the 51 Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Detained, Tortured, and Disappeared,” May 7, 2012, (202) Republican Guard, Central Security, the Political Security Agency, and the National Security Agency.57 Abdul Karim Lalji remained in detention in the District Prison in Sana’a, despite the issuance of a presidential amnesty ordering his release. Lalji was arrested four years ago and prosecuted in an unfair trial before the Specialized Criminal Court (a state security court), which sentenced him to death on charges of spying for Iran.58 Military units detained several pro-revolution soldiers for several months without trial, with the exception of Major Ahmed Qaid al-Sharaabi, who was referred to a military trial.59 Various military units abducted and detained soldiers in other units, as did members of the Republican Guard and First Armored Division.60 In many cases, people were detained as hostages to force their relatives to turn themselves in. Dr. Tawfiq Saleh Dhubyan, for example, was held for nine months to force a relative to turn himself in; he was released in March 2012 after undertaking a 12-day hunger strike.61 Six people from one family, including children, were detained in the District Prison in the Hajja province to force a relative accused in a criminal case to turn himself in.62 Yemeni and international rights groups accused the First Armored Division of running a detention facility near Taghyir Square in the capital, where the division allegedly detained hundreds of people. Members of the Islamist Reform Party also maintained a prison in the square.63 Forms of torture employed in detention facilities under the control of the National Security Agency and the Political Security Agency include beatings with rifle butts, batons, and electrical cables, kicking, electroshock, cigarette burns, being hung from the ceiling, threats of death and rape, and forcing prisoners to drink urine.64 57 Voice of Yemen, “Hud: mi’at al-ashkhas makhfiyin qasriyan fi zanazin sirriya taht al-ard,” Mar. 3, 2012, (203) Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Organizations Although the Ministry of Social Affairs has improved its performance with regards to issuing licenses to NGOs, the situation has not improved for unions, as the National Security Agency has asked the ministry to suspend the registration of certain trade unions, including the Central Bureau for Oversight and Accounting Union.65 The abuses targeting human rights defenders and their organizations in the last few years of Saleh’s rule – including intimidation, abduction, arbitrary detention, involuntary disappearance, torture, unfair trials, travel bans, and raids on NGO offices – have declined somewhat. Nevertheless, on April 16, 2012, Ali al-Dailami, the president of the Yemen Organization for the Defense of Rights and Democratic Freedoms, was stopped at the airport in Sana’a and his passport confiscated. He was questioned and accused of leaving Yemen illegally, although his passport carried a clear exit stamp. Dailami was returning from Cairo, where he had taken part in a training program on international human rights mechanisms organized by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.66 Blogger and rights activist Huda Jaafar received abusive messages on her Facebook account threatening retribution if she did not apologize for her criticisms of Yemeni politicians.67 In March, religious extremists accused southern rights activist Ad Numan of being an unbeliever and distributed flyers in mosques publicizing the accusation after he published several articles deemed blasphemous.68 65 HOOD, “Taqrir idarat al-shakawi: al-markaz al-ra’isi al-nisf al-awwal min al-‘am 2012.” 66 YODRDF, “Munazzamat Yaman tutalib bi-ilgha’ ism ‘Ali al-Daylami min qa’imat a- mamnu’in min al-safar fi matar San’a’,” Apr. 17, 2012, (204) Syria For over four decades, public freedoms in Syria were severely repressed and the country witnessed widespread violations to human rights under the regimes of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. This repression in Syria went unrivaled in the Arab world, except perhaps by the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Moammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. Expectations that Syria would experience a lessening of this repression and see a measure of political liberation when Bashar al- Assad assumed the presidency after the death of his father Hafez were quickly proven wrong. Bashar maintained the core of the police state by extending the state of emergency that had been in effect since 1963, thus allowing the security authorities sweeping exceptional powers, which they used to carry out arbitrary arrests and to destroy homes. Bashar also granted increased immunity to the security and intelligence establishments and to the army in order to protect them from being held accountable for the violations and crimes they committed. Although the pro-democracy and pro-reform movement grew significantly during the years of Bashar’s rule, Bashar al-Assad confronted this movement with further repression, including through the increased use of state security and military courts which issued (205) highly repressive judgments against the political and rights activists involved in the movement, whether independently or through their affiliations to political parties. The constitutional and legal framework of the country further reinforced the domination of the Baath Party, known as the “historical leader.” At the same time, other political parties – despite being legally licensed – were utterly marginalized. Bashar’s era, like that of his father, was marked by a dismal record in terms of human rights, particularly due to the systematic practice of torture, enforced disappearance, the blatant denial of the right to freedom of association, including overt hostility to human rights defenders and organizations, and systematic and institutional discrimination against the Kurdish minority. During 2011, the regime dealt brutally with the peaceful uprising which had begun calling for change in March. In this context, the security apparatus, the armed forces, and militias sponsored by the regime committed crimes amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity under international humanitarian law. Throughout 2012, the state of human rights in the country deteriorated immensely, as state repression against peaceful protest underwent a qualitative change to become an internal armed conflict between the security forces, the army, and regime-backed militias known s “shabiha” on one side and what became known as the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) on the other, which was joined by officers and soldiers who refused to carry out the orders of the regime and defected. The FSA also included some opposition groups which had gradually resorted to armed resistance to combat the brutal repression exercised against them by the state and to seek revenge for the increasing number of victims and destruction of property. In its attempt to destroy the armed resistance movement, the regime escalated its repressive tactics to include the use of heavy artillery by the army to shell residential areas as well as the destruction, plundering, and arson of property, arbitrary killings, and summary executions. Such acts of repression were not limited to the towns and villages considered strongholds of the armed opposition or the FSA, nor were the places which maintained the peaceful nature of the uprising spared. A number of hospitals were hit by heavy shelling, and some were used as detention centers and places of summary execution. Arbitrary arrest and systematic torture were practiced (206) against doctors, emergency caregivers, and those involved in delivering humanitarian aid. It is difficult to arrive at exact numbers of civilian casualties of the violent repression exercised against the popular protests and against the population in general, just as it is nearly impossible to determine the number of those affected by the armed clashes between pro-regime forces and anti-regime armed groups. Reports of the United Nations1 state that the number of deaths between the beginning of the uprising in March 2011 and the end of 2012 has probably surpassed 60,000, while the Syrian Network for Human Rights has estimated the number of civilian casualties during 2012 alone to be more than 36,000.2 This number is closely corroborated by the estimates of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which documented the deaths of nearly 40,000 people during 2012, 90% of whom were civilians.3 International reports point to the displacement of nearly a million people and some 350,000 have attained refugee status in neighboring countries;4 more than 170,000 displaced people from Syria have been documented by the UN High Commission for Refugees in Lebanon.5 Arbitrary arrest is widespread and torture is frequently practiced, often resulting in death. A large number of detainees have become disappeared, not only because of the refusal of the authorities to reveal information about their whereabouts but also because the authorities do not even acknowledge that some of them are being held in custody 1United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Data Analysis Suggests over 60,000 People Killed in Syria Conflict: Pillay,” Jan. 2, 2013, (207) by the state. Arrests, enforced disappearance and even killings have affected a large number of human rights defenders. Killings and physical attacks have similarly targeted a number of those working in humanitarian aid and medical care, as well as journalists, reporters, and artists. Ironically, it was in the context of these acts of severe repression that a referendum on a new constitution for the country was held in February 2012, despite a large boycott of the referendum. The new constitution, however, did nothing to change the power structures in the country, with the exception of removing the Baath Party’s status as “leader of the state” to become one among several parties. Observers did not consider this to be a significant change, given that the role and effectiveness of the party had already been giving way to that of the massive power structures which had been built around the presidency, the extensive networks of interests established to support it, and the security establishment which had become entrenched in all areas of the state.6 In early May, parliamentary elections were held, ostensibly to allow the Syrian people to determine the affairs of their country through free and fair elections. Three anti-terrorism laws were passed which included broad language when defining “terrorist crimes.” These laws in effect give legitimacy to arbitrary arrests of opposition members and allow for the imposition of severe penalties, up to and including the death penalty. Such broad definitions also allow for the punishment of writers and journalists based on accusations that they are guilty of spreading terrorist propaganda or inciting to terrorist acts. These penalties can include hard labor for “distributing publications which could comprise terrorist propaganda.” Such penalties can also be imposed on individuals accused of supporting terrorists simply for delivering humanitarian aid. These laws call for the dismissal of any government employee from his/her position if found guilty of such acts by a court and that the employee not be paid severance pay.7 6 International Crisis Group, “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” Aug. 1, 2012, (208) The situation in Syria has become increasingly blurred as some of those affiliated with the FSA and other armed opposition groups have also committed grave violations such as extrajudicial killings, summary executions, and torture against captives from pro-regime forces or militias. Massacres Perpetrated to Suppress the Uprising Attempts to suppress the uprising and armed resistance led to the perpetration of grave violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes were frequently committed in cities and towns considered strongholds of the opposition. Many of these crimes aimed to terrorize the population and to seek revenge against those supportive of the opposition through collective punishment. The city of Idlib and the surrounding towns experienced widespread killings at the hands of the Syrian armed forces during the period between March 10 and April 16. In some cases, men were taken from their houses with their hands tied and lined up with their faces to a wall before the armed forces opened fire on them. 16 people were reportedly shot and killed in Sarmin, one of the villages near Idlib, immediately upon being arrested. In the village of Taftanaz, over 20 people from one family were killed in the same manner. Similar acts of killing took place in Mound Zawiya and Mount Wastani south of Idlib, after which the armed forces burned the victims’ bodies. The shelling of the Mount Zawiya area led to the partial or total destruction of over 1500 homes and the burning of mosques and field hospitals in Idlib.8 On May 25, the town of Houla, near the city of Homs, witnessed the massacre of some 108 people, among them 49 children and 34 women. A number of these victims died due to the use of heavy artillery and tanks to shell the town, yet most were executed by armed b-al-khatf b-al-ashghal a-shaqa,” July 2, 2012, (209) men thought to belong to militias supported by the regime.9 After the Houla massacre, the army moved northward and invaded the city of Hamah, shelling various areas of the city with heavy artillery, which injured over 90 people and led to 33 deaths, among them 7 children and 5 women. When residents attempted to flee the shelling, they were targeted by snipers from the security apparatus, leading to a large number of injuries, including of women and children; some of the injuries were critical.10 On June 13, armed pro-regime militias supported by security forces used ambulances belonging to the Red Crescent to invade the city of Haffah in Latakiyya governorate, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Haffah had long been besieged and targeted with violent shelling by all kinds of heavy artillery. The militias abducted the injured and a number of the bodies of those who had been killed and took them to an unknown location. The number of those who died increased due to attacks on those who had been injured; this took place in the context of a broader pattern of systematic attacks against the injured and medical teams treating them in field hospitals.11 A number of hospitals were directly bombed, resulting in the deaths of a number of civilians and injured persons who were inside.For example, in early April the army bombed the National Hospital in Homs, destroying the hospital and killing at least 11 citizens.12 In August, the main hospital able to treat emergency cases in the area controlled by the opposition in Aleppo was also bombed, resulting in the deaths of a number of civilians and significant damage to the hospital.13 It was reported that the governmental hospital in Homs was turned into a 9 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Andema yuthbah at-tifl fe hodn omeh: 36 monathama wa shakhseyya haquqeyya yudenon majazar an-natham as-sury,” May 30, 2012, (210) center for interrogations and executions and that soldiers burned the dead bodies to prevent them from being subsequently identified.14 On July 12, over 200 people were massacred in the village of al- Tarimsah after the army carried out an intensive attack on the village using helicopters and tanks; the village was then looted by “shabiha” militias.15 According to the Syrian Human Rights Committee, another massacre was committed on August 25 in Darayya, a suburb of Damascus, in which 242 people were killed. Most of the corpses were found with bullet wounds in the city’s mosque; among them were 13 female bodies.16 A similar massacre was committed in the village of al-Ma’adameyya, also near Damascus, where 86 people were killed due to air strikes and attacks by “shabiha” armed groups on homes; helicopters subsequently bombed those who went out to bury the dead.17 On December 29, government forces and pro-regime groups of “shabiha” perpetrated another massacre in the area of Deir Ba’lba in Homs, in which over 220 civilians were killed and entire families were executed, including women, children, and the elderly.18 According to evidence documented by rights organizations, the army also used weapons prohibited under international law, particularly 14 International Crisis Group. 15 Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “260 qateelan fe mathbaha maru’a tertakibha al-qowat as-sureyya wa al-malishiyyat al-musalaha al-munasira l-an-natham fe qareyyet al-tarimsa,” July 14, 2012, (211) cluster bombs,19 in addition to incendiary bombs dropped from the air on a number of residential areas.20 The areas which fell under the control of the Syrian army often witnessed widespread looting to the point that army vehicles were used to carry off the plunder. The security apparatus and the armed “shabiha” groups did the same. Soldiers also frequently destroyed private property and burned homes. UN observers called this a form of collective punishment to make residents pay for their support of the opposition.21 Crimes Committed by Anti-Government Armed Groups Armed groups opposed to the government also committed grave crimes in violation of the rules of war and international humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, yet these crimes have been on a smaller scale than the crimes committed by government forces and pro-regime militias. In a statement to the United Nations, the Syrian government accused the FSA of carrying out kidnappings, killings, and enforced disappearances of Syrian citizens, including against women and children as well as members of the army and security forces.22 Evidence points to the FSA having tortured and executed individuals who appeared to be from the “shabiha” groups in Homs. Cases of holding people for ransom with the aim of pressuring for the release of detainees held by the government were also documented.23 Rights 19 Human Rights Watch, “Despite Denials, More Cluster Bomb Attacks,” Oct. 23, 2012, (212) reports in March cited that extremist groups within the FSA – such as the Nour and Farouq and Suleiman al-Farsi brigades – also committed grave violations. Acts of disappearance, detention, and torture targeted members of the security forces, government supporters, and people thought to be members of pro-regime “shabiha” militias. Torture was carried out against detainees during the initial periods of their detention in centers controlled by the opposition. Some 12 cases were recorded of summary executions of both members of the security forces and civilians.24 UN reports documented numerous cases in which anti-government forces killed members of government forces or “shabiha” militias upon capture; the FSA also carried out numerous killings. In June, some prisoners of war were executed in al-Qusayr in the governorate of Homs after they were condemned by a judicial investigative commission formed by the FSA. Two Alawite soldiers were also executed in Talbesa in the Homs governorate. Twenty members of “shabiha” groups were also killed by anti-governorate combatants in Aleppo. Members of the FSA justified such acts, saying, “Either they (pro-government forces) wipe us out, or we wipe them out.”25 Reports also pointed to anti-government armed groups violating the rights of 24 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses,” Mar. 20, 2012, (213) children, including by using them as child soldiers,26 to transport weapons and supplies, or as lookouts.27 In November, an unidentified armed group committed a mass killing of detainees being held in the governorate of Idlib. Video clips revealed that nearly 10 men, thought to belong to the security forces, were captured, beaten and kicked, and shot and killed by members of the armed group. Reports suggested that the total number of those killed in this massacre was not less than 18 people.28 The FSA and some other armed opposition groups have kidnapped civilians based on their being from towns supportive of the Syrian regime, considering them a legitimate target.29 11 Lebanese Shiites traveling on a pilgrimage through the governorate of Aleppo were abducted on May 22; 9 remained held by one of the opposition groups at the end of the year. A number of Iranian civilians were also kidnapped. A Ukrainian journalist named Anhar Kochneva was also captured by an opposition group, which accused her of cooperating with and supporting the Syrian army and regime. Her abductors threatened to execute her in December,30 and her fate remained unknown until the end of the year. 2012 witnessed a number of explosions, both by suicide bombers and car bombs, which also led to the deaths of dozens of civilians. Reports were not able to determine the identity of those responsible for the 26 Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General submitted to the 21st Session of the UN Human Rights Council under Agenda Items 2 and 4, “Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic: Implementation of the Human Rights Council Resolution 19/22,” Sep. 25, 2012, (214) explosions. The worst of these bombings took place on May 10 inside one of the branches of the military security in Damascus, leading to 55 deaths. Another bombing on April 30 near a government compound in Idlib killed 20. A bombing on July 18 in the headquarters of the Syrian National Security killed the minister of defense and a number of officials from the security establishment.31 Arbitrary Arrest Campaigns and Systematic Torture Between March 2011 and October 2012, over 32,000 people in Syria were arbitrarily arrested without charge or trial, including a large number of those who had taken part in the peaceful protests or announced their support for them as well as many human rights defenders, journalists, doctors, and providers of humanitarian aid.32 Individuals and entire families were arrested to pressure their relatives to turn themselves in to the authorities or to provide information which would assist in their capture or incriminate them.33 The pattern of holding people hostage spread to include families of individuals from the security forces who had defected to join the ranks of the opposition.34 Arrest campaigns also spread to include religious leaders. For instance, Sheikh Ahmed Mu’ath al-Khatib, a former imam at the Umayyad Mosque, was arrested several times. Upon his release after having been detained in late May, he fled the country and was later chosen to head the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.35 31 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Submitted to the 21st Session of the UN Human Rights Council. 32 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Free Peaceful Activists, Journalists, Aid Workers in Amnesty,” Oct. 25, 2012, (215) Even though the Syrian president has issued amnesties six times since the beginning of the uprising, most recently at the time of the Muslim holiday Aid al-Adha when prison sentences against those responsible for various crimes were annulled or reduced, thousands of peaceful activists, journalists, rights defenders, and providers of humanitarian aid remain under arrest; many have not been charged despite the long periods they have spent in detention.36 The Syrian authorities have arbitrarily arrested thousands of individuals based on legislative decree 55 of 2011 and the anti-terrorism law issued in 2012, both of which allow the state to arrest individuals and to hold them for up to 60 days without judicial review. Indeed, many individuals have been held in detention long past this 60-day period.37 A large number of detainees have joined the ranks of those who have been forcibly disappeared due to their being held in isolation from the outside world and the refusal of the authorities to provide information regarding their whereabouts. Among them are Mazen Darwish, director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, and a number of employees of the Center, as no information has been provided about their status or whereabouts since the office of the Center was raided by members of the air force intelligence and 16 people were arrested, including seven women.38 Reports confirm that detainees are regularly subjected to brutal torture. According to testimonies of detainees who have been released, torture methods include sexual assaults and rape, electric shocks to the genitals and other parts of the body, beatings with clubs and cables, burning, and stripping detainees of their clothes.39 Torture has been practiced against children, who have been forced to sit in painful positions, bound and hung by their limbs –including from their genitals– from the ceiling, and had heavy slabs of concrete placed on their heads.40 watany li-qowa a-thawra wa al-mu’arada yentakhib ad-da’eyya ahmed mu’ath al-khatib ra’esan lih,” Nov. 11, 2012, (216) These crimes have been committed by the State Security and Political Security establishments as well as by the Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence services. Torture takes place in buildings belonging to the security apparatuses and in detention centers and prisons, as well as in public squares, sports arenas, and schools, which are also used as temporary detention centers. Hospitals have also been converted into detention centers and places of execution, with injured people being caught inside and tortured or executed and their bodies thrown into the streets.41 Doctors and medical teams have been tortured and killed as well. For instance, the bodies of three doctors who were detained in Aleppo on June 17 by the Air Force Intelligence were found in a burned car a week later bearing signs of severe torture; the hands of one were tied behind his back and the leg of another broken and his fingernails pulled out.42 In light of the official information blackout about the status and whereabouts of detainees and the impossibility of visiting them, it is difficult to determine the number of those who have been killed as a result of torture or who have been intentionally killed in detention. One report pointed to more than 585 cases of death due to torture as of the end of April 2012.43 Human Rights Defenders Arbitrarily Arrested and Killed Human rights defenders did not escape the acts of violence and abuse. Many of these defenders have been arbitrarily arrested, forcibly disappeared, tortured, or killed since the beginning of the uprising. On February 16, 2012, members of the Air Force Intelligence raided the office of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression in Damascus, arresting director Mazen Darwish and 15 others, including a visitor to the Center, Shadi Yazbik, who was released on March 12. The seven women who had been among those arrested were released 48 hours later on the condition that they would present themselves 41 Ibid. 42 Amnesty International, “Syria: Detained Medics Tortured and Killed amid Aleppo Crackdown,” June 26, 2012, (217) daily to one of the detention centers to complete investigations with them. Upon their arrest, Mazen Darwish and the eight other men were placed in solitary confinement in one of the detention centers run by the Air Force Intelligence, and their lawyers, families, and colleagues were unable to visit them or to communicate with them. According to reliable sources, Darwish was tortured while being interrogated. The authorities have not stated what charges have been brought against him or his detained colleagues. No information about Darwish has been provided since this time,44 and his whereabouts remained unknown as of the writing of this report. Information on his detained colleagues Abdelrahman Hamada, Hussein Gharir, Mansour Hamid al-Omri, and Hani Zeinani was similarly withheld. Seven employees of the Center and one visitor to the office were referred to a military court on charges of possessing banned information for the purpose of publishing it. The hearing of their case was postponed after the Air Force Intelligence failed to inform the court of whether Mazen Darwish would appear at the hearing as a witness. Those charged in this case included bloggers Bassam al-Ahmed, Jowan Faris, Ayhem Ghuzoul, Yara Bidr, Razan Ghazawi, Miyadeh al-Khalil, Sanaa Zeitani, and Hanadi Zahlout.45 Other rights activists have also disappeared since their arrest in 2011, including Beraa Bekirati, Anes al-Shaghri, and Yehia al-Sharbaji, a proponent of non-violence.46 On June 16, Rashid Omar Mohamed, a member of the Kurdish Organization for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Freedoms in Syria (DAD), was attacked in the city of Al-Malikiyah by unknown armed assailants wearing masks who beat him severely with iron rods and left him seriously injured.47 On June 3, armed assailants shot and 44 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “The Syrian Authorities Must Reveal the Fate of Mazen Darwish and SCM Staff,” Mar. 14, 2012, (218) killed Adnan Wahbeh, a member of the Arab Organization for Human Rights in Syria and of the executive office of the National Coordinating Body of the Forces for National Democratic Change in Syria. The attack took place in his clinic in the city of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus.48 On July 14, the security apparatus arrested activist Salim Qubani while he was in Damascus to obtain humanitarian supplies for civilians in Homs; he was taken to an unknown location.49 On October 2, rights activist and prominent lawyer Khalil Matouq, executive director of the Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research, was abducted as he was driving his car to his office. He was held in one of the detention centers run by the Political Intelligence in Damascus. 50Matouq had been called for questioning by the security apparatus a number of times in the period leading up to his abduction due to his work as the legal representative of detained activists and his trips abroad to receive medical treatment, as he suffers from a respiratory condition.51 Repression of Freedom of Opinion and Expression The freedoms of opinion and expression have been severely repressed in Syria, as the government has used systematic censorship and arbitrarily refused to grant media licenses in order to control media outlets. Journalists and bloggers who express independent or critical viewpoints have been harassed, expelled from their jobs in the derike.com/index.php?view=article&catid=78%3A2012-05-25-19-12-25&id=214%3A2012- 06-20-06-52-59&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=29>. 48 Arab Organization for Human Rights in Syria, “‘Amaleyat al-ightiyal al-athma tutal hayat az-zamil ad-doctor ‘adnan wahbeh ‘odou al-manathamah al-wataneyya li-huquq al-insan fe sureya,” June 3, 2012, (219) government sector, or arbitrarily detained,52 and as such Syria has become one of the most dangerous places in the world for media professionals to work. Rights sources estimate that over 150 of those working either professionally or informally in the press and different forms of media have been detained since the beginning of the uprising.53 At least 36 of them remained in prison at the end of 2012, and at least 60 journalists, media professionals, internet activists, and others who collaborated with newspapers and information networks were killed.54 The Syrian government targeted others through physical assaults, arrest, torture, and killing due to their opinions which opposed the regime and supported democratic freedoms.55 At the beginning of April, journalist Mary Askander, who was known for her criticisms of the repression in Syria which were published in a number of Arab papers, and Ali Mohamed Othman, the director of the Media Center in the region of Baba Amr in Homs, were arbitrarily arrested. 56 On April 24, the Air Force Intelligence arrested Salameh Kaileh, a Jordanian journalist of Palestinian descent, after raiding his apartment in Damascus. He was cursed, beaten, and subjected to the “falaqa” method of torture (painful beatings on the feet leaving few physical marks), after which he was taken to the military hospital in Al-Mezzeh for treatment. He was forced to sleep with two other ill people in one bed with their hands and feet bound and their faces covered, and they were forced to defecate in the bed. Keila was subjected repeatedly to severe beatings while being blindfolded and tied to the bed. In mid-May, he was expelled to Jordan.57 On May 18, journalist Mohamed Abdelmowli al-Hariri was sentenced to death on charges of high treason and dealing with foreign bodies 52 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Submitted to the 19th Session of the UN Human Rights Council. 53 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Free Peaceful Activists, Journalists, Aid Workers in Amnesty.” 