72-4490 FREY, Linda Sue, 1947- ANGLO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1703-1708: THOMAS WENTWORTH, BARON RABY’S MISSION TO BERLIN. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 History, modern University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan 0 Copyright by- Linda Sue Frey 1971 ANGLO-PRUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1703-1708: THOMAS WENTWORTH, BARON RABY*S MISSION TO BERLIN DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Linda Sue Frey, B.S. in Ed., B.A., M.A. * * * * The Ohio State University 1971 Approved by U A dviser Department of History PLEASE NOTE: Some Pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Dr* John C* Rule for his constant encouragement, perceptive criticism , and invaluable assistance in perparing this manuscript* The gracious assistance of the staffs of the Ohio State University Library, the B ritish Museum, the London Public Record Office, the Oesterreichische Staatsarchiv, the Hannover Stadtarchiv, and the Algemeene Rijksarchief greatly facilitated nay research* I also want to thank my twin sister, Marsha, and my mother for their unflagging moral support. i i VITA February 21, 1947 . Born - Toledo, Ohio 1 9 ^ 7 ............................... • B.A., summa cum laude, B.S. in Ed., summa cum laude, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1 9 6 8 ..................................... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1967-1970 .......................... National Defense Education Act Fellow • 1970-1971 .......................... Teaching Associate, Department of History The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio ' Fields of Study Major Field: Early Modern Europe. Professor John C. Rule Minor Fields: Medieval Europe. Professor Franklin Pegues Tudor Stuart England. Professor Clayton Roberts Modern Britain. Professor Philip Poirier TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................ i i VITA ................................................................................................................. i i i Chapter I . INTRODUCTION............................... ................................................... 1 I I . A CRUCIAL ALLIANCE..................................................................... 15 I I I . KING AND COURT.................................................................. 35 IV. THE MISSION OF THOMAS WENTWORTH, BARON RABY .... 68 V. POTENTIAL DISRUPTION: 1703.......................................................... 95 V I. A FURTHER BINDING; 1704 ......................................................... 121 V II. ALLIED DISSENSION: 1705 .................................................... 168 VIII.THAT UNCERTAIN GAME:THE CRISIS OF 1706 ........................... 204 IX. A PORTENTOUS DISILLUSIONMENT:1707-1708 ....... 258 EPILOGUE........................................................................................................ 302 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 317 APPENDIX A • • • 325 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... 326 iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This dissertation w ill seek to examine England*s decisive influence on the foreign policy of Frederick I, king in Prussia (Fred­ erick III, elector of Brandenburg), from 1703 to 1711. England sought to mediate the dissensions of an incohesive alliance, to persuade Frederick to fu lfill his obligations as an ally, and to prevent Prussian interference in the Northern War. The influence of Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, the English representative to Berlin from 1703 to 1711, was very important in binding Frederick more firmly to England*s interests. 1. Historiographical Background A selective analysis of historians dealing with Frederick I reveals how the legend surrounding Frederick has been created. The legend of Frederick I really began with Frederick the Great*s Criticism of his grandfather, which was published posthumously in 1789. Fred­ erick's criticism of his grandfather as a mercenary king, who sacrificed the interests of.the state to his prodigality by binding the state to the allied cause, has decisively influenced later interpretations of Fred­ erick's foreign policy. Frederick the Great, the embodiment of enlightened absolutism, criticized Frederick for possessing the vices of 2 courtly absolutism. For example, Frederick II regarded Fredericks foreign policy as an extension of the king's own weakness and vanity. Frederick II believed that Frederick* s inordinate fondness for pomp and splendour induced him to sacrifice the blood of his subjects and the strategic interests of his state in order to obtain subsidies and to pave the way for the recognition of his royalty. Frederick*s in­ fatuation with the external representation of his power contrasted markedly with his own debilities. Fettered by his indecision, his power was largely an illusion. The legend of Frederick I was further developed in the nineteenth century by Carl von Noorden in an article published in 1367 in which he discussed Prussian politics during the War of the Spanish Succession as a fatal mistake that Frederick made by tying his goals and ambitions to the good w ill of the A llies. By becoming dependent on the Allies, Frederick lost his freedom of action and was unable to exploit Prussia's pivotal position between the East and the West. By avoiding involvement in the Northern War, Frederick failed to follow Prussia's true interests in the East. In Noorden's Europaische Geschichte (1870, 1874» and 1882), he reiterates his criticism that Frederick's failure to intervene in the Northern War after the 1702 battle of Clissow, in which Charles defeated the Poles, was a strategic e r r o r . The historical interpretation of Frederick was decisively 3 influenced by Johann Gustav Droysen in his Geschichte der preussischen / Politik (1872). He contends in this incisive and authoritative study that Frederick followed ,'im Westen Krieg ohne Politik, ira Osten Politik ohne Krieg.** Bernhard Erdmannsdorffer*s Deutsche Geschichte (1893) and Ernst Berner's Geschichte des preussischen Staates ( 1896) essentially followed Droysen*s interpretation. Erdmannsdbrffer asserted that Frederick's involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession stifled Prussia's natural expansion to the Northeast. Frederick, who became more and more tightly bound to the interests of the Maritime Powers and of the emperor, did not have the strength or determination to extricate Prussia from its increasingly precarious and little honored position in the Grand Alliance. Berner contends that Frederick felt morally bound to defend the empire and to aid his sovereign, the emperor. According to Berner, Frederick was not an elastic Realpolitiker and could not reconcile the demands of his Christian and German conscience with the necessities of Machtpolitik. Frederick's commitment to the West consequently smothered Prussia's natural impetus to intervene in the North. Ernst Berner's article on Frederick's foreign policy(1900) continues the theme that Prussian politics was deflected from its course of intervention in the Northern War by the Allies in the War of the Spanish Succession. In contrast to this interpretation, Albert Waddington, a French historian, in his Histoire de Prusse (1911) portrays Frederick 4 as an intelligent but weak man, who was guided by political goals in his policies, but who was trapped by his own vacillation and by adverse circumstances. Max Braubach in his article,"D ie Bedeutung der Subsidien" (1923) contends that Frederick's efforts to maintain an independent position in the Grand Alliance and to follow an in­ dependent policy were undermined from the beginning by the subsidies which kept Frederick tied to the Allies' interests. His position gradually degenerated until the Allies regarded him as a mere vassal tied to their interests. Braubach in a general study on the rise of Prussia (1933) differs with Droysen in his contention that Frederick had genuine political reasons for participating in the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick deliberately avoided commitment in the Northern War until he could be certain that his intervention would be m ilitarily decisive. Braubach believes that Frederick's maintenance of his neutrality in the Northern War was a sound policy as long as Charles was the victor in Poland and Saxony. After the Swedish defeat at Poltava in July 1709, however, Frederick should have interfered in the Northern War. His failure to do so meant that Prussia gained nothing from Sweden's defeat. Braubach criticized Frederick for following a policy of missed opportunities, of unexploited chances because he failed to intervene in the Northern War at the decisive moment. Other historians have helped to create Frederick's image in 5 history. Walter Koch’s work (1926) on Fredericks court and government furnishes valuable insights into the factionalism which dominated the court and the king. Arnold Berney's study (1927) of the relations between Frederick I and the Habsburgs reveals the bitter dissensions which wracked the alliance. It is pivotal in understanding Frederick’s increasing disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the Allies in the War of the Spanish Succession. He convincingly argues that Droysen* s thesis is not applicable to Frederick’s politics u n til after the battle of Poltava