54 Reporters Without Borders, “Targeted Killings and Forced Confessions Condemned,” Dec. 4, 2012, (220) and transferred to the military prison of Seidanayyah. At the end of 2012, no information was available regarding whether the sentence had been carried out. Al-Hariri had been arrested on April 16 after a television interview with Al-Jazeera in which he spoke about the severe humanitarian and security situation in the governorate of Deraa. He was subjected to brutal torture leading to fractures in his spine, yet the security apparatus continued to interrogate him even as he was partially paralyzed, refusing to provide him with the necessary medical care.58 On May 26, the security forces arrested novelist Khalid Khalifa as he was participating in the funeral of the youth Rabe’a al-Ghazi in central Damascus. Khalifa was detained for several hours before being released, during which time he was subjected to violent beatings which led to fractures in his hand and bruises on his head. Hossan Abbas, well-known for his criticism of the government, was similarly attacked; he had been with Khalifa at the funeral.59 On August 11, the security apparatus arrested playwright Zaki Kordilo and his son from his home in Damascus and took them to an unknown location after confiscating their personal computers.60 On August 24, actor and television writer Mohamed Omar Owso was arrested along with his family members from his home in Damascus; he had been an active participant in the protests in support of the revolution.61 On August 23, the authorities arrested cinema producer Arwa al-Neirbeh, the son of the well-known opposition member Mawafeq al-Neirbeh, at the international airport in Damascus as he was traveling to Cairo.62 Foreign journalists were also forcibly disappeared. Two Turkish journalists, Adam Owzkoz and Hamed Kuskuf, disappeared in March, and nothing was heard from them for nearly two months while they 58 Skeyes Media, “Skayz yudin al-hokm al-qada’y as-sory bi-i’adam an-nashet al-i’alamy mohamed al-hariri,” May 19, 2012 (221) were in detention. They were released in May through an Iranian intermediary based on a request from Turkey.63 On September 21, security forces raided the home of journalist and photographer Abdelkarim al-Oqda, who had filmed hundreds of videos of the acts of repression taking place daily in Syria. He and three of his friends were killed during the raid, and the house was burned; some sources suggested that the fire was lit intentionally.64 On August 22, Musaab Mohamed Said al-Awdallah, a journalist with the state-owned newspaper Tashrin, was killed after the army raided his house. He had had links to the opposition and had criticized the repression practiced by the government in articles he published under a false name.65 Two other Iraqi journalists were killed while covering the events of July 18; reports suggested that one of them, Falah Taha, was killed during clashes in Damascus, and that the other, Ali Jabouri al-Kaabi, was killed in the neighborhood of Jarmaneh in Damascus by a group of unknown armed assailants.66 On May 27 and 28, five journalists were killed while filming unrest in Homs – the largest number of journalists killed in a single incident.67 On August 20, Japanese journalist Mika Pamamato was killed in a bombing of Aleppo. Three other local journalists were reportedly killed in August as well.68 The most prominent of the fatal attacks on media institutions took place in June, when the armed opposition raided the Syrian Arab News Agency, a governmental television channel whose programs blame what they refer to as “terrorists” for the violence in the country. 63 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Syria Detains Journalists, Releases Others.” 64 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Syrian Journalist Killed in City of Hama,” Sep. 21, 2012, (222) The armed attack led to the deaths of three journalists and four other employees at the Agency.69 Artists were also attacked, including on August 25, when the well- known caricaturist Ali Farzat was attacked for the second time since the beginning of the revolution by unknown assailants who abducted him as he was returning from his office to his home. Farzat was severely beaten and thrown from the car along the road to the Damascus airport, which led to bruising all over his body.70 69 Amnesty International, “Syria: Attack on TV Station Condemned as UN Report Finds Violence Worsening,” June 27, 2012, (223) (224) Bahrain In Bahrain, the authorities took several legislative and practical measures to give the impression of complying with the recommendations of the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which was set up to investigate grave human rights abuses seen in the country following the popular pro- democracy uprising in February 2011. However, most of these measures were purely cosmetic or of limited effect in addressing abuses, ensuring punishment for the perpetrators, and preventing future violations. The lack of serious political will to adopt and implement the BICI recommendations was clearly demonstrated through the practices of the government in 2012, including continued physical and psychological torture and the use of excessive force in dealing with peaceful demonstrations-particularly those originating in Shiite areas, whose residents face systematic discrimination despite the fact that they constitute the majority of the population. The government also failed to implement the BICI recommendations aimed at addressing ongoing discrimination on the basis of sect or ideology. However, the greatest failure related to implementation of the commission’s recommendations was the lack of action towards prosecuting senior security officials responsible for the serious violations committed in 2011, as only a few low-ranking officers and soldiers were referred to trial. According to official data, as of mid-2012, only 21 policemen, the highest-ranked among them being a colonel, had been charged in connection with the killings and (225) torture that had occurred in response to the 2011 uprising; of these, only three had been convicted and imprisoned.1 In light of the continued impunity enjoyed by senior security officials, it is no surprise that demonstrators continue to be killed. Suppression of protests led to some 40 documented deaths since the BICI recommendations were issued. This is particularly significant when compared to the 52 deaths which resulted from violent responses to protests before the BICI report was issued and in light of the fact that additional deaths continued to occur as a result of the widespread use of torture, including the torture of children, in Bahrain.2 As serious human rights violations continued through 2012, attempts to cover up these crimes were accompanied by escalating attacks against human rights organizations. Prominent human rights defenders were subjected to arbitrary trials and imprisonment, while representatives of international organizations were denied entry to the country. The intimidation of human rights defenders included death threats and smear campaigns against them for engaging with United Nations forums. The Bahraini authorities also urged other Arab governments to cooperate in preventing these defenders from participating in regional activities in other Arab countries. Foreign journalists, photographers, and correspondents also came under increasing attack, and some were deported in an attempt to limit criticism targeting the Bahraini authorities. In November, a decree was issued which arbitrarily stripped 31 Bahrainis of their citizenship without due process, ostensibly for harming national security.3 Some minor developments sought to positively address the critical situation in the country. A national committee to salvage the BICI recommendations was created, and on April 9 the cabinet issued a decree tasking the minister of justice and Islamic affairs with the formation of an agency to monitor the implementation of the recommendations and to act as a liaison between all the ministries and government bodies responsible for this implementation. Most importantly, a compensation fund was created for victims of abuses, and the individuals who had been arbitrarily fired from their jobs following the events of 2011 were returned to their positions.4 1 Recommendation Follow-Up Agency, Follow-Up Report, June 2012, (226) In terms of legislation, the authorities sufficed with introducing modest amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code to include a more comprehensive definition of torture, to adopt the principle, as under international law, that prosecuting crimes of torture shall not be subject to a statute of limitations, and to reduce the period during which it is permitted to hold defendants in preventive detention. Despite the existence of multiple arbitrary restrictions on freedom of expression in Bahraini law, legislative amendments only abolished two articles of the Penal Code: the first had criminalized the dissemination of false data, news, or rumors abroad, and the second had criminalized the possession, distribution, creation, or posting of images harming the country’s reputation. Only a limited amendment was made to Article 168 of the Penal Code, which punishes the publication of false news; this article now stipulates that such acts must be intentional and entail harm to national security, public order, or public health in order to be punishable.5 The year 2012 also saw the adoption of minor constitutional amendments to give parliament a measure of oversight over the government’s performance. Theoretically, these amendments also give the parliament the right to withdraw confidence from the government, yet in practice it is the king who is authorized in this case to dismiss the government and appoint a new one or to dissolve the parliament.6 Escalating Crackdown on Human Rights Defenders Human rights defenders continued to pay a high price for standing up to ongoing violations in Bahrain. On January 6, security forces fired tear gas to disperse a peaceful demonstration held in solidarity with detainees. During the demonstration, Nabil Rajab, the president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), was specifically targeted: After being pushed to the ground, he was brutally beaten with batons and other weapons, leaving him with serious injuries on his body and face. He was taken to the Salmaniya Hospital, where he was detained and interrogated before being allowed to return home the following day.7 On May 5, the authorities arrested Rajab upon his return from Beirut following an advocacy workshop, and on May 16 he was referred to trial on charges of insulting the statutory bodies on his 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: i’tida’ athim ‘ala-l-mudafi’ ‘an huquq al-insan Nabil Rajab,” Jan. 8, 2012, (227) blog.8 Rajab was again detained on June 6, one day after he appeared in an interview with Al-Jazeera English, during which he criticized the lack of serious reforms and the ongoing violations faced by the people of Bahrain.9 On July 9, the Lower Criminal Court convicted him of charges of libel against citizens of al-Muharraq and sentenced him to three months in prison.10 On August 16, the Supreme Appellate Court sentenced him to three years in prison on charges of partaking in illegal assemblies following his participation in peaceful protests demanding basic liberties and democracy.11 Rajab was held in solitary confinement, deprived of private phone calls to his family, and denied access to newspapers.12 On December 11, the appellate court upheld the conviction but reduced his sentence to two years in prison.13 On February 12, blogger and activist Zeinab al-Khawaja was detained while taking part in a peaceful march toward the Pearl Roundabout in Manama; the Public Prosecution charged her with gathering unlawfully with more than five persons.14 She was arrested again on April 21 during a demonstration protesting the ongoing imprisonment of her father, prominent rights advocate Abdulhadi al-Khawaja; she was charged with obstructing traffic and insulting an officer.15 On September 26, the Lower Criminal Court 8 BCHR, “100 munazzama min anha’ al-‘alam tuwajjih nida’ li-inha’ al-i’tida’ ‘ala hurriyat al-ta’bir wa itlaq sarah kull al-mudafi’in al-huquqiyin al-mu’taqalin wa-l-mudawwinin,” May 18, 2012, (228) sentenced her to two months in prison on charges of destroying property of the Interior Ministry16 for ripping up images of the king of Bahrain.17 On February 14, the authorities arrested two prominent human rights activists, Naji Fateel and Hassan al-Jaber, while they were documenting rights violations during demonstrations commemorating the one-year anniversary of the pro-democracy uprising in Bahrain.18 On April 15, the security apparatus detained Sayyed Yousif al-Mahafithah, who is responsible for the monitoring and documentation work of BCHR, and two members of Human Rights Watch, Tom Malinowski and Nadim Houry, while they were observing a peaceful protest against the Formula One race in the village of al-Diraz. They were held for four hours before being released.19 Al- Mahafithah was later detained in November while observing an anti- government demonstration; he was held for 12 days with no charges brought against him before being released. On December 17, security forces again arrested him while he was observing a demonstration in Manama held in commemoration of the deaths of two demonstrators in 1994. The following day, the public prosecutor accused him of publishing a photo on his Twitter account showing the leg of a person with apparent shotgun injuries and ordered that he be detained for one week pending investigation. On December 25, his detention was renewed for 15 days on charges of intentionally disseminating false news.20 On October 16, Mohammed al-Maskati, the president of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, was arrested on charges of rioting and taking part in an illegal assembly after he participated in protests in Manama on October 12; he was released the following day. Previously, al-Maskati had been subjected to an intimidation campaign in September, when he received at least 12 anonymous phone calls threatening his life and the safety of his family after he presented an oral intervention to the UN Human Rights 16 Al-Wasat, “Hukm bi-l-habs li-shahrayn ‘ala-l-nashita Zaynab al-Khawaja,” Sep. 26, 2012, (229) Council during a discussion on intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders.21 The Bahraini government’s hostility to human rights defenders was most clearly expressed during the 21st session of the UN Human Rights Council, attended by al-Maskati. Human rights defenders faced retaliation for their participation in the session, including death threats, intimidation, harassment, and incitement to hatred and violence against them by state- owned media.22 Despite international protests and appeals for the release of 13 prominent political and rights activists who had called for democratic reforms, they remained in prison. These activists had been subjected to unfair trials by an exceptional military court, which issued a sentence of life in prison against seven of the defendants, including Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, the founder of BCHR, and sentences ranging from two to fifteen years in prison against the remaining defendants. Following heightened international pressure and criticism, the authorities held a retrial for the activists, yet on September 4 the Supreme Criminal Appellate Court upheld all the verdicts against the 13 activists without opening investigations into or even taking into consideration the fact that their original convictions were based on statements and confessions made under torture.23 As part of the harassment of rights activists outside of Bahrain, Nabil Rajab was denied entry to Egypt on April 21, when the authorities confiscated his passport, held him in Cairo International Airport, and informed him that he was on a list of persons prohibited from entering the country.24 Maryam al- Khawaja was also denied entry on August 16,25 as was rights advocate Falah 21 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: tawassul al-hamla al-qada’iya didd al-mudafi’in ‘an huquq al-insan wa-l-nushata’,” Oct. 17, 2012, (230) Rabie on April 24. Political activist Qassem al-Hashimi and Bahraini critic Ali al-Deiri had also been prohibited previously from entering the country.26 The authorities also imposed further restrictions on international organizations and denied them entry to Bahrain on several occasions. On January 8, the authorities refused to grant entry to Richard Sollom, the deputy director of Physicians for Human Rights, to attend the appeal of the case against the medical staff who had been charged in the context of the uprising.27 On April 12, Doctors Without Borders also announced that its team had been denied entry to Bahrain and that the Health Ministry had refused to grant a permit for it to work in any clinics in Bahrain.28 Suppression of Peaceful Assembly The authorities continued to use excessive force against peaceful protests and assemblies, with tear gas, birdshot, and rubber bullets killing several and inflicting serious injuries. Sayyed Hashem Said, age 15, died after being injured with a tear gas canister while facing security forces in a protest in Sitra, located south of the capital, on December 31, 2011. Salma Mohsen Abbas also died after a security officer launched a tear gas canister into her home in Barbar while dispersing a protest in the village on January 13, 2012.29 On January 20, Yassin al-Asfour, age 14, died when security forces launched tear gas canisters into his home in Maamir, south of the capital. Rights sources said that some 13 people have died since February 2011 because of the use of tear gas against protestors and the throwing of tear gas canisters into citizens’ homes.30 On April 13, security forces attacked thousands of mourners at the funeral procession of photographer Ahmed Ismail, who was killed by unknown 26 BCHR, “Istimrar al-‘amal bi-l-qawa’im al-sawda’ fi Misr li-l-tadyiq ‘ala-l-mudafi’in ‘an huquq al-insan,” Apr. 25, 2012, (231) gunmen; dozens of mourners were injured.31 On June 14, a peaceful demonstration in the village of Ali was similarly met with repression. When a group of demonstrators sought shelter in a local house to get away from the tear gas and gunfire, security forces stormed the house, beat them with batons and shoes, and kicked and punched them. A 16-year-old boy who was in the house was beaten and insulted, after which police took him to the central square of the town, where he was subjected to further torture and beatings and threatened with murder and rape.32 On June 22, five associations of the political opposition (National Democratic Action Society-Waad, Wefaq, Nationalist Assembly, Unitary Assembly, and al-Ikha—all legally licensed) called for a march, but the head of General Security banned the march and warned against taking part in it. When the associations went ahead with the protest, participants came under gunfire at close range that targeted the upper parts of their bodies, leaving several demonstrators seriously injured. Yousif al-Mahafithah, who is responsible for the monitoring and documentation work at BCHR, was beaten by a member of the security forces and an attempt was made to steal his phone.33 On June 27, security forces responded to a peaceful protest in Buri by using tear gas and birdshot, and several demonstrators were injured, among them rights activist Zeinab al-Khawaja, who sustained fractures that kept her from being able to walk without crutches. On June 29, security forces banned a march of political opposition associations on al-Badie Street, surrounding the area, attacking anyone present in the streets, and imposing an unofficial curfew; dozens of citizens were brutally beaten and several were injured with birdshot.34 On September 21, the authorities used excessive violence to disperse a peaceful demonstration in Manama called for by the February 14 Youth Coalition to demand political and social reforms and to show solidarity with detainees; several were injured and a number of demonstrators were detained. On September 23, 29 of these detainees were 31 BCHR, “Ba’d tahdidat wazir al-dakhiliya bi-l-tas’id didd al-mutazahirin: ‘asharat al-jarha wa-l-musabin bi-talaqat rasas al-sayd la yahsulun ‘ala-l-‘ilaj al-lazim,” Apr. 19, 2012, (232) brought before the Public Prosecution, which remanded them for a month pending investigation.35 Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression Restrictions on freedom of expression and media and repression of government critics and political dissidents continued. Pressure on journalists, including foreign correspondents, mounted with the goal of quelling media coverage of ongoing assaults on peaceful protests. Several journalists and political opposition activists were also targeted with arrest, prosecution, and even physical assaults. On March 31, journalist Ahmed Ismail Hussein was shot and killed while he was photographing violations by security forces against demonstrators in the village of Salmabad, southwest of Manama.36 Photographer Mazen Mahdi was attacked on January 3 while covering a demonstration in front of the central police station in Samahij, northeast of Manama.37 On April 8, anti-riot forces beat and insulted journalist Ahmed al-Busta while he was covering a protest march in Manama.38 The authorities rejected applications for entry visas for six foreign journalists on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the popular uprising, including Nicholas Kristof and Adam B. Ellick of the New York Times, Kristin Chick of the Christian Science Monitor, Cara Swift of the BBC, Alex Delmar- Morgan of the Wall Street Journal, and Gregg Carlstrom of Al-Jazeera.39 The authorities also detained seven foreign journalists who were attempting to cover anti-government demonstrations in the run-up to the Formula One race in Manama on April 22. Two of them—correspondents with Britain’s Channel Four and the Sunday Telegraph—were deported. Among those detained in this context was freelance journalist Mohammed Hassan, who had also been detained just two days before, after he was hit with a 35 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: tawasul istikhdam al-quwwa al-mufrita ka-radd wahid ‘ala-l-ihtijajat al-mutaliba bi-l-dimuqratiya,” Sep. 23, 2012, (233) percussion grenade, beaten, and kicked. Hassan had been working with journalists from the British ITN network.40 On December 28, the authorities detained Mazen Mahdi, a photographer with DPA, for more than two hours while he was covering popular demonstrations in the town of Sar, 10 km west of the capital.41 The government blocked several independent news websites, especially those with live feeds, for “violating regulations and laws of the Kingdom of Bahrain.” The site live973.info, which streams live images of opposition demonstrations, was blocked, as was the “Al-Wefaq Live” page on the audio streaming website mixlr.com. The authorities also blocked the new “Sahet al-Hurreya” page on the mixlr.com site42 as well as Livestation applications for smart phones and iPads in Bahrain, as these applications permit the streaming of television broadcasts.43 On June 2, the authorities arrested director and artist Yasser Nasser al- Abbasi, who was then brutally beaten by security forces. The Public Prosecution ordered him to be detained for 15 days pending an investigation into accusations that he had participated in an unauthorized march.44 On 19 April, journalist Reem Khalifa was fined 100 Bahraini dinars and ordered to pay compensation of 500 dinars after she was convicted of libel and physically assault against pro-government elements; Khalifa had filed a suit against government supporters who beat and insulted her in February 2011.45 On May 17, the authorities arrested journalist Ahmed Radhi following statements he made during interviews criticizing the proposed 40 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Bahrain Cracks down on News around Formula One Races,” Apr. 23, 2012, (234) union between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain;46 he was released four months later.47 The deputy secretary-general of the opposition group National Ikha, Al- Sayyed Youssef Qudrat Amrullah, was abducted by civilians—likely Interior Ministry subordinates, according to the BCHR—while taking part in the funeral procession of Youssef Muwalli. The Muwalli family rejected the Interior Ministry’s statement that it had found Youssef’s body after he had disappeared in mysterious circumstances, accusing the authorities of torturing him to death. A Wefaq activist, Wahib al-Shuwaikh, was also detained after his home was raided at dawn on January 23 without a warrant; this occurred only weeks after he had addressed the issue of the workers who had been fired for political reasons in a public speech.48 Continued Torture Torture continues to be used against detainees and during the arrest of demonstrators, and deaths thought to be the result of torture have also been reported. In a new development, these practices have begun to frequently target children as well. Nevertheless, the country saw no serious measures to apprehend those responsible for torture or to hold them to account. Political prisoners are specifically subjected to ill treatment before and after receiving family visits. Before the visit, prisoners are forced to stand for up to six hours blindfolded and handcuffed, without food or water, typically in the same room where they report having been tortured at the beginning of their detention. Prisoners are not permitted to pray during this time. As a result of this treatment, the families of some prisoners suspended family visits as of November 22, in protest of the mistreatment of their loved ones.49 On January 13, the Interior Ministry announced that it had found the body of Youssef Ahmed Muwalli on the Amwaj Islands five days after he had disappeared. His mother had filed a missing persons report, and an officer at the Samahij police station had told her that her son was in the investigations building. After his body was found and identified by his parents, the family 46 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Bahrain Arrests Critical Journalist,” May 17, 2012, (235) said there were signs of torture on the victim’s head and neck, as well as cigarette burns on his hands and bruising all over his body.50 On January 27, Mohammed Ibrahim Yaaqoub, age 19, died only hours after he was arrested and beaten in an area near the Sitra police station by 15-20 policemen, according to eyewitnesses. Before he was buried, bruises and cuts were seen on various parts of his body.51 On January 3, police detained student and political activist Hassan Awn from his school. He was subjected to various forms of torture, including beatings on his feet with a rubber hose, being forced to stand for more than 11 hours, and being stripped and raped with a water hose.52 On February 11, anti-riot police arrested five people during a demonstration in the town of Sanabis, after which they were taken to an unofficial detention site. There they were beaten, slapped, insulted for their Shiite beliefs, bound and thrown in a swimming pool, and threatened with electrocution. On April 17, the police arrested a group of young adults and seven children and beat and threatened to rape them for participating in protests.53 On April 14, Mansour al-Jamri, age 16, was detained with a group of demonstrators. Mansour, who helps document human rights violations against demonstrators in Shiite villages, was tortured and beaten in prison after his arrest.54 Similarly, Sayyed Yassin Shibr, age 13, and another minor, Abd al-Karim Hassan, were also tortured after being arrested during clashes between police and demonstrators on April 29.55 Al-Sayyed Hashem Salman Juma, age 18, was tortured after he was arrested in June when anti-riot forces attacked the village of al-Malekiya. He was transferred to the municipal building in Karzakan where he was beaten with batons, had water poured 50 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: wafat shabb wa ‘a’ilatuhu taqul bi-anahu maqtul taht al-ta’dhib,” Jan. 14, 2012, (236) over him, and was electrocuted on his back seven times before police left him in an abandoned field.56 On November 27, anti-riot police stormed the Dry Dock Prison after a coalition of prisoners of conscience issued a statement about the conditions of Bahraini political prisoners, vowing to claim their rights. The families of the prisoners have had no contact with the prisoners since that time.57 Adnan al-Mansi, who has been detained since May 30, was also subjected to severe physical torture, including sexual assaults, denial of adequate medical treatment, being forced to stand in the sun, denial of access to a toilet, and deprivation of water. Adnan’s lawyer reported that Adnan had been raped by officials from the Ministry of Interior, leading to severe anal bleeding. Adnan was also brutally beaten on the head, causing temporary paralysis and chronic headaches. Due to his deteriorating health, he lost consciousness in the prison and was taken to the Salmaniya Medical Complex for treatment.58 Discrimination against Shiites The authorities took no serious steps to end the systematic sectarian discrimination against Shiite citizens. In order to exhibit some compliance with the BICI recommendations, the authorities adopted training programs to prevent the spread of sectarian and communal hatred and showed a limited interest in repairing Shiite houses of worship, which had been severely damaged during clashes following the popular pro-democracy uprising in February 2011. However, despite government assertions that the issue of the workers who had been arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs in the context of the uprising had been resolved, a group of workers belonging to the Shiite majority still awaits reinstatement. According to Bahraini trade unions, many of those permitted to return to work were asked to sign pledges stating that they would not participate in protests again and pressured to suspend their union 56 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: istimrar mumarasat al-ta’dhib didd al-mu’taqalin wa bi-taghtiya min al-niyaba al-‘amma.” 57 BCHR, “al-Bahrayn: taqarir ‘an intihakat wa tahdid wa darb al-sujana’ al-siyasiyin fi sijn al-hawd al-jaf,” Dec. 2, 2012, (237) activities; in some cases, they were asked to perform jobs and duties other than their original positions.59 In addition, Shiite clerics continue to be humiliated by security personnel. On July 27, a security patrol stopped Sheikh Ibrahim Ali Nasser al-Safa, the director of the Ghadir hawza (a religious school for Shiite Muslims) as he was returning to his home in the Sitra area. The patrol forced the sheikh to remove his turban as they watched and laughed derisively.60 On July 29, the same thing happened to Sheikh Mohammed Jawad al-Shihabi, the director of the Imam al-Baqer hawza.61 59 Amnesty International, “Bahrain: One Year on, Accountability Remains a Distant Aspiration,” Feb. 13, 2012, (238) Section Three Human Rights in the Countries Less Affected by the “Arab Spring” (239) (240) Iraq Nine years after the overthrow of the brutal totalitarian regime headed by Saddam Hussein, human rights violations in Iraq have not diminished. Rather, chaos has reigned following the collapse of the Iraqi security and armed forces. Meanwhile, the grave human rights violations committed by the invading American forces in their efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein, eradicate remnants of the Baath Party, and confront the armed militias which opposed the occupation have largely gone unpunished. In addition, the political aftermath of the Saddam era has triggered bloody sectarian conflicts. These conflicts exacerbated the difficulties of establishing a new political system based on quotas of the various ethnic groups in the country, even as this system failed to achieve consensus about how to fairly distribute power, land, and resources. The interference of regional players has also contributed to these conflicts, for while Iran backs some of the Shiite factions with which it has close ties, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar support Sunni groups for religious and political reasons, including to limit the spread of both Shiite Islam and Iran’s political influence in the region. Some 132,000 people died in the period between the American invasion in March 2003 and the end of 2011, when the last American soldier left Iraq.1 1 Iraqi Body Count, “Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence,” (241) Several parties are responsible for grave crimes, including the invading forces, the Iraqi military, and the Iraqi police forces, which were rebuilt along sectarian lines following the 2003 invasion. Armed militias loyal to vying factions within Iraq also committed serious violations, as did members of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, which made Iraq a base for its activities. Chronic failures to administer the political process in Iraq led to the continued regression of the state of human rights in the country. Arbitrary arrests and torture have spread while impunity for grave violations has become entrenched, especially in light of the absence of adequate guarantees for judicial independence. In recent years, the Iraqi government has also become less tolerant of the freedom of expression and criticisms aimed at government officials as well as of the right to peaceful protest and assembly. Minorities continue to be subjected to discrimination and attacks which aim to marginalize them in order to ensure that land and wealth are divided between the largest ideological and ethnic groups: Shiite and Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The developments of 2012 do not indicate that the Iraqi government has the capacity to restore stability and security, to ensure domestic peace, or to rebuild the state and society based on respect for human rights in the foreseeable future. Nouri al-Maliki’s government has failed to implement the power-sharing deal which required that senior security positions be distributed between the major political, ideological, and ethnic groups in Iraqi society, including Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. Shiite Islamist political parties continue to be concerned that Sunnis seek to end their hold on power, while Sunni parties sense that the Shiites are attempting to maintain Sunni marginalization. This political and security climate, along with failures to resolve outstanding issues with neighboring states in the region, has contributed to the spread of chaos and violations.2 Acts of violence and terrorism in did not diminish since 2011. This is partly due to the fact that security forces chronically lack adequate training and that al-Maliki’s has tended to give high-ranking positions in the security apparatus to individuals close to him.3 Many of the acts of sectarian violence and terrorism target police officers, members of the army, and government officials – most of them Shiite – as well as Shiite residential areas and shrines. Violence also targets minorities, 2 Crisis Action Group: “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis,” Jul. 30, 2012, (242) particularly Christians, Yazidis, and Shabak people. The spread of attacks and repression against religious, ideological, and racial minorities is attributable to efforts of the major ethnic and ideological groups, such as the Shiite and Sunni Arabs and the Kurds, to increase their control on power, land, and natural resources in the regions in which they make up the majority of the population. In light of ongoing political conflict, ideological disputes, and security challenges, the state of human rights remains grave, according to United Nations reports.4 Growing restrictions on freedom of expression have been recorded, especially in the Kurdish region. If the law proposed by the central government is passed by the parliament, journalists, writers, bloggers, and rights activists may be subjected to severe sentences, including life in prison, as the vague language of the law allows for punishment of individuals for practices that are at the core of free expression and access to information. The Kurdish parliament is also discussing another draft law which provides a penalty of 10 years imprisonment for those who insult “the sacred.” The authorities imposed severe restrictions in order to limit political protests, and a number of assemblies were subjected to repression, particularly in the Kurdish region. Some 12,000 individuals remained arbitrarily arrested without official charges or trial, including a large number of Baathists who were detained on allegations of “conspiring against the regime.” Hundreds were held in preventative detention under the claim of “averting possible terrorist operations.” Crimes of torture and ill-treatment continued, particularly in secret detention facilities or prisons which are not subject to the surveillance of the judiciary or the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, the issuance and implementation of death penalties increased in cases related to terrorism as well as in other criminal cases. Such sentences are particularly grave in light of the contested nature of the independence of the judiciary and of the use of torture to extract confessions. In April, the Council of Representatives announced the names of the members of the High Commission for Human Rights, which is responsible for monitoring human rights violations committed by government institutions or by any other parties. Nevertheless, the formation of the Commission was criticized for the lack of transparency regarding standards for selection of members, for being based on the system of sectarian and 4 UN News Center, “UN Report: Human Rights Situation in Iraq Remains Fragile,” May 30, 2012, (243) ethnic quotas, and for the fact that most of those selected did not have adequate experience in the field of human rights.5 Continued Acts of Violence and Terrorism Acts of violence and terrorism did not diminish even after the last American soldier was withdrawn from Iraq just before the end of 2011. Suicide bombings, parcel bombs, attacks with mortar bombs or firearms, and assassinations remained near-daily occurrences and targeted members of the police and the military, government officials, and civilians. Throughout the year 2012, 4,471 people were killed, which represents a slight increase in the number of casualties as compared to the 4,137 deaths which occurred in 2011.6 A large percentage of attacks were sectarian in nature, targeting police forces and members of the military, most of whom are Shiite. Residential compounds and Shiite shrines were similarly targeted, especially during Shiite religious celebrations. This demonstrates that the intention of those who carried out such attacks was to instigate sectarian conflict. The Sunni organization Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for a number of attacks which aimed to incur the highest number of casualties possible.7 Some of the attacks targeted specific minorities – as will be discussed below – with the goal of changing the demographic composition of the population by forcing minorities in certain governorates to leave their homes and land. Acts of violence and terrorism peaked between July 21 and August 18, which coincided with the Muslim month of fasting. During this period, 409 people were killed and 975 injured in numerous explosions and armed attacks in different regions.8 5 A K News, “Nashiton yinqasimon bi-sha’in ‘asma’ ‘awel mofawdeyya li-huquq al-insan fe al-iraq,” Apr. 12, 2012, (244) According to several news sources, this violence included killings of entire families, most of which occurred when the homes of members of the security forces or government workers were stormed and everyone inside was killed. Such killings were at times committed using bladed weapons. These acts terrorized members of the government forces and other government workers and led them to leave their positions.9 Deadly explosions also occurred on the occasion of the Muslim feast Eid al-Adha, when dozens were killed or injured, including Iranian citizens visiting the country. Families of the Shabak sect in Mosul were also targeted by armed attacks, and two car bombs in the city of Sadr led to deaths of 16 people and the injury of 159 others.10 The year 2012 saw an increase in the killing of youth identified as “emo,” as they are viewed by some as “Satan worshippers” due to their dress and practices which challenge prevalent social norms and which result in some of them being labeled homosexuals. Emo youth have become targeted by hate campaigns initiated not only by religious groups but also by some media outlets which described them as “immoral” and “vampires.” The Interior Ministry also contributed to the instigation of attacks against them through statements claiming that they represent a danger to society. Several emo individuals were forced to cut their hair or to go into hiding after receiving death threats, and ten individuals belonging to emo groups were killed since the middle of February.11 Pictures have been circulated on the Internet of youth said to be emo who were killed by stoning; the perpetrators are unknown.12 Despite the passage of nine years since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, more mass graves of the victims of Hussein’s repressive campaigns against his opponents continue to be discovered. According to officials from the Ministry of Human Rights, a mass grave was uncovered in the desert region 9Press TV, “Gunmen Kill 5 Family Members in Iraq’s Samarra,” Jul. 29, 2012, (245) north of the city of Najaf, bringing the number of mass graves which have been discovered in Najaf alone to 12, while 48 mass graves have been reported in the area.13 According to government statistics, 80 mass graves containing some 400,000 corpses have been found in various governorates of the country since the fall of the former regime.14 The Situation of Minorities and Refugees Religious, ideological, and racial minorities continued to face various forms of discrimination and aggression under the domination of the major ideological and ethnic groups, including Kurds and Sunni and Shiite Arabs, as a result of the attempts by majority groups to tighten their grip on power, land, and natural resources. Despite growing criticisms at the local, regional, and international levels regarding the severe repression experienced by Christians in Iraq, displacement of Christians from some of the regions in the northern governorate of Ninewa continues. Christian organizations assert that both the central government in Baghdad and the regional government in Kurdistan continue to issue administrative orders allowing for areas of land where Christians live to be allocated to government institutions, local administrative bodies, and even investment companies to build residential compounds. This reinforces plans to drive the Christian population out of these regions by force.15 The displacement of Christians from the governorate of Ninewa is exacerbated by the fact that they are targeted by armed groups such as al- Qaeda in order to force them to leave their lands and homes in the governorate, which had historically been home to the largest population of Christians in Iraq. The Amal Association for Christians’ Rights blames the security apparatus for failing to provide necessary protections to Christians, thus forcing their families to flee the governorate. The Open Doors Organization states that the number of Christians in Ninewa has decreased 13 Aswat al-Iraq, “First Mass Grave in Najaf Unveiled,” Aug. 2, 2012, (246) from 850,000 in 2003 to 345,000 in 2012. Pressures aiming to change the demographic make-up in Mosul, the capital of the Ninewa, led 5,000 families to leave the city.16 The Minority Rights Group International emphasizes the rising fears for the safety of some minority groups, particularly the Yazidi and Shabak peoples in northern Iraq.17 Yazidi organizations condemn the discrimination experienced by the this minority group as well as repressive practices such as raids carried out by Kurdish security forces, arbitrary arrests of Yazidi leaders and activists who refuse to cooperate with the Kurdish regional authorities,18 and destruction of temples and exhumation of Yazidi graves in Dohuk and Ninewa. The Yazidis have demanded that the Iraqi central government put an end to these violations committed against them by the authorities in Kurdistan.19 The Shabak people continued to suffer from violations and terrorist campaigns designed to force them to abandon their lands. According to news sources, at least five bombings took place throughout the year targeting the areas where the Shabak people live or the Shiite shrines belonging to them, resulting in dozens of deaths.20 The Turkmen represent the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, dwelling mainly in the disputed regions claimed by both the central authorities and the Kurdish regional government. Kirkuk is particularly disputed, as it is rich in oil. The Turkmen have occasionally been subjected to terrorist attacks in 16 Ishtar TV, “Mumethel kouta al-maseheyin fe maglas muhafizat ninawa hunalek muhawelat jadida li-istehdaf al-maseheyin fe al-mosul,” Jun. 10, 2012, (247) their cities, such as on August 2, when the four members of one Turkmen family were killed by unknown, armed attackers who stormed their home in Amrla south of Kirkuk; the police rejected theft as being the motive behind this killing.21 On August 16, the Turkmen Front revealed information about the abduction of some 700 Turkmen from the governorate of Kirkuk over the previous five years and accused the security apparatus of dereliction.22 The head of the Turkmen Front asserted that the attacks, as well as the spread of kidnappings of Turkmen in Kirkuk, were politically motivated.23 Some 3,000 families of members of the Iranian opposition organization Mujahadeen-e-Khalq who have been living in Iraq since the Saddam Hussein era continued to face repression. The siege imposed on these families at Camp Ashraf has been ongoing for more than a year, and a number of residents were killed in confrontations with security forces,24 leading many of the families to flee to Camp Liberty, close to the Baghdad airport.25 However, complaints continue to be heard regarding the poor living conditions in the new camp and mistreatment at the hands of security guards, who prevent access to certain supplies and conduct arbitrary inspections.26 Violations to Freedom of Expression and the Press In comparison to the nearly 260 deaths among Iraqi and foreign journalists since the American invasion, the number of journalists killed has diminished 21BBC Arabic, “Al-‘Iraq: 17 qateelan fe silsilet hagamat mutafariqa,” Aug. 2, 2012, (248) greatly.27 During 2012, three media professionals were killed: Ghazwan Anas, a presenter with the channel Sama Mosul, was killed by armed attackers in front of his family after they stormed his home;28 Cameron Salah el-Din, a presenter on the satellite channel Salah el-Din, was killed on April 12 following the explosion of a bomb which had been placed by unknown attackers under his car in the city of Tikrit;29 and Samir al-Sheikh Ali, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper al-Jamahir al-Baghdadiyya, was shot and killed by unknown assailants on November 17 as he was driving in downtown Baghdad – a number of sources claimed that he was targeted due to his journalistic activities.30 The authorities exert various forms of pressure to hinder the work of journalists and reporters,31 yet the most serious violations are those which occur in the Kurdish region. On April 8, the Media and Communications Authority threatened to close the satellite channel The Sumerian and to suspend its license if it continued to broadcast a satire program and another program discussing various political and social issues.32 In June, the Media and Communications Authority announced its decision to suspend the work of 44 media outlets, claiming that they had breached the conditions set for their work. The outlets were given a period of 45 days to rectify their statuses and verify their licenses to work. At the same time, some media outlets accuse the Authority of delaying the issuance of broadcast licenses.33 The Authority was later forced to postpone implementation of its decision due to widespread protests by journalists and reporters and the intervention of the parliament’s Culture and Information Committee in the matter.34 In December, the security forces closed the offices of the television station Al-Baghdadiyya and the independent radio station al-Mohebba and banned 27Journalistic Freedoms Observatory, “272 intihakan dhid al-sahafiyin wa al-sulutat ta’ud hazmet qawanen li-taqeyed hurriyet al-ta’beer,” (249) them from broadcasting based on claims that they had committed administrative breaches to broadcasting regulations. The directors at the two stations denied such charges. Some accounts point to the decision to shut down Al-Baghdadiyya as being strongly connected to the station’s work in exposing government corruption, while al-Mohebba was also known for being critical of the government. Security forces had previously prohibited correspondents from al-Baghdadiyya from covering Shiite celebrations in ‘Ashoura and accused them of being supporters of the Saddam Hussein regime.35 The Iraqi government is moving towards imposing greater legal restrictions on the freedom of expression, the repercussions of which could have serious consequences for civil society and rights activists. The government has presented to the parliament a draft law on “information crimes” which would punish anyone who intentionally used computers or the Internet to “imperil the supreme economic, political, military, or security interests of the country” with life in prison. The same penalty may be imposed for crimes of “participating, negotiating, propagating, contracting, or dealing with any hostile body with the intention of destabilizing security or public order or of endangering the country,” as well as for the use of computers and the Internet for the purpose of “inciting ideological or sectarian conflicts or damaging the reputation of the country” or to publish or broadcast false or misleading facts with the intention of undermining confidence in the current regime or weakening the national economy and financial confidence in the state. The draft law further imposes a prison term of one year for the crime of “violating religious and moral values”, “social values”, or “the sanctity of private life.”36 The law uses vague expressions in its classification of “crimes” which may easily be used to punish those who express opposing political opinions or criticize economic, social, human rights, and other policies. Despite the increasing growth in the number of media outlets and journalists in the Kurdish region, violations against journalists and reporters have also increased.37 Several cases have been reported of journalists who have been 35Committee to Protect Journalists, “Iraqi Broadcaster and Radio Station Forced Off the Air,” Dec. 17, 2012, (250) subjected to threats and detention, and media institutions have also been raided.38 On May 7, the Kurdish authorities arrested Hemin Ari, the editor-in-chief of the magazine Sheria, after it published an article written by a Kurdish man living in Norway which included a fictional conversation with God, which was considered “offensive to Islam.” Despite the fact that the magazine apologized for having published the article, the authorities banned it from publication for an undetermined period. The publication of the article led to protests in front of a mosque, and some of the demonstrators in the streets of Arbil called for the writer to be killed.39 Meanwhile, the parliament of Kurdistan began discussing a draft law for the “protection of the sacred,” which would impose penalties reaching up to 10 years in prison and the closure of publishing bodies in cases of “depicting the prophets in an inappropriate manner” and “insulting or mocking the divine.”40 In April, the Kurdish authorities arrested Sherwan Sherwani, editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Bashour, which is issued in Dahok, after it published two articles condemning financial and administrative corruption. Sherwan was released ten days later on a bail of 1,000,000 Iraqi dinars.41 In October, the Criminal Court in Arbil sentenced independent journalist Karzan Karim to two years in prison following his conviction on charges of “undermining the institutions of the state” and “imperiling the security and stability of the region” after he published a report about alleged corruption in the security apparatus of the Kurdish region. It is important to note that Karzan had worked previously with this security apparatus in the Arbil airport. According to Karzan, he was subjected to beatings and torture while in detention, and his lawyer was threatened by security officials.42 38 Kurdiu, “Markaz metro l-il-dufa’ ‘an al-sahafiyin yutalib al-itihad al-watany al-kurdistani bi-tawdeeh,” Jul. 25, 2012, (251) The Right to Peaceful Protest and Assembly The political protest movement which had swelled in 2011 saw a major decline in 2012 due to the repressive campaigns undertaken by the security apparatus against demonstrations. This repression even led to the deaths of a number of protestors. Moreover, new legislation was passed to further restrict the right of Iraqis to protest and express their opinions freely.43 On the one-year anniversary of the repression of protests which had occurred in the capital on February 25, 2011, security forces attempted to prevent demonstrators from reaching Liberation Square by closing the roads leading to it, claiming that explosives had been planted and that terrorists were present in the area surrounding the square. In order to frighten away protestors who approached the square, members of the security forces stated that they had a long list of individuals wanted for arrest and required that those who wished to pass through the square show their identity cards to see if their names were on the list. Journalists were prevented from entering the square with cameras, recorders, or even mobile phones, and some of them were detained briefly on charges of having “breached the regulations for protests” and “entered forbidden areas.”44 The security authorities also prohibited the Communist Party from organizing an assembly and a march in the capital on the occasion of the International Workers’ Day on May 1.45 In the Kurdish region, similar protests in February were subjected to more violent forms of repression. Protestors in Suleimaniyah were subjected to beatings, arrests, and brief periods in detention, and media professionals were attacked and their equipment confiscated.46 In southern Iraq, repressive measures were taken to confront activists, union members, and workers in the field of oil production following a series of protests against the poor living conditions of workers. These measures included punishments of arbitrary transfers, dismissals, financial penalties, and travel restrictions. On April 17, 26 workers at the Maysan Oil Company 43 For more information about the repression of 2011 protests and the draft law, see CIHRS annual report 2011, “Fractured Walls, New Horizons,” (252) were arrested in southern Iraq following their participation in a protest against corruption.47 During the month of September, the armed forces closed a number of night clubs based on orders from Nouri al-Maliki, who is considered the head of the armed forces. The office of al-Maliki justified these actions as coming in response to judicial orders and complaints of citizens who had been negatively affected by the presence of bars, restaurants, and night clubs in their areas of residence, as such establishments contradict the prevalent social traditions, morals, and values. However, the High Judicial Council denied having any link to these measures or having issued any judicial orders on the matter.48 Establishing Political Parties There continues to be no legal framework in Iraq to govern the work of political parties despite the existence of over 500 political parties, most of which were established following the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Last year, the government prepared a draft law to govern political parties, yet the parliament has yet to adopt it. In contradiction of democratic standards, this draft law includes restrictions that hinder the freedom to establish and take part in the activities of political parties. The law imposes severe penalties for those who fail to abide by these restrictions, including dissolution of the party by judicial order.49 Among the draft law’s restrictions to the freedom to establish political parties is the condition that the party’s program must differ from the programs of other parties. This closely resembles the Egyptian law on political parties, which was annulled following the ouster of Mubarak and 47 Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, “No Trials, No Sanctions, No Fines Targeting Unionists, and No Governmental Intervention in Iraqi Unions Elections!” Jun. 14, 2012, (253) which was formerly used as a pretext to reject requests to establish parties in Egypt. The draft law further stipulates that the founders or leaders of any party must not include anyone who was proven to have called for, participated in, or circulated ideas which contradict the general principles of the constitution. This represents a blatant violation of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to criticize constitutional texts and principles and to call for their amendment or annulment. The draft law imposes a 10- year prison sentence on those who establish, lead, belong to, or fund any unlicensed political party which espouses ideas that undermine the provisions of the constitution. Another unjustified restriction requires at least 2,000 founding members for the establishment of a party, with not less than 100 founding members residing in each of at least six different governorates of the country. Although the draft law grants the administrative courts and the Federal Supreme Court the authority to rule on requests to establish parties and on cases filed to dissolve them or suspend their activities, it also allows for the courts to review requests to establish parties in private sessions if deemed necessary due to considerations of public interest, public order, or public morality. The draft law also introduces a “Political Parties Affairs Department” under the Justice Ministry to be responsible for following the activities of political parties and to evaluate their compliance with the law. This department is mandated to investigate breaches to the law committed by political parties and to present appeals to decisions related to political parties to the appropriate courts. Thus, the draft law essentially places political parties under the oversight of the executive. A more acceptable alternative would have been for the draft law to provide for the formation of an independent commission to deal with the affairs of political parties. Arbitrary Arrest and Torture The security apparatus continued to arrest those suspected of acts hostile to the government. In many cases, detainees are detained in unknown locations for long periods of time, often without being presented with formal charges or brought before a court. At the beginning of the year, it was reported that some 12,000 detainees were being held without trial in prisons under the (254) control of the Ministry of Justice alone. Further prisoners continued to be held in detention centers under the supervision of the police and the army.50 In May it was reported that a large number of those who had belonged to the now-dissolved Baath Party remained in detention. It is important to note that security campaigns rounded up nearly 1,500 former Baath members in October and November 2011, based on allegations that they were conspiring against the government. These measures were not subject to judicial oversight.51 Immediately prior to the Arab Summit in Baghdad, a wave of arrests in March resulted in the preventive detention of 532 individuals, according to security reports presented to the parliament. It is believed that many were targeted simply for having been arrested previously.52 Although the authorities had announced the closure of the infamous prison at Camp Ashraf in March 2011, rights sources indicated that some of those detained during the security campaign against the Baathists and the wave of arrests which preceded the Arab Summit were indeed held in the camp’s prison. It is important to note that the Camp Ashraf prison had been under the oversight of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces rather than the Ministry of Justice. Other prisons also exist that are not under the administration of the Ministry of Justice, including the Muthanna airport prison.53 Reports asserted that Iraq continues to maintain a number of secret detention facilities run by the security forces. The detention centers are not subject to judicial oversight, nor are lawyers allowed to contact the detainees held at these sites. It is likely that detainees in these facilities are subjected to torture.54 Serious questions were raised over whether the death of Amer Seriut Zeidan al-Batawi, who was the bodyguard of former vice president Tarek al- Hashmi, resulted from torture. Al-Batawi had been held in detention for about three months after having been charged of committing acts of terrorism. When his body was received by his family on March 20, it bore clear signs of torture, including on sensitive areas of the body. Burns and 50 Amnesty International, “Annual Report 2012; Iraq,” (255) cuts were visible on various parts of his body, and he had lost 17 kilograms while in custody.55 It is important to mention that an arrest warrant had been issued for Tarek al- Hashmi in December 2011 based on charges related to murder and leading death squads. Al-Hashmi had fled to the Kurdish region and then to Turkey. The Iraqi Criminal Court issued death sentences against him in three separate cases.56 It is also important to note that during the first ten months of 2012, 119 people were sentenced to death for criminal offenses, many related to state security or terrorism. These sentences are even graver in light of the fact that trials in Iraq do not meet fair trial standards, the judiciary lacks independence, and torture is frequently used to extract confessions.57 55 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Investigate Death of VP’s Bodyguard in Custody,” Mar. 23, 2012, (256) Lebanon Lebanon has a constitutional parliamentary system of governance in which the Lebanese Parliament is the only institution elected directly by the people. The assembly elects the president, who appoints the prime minister following consultations with parliamentarians. The distribution of certain government posts is subject to a religious, sectarian quota system: the president must be a Maronite Christian, the speaker of the assembly a Shiite Muslim, and the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. Under the Taif Accords of 1989, which put an end to the civil war (1975-1990), the parliament is divided equally between Muslims and Christians, with proportional representation based both on confessions within each religion and on geographic areas. Despite the appearance of party pluralism, all political parties are sectarian based, even though their political and sectarian interests require them to engage in cross-confessional alliances. Although the Taif Accords stipulated full state sovereignty over all of Lebanese territory and the dissolution and disarmament of all militias, the state has been unable to achieve this. For one, Syria maintained a military presence in the country from 1976 to 2005, during which time Syria supported certain groups for political reasons and pitted the various sects against each other. In addition, the Shiite group Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, has used the Arab-Israeli conflict as grounds to forestall any attempt to disarm it, claiming to be resisting Israeli (257) threats and fighting to liberate Lebanese territory. Ultimately, Hezbollah has become a state within a state, able to deter and intimidate its domestic opponents and even state institutions by force of arms, which gravely undermines the institutions of the state as established by law and indeed the rule of law itself. During the limited times in which Lebanon has experienced relative political stability, freedom of expression and other public liberties have been allowed to flourish, especially as compared to many Arab countries. These freedoms tend to be greatly eroded, however, in times of major political crises, which rapidly assume sectarian dimensions. These crises are exacerbated by the fact that domestic politics have been and continue to be held hostage to the conflicts and calculations of regional and international players. Over the past seven years, specifically since the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the head of the Sunni Future movement, human rights in Lebanon have faced setbacks due to the political and confessional polarization that has divided the country into two opposing camps on multiple issues. Most significant among these issues is seeking justice for the Hariri assassination and the string of bombings and assassinations that largely targeted figures affiliated with the Sunni movement and its allies, as well as international resolutions that ended the Syrian military and intelligence presence in Lebanon and required Hezbollah to turn in its weapons to the Lebanese army. The political crisis around these issues threatened renewed civil war in 2008 after Hezbollah deployed across Beirut and turned its so-called weapons of resistance against their domestic political opponents and other Lebanese. Hezbollah has also challenged orders issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the international court established by the United Nations to investigate the Hariri assassination, by refusing to turn over Hezbollah members indicted by the tribunal. Indeed, Hezbollah threatened to reignite civil war if groups opposed to it continued to support the international tribunal or to demand an end to the state’s parallel power structures and the disarmament of Hezbollah. This crisis paralyzed the states institutions, as established by the constitution, for a long period. Given the balance of power between the two main political camps, those responsible for grave abuses committed since the Hariri assassination enjoy ongoing impunity. Although Syria no longer maintains a military presence in the country, Damascus continues to exert significant political influence through Lebanese parties closely aligned with the Syrian government and to prevent accountability for violations that occurred during the Syrian presence in Lebanon as well as the disclosure of the fates of thousands of people who disappeared during this period. (258) Throughout the year 2012, human rights were further eroded as the political and sectarian divisions in Lebanon between parties close to the Syrian regime and those opposed to it sharpened due to the deterioration of the popular uprising in Syria into an internal armed conflict. 2012 saw the worst sectarian clashes since Hezbollah occupied Beirut in 2008, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. Dozens of Syrian nationals were abducted as revenge for the abduction and disappearance of Lebanese in Syria, while pro-Assad parties in Lebanon were accused of attacking the homes of Syrians residing in Lebanon who support the Syrian opposition. Journalists, media figures, and media outlets were also attacked due to their positions on these events or to their coverage of the clashes. In this context, the Lebanese army assumed more control over political life and the public sphere, which resulted in additional human rights violations by the military. Among these violations were severe and at times violent security measures taken against the camps of Palestinian and other refugees as well as the increased use of military courts to try civilians, including several human rights defenders. Attempts to end impunity saw no progress in 2012, particularly with regards to holding those responsible for the Hariri assassination and the subsequent assassinations and bombings to account. Complaints of poor prison conditions continue to be recorded, and journalists, bloggers, and artists remain targeted by security harassment and prosecution, which reflects a growing intolerance for freedom of expression, independent media, and creative freedom. The Impact of the Syrian Uprising on Peace in Lebanon In May, security personnel in civilian clothes arrested Lebanese Islamist activist Shadi al-Mawlawi, a vocal supporter of the Syrian opposition, in Tripoli, sparking sectarian clashes which lasted for several days in several Tripoli neighborhoods and left 24 people dead and over 90 injured.1 On May 13, al-Mawlawi appeared before a military court in Beirut, where he and five others were charged with belonging to a terrorist group.2 The military court 1 The Gulf and Middle East Association for Civil Society, “Lubnan: al-munazzama tudin a’mal al-‘unf fi Tarabulus wa Bayrut,” May 23, 2012, released al-Mawlawi on bail on May 22 and banned him from travel until the completion of the investigation.3 On May 20, a Sunni cleric known for his support of the Syrian opposition was killed along with a man who was traveling with him when Lebanese soldiers shot them at a checkpoint in the Akkar region in northern Lebanon.4 The incident stoked sectarian tensions between Sunnis, the Lebanese army, and other political factions. Beirut saw armed clashes between the Future movement, loyal to former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri and opposed to the Syrian regime, and the pro-Syrian “Arab Movement” led by Shaker Berjawi, which left three people dead and 18 injured.5 On June 3, unknown persons torched and destroyed shops owned by Alawites in the al-Tabana, Baal al- Darawish, and Azmi Street areas of Tripoli.6 According to unconfirmed news reports, clashes were renewed on July 27 between Sunni and Alawite groups in Tripoli when two Alawites heading to the Alawite-majority area of Jabal Mohsen only minutes before the end of the fast were attacked by unknown persons between Jabal Mohsen and al- Qubba, a Sunni-majority area; the assailants beat and stabbed the Alawites, after which the two were taken to a hospital. Clashes immediately erupted between residents of the two areas and spread to al-Tabana, another Sunni- majority area, ultimately injuring 15, among them three soldiers.7 On August 20, the same areas saw further clashes, this time involving the use of mortars, snipers, and both light and heavy automatic weapons; 5 were killed and 50 injured. Army units stepped in and opened fire at the sources of 3 Al-Hayat, “al-Qada’ al-Lubnani yukhli bi-kafala Shadi al-Mawlawi,” May 23, 2012, gunfire to suppress it.8 Clashes erupted once more on August 23, and four more people were killed, including a Sunni cleric. Seven Alawite-owned shops were torched in Sunni-majority neighborhoods, and 41 people were injured, including soldiers.9 Syrian nationals in Lebanon were kidnapped in retribution for similar abductions of Lebanese in Syria. Members of Lebanon’s Miqdad family claimed responsibility for the abductions of dozens of Syrians and a Turkish national, claiming that these acts came in response to the kidnapping of one of their family members, Hassan al-Miqdad, in Syria on August 13 by a group claiming to be allied to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In a televised statement on August 16, a representative of the previously unknown group “Mukhtar al-Thaqafi” - thought to have been formed in response to the abduction to 11 Lebanese Shiites in Syria on May 22 - said that the group had carried out retaliatory kidnappings and would target Syrians who supported the opposition or the FSA. The Lebanese authorities took no action to apprehend the kidnappers.10 At least seven Syrians and Lebanese were also subjected to kidnappings near the Syrian border in northern Lebanon after Lebanese Alawites abducted a Sunni Lebanese supporter of the Syrian uprising, sparking a series of retaliatory kidnappings between the two sides on June 9-10.11 On October 19, a bombing took place in Sassine Square in the densely populated Achrafieh quarter of east Beirut targeting Brigadier General Wisam al-Hassan, head of the information division in the Internal Security Forces, killing three people, among them al-Hassan and his driver, injuring dozens more,12 and leaving hundreds homeless. Armed clashes broke out in 8 al-Hayat, “Qatla wa jarha bi-ishtibakat fi Tarabulus,” Aug. 22, 2012, Beirut and Tripoli following the incident that left at least five dead and dozens injured.13 Aside from his important role in Lebanese intelligence, al- Hassan had also been close to the March 14 coalition, which opposes the Assad regime and Hezbollah, and to the Hariri family, which leads the Future movement. Only a few months before al-Hassan’s assassination, the division he headed had played an important role in exposing an attempt to smuggle explosives from Syria to Lebanon. These events lead to the arrest of former Information Minister Michel Samaha, who is close to the Syrian regime. Samaha was charged with complicity in a smuggling attempt. Al- Hassan’s division also played a prominent role in the investigations into the Hariri assassination.14 Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression Restrictions on freedom of expression in Lebanon increased in 2012, as journalists, bloggers, and artists were targeted by ongoing security harassment and prosecution. Some were physically assaulted by unknown assailants amid the increasing political and sectarian polarization in Lebanon over the Syrian conflict. On April 9, a Lebanese photographer with the al-Jadid television channel, Ali Shaaban, was shot in the chest and killed when the Syrian border patrol opened fire on the car of the television crew with which he was working close to the Syrian border in northern Lebanon. The official Syrian media claimed that the Syrian forces had first come under fire from armed terrorist groups.15 On May 15, Suheib Ayoub, a journalist with al-Mukhtar online and a photographer with al-Nahar, was attacked by demonstrators in Tripoli while photographing the events. The demonstrators held him for several hours, confiscated his two cameras, and forced him to erase the photos he had taken.16 Will Hold despite Blow,” Oct. 23, 2012, On May 17, a film crew with Russia Today was attacked at an army checkpoint by unknown persons while covering protests in northern Lebanon following the death of Sheikh Ahmed Abd al-Wahed, known for his support of the Syrian revolution, and his colleague Mohammed Murib. Cameraman Omar Khadaj sustained bruising on his face and head as a result of the assault.17 On May 20, journalists and camera crews with several news outlets were assaulted and threatened by unknown persons as they covered renewed clashes in northern Lebanon between Sunnis and Alawites. The al-Jadid television crew was also attacked on the al-Abda road.18 On June 2, Afifi Diab, al-Akhbar’s correspondent in the Beqaa, was beaten by unknown persons in Shatoura because of an article he wrote entitled, “Ziad al-Homsi: You Are a Traitor.” Diab said that he had previously received threats due to his coverage of the al-Homsi case. Al-Homsi was released a week before the assault, after the military appellate court reduced his sentence; he had been imprisoned on charges of dealing with Israel.19 On June 10, Ghada Francis, a correspondent with al-Jadid, was beaten while covering internal elections of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Duhour al-Shuweir.20 On June 18, a photographer with al-Manar, Khidr Markiz, was assaulted by unknown persons while covering protests by families of Lebanese nationals kidnapped in Syria which were taking place on the road to the Beirut airport.21 On June 25, al-Jadid channel itself was attacked by five masked men who opened fire in front of the building and threw Molotovs at it, starting a fire in the entrance.22 The previous day, the channel had hosted Sunni Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir, who pledged to defend Sunni interests and fiercely criticized Hezbollah, its secretary-general, and Speaker of the Assembly 17 Russia Today Arabic, “Fariq Rusiya al-yawm yata’arrad li-l-i’tida’ min qibl musallahin majhulin,” May 17, 2012, Nabih Berri.23 Citizens managed to apprehend one of the assailants, yet local residents subsequently held a sit-in in solidarity with him. While covering the sit-in, a cameraman with Lebanon Television, Mohammed Rahma, was physically and verbally assaulted and his camera confiscated.24 On June 25, military intelligence arrested Jordanian film director Sandra Madi in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Tripoli while she was interviewing a Palestinian youth.25 She was released four hours later, after the investigator threatened to arrest her again if she continued her work in Lebanon.26 Madi is the director of “Nahr al-Barid: Detention Camp,” in which she documented the humanitarian and economic conditions of the camp both before and after its partial destruction in 2007. After the first screening of the film, she stated that she had smuggled her camera equipment into the camp and used hidden cameras to get her footage. On July 26, police assaulted Mahmoud al-Zayyat, a correspondent with al- Diyar, Voice of the People radio, and AFP, and Jamal al-Gharbi, a journalist with al-Bana and a correspondent for al-Mayadin channel, while they were filming clashes between citizens and supporters of Sheikh Ahmed al-Asir in front of the Bilal Bin Ribah Mosque in Tyre.27 On July 29, Diya Abu Taam, a correspondent with al-Manar, was beaten and cursed by military intelligence personnel in the Zouq Masbah region of Mt. Lebanon while filming in a coastal area adjacent to a military facility.28 On August 28, an MTV film crew was attacked by unknown persons while filming sectarian clashes in Tripoli.29 On August 30, independent journalist Rami Aysha was detained with two others in southern Beirut by Hezbollah militiamen and held without charge 23 Maharat Foundation, “Maharat tastankir al-i’tida’ ‘ala qanat al-jadid wa tad’u ila himayat al-mu’assasat al-i’lamiya,” June 26, 2012, at the al-Qubba Prison until September 26, when he was released on bail.30 Upon his arrest, Aysha had been brutally beaten before being taken to the military police center in Beirut, where he was beaten again. Aysha had been covering the situation in Syria since the beginning of the uprising and the emergence of the FSA and had published several investigative pieces on weapons smuggling between Lebanon and Syria.31 In relation to religious pressures to curb creative freedoms, on May 21, a screening of the film “Maxi Skirt,” by director Joe Bueid, was suspended due to pressure from the Catholic Media Center; the film was not screened until several scenes had been altered or cut.32 A scene from the comedic film “To Baalbek” was also censored by general security following a request from the Internal Security Forces, which considered the scene insulting, as it portrayed a bearded policeman soliciting a bribe from a citizen in exchange for passage through a security checkpoint on the way to the Baalbek fortress.33 On November 14, the Beirut Appeals Court dropped obscenity charges which had been brought against comedian Edmond Haddad and actress Rawiya al-Shab due to a scene in a play they presented in December 2009.34 Previously, the first-instance court had convicted them and sentenced them both to one month in prison.35 Some political activists and rights advocates also faced legal action due to their expression of opinions or their disclosure of information on prison conditions. On February 8, activist Ali Aqil Khalil was referred to military trial on charges of supplying the media with fabricated information, after he released photos and reports on torture and poor conditions in the Roumieh Prison during a press conference on June 26, 2011, the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. The military court sentenced him to two months in prison and a fine of 600,000 Lebanese lira.36 On April 22, 30 Skeyes, “Ikhla’ sabil al-sahafi Rami ‘Isha bi-kafalat milyun lira,” Sep. 26, 2012, Mahmoud al-Adawi, a member of the Committee to Care for Prisoners and Their Families, appeared before a military court on charges of facilitating an attempted escape from the Roumieh Prison, which he had visited. Al-Adawi was denied an attorney during questioning, and his family was not permitted to visit him before his transfer to the al-Qubba Prison in Tripoli.37 Similarly, it was feared that Saadeddine Shatila, the representative of Alkarama in Lebanon, would be referred to military trial after a military court questioned him on charges of publishing information that defames the army. The charges against Shatila were dropped in February 2012.38 On April 14, an assassination attempt was made against political activist Mustafa Juha, the coordinator for the Lebanese Sovereignty Movement, when unknown assailants opened fire on his car on the al-Damour highway, 20 km south of the capital; five bullets hit his car. Juha believes that the assassination attempt was politically motivated, as it came only a short time after the 20th anniversary of the assassination of his father, who was known for his anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian writings. At the time of the assassination attempt, Juha was in the midst of reprinting two of his father’s books in memory of his death, the perpetrators of which were never identified despite investigations into the incident.39 Following the assassination attempt, Juha requested asylum in Sweden.40 On April 20, the military police arrested activists Khodor Salameh and Ali Fakhri after they drew a ’Permanent Revolution’ graffiti in Bechara Al- Khoury Square in Beirut. The two activists were released late the following evening after a sit-in was held in solidarity with them. Those holding the sit- in were beaten and cursed by security forces, who also injured two photographers and broke their cameras.41 majlis huquq al-insan al-dawriya 19,” On June 15, the website of the Palestinian Human Rights Foundation (Monitor) was hacked, bringing down some of its pages.42 Abdulaziz Tarakji, the chair of the association’s board of directors, was also threatened and slandered via phone and email and subjected to an attempted abduction and assault near a security office in Tyre. The Monitor accused employees with the Palestinian embassy in Beirut of being responsible for these attacks.43 Status of Prisoners and Detainees Reports documented dismal prison conditions in Lebanon, including the spread of disease due to poor ventilation, and complaints continued to surface of insufficient health services, including access to doctors and medicine. For instance, the Roumieh Prison has only one doctor in the prison, which holds 4,000 inmates,44 and since 2007 more than 50 of its prisoners have died due to inadequate healthcare. Prisons are also overcrowded due to slow trials and arbitrary provisional detention, with 65 percent of prisoners being held without trial.45 On June 19, 14 Islamists were released after spending five years in prison without trial; they were among some 140 Islamists detained following fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp between the Lebanese army and the Fath al-Islam organization in 2008.46 Previously, two prisoners had died and 45 injured on April 6, 2011 when Internal Security Forces and the army stormed Roumieh Prison after four 42 Skeyes, “Qarsanat al-mawqa’ al-ilaktruni li-l-jam’iya al-Filistiniya li-huquq al-insan,” June 18, 2012, days of riots by prisoners demanding improved conditions and shorter pretrial detention periods.47 Status of Refugees and Migrant Workers in Lebanon The condition of Palestinian refugees did not improve in 2012. Strict security at the entrances to the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp remained in place and continued to be a source of tension, at times leading to violent clashes with army forces that resulted in a number of casualties. Increased repression was also reported against non-Palestinian refugees and migrants, including attacks on Egyptian and Syrian workers and Sudanese refugees. For more than five years, the army has imposed severe restrictions on the movements of residents of Palestinian refugee camps and visitors to them, following clashes between Fath al-Islam and the Lebanese army on May 20, 2007. Residents of the camp must show a blue identity card and permit to enter the camp. Further, they are not permitted to undertake reconstruction to buildings in the camp themselves, which has severely hindered their efforts to rebuild.48 The strict security measures have worsened the living conditions of camp residents and led them to increasingly resort to violence. On June 15, the army and camp residents clashed after the army attempted to detain a Palestinian riding a motorbike without legal papers. Ahmed al-Qassem, age 18, was killed, several people were injured, and a number of young camp residents were arrested.49 Three days later, the army again opened fire during unrest following al-Qassem’s funeral procession, which led to the death of another Palestinian, Fouad Mohi al-Din al-Loubani.50 On April 29, clashes erupted between dozens of Egyptian workers and police, who used force to disperse the workers, who had been demonstrating in front of the Egyptian embassy in protest of a Lebanese law requiring migrant workers to have a local sponsor to obtain residency and a work 47 Human Rights Watch, “Lebanon: Prison Deaths, Injuries Need Independent Investigation,” Apr. 8, 2011, permit. Twenty people were injured in the clashes and 19 Egyptian workers were arrested. After intimating that seven of them would be referred to a military court on charges of attempting to kill military personnel,51 the authorities released them on May 2.52 On June 11, 21 Sudanese refugees staged a hunger strike in front of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Beirut demanding a swifter resettlement process due to the hardships they face in Lebanon, including expulsion from various cities, arbitrary detention, and illegal repatriation. In addition, they face difficulty finding adequately paid work and their children cannot attend school, since they lack legal residency permits. Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and thus treats refugees as illegal immigrants.53 On October 7, the army attacked 72 migrant workers from Syria, Egypt, and Sudan, storming their living quarters in Beirut and beating them brutally,54 after receiving a complaint from neighbors accusing them of harassing girls and bothering local residents.55 51 Al-Jazeera, “Jarha fi ihtijaj Misriyin bi-Lubnan,” Apr. 29, 2012, (270) The Occupied Palestinian Territories The Palestinian people continued to be subjected to various abuses by the Israeli occupation forces as well as by both parties of the Palestinian Authority (PA): Fatah and Hamas. Particularly since 2007, the political discord between the latter two has led to the erosion of human rights, as each has acted within its sphere of influence to seek retribution against persons, civil society groups, and media thought to be loyal to the other party. In recent years, this has meant that Hamas supporters have been subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, and ill treatment in the West Bank, while Fatah supporters have suffered the same fate in the Gaza Strip. Despite the finalization of a national reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas under Egyptian auspices in May 2011, this did not lead to a national unity government able to put an end to Palestinian factionalism, although both parties had agreed to authorize the Palestinian president to form this government. Nor was the reconciliation agreement accompanied by any practical measures on either side to foster public liberties, stop assaults on citizens’ rights, and end politically motivated detentions. In fact, throughout 2012 the suppression of citizens’ right to freedom of assembly and peaceful protest continued, both by the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Journalists and media professionals also faced assault and arrest and were prevented from doing their jobs by both sides. (271) Due to the lack of transparency and the denial of both Fatah and Hamas that political detentions occur, there is little information on the number of detainees held by either party. As such, it is difficult to assess the general amnesty announced by Hamas late last year, which was ostensibly meant to cover many Fatah loyalists. In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip the torture and ill treatment of detainees continued, leading to deaths in detention facilities in some cases. Arbitrary death sentences were handed down to several persons, and cases of extrajudicial killings of people accused of collaborating with the enemy were also documented. Although Israel implemented its unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, it continues to exercise absolute control over Gaza’s airspace and its sea and land borders. As an occupying power, Israel is thus obligated to comply with international humanitarian law in its conduct and practices toward Gaza. However, Israeli violations of international law in the occupied Palestinian territories became more violent, especially against residents of Gaza. Israel is aided in this by the chronic failure of the international community to achieve a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to hold Israel to account for crimes committed against the Palestinian people. In 2012, Israel continued to attack and kill civilians and destroy their property in the Gaza Strip: in mid-November, Israeli forces carried out an eight-day assault on the area that killed 156 people, including 103 civilians, a quarter of whom were children under the age of ten. Israel continued its collective punishment of the population of the Gaza Strip through maintaining its siege on the area into its sixth year, while Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem displaced even more Palestinians. Thousands of Palestinian detainees suffer various abuses in Israeli prisons, particularly solitary confinement and the prohibition of visits, while hundreds of Palestinians are detained without charge or trial. The Israeli authorities also used excessive force to suppress protests, leading to the deaths of several persons. Israeli attacks extended to journalists and media crews, some of whom were arrested and prosecuted, while the offices of several media outlets in the West Bank were raided. In 2012 the UN General Assembly approved a resolution recognizing the statehood of Palestine and giving Palestine non-member observer status in the UN. This resolution allows Palestine to ratify the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, and other international treaties and conventions related to human rights and international humanitarian law. Ratification of these treaties would provide stronger guarantees for (272) international justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Israel and the Palestinian authorities.1 I. Human Rights Violations Committed by the Israeli Occupation Authorities Assaults on Civilians and Extrajudicial Killings In 2012, Israeli occupation forces routinely targeted civilians and their property in missile and artillery attacks in various areas of the Gaza Strip, while also continuing extrajudicial killings by assassinating those it considers to be involved in military actions against Israel. These attacks reached their peak with Israel’s military offensive on Gaza – known as Operation Pillar of Cloud – which began with the assassination of Ahmed al- Jabari, a Hamas military leader. The subsequent eight days of shelling killed at least 156 people, among them 103 civilians, and injured 1,000 others, among them 971 civilians; three journalists were killed,2 as were 41 children, among them 21 under the age of ten.3 126 homes were completely destroyed and 1,985 others partially destroyed, while 244 public facilities were damaged, including 15 hospitals and health centers, 90 schools, and 14 media outlets.4 In the first six months of 2012, more than five assassination operations were carried out, killing 7 and injuring 18. In the same period, missile and artillery 1 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “CIHRS: The State of Palestine Should Ratify Human Rights Treaties; Israel Must End Retributive Acts,” Dec. 13, 2012, (273) fire in various areas of the Gaza Strip killed 29 people, among them three children, while ten others were killed during attempts to prevent Israel from imposing buffer zones on Gaza’s eastern and northern borders.5 In September and October, 22 people were killed in missile and artillery attacks on various areas of the Gaza Strip.6 Arbitrary Detention and the Status of Prisoners Although 2011 saw the release of nearly 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, detained by Hamas, the frequency of arrests made by Israeli forces increased in 2012, particularly in the West Bank. Some Gazans were also abducted and detained, especially when attempting to cross the borders, while several prisoners released as part of the Shalit deal were re-detained. Some 900 people were detained in the first three months of 2012, bringing the total number of Palestinians in Israeli prisons to nearly 4,700, among them 185 children, 320 administrative detainees, 27 members of the Palestinian parliament, and several former ministers.7 Some 2,000 detainees organized a hunger strike8 seeking an end to abuses in prisons, especially the denial of medical care, torture, strip searches, beatings, spraying with nerve gas, and the denial of visits and the delivery of clothes and blankets.9 5 Mezan, “Min al-maydan: taqrir maydani hawl intihakat huquq al-insan al-Isra’iliya fi qata’ Ghazza: taqrir al-nasf al-ula min al-‘am 2012,” May 3, 2012, (274) Although the Israeli authorities administering the prisons agreed to permit visits to detainees following the strike, based on an agreement brokered by the Egyptian government, Israel did not fully apply the terms and allowed only a very small number of visits, subjecting visitors to degrading search procedures and halting visits completely in early November.10 The occupation authorities have prohibited visits to Gaza detainees since June 2007.11 Although the latest prisoner deal stipulated an end to solitary confinement of prisoners and no renewals of administrative detention orders except in cases where new intelligence justified the measure, the occupation authorities nevertheless reinstated both solitary confinement and administrative detention, leading several prisoners to launch renewed hunger strikes.12 In June, the occupation authorities released five Palestinian MPs; 22 MPs remained in Israeli prisons, 19 of them Hamas members. The other three were Ahmed Saadat, the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and prominent Fatah MPs Marwan al-Barghouti and Jamal al-Tirawi.13 On November 23, the occupation authorities arrested six additional Palestinian MPs, among them Dr. Mahmoud Ahmed Abd al-Rahman al- Rimhi, the assembly secretary, and Bassem Ahmed al-Zaarir, both of whom were given six-month administrative detention orders.14 (275) Siege and Collective Punishment of Gaza For the sixth year in a row, the occupation authorities exercised collective punishment on the residents of the Gaza Strip by maintaining the siege by which they impede the movement of people and goods, including the import of basic foodstuffs, fuel, medicine and medical equipment, construction materials, and sanitation materials. Fishermen are also prohibited from pursuing their livelihood due to the naval siege, which limits fishing to an area 3 miles off the coast; violators are arrested or shot. The ceasefire between Israel and the Hamas government, reached under Egyptian auspices after the offensive on Gaza in November 2012, did not lead to an opening of the Israeli-controlled border crossings to facilitate the entry and exit of people and goods. The export ban on goods produced in the Gaza Strip— both to the West Bank and the wider world—continued, with the exception of a very small quantity of agricultural products. The land crossing at Rafah remains the exception, as since May 2011 the Egyptian authorities have increased its hours of operation and permitted men aged 18-40 to obtain visas.15 Settlement Expansion The Israeli occupation authorities continued to disregard the international ban on establishing settlements in occupied territory, as per the Fourth Geneva Convention. As a result of settlement expansion, more Palestinians were displaced from land that Israel seeks to annex to its settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Israel announced its intention to evacuate 13 Palestinian villages in Mt. Hebron in order to expand the existing Israeli settlement there and establish a closed military zone. If implemented, the plan will leave 1,650 Palestinians homeless.16 In addition, in late November Israel declared that it would build 3,000 additional housing units in new or existing settlements in the West (276) Bank, which will displace 20 Palestinian communities, or approximately 2,300 people.17 Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression On February 29, Israeli occupation forces raided the offices of Quds Educational Television, Watan Television, and the Watan online news service in Ramallah. At Watan Television, four staff members were detained for more than two hours while broadcast equipment, computers, and important documents were confiscated. Israel claimed that Watan had been broadcasting in contravention of the law, despite the fact that it had been granted a license by the PA.18 Israel also claimed that the both Quds Educational Television and Watan Television had used frequencies that interfered with broadcasters and communication in Israel, which the PA spokesman denied.19 The offices of the Hona al-Quds news agency in Jerusalem were also raided during the agency’s inauguration on April 12; the celebration was canceled because of PA sponsorship.20 In January, Israeli intelligence summoned journalist Rassem Obeidat and issued an order prohibiting him from entering the West Bank for seven months on the pretext of “maintaining state security.” Obeidat was scheduled to take part in a radio program in the West Bank on issues specific to Jerusalem.21 The Ofer Court in Israel sentenced journalist Suhaib al-Asa, a correspondent for Bethlehem Radio and al-Jazeera Talk, to four months in prison; al-Asa 17 Amnesty International, “Israel Must Halt Construction of West Bank Settlements,” Dec. 3, 2012, (277) had been arrested on February 5 in eastern Bethlehem and subjected to a lengthy interrogation regarding the nature of his work as a journalist. He was released on May 21, 2012.22 On May 17, Israeli occupation forces arrested Bahaa Moussa, the director of the Palestinian satellite channel The Prisoner after raiding his home and confiscating equipment, material, and information about the channel.23 Numerous journalists and photographers were assaulted while covering the suppression of demonstrations. On January 27, photographer Muhib al- Barghouti was shot in both legs during a march in Bilin against the separation wall. His colleague, photographer Mohammed Atiya al-Tamimi, was injured in a similar march in the West Bank village of Nabi Saleh.24 In early December, Israeli soldiers assaulted four Palestinian journalists and forced them to strip down to their underwear and to kneel on the ground with their hands behind their heads. The journalists were detained at a military checkpoint in Hebron while on their way to cover the death of a Palestinian who had been shot by an Israeli soldier with the Border Guard. Their vehicle was marked “television,” and two of the journalists were wearing jackets marked “press.” Two of the journalists worked with Reuters, the third worked with the Hamas-affiliated al-Quds Television, and the fourth is a freelance journalist. Israeli soldiers also arrested four journalists after preventing them from covering clashes between soldiers and Palestinian demonstrators during the funeral procession of the Palestinian who had died. The four journalists work with the Associated Press, the European News Agency, AFP, and Reuters.25 Suppression of Peaceful Protests Israeli occupation forces used excessive force when confronting peaceful protests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to deaths on several occasions. On February 24, Talaat Ramiya was killed when Israeli occupation forces shot him while he was taking part in a peaceful march at the entrance to al- 22 SKeyes, “al-Quwwat al-Isra’iliya tufrij ‘an al-sahafi Suhayb al-‘Asa,” May 23, 2012, (278) Ram, located north of Jerusalem, in protest of attempts to storm al-Aqsa Mosque. On March 5, Mohammed Abu Awwad, age 19, was shot and killed while participating in a march organized by a school in Birzeit to commemorate the anniversary of the death of six members of one family who had been killed when their car crashed into an Israeli military jeep.26 In the Gaza Strip, Mahmoud Zaqout was killed on March 30 when occupation forces opened fire on hundreds of demonstrators who gathered west of Beit Hanoun, near the separation barrier, to commemorate Land Day. Others were injured in a similar assembly held near the border with Israel through the use of tear gas grenades, rubber bullets, and live ammunition by occupation forces.27 Harassment of Human Rights Defenders Occupation forces imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of several human rights defenders inside the West Bank. Abdullatif Ghaith, the president of Addameer, received an order in August 2012 banning him from travel abroad until January 2013. He had previously been summoned for questioning by Israeli intelligence in Jerusalem, ostensibly because he constitutes a threat to state security. Ghaith, a resident of East Jerusalem, had previously been banned from entering the West Bank, where the Addameer offices are located, pursuant to six-month ban issued in October 2011 which was extended for an additional six months in April 2012. Shaawan Jabbarin, the director of al-Haq in Ramallah, was banned from leaving the West Bank from 2006 until 2012, after which point he has still been required to obtain permission from the Israeli authorities prior to travel.28 The occupation authorities have banned Addameer lawyers from visiting their detained clients, and Ayman Nasser, a lawyer and researcher with 26 PCHR, “Intihakat quwwat al-ihtilal al-Isra’ili li-l-haqq fi-l-tajammu’ al-silmi fi-l-ard al- Filistiniya al-muhtalla min Yanayir 2011 ila Uktubir 2012.” 27 Ibid. 28 Frontline Defenders, “Israel/OPT: Travel Ban on Human Rights Defender Mr Abdullatif Ghaith,” Aug. 13, 2012, (279) Addameer, was tortured during a protracted interrogation after being detained by occupation forces on October 15.29 On December 11, Israeli forces raided the offices of three Palestinian NGOs in Ramallah—Addameer Prisoners Support Association, the Palestinian NGO Network, and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees—and confiscated their computers and files.30 During 2012, Israel made the unprecedented decision to freeze its relations and cooperation with the UN Human Rights Council after the council passed a resolution on March 19 condemning settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories and delegating an independent international fact- finding mission to investigate the settlement policy and its impact on the human rights of Palestinians. The Israeli government refused to allow any representatives of the council to visit Israel or the occupied territories. 31 The occupation authorities also continued their policy of limiting acts of international solidarity with the Palestinian people. Israel took measures to prevent the arrival of hundreds of international activists to the Palestinian territories on April 15, organized as part of the Welcome to Palestine Campaign. These measures included sending blacklists with solidarity activists’ names to airlines for the cancellation of their reservations. The Ben Gurion Airport was also put on high alert in preparation for the arrival of some of the activists, 31 of whom were detained and deported to their countries of origin.32 On August 26, the Israeli authorities prohibited dozens of activists with the same campaign from entering the West Bank through the al-Karama crossing on the Jordanian border.33 29 Amnesty International, “Israel Must Stop Attacks on Palestinian NGOs and Human Rights Defenders,” Dec. 11, 2012, (280) II. Violations by the Palestinian Authority (PA) Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Security and intelligence agencies of the PA in the West Bank and of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip continued to engage in arbitrary detention, political persecution, and torture. From January through November 2012, the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) received 652 complaints of illegal detention, 699 complaints related to torture and ill treatment in detention centers in the West Bank, and 291 similar complaints for the Gaza Strip.34 In late November, the Hamas government issued a blanket amnesty35 for cases related to the Fatah-Hamas dispute in 2007, including for six Fatah members. Nevertheless, Fatah denied that the amnesty had occurred and said that 70 of its members were still being detained by the Hamas government.36 According to Hamas, the amnesty included the return of 17 Fatah members who had left the Gaza Strip during the dispute and others may be allowed to return in increments; it was announced that nine other Fatah members who had nearly completed their sentences would also be released.37 The number of Hamas detainees in the West Bank also declined while Hamas supported the PA president’s bid at the UN.38 Nevertheless, the PA continues to hold 30 political prisoners affiliated with Hamas.39 PA security agencies carried out the biggest arrest campaign against members of Hamas in September, when the Preventive Security Agency and General Intelligence detained 71 Hamas members in various areas of the West Bank. The list of detainees included Fouad al-Khafash, the director of the Ahrar Center for Prisoner Studies, Walid Khaled Hussein, the director of 34 See the monthly reports issued by the ICHR, (281) Filistin in Salfit, and Sheikh Riyad Rashid al-Walwil.40 After the governor of Jenin, located in the northern West Bank, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in May, some 150 people were arrested, among them Zakaria Zubeidi, the former Aqsa Martyrs Brigades leader who helped establish the Freedom Theater and has staged plays critical of both the PA and the Israeli occupation.41 Zubeidi was placed in solitary for 50 days and denied contact with his lawyer, who was also detained for one week for insulting the prosecution and the Preventive Security Agency. Zubeidi was denied access to newspapers and television, forced to drink water from the toilet, restrained with his arms in painful positions for two days, and denied sleep. During this time, interrogators attempted to obtain information from Zubeidi about weapons held by armed Palestinian groups during the second intifada, nearly ten years ago. Zubeidi was taken to the hospital on September 1142 and released by the Jenin court in late September.43 In addition, the Israeli occupation authorities raided the Freedom Theater, arresting several staff members following the death of an Israeli who was among the founders of the theater.44 The Gaza Strip saw the largest arrest and intimidation campaign against Fatah in March 2012, when more than 40 activists were summoned by Internal Security and interrogated about their links with Fatah; some of them were tortured.45 On August 9, Internal Security in the Khan Yunis province arrested three Fatah leaders—Ammar al-Agha, Atef Shaath, and Wajih Shaath—following the organization of a cultural evening during Ramadan. They were released after questioning a few hours later.46 Fayez Abu Eita, the 40 PCHR, “Palestinian Security Services Arrest Dozens of Hamas Members in the West Bank,” Sep. 19, 2012, (282) Fatah spokesman in Gaza, was arrested after making statements in support of the Palestinian president and his speech at the UN General Assembly.47 For the fourth year in a row, Hamas refused to allow representatives of the ICHR to carry out an inspection of conditions in detention facilities, where several deaths had occurred, both the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank.48 Among those who died were Osama Aql Hassan Mansour, who died on July 15 one month after his arrest by military intelligence in Ramallah,49 and Mohammed Said Abd al-Mutallib, who committed suicide in the Khan Younis police station on October 16 after being subjected to falaka beatings.50 On December 27, Atef Derbas died in the Shifa Hospital in Gaza as a result of medical neglect inside the Ansar District Prison.51 Arbitrary Execution and Extrajudicial Killing The Hamas government applied the PLO’s revolutionary Penal Code to refer civilians to military tribunals on charges that carry the death penalty, despite the legal challenges that have been brought against the law’s constitutionality based on the fact that the law was never reviewed by the legislature. Hamas continued to implement death sentences without ratification by the PA president, as required by the Palestinian Basic Law. In 2012, it executed six people convicted of murder of Gaza; in some cases the convictions were based on confessions obtained under torture. An additional 27 people are on death row awaiting execution.52 47 ICHR, “October 2012 Report of Human Rights Violations,” (283) During the Israeli offensive on Gaza in November, a number of those accused of “collaborating with the enemy” were subjected to extrajudicial execution. At least seven people were killed, six of them on November 20 by armed men in two vehicles and several motorcycles in the neighborhood of Sheikh Radwan, north of Gaza City. The men shot the six victims before mutilating the bodies of a number of them. The seventh victim, Ashraf Abd al-Hamid Aweid, was an inmate in the Gaza District Prison and was being prosecuted before a military court on charges of espionage; he was shot by armed men on November 16. On November 25, Hamas announced the formation of a commission to investigate extrajudicial killings.53 Assaults on Freedom of Expression In January 2012, Preventive Security in Hebron summoned Ahram Weekly correspondent Khalid Amayreh three times for questioning about his opinions of the Arab revolutions and the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, as well as statements in which he described Ismail Haniyeh, who had headed the dismissed Cabinet in Gaza, as a legitimate prime minister, which his interrogators considered an insult to the PA. Journalist Rami Samara, an editor with the Wafa Palestinian News Agency and an announcer with Radio Ajyal, was held for several hours after he criticized the executive committee of the PLO on Facebook.54 Palestinian intelligence in the West Bank detained journalist Youssef al-Shayed, a correspondent with the Palestinian al-Ayyam and the Jordanian al-Ghad, for nearly eight hours in an attempt to find out about his sources for a story that accused the Palestinian diplomatic mission in France of corruption and spying on Islamist movements abroad for Palestinian and foreign intelligence agencies. He was again detained on March 26 after being accused by the Foreign Ministry of libel; he was released by a court on April 2 on bail of $14,000.55 53 PCHR, “PCHR Condemns Extra-Judicial Killings of Persons in Gaza for Alleged Collaboration with Israel,” Nov. 21, 2012, (284) In February, the public prosecutor blocked eight news websites in the West Bank due to their criticism of the Palestinian president.56 On March 17, Palestinian intelligence in Nablus summoned journalist Shahd Beni Awda after she drew a cartoon criticizing the president; the interrogation was cancelled following the intervention of the head of the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate.57 On March 28, Ismat Ahmed Abdul-Khaleq was detained on charges of libeling the Palestinian president and inciting to civil strife due to opinions he published on Facebook; he was released on bail on April 4.58 In July, four journalists—Reuters correspondent Said al-Hawari, photographers Ahmad Mesleh and Ahmad Awda, and journalist Mohammed Jaradat— were beaten and had their cameras confiscated by security forces while they were covering demonstrations against the PA in Ramallah. Jaradat was taken to the hospital for treatment following the beating.59 In October, Jihad Harb appeared before the investigative authorities pursuant to a complaint from the presidency that accused him of undermining the stature of the PA and insulting members of the president’s office due to an article he had published two months before.60 In the Gaza Strip, attacks on freedom of expression largely took the form of barring journalists from being able to perform their jobs. On March 8, police prevented Mohammed Zuhdi al-Mashharawi, a correspondent with Sky News Arabic, from covering a group wedding organized by the Hamas government. Al-Mashharawi was beaten and taken to a detention facility before being released some time later. On March 26, police stopped journalist Mahmoud Emad al-Zaanoun, who works with the Doha Center for Media Freedom, from doing a video investigative piece on the fuel shortage; he was held for two hours at the al-Shajaiya police station before being released. On March 28, armed men prevented journalist Salem Mohammed Abu Salem, who was accompanied by two foreign journalists, from interviewing people at an orange orchard east of Gaza City. The journalists were taken to the Internal Security office where their work equipment and cellphones were confiscated. Abu Salem was also compelled to give security 56 CPJ, “Palestinian Authority Blocks Critical Websites,” Apr. 24, 2012, (285) officials his email password before he and his two colleagues were released.61 On May 7, police detained a crew with the al-Quds satellite channel in front of the Shifa Hospital, preventing them from filming the mothers of prisoners on hunger strike in Israeli prisons.62 On July 18, Mohammed Suleiman Abu Nasira, a program presenter on Hona al-Quds, was detained for five hours while covering a sit-in in the al-Ramal quarter of Gaza City protesting the electricity blackouts.63 On November 17, armed men in civilian clothes attempted to enter the home of journalist and director Kholoud Khalil Shaaban to inform her that she had been placed under house arrest and to confiscate her equipment. In November, with the start of the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, Internal Security put many Fatah members under house arrest and ordered them not to leave their homes until the offensive was over.64 In November, Internal Security and the Government Press Office prevented Majid Shoblaq, a correspondent with the Masriya satellite channel, and his wife, Hanan Abu Doghaim, a journalist and announcer at the local Iman Radio, from traveling to Cairo through the Rafah crossing to take part in a conference on the future of Arab media and Arab NGOs.65 Suppression of Freedom of Assembly and Peaceful Protest Assemblies and peaceful protests faced crackdowns on several occasions by the Ramallah government in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, General Intelligence in Ramallah detained several people for one day in February after they organized a march in solidarity with the 61 ICHR, “ March Report of Human Rights Violations.” 62 ICHR, “May 2012 Report of Human Rights Violations,” (286) Syrian people.66 On June 30 and July 1, police used excessive force to disperse demonstrators in Ramallah protesting a meeting between the Palestinian president and the Israeli deputy prime minister. Five protestors were held for several hours, while journalists were beaten and prevented from filming. Journalist Mohammed Jaradat was hospitalized after being beaten with batons and kicked during the demonstration and while in custody at the police station; the hospital also admitted ten other injured demonstrators. The president announced the formation of an independent committee to investigate the use of excessive police force.67 Although the committee submitted a report on its findings to the president on July 24 in which it called for the prosecution of the head of police in Ramallah, the head of the criminal investigations unit, and several other officials, the PA did not respond to the report’s recommendation to hold officials accountable for the use of violence against demonstrators.68 On November 13, female police slapped and kicked women and children taking part in a sit-in in front of the Preventive Security office in Hebron to protest the ongoing detention of their relatives.69 In the Gaza Strip, violations to the right to organize public assemblies, marches, and sit-ins increased. On February 12, police dispersed an assembly held in solidarity with Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque, while on February 19 they used force to break up a peaceful gathering in al-Nuseirat, located in the Central Province, organized by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to demand a solution to the electricity crisis.70 On March 22, Internal Security in Gaza summoned several activists who organized a sit-in in front of Gaza’s energy agency to protest the electricity crisis; the protest was dispersed by security forces.71 On July 18, police 66 ICHR, “February 2012 Report on Human Rights Violations,” (287) detained two protestors for 24 hours in Rafah, where they were demanding electricity; they were beat with batons while in custody.72 On May 9, Hamas police intervened to break up the concluding panel of the Palestine literature festival, devoted to the topic of freedoms and repression. An Egyptian delegation had taken part in the conference that included bands, writers, political activists, and revolutionary youth. While an Egyptian writer was giving a speech on public freedoms, the electricity was cut and police raided the conference hall. They then ordered participants to leave on the grounds that the meeting was not authorized, and a member of the Egyptian band Iskandarella was assaulted.73 In late August, Internal Security raided a group wedding sponsored by Fatah in one of the halls on the western coast of Gaza and set up barriers to prevent the arrival of guests.74 On September 12, Internal Security in Gaza banned the organization of a workshop in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, held at the offices of the ICHR, saying that the security situation did not allow for such an event and that the Association of Prisoners and Ex- Prisoners (Hussam) that helped organize the workshop was banned in Gaza;75 the association’s main headquarters are located in the West Bank. 76 In October, police prohibited a women’s sit-in in Gaza demanding national reconciliation.77 On November 13, police surrounded the site of another sit- in organized for the same purpose near the Palestinian Legislative Council in Gaza, detaining eight political activists who expressed solidarity with those holding the sit-in; they were released later the same day.78 Also in November, Hamas police intervened twice to thwart attempts to commemorate the death of late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat at Quds University in Rafah and at Azhar University in Gaza City.79 72 ICHR, “July 2012 Report on Human Rights Violations.” 73 SKeyes, “Amn hamas yaqtahim ihtifaliyat Filistin li-l-adab,” May 10, 2012, (288) Harassment of Human Rights Defenders On January 9, Yazan Sawafta, a lawyer and researcher with the ICHR, was physically assaulted by Preventive Security in the West Bank, which also confiscated his identity card and camera. Sawafta was observing a demonstration organized by relatives of detainees held by the PA in Nablus.80 On April 8, the interior minister issued an order dissolving the branch of the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Rasid) in the West Bank without prior notice. The order was thought to be related to Rasid criticisms of Palestinian diplomats in Lebanon.81 In November, Sherif al-Asi, a researcher with the Palestinian Center for Human Rights in Ramallah and al-Bira, was threatened with arrest by members of the presidential guard while covering a sit-in by PhD holders. The guards prevented him from taking statements from protestors and forced him to leave, even though he informed them of the nature of his work and the reason for his presence.82 In the Gaza Strip on January 13, Mahmoud Abu Rahma, the director of international relations at the Mezan Center for Human Rights, was attacked and stabbed by masked men as he was on his way home, calling him an atheist and an agent for foreign powers. Only ten days before, Abu Rahma had also been attacked and beaten. It is believed that both attacks were planned to carry out the death threats he received after publishing an article on Maan News in which he criticized the Hamas government and the PA for their failure to investigate torture and arbitrary detention and to hold offenders to account; Abu Rahma was also critical of Hamas’s stance towards armed groups in the Gaza Strip.83 (289) (290) Saudi Arabia For the last nine years, citizens of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have increasingly called for modernization, democratization, and the renewal of religious discourse to pave the way for the necessary institutional, constitutional, and legislative reforms to end discrimination against women and the Shiite minority. Rights activists have boldly established independent human rights organizations despite the official authorities’ hostile stance towards independent civil society. The authorities’ response to these calls has changed according to different levels of international pressure for reform following the terrorist attacks of September 2001. At times the government has shown a degree of tolerance, while at other times it has severely repressed reform advocates and independent human rights activists. King Abdullah’s assumption of power in August 2005 raised expectations of possible reform given his discourse, which focuses on four issues closely linked to human rights: women’s rights, freedom of expression, a fair judicial system, and religious tolerance. The king’s reformist discourse has allowed a broader margin for differences of opinion and permitted the emergence of voices critical of government policies, provided the critique does not extend to the king or the ruling family or encroach on Islam, religious institutions, or clerics. Nevertheless, the king’s discourse is not matched by sufficient political will and has been met with resistance by extremely conservative factions inside the ruling family, the security (291) establishment, and the religious establishment. The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, known as the religious police, has proved to be a crucial tool for these factions in suppressing personal liberties and harassing those whose views differ from their own, particularly among the Shiite community, whose right to practice their religious rites and hold religious festivals remains under constant attack despite royal rhetoric about religious tolerance and a national dialogue involving all sects and communities. In light of the more recent decline in international pressure, the king’s reformist discourse has not been translated into institutional or legislative reforms. Indeed, in the last five years, there have been increasing assaults on freedom of expression, and reform advocates and activists documenting human rights abuses have become targets for arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trials, and travel bans. The authorities continue to forbid the establishment of political parties and human rights organizations, even as they attempted to win international favor with the establishment of a rights organization whose members are closely linked to the government, including government officials and members of the Consultative Assembly. The authorities also established the Human Rights Commission, a government human rights directorate.1 Amid rising fear of the spread of the Arab revolutions, 2011 saw less tolerance and increasing crackdowns on demonstrations and collective protests in the kingdom. 2 The year 2012 saw no improvement of the deteriorating human rights situation. Indeed, repression increased, particularly in relation to human rights defenders and political dissidents. The authorities also continued to deal harshly with all forms of peaceful demonstrations and protests regardless of their size. Severe measures were used to crack down on demonstrations and protests by Shiite citizens, who continued to suffer from systematic discrimination and restrictions on their right to practice their religion. 1 On the general state of human rights in Saudi Arabia, see the previous four annual reports issued by the CIHRS: From Exporting Terrorism to Exporting Repression, 2008 report, (292) New specialized anti-terrorism criminal courts were used to try human rights defenders, regime critics, and internet activists. Websites continued to be blocked if they included any information about arrests of and abuses committed against those involved in peaceful protests. Grave abuses in prisons and detention facilities persisted, as did physical and psychological torture. Demeaning corporal penalties continued to be applied which constitute violations of the Convention Against Torture, to which Saudi Arabia is a party. Harassment of Human Rights Defenders and Reformists In keeping with its hostile stance on the establishment of independent human rights organizations, in early 2012 the authorities refused to license the Adala Center for Human Rights, based on the claim that the center’s objectives did not comply with existing regulations on associations and charitable institutions. The founders of the center appealed the decision before the Administrative Court.3 Waleed Abulkhair, the president of the Monitor of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia (MHRSA), applied for a license as well but was rejected, after which the organization was registered in Canada. An application was then filed with the Saudi monarch to allow the organization to operate in the kingdom, but no response was received.4 The Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) was subjected to the most abuse. On April 10, the Riyadh Specialized Criminal Court sentenced activist and ACPRA founder Mohammed Saleh al-Bejadi to four years in prison and banned him from travel for an additional five years after his conviction on charges of participating in the establishment of a human rights association, sullying the state’s reputation in the media, calling on the families of political detainees to demonstrate and stage sit-ins, questioning the independence of the judiciary, and possessing banned books. The judgment was issued in a secret session more than one year after al-Bejadi was arrested and without due process guarantees, particularly the right to an attorney.5 3 Adala Center for Human Rights, “Mu’assisu al-‘adala ya’taridun ‘ala rafd talabihim ta’sis markaz li-huquq al-insan,” Jan. 23, 2012, (293) Saudi Arabia continues to use the Specialized Criminal Court, established in 2008 to consider terrorism cases, to prosecute peaceful dissidents and rights activists on politicized charges without regard for due process and without clearly defining the jurisdiction of these courts or their methods of operation.6 Two other activists with ACPRA—Abdullah al-Hamed and Mohammed al- Qahtani—were also referred to trial on June 11 and June 18 respectively; they faced several charges, including rebelling against the ruler, questioning the judiciary, establishing an organization without a permit, undermining the public order, smearing the reputation of state officials, sowing civil strife and division, inciting to the dissolution of allegiance to the king, and inciting international organizations against the kingdom. 7 This came after al-Qahtani cooperated with and submitted information to the UN Human Rights Council. The judgment in the trial of al-Qahtani and al-Hamed was expected on January 16, 2013.8 Another activist with the same organization, Abd al- Karim Youssef al-Khidr, was questioned and is expected to be charged and prosecuted as well. Activist Fowzan al-Harbi was prohibited from travel with no cause given on May 22, shortly before he planned to attend a human rights conference.9 In June, the Saudi authorities placed travel bans on several activists, among them Abd al-Mohsen al-Ayyashi, Mamdouh al- Zaydi, Hussein al-Zaydi, and Mohammed al-Huwayl, after they signed and Rights Council, (294) published a political statement issued by ACPRA titled “Citizens: The oath of allegiance has conditions, so let’s demand them.”10 On December 12, Sheikh Suliman al-Reshoudi, the president of ACPRA, was arrested only hours after the publication of his lecture on the status of demonstrations and sit-ins in Islamic law, in which he affirmed the legitimacy of peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins for the purpose of demanding rights.11 Meanwhile, the trial of rights activist Fadhil al-Manasif, a founding member of the Adala Center for Human Rights and who has been detained since October 2011, continues, after he was charged with participating in peaceful sit-ins and marches in al-Awwamiya. He is being prosecuted before a specialized anti-terrorism court.12 On April 10, rights activist Mekhlef al-Shammari learned that he had been banned from travel while attempting to cross the King Fahd Bridge into Bahrain. The authorities had issued the secret order banning him from travel for ten years following his release on bail in February 2010. Al-Shammari was again imprisoned in June 2010 because of his opinions; he had been charged with writing material that troubled others.13 The authorities similarly banned activist Waleed Sami Abulkhair, the president of the MHRSA, from travel pursuant to an order issued by the Interior Ministry on March 12. He is also being tried on charges of showing contempt for the judiciary and impugning the kingdom’s reputation by giving false information to an international organization.14 Abulkhair has 10 Field statements from the MHRSA and ACRPRA. To read the statement see, ACRPRA, “ACPRA Calls upon Saudi Citizens to Demand Allegiance Conditions,” June 22, 2012, (295) also been repeatedly summoned for security questioning because of his activities.15 On June 17, the authorities detained activist Raef Badawi and referred him to court on charges of creating a liberal network after the network he established declared May 7 to be liberalism day in Saudi Arabia and he wrote a blog entry about liberalism.16 During his trial, the Jeddah Criminal Court amended the charge against him to be defamation of Islam and disobedience of the ruler. In the session of September 17, the court referred him to a higher court—the Jeddah General Court—after it added the charge of apostasy. The court asked Badawi to repent to avoid a death sentence, but he refused.17 Torture The security authorities use various means of torture against detainees, including beatings with hoses and wires on the hands and feet, electroshocks to sensitive areas of the body, and forced standing for long periods with the arms raised. Such practices are used during interrogations to force confessions.18 Psychological torture is also used, including threats of rape or the insult of detainees’ family or their religious beliefs, if they are Shiites.19 Signs of torture are visible on the bodies of released detainees,20 and weight loss is common.21 One of the most notorious cases was that of Musa Jafar al- Mabyuq, who was left emaciated and mentally impaired by the violent physical and psychological torture to which he was subjected.22 15 Field testimonies from MHRSA. 16 CIHRS, “Ziyada muqliqa li-l-qam’ wa-l-hujum ‘ala-l-mujtama’ al-madani fi mintaqat al- khalij”; Adala Center, “al-Hurriya al-mukabbala”; ANHRI, “‘Ala-l-nizam al-Sa’udi al- tawaqquf fawran ‘an mulahaqat nushata’ bi-tuham muzayyafa,” June 26, 2012, (296) In another case, Nazeer al-Majed was beaten, electrocuted, punched on his face, and kicked all over his body. He was whipped on his back with a sharp object and forced to stand in a painful position for four hours with his arms raised and his legs shackled; security personnel also beat his head against a wall.23 In early 2012, Hussein al-Suleiman was beaten by an officer after he arrived bound hand and foot at the General Directorate of Investigations. His left leg was broken as a result, and the officer threatened to break his other leg.24 A group of Ethiopians were arrested on December 15, 2011 for holding a prayer service in a private home during a Christian holiday. The women were transferred to the Buraiman Prison, where they were forced to strip and subjected to a cavity search by a policewoman, ostensibly to detect any concealed contraband. They were also forced to put their fingerprints on a document they were not permitted to read, which incriminated them for mingling with men who were not their husbands.25 Despite the international ban on degrading punishment under the Convention Against Torture, to which Saudi Arabia is a party, the kingdom continues to apply lashing as a sentence. Egyptian national Nagla Wafa was sentenced to 500 lashes and five years in prison in May after she had been arbitrarily detained without trial for 20 months. According to reports from rights groups, she was given no legal support until the sentence was issued. Wafa appealed to the appellate court, which vacated the sentence due to the lack of incriminating evidence, yet the sentence against her was upheld during the retrial. She faced ill treatment in prison and was denied visits and contact with her family for six months.26 Egyptian attorney Ahmed al-Gizawi may be sentenced to death after the authorities accused him of possessing illicit drugs upon his arrival at the Jeddah airport on April 17. It was feared that measures were taken against him because he filed a suit with the Egyptian judiciary demanding the 23 Amnesty International, “Dissident Voices Stifled in the Eastern Province.” 24 Ibid. 25 Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Christians Arrested at Private Prayers,” Jan. 30, 2012, (297) release of Egyptians detained in Saudi Arabia, naming the Saudi monarch in the suit.27 Freedom of Assembly The authorities detained hundreds of people in security sweeps targeting participants of demonstrations that began erupting in the kingdom in 2011. Reports in April estimated that some 600 people had been detained, some of whom spent more than six months in prison without charge or trial. Many of them were denied family visits despite their long confinement, and at least 33 of them were fired from their jobs.28 Many others who had been involved in protests also faced retaliatory measures such as dismissals and garnished wages.29 In January 2012, the Interior Ministry put two documents into effect that permit disciplinary measures leading to the dismissal of public servants who criticize state policy. One of the documents calls for “raising awareness among public servants of their occupational responsibilities and duties and their obligation not to publish, issue, or sign statements or speeches that oppose state policy or are inconsistent with fundamental state regulations.” The document adds that “measures shall be taken before the competent body to demand the dismissal of the employee in accordance with the occupational regulations to which the employee is subject.” These directives were used against those who took part in peaceful demonstrations or assemblies.30 In 2012, crackdowns were largely directed at demonstrations by Shiites in the Eastern Province, where a number of demonstrators were killed as a result. For example, Zuhair al-Said was shot and killed by police during a demonstration on February 11 in al-Awwamiya after armored police vehicles intervened to disperse a march protesting the death of Mounir al-Maidani, who had died in the hospital after he was injured by security forces on 27 CDHRAP, “al-Gizawi yu’akkid bara’atahu wa yattahim al-iddi’a’ al-Sa’udi bi-l-talfiq,” Sep. 6, 2012, (298) February 9.31 The same town saw another demonstration on July 9 in protest of the detention of Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a prominent Shiite leader. The police dispersed the demonstration with live ammunition, killing two and injuring dozens.32 On July 26, dozens of demonstrators were injured in al- Qatif when the police used live ammunition to disperse another peaceful assembly in support al-Nimr. Activist Mohammed al-Shakhouri was detained; he was one of 23 people wanted for arrest in connection with their participation in demonstrations over the last year.33 On September 17, a criminal court in Qatif sentenced three demonstrators to prison and lashes on charges of taking part in anti-state assemblies.34 On July 13, ten women from the al-Muattaq family were arrested while peacefully protesting the continued detention of their family members. All but two of the women, both minors, were later released. The investigating body issued an order to hold the two girls and that they be transferred to a facility for the care of minors in Riyadh; their families were not informed. The girls were questioned without an attorney or guardian present, and the director of the local investigation and prosecution directorate refused to release them on bail and denied them visits or outside contact.35 On March 7, many female students at King Khaled University in Abha, located in the southern part of the kingdom, were injured when security patrols and the religious police intervened to disperse a protest they were holding to demand improved educational conditions.36 On September 14, the police detained demonstrators protesting the film “Innocence of Islam,” which they considered to be blasphemous and insulting to the prophet 31 CDHRAP, “Quwwat al-kayan al-Sa’udi taqtul al-shabb Munir al-Maydani,” Feb. 10, 2012, (299) Mohammed, in Bureida, northeast of Riyadh; they were released three days later.37 On October 7, a court convicted 15 people charged with incitement to chaos and strife and illegal assembly after they took part in a demonstration on September 23 in front of the al-Tarafiya Prison in al-Qasim in central Saudi Arabia seeking the release of their relatives who had been detained for long periods of time. The defendants received sentences of 3 to 15 days in prison, as well as suspended sentences of 50-90 lashes and prison terms of two-five months.38 On November 20, security forces arrested 15 citizens who organized a protest in front of the Human Rights Commission in the capital to demand the release of their relatives who were being held without trial. The protestors were beaten and kicked while being taken to the investigations directorate for questioning. The security forces also detained 22 women and children taking part in the protest. They were later released after being compelled to sign a pledge not to take part in such protests again.39 Rights sources estimated that at the end of 2012, 175 people, among them 22 children, were still detained in Saudi prisons in connection with the suppression of peaceful demonstrations. It was estimated that at least 15 people had been killed in the context of crackdowns on demonstrations between March 2011 and the end of 2012.40 Growing Suppression of the Shiite Minority The Shiite and Ismaili minorities41 continued to face numerous arbitrary restrictions on their exercise of the right to religious freedom. They further suffer from official discrimination in government employment and 37 CDHRAP, “al-Sultat al-amniya ta’taqil mutazahirin bi-tuhmat nusrat al-rasul,” Sep. 16, 2012, (300) education: No Shiite holds a high government office or a senior security position, and Shiites and Ismailis account for only six members of the 150- member Consultative Assembly. These minorities are also at risk of harassment, arrest, and detention for religious reasons, including for taking part in assemblies, using megaphones outside husseiniyat, or taking part in religious festivals or processions. In January, clashes between police and a group of Shiites in Qatif during a religious festival left one Shiite dead and three injured; several people were detained.42 On August 3, police opened fire on several residents of Qatif who were taking part in religious festivities held to commemorate the birthday of Imam al-Hassan Bin Ali Bin Abi Taleb; Hussein Youssef al-Qalaf was killed as a result.43 On July 9, the authorities detained well-known cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr after pursuing him through the streets of al-Awwamiya in the al-Qatif governorate. Gunfire during the chase caused al-Nimr’s car to crash into the wall of a house, injuring him.44 He was detained due to his critical opinions of the Saudi regime and the spread of a video in which he criticized the ruling family.45 On January 25, a security squad carried out raids in the town of al-Qadih and detained nine Shiites, including men in their 60s. While the elderly detainees were released, the police referred the rest of the detainees to the General Directorate of Investigations, where the government accused them of shooting at police patrols and security personnel.46 On September 10, security vehicles surrounded al-Awwamiya in the Qatif governorate in pursuit of Shiite youth included on a list of 23 persons wanted by the Interior Ministry. An exchange of gunfire ensued, injuring four citizens and damaging Shiite-owned property, and several people were arrested. Two cars were also hit with gunfire, killing a driver. The clashes took place two days after the interior minister stated that the judiciary was close to the Qatif- based “lost faction,” a reference to the religiously wayward.47 42 Annual report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2012, (301) The authorities arrested several citizens while they were departing the kingdom. On March 14, Shiite al-Sayyed Murtada Hashim al-Mousawi was detained at the Khafji border crossing on his way to Kuwait.48 On March 25, Yasser al-Shuyukh was detained on his way to the UAE in the border district of al-Batha; he was released in early April.49 The security authorities accused the men of taking part in peaceful marches in al-Qatif. On March 18, police in al-Qatif arrested Shiite footballer Ahmed Samir al- Qasla.50 On March 22, Shiite youth Abdullah Eissa al-Miyad was detained in connection with his participation in peaceful demonstrations in Qatif. According to testimonies, he was released on October 15.51 Many Shiites were detained and prosecuted after exercising their right to express their opinions. In March, the authorities arrest minor Jafar Sadeq al- Sadeq and Haidar Hassan al-Mahal, residents of al-Rabiyia, on charges of writing slogans in support of Shiite rights on the town’s walls and streets. Al-Sadeq was released in May while al-Mahal continues to be detained at the General Directorate of Investigations in Dammam.52 In another case, the Qatif criminal court sentenced Mounir Adel al-Quraysh, a resident of Safwa, to eight months in prison and a fine of 10,000 riyals after he was convicted of undermining state security by sending an SMS on Saudi National Day expressing his solidarity and support of the Bahraini people.53 On April 3, the authorities demolished a mosque in al-Khobar in the Eastern Province on the grounds that it had not been approved by the proper authorities, despite the fact that it was built nearly four decades ago.54 On December 16, a Saudi court sentenced well-known Shiite cleric Sheikh Tawfiq al-Amer to three years in prison. Al-Amer had been arrested 17 months earlier due to his repeated reformist calls for a constitutional monarchy, religious liberties, and an end to sectarian discrimination. According to his legal advisor, it is likely that al-Amer would have been 48 CDHRAP, “al-Sultat al-Sa’udiya ta’taqil al-shabb al-shi’i al-Sayyid Murtada Hashim al- Musawi,” Mar. 14, 2012, (302) released if he had signed a pledge to refrain from giving sermons, which he refused to do. The judgment against him also included a five-year travel ban and a ban on preaching.55 Freedom of Expression Almost a year after his arrest on March 11, 2011, Khaled al-Johani was referred to the Specialized Criminal Court on February 22. Although the court ostensibly specializes in terrorism cases, al-Johani was charged with participation in demonstrations and contact with foreign media in order to tarnish the kingdom’s reputation.56 On February 22, poet and photographer Habib Ali al-Maatiq was arrested at his workplace in al-Qatif because of his supervision of the Fajr Cultural Network, which was shut down the same day; the network had published news and photos of protests in Qatif.57 The following day, Hussein Malek al- Salem, the director of the network’s website, was detained and moved to the Dammam Prison.58 The authorities also blocked the Fajr site.59 On February 25, the police in Taif, located in the western part of the country, detained journalist Jalal Mohammed Al Jamal, the director of the Awamia website. He was charged with opposing and inciting to the fall of the state after his website covered demonstrations in the Eastern Province; the authorities also blocked the website.60 The authorities issued an order banning the writings of Hamza Kashghari from appearing in Saudi newspapers and periodicals after he posted material on Twitter that the government considered to be defaming to religion. The government later issued an order for his arrest after several people labeled him an unbeliever and others called for his execution or murder.61 He had 55 Rasid, “Mahkama Sa’udiya taqdi bi-sajn al-shaykh al-‘Amir thalath sanawat,” Dec. 17, 2012, (303) fled to Malaysia, where the authorities arrested him in the Kuala Lumpur airport while he was en route to New Zealand to seek asylum. On February 12, he was deported back to Saudi Arabia.62 On December 24, prominent Saudi writer Turki al-Hamad was arrested by order of the interior minister for statements made on Twitter that some considered defamatory to Islam. Al-Hamad’s tweets sharply criticized the conduct of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and labeled what he called Islamist currents “neo-Nazis.”63 The Specialized Criminal Court sentenced cleric Youssef al-Ahmed to five years in prison and a fine of 100,000 riyals on charges of undermining the public order and publishing material to sow civil strife after he published a video64 in July 2011 decrying the practices of the security apparatus and criticizing the detention of women following a sit-in demanding the release of two political activists.65 On May 5, the authorities arrested Dr. Ahmed Saad Bin Gharam al-Ghamidi, a professor of modern sciences at Umm al- Qura University and a member of the Islamic Umma Party after he criticized the authorities in posts on Twitter for detaining those with different opinions. He also called for a system of governance chosen by citizens in a free general election.66 On May 12, the Cabinet issued a decree limiting journalism to those journalists accredited by the Saudi Journalists Commission based on the pretext of preventing non-professional writers and journalists from making unfounded, false claims.67 62 Front Line Defenders, “Malaysia/Saudi Arabia: Human Rights Defender Mr Hamza Kashgari Deported to Saudi Arabia Where He Risks Being Sentenced to Death,” Feb. 13, 2012, (304) The authorities also continued to block online content, bringing the number of blocked political sites and sites dedicated to rights issues to 25.68 Discrimination against Women Women continue to occupy a lower status than men in Saudi Arabia. Under the law, they are treated as minors and subjected to the authority of their guardians, who make decisions affecting some of the most vital areas of their lives, such as work, education, marriage, and travel. The government did not uphold the commitments it made before the UN Human Rights Council during its 2009 Universal Periodic Review to end male custodianship of women, despite the fact that the next periodic review of Saudi Arabia will be held next year.69 Women are still banned from working in the judiciary, the public prosecution, and the legal profession.70 The Saudi authorities prohibited Saudi female athletes from participating in the Olympic games of 2012 in London. Following broad international criticism, however, the kingdom reconsidered and declared that women would participate in the games, though they were restricted to events that “are appropriate for the nature of women, meet the standards of women’s decency, and don’t contradict Islamic law.”71 68 Adala Center, “Qa’ima bi-ba’d al-mawaqi’ al-mahjuba min dakhil al-Sa’udiya,” Aug. 7, 2012, (305) (306) Sudan Sudan has been ruled by an authoritarian military regime with religious underpinnings since 1989, when Omar al-Bashir staged a military coup to overthrow the elected civilian government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party. Bashir then dissolved all political parties and civil society groups, with the exception of religious groups, and brought unions under the administrative control of “steering committees” headed by individuals who were closely linked to the new regime. Members of the political opposition, union leaders, and human rights defenders were severely harassed, including through arbitrary arrest and torture in secret detention centers known as “ghost houses.” Despite the more recent resurgence of political parties and civic activity after having been banned for many years, the Bashir regime continued to use repressive tactics to curtail the political opposition and employed legislation which violates the right to freedom of association to clamp down on civil society organizations. The licenses of a number of human rights organizations were revoked, and activists continued to face arrest and unfair trials. Freedom of expression in Sudan continued to face repression as well, particularly through the imposition of security censorship on newspapers, confiscation of publications, and the prosecution of journalists in recent years. (307) The Bashir regime sought to ensure its ability to remain in power by stirring up and exploiting conflicting tribal loyalties and inciting certain tribes against its political opponents in order to erode their traditional centers of support. This was seen most clearly in Darfur and in southern Sudan, where such policies led to a massive failure to address problems arising from ethnic and religious diversity and thwarted all chances for national integration, giving way instead to armed conflicts which have led to massive casualties and the displacement of millions over the past ten years. These policies and practices led the International Criminal Court to accuse the Bashir regime of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in the context of the war in Darfur and to issue a warrant for the arrest of President Bashir and a number of other Sudanese officials. Indeed, these policies also resulted in the official secession of South Sudan in July 2011. In light of the continuation of such policies and practices throughout 2012, the state of human rights remained bleak. No improvements were made to the country’s legislative framework - notable for its hostility to fundamental freedoms – and the police continued to exploit their exceptional powers to commit serious violations amidst an environment of impunity for the entire security apparatus. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees continued, and excessive force was increasingly used against peaceful political and social protests, leading to numerous deaths among demonstrators. Political activists, human rights advocates, and other civil society activists were increasingly subjected to arbitrary arrest due to their suspected participation in or support for these demonstrations. Freedom of opinion and expression was repressed, including through security harassment, prosecutions, orders banning the works of particular writers from being published, and the confiscation of newspapers, which resulted in major financial losses for the papers and forced some of them to close. A number of websites were blocked, particularly those which monitor violations committed by the security apparatus while dispersing protests. Several of the most active human rights organizations and academic centers were also closed or their activities suspended. The Bashir regime continues to defy the indictment issued by the International Criminal Court regarding the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of genocide committed in Darfur, where arbitrary shelling continues to target towns and villages and brutal attacks and massacres are committed against civilians by tribal militias loyal to the regime. The Sudanese authorities have likewise shirked their responsibility to ensure the security of peacekeeping forces, which continue to face armed attacks and even abduction. The failure of negotiations between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the South Sudanese government in (308) Juba to settle a number of issues, including where to draw the borders and how to distribute oil profits, has led to continued armed clashes between the two countries, exacerbating the deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increasing numbers of displaced people in the border areas. Some 50,000 citizens of Southern descent living in Sudan are at risk of being stripped of their Sudanese citizenship, even if they do not wish to obtain the citizenship of South Sudan. Tensions between Khartoum and Juba have ignited armed conflict in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions between forces loyal to Khartoum and groups associated with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-North), which is considered by the Bashir regime to be loyal to his opponents in South Sudan. These armed clashes exacerbated the humanitarian suffering among civilians, and extrajudicial killings became more widespread along with arbitrary shelling. Furthermore, the Sudanese authorities refused to allow supplies for humanitarian aid to reach those affected by the fighting. Repression of Political Protests and Peaceful Assemblies On January 27, two people were killed and dozens injured as the result of excessive force and live ammunition used by the security forces to suppress protests in the city of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur. The protests had called for the fall of the regime and took place after the government dismissed the governor.1 On June 16, student demonstrations began at Khartoum University and then spread throughout the city and even reached other parts of the country, protesting the austerity measures which had been announced by the government and had resulted in hikes in food prices. Students at other universities and people living in the city joined the protests, which began calling for the fall of the Bashir regime. Police, security forces, and national intelligence forces dealt with these protests severely, using clubs, tear gas, and live ammunition against demonstrators. Some members of the security forces who took part in suppressing the demonstrations were dressed in civilian clothing, and thugs were employed in support of the government, attacking protestors with clubs and knives and causing further injuries. Dozens of students and youth activists were arrested and subjected to ill treatment while being held in detention; some were even punished with 1 Radio Dabanga, “Maqtal 2 we garh we i’ateqal al-a’asharat fi al-youm al-thaleth le- mothaharat neyala we edana wase’a le-estekhdam al-hokuma lel-qowwa al-mofreta,” Jan. 27, 2012, (309) lashes.2 They also faced charges of undermining the public peace and inciting to riots under the broad provisions found in articles 69 and 77 of the criminal code.3 On August 13, the Sudanese security apparatus re-arrested activist Radwan Yaqoub Dawwod just as he was about to be released following a court ruling ordering his release and dropping the charges against him due to lack of evidence. Dawwod had been charged of participating in organizing student protests, of possessing a petrol canister in order to use it against security forces, of blocking the flow of traffic, and of threatening public safety. 4 On July 31, the authorities violently dispersed a peaceful demonstration in Nyala in which students from the various schools in the city took part in protesting price hikes. This violent police response led to the deaths of twelve protestors and the injury of around 60 others; a number of demonstrators were also arrested.5 In early September, the security apparatus carried out an arrest campaign against members of the opposition and rights activists in Nyala following protests against the deteriorating economic situation in the city in August. As number of activists had called for continued protests in Nyala, the security and intelligence agencies arrested a number of youth from their homes without presenting clear charges against them; the youth were not allowed to appoint lawyers or to communicate with their relatives at the time. When one of these detainees, Yousef al-Sharani, was forcibly disappeared after he was 2 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Next Target of Bashir’s Historical Repression: Attacks on Peaceful Protests in Sudan,” June 27, 2012, (310) arrested on September 66 and it was feared that he may have been killed; no information was available regarding his fate as of the end of the year. In mid-September, three people were killed and others injured during an attempt by demonstrators to break into the American embassy in Khartoum out of protest against the film “Innocence of Islam,” which was considered insulting to the Prophet Mohamed. After tear gas was used by soldiers in an attempt to disperse the protestors, a police car was used to chase them away, and several protestors were run over. Protestors had previously broken into the German embassy and attempted to break into the British embassy, as well.7 On October 7, rights advocates and students at the University of al-Fashir, the capital of the state of North Darfur, conducted an open-ended sit-in to demand an investigation into allegations that a female student had been raped by a member of the regime’s forces after he threatened her with a weapon. The authorities conducted no such investigation; rather, the security apparatus raided the university campus on October 10 and attacked the students, beating them, using tear gas against them, and arresting a number of those present.8 On October 9, anti-riot police forcibly dispersed a protest being held at the Port Sudan branch of the Red Sea University to protest the redo of the university elections which had originally been held in April. Four students sustained broken bones and other injuries, and two students were detained by anti-riot police. It is important to note that the April elections had resulted in the defeat of the two candidates of the group loyal to the Sudanese regime.9 In December, four students from Darfur were killed and two others disappeared after security forces used excessive force to disperse protests held on December 5 inside Al-Jazeera University. Students had planned the demonstration to protest the establishment of a registration fee for Darfurian 6 Al-Karama, “Al-Sudan: i’ateqal we ikhtefa’ al-taleb youssef al-sha’arani,” Sept. 8, 2012, (311) students and to demand the release of eleven students who had asked to be exempted from paying the fee. The use of force by police pushed students towards a nearby waterway and caused several to fall into it, at which point the six students disappeared; four of their bodies were later found in the waterway. It was noted that three of the bodies carried signs of beatings, which suggested that they had been physically assaulted before they drowned. The authorities refused to make public the medical reports regarding the reasons for their deaths. The police also used excessive force against the protests which broke out in Khartoum and elsewhere in condemnation of the killing of the students and demanding the dismissal of the government; additional protestors were injured and dozens arrested as a result.10 Restrictions on Political Opposition and Freedom of Expression The authorities continued to adopt policies which allowed them to influence and censor the press, including through new strategies focused on creating economic losses for newspapers rather than imposing forms of pre- publication censorship. In the past, night raids of newspapers had been frequently conducted by the security apparatus in order to review all material prepared for publication in order to remove or replace any content that displeased the authorities before the paper went to press. In 2012, the authorities increasingly turned to new tactics which consisted of increased confiscation of newspapers after they were printed, which caused the papers to incur massive financial losses. For instance, the security apparatus confiscated several issues of the newspaper Al-Midan after they were printed and before they were distributed; at times, these confiscations took place multiple times within a very limited period of time (the issues of February 21 and of March 13, 15, 17, and 18 were all confiscated).11 Instructions from the security apparatus to the administrative boards of newspapers ordering them to prevent certain journalists from publishing their writings became a near-daily occurrence. Papers which failed to comply with these orders were punished by having their issues confiscated 10 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Justice Needed for Student Deaths,” Dec. 10, 2012, (312) or being prevented from publishing at all. Editors of some newspapers stated that they received threats that their papers would be shut down entirely if they allowed certain journalists to publish their writings.12 The journalists who were prevented from writing in this way included Heidar al-Makashifi of the newspaper Al-Sahafa, who was banned from publication on May 6 based on orders from the National Security apparatus,13 as well as Abdullah al-Sheikh, a former editor; Abou Thur Ali al-Amin, a writer with the newspaper Ra’i al-Sha’ab, which had been shut down; Fayez al-Salik, Zohair al-Suraj, Amel Habani, Rasha A’oud, Ashraf Abdulaziz, al-Taher Abou Jouhara, Mohamed Mahmoud al-Sobhy, and Abdel Salam al-Qurai, all from the newspaper Al-Jarida; and Mujahid Abdullah and Essam Jaafar, both of the newspaper Alwan.14 The security apparatus also issued daily instructions to newspaper editors with lists of subjects about which it is prohibited to publish criticisms or commentaries.15 Newspapers face trials which do not provide them with the most basic guarantees of a fair trial based on cases filed by the National Intelligence and Security apparatus with the “Press and Publications Court,” which often rules against the newspapers and imposes severe fines, representing another major economic burden on newspapers. Journalists are also penalized with monetary fines or imprisonment if the fines are not paid. A number of journalists, writers, and editors of newspapers - who are considered responsible for the articles that are published – also face trial based on their expression of opinion. Among them is Mudehet Abdullah, the editor of the newspaper Sahifet al-Midan, and journalist Hussein Saad, who were charged by the legal department of the National Intelligence and Security apparatus of calling for violence and hatred against the state, stirring up strife between sects and ethnicities, supporting revolt, encouraging rebels, and detracting from the prestige of the state, after Saad had written an article in April on the anniversary of the death of Yousef Kuwa Mikky, one of the deceased leaders of the Nuba Mountains and among the most prominent leaders of the popular armed movement. Similarly, the Press and Publications Court in the city of Wad Madani, the capital of the state of al-Jazeera in central Sudan, ruled against Ameer Hussein, from the newspaper Al-Jarida, and imposed on him a fine of 3,000 pounds or four 12 Amnesty International, “Sudan Must End Clampdown On Media,” May 15, 2012, (313) months in prison if he did not pay. Othman Shanqar, editor of Al-Jarida, was detained by the police of the court until the fine was paid.16 Journalist and prominent writer Faisal Mohamed Saleh, the editor of columns in a number of local papers, was summoned every day for nearly two weeks in April and May and forced to wait to be questioned for the whole day without food or water; investigations with him never took place. When he refused to return again, the authorities arrested him twice on vague charges, such as “crimes against the state,” as well as previous charges of defamation for having published information in March 2011 regarding the rape of a female activist by the National Security apparatus.17 In early 2012, the security apparatus shut down the newspapers Alwan and Ra’i al-Shaab, which both have Islamist leanings. Reports stated that the closure of Alwan followed its reporting on issues which revealed its support for the Justice and Equality movement, one of the sects in Darfur which oppose the government. It was suggested that this was the reason for the closure of Ra’i al-Shaab as well, as officials within the National Security apparatus commented on this closure by saying that press freedoms do not mean subjecting national security to danger or supporting rebel movements. 18 The independent newspaper Al-Tayyar was also closed after being raided, the May 18 issue of the newspaper Akher Lahtha was confiscated, and the newspaper Al-Midan was prevented from publishing its issue on May 20.19 On September 3, the government confiscated issue no. 807 of the journal Al- Ahram Al-Araby, which is published in Egypt, due to an investigative piece dealing with slave trading between Sudan and Libya and the human 16 Journalists for Human Rights, “Annual Report on the Monitoring and Documentation of the Case and Situation of Freedom of the Press and Expression in Sudan” (Arabic), May 2-3, 2013, (314) trafficking networks in Khartoum. The same journal was confiscated again on September 8 for the same reasons. 20 A number of journalists and members of the political opposition were arrested due to their anti-government positions or opinions. Following the protests which broke out in June, the National Security and Intelligence apparatus raided a number of homes and offices of well-known activists to arbitrarily arrest them. On June 19, 40 activists belonging to various peaceful youth movements were arrested from the headquarters of Al-Haq, a political opposition party; they were released the following day. Similarly, Mohamed Boushi Alim and Sadiq Tawwor, the leaders of the Baath Party, were arrested from their homes on the mornings of June 20 and 23, as were three members of the opposition Umma Party on June 24, including Adam Jarir, a member of the political bureau of the party. The security forces further ordered that all of the party’s activities in Khartoum be ceased.21 On June 23, a number of opposition leaders were arrested from their homes, including Mohamed Farid Byoumi of the Sudanese Conference Party, Sataa al-Haj of the Nasry Party, and Mohamed Deya’ ad-Dein of the Baath Party.22 On June 16, the National Intelligence and Security apparatus raided the office of the Agence France-Presse news agency (AFP) in Khartoum and arrested journalist Talal Saad, who works with AFP, and a correspondent with the local daily paper Al-Tayyar. The security apparatus threatened AFP that it would break the computer in the office if they did not erase the photographs which had been taken by Saad, who remained in detention for 24 hours before being released.23 20Sudan Today Online, “Al-sudan tosader majalet al-ahram we tamna’ tawzea’ha fi al- khartoum,” Sept. 5, 2012, (315) On June 22, activist Osama Mohamed was forcibly disappeared and held by the National Intelligence and Security apparatus in an unknown location after he spoke about the importance of participating in protests in Khartoum during an interview with Al-Jazeera English.24 On June 23, Simon Martili, a resident correspondent for AFP, was arrested as he was speaking with student protestors and taking pictures outside of their university; he was held for 12 hours. Videographer and blogger Naglaa Sayyed Ahmed was summoned for questioning on June 20, 21, and 24 in order to prevent him from covering the protests as well.25 On June 26, the authorities deported Egyptian journalist Salma al-Wardani, a correspondent with Bloomberg, after she had been detained without charge following her coverage of anti-government protests on June 21. On June 26, al-Wardani went to the Press Center to renew her press credentials, yet she was informed that an order for her immediate deportation had been issued; she was not given any time to settle her personal affairs before being deported.26 Also on June 26, the National Intelligence and Security apparatus raided the home of journalist Maha al-Sanoussi and confiscated her personal computer. The following day, she was called by the security apparatus for questioning and interrogated for 11 hours regarding her coverage of the protests. Al- Sanoussi had been arrested previously with Salma al-Wardani for several hours on June 21.27 On July 4, the security apparatus arrested Egyptian journalist Shaimaa Adel, a correspondent with the newspaper al-Watan, as she was covering the protests; she was released in mid-July after the Egyptian authorities intervened on her behalf.28 24 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Next Target of Bashir’s Historical Repression: Attacks on Peaceful Protests in Sudan.” 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Sudan Must End Crackdown on Press Covering Protests.” 27 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Next Target of Bashir’s Historical Repression: Attacks on Peaceful Protests in Sudan”; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Sudan Must End Crackdown on Press Covering Protests.” 28 The International Center for Supporting Rights and Freedoms, “Al-sahateyya shaimaa’ a’adel la tazal mohtageza we al-markaz al-dawli le-da’am al-hoqooq we al-horreyat yotolab al-sultat al-masreyya be-sora’et e’adetha ela ard al-waran al-khamees,” July 12, 2012, (316) On December 25, the security authorities arrested Khaled Ahmed, a journalist with the newspaper Al-Soudani, and confiscated his camera and deleted all of the pictures on it as he was covering a student protest at Khartoum. Ahmed was interrogated before being released.29 On December 31, the security forces arrested journalists Faisal Mohamed Saleh and Mohamed Amin and attacked and beat Abdelbaqi al-A’oud, a correspondent with the Al-Horra channel, as he was covering a gathering which had taken place in front of the Human Rights Commission to submit a memorandum of protest against an arbitrary decision to close the Sudanese Studies Center;30 he was later released.31 The authorities continued to block and hack websites, as in June when they blocked the Arabic news website Hureyyat due to its coverage of the anti- government protests along with two other news websites, namely Sudanese Online and Al-Rakoba.32 On September 16, YouTube was blocked without reasons for this decision being made public.33 On October 10, the website Itha’at Kadentikar, which uses the Nubian language, was hacked, according to the administrators of the webpage. It is well-known that the government uses an “electronic jihad unit,” a body connected with security networks specialized in hacking. Previously, this unit had targeted a number of opposition websites, including Al-Rakoba, Sudanial, and Sudanese Online and blocked other news websites on Sudan.34 07-05-05-29-32&catid=44:sudan&Itemid=136>; Egypt Independent, “Egypt Journalist Freed in Sudan, Returns Home,” July 16, 2012, (317) Torture and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners Detainees held by the National Intelligence and Security apparatus are often subjected to ill-treatment and torture, and such practices were increasingly used against students detained in the context of protests calling for democracy.35 Testimonies of a number of detainees who were released confirmed that they had been subjected to torture,36 including through beatings with clubs and water hoses, and the heads, faces, and eyebrows of male detainees were shaved before they were released. On October 29, journalist Samia Handousa was abducted by persons wearing civilian clothes who forced her into a car and covered her head with a black bag. She was detained in an unknown location for five days, during which she was tortured and terrorized. Handousa had previously received a call on her phone on October 27 summoning her to the National Intelligence and Security apparatus in Khartoum, at which point she said that she would not present herself without being officially summoned. During the period of her detention, her phone was confiscated and she was not able to communicate with the outside world. She was forced to sit on her knees with her face to the wall in a room where a mentally unstable person was also being held; signs of torture were visible on his body. From her place of detention, Handousa was able to hear the screams of other people who were apparently being tortured. Two hours after she was detained, she was brought to the office of the interrogator, who showed Handousa a file containing a number of articles and accused her of opposing the regime and insulting the Sudanese president. He then asked her about her name and tribe, and when she informed him that she is from Darfur, he cursed her with racist obscenities. She was forced to take off her outer garment, or abeyya, and her hair was cut. She was then subjected to lashes with rough water hoses, hit, and kicked. An iron was used on various parts of her body, and those present threatened to kill her son in front of her. After five days in detention, Handousa was left on the side of a road far from Khartoum.37 It is important to note that Sudan continues to implement a number of degrading physical punishments despite their being banned under the 35 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Rights Record Deteriorates with New Conflicts,” Jan. 22, 2012, (318) International Convention against Torture, including lashes and stoning. On April 22, for example, a court sentenced Intisar Sharif Abdullah, who had not yet turned 18, to death by stoning after only one hearing. In issuing this sentence, the court relied only on a confession by Abdullah which had been extracted under torture, even though the man with whom she was accused of committing adultery denied the charges and was released.38 Women and girls are often arrested and subjected to lashes if they commit acts considered by the authorities to be “disgraceful” or to “undermine public morals” under article 152 of the penal code.39 Continued Repression of Human Rights Defenders In June, the authorities expelled four foreign humanitarian aid organizations working in eastern Sudan from the country under the pretext that they had failed in the implementation of their projects. The organizations are the Swedish organization Protect the Children, the Irish organization Goal, a Japanese group for humanitarian work, and another humanitarian organization from Ireland. One week before, the Spanish branch of Doctors Without Borders had been prevented from transporting medical equipment to Darfur.40 On July 15, the security apparatus ordered the Khatim Adlan Center to cancel a conference regarding the economic crisis in Sudan for security reasons. The center was then notified that it would be required to obtain prior security authorization before undertaking any further activities.41 Following the protests which were initiated by students at Khartoum University on June 16, the security apparatus arrested Dr. Kamel Idris, vice president of the Sudanese Group for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms, from in front of his home in Khartoum on June 20.42 On July 1, Mai Shiteh, an activist with the Girifna movement, was arrested from her home in Om Durman; she was threatened with a pistol while being interrogated. Along 38 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Ban Death by Stoning,” May 31, 2012, (319) with several others, she announced a hunger strike in protest of the fact that health and sanitary products were not provided. Before her release on August 11, Shiteh was forced to sign a document stating that she would renounce her activism and stop submitting reports to international organizations regarding human rights violations committed by the government.43 On July 8, the authorities prevented lawyer and human rights defender Kamal Omar from traveling to Doha, where he was scheduled to participate in a program regarding the protests in Sudan which was to be broadcast on the Al-Jazeera channel.44 On July 19, the authorities arrested lawyer and human rights defender Sayyed Ahmed Madwa and detained him in an unknown location without bringing charges against him. He had visited and provided legal assistance to detainees in the Sinja, Rasirs, and Sinar prisons who had been arrested in the context of the protests which had taken place earlier the same month.45 During the last week of June, Bikry al-Ajami, an activist with the Girifna movement, and Faisal Shabo, one of the founders and directors of the Sima Organization for Children’s Rights, were arrested without any charges being brought against them until August 16, when they were released. During their detention, the two activists were subjected to torture, causing Shabo to sustain a severe hemorrhage and a heart attack for which he had to be hospitalized. Family visits to the activists were severely restricted, and al- Ajami was transferred to Port Sudan, 100 miles from his family’s place of residence, making visiting him much more difficult.46 43 Frontline Defenders, “Sudan – Update: Release of Human Rights Defender Ms Mai Shutta and Continued Arbitrary Detention of Mr. Bakry Al-Ajami and Mr. Faisal Shabu,” Aug. 15, 2012, (320) Beginning in August, it became clear that the authorities were seeking to systematically repress civil society organizations, as smear campaigns aiming to damage the reputations of these organizations escalated. At the same time, the Humanitarian Aid Commission summoned representatives of the organizations registered with it and asked them to bring their affairs into compliance with the 2006 Law on Voluntary Work, despite the fact that these organizations had been operating according to the law. In November, the commission carried out surprise inspections of some of these organizations, investigated them with the aim of harassing them, and threatened to shut down their activities. The Ministry of Culture and Information also harassed the cultural organizations registered with it by obstructing the procedures for renewing licenses in preparation for closing them or freezing their activities. In December, the Ministry of Culture and Information and the Humanitarian Aid Commission issued decisions to shut down or suspend a number of organizations in Khartoum and other states. When a delegation representing these organizations was heading to the National Human Rights Commission to submit a complaint regarding the matter on December 30, the police stopped the delegation on their way and prevented it from submitting the complaint. The police further attacked some of the media personnel present at the scene, beating and cursing them.47 On December 18, the activities of the Arry Organization for Human Rights were suspended and six of its employees arrested on charges of receiving foreign funds, working against the interests of the state, and tarnishing Sudan’s image abroad. The Arry Organization works to document abuses committed in the Nuba Mountains and in the Blue Nile region. On December 24, the activities of the Sudanese Studies Center were also frozen for a period of one year based on allegations that its activities represented a threat to national security and that the center had received foreign funds. The executive director of the center, Abdullah Aboul Reish, was detained for a time before being released. On December 26, the registration of the Khatem Adly Center for Enlightenment and Human Development was cancelled and it was removed from the list of voluntary organizations licensed to work in Sudan. Its assets were confiscated, including items belonging to employees at the center.48 47 Advocating Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Publication Campaign and the Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society Organizaitons, “Bayan hawl al-waqfa al- ehtegageyya amam al-qasr al-gomhoury,” Jan. 7, 2013, (321) Meanwhile, the first hearing of the trial of Sudanese activist Jalila Khamees took place on December 18; Jalila had played a prominent role in providing humanitarian aid to displaced persons in South Kordofan and in uncovering the deteriorating situation of areas affected by the conflict in Kordofan. Jalila faced the possibility of being sentenced to death if convicted, as the charges officially brought against her on December 13 included “undermining the constitutional order” and “stirring up a war against the state,” along with lesser charges such as “spreading false information” and “inciting to hatred and sectarian strife.” The security apparatus had arrested Jalila in March 2012, and she remained in solitary confinement for three months until she was transferred to the Om Durman prison in Khartoum.49 Continued Armed Conflict and Its Repercussions on the State of Human Rights in Sudan Despite the secession of South Sudan, agreements between the authorities in Juba and those in Khartoum faltered regarding a number of key issues, chief among them how to deal with the disputed border region of Abyei and how to divide oil profits. These unresolved issues led to increased acts of hostility between the two countries.50 Khartoum attempted to confiscate oil from South Sudan which was being transported across its territory, leading the government in South Sudan to reduce its oil production and completely stop exporting it through Sudan. South Sudan also moved troops to take control of the sources of oil in the disputed area of Higlig, leading to the outbreak of military clashes between the two parties and prompting Sudan to bomb refugee encampments and cities in South Sudan.51 eghlaq marakez thakafeyya bel-sudan,” Jan. 6, 2013, (322) Over 10,000 people from the disputed Abyei area remained displaced in South Sudan, as the option of returning to their homes was considered to be highly dangerous.52 Armed clashes between Sudanese forces and armed groups belonging to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North, which is considered to be loyal to and supported by the government in Juba, continued to affect the Kordofan and Blue Nile regions as well.53 SPLM-North claims that the Sudanese government started to implement plans to assassinate its leaders in the state of South Kordofan and called the security authorities responsible for the assassination of Kheirullah Ismail, head of SPLM-North in Dabib in South Kordofan, who was killed in a market on March 15.54 This conflict led tens of thousands of people to flee to camps for displaced persons, where their only hope for survival is the arrival of trucks bringing humanitarian aid. Despite the fact that the authorities in Khartoum and the “rebels” signed two memorandums of understanding regarding allowing such aid to be delivered unhindered, humanitarian aid is unable to reach those who need it most.55 The number of those who have fled the killing to the border of South Sudan since the beginning of the armed conflict in September 2011 is estimated to be some 169,000 people. These displaced persons face severe difficulties in obtaining food, water, and shelter, and their suffering is exacerbated by the imposition of a ban by the Sudanese government on all forms of trade in all border areas. This has led to a severe shortage of food among those residing in South Kordofan, particularly in the areas under the control of the SPLM-North. This represents a blatant violation of Sudan’s obligation to protect its citizens.56 52 Amnesty International, “One Year On: Failure of Leadership in Sudan and South Sudan has led to Human Rights Crisis.” 53International Crisis Group, “Mana’a endela’a harb wase’a el-netaq bayn al-sudan we ganoun al-sudan.” 54 Hurriyal, “Al-haraka al-sha’abeyya todayen eghteyal al-shaheed khair allah ismail,” Mar. 19, 2012, (323) In May, the United Nations Security Council announced its support for the recommendation presented by the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the United Nations to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced persons by independent organizations. At the end of June, the Sudanese government announced its official acceptance of this recommendation, yet it has imposed arbitrary conditions and failed to allow the delivery of such aid, which emptied its acceptance of the recommendation of its meaning.57 Camps for displaced persons in South Sudan have been subjected to aerial bombings by Sudanese planes.58 Such arbitrary bombings have led to the death, disfigurement, and injury of dozens of civilians and inflicted major damage on their property, including markets, homes, schools, and offices of aid organizations.59 Internationally banned weapons such as cluster bombs have been found in civilian areas which were bombed by Sudanese forces.60 Since September 2011, the Sudanese authorities have banned journalists, independent monitors, and humanitarian organizations from entering the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. With the expiration of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in the region, it has become impossible to document the effects of the continued fighting on civilians in the two states.61 With regards to the amended system of Sudanese citizenship following the independence of South Sudan, the Sudanese government now considers all Sudanese of southern origin to be citizens of South Sudan and that individuals automatically lose their Sudanese citizenship when then obtain the citizenship of South Sudan, “whether de jure or de facto.” The law does not indicate how individuals may be considered to have obtained Sudanese citizenship “de facto.” In practice, implementation of this system threatens to strip between 50,000 and 70,000 people of their Sudanese citizenship, even if they do not seek to obtain citizenship in South Sudan and do not have any connection to or interests in South Sudan.62 57 Amnesty International, “One Year On: Failure of Leadership in Sudan and South Sudan has led to Human Rights Crisis.” 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Ongoing Crackdown on Peaceful Demonstrators, Human Rights Defenders and Journalists: Oral Intervention at the United Nations Human Rights Council.” 61 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Blue Nile Civilians Describe Attacks, Abuses,” Apr. 23, 2012, (324) The Sudanese government further continued to refuse to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, which between 2007 and 2009 issued arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Minister of State for the Interior Minister Ahmed Haroun, who was the security official responsible for Darfur at the time, and Ali Kushayb, the leader of the Janjawid militias, based on charges of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide during the war in Darfur. Nor has Sudan taken steps towards implementing the recommendations issued by the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur in 2009 regarding judicial reformation.63 In early March 2012, the pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court issued a fourth arrest warrant for the current minister of defense, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, who had worked during the war in Darfur in 2003 and 2004 as the minister for the interior, and thus as the direct superior of Minister of State for the Interior Ahmed Haroun. A report issued by the attorney general of the International Criminal Court in mid-June stated that the government continued to fail to uphold its responsibility to cooperate with the court by turning in the wanted persons. The report pointed out that these fugitives of justice continued to use the apparatuses of the state to commit further crimes, referring in this context to the fact that Haroun, who had become the governor of the state of South Kordofan, has incited the government forces fighting opposition militias not to return with prisoners of war, “as we have no place for them,” according to Haroun. The attorney general of the International Criminal Court further pointed out that this kind of rhetoric was previously used by Bashir himself in order to incite government forces in Darfur not to take prisoners of war and to leave the land completely scorched.64 In light of the continued impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of crimes in Darfur, such violations continued into their eighth year. At the beginning of 2012, government bombings of eastern Darfur began anew, leaving a number of civilians dead and destroying several villages.65 In August, a militia attacked the Kisab camp for internally displaced persons, looting homes and markets and killing at least 21 people and forcing all of the 63 Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Rights Record Deteriorates with New Conflicts.” 64 International Criminal Court, “Fifteenth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593,” 2005, (325) camp’s residents – some 25,000 people – to flee into the wilderness, where they struggled to survive without any form of shelter.66 On November 2, a large number of armed men from the al-Berti tribe who belong to the popular defense forces – local militias used by the Sudanese government in parallel to army forces in conflict areas in the country – attacked the town of Sijili, which lies 40 kilometers east of the city of al- Fashir, the capital of the state of North Darfur, and is inhabited by members of the al-Zaghawa tribe. Witnesses stated that the attackers entered the town and opened fire on civilians, looting and setting fire to homes and shops. The attack led to the deaths of 13 civilians, including two infants; a number of others were wounded or abducted. The authorities prevented members of the joint UN-AU Peacekeeping Forces from visiting the area until November 6.67 The joint peacekeeping forces (UNAMID) were attacked by armed groups on various occasions, most recently on October 23, in order to prevent the UNAMID forces from investigating acts of violence committed in the Hishabeh region in North Darfur, where more than 70 civilians were killed due to aerial bombings and clashes between government forces and armed Darfurian factions between September 25 and 27.68 66 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, “Ongoing Crackdown on Peaceful Demonstrators, Human Rights Defenders and Journalists: Oral Intervention at the United Nations Human Rights Council”; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, “25 alf nazeh men a’amal o’nf gadeeda fi darfur,” Aug. 11, 2012, (326) Algeria Algeria is governed by an authoritarian regime based on limited party pluralism, a system which leads in practice to one-party rule with several ineffectual parties - unable to play a real political role - dotting the landscape. The situation is exacerbated by severe restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression, including the near absolute control of the media, and the suppression of the right to peaceful assembly, trade union liberties, and the right to freedom of association. Particularly since the declaration of a state of emergency in the 1990s, the military establishment has played a dominant role in administering political life and the public sphere in Algeria. At this time, the security and intelligence apparatus and the armed forces were given free rein to commit grave human rights abuses in the name of combating the violence and terrorism unleashed after the authorities abrogated the results of the 1991 parliamentary elections, in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had won a majority of seats. To prevent repercussions of the Arab Spring uprisings from spreading to Algeria, the Algerian president vowed in early 2011 to institute serious reforms to strengthen liberties and lifted the state of emergency. However, this was accompanied by granting exceptional powers to the army under the pretext of bolstering counterterrorism measures. Further legislative changes similarly gave the security apparatus exceptional prerogatives to arrest (327) suspects in terrorism cases, including in preventive detention.1These changes effectively ensured the perpetuation of the basic elements of the state of emergency. The hopes that the reforms promised by the president would be realized have evaporated. Nearly two years after the state of emergency was officially ended, Algeria had seen no real advancement of public liberties or respect for human rights. On the contrary, in early 2012 the authorities approved several new bills that impose further restrictions on NGO activity and press freedoms. A new law governing political parties was also passed that maintained the same restrictions as the old legislation, including the ban on certain Islamist factions from engaging in party activity. Heavy legal restrictions on peaceful assemblies or protests in the capital also remained in place, while the security apparatus continues to pursue those involved in such protests, both in the capital and elsewhere. The imposition of prison sentences continues to be used to intimidate journalists, media workers, and bloggers, just as security harassment and prosecution by a non-independent judiciary are used to intimidate and punish rights advocates and defenders of trade union freedoms and economic and social rights. In context of restricted liberties, parliamentary elections were held in 2012, despite calls to boycott them. Dozens of those who advocated the boycott were arrested; some were prosecuted. The elections failed to improve the regime’s image in the eyes of the international community, despite the fact that the authorities welcomed international observers and adopted an electoral system that led to a significant improvement in women’s representation in the parliament. The elections resulted in the ruling party winning a majority of seats and were severely criticized due both to the executive’s control over the selection of election supervisors and to the use of a proportional list system that set a minimum threshold of 5 percent of the vote to obtain representation in parliament, which fragmented the vote to the benefit of the ruling party. Political Participation and the Rotation of Power As part of the top-down reforms promised by the president in 2011 to stave off the impact of the “Arab spring” in Algeria, parliamentary elections were held on May 10, 2012. Official circles were keen to use these elections to improve the country’s international image, particularly since they took place in a political environment utterly hostile to liberties. 1 On the state of emergency, see the CIHRS annual report for 2011, “Fractured Walls, New Horizons,” (328) To create the appearance of free elections, the authorities lifted a ten-year ban on the establishment of new political parties. Between January 15, when the new law on political parties entered into force, and March 26, the last day to file for candidacy, the Interior Ministry approved 21 new parties, thus giving the impression of a political opening. However, the ban on political activity imposed on many who were previously involved in the FIS was not lifted.2 The authorities permitted extensive monitoring by international and regional election observers, including from the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations, and the National Democratic Institute from the United States. Prior to the elections, the authorities also passed a law to increase women’s representation in elected bodies by establishing a quota for women on party and independent electoral lists. Under the law, lists that do not include the stipulated number of female candidates are rejected. The move lent a better face to the electoral process, as did the authorities’ decision to grant financial incentives to political parties based on the number of female candidates included on their lists for parliamentary, local, or provincial elections.3 Thanks to the law, women won 32 percent of the seats in the parliament (146 of 462 seats), compared to only 31 of 389 seats in the previous parliament.4 The Algerian elections law created two committees to supervise elections.5 The first, the National Supervisory Committee for the Parliamentary Elections, is a judicial committee, but the executive has power over it insofar as the president selects its members, rather than the judges themselves. The second, the National Committee to Monitor Parliamentary Elections, includes by law representatives of the parties participating in the elections and representatives chosen by independent candidates. The committee is supposed the monitor all phases of the electoral process and coordinate and exchange information with the National Supervisory Committee. 2 Law 04-12 of Jan. 12, 2012 on political parties, published in the Official Gazette, no. 2, Jan. 15, 2012, p. 9, (329) The law provides for closed proportional lists and requires that any party or independent list win at least 5 percent of the vote to obtain a seat in parliament. In effect, this meant that much of the electorate’s vote was wasted, particularly the votes of those who supported new parties, whose participation fragmented the electorate to the benefit of the large, traditional parties. In particular, the ruling party, the National Liberation Front, benefited by this phenomenon and won 208 seats in parliament.6 It is important to note that the Algerian authorities preceded the elections with a campaign targeting political and rights activists. Political activist Abduh Bendjoudi, with the Independent Youth Movement for Change, was assaulted and detained along with 24 activists from other organizations, including SOS-Disappeared. The detainees included Fatima Yous, Djedjigua Cherguit, Hacene Ferhati, and Slimane Hamitouche, who were arrested on April 14 after participating in a peaceful assembly calling for a boycott of the elections.7 Harassment of Human Rights Defenders and Union Activists The Algerian authorities inaugurated 2012 by adopting a law which imposes draconian restrictions on civic work and the freedom of association. The law applies a system of prior authorization to establish NGOs and imposes extremely severe restrictions on civic activity, particularly regarding funding and cooperation with international organizations. It permits NGO activities to be suspended pursuant to administrative orders and provides for prison sentences against those who violate the provisions of the law.8 The authorities also continued to postpone the granting of legal status to several associations and human rights organizations, among them SOS- Disappeared, whose application the authorities refuse to approve on the grounds that the association must first obtain an approved meeting hall for the convening of their founding meeting, despite the fact that the law does not require such a condition.9 6 For final election results, see (330) Under Law 14-90/1990, the establishment of independent trade unions also requires a prior permit from the Ministry of Labor, and requests for permits of prospective unions are usually rejected or delayed indefinitely. Since the state of emergency was lifted, the authorities have rejected licenses for five trade unions, among them the National Independent Union of Central Bank Employees for Agriculture and Rural Development and the National Union of Vocational Training Workers.10 The year 2012 also saw increasing security harassment and prosecution of human rights defenders and defenders of union freedoms and economic and social rights. On January 18, Hadj Aïssa Abbas and Mohamed Seddik Bouamer, representatives of Laghouat branch of the National Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Unemployed (CNDDC) were sentenced to 18 months in prison on charges of unlawful assembly, after they took part in a peaceful demonstration demanding the rights of the unemployed.11 On April 18, Abdelkader Kherba, a member of the CNDDC and the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), was detained while photographing a sit-in held by court clerks. He was sentenced to one year in prison (suspended) on May 3 after being charged with inciting to an illegal assembly.12 Kherba was again arrested on August 21 and was detained for three weeks on charges of insulting a public servant in the course of duty; he was acquitted on September 2.13 Against the background of Kherba’s first trial, the authorities arrested Yacine Zaïd, the head of the Laghouat branch of the LADDH; Abdou Bendjoudi, a member of the Independent Youth Movement for Change; Athmane Aouameur, a member of the Network for the Defense of Liberty and Dignity; and Lakhdar Bouziani, a member of the National Independent Union of Public Administration Workers (SNAPAP) after they took part in a peaceful sit-in on April 26 in front of the Sidi Mohammed court to condemn 10 Ibid. 11 EMHRN, “Harassment of Union Leaders and Bans on Demonstrations Continue in Algeria despite the Repeal of the State of Emergency,” Mar. 2, 2012, (331) Kherba’s trial. They were referred to trial in the Bab al-Ouad court on charges of inciting to an unarmed assembly, but the court referred the case to the prosecution after ruling on September 28 that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.14 On October 1, the police arrested rights activist Yacine Zaïd while on his way to the city of Hasi Mesoud, located 800 km south of Algiers. Zaïd was physically assaulted before being detained on charges of insulting the police. On October 8, the Ouargla court convicted him and gave him to a suspended sentence of six months in prison.15 On June 19, the authorities detained 70-year-old Hadj Mohammed Smaïn, a prominent leader of LADDH, after the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s conviction issued ten years ago, sentencing him to two months in prison on defamation charges due to his involvement in exposing the issue of the forced disappearances seen in the country in the 1990s. Smaïn was released on July 5 as part of a presidential amnesty granted to mark Algeria’s Independence Day.16 As will be discussed below, several rights and labor activists were also detained for participating in various peaceful assemblies and protests. Suppression of Peaceful Assemblies The authorities continued to deal severely with all forms of peaceful protest. On February 26, 40 trade unionists were arrested in front of the press building in the capital, where they were staging a sit-in to demand the rights of the unemployed and marginalized workers; they were released later the same day. The detainees included Tahar Belabès, the official spokesman for the CNDDC, and trade unionist Malika Khalil. The same day 40 teachers were arrested during a sit-in in front of the presidential palace demanding permanent contracts.17 14 FIDH, “Algérie: renvoi pour ‘incompétence’ des poursuites ouvertes contre quatre défenseurs,” Oct. 1, 2012, (332) On April 24, the police used force to disperse several citizens who attempted to stage a sit-in in front of the presidential palace, leading to several injuries, particularly among women; some 100 people were arrested.18 On May 7, the authorities arrested some 200 workers, among them 65 women, who belong to the Independent Union of Pre-Employment Contract Workers while they were taking part in an assembly in the capital demanding adequate jobs; they were released later the same day.19 On June 9, police in civilian clothes used violence to remove seven trade unionists occupying a street in the capital in solidarity with colleagues on a hunger strike and in protest at the authorities’ disregard for justice workers’ demands and their refusal to speak with representatives of the National Federation of Justice, a subsidiary of SNAPAP.20 According to numerous media sources—although not confirmed by the CIHRS—social protests this year saw a notable development when thousands of soldiers belonging to the National Guard began demonstrating and demanding government recognition of their sacrifices during the 15-year fight against terrorism. In the first week of July, security forces blocked a march of several thousand soldiers, who had gathered in Blida, 40 km west of Algiers, toward the capital. Police dispersed them with batons and water hoses. The soldiers were seeking fair financial compensation for retirees, the addition of the overtime that they had served over the past 15 years to their pensions, and improved working conditions.21 and Bans on Demonstrations Continue in Algeria despite the Repeal of the State of Emergency>. 18 FIDH, “Harassment against Those Who Struggle for Human Rights Must Stop,” Apr. 25, 2012, (333) Restriction of Press and Media Freedoms Despite the adoption of a new media law early in the year which was marketed as a major step toward reform and the advancement of media freedoms, the exercise of such freedoms continues to place Algerians at risk of prosecution and prison sentences. In practice, the law contains 32 articles which allow for the restriction and criminalization of freedom of expression through the use of vague language, such as infringements on Islam or other religions and contraventions of “the national identity and cultural values of society,” “the exigencies of state security and national defense,” “the exigencies of public order,” “the country’s economic interests,” or “the exigencies of the state’s foreign policy.”22 On June 25, Fatima Zahraa Amara, a journalist with the online journal Akher Sa’a, was sentenced to two months in prison, fined 20,000 Algerian dinars, and required to pay compensation of 100,000 dinars after she was convicted of libel and slander against a former hospital director who had been accused of sexual harassment by a female hospital employee. On June 15, journalist Mansour Si Mohammed was also sentenced to two months in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars after he was convicted of libel and slander against the director of a local tax collection office.23 In early May, the security apparatus arrested blogger Tareq Memari for broadcasting videos advocating a boycott of the parliamentary elections. One of the videos showed him burning his voting card and tearing down a poster. He faced several charges, including the destruction of administrative documents, inciting to assembly, insulting a statutory body, and destroying the property of others. The prosecutor asked for a sentence of three years in prison to be imposed. On June 27, he was given a suspended sentence of eight months in prison and fined 100,000 dinars.24 22 Committee to Protect Journalists, “In Algeria, New Media Law Stifles Free Expression,” Jan. 25, 2012, (334) Morocco Over the course of more than a decade, Morocco has maintained a relatively positive human rights record in comparison to other Arab countries. The monarchy has long attempted to maintain power and quell popular dissent through deft political initiatives, including limited acquiescence to the demands of rights organizations and pro-democracy forces. As such, Morocco has often been perceived as the country in the region most likely to offer an Arab example for political and democratic top-down reform. Before King Hassan II left the throne, he had adopted a “democratic approach” which included the alternation of power by allowing the winning party in elections for the legislature to form a government. In fact, the King commissioned Abdel Rahman al-Yussefi, the most prominent leader of the opposition, to form the government, due to his position as head of the Socialist Union Party, which held a plurality of seats in the Parliament at the time. This openness on the part of the Moroccan monarchy also allowed significant space for the work of human rights organizations and civil society associations, which experienced a period of relative thriving. After King Mohamed VI assumed power, he responded further to the demands of rights organizations by supporting an initiative to reveal the truth about grave abuses committed under King Hassan II through a transitional justice initiative. An independent Equity and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2003 which was authorized to uncover the truth about the (335) abuses of the past, to offer compensation to those found to be victims, and to submit recommendations for making a clean break with the type of grave violations that were committed in the past. With the first signs of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, the monarchy sought to contain domestic repercussions of this movement by forming a committee to draft a new constitution for the country which would contain more modern provisions, affirm the pluralistic nature of Moroccan society religiously, linguistically, and culturally, and include multiple references to human rights and the international conventions that guarantee them. However, the new constitution failed to address the imbalance of power in the country, retaining the monarchy’s supremacy and ensuring that the king remains immune to criticism due to his position as the “prince of the believers.” Following the adoption of the new constitution, early parliamentary elections were held. The King then appointed the Islamist Justice and Development Party, which won a plurality of the votes, to form a government, as is stipulated by the new amendments to the constitution. Unfortunately, ten years after the beginning of the transitional justice initiative, the most important recommendations of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to put an end to grave abuses have not been implemented, including those related to guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and security reform. Rather, security violations increased alongside increasing terrorist attacks since the 2003 bombings in Casablanca. The increase in acts of social protest in the most marginalized areas of the country, due to their high rates of poverty and unemployment, has been accompanied by intensified police repression and the subjection of peaceful protestors to unfair trials. Acts of political protest have been similarly repressed. Morocco continues to criminalize free expression and media freedoms by refusing to abolish prison sentences for crimes related to expression of opinion. The authorities do not allow any criticism of the monarchy; they have similarly cracked down on speech which may be considered harmful to Islam and punished those who breach certain red lines by discussing issues of corruption and misuse of power. The controversy over Western Sahara has become a primary cause of human rights violations in Morocco. The authorities consider calls for self- determination for the Sahrawi people a breach of Moroccan sovereignty and a threat to Moroccan territorial integrity which must not be allowed. Therefore, any demonstrations held within the Sahrawi territory – even peaceful gatherings – are dealt with through the use of excessive force, and (336) harsh restrictions are imposed on the activities of Sahrawi rights organizations, most of which do not enjoy legal recognition. Political activists and rights advocates in the territory are continually subjected to physical attacks, arbitrary arrest, torture, and unfair trials. Throughout the year 2012, human rights in Morocco continued to be affected by the same types of violations which pervaded the country in recent years, including the spread of excessive force to suppress acts of political and social protest, the use of collective punishment against residents of regions which witness frequent social protests, unfair trials of detainees, and the failure to investigate claims of defendants regarding being tortured and forced to make incriminating confessions, which may be the only evidence brought against them. Journalists, bloggers, artists, and political activists have also been prosecuted. The territory of the Western Sahara also continued to witness widespread violations which severely restricted the civil and political rights of the Sahrawi people, including the right to self-determination. These abuses were accompanied by increased suppression of gatherings, further security attacks on activists – including through the practice of torture – and continued use of courts which lack basic standards for fair trials. The Right to Peaceful Assembly The authorities showed a measure of tolerance for political protest, while at the same time dealing with social protest movements through repression. On several occasions, the security apparatus intervened violently to disperse marches and sit-ins, leading in most cases to widespread injuries and arrests. Violent security measures were used throughout the year to confront peaceful protests held by unemployed citizens, and in most cases dozens of protestors were detained or injured due to the use of force to disperse them or the physical attacks which occurred at the time of arrest.1 Several violations were recorded in relation to what became known in the media as “Black Wednesday” (February 29, 2012), when police used violence to disperse a peaceful protest of unemployed persons who had gathered in front of the Ministry of Public Sector Modernization. This police 1 Moroccan Association of Human Rights, “Bayan fara’ ar-rabat howl al-i’atiqalat wa al- isabat fe sufuf majmu’at at-tanseq al-midani al-utur al-‘olya al-mu’atala,” Feb. 16, 2012, (337) response resulted in several injuries.2 At the same time, police intervened violently to disperse a peaceful march organized by the National Federation of Workers and Officials of Local Collectives, which belongs to the Moroccan Labor Union. 30 people were injured, including Abdel Salam Belfahel, president of the Rabat branch of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, and dozens of those who had participated in the march were brought for prosecution, among them 24 members of the National Association of Unemployed Graduates. The attacks also targeted the offices of the Moroccan Labor Union and the protestors who were inside.3 The police further forcibly confronted a peaceful protest organized by the “al- ‘Ayalat Jayat” movement out of solidarity with political prisoners who were holding a hunger strike. Two women were arrested from among the members of the movement, namely Safaa Essam and Fatima al-Kam.4 On March 8, the police began a campaign to terrorize residents of the city Beni Bouayach at night. They broke into homes and terrorized those inside, cursing them and arresting some. It is important to note that Beni Bouayach is located in rural northern Morocco, where frequent demonstrations are held to protest the economic and social marginalization of the region. Police also broke down doors of some shops and used clubs, stones, water hoses, and tear gas to confront the protestors.5 Six of those detained have received sentences of between 4 and 6 years in prison.6 Similarly, the city of Taza in eastern Morocco was also targeted by police attacks after demonstrations broke out on a nearly daily basis throughout January and February in protest of the increased cost of living and high unemployment rates among young people. The police surrounded the city and used violence to disperse and chase down protestors, resulting in the injury of 150 people and dozens of arrests.7 The families of those detained organized demonstrations and blocked roads when the detainees were 2Moroccan Association of Human Rights, “Fara’ al-jama’ayya bir-rabat yudin al-qama’ al- khatir l-al-ihtijajat as-silmeyya yom al-arba’a’29 febrayer,” Feb. 29, 2012, (338) brought before court, which led to violent clashes with the police, who stormed a number of homes after breaking down their doors, attacking residents and threatening the women with rape after calling them prostitutes.8 Six of those arrested during these events were sentenced to ten months in prison; seven others were issued a suspended sentence of five months in prison.9 On June 5, police removed the tents of protestors who were holding a sit-in in the city of Khouribga in central Morocco. During the incident, several injuries of varying severity were sustained and dozens of protestors were arrested, some of whom were referred to trial.10 Anti-corruption union protests held in May and June were met with similar violence by security personnel in the city of Ouarzazate in southeastern Morocco.11 On June 10, police forcibly dispersed a peaceful march which had been called for by the February 20th movement in the city of Imzouren in northern Morocco. A number of protestors were detained, and some were injured.12 Following the conclusion of a peaceful protest in Casablanca on July 22, police arrested a number of members of the February 20th movement and referred them to trial on charges of organizing an unauthorized gathering, insulting the police establishment, and attacking policemen. The court did not take into consideration that the only evidence presented was the confessions of the activists themselves, who affirmed that they had been subjected to torture and some to sexual assault in order to force them to sign confessions condemning them of the charges brought against them. The court refused to investigate the officers who claimed to have been assaulted or to hear the testimonies of witnesses. Five of the movement’s members 8Moroccan Association of Human Rights, “At-taqrir al-naha’I li-lajnat at-taqassi fe ahdath taza,” Mar. 28, 2012, (339) were sentenced to up to 10 months in prison, and another member was issued a suspended prison sentence.13 Other demonstrations called for by the February 20th movement on August 22 in the capital and other cities were also subjected to violent police interventions, including beatings with clubs and sticks, kicking, punching, and insulting protestors and chasing them through the streets.14 On December 28, the police prevented a march called for by residents of Sidi Yusef ben Ali in Marrakesh to protest increasing prices. The police closed all roads leading to the city council, surrounded the old quarter of Sidi Yusef ben Ali, and used tear gas, water hoses, and armored vehicles. 32 people, including security officers, were injured, and 70 people were arrested, most of whom were under the age of 18 and were later released. The protestors had resorted to setting fire to garbage containers and throwing rocks in an attempt to confront the security forces. On December 31, the ten adults who had been detained appeared before the public prosecutor and were referred to court on the same day; their families were barred from entering the court.15 Violations to Freedom of Expression and Opinion On February 13, Abdel Samad al-Haidur, an activist with the February 20th movement, was sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 15,000 Moroccan dirham for having criticized the King in a video that he had posted on YouTube. Similarly, Walid Bahoman, a student, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on charges of “attacking the sacred values of the nation” for having published material on Facebook that ridiculed the King.16 On May 11, rap singer Maaz Balghawat was sentenced to one year in prison on charges of “insulting the police” in one of his songs, which had criticized corruption among the police.17 13Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Contested Confessions Used to Imprison Protesters,” Sep. 17, 2012, (340) On May 18, the poet Yunis Belkhadim of the February 20th movement was sentenced to two years in prison and a fine of 5,000 dirham on charges of attacking members of the security forces at the Dar al-Hamra police station following the arrest of rap singer Maaz Balghawat. Some sources indicated that the severe punishment of Belkhadim may have been due to his having ripped of a picture of the King while participating in a march in Casablanca. 18 On June 1, activist and blogger Mohamed Socrates was arrested on charges of drug trafficking. The Marrakesh Court of First Instance sentenced him to two years in prison and a fine of 5,000 dirham. Sources close to Socrates affirmed that he was forced to sign a record stating that he had had one half of a kilogram of hashish in his possession under threat that if he did not, the same charge would be brought against his handicapped brother or his elderly father. Socrates is well-known as a supporter of secularism and for his writings which sardonically criticize the government.19 On August 22, Omar Broksy, a correspondent with the Agence France Press, was attacked by police while covering a peaceful protest called for by the February 20th movement,20 and on October 4 the authorities issued an order stripping him of his credentials as a reporter.21 The Minister of Communications ordered a ban on the February 2 issue of the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur when the journal published a cartoon picture of God taken from the French-Iranian film “Persepolis” (a 18Moroccan Organization for Human Rights, “Bayan bi-khusus al-hokm as-sadir fe haq as- seid yunis bilkhadim,” June 25, 2012, (341) girl from Persia).22 A particular issue of the French newspaper l’Oberlin was also banned from distribution, because it included an insulting picture of the prophet Mohamed.23 The Spanish newspaper “El País” was also banned because of its publication of excerpts from a book by Catherine Graciet and Eric Laurent titled “The Predator King”, which discusses the wealth of King Mohamed VI.24 Islamic preacher Abdullah al-Nahari issued a fatwa calling for “spilling the blood” of al-Mukhtar al-Ghazyawi, editor-in-chief of the newspaper “al- Ahdath al-Maghribeyya,” and affirming the “acceptability of killing him,” because he had defended personal freedoms and sexual relations between two consenting adults during a televised interview on an Arab satellite channel.25 Torture and Enforced Disappearance The deterioration of prison conditions and the spread of practices of torture and physical and psychological assault of detainees and prisoners continued to be reported. Such practices routinely affected Sahrawi activists as well as those involved in various political and social movements. The National Council for Human Rights affirms the continuation of practices of torture and ill-treatment in prisons, including beatings with sticks and plastic tubes, suspension by handcuffs in the doorways of prison cells for extended periods of time, use of wooden rods and hot irons, pricking with needles, stripping of 22Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Weeklies Censored for Depicting God, the Prophet Muhammad,” Feb. 10, 2012, (342) clothes, and insults and curses. The report of the National Council for Human Rights pointed to the existence of rooms specifically used for torture inside a number of prisons and penal institutions and indicated that mechanisms for supervision and inspection of prisons are not enforced. The report stressed the importance of creating a work plan to combat torture in cooperation with the government, the parliament, the judiciary, and civil society.26 On January 20, Sahrawi political prisoner Bila Sheikhato Ali Salem was subjected to physical attacks and insults by three employees in the local prison of Lakhal in Laayoune in southern Morocco, during a visit by his family and after he had received a paper with phone numbers that he had wanted to call via the telephone in the prison. He sustained injuries to his nose and mouth, and the visit was arbitrarily ended.27 On February 2, another Sahrawi political prisoner, Mohamed Dihani, was subjected to torture and insults by the administration of the prison in Salé. His hands were bound behind his back and he was suspended in painful positions and cursed and insulted.28 On May 6, Sufian al-Azzami was abducted while he was traveling from Fez to Casablanca to look for work. That same day, he had called his mother to inform her that he had arrived in Casablanca and would return soon to Fez. When she did not receive any news from him for several days, his family began to search for him and informed the police of his disappearance. His father learned that the numbers from which al-Azzami had called were telephone numbers of one of the general intelligence offices in Casablanca, at which point the authorities denied any connection to his disappearance or having arrested him.29 On May 21, the family learned that he was in Razi Psychiatric Hospital in Salé. Al-Azzami stated that he had been subjected to 26National Council for Human Rights, “Azmet as-sugun: masu’leyya mushtaraka,” Oct. 30, 2012, (343) beatings and torture, yet he could not identify the responsible party or the place where he had been attacked.30 On May 17, Ahmed Ben Miloud, an Algerian prisoner held in the Salé prison, died following an extended hunger strike which he had begun 70 days before. Ben Miloud had been charged with targeting the Algerian consulate in Oujda after he had been found with a handgun in his possession while attempting to enter the consulate last year. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison, and it was reported that he was subjected to torture in his prison cell as well as to severe beatings and rape with rods. The Moroccan Coalition for Human Rights, which includes 18 rights organizations, stated that the death of Ben Miloud reflects the deteriorating status of those held in Moroccan prisons and the disregard of the authorities for their legitimate demands.31 On May 28, Mohamed Hajib, a detainee in the Salé prison, was subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including severe beatings, suspension in painful positions for extended periods of time, and threatened rape, which caused him to attempt suicide.32 Minority and Migrant Rights Despite some positive steps taken to address the problems of discrimination and marginalization of the Amazigh (Berber) minority, particularly the launching of Channel 8 in the Amazighi language, the inclusion of Amazighi as an official language of Morocco in the constitution, and the continuation of a program to teach Amazighi, the rights report issued by the “Amazighi Network for Citizenship” indicated that some of the educational programs used in Morocco continue to include texts and data which encourage discrimination and marginalization and instill the idea that Amazighi history, civilization, and culture are inferior. The report criticizes the fact that the Amazighi language is not available universally in public administration and 30Alkarama, “Al-maghreb: tam al-‘athour ‘ala safyan al-‘azami,” May 23, 2012, (344) state institutions, such as hospitals, police stations, and regional administrative centers.33 It was also reported that migrants from Africa were subjected to various forms of violence, which contravenes Morocco’s obligations under the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families. On June 5, the Moroccan authorities set out to arrest a group of Africans after they met with members of the National Council for Human Rights in the city of Taourirt. The police had set an ambush for them near the headquarters of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights and were able to detain Mohamed Sonje from Cameroon.34 The Sahrawi Conflict and Its Effect on Human Rights The controversy over the Western Sahara’s relationship to Morocco remained a major cause of human rights violations in the country and within the territory of the Western Sahara. Political activists and human rights defenders face harassment, while peaceful protests are repressed and human rights organizations in the territory are refused legal recognition. Arrests, torture, and unfair trials are also frequently witnessed. On January 6, police arrested rights activist Hassana al-Waly in the city of Dakhla following violent protests in the city during the last week of September, 2011.35 On April 18, the Laayoune Court sentenced him to three years in prison36 on charges of attacking workers, inciting and sharing in blocking public roadways, and participating in protests.37 33Amazigh Network for Citizenship, “Taqrir a-shabaka al-amazigheyya min ‘ajl al-mowattana howl al-huquq al-loghaweyya wa a-thaqafeyya al-amazigheyya b-al-maghreb,” May 21, 2012, (345) On April 14, Sahrawi rights activist Mamai Hanon was physically and verbally assaulted in the city of Dakhla while being interrogated regarding his reasons for meeting with advisors from the American and British embassies and with international observers from Spain. When Hanon refused to give any information about his rights activities, the police accused him of “attacking an employee who was performing his professional duties.”38 On April 4, 19 Sahrawi political and rights activists who were being held in the local prison of Lakhal in Laayoune were subjected to harassment by the prison administration following their return from the first hearing of their trial. The activists had held up signs calling for the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination; as punishment, the prison administration denied them breaks outside of their cells as well as contact with their families, their lawyers, and even other detainees in the prison.39 On January 7, the authorities arrested 16-year-old Gowhar Bougarfa following his participation in a peaceful protest calling for the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The Laayoune Court sentenced him in a closed hearing to one month in prison.40 On February 23, 34 Sahrawi women were injured when police intervened to break up a demonstration called for by the coordinating committee of Akdim Izik to express solidarity with 23 Sahrawi political detainees who were undertaking a hunger strike in Sale prison.41 On April 26, security forces as-sahara’ al-gharbeyya ahkaman qaseyya bi-haq nushata’ wa mu’ataqalin siyassiyyin sahrawiyyin,” Apr. 19, 2012, (346) dispersed a peaceful demonstration in Laayoune which had been called for by the Akdim Izik coordinating committee to demand the release of Sahrawi political prisoners and to denounce the plundering of natural resources. The police arrested activists al-Mahgoub Ayyach and Mustafa Lama’ and injured 11 participants in the protest.42 On May 8, the city of Guelmim in southern Morocco was blockaded by police to prevent peaceful demonstrations in front of the regional hospital which had been called for by activists to protest the spread of bribery and corruption and the absence of health services. Despite the police blockade, a number of citizens were able to reach the hospital, and efforts to disperse them led to dozens of injuries.43 Similarly, security forces broke up a number of demonstrations in Laayoune and arrested numerous protestors.44 On July 23, nine people were injured following their attempt to break the security blockade which had been imposed on the house of union activist Ahmed al-Diyah and the street leading to it.45 On May 11, the authorities transferred Mostafa al-Budani and Mohamed Bizi to the Lakhal prison in Laayoune for their participation in a protest condemning repressive practices and expressing solidarity with Sahrawi political prisoners.46 On March 5, the First Instance Court in Guelmim in southern Morocco sentenced a number of Sahrawi youth to two months in prison following their participation in a peaceful protest.47 On March 28, the Court of Appeals in Laayoune sentenced Saleh al-Saghir to eight months in prison on charges of having participated in protests in the city of Dakhla in 2011, 42 Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State, “Bayan a’ajil: as-sulutat al-maghribeyya taqma’ tathahira silmeyya wa tu’ataqil nashitan wa tusib ahad ‘ashar musharikan,” Apr. 28, 2012, (347) despite the fact that al-Saghir had proven that he had been in a place 287 kilometers from Dakhla at the time of the protests.48 On April 11, the Appeals Court in Laayoune sentenced Sahrawi political prisoner Ghali Bouhla to one and a half years in prison on charges of forming a criminal gang, attempting premeditated murder, and carrying knives as weapons. Bouhla stated that his arrest was meant to punish him for his political positions; his family was assaulted in their home after they denounced his arrest and called for his release.49 On April 18, the Appeals Court in Laayoune issued harsh sentences against six human rights defenders, ranging from 1-3 years in prison. These sentences came in the wake of the events that occurred in Dakhla in 2011. The court refused to investigate claims of the defendants that they had been tortured to force them to confess to the charges brought against them.50 On July 11, the Appeals Court in Laayoune sentenced Sahrawi citizens Mostafa al-Budani and Mohamed Nadour to eight months in prison following their participation in a protest held in the district of Lahachicha on the 39th anniversary of the founding of the Polisario front.51 As a continuation of the restrictions imposed on the work of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights in the Western Sahara, the authorities banned the Association’s branch in Laayoune from organizing a peaceful march on February 19 which had been set to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the February 20th movement. Security forces surrounded the offices of the 48Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders, “Al-hokm bi-08 ashhur sijnan nafizhan ‘ala al-mu’ataqal as-sahrawi ’saleh as-saghir’ mahkamet al-iste’naf / as-sahara’ al-gharbeyya,” Mar. 28, 2012, (348) Association and blocked the streets leading to the building where they are located to prevent the march from occurring.52 52Frontline Defenders, “Morocco: Attack against Yousuf Abu Hilala Member of the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) and Banning of a Peaceful AMDH Rally,” Feb. 22, 2012, (349) (350) Acknowledgements The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) would like to express its appreciation for the many national, regional, and international human rights organizations and research institutions that persistently monitor, study, and analyze important developments to the situation of human rights in the Arab region. Without their efforts, it would have been impossible to publish the present report, for the information that these organizations have provided -whether through their various publications or on their websites- was essential to its writing and preparation. Furthermore, several of these organizations reviewed preliminary drafts of this report and provided up-to- date information to be included in the final version. CIHRS would also like to thank the researchers in several Arab states who worked with us to prepare this report. Finally, CIHRS expresses its gratitude for the contributions and recommendations presented by members of the CIHRS International Advocacy Program’s Advisory Board, which includes members from 11 Arab countries, as well as by members of the CIHRS Board of Directors. The findings and conclusions of the report do not necessarily represent the points of view of any of these individual researchers, advisors, or organizations. Nor does this report constitute their positions as a group. CIHRS notes that the order of the following list of organizations whose research and consultation aided the creation of this report does not have any particular significance. (351) National Organizations Bahrain 5. Bahrain Center for Human Rights http://www.bahrainrights.org/ 6. Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights http://www.byshr.org Iraq 7. NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq http://www.ncciraq.org/ 8. Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative http://www.iraqicivilsociety.org Egypt 9. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights http://www.eohr.org 10. The Egyptian Association for Community Participation Enhancement http://www.mosharka.org 11. Al Nadim Centre for Psychological Rehabilitation for Victims of Violence and Torture http://alnadeem.org 12. New Woman Research Center http://www.nwrcegypt.org 13. The Center for Trade Union and Workers' Services http://ctuws.blogspot.com 14. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights http://www.eipr.org/ 15. Hisham Mubarak Law Center http://www.hmlc-egy.org 16. Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies http://www.andalusitas.net/ 17. The Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights http://ecwronline.org 18. Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance http://www.cewla.org/ 19. The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights http://ecesr.com/ 20. Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression http://www.en.afteegypt.org/ 21. No to Military Trials for Civilians http://en.nomiltrials.com/ 22. The National Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Expression http://ta3beer.com 23. The Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession www.acijlp.org 24. National Community for Human Rights and Law http://nchrl.blogspot.com Lebanon 25. Maharat Foundation http://www.maharatfoundation.org/ 26. The Palestinian Human Rights Organization http://www.palhumanrights.org 27. Lebanese Center for Research and Consulting http://www.center-lcrc.com 28. Khiam Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture http://www.khiamcenter.org/ne 29. Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness) http://www.pahrw.org/ar 30. The Anti-Racism Movement http://www.antiracismmovement.com (352) Morocco 31. The Moroccan Association for Human Rights http://www.amdh.org.ma 32. The Moroccan Coalition for Human Rights Groups 33. National Human Rights Council http://ccdh.org.ma/?lang=en 34. Dignity Forum for Human Rights http://fddh-association.com 35. Amazigh Network for Citizenship www.reseauamazigh.org 36. Moroccan Instance for Human Rights http://www.instance-mdh.org 37. The Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State www.asvdh.net/ 38. The Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) http://www.codesaso.com/ 39. The Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights http://lmddh.tadwena.com/ Saudi Arabia 40. The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula http://www.cdhrap.net 41. Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association http://www.acprahr.org/ 42. Monitor of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia https://www.facebook.com/groups/40258229626 43. Adala Center for Human Rights www.adalacenter.net 44. Asharq Center for Human Rights http://alsharqcenter.com Sudan 45. Journalists for Human Rights https://jhr-online.org/ 46. African Center for Justice and Peace Studies http://www.acjps.org/home.html/ Syria 47. Syrian Human Rights Organization http://www.shro-syria.com 48. Kurdish Organization for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Freedoms in Syria http://dadkurd.co.cc 49. Syrian Human Rights League http://www.shrl.org 50. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights http://www.syriahr.com 51. The Syrian Human Rights Committee http://www.shrc.org 52. The Arab Organization for Human Rights-Syria http://www.aohrs.org/ Tunisia 53. Committee for the Respect of Liberties and Human Rights https://www.facebook.com/pages/CRLDHT/136483289697861 54. Tunisian Association of Democratic Women http://femmesdemocrates.org/ 55. National Observatory for Press, Publishing, and Creation Freedom http://www.anhri.net/tunisia/olpec (353) 56. Tunisian Anti-Torture Association http://www.anhri.net/?cat=193 57. The National Committee to Support the Families of the Mining Basin 58. Liberté et Equité 59. The Tunisian Observatory for Union Rights and Freedoms http://nakabi.maktoobblog.com/ 60. The National Instance for Information and Communication Reform http://www.inric.tn 61. Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights www.ltdh.org Yemen 62. Sisters’ Arab Forum for Human Rights http://saf-yemen.org 63. National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (Hood) http://www.hoodonline.org 64. Yemeni Organization for Defending Rights and Democratic Freedoms http://www.hurryat.org/en/ 65. Southern Observatory for Human Rights http://sohr-aden.org/ 66. The Center for Training and Protecting Journalists' Freedoms (CTPJF) http://ctpjf.org/ 67. Women Journalists Without Chains http://womenpress.org 68. The Center for Progressive Media www.alealamy.net Occupied Palestinian Territories 69. Al–Haq (Ramallah) http://www.alhaq.org/ 70. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (Gaza) http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/ 71. Al Mezan Center for Human Rights (Gaza) http://www.mezan.org/en/ 72. The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) http://www.ichr.ps/en 73. Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms http://www.madacenter.org/index.php?lang=1 Algeria 74. Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights www.la-laddh.org 75. Algeria Watch www.algeria-watch.org Libya 76. Lawyers for Justice in Libya www.libyanjustice.org 77. Libyan Observatory for Human Rights https://www.facebook.com/mrsdlibya (354) Regional Organizations 78. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information http://www.anhri.net 79. Gulf Center for Human Rights http://gchr.org 80. The International Center for Supporting Rights and Freedoms http://www.icsrf.org 81. Alkarama for Human Rights http://en.alkarama.org/ 82. Skeyes Center for Media and Cultural Freedoms http://www.skeyesmedia.org/en/Home 83. Arab Reform Initiative http://www.arab-reform.net/ 84. Arab Organization for Human Rights http://www.aohr.net/ 85. Doha Center for Media Freedom http://www.dc4mf.org International Organizations and Institutes 86. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network http://www.euromedrights.net 87. Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org 88. IFEX www.ifex.org 89. The Carter Center www.cartercenter.org 90. Article 19 http://www.article19.org/ 91. Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ 92. International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org 93. International Federation for Human Rights http://www.fidh.org/ 94. Front Line Defenders http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/ 95. Reporters Without Borders http://www.rsf.org 96. Committee to Protect Journalists http://www.cpj.org/ 97. Christians in Action for the Abolition of Torture http://www.acatfrance.fr 98. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://www.carnegieendowment.org 99. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights http://www.ohchr.org 100. Global Network for Rights and Development http://www.gnrd.net 101. International Press Institute http://www.freemedia.at/home.html 102. Foundation for the Future http://www.foundationforfuture.org/en/WebPresence.aspx 103. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees www.unhcr.org 104. United Nations Support Mission in Libya http://unsmil.unmissions.org/ Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) http://www.cihrs.org (355) (356